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    "label": "Radio and television address to the nation on nuclear test ban treaty, 26 July 1963",
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    "title": "Radio and television address to the nation on nuclear test ban treaty, 26 July 1963",
    "description": "This folder contains materials collected by the office of President John F. Kennedy's secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, concerning President Kennedy's radio and television address to the American people on the passage of a treaty banning atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, later known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) or Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). In his speech the President explains that the treaty will strengthen national security, lessen the risk and fear of radioactive fallout, reduce world tension by encouraging further dialogue, and prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations not currently possessing them. The President emphasizes that while the treaty does not eliminate the threat of nuclear war, a limited test ban is safer than an unlimited arms race. Materials in this folder include note cards, a draft by Special Counsel and speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, and press copies of the speech.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193884",
    "identifierLocal": "JFKPOF-046-008",
    "creators": [
        "Sorensen, Theodore Chaikin, 1928-2010"
    ],
    "collections": [
        "Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: President's Office Files",
        "Speech Files"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Cold War"
    ],
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    "ocrText": "July 26, 1963\nGood evening, my fellow citizens:\nI speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the\nadvent of nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the War.\nSince that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening\nprospects of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come\nto possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race several times over,\nthe world of Communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in\na vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interests. Each increase of tension\nhas produced an increase in arms; each increase in arms has produced an\nincrease in tension.\n-2-\nIn these years, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently\ncommunicated suspicions and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope.\nOur representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met\nin Washington and in Moscow, at the United Nations and in Geneva. But\ntoo often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord or disillusion.\n-3- -\nYesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations\nwere concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere,\nin outer space and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been\nreached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international\ncontrol -- a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch submitted our\ncomprehensive plan to the members of the United Nations.\n-4-\nThat plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small,\nhave all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on\nnuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground\ntests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the nuclear\ntests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water. For\nsuch tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can\npick up.\n-5-\nThe treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which\npermits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we\nourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection and\nno international body.\nWe should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any\nnation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw it if finds\nthat extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have\njeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right to self-defense will\nin any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of\nnuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the\nproduction of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war.\n-6-\nNevertheless this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing\nwhich would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States,\nthe United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and all others who sign it from engaging in the\natmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a\nwelcome sign of hope.\nFor this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal\nobligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing underground, or from\nbeing ready to resume atmospheric tests if the acts of others SO require, it gives us a\nconcrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms\nof nuclear tests.\n-7-\nThis treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance.\nWe have made clear -- most recently in Berlin and in Cuba -- our deep resolve\nto protect our security and our freedom against any threat or aggression.\nWe have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race.\nIn three Administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have worked together\nto this end, always with the support of Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan\njoined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban treaty in 1959,\nand again with me in 1961 and 1962.\n-8- -\nBut the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side -- it is a\nvictory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet\nUnion. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing.\nThis treaty is not the millenium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or\ncause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of\nwar. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance\nto others. But it is an important first step -- a step toward peace -- a step\ntoward reason -- a step away from war.\n-9-\nHere is what this step can mean to you and your children and your neighbors.\nFirst, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tensions and broader\nareas of agreement. The Moscow talks reached no agreement on any other subject,\nnor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made\nit clear that any non-aggression arrangements across the division in Europe would\nrequire full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He\nalso made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning\nall tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament.\nThe Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such\ngoals require.\n- -10-\nNo one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements,\nif any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls\non preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and types of armaments.\nThere could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear weapons. The\nimportant point is that efforts to seek new agreement will go forward.\nBut the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be\nreluctant about this one. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol\nof East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol -- if it can\nsymbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another -- if both sides\ncan by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration --\nthen this short and simple treaty may well become anhistoric mark in man's\nage-old pursuit of peace.\n-11-\nWestern policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to\nrenounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all peoples may\nlive and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot\nlead toward that end -- but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress,\ncan clearly move in that direction.\nI do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be\nan easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists,\nnew dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.\n-12-\nBut those dangers pale in comparison to those of the\nspiralling arms race and a collision course toward war. Since the\nbeginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has\nbeen the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and peace-loving\nas our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two\nand a half years I have been required to report to you as President that\nthis nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military\nconfrontation -- in Laos, in Berlin and in Cuba.\n- -13-\nA war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be\nlike any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than\n60 minutes, could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans\nand Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors,\nas Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, \"would envy\nthe dead\". For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions\nand poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of all its horrors.\n-14-\nSo let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this\nopportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous\nnuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.\nSecond, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears and\ndangers of radioactive fall-out. Our own atmospheric tests last year were\nconducted under conditions which restricted such fall-out to an absolute minimum.\nBut over the years the number and yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased --\nand so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted\ntesting by the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less\nadept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us\nmust breathe.\n- -15-\nEven then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in\ntheir bones, with leukemia in their blood or with poison in their lungs might seem\nstatistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this\nis not a natural health hazard -- and it is not a statistical issue. The loss of even\none human life, or the malformation of even one baby -- who may be born long\nafter we are gone -- should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren\nare not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.\nNor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests befoul the\nair of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without\ntheir knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of\natmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all nuclear powers as\nequally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see\nbreathe\nthe world more clearly, while enabling all the world to bxche more easily.\n-16-\nThird, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear\nweapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in\naddition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant number of\nnations will have the intellectual, physical and financial resources to produce\nboth nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is\nestimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of\nobtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased\ntoday.\n-17-\nI ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have\nnuclear weapons in many hands -- in the hands of countries large and small, stable\nand unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world.\nThere would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no\nchance of effective disarmament. There would only be increased chances of\naccidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve\nthemselves in otherwise local conflicts.\nIf only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American,\nRussian or other city -- whether it was launched by accident or design, by a\nmadman or an enemy, by a large nation or small, from any corner of the world --\nthat one bomb could release more destructive force on the inhabitants of that\none helpless city than all the bombs dropped during the Second World War.\n-18-\nNeither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, nor the United Kingdom,\nnor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great\nobligation -- all four nuclear powers have a great obligation -- to use whatever\ntime remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade other\ncountries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess or produce such weapons.\n-19-\nThis treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none\nof the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens\nthe door for further agreements on the control of nuclear weapons. And it is open\nfor all nations to sign. For it is in the interest of all nations -- and already we\nhave heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.\n-20-\nFourth, and finally, this treaty can limit the nuclear arms race in ways,\nwhich, on balance, will strengthen our nation's security far more than the\ncontinuation of unrestricted testing. For in today's world, a nation's security\ndoes not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary is doing\nthe same. And unlimited competition in the testing and development of new\ntypes of destructive nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either\nside.\n-21-\nUnder this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other\nnations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to\ndeter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's\nhomeland. We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, all the nuclear\nstrength that we need.\nIt is true that the Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher\nthan that which we have thought to be necessary; but the hundred megaton bomb of\nwhich they spoke two years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic\npower. The United States has deliberately chosen to concentrate on more mobile\nand more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield; and our\nsecurity is not, therefore, impaired by the treaty I am discussing.\n-22-\nIt is also true -- as Mr. Khrushchev would agree -- that nations cannot afford\nin these matters to rely simply on faith in their adversaries. We have not, therefore,\noverlooked the risks of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep\nin outer space -- hundreds of thousands of miles away from the earth -- illegal tests\nmight go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of\nobservation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal; and we can\ndecide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to\nus and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at this range. For any\ntests which might be conducted so far out in space which cannot be conducted more\neasily and efficiently -- and legally -- underground would necessarily be of such a\nmagnitude that they would already be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ\nnew devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere.\n-23-\nAny violation, moreover, involves -- along with the risk of detection --\nthe end of the treaty and world-wide consequences for the violator. Secret\nviolations are possible -- and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are\npossible -- and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we\nremain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing, if we must. But\nit would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of\nillegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost and the hazard of discovery.\nAnd the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my\njudgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interest. For these\nnations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in halting the\nspread of nuclear weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive.\n-24-\nWhile it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks\ninherent in any treaty -- and such risks in this treaty are small -- the far\ngreater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the\nrisk of a nuclear arms race, the risks of new nuclear powers, nuclear\npollution, and nuclear war. This limited test ban, in our most careful\njudgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited nuclear\narms race.\n(MORE)\n-25-\nFor all these reasons, I am hopeful that this nation will\npromptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course,\nbe debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely\nrequires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties; and that\nconsultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document\nwhich may mark anhistoric and constructive opportunity for the world\ndeserves anhistoric and constructive debate.\n-26-\nIt is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate. For\nthis treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for our children and our\ngrandchildren -- and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate\nwill involve military, scientific and political experts, but it must not be\nleft to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours. If we are\nto open new doorways to peace -- if we are to seize this rare opportunity\nfor progress -- if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of\nweapons as we are in their invention -- then let us now show all the world,\non this side of the Wall and the other, that a strong America also stands for\npeace.\n-27-\nThere is no cause for complacence. We have learned in times past\nthat the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been\ndisappointed more than once; and we have no illusions now that there are any\nshort-cuts to peace.\nAt many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their\nefforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentrations of nuclear and\nconventional arms must still be deterred. The familiar contests between\nchoice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are all still there --\nin Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin and all around the world -- still requiring\nall the vigor and vigilance we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage\nour cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been\nachieved and that our strength and unity were no longer required.\n-28-\nBut now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open.\nNo one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time\nhas come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will\njudge us harshly if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action.\nAnd this is the place to begin.\nAccording to the ancient Chinese proverb, a journey of a thousand miles\nmust begin with a single step. My fellow Americans: let us take that first step.\nLet us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way to peace.\nAnd if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we,\nin this land, at this time, took the first step.\nThank you -- and good night.\nFOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE\nJULY 26, 1963\nOFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nREMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT\nIN NATIONWIDE RADIO-TV ADDRESS\n(AS ACTUALLY DELIVERED)\nGood evening, my fellow citizens:\nI speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen\nyears ago the advent of nuclear weapons changed the course\nof the world as well as the war. Since that time, all man-\nkind has been struggling to escape from the darkening pro-\nspect of mass destruction on earth. Inan age when both sides\nhave come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the\nhuman race several times over, the world of communism and\nthe world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious\ncircle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase\nof tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase\nof arms has produced an increase of tension.\nIn these years, the United States and the Soviet\nUnion have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings\nto each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have\nmet at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Wash-\nington and in Moscow; in Geneva and at the United Nations.\nBut too often these meetings have produced only darkness,\ndiscord, or disillusion.\nYesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness.\nNegotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all\nnuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under\nwater. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on\nbringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international\ncontrol -- a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch\npresented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.\nThat plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans,\nlarge and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to\ninternational inspection. A ban on nuclear tests, however,\nrequires on-the-spot inspection only for undergronnd tests.\nThis Nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect\nthe nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in\nthe air or under water. For such tests produce unmistakable\nsigns which our modern instruments can pick up.\nThe treaty initialed yesterday, threefore, is a\nlimited treaty which permits continued underground testing\nand prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police.\nIt requires no control posts, no on-site inspection, no\ninternational body.\nWe should also understand that it las other limits\nas well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an\nopportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary\nevents related to the subject matter of the treaty have\njeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right\nof self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this\nMORE\nPage 2\ntreaty mean an end to the threat of nuclear war. It will\nnot reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not halt the pro-\nduction of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use\nin time of war.\nNevertheless, this limited treaty will radically\nreduce the nuclear testing which would otherwise be con-\nducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States,\nthe United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who\nsign it, from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have\nso alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome\nsign of hope.\nMORE\nPage 3\nFor this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and\nsolemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this nation from\ntesting underground, or from being ready to conduct atomospheric tests\nif the acts of others so require, it gives us a concrete opportunity to\nextend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of nuclear\ntests.\nThis treaty is in part the product of Western patience and\nvigilance. We have made clear -- most recently in Berlin and Cuba --\nour deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any\nform of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination\nto limit the arms race. In three Administrations, our soldiers and\ndiplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great\nBritain. Prime Minister MacMillan joined with President Eisenhower in\nproposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962\nBut the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one\nside -- it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either\nto or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition\nof the dangers in further testing.\nThis treaty is not the millenium. It will not resolve all\nconflicts, or cause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate\nthe dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or\nprograms of assistance to others. But it is an important first step --\na step towards peace -- a step towards reason -- a step away from war.\nHere is what this step can mean to you and to your children\nand your neighbors.\nFirst, this treaty can be a step towards reduced world tension\nand broader areas of agreement The Moscow talks have reached no agreement\non any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter.\nUnder Secretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrange-\nments across the division in Europe would require full consultation with\nour allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our\nstrong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests\neverywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament.\nThe Soviet Government however, is still unwilling to accept the inspec-\ntion such goals require.\nNo one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further\nagreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They\ncould include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on num-\nbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the\nspread of nuclear weapons. The important point is that efforts to\nseek new agreements will go forward.\nBut the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason\nto be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have\nlong been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also\nbe a symbol if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning\nof another -- if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and\nexperience in peaceful collaboration -- then this short and simple treaty\nmay well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.\nWestern policies have long been designed to persuade the\nSoviet Union to renounce agfression, direct or indirect, so that their\npeople and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited\ntesting of new weapons of war cannot lead towards that end -- but this\ntreaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in\nthat direction.\nI do not say that a world without aggression or threats of\nwar would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges\nfrom the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mis-\ntaking their intent.\nMORE\nPage 4\nBut those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiralling\narms race and a collision course towards war Since the beginning of\nhistory, war had been mankind's constant companion. It has been the\nrule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving\nas our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in\nthe last two years and a half I have been required to report to you\nas President that this nation and the Soviet Union stood on the\nverge of direct military confrontation -- in Laos, in Berlin and\nin Cuba.\nA war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not\nbe like any war in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting\nless than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe\nout more than 300 million Americans, Europeans and Russians, as well\nas untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev\nwarned the Communist Chinese, \"The survivors would envy the dead\". For\nFor they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison\nand fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let\nus try to turn the world from war. Letus make the most of this oppor=\ntunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the\nperilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward\nfinal annihilation.\nSecond, this treaty can be a step towards freeing the world\nfrom the fears and dangers of radioactive fall-out. Our own atmospheric\ntests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such\nfall-out to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the\nyield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radio-\nactive hazards fromsuch testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the\nnuclear powers, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept\nin limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of\nus must breathe.\nEven then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer\nin their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their\nlungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with\nnatural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard -- and\nit is not a statistical issue. The loss of even one human life, or the\nmalformation of even one baby -- who may be born long after we are gone\nshould be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not\nmerely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.\nNor does this affect the nuclear powers alone. These tests\nbefoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the\nuncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent.\nThat is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many\ncountries to regard all nuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope\nthat its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more\nclearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.\nThird, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread\nof nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next\nseveral years, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small\nbut significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical\nand financial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means\nof delivering them. In time it is estimated, many other nations will\nhave either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads,\neven as missiles can be commercially purchased today.\nI ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean\nto have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries\nlarge and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible,\nscattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then,\nno stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament.\nThere would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an\nincreased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what\notherwise would be local conflicts.\nMORE\nPage 5\nIf only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped\non any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was\nlaunched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy,\nby a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the\nworld, that one bomb could release more destructive power\non the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the\nbombs dropped in the second world war.\nNeither the United States nor the Soviet Union\nnor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that\nday with equanimity. We have a great obligation, all\nfour nuclear powers have a great obligation, to use whatever\ntime remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to\npersuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire,\npossess, or produce such weapons.\nThis treaty can be the opening wedge in that cam-\npaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist\nother nations to test in the forbidden environments. It\nopens the door for further agreements on the control of\nnuclear weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign,\nfor it is in'the interest of all nations, and already we\nhave heard from a number of countries who wish to join with\nus promptly.\nFourth and finally, this treaty can limit the\nnuclear arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen\nour nation's security far more than the continuation of un-\nrestricted testing. For in today's world, a nation's security\ndoes not always increase as its arms increase, when its\nadversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in\nthe testing and development of new types of destructive\nnuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either\nside. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the\ntesting of other nations could never be sufficient to offset\nthe ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a\nnuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's\nhomeland.\nWe have, and under this treaty we will continue\nto have, the nuclear strength that we need. It is true that\nthe Soviets have tested nuclear weapons of a yield higher\nthan that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred\nmegaton bomb of which they spoke two years ago does not and\nwill not change the balance of strategic power. The United\nStates has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more\nmobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely\nsufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not im-\npaired by the treaty I am discussing.\nIt is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree,\nthat nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply\non the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, there-\nfore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at\npresent a possibility that deep in outer space, that hun-\ndreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the\nearth illegal tests might go undetected. But we already\nhave the capability to construct a system of observation\nthat would make such tests almost impossible to conceal,\nand we can decide at any time whether such a system is\nneeded in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited\nMORE\nPage 6\nreward to others of violations attempted at that range. For\nany tests which might be conducted so far out in space,\nwhich cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and\nlegally underground, would necessarily be of such a mag-\nnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal.\nWe can also employ new devices to check on the testing of\nsmaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violations,\nmoreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the\nend of the treaty and the worldwide consequences for the\nviolator.\nSecret violations are possible and secret pre-\nparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and, thus,\nour own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we\nremain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing,\nif we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this\ntreaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing\nare obviously slight compared to their cost, and the hazard\nof discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will\nsign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted\ntesting as a matter of their own self-interest, for these\nnations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the\narms race, in holding the spread of nuclear weapons, and\nin breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be\ntheoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent\nin any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are small, the\nfar greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted\ntesting, the risk of a nuclear arms race, the risk of new\nnuclear powers, nuclear pollution, and nuclear war.\nThis limited test ban, in our most careful judgment,\nis safer by far for the United States than an unlimited\nnuclear arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful\nthat this Nation will promptly approve the limited test ban\ntreaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and\nin the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice\nand consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consul-\ntation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A\ndocument which may mark an historic and constructive oppor-\ntunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive\ndebate.\nIt is my hope that all of you will take part in\nthat debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is par-\nticularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they\nhave no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve\nmilitary, scientific, and political experts, but it must be\nnot left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are\nyours.\nIf we are to open new doorways to peace, if we\nare to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are\nto be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as\nwe have been in their invention, then let us now show all\nthe world on this side of the wall and the other that a\nstrong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for\ncomplacency.\nWe have learned in times past that the spirit of\none moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been\ndisappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now\nMORE\nPage 7\nthat there are short cuts on the road to peace. At\nmany points around the globe the Communists are continuing\ntheir efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their con-\ncentration of nuclear and conventional arms must still be\ndeterred.\nThe familiar contest between choice and coercion,\nthe familiar places of danger and conflict, are still there,\nin Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the\nglobe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance\nthat we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our\ncause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace\nhas already been achieved, and that our strength and unity\nwere no longer required.\nBut now, for the first time in many years, the\npath of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the\nfuture will bring. No one can say whether the time has\ncome for an easing of the struggle. But history and our\nown conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now\nmake every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is\nthe place to begin. According to the ancient Chinese pro-\nverg, \"A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a\nsingle step.\"\nMy fellow Americans, let us take that first step.\nLet us, if we can, get back from the shadows of war and\nseek out the way of peace. And if that journey is one\nthousand miles, or even more, let history record that\nwe, in this land, at this time, took the first step.\nThank you and good night.\nEND\nSPEECH - TEST BAN\nJULY 26, 1963\nTCS 1st DRAFT\n7/25/63\nGood evening, my fellow citizens:\nthe\nFor most of the 18 years since Hiroshima changed the course of / war\nthe\nand / world, mankind has been slowly.\nsliding toward a bottomless\n-\npit of destruction. In an age when both sides possessed enough nuclear power\nto destroy all life on this planet seven times over, the two worlds of communism\nand free choice have been caught up in a vicious , disastrous circle of\nconflicting ideology and interests, Each outbreak of tensions has produced an\nincrease in arms; each increase in arms has produced a new outbreak of\ntensions. The United States and the Soviet Union, as the leaders of these\nfrequently\nopposing forces, have/communicated suspicions and warnings to each other,\nOur\nbut very rarely hope. /representatives\n:\nhave met at the summit\nand at the brink, in Moscow and in Washington, at the United Nations and in\ndarkness,\nGeneva. But too often these meetings have produced only/discord or\ndisillusion.\ndarkness.\nYesterday a shaft of light cut into the /\nNegotiations were\nconcluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests which can be detected\nby existing national means -- tests in the atmosphère, in outer space and\nunderwater. This is a limited treaty. No control posts, no on-site inspection\nand no international body would be required, and underground testing would be\npermitted. Any nation signing the treaty would have an opportunity to withdraw\nif it felt new events jeopardized its interests; and no nation's right to self-\nwould\ndefense would be in any way impaired. Nuclear stockpiles / not be reduced;\nwould\nwould\nthe production of nuclear weapons yo. not be prohibited; and their use /** not\nbe in any way restricted or determined by any other nation.\n-2-\nnevertheless,\nlimited\nIt is clear, that this/treaty will substantially reduce the\namount of nuclear testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides --\nthat it will prohibit those who sign it from engaging in almost any tests\nof major military significance -- and that it offers to all the world a welcome\nray of hope.\nFor this is not another vague moratorium in which an open society\nsuch as ours, unable and unwilling to engage in clandestine testing, is\nunable to ascertain whether other powers are testing underground and unable\nto respond quickly to a test above ground. This is a specific and solemn\nlegal obligation with no restrictions on our maintaining readiness and\nprogress through underground testing, but with a concrete opportunity to\nextend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of testing.\ntherefore,\nIt is consistent, with the proposals made by President Eisenhower\nin 1961 and 1962.\nin 1959, and by Prime Minister Macmillan and But\none side\nachievement of that goal is not a victory for *haxxxxx -- it is a victory\nfor all mankind. It does not reflect concessions either to or by the Soviet\nUnion -- it reflects our mutual recognition of the dangers in further\ntesting.\nIt is not the millenium. It will not resolve all conflicts between\nourselves and the Soviets, or cause them to cease their ambitions, or\neliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or\nallies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first\nstep -- a step toward peace -- a step toward reason -- a step away from war,\n-3-\nwhat\ncan mean\nPermit me to outline this step/to you and your children and\nyour neighbors.\nFirst of all, it is a step toward reduced world tensions and broader\nareas of agreement. The Moscow talks did not seek agreement on any other\nsubject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Undersecretary\nHarriman made it clear that a non-aggression pact between the NATO and\nWarsaw powers would require the consultation and consent of our allies.\nHe also made clear our preference for a comprehensive treaty banning\nunderground tests and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarma-\nin turn,\nment; but the Soviet s/made it clear that they were still unwilling to accept\nthe inspection such goals would require.\nfurther\nNo one can predict with certainty, therefore, what/agreements, if\nany, can be built on the foundationsof this one -- whether they would include\ncontrols on the spread of nuclear weapons, on preparations for surprise\nP\nattack or on numbers and types of armaments. But the difficulty of predicting\nthe next step is no reason to be reluctant about this one. For nuclear test\nban negotiations have long been the symbol of East-West disagreement.\nIf this treaty can also be a symbol -- if it can symbolize the end of one\nera and the beginning of another -- if both sides can by this treaty gain\nconfidence and experience in peaceful collaboration -- then this short and\nsimple treaty may mark an historic turning point in *heobix****** man's long\npursuit of peace.\n-4-\nFor Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet\nUnion to renounce the role of aggression and to seek accommodation with the\nWest. Our testing new weapons of war cannot now accomplish that end --\na\nbut effective new pacts of peace perhaps can. And nuclear test ban\ntreaty unites our two countries\" interests against those whose militant beliefs\nin war cause them to oppose this symbolic step toward peace.\nTonight the waters of world events are comparatively calm and quiet.\nBut let us not forget that three times in the last two and one half years the\nUnited States and the Soviet Union have been on the verge of a military\nconfrontation -- in Laos, in Berlin and in Cuba. Let us not forget that any\nclash between two determined powers can quickly become a nuclear exchange --\nand that a nuclear attack on the United States today, using, for example, 100\nof\nwarheads of a 7 megaton capacity, would wipe out more than half/our entire\npopulation.\nSo let us make the most of this unique opportunity to reduce tensions\nand suspicions, to slow down the costly, perilous nuclear arms race and to check\nthe world's slide toward a final destructive war. To go a thousand miles,\nreads an ancient Chinese proverb, it is first necessary to take the first step;\nand this treaty is a small but important step forward on a long, hard journey\ntoward peace.\nSecond, this treaty is a step toward freeing the world from the fears\nand dangers of radioactive fall-out. Our own atmospheric tests last year were\nconducted under conditions which restricted such fall-out to an absolute\nminimum. But over the years the number and nature of weapons tested have\n-5-\nrapidly increased the yield of fission and strontium-90; and continued\nunrestricted testing by all the nuclear powers, joined in time by other nations\nbut steadily\nless adept at preventing pollution, will slowly/contaminate the air which all\nmust\ninhabitants of this globe / breathe.\nEven then, the number of children and grand-children with cancer in\nwith\nwith\ntheir bones, /leukemia in their blood and/poison in their lungs may seem\nstatistically small, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is\na natural health hazard and it is not\nnot/a statistical issue;\nand\nthe loss of\none human life, or the malformation of one child born.ling after we are gone,\nshould be of concern to us all.\nNor is this a matter of concern to the nuclear powers alone. Their\ntests contaminate the air of all men and nations, the committed and\nuncommitted alike, without their knowledge or consent. The continuation of\natmospheric testing causes many countries to regard all nuclear powers as\nequally evil; and its prevention will enable them to see the world more\nenabling\nclearly while / the world to breathe more easily.\nThird, this treaty is a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear\nweapons to nations which do not now possess them. During the next several\nyears, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but significant\nnumber of nations will have the physical and financial resources to produce\nboth nuclear weapons and the insans of delivering them. In time, it is\nestimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or the opportunity\nto purchase nuclear warheads from neutral commercial markets, much as\ncan be\nmissiles / purchased today.\n-6-\nThink, for a moment, what it would mean to have nuclear powers in\nin\nLatin America,/the Middle East, in all parts of the globe. There will be no\nstability in the world then, no restful sleep, no chance of disarmament.\nThere will be only increased opportunities for nuclear blackmail, increased\npossibilities of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the present\ngreat powers to involve themselves in local conflicts. And one thermonuclear\nbomb dropped on this country - whether launched by accident or design, by\na madman or an enemy, by a large nation or small, from any corner of the\nworld would unleash upon our cities and homes and families more\ndestructive energy than all the bombs dropped by the Allies in the Second\nWorld War.\nNeither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom\nnor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. Although\nCommunist China may conduct a test explosion or two, it is likely that several\nyears remain before any fifth nation is prepared to launch nuclear weapons;\nexisting\nhave an obligation, therefore, to\nand the four / : nuclear powers / . use this time to prevent proliferation,\nto persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess or produce\nwith any conviction or success\nnuclear weapons. Yet how can we conduct such a campaign/if we are\ncontinuing, in most cases over their objections, to test such weapons\nourselves?\n, therefore,\nthe\nIt is/the hope and objective of / three signatories to this treaty that\nthis treaty\nall nations, large and small, will sign their names along with ours; for / is\nin the interests of all nations. Hopefully, the pressures of world\n+\nand domestic politics will induce many to sign who, in the absence of a\n-7-\nin the atmosphere.\ntreaty, would someday be testing their own weapons/ Without xxxxxxxxxxxxxixx\nsuch\nfor\n/tests, the experimentation they require /nuclear research and development\nis impossible; and few,if any, countries would be willing to undertake the\ndemanded\nheavy investment by nuclear weapons with no opportunity to verify\ntheir results.\nI do not, of course, expect the Communist Chinese to sign this treaty.\nThey have already denounced it as a Capitalist plot. But if the response to\nthis treaty can serve to increase their isolation from the world community --\nnuclear\nif it can encourage other nations to apply sanctions against their/development--\nthen\n/the outlook is not altogether gloomy. This treaty alone will not halt the spread\nof nuclear weapons -- but it offers to all the world the time, the hope and\nthe leverage we need to undertake that task with confidence.\nFourth and finally, this treaty is a step toward a check on the nuclear\narms race. Specifically, it would tie both sides to their present state of\ntechnology on nuclear weapons of a very high yield; and it is the best\njudgment of my chief military and scientific advisers that this will protect\nthe security of the United States far more than the continuation of unrestricted\ntesting.\nFurther atmospheric tests would be useful, to be sure, as our last series\nhas shown. But such tests are not needed, I am advised, to continue our\nto increase\npresent urgent efforts to improve our anti-missile defenses,/the\nto assure\nthe defenses of\nsurvivability of our weapons and/their ability to penetrate/any aggressor.\nMoreover,\nxxxi a nation's security no longer of necessity increases with every increase\n-8-\nin the quality and quantity of its armaments. Unlimited competition in the\ntesting and development of new types of nuclear weapons will not make the\nworld a safer place for either the Russians or ourselves.\nUnder a limited test ban treaty, on the other hand, any gains made\nby any other power through underground testing -- or even through illegal,\nundetected testing -- could not be sufficient to offset this nation's ability\nto deter or survive a nuclear attack and to penetrate and destroy the aggressor's\nhomeland.\nIt is true that the Soviet Union is more advanced in the more powerful,\nhigher yield nuclear weapons. You will recall, for example, their talk two\nyears ago of a 100 megaton bomb. But the United States has deliberately\nchosen to concentrate on smaller, more mobile and, in our view, more\neffective weapons. Hundred megaton bombs may have a role as instruments\nof terror -- and no doubt continued atmospheric testing would see more\nsuch weapons developed by the Soviets for that purpose. But militarily they\nperform no unique missions that a number of smaller, less vulnerable\nweapons could not do better; and thus freezing the present state of high yield\nweapons causes us no concern whatsoever.\n-9-\nOn the other hand, in the absence of a treaty, the Soviet Union could\ncatch up with us in smaller weapons far more quickly and/cheaply more by testing\nin the atmos.phere than they can underground with a treaty. The United\nwe\nStates today has more experience in underground testing and/intend to use\nthis capacity\n/ to maintain the adequacy ofour arsenal. While we may be blocked from\nmaking gains in certain areas, all other signatories will also be blocked in\nthose same areas; and that is far preferable to their using an unrestricted\ntest period to endanger our present capabilities.\nNevertheless, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree\n/ nuclear powers cannot afford to rely on faith in their adversaries; and\nsimply\nwe have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of cheating by the Soviet Union.\nBut that risk is far less than the risks created by unrestricted testing. For\npractically every test which could be conducted so far away in space as to\nalso\nmore\nescape detection could/be conducted more easily and/efficiently underground\nby both sides -- and undergræindtesting, you will recall, is legal under this\ntreaty. Possibly high-yield multi-megaton weapons tests could be conducted\nbehind shielding in \"deep space\" -- but the likelihood of our learning of either\nthe missile launch or the test reading is so great that there would seem to be\nthe Soviets'\nlittle incentive for/incurring the extraordinary costs and delays which would\nbe involved merely to test weapons in which their development is already suffi-\nAnd\ncient. / there is, of course, little psychological gain from a hundred megaton\ntest which is conducted in secret.\nAny cheating, moreover, involves the risk of detection and the treaty's\ncoming to an end; and the Soviets are signing this treaty, in my opinion,\n-10-\nbecause they, too, believe it to be in their own self-interest -- because they,\ntoo, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in halting the spread of nuclear\nweapons and in breathing air that is not radioactive. Secret\ntests from which little reliable data can be obtained are hardly worth risking\nall\nthe end of such a treaty and the indictment of/mankind, when it would be so\nto\nmuch easier to test underground or/withdraw altogether.\nSecret violations, however, are always a risk. Secret preparations\nfor a sudden open resumption of testing are always a risk, although our\nreadiness to match any resumption will be maintained through underground\ntesting and laboratories. But no treaty is possible without risks. Only\nfools seek fool-proof solutions in today's world. And the far greater risks\nto our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risks of a mush-\nrooming arms race, the risks of nuclear proliferation, nuclear pollution\nand nuclear war.\nFor all these reasons, I am certain that this nation will promptly and\ngladly approve the limited test ban treaty. Were we to reject it now, after all\nthe years we have requested it, we could surely expect the permanent distrust\nof our adversaries, the dismay of our friends and the despair of a now-hopeful\nworld.\nThere will, of course, be debate, in the country and in the Senate.\nDet\nthe bi-partisan background of this proposal should prevent a repetition of 1919,\nour\nwhen partisan politics was allowed to submerge interest in a\nLeague of Nations.\nWhat may be a historic, constructive turning-point in\nhistory deservesan historic, constructive debate. And surely\n-11-\nwho are listening tonight\nI hope all of you/will take part in that debate. This treaty is for you.\nIt is particularly for your children and grandchildren -- and they have no\nlobby here in Washington. But this debate should not be left to the politicians\nor the scientists or the generals. The power and the responsibility are yours.\nIf we are to open new doorways to peace -- if we are to seize this rare\nopportunity enhanced by the r.\ncommunist split -- if we are to be\nas bold and far-sighted in our control of weapons as we are in their\ninvention -- then let us show all the world, on this side of the Wall and the\nother, that America stands for peace.\nThere is no cause for overconfidence. We have learned in times\nAnd today\npast that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. / the old\nproblems of propaganda and poverty are still there. The old conflicts over\nchoice and coercion are still there. The old need for - our . vigor and\nvigilance is still there.\nBut now, for the first time in many years, we have a solid, hopeful\nbeginning. In explaining the principle of the lever, Archimedes is reported\nto have said: \"Give me a lever and a place to stand and I will move the\nworld.' 11\nIt is here that we take our\nMy fellow Americans: this treaty can be our lever.\n/\nstand. Let us move the whole world toward peace.\nFLAT RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M. (EDT)\nJuly 26, 1963\nOffice of the White House Press Secretary\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S RE-\nMARKS ADDRESSED TO THE NA-\nTION, JULY 26, 1963\nGood evening, my fellow citizens:\nI speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent\nof nuclear weapons changed the course of the world as well as the War.\nSince that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darken-\ning prospects of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides\nhave come to possess enough nuclear power to destroy the human race\nseveral times over, the world of Communism and the world of free choice\nhave been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and inter-\nests. Each increase of tension has produced an increase in arms; each\nincrease in arms has produced an increase in tension.\nIn these years, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently\ncommunicated suspicions and warnings to each other, but very rarely\nhope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they\nhave met in Washington and in Moscow, at the United Nations and in Ge-\nneva. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord\nor disillusion.\nYesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were con-\ncluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere,\nin outer space and under water. For the first time, an agreement has\nbeen reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under inter-\nnational control a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch sub-\nmitted our comprehensive plan to the members of the United Nations.\nThat plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small,\nhave all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban\non nuclear tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for under-\nground tests. This nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect\nthe nuclear tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under\nwater. For such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern in-\nstruments can pick up.\nThe treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which per-\nmits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we\nourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no on-site inspection\nand no international body.\nWe should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation\nwhich signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds\nthat extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have\njeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right to self-defense\nwill in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the\nthreat of nuclear war. It will not reduce nuclear stockpiles; it will not\nhalt the production of nuclear weapons; it will not restrict their use in time\nof war.\nNevertheless this limited treaty will radically reduce the nuclear testing\nwhich would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the\nUnited States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and all others who\nMORE\n- 2 -\nsign it from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed man-\nkind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.\nFor this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal\nobligation. While it will not prevent this nation from testing underground,\nor from being ready to resume atmospheric tests if the acts of others so\nrequire, it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other\nnations and later to other forms of nuclear tests.\nThis treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have\nmade clear -- most recently in Berlin and in Cuba -- our deep resolve to\nprotect our security and our freedom against any threat or aggression.\nWe have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms\nrace. In three Administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have worked\ntogether to this end, always with the support of Great Britain. Prime\nMinister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limi-\nted test ban treaty in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962.\nBut the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side -- it is a\nvictory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet\nUnion. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further\ntesting.\nThis treaty is not the millenium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or\ncause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers\nof war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of\nassistance to others. But it is an important first step -- a step toward\npeace -- a step toward reason -- a step away from war.\nMORE\n-3-\nHere is what this step can mean to you and your children and your\nneighbors.\nFirst, this treaty can be a step toward reduced world tensions and broader\nareas of agreement. The Moscow talks reached no agreement on any\nother subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under-\nSecretary Harriman made it clear that any non-aggression arrangements\nacross the division in Europe would require full consultation with\nourallies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear\nour strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all\ntests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete\ndisarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to\naccept the inspection such goals require.\nNo one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if\nany, can be built on the foundations of this one. Theyould include\ncontrols on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and types of\narmaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of nuclear\nweapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreementswill\ngo forward.\nBut the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant\nabout this one. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol\nof East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol if it can\nsymbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another if both sides\ncan by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration --\nthen this short and simple treaty may well become anhistoric mark in\nman's age-old pursuit of peace.\nWestern policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union\nto renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all\npeoples may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new\nweapons of war cannot lead toward that end but this treaty, if it\ncan be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.\nI do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an\neasy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the\nCommunists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their\nintent.\nBut those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiralling arms\nrace and a collision course toward war. Since the beginning of history,\nwar has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not\nthe exception. Even a nation as young and peace-loving as our own has\nfought through eight wars. And three times in the last two\nand a half years I have been required to report to you as President that this\nnation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military\nconfrontation in Laos, in Berlin and in Cuba.\nA war today or tomorrow, if it led to nuclear war, would not be like any\nwar in history. A full-scale nuclear exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes,\ncould wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans and Russians,\nas well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman\nKhrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, \"would envy the dead\". For\nthey would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and\nfire that today we cannot even conceive of all its horrors.\nMORE\n-4-\nSo let us try to turn the world from war. Let us make the most of this\nopportunity, and every opportunity. to reduce tension, to slow down the\nperilous nuclear arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final\nannihilation.\nSecond, this treaty can be a step toward freeing the world from the fears\nand dangers of radioactive fall-out. Our own atmospheric tests last year\nwere conducted under conditions which restricted such fall-out to an\nabsolute minimum. But over the years the number and yield of weapons tested\nhave rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from\nsuch testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the nuclear powers, joined\nin time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution,\nwill increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe.\nEven then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their\nbones, with leukemia in their blood or with poison in their lungs might\nseem statistically small to some, incomparison with natural health\nhazards. But this is not a natural health hazard -- and it is not a\nstatistical issue. The loss of even one human life, or the malformation\nof even one baby -- who may be born long after we are gone -- should\nbe of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely\nstatistics toward which we can be indifferent.\nNor does this affect the mclear powers alone. These tests befoul the\nair of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted\nalike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the\ncontinuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all\nnuclear powers as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will\nenable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling\nall the world to breathe more easily.\nMORE\n-5-\nThird, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear\nweapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several\nyears, in addition to the four current nuclear powers, a small but\nsignificant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical and\nfinancial resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means\nof delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have\neither this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even\nas missiles can be commercially purchased today.\nI ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear\nweapons in many hands -- in the hands of countries large and small,\nstable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout\nthe world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no\nreal security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only\nbe increased chances of accidental war, and an increased necessity for\nthe great powers to involve themselves in otherwise local conflicts.\nIf only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American,\nRussian or other city -- whether it was launched by accident ot design,\nby a madman or an enemy, by a large nation or small, from any\ncorner of the world -- that one bomb could release more destructive force\non the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped during\nthe Second Wiorld War.\nNeither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, nor the United Kingdom,\nnor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have\na great obligation -- all four nuclear powers have a great obligation -- to\nuse whatever time remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,\nto persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess or\nproduce such weapons.\nMORE"
}