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This is a memorandum from Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to President Lyndon B. Johnson summarizing the suggestions of the members of the Council on Equal Opportunity for actions they think the President should take after the events of "Bloody Sunday" in Selma, Alabama, when law enforcement officials attacked civil rights demonstrators.
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2803381
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Memorandum from Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to President Lyndon B. Johnson
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1
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id
2803381
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document
title
Memorandum from Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to President Lyndon B. Johnson
description
This is a memorandum from Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to President Lyndon B. Johnson summarizing the suggestions of the members of the Council on Equal Opportunity for actions they think the President should take after the events of "Bloody Sunday" in Selma, Alabama, when law enforcement officials attacked civil rights demonstrators.
citationUrl
creators
Humphrey, Hubert Horatio, Jr., 1911-1978
collections
President's Daily Diary
Appointment Files
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Suffrage
Civil rights
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1
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2803381
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12
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1965-03-12
month
3
year
1965
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nara-archive
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1
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0
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document
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57ca87fd60f40bc6
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(1)
THE VICE president
WASHINGTON
March 12, 1965
MEMORANDUM
FOR : The President
FROM : The Vice President
As you suggested, I met this afternoon with the Council on
Equal Opportunity to discuss the current situation in Selma and
obtain the views of the Council members as to what further steps,
if any, the federal government should undertake. At the opening
of the meeting, I explained in some detail the actions which the
federal government has already taken with respect to the Selma
situation and discussed candidly the alternatives which seemed
immediately available and the reasons why they were not used.
At that juncture I threw the meeting open and received suggestions
and comments from almost everyone present. It was recognized
that you and other officials have on numerous occasions spoken
forcefully of the federal government's strong commitment to
civil rights and the need for voting legislation at this time;
nevertheless, it was felt that in the highly emotional, tense,
present circumstances reiteration was necessary. A number of
people expressed their concern that confidence of the civil rights
movement in the federal government is threatened and stressed
the need for making known in a positive and affirmative manner
the concern of the federal government.
There was a strong general feeling that there would be great
utility in your carrying to the public, via national television, a
positive and affirmative statement of the federal government's
position in the Selma situation. Such a statement could include
the following items:
The President
Page Two.
(1) The federal government recognizes the serious barriers to full
registration and voting participation by Negro citizens in certain
areas of the South; therefore, you are sending to the Congress a
special message and legislation to remove these barriers.
(2) There exists a constitutional right for Americans to petition
their government for redress of grievances and the federal govern-
ment has vigorously pressed that right in the District Court proceeding
-- the proper place for definition of the rights of the Selma demon-
strators. The Attorney General has urged the court to issue an order
allowing the march from Selma to Montgomery. If it is issued, the
federal government will see that the order is enforced.
(3) There must be preservation of law and order in all situations.
The federal government stands ready to do whatever may be necessary
to assure that this is so.
(4) In response to the feeling shared by many Americans of "What can
I do?", you can request that they petition Members of Congress for
prompt passage of an effective and meaningful voting bill.
There was a strong feeling within the group that your message should
be keyed to action by the federal government -- the strongest and most
imminent action being submission of the Administration's voting bill
to the Congress. It was also felt strongly by the group that the legis-
lation should be submitted as soon as possible. There is believed to
be some lack of public understanding as to the reasons why it has not
already been submitted.
It should be emphasized that the group was not urging a television
appearance by you prior to the time you could announce specific and
imminent submission of the legislation. It was generally believed
that such an appearance over the weekend announcing that the
legislation would be sent to the Hill on Monday morning would be
particularly beneficial. In fact, it was thought sufficiently important
to make the announcement over the weekend even if it meant that the
legislation submitted on Monday was not in final form.
The President
Page Three.
For your information, I will also relay several other suggestions
on which there was no general consensus:
(1) That you contact Governor Wallace and invite him to Washington,
along with other appropriate Alabama officials, to discuss resolution
of the Selma difficulties; while Governor Wallace probably would not
accept your invitation, this, it was suggested, would make it clear
that you had exhausted all possible avenues.
(2) That, either in conjunction with, or apart from, the foregoing,
the broadest possible contacts be made with Alabama business and
industrial leaders to urge them to bring all possible pressure against
the Governor. It was suggested that Cabinet officers might be
utilized to make some of these calls personally, using contacts among
their clientele groups.
(3) That a high federal official, such as the Vice President or the
Attorney General, go to Selma as a symbolic federal presence; as
discussion progressed, however, this idea seemed to lose favor.
With but minor dissent, the group indicated a strong belief that
federal troops should not be used under present circumstances. It
should be emphasized, however, that this view was based on present
circumstances and was subject to change with any significant change
in the situation. The feeling was expressed that the F. B. I. does
not represent a meaningful presence in Selma for Negro citizens and
that, as a "presence" marshals would be better. The difficulties
inherent in using marshals were recognized as probably precluding
this course, however.
Finally, you should know that it was the overwhelming sentiment
of the group that the decision as to use of force was one that could be
made only by you and that the Council recognized the difficulty of
this decision and was ready to support you wholly.
Because I knew you wished to have the advice of the Council members,
I urged that they express themselves candidly and frankly. I have
tried to reflect their expressions as accurately as possible.