Annex No. 21 Cuban Operation

2/ H CENTRAL AGENCY WASSINGTON OF DEPUTT ERECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE S - 1961 D. Tayloz SUSJECT Operation about 9:33 p.m. or 13 (D-1) Iwas called in the CLA headcuarters for the cperation by the Special Assisten: to the Diresicent, Mr. McGeorge Bund; He notified me that wa vould not be permitted to launci: zir strikes the next morning until they co 16 be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. further consultazion regarding this matter should be with the of Stats. 2. : called the Secretary and ifl could come to his office and discuss this decision. Bissell joined me the Secretary's office where we arvivod =: zhout 10:15 p.m. 3. The Sucretary informed us that were political considera- tions proventing the clanned nit striker belore the béachhend was in our hands and The dit strikes C:L D-2 had Ellowed bacause of milittry Political recuirements = the present time were considuration situation. at the United Nations. Scongtary described Stevenson's attitude in come Ectz Scovenson hac insisted that the 2i2 strikes would mekeis abcoluscly impossible for the c. S. position to be sustainad. The Secretury stated that such = zesult wis unacceptobla. 1. In the light of this he asked that we Cescribe the implications of the decie - We told him the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that is was now physicilly impossible tb stop the over-al landing operation