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OCR Page 1 of 27825-1
11/8/71
Chapter 25: Shoring Up Proves Not Enough
Militarily, the two months from early April to mid-June were a
test of a strategy of limited air attacks on the North, limited ground
involvement by American and other outside forces, and attempts to build
up the South Vietnamese capacity. From (33,000) in early April, inclu-
ding the pre-March core of (24,000), US force strength in South Vietnam
grew to (53,000) by early June, with another 15-20,000 already decided
and on the way. This was an important series of build-up decisions,
made in part on what seemed clear cases of individual need, in part to
lay a groundwork for whatever might be needed in the future. It went
side by side with much larger plans to expand South Vietnamese forces.
These outside force increases were the main stuff of high-level -
decision during this period. Less notably, the application of American
air power grew rapidly at this time, and established itself as a central
element in the way the war was being fought on the ground.
Yet, despite these American actions -- indeed, before they could
possibly have taken full effect -- the test came between the expanded
REINFORMED FROM THE
Viet Cong, North, and the South Vietnamese Army. It was an all-too-
conclusive demonstration of who was on top. Between May 11th and June
15th, a series of military disasters engulfed the South Vietnamese;
whole battalions disappeared, others were shredded, and the morale of
AMERICAN
the whole Army became defeatist. The in-between strategy of this period
had clung to the old thesis that only the South Vietnamese could win
their own fight. By mid-June this thesis was rapidly confronting the
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