Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7 October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7 October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum. Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the Graznyy, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles. If we asked her to stop and she did, we would inspect the cargo for contraband and release her if, as expected, she had no prohibited material aboard. If she refuses to stop, we would stop her by force and sink her if the cargo included prohibited material. Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone. The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown -- Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Depart- ment to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to pre- pare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented. The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denucleariza- tion of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries. Under Secretary Ball reported that the Turks would be very difficult about withdrawal of their strategic missiles, but the Italians would be easier to persuade if we chose to withdraw Jupiters from Italy. DECLASSIFIED 12356 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE NLK-92-177 3,4 MMB 10/31/94