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This is a meeting summary on two options in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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595352
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Cuban Missile Crisis Meeting Summary
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doc
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document
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1
Source metadata
id
595352
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Cuban Missile Crisis Meeting Summary
description
This is a meeting summary on two options in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
citationUrl
collections
Theodore Sorensen Papers
Legislative Files
subjects
Summaries
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
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595352
coverageEndDate
day
18
logicalDate
1962-10-18
month
10
year
1962
coverageStartDate
day
18
logicalDate
1962-10-18
month
10
year
1962
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item
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description
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nara-archive
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photo
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f64e2fc6e3ad79bd
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TCS - 10/18/62
Two big questions must be answered, and in conjunction with each other:
1. Which military action, if any:
-- Linited air strike: Rusk, probably Ball and Johnson, Acheson originally
-- Fuller air strike: McNamara and Taylor (who convinced Achesoa)-1
Bohlen's 2nd choice
Blockade: Bohlen, Thompson, probably Martin, probably McNamara and
Taylor 2nd choice
Invasion: McCone, maybe Nitse
2.
Should political action in particular a letter of warning to Khrushchev --
precede military action?
If blockade or invasion, everyone says yes
If air strike
-- Yes: Bohlen, Thompson (also K. O'Donnell)
-- No: Taylor, McNamara, presumably Acheson
Undecided: Rusk
These questions could be focussed upon by considering either the Rusk or the
Bohlen approaches.
Rusk favore the limited or "surgical" air strike without prior political action or
warning. This is opposed by 3 groups.
-- By the diplomats (Bohlen, Thompson, probably Martin) who insist that
prior political action is essential and not harmful
By the military (McNamara, Taylor, McCone) who insist that the
air strike could not be limited
-- By advocates of the blockade route
Bohlen favors a prompt letter to Khrushchev, deciding after the response whether
we use air strike or blockade
-- All blockade advocates would support this, and some of the air strike
advocates
-- Taylor would oppose this, unless the decision had already been made
to go the blockade route
If you accept the Bohlen plan, we can then consider the nature of the
letter to K.
Also ask Pentagon to develop:
1. Extent to which military problems are increased by the advance
warning a note to Khrushchev would touch off
2. Hard necessity of follow=up sortie to initial "surgical" attack
3. Possibilities of commandex-type raid by parachute or helicopter