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a. This course of action might have certain political ady intages
in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could
plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.
b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary
landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces
from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the
Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the
diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus
enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These
advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise
supporting the main unit.
7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the
whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead
in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to
hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or
well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation
there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S. fafter a
decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which
additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beach-
head.
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- 10 -
Document source description
Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs operation.
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"ocrText": "11\nTOP SECRET\na. This course of action might have certain political ady intages\nin that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could\nplausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help.\nb. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary\nlanding would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces\nfrom the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the\nCastro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the\ndiversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus\nenhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These\nadvantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise\nsupporting the main unit.\n7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the\nwhole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead\nin the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to\nhold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or\nwell-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation\nthere of the provisional government, its recognition by the U. S. fafter a\ndecent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which\nadditional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beach-\nhead.\nTOP SECRET\n- 10 -"
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