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c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective
area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead
unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.
5.
A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an
amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air
support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla
operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead
had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and
especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro
regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis
provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.
a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter
around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro
militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with
substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and
the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of
the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce
defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce
widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessfu in
thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the
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- 8 -
Document source description
Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs operation.
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- 193253
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "II\nTOP-SECRET\nc. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective\narea could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead\nunimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact.\n5.\nA Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an\namphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air\nsupport, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla\noperations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead\nhad been secured. If initial military operations were successful and\nespecially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro\nregime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis\nprovided for at least non-governmental logistic support.\na. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter\naround the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro\nmilitia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with\nsubstantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and\nthe display of professional competence and of determination on the part of\nthe assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce\ndefections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce\nwidespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessfu in\nthus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the\nTOP GECRET\n- 8 -"
}