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    "title": "Draft Review for \"The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American and Greek Engineers\"",
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    "ocrText": "Engineering History and Heritage\nThe Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers\n--Manuscript Draft--\nManuscript Number:\nEHH-D-11-00033\nFull Title:\nThe Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers\nArticle Type:\nGeneral paper\nAbstract:\nBuilt by an American contractor, Ulen and Company, on behalf of the Greek State, the\nMarathon Dam, one of the largest European constructions and the world's only marble\ndam when erected in October 1929, was by no means just a US product. Greek\nengineers proved to be a worthy ally to the Ulen engineering staff, unfolding specific\nskills and demonstrating qualities in which their American counterparts seemed to be\nlacking. By \"reading\" the Marathon Dam as an example of cooperation between a\ntechnologically advanced nation and one located on what is conventionally regarded\nas the edge of the developed world at the time, the authors would like to encourage\nresearch into technological systems in the design and building of which nations and\ngeographical areas that historians used to \"scorn\" were involved. They are convinced\nthat new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge once scholars take seriously\nthe many components of an increasingly interconnected world involved in technological\ndevelopment and its heritage.\nPowered by Editorial Manager® and Preprint Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation\nMain Text\nClick here to download Main Text: Document.doc\nThe Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers\n1\n2\n3\nAbstract\n4\n5\n6\n7\nBuilt by an American contractor, Ulen and Company, on behalf of the Greek State, the\n8\n9\nMarathon Dam, one of the largest European constructions and the world's only marble dam\n10\n11\n12\nwhen erected in October 1929, was by no means just a US product. Greek engineers proved to\n13\n14\nbe a worthy ally to the Ulen engineering staff, unfolding specific skills and demonstrating\n15\n16\n17\nqualities in which their American counterparts seemed to be lacking. By \"reading\" the\n18\n19\nMarathon Dam as an example of cooperation between a technologically advanced nation and\n20\n21\n22\none located on what is conventionally regarded as the edge of the developed world at the time,\n23\n24\nthe authors would like to encourage research into technological systems in the design and\n25\n26\nbuilding of which nations and geographical areas that historians used to \"scorn\" were\n27\n28\n29\ninvolved. They are convinced that new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge once\n30\n31\nscholars take seriously the many components of an increasingly interconnected world involved\n32\n33\n34\nin technological development and its heritage.\n35\n36\n37\n38\n39\n40\nIntroduction\n41\n42\n43\n44\nSeptember 1922 was a dreadful month in the history of Modern Greece, a rather young\n45\n46\nNation, at least as measured by the standards of the Old Continent, since she gained her\n47\n48\n49\nindependence as late as in 1832, after a national upheaval against the Ottoman Empire, and\n50\n51\nthe intervention of the Great Powers - Great Britain, France, and Russia - of the time (Gallant\n52\n53\n2001). The Greek army had just experienced a series of critical defeats by the Turks led by\n54\n55\n56\nMustapha Kemal Atatürk, the father of Modern Turkey. Smyrna was burning, and panic-\n57\n58\nstricken mobs of people belonging to the then affluent and populous Greek community of the\n59\n60\n1\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\ncity were running to the waterfront, hoping to escape violence and death by being conveyed to\n1\n2\none of the ships lying in the harbor. The destruction of Smyrna was the last act of a war that\n3\n4\n5\nhad started ten years earlier, and was waged, apart from Greece and Turkey, by most of the\n6\n7\nBalkan countries.\n8\n9\n10\nIf the military defeat of 1922 resulted for Greece in the definitive loss of the territories that\n11\n12\n13\nher army had temporarily conquered in Asia Minor, it didn't prevent her from eventually\n14\n15\nsucceeding in doubling her population and size during the decade 1912-1922. The 1922\n16\n17\n18\ncatastrophe even increased the human potentialities of the country by about 1,200,000 new\n19\n20\ncitizens, forced, following the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey of\n21\n22\n23\nJanuary 30, 1923, to leave the land of their ancestors in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and\n24\n25\nto settle in within the new frontiers of the Greek State as they were redesigned according to\n26\n27\n28\nthe Treaty of Lausanne signed by the two countries on July 23, 1923.\n29\n30\n31\nMost of these new Greeks were installed in regions that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire\n32\n33\nbefore the 1912-1922 war. But some other territories that had been part of the Greek State\n34\n35\n36\nsince its creation in 1832 were also deeply affected by the influx of so many people in such a\n37\n38\nshort span of time. Between 1923 and 1928, the population of Athens and its environs, the\n39\n40\n41\ncity of Piraeus included, critically surged after the arrival of around 300,000 new people\n42\n43\n(Geniki Statistiki Ypiresia Ellados, 1931, p. 48-49). This sudden increase in the number of\n44\n45\ninhabitants of the two cities led to a dramatic deterioration of their urban landscape. The\n46\n47\n48\nexisting infrastructures now proved to be totally inadequate for serving the needs of the\n49\n50\ninhabitants, old and new. Especially, water consumption literally collapsed. In 1920, the\n51\n52\n53\navailable (average) quantity of water in Athens was equal to thirty liters per day per inhabitant\n54\n55\n(Istoriko Archeio Dimou Athinaion, 1921), needless to say a poor achievement for a European\n56\n57\n58\ncapital in the early decades of the 20th century. But the worst was still to come. In the years\n59\n60\n2\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nfollowing the arrival and settlement of Greeks expelled from Turkey, water consumption\n1\n2\ndropped to 10 liters per day per inhabitant (Gausmann, 1932), that is the average amount a\n3\n4\n5\nParisian was provided by his municipality on a daily basis around 1800 (Bocquet et al., 2008, p.\n6\n7\n1824). Obviously, new public works were necessary in order to supply the region of Athens\n8\n9\n10\nwith a decent quantity of the \"precious liquid\".\n11\n12\n13\nOn December 22, 1924, the Greek government signed a contract with the American\n14\n15\nengineering corporation Ulen & Company, and its economic ally in Greece, the \"Bank of\n16\n17\n18\nAthens\" (Eleftheron Vima, 1924). Some months later, on April 4, 1925, and after a series of\n19\n20\ndiscussions within the National Parliament and the public sphere, the agreement became a law\n21\n22\n23\nof the Greek State (Efimeris Kyverniseos, 1925). Among the key components, and probably\n24\n25\nthe most important one, of the projected water supply system was a dam located near the\n26\n27\n28\nhistoric Marathon battlefield (Figure 1). It was not by chance that among the different options\n29\n30\nfor supplying Athens and its environs with water: ---i.e., carry water into the city from remote\n31\n32\nsprings, create a water storage system nearby the dam solution was eventually adopted.\n33\n34\n35\nIndeed, in the 1920s, all conditions were ripe for the construction of a water storage system at\n36\n37\nthe site of Marathon.\n38\n39\n40\n41\n[INSERT FIGURE1]\n42\n43\n44\nThe long path to the Marathon Dam\n45\n46\n47\nIn 1834, the year it became the capital of the newly founded Greek Kingdom, Athens was a\n48\n49\n50\nsmall town of 14,000-odd inhabitants, completely devoid of any modern infrastructure. At the\n51\n52\ntime, Athens dwellers got their water from the handful public fountains and the numerous\n53\n54\n55\nprivate wells in the city (Chatzis, 2007; Chatzis and Mavrogonatou, 2010; Chatzis and\n56\n57\nMavrogonatou, forthcoming). For many years, serious shortage of the \"precious liquid\" was a\n58\n59\n60\n3\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\npermanent feature of everyday life in the Greek capital. In the second half of the 1840s, the\n1\n2\n(re)discovery of the aqueduct built by the Roman Emperor Hadrian (76-138) and his\n3\n4\n5\nsuccessor (Leigh, 1999), and the subsequent works carried out by the municipality, in a rather\n6\n7\npiecemeal and intermittent way as they solely depended on the limited financial resources of\n8\n9\n10\nthe city, significantly upgraded the water supply conditions of Athens, especially during the\n11\n12\n1870-1890 period. But despite this improvement, at the end of the 19th century the \"water\n13\n14\nissue\" was still to be resolved for the inhabitants of Athens. Given the chronic paucity of\n15\n16\n17\nmunicipality's financial inputs, the central state decided to interfere in local affairs. Charilaos\n18\n19\nTrikoupis (1832-1896), the modernizing Prime Minister who dominated the political stage of\n20\n21\n22\nhis country over the 1880-1895 period, turned to Edouard-Marie Quellennec (1856-1927), a\n23\n24\nFrench State engineer and a member of the famous \"Ponts et Chaussées\" corps (Bridge and\n25\n26\n27\nRoads Corps) (Chatzis, 2009), and asked him to deal with the water question. Quellennec was\n28\n29\nat that time in Greece along with a team of French engineers and other technicians as a\n30\n31\n32\ntechnical expert invited by the national government to help it with the design and the\n33\n34\nimplementation of the most ambitious program of Public Works the Greek state had ever\n35\n36\nenvisioned, and partially implemented, since its foundation (Chatzis, 2004). Indeed, in 1889,\n37\n38\n39\nQuellennec produced a draft in which he proposed to carry into the region of Athens water\n40\n41\nfrom the springs of Stymphale located in Peloponnese. Based on this first comprehensive\n42\n43\n44\ntreatment of the water issue, the government of Trikoupis prepared a bill in May 1890. While\n45\n46\nthe latter didn't succeed in becoming a law of the State, it nevertheless launched a series of\n47\n48\n49\ndebates within the engineering community, and stimulated it to seek ways for ameliorating\n50\n51\nQuellennec's work on the one hand, to devise alternative solutions to the water problem of\n52\n53\nAthens and its surroundings, on the other hand.\n54\n55\n56\n57\n58\n59\n60\n4\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nThe dam solution loomed on Athens' horizon a short time after Quellennec's study first\n1\n2\nappeared. In the late 1890s, Rosseels, the then Belgian Consul General in the Greek Capital,\n3\n4\n5\ndrew up a proposal in which the first reference to a (future) dam at the site of Marathon can be\n6\n7\nfound (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1900). But during the 1890s and the first decade of the\n8\n9\n10\n20th century, the water storage option was given a cold welcome in Greece. Quellennec\n11\n12\nhimself wasn't favorable to Rosseel's proposal (Quellennec 1899). Georges Bechmann (1848-\n13\n14\n1927), a fellow of Quellennec who had gained a worldwide reputation as chief engineer of\n15\n16\n17\nthe Paris Water Department, when invited by the Greek government as a technical adviser,\n18\n19\nalso opposed the project in 1900 (Bechmann, 1900, p. 64-65). Twelve years later, another\n20\n21\n22\nEuropean engineer, K. Kinzer from Austria, also working on behalf of the Greek State,\n23\n24\nexpressed in his turn the same aversion to the dam solution (Kinzer, 1912, p. 4-6). Several\n25\n26\n27\neminent and highly influential members of the Greek engineering community of the day also\n28\n29\ncriticized the water storage solution, which was now put forward, especially during the 1902-\n30\n31\n32\n1906 period, by an increasing number of engineers and engineering firms as the cheapest\n33\n34\nsolution to the \"water problem\" for Athens (Kalantzopoulos, 1964, p. 23-31). Thus, in 1899,\n35\n36\nPetros Protopapadakis (1858-1922), a former student of the \"Ecole Polytechnique\" and\n37\n38\n39\n\"Ecole des Mines\" in Paris, in a conference organized by the Greek Polytechnical Association\n40\n41\n- i.e., the first professional organization of Greek engineers -, pleaded the case for spring\n42\n43\n44\nwaters, and expressed strong doubts about dams, the construction of which was, in his\n45\n46\nopinion, subjected to many technical problems (Protopapadakis, 1899). In 1907, in a paper\n47\n48\n49\npublished in the Greek engineering journal \"Archimidis\", Anastasios Soulis (1836-1918), a\n50\n51\ngraduate of the French \"Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées\" and a Professor at the Polytechnic\n52\n53\nSchool of Athens, also gave a negative assessment to the water storage solution (Soulis,\n54\n55\n56\n1907). It is worth noting that it was Soulis who, in his 1884 manual entitled \"Hydraulics\"\n57\n58\nproduced the first lengthy presentation of the \"state-of-the practice\" in the domain of water\n59\n60\n5\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nstorage techniques in Greek (Soulis, 1884, p. 356-395). Obviously, as most of the 19th century\n1\n2\nGreek engineers were steeped in the French engineering tradition (Assimacopoulou et al., 2009;\n3\n4\n5\nAssimacopoulou and Chatzis, 2003), they were following their counterparts in France in their\n6\n7\npredominant preference for spring waters as the best way for providing cities with the\n8\n9\n10\n\"precious liquid\". This option was especially illustrated by \"Hausmannian\" Paris (Bocquet et\n11\n12\nal., 2008), which by the end of the 19th century had been transformed into an icon of the\n13\n14\nmodern city, and was enjoying the status of a template concerning urban infrastructures\n15\n16\n17\n(Harvey, 2003).\n18\n19\n20\nBut the future is not necessarily a repetition of the past. From the 1910s on, Greek engineers\n21\n22\n23\nstarted modifying their views on the respective pros and cons of remote spring waters and\n24\n25\nwater storage systems for providing cities with water. As a result, the \"dam solution\" was\n26\n27\n28\ngaining more and more adherents among them. This shift in attitude didn't happen\n29\n30\nhaphazardly. Indeed, from the late 19th century on, a steadily increasing number of\n31\n32\npractitioners throughout the world resorted to storage techniques for supplying cities with\n33\n34\n35\nwater. Without a doubt, the US was in the vanguard of the movement, especially thanks to the\n36\n37\nfoundation of two institutions: the Bureau of Reclamation (1902) and the Tennessee Valley\n38\n39\n40\nAuthority (1933). After importing to their fatherland the groundbreaking work by French\n41\n42\n\"Ponts et Chaussées\" engineers Joseph-Augustin Torterue de Sazilly (1812-1852) and Emile\n43\n44\n45\nDelocre (1828-1909), who developed mathematically based methods of gravity dam design in\n46\n47\nthe 1850s, American engineers, from the 1880s on, cultivated extensively the art of this kind\n48\n49\nof structures (Billington et al. 2005; Smith, 1971; Schnitter, 1994; Kollgaard and Chadwick, 1988).\n50\n51\n52\nIn 1888, Edward Wegmann published \"The design and construction of masonry dams\", one of\n53\n54\nthe first, and extremely popular, manuals entirely dedicated to this kind of structure\n55\n56\n57\nworldwide (Wegmann, 1888; 1918). At the turn of the century one of the highest dams of the\n58\n59\n60\n6\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\ntime, the \"New Croton\" Dam (built in 1898-1906, 91 m high) was erected near New York,\n1\n2\nand within the years following its completion, two other dams symbolized the preeminence of\n3\n4\n5\nthe New Continent in this domain of Public Works: the arch (no gravity) \"Shoshone\" Dam\n6\n7\n(1905-1909, 100 m high) and the gravity \"Elephant Butte\" Dam (1912-1916, 91 m high). The\n8\n9\n10\ndevelopment of large water storages system around the world -- even in France, one could\n11\n12\nnumber seventy \"large\" dams, i.e., higher than 15 meters, in 1919 (Bordes, 2010, p. 75) -- led\n13\n14\nto the creation of the \"International Commission on Large Dams\" in July 1928. By\n15\n16\n17\nprogressively embracing the dam solution, Greek engineers were merely keeping up with the\n18\n19\nviews of their counterparts abroad.\n20\n21\n22\n23\nThe first comprehensive study of the artificial lake and the related dam at the site of Marathon\n24\n25\nwas produced by the American firm \"Ford, Bacon and Davis\" at the end of the 1910s (Ford,\n26\n27\n28\nBacon and Davis, 1920; Archibald, 1921; Genidounias, 1923; Mpotsaris, 1925). Invited by\n29\n30\nthe recently founded \"Bank of Piraeus\", which, alongside other banks and industrial\n31\n32\ncompanies of the time, was entertaining fond hopes for a concession of the (future) water\n33\n34\n35\nsupply system of Athens, a team of thirty American men, placed under the supervision of\n36\n37\nWalter Spear, a graduate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the then chief\n38\n39\n40\nengineer at the Board of Water Supply of the New York City (Speer, 1922), was dispatched in\n41\n42\nGreece in 1920, and \"were in the field from March until September with forty or fifty Greek\n43\n44\n45\nassistants. All survey work was done by stadia. Experienced rod men and instrument men\n46\n47\nwere almost impossible to get, but a large part of the drafting was done by local men. They\n48\n49\nproved to be good workmen, but very slow, and the English characters bothered them when it\n50\n51\n52\ncame to lettering a plan\" (Archibald, 1921, p. 465). This cosmopolitan team \"did an\n53\n54\nunbelievable amount of excellent work and within about a year produced an exhaustive study\n55\n56\n57\nof the various problems presented and reached conclusions, which, with certain modifications\n58\n59\n60\n7\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\ndue to unpredictable changes, should form the basis for all future work on these projects\n1\n2\n(Gausmann, 1940, p. 79)\", in the words of R. Gausmann, the General manager of Ulen for the\n3\n4\n5\nMarathon dam (infra). The technical and financial elements of the study were presented to the\n6\n7\nGreek government in October 1920, but the 1920-1922 war against Turkey prevented the\n8\n9\n10\nproject from coming into fruition.\n11\n12\n13\nImmediately after the hostilities between the two countries were definitively brought to a\n14\n15\nclose, a team of Greek State engineers once more came to grips with the question of supplying\n16\n17\n18\nAthens and Piraeus with water. The \"task force\" squad, which was headed by Theologos\n19\n20\nGenidounias (1871-1938) and comprised two other engineers, Petros Loprestis and Argyrios\n21\n22\n23\nKoumousis, reported the results of their study in January 1923 (Genidounias, 1923). After a\n24\n25\ndetailed examination of all the proposals produced so far, they followed in \"Ford, Bacon and\n26\n27\n28\nDavis\" company's footsteps, and suggested the construction of a water storage system in\n29\n30\nMarathon. In several respects, the composition of the team was a microcosm of the\n31\n32\ncommunity of engineers in Greece in the 1920s (Antoniou, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2007). As\n33\n34\n35\nin the 19th century, the latter showed strong cosmopolitan strains, as it was composed of a\n36\n37\ngreat number of graduates of engineering institutions in Europe -- in the meantime France\n38\n39\n40\nceased to be the main destination and was superseded in this role by German speaking\n41\n42\ncountries and Italy -, graduates who often had also gained professional experience abroad.\n43\n44\n45\nFor instance, Genidounias was a graduate of the famous Polytechnic School of Zurich, and\n46\n47\nworked for a long while outside the borders of his fatherland. His baptism of fire as a young\n48\n49\nengineer took place in Asia Minor, where he was employed by the company involved in the\n50\n51\n52\nbuilding of the railway line connecting EsciSehir and Ikonio. In 1897, he returned to\n53\n54\nSwitzerland, and specialized in hydraulic works and the use of reinforced concrete (the\n55\n56\n57\n\"Hennebique\" system). From 1905 to 1919, Genidounias served the Egyptian government,\n58\n59\n60\n8\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nand as a high civil servant at the Ministry of Public Works, he played a key part in the\n1\n2\ndevelopment of several large programs of public works aiming to harness and to exploit the\n3\n4\n5\nwater resources of the Nile. Once back in Greece, in 1919, he was assigned a position at the\n6\n7\n\"Water Works Department\" (WWD), set up in 1917 within the Ministry of Transportation,\n8\n9\n10\nfounded, in turn, three years earlier by the first government of the liberal Eleftherios\n11\n12\nVenizelos (1864-1936), the politician who stamped inter-war Greece with his modernizing\n13\n14\nzeal (Personal Folder of Genidounias; Tsatsos, 1938; Gausmann, 1940, p. 59-61). Within the\n15\n16\n17\nWWD, Genidounias thoroughly examined the different proposals concerning the \"water\n18\n19\nissue\" of Athens that had been produced since Rosseel's contribution, and steadily defended\n20\n21\n22\nthe \"dam solution\" at the site of Marathon (Genidounias, 1922). Petros Loprestis (1870-1941)\n23\n24\ngraduated from \"R. Scuola d'Ingegneria di Padova\" in 1893. After serving as a municipal\n25\n26\n27\nengineer on the island of Corfu, he moved to the Greek Capital, and from 1919 on, he worked\n28\n29\nfor the central government at the Ministry of Transportation. He even managed WWD from\n30\n31\n32\n1931-1932. An author of many publications on urban hydraulics, he actively participated in\n33\n34\nthe design and implementation of nearly all the large hydraulic works programs in Greece\n35\n36\nduring the 1920s and the 1930s (Kitsikis, 1934, p. 190; Anonymous, 1941). Argyrios\n37\n38\n39\nKoumousis, the youngest member of the team, was a former pupil of the \"Technische\n40\n41\nHochschule\" in Munich, from which he graduated as a civil engineer in 1915 (Kitsikis, 1934,\n42\n43\n44\np. 161).\n45\n46\n47\n48\n49\nThe study by Genidounias and his two fellows proved to be instrumental in the adoption of\n50\n51\nthe Marathon dam as the best solution for the supply of Athens and Piraeus with water. Apart\n52\n53\nfrom a small minority, whose members persisted in defending the option based on the\n54\n55\n56\ntransportation into Athens and its environs of spring waters from Peloponnesus (supra), Greek\n57\n58\nengineers were now massively voting for the \"dam solution\" in Marathon (X, 1923; Ta\n59\n60\n9\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nChronika, 1923; 1925). The same year in which Genidounias and his team at WWD published\n1\n2\ntheir study, in an article that appeared in \"Archimidis\", Alexandros Sinos, a professor of\n3\n4\n5\nhydraulics at the Polytechnic School of Athens, informed the community of Greek engineers\n6\n7\nabout the advantages of the water storage systems (Sinos, 1923), a subject that continued to be\n8\n9\n10\na matter of interest for Greek engineers in the 1930s (Floris, 1933; 1936). At the same time,\n11\n12\npoliticians (Mpotsaris 1925, p. 575), physicians (Kalantzopoulos, 1964, p. 59) and the press\n13\n14\n(Ta Chronika, 1923) were frequently referring to the many examples of cities in the US as\n15\n16\n17\nwell as in Europe that had already successfully adopted water storage techniques, and were\n18\n19\ntrying to convince the inhabitants of Athens and Piraeus that water from artificial lakes could\n20\n21\n22\nbe as tasty and healthy as spring water.\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\nThe construction of the dam\n29\n30\n31\n32\nIn the early 1920s, the \"dam solution\" in Marathon was very popular among Greek engineers\n33\n34\nand politicians. The massive arrival (at) and the subsequent settlement of successive tides of\n35\n36\n37\nGreeks from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace in the region of Athens functioned as a catalyst,\n38\n39\ncompelling the Greek governments of the time to take action and materialize the plan. Given\n40\n41\nthe technical experience American companies had gained in this domain since the end of the\n42\n43\n44\n19th century, and the growing presence of American capitalism in inter-war Europe (Bonin and\n45\n46\nde Goey, 2009; Bairoch, 1997), it is not by chance that the two firms that made a tender both\n47\n48\n49\nhad American nationality (Cassimatis, 1988). As we have already said in the Introduction, the\n50\n51\nrace was eventually won by Ulen & Company, which, in the opinion of the Greek Embassy in\n52\n53\n54\nWashington and part of the press at least, surpassed its competitor MacArthur Brothers Co in\n55\n56\ninternational reputation and financial stamina (Efimeris ton syzitiseon tis D' en Athinais\n57\n58\n59\nSyntaktikis ton Ellinon Synelefseos, 1925, p. 553 ; Empros, 1928).\n60\n10\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nUnder the terms of the contract, Ulen and the Bank of Athens granted the Greek State a loan\n1\n2\nof ten million dollars over twenty years and half, to be used for the construction of a modern\n3\n4\n5\nwater network, capable of meeting the increasing needs of the cities of Athens and Piraeus. In\n6\n7\norder to service such a loan and to cover the running costs of the projected network, the Greek\n8\n9\n10\nstate imposed upon the owners of all city buildings that would be supplied by the new water\n11\n12\nsystem a specific tax during the building process, and after the completion of the network, a\n13\n14\ncompulsory subscription. According to the agreement, the State would also hand out\n15\n16\n17\nconcession of the network over twenty-two years after its completion to a company to be set\n18\n19\nup. In addition to loaning the Greek State, Ulen was designated as the contractor of the\n20\n21\n22\nproject, and was entrusted with the tasks of the design and building of the water supply\n23\n24\nsystem to come; for these services, the American firm would receive the total payment of\n25\n26\n27\n1,200,000 dollars (Efimeris Kyverniseos, 1925).\n28\n29\n30\nJudging from the track-record of the firm, the choice of Ulen as contractor seems sound.\n31\n32\nFounded in 1897, the company soon became member of the small group of first-rate\n33\n34\n35\nAmerican corporations specialized in large Public Works programs. Indeed, before being\n36\n37\ninterested in the Greek market, the company had already carried out more than a hundred\n38\n39\n40\nwater supply and sewage programs in the US and South America. Among them was the\n41\n42\nbuilding of the longest underground aqueduct of the time, and probably the flagship of the\n43\n44\n45\nfirm's achievements: designed as part of the water supply system for New York City, the\n46\n47\n\"Shandaken Tunnel\" was 29 kilometers long, and its quick completion in 1923 was\n48\n49\nimmediately hailed as a technical breakthrough. Besides designing and building urban\n50\n51\n52\nhydraulics works, Ulen was also involved in the sectors of railways, harbor works, and\n53\n54\nhydroelectric power plants. It even worked on behalf of Ford Corporation, and built plants for\n55\n56\n57\nthe giant of the automotive industry (Ethnos, 1925).\n58\n59\n60\n11\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nFor its first contract in Greece, Ulen mobilized the large stock of experience it had\n1\n2\naccumulated so far. Being part of the class of concrete gravity dams, the Marathon\n3\n4\n5\nconstruction was 285 m long, 54 m high, and varied in thickness from 4.5 m at the top to 48\n6\n7\nm at the bottom, while it had a circular shape with a 400 m radius (Gausmann, 1934) (Figure\n8\n9\n10\n2). Less impressive, to be sure, than the then largest water storage systems in the US, the\n11\n12\nGreek product of the American company was nevertheless a sizeable dam, and one of the\n13\n14\nbiggest European constructions of the time. It could match, for example, the highest French\n15\n16\n17\ndam in the 1920s, the \"Furens Dam\": built in 1862-1866, this legendary masonry construction\n18\n19\nnear Saint-Etienne had a maximum height of 56 m. In one respect at least, the Marathon Dam\n20\n21\n22\nwas, and probably still is, even unique around the world, since it was entirely paneled\n23\n24\nexternally on both sides with Pentelic marble, the building material that the Parthenon was\n25\n26\n27\nmade of (Figure 3). This feature of the construction --- to be sure, a hint of the region's\n28\n29\nglorious past (Kaika, 2006) --- didn't pass unnoticed. Not later than November 1929, the\n30\n31\n32\n\"Popular Science Monthly\" hailed \"The World's only Marble Dam\" (Anonymous, 1929a),\n33\n34\nand did so the \"New Reclamation Era\" (Anonymous, 1929b), and more recently the \"New\n35\n36\nScientist and Science Journal\" (White, 1971, p. 481).\n37\n38\n39\n40\n[INSERT FIGURES 2 & 3]\n41\n42\n43\nThe building site opened its doors in October 1926 (Figures 4 and 5), and three years later, in\n44\n45\nOctober 1929, the dam had been totally erected with success. It cost 2,120,000 dollars,\n46\n47\n48\ncontained over 156,000 m³ of concrete, and its completion mobilized 900 people a day on the\n49\n50\naverage (Gausmann, 1934). Organizing efficiently the work of many workers gathered in a\n51\n52\n53\nlimited place was one of the thorniest problems for engineers after the rise of the big\n54\n55\ncorporation at the turn of the 20th century (Porter, 2006).\n56\n57\n58\n59\n[INSERT FIGURES 4 & 5]\n60\n12\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nIn the 1920s, the rationalization of work, that is the effort at increasing the output of labor and\n1\n2\nmachinery thanks to a series of strategies -- such as separating the conception from the\n3\n4\n5\nexecution of work, breaking down the work into simple operations, \"objectifying\" and\n6\n7\nmeasuring tasks carried out by machines and laborers, stimulating worker's productivity with\n8\n9\n10\nfinancial incentives was already a fully-fledged area of engineering practice and research,\n11\n12\nsymbolized by a series of neologisms, such as \"Taylorism\", \"Fordism\", or \"Scientific\n13\n14\nManagement\" (Rabinback, 1992, Chatzis, 2008). Being already familiar with the rationalization\n15\n16\n17\nof work movement, probably while involved in the construction of factories for the Ford\n18\n19\nMotor company, Ulen's staff didn't hesitate to mobilize \"Scientific management\" techniques\n20\n21\n22\non the dam building site in Greece (Figure 6). Indeed, the various operations were sorted out\n23\n24\non the basis of their difficulty of execution, while the working people employed at the site,\n25\n26\n27\nengineers and foremen included, were assigned specific tasks according to their qualifications\n28\n29\n- and their gender (Figure 7) --, and they were paid accordingly. Specialized Ulen staff\n30\n31\n32\nproceeded to the evaluation of the time needed for the different construction tasks and\n33\n34\noperations, and used such times to stimulate the work effort provided by the operators through\n35\n36\na system of financial incentives and bonuses (Loprestis, 1928; Tsalikis, 1927, p. 196). Though\n37\n38\n39\n\"Scientific Management\" was not a terra incognita for the Greek engineers, who first heard\n40\n41\nabout Taylor and \"Taylorism\" as early as 1916 in the columns of the journal \"Viomichaniki\n42\n43\n44\nkai VIotechniki Epetheorisis\", very few applications of such techniques eventually took place\n45\n46\nin inter-war Greece (Antoniou et al., 2007, p. 245-250). The Marathon Dam was one of these\n47\n48\n49\nscarce applications. It even turned out, in the opinion of the witnesses of the time at least, to\n50\n51\nbe a successful one. Indeed, it seems that the Greek workers at the building site were not\n52\n53\nopposed to being subjected to such techniques (Tsalikis, 1927, p. 196).\n54\n55\n56\n57\n[INSERT FIGURES 6 & 7]\n58\n59\n60\n13\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nTo deal with the construction of the Marathon dam, Ulen dispatched a part of its engineering\n1\n2\nstaff to Greece. As the General Manager of the project in Athens, R Gausmann, put it, given\n3\n4\n5\nthe lack of experience of Greek engineers in the management of large public works programs,\n6\n7\n\"it could not be expected that foreign capital, or in fact Greek capital either, would be willing\n8\n9\n10\nto risk money on important projects, entirely under Greek direction\" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 40).\n11\n12\nBut even so, to a significant extent the construction of the dam was a Greek adventure as well.\n13\n14\nSeveral Greek engineers were, indeed, involved in the design and building of the structure.\n15\n16\n17\nThey proved to be helpful, even indispensable, to their American counterparts, especially\n18\n19\nthanks to their mathematical and scientific skills. To his amazement, for Gausmann the Greek\n20\n21\n22\nengineer proved to be able to \"produce formulae with the same facility that the magician\n23\n24\nproduces rabbits from a borrowed hat\", and, in doing so, \"he dazzles the poor American with\n25\n26\n27\nhis mathematics and his reasoning, which are both faultless\" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). In this\n28\n29\nrespect, he contrasts with the American engineer. To quote Gausmann once more, the latter\n30\n31\n32\ndemonstrates in his practice a series of qualities that make him an efficient practical man,\n33\n34\nsince \" he has (...) been brought up to realize that there are usually more than one acceptable\n35\n36\nways of obtaining the desired results, and that the main thing is not to spend too much\n37\n38\n39\nvaluable time, trying to determine beforehand which is absolutely the best way of doing a job,\n40\n41\nbut to select a method, which is known by past experience to be adequate and which will\n42\n43\n44\nproduce good results, and then to go ahead and push it through as quickly and as cheaply as\n45\n46\npossible\" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). But, at the same time, Gausmann noted wistfully, \"the\n47\n48\n49\nAmerican engineer is never quite certain about formulae, nor how much they should be\n50\n51\ntrusted. If he can find some way to measure and weigh and experiment, even on a small scale,\n52\n53\nhe feels more certain of his results\" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). These national specificities\n54\n55\n56\nconcerning mathematics and theoretical sciences and their use for engineering purposes\n57\n58\nstemmed, in part at least, from the differences between the education Greek and American\n59\n60\n14\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nengineers used to receive at that time. Indeed, despite the fact that by the end of 19th century\n1\n2\nthe leaders of the American engineering community accepted formal educational training as\n3\n4\n5\nthe best means for entering the field, it was only after the arrival of a number of European-\n6\n7\nborn or European educated engineers in the US in the wake of World War I that the\n8\n9\n10\nengineering schools in the USA started emphasizing higher mathematics and abstract scientific\n11\n12\nknowledge in their curricula (Seely, 2004, p. 53 & 65). Greek engineers, in contrast, had had a\n13\n14\nstrong theoretical background since the foundation of the Greek State. When Modern Greece\n15\n16\n17\nlacked sufficient engineering educational infrastructures, they used to study abroad, enrolling\n18\n19\nin schools that were often leaders in building bridges between scientific knowledge and\n20\n21\n22\nengineering: indeed, some of the best French engineering institutions during the 19th century,\n23\n24\nand their German and Italian counterparts in the first decades of the 20th century were\n25\n26\n27\nfrequently visited by young Greeks wishing to become an engineer. Little by little, this\n28\n29\ntheoretical tradition in engineering education also took root in Greece; as a result, engineers\n30\n31\n32\ngraduated from the Polytechnic School of Athens after the 1890s were also offered a\n33\n34\ncurriculum placing strong emphasis upon scientific and mathematical fundamentals\n35\n36\n(Antoniou, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2007, p. 254-250).\n37\n38\n39\n40\nSome of the Greek engineers who impressed Gausmann with their mathematical skills and\n41\n42\n\"faultless\" reasoning were hired by the American firm, and even worked in positions of\n43\n44\n45\nresponsibility. Thus Aristopahnis Tsalikis was employed by Ulen from 1925-29 as one of the\n46\n47\nright-hand men of the American chief engineer Keayes. Tsalikis graduated from the Civil\n48\n49\nEngineering Department of the \"Technische Hoschschule\" in Munich in 1903, and started his\n50\n51\n52\nprofessional career working for the large corporation \"Siemens-Halske\" in the building of the\n53\n54\nsubway in Hamburg. His second employer was another German company, \"Lenz\", in Berlin.\n55\n56\n57\nThere, Tsalikis was involved in several railways and hydraulic works as chief engineer. In\n58\n59\n60\n15\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n1917, the year he moved back to Greece, he was assigned a position of responsibility at\n1\n2\nWWD within the Ministry of Transportation. After working for Ulen, he was appointed\n3\n4\n5\nGeneral Director of the Technical Works Department within the Ministry for Agriculture\n6\n7\n(Kitsikis, 1934, p. 358).\n8\n9\n10\n11\nBut the most important Greek actor participating in the Marathon venture was of a\n12\n13\n\"collective\" nature: the group of Greek engineers within the Ministry of Transportation who\n14\n15\nwere responsible for controlling and overseeing the design and building process on behalf of\n16\n17\n18\nthe Greek State. Let us close this section by mentioning a specific contribution of a member\n19\n20\nof this group to the success of the operation. We have already referred to Loprestis, one of the\n21\n22\n23\nproponents of the Marathon Dam solution as the best means to supply Athens and its\n24\n25\nsurroundings with water (supra). During the construction of the dam, Loprestis suggested the\n26\n27\nuse of volcanic ash, known as \"Santorin earth\"-- from the name of a Greek volcanic island--\n28\n29\n30\nfor enhancing the strength and the hydraulic properties (the imperviousness) of the concrete,\n31\n32\ni.e., the material the dam was made of. Loprestis's idea appealed to the Ulen staff, who asked\n33\n34\n35\nthe person responsible for the \"Laboratory of Strength of Materials\" at the Polytechnic School\n36\n37\nof Athens to undertake a series of experiments, after the completion of which the idea first put\n38\n39\n40\nforward by the Greek engineer was endorsed by the Americans, and turned into reality\n41\n42\n(Tsalikis, 1927).\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n48\n49\nConclusion\n50\n51\n52\nThe Marathon Dam was dedicated in October 1929, and it is still operational. Built by an\n53\n54\n55\nAmerican contractor on behalf of the Greek State, this technological artifact was by no means\n56\n57\nthe mechanical application of know-how elaborated in the USA and simply transferred\n58\n59\n60\n16\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nwithout the slightest alteration to Greece. As we have seen, the Marathon dam bears the stamp\n1\n2\nof the Greek engineering community as well. First of all, it was the late outcome of a\n3\n4\n5\nparticularly lengthy public debate in Greece, which started in the 1890s and in which many\n6\n7\nGreek engineers took part. The decisive study that suggested that the storage system was the\n8\n9\n10\nbest solution for supplying Athens with water was also probably produced by a team of Greek\n11\n12\nstate engineers working at the Water Works Department within the Ministry of Transportation.\n13\n14\nBut even after the Greek State turned to a foreign company for the final design and the\n15\n16\n17\nbuilding of the dam, the Greek engineering community continued to be fully involved in the\n18\n19\nventure. Greek engineers proved, indeed, to be a worthy partner for the Ulen engineering staff\n20\n21\n22\nin several respects, exhibiting specific skills and demonstrating qualities in which their\n23\n24\nAmerican counterparts seemed to be lacking.\n25\n26\n27\n28\nThe Marathon Dam can thus be read as an example of cooperation, to be sure an\n29\n30\nunsymmetrical one but a real cooperation all the same, between a technologically advanced\n31\n32\nnation and one located on what is conventionally regarded as the edge of the developed world\n33\n34\n35\nof the time. In this respect, the case of the Marathon Dam questions a series of views and\n36\n37\npractices that have dominated the writing of the history of technology until recently. Indeed,\n38\n39\n40\nmany historians serving the field have focused on a handful of nations, deemed the sole\n41\n42\ninteresting actors participating in the race for technological innovation. In turn, this almost\n43\n44\n45\nexclusive focus on a very small number of nations, considered uncritically to be the only ones\n46\n47\nthat deserve the attention of scholars, to the detriment of the supposedly \"uninteresting\"\n48\n49\nmultitude, has led to a conception of technological transfer as a bipolar and mono-faceted\n50\n51\n52\nprocess that comprises an active \"transmitter\" and a passive \"receptor\", and involves no\n53\n54\nsignificant transformation. Does the case studied here stand as unique? In the light of a series\n55\n56\n57\nof recent works by historians of science and technology, the answer seems to be a rather firm\n58\n59\n60\n17\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n\"no\" (Saraiva, 2009; Raj, 2007; Krige, 2006). We would like thus to encourage researchers to\n1\n2\ncarry out investigations into other technological systems, the design and building of which\n3\n4\n5\ninvolved nations and geographical areas that researchers traditionally ignored. We are\n6\n7\nconvinced that new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge after scholars introduce\n8\n9\n10\nin the picture of the technological development and its heritage the contributions of the many\n11\n12\ncomponents of an increasingly, thanks to the action of technology among other forces,\n13\n14\ninterconnected world.\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\nREFERENCES\n22\n23\n24\nAnonymous (1929a) The World's only Marble Dam, a unique engineering feat near the battlefield of\n25\n26\n27\nMarathon. Popular Science Monthly 115(5): 58.\n28\n29\nAnonymous (1929b) Marathon Dam, Greece, Mosaic Marble-Faced. New Reclamation Era\n30\n31\n20(11):170\n32\n33\nAnonymous (1941) Nekrologia, Petros Loprestis. Technika Chronika 233-234: 224-225.\n34\n35\n36\nAntoniou Y (2006) Oi Ellines michanikoi. Thesmoi kai idees 1900-1940. 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The American City 26(1): 23-27. -\n39\n40\nTa Chronika (1923) 13-4-1923, 10-5-1923, 11-5-1923, 12-5-1923, 13-5-1923 and 15-5-1923.\n41\n42\nTa Chronika (1925) 30-5-1925.\n43\n44\nTsalikis A (1927) I ek Marathonos ydrefsis ton Athinon kai tou Peiraios. Erga 56: 189-211.\n45\n46\n47\nTsatsos A (1938) Nekrologia, Theologos D. Genidounias. Technika Chronika 163: 904-905.\n48\n49\nWegmann E (1888) The design and construction of Masonry Dams, giving the method employed in\n50\n51\ndetermining the profile of the Quaker Bridge Dam. Wiley, New York.\n52\n53\nWegmann E (1918) The design and construction of dams, including masonry, earth, rock-fill, timber,\n54\n55\n56\nand steel structures also the principal types of movable dams (6th ed.). Wiley, New York.\n57\n58\n59\n60\n22\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\nWhite S (1971) Review of 'A guide to the industrial archaeology of Europe, by Kenneth Hudson'.\n1\n2\nNew Scientist and Science Journal 51(766): 481.\n3\n4\nX Th (1923) Ergasiai tou Syllogou: Syzitiseis ypo tin Genikin Enosin Ellinon Epistimonon\n5\n6\nMichanikon apartizonton Syllogon peri tis ypo Ypourgeiou Sygkoinonias meletitheisis\n7\n8\n9\nydrefseos ton Athinon kai Peiraios ek technitis limnis en Marathoni, Archimidis 7: 55-61.\n10\n11\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n29\n30\n31\n32\n33\n34\n35\n36\n37\n38\n39\n40\n41\n42\n43\n44\n45\n46\n47\n48\n49\n50\n51\n52\n53\n54\n55\n56\n57\n58\n59\n60\n23\n61\n62\n63\n64\n65\n1882\nE\n11\n.\nAuropeia\nAg.\nYYP48,\nnapaxhs\n14840\nSpapping\nand\n14240\nTruepios fequires\nсухатие this yy 8333 AMOUNTAQUE\n100 Y4223\n14,827.\n114220 ERR\nBetter\nФРАГМА.\nпарохиз\nX\nthe\nRparai\n2 3\nSTATE\nFigure\nClick here to download high resolution image\nFigure\nClick here to download high resolution image\nPROGRESS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE\nMARATHON PROJECT AS MEASURED BY\nEXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT.\n1925\n1928\n1927\n1928\n1929\n1930\n1931\n1932\n300,000\n4,000\nExpenditure in US)\nDollars during Month)\n3,000\n200,000\nDollars\n2,000\nMen\n14\n100,000\nAverage Number of Men\nEmployed During Menth.\nMax.Manth=3,630\nAve. \" *1,500±\n1,000\nPROGRESS EACH MONTH\n0\n0\nMarathon Dam\nWORK\nBoyiati Tunnel\nWORK\nDistribution System\nIN\nIN\nPurification Plant\nPROGRESS\nPROGRESS\nPreliminary Work\nCleaning UP.\n3,263,000\n12,000,000\nTotal Employment in 8tr than Days:\n3,000,000\n$14289,182.18\n10,000,000\n8,000,000\n2,000,000\nDollars\n6,000,000\nEight Hour Man Days\n4,000,000\nTotal Expenditure in U.S.Dollars\n1,000,000\nTOTAL PROGRESS TO DATE\n2,000,000\n$\n1940\n0\no\n1923\n1926\n1927\n1928\n1929\n1930\n1931\n1932\nFigure\nClick here to download high resolution image"
}