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{
    "localId": "6037279",
    "label": "Letter From President John F. Kennedy to General Lauris Norstad",
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{
    "id": "6037279",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Letter From President John F. Kennedy to General Lauris Norstad",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037279",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 21,
            "logicalDate": "1961-07-21",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1961
        }
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{
    "seq": 3,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/79/372/6037279/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-11/Kennedy-to-Norstad.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "1961 JUL 21 18 40\nOFF SECY OF DEFENSE\nEYES ONLY\nJuly 21, 1961\nSECRET\nDear General Norstad:\nI enjoyed reading your recent telegram regarding Berlin (ALO 565)\nto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I agree thoroughly\nwith you on the need for a position of great flexibility in preparing\nfor a Berlin crisis. Your comment on the desirability of arranging\nour preparations 80 as to avoid stimulating counterproductive Soviet\nreactions seems to me very well taken. You can be sure that your\nsuggestions will be taken fully into account in our preparations for\na Berlin crisis.\nI wanted, in this connection, to write you my views concerning the\nrelation to that crisis of the military planning which NATO will be\ndiscussing and undertaking In the months ahead.\nI am anxious that this discussion and planning be geared, insofar\nas feasible, to needs which will be particularly important In the\nlight of the Berlin crisis -- recognizing that this crisis may last\nfor a very considerable period, on an on-again off-again basis.\nThis would mean, I should think, focusing particularly on efforts\n(1) to fulfill approved (MC-70) NATO force goals, particularly on\nthe Central Front; and (ii) to agree on the need to improve the\nmobility. equipment, training, and manning levels of these forces,\nas you have recommended in your 1966 goals. beginning with units\nwhich are in existence or can be created fairly quickly.\nI hope that the Alliance can concentrate on this in the months ahead\nand that allied agreement and action on these programs will not be\ndelayed in an attempt to secure agreement on more long-term pro-\nposals, notably those for nuclear programs additional to MC-70.\nI understand the military considerations that have prompted you to\nseek MRBM's as part of your 1966 force requirements, in order to\nfulfill the nuclear strike functions now performed by your strike\naircraft. I also understand the long lead time necessarily involved\nin any such program.\nSEGRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12956, Sec. 3.6\nnno 932006\nSecDef Cont. No. 1425\ncy 2.\nBy mRlej Date 3/13/96\n- 2 -\nSECRET\nThis proposal raises, however, troubling and sensitive political\nissues. It also raises questions of priority relative to other military\ntasks. There is, as a result, a substantial difference of opinion\nwithin the Alliance as to whether, and if so how, MRBM's should\nbe deployed to NATO forces. Considerable time will be required\nto resolve that difference one way or another.\nI hope that the Alliance can continue to discuss and consider this\nmatter, including the proposal in my Ottawa speech for a truly\nmultilateral sea-borne missile force. A Berlin crisis does not seem\nthe best time, however, for the divisive debate that might be trig-\ngered by a crash attempt to resolve this Issue quickly - in time to\nlink It with agreement and action on other NATO force goals. I hope\nthat we can reach agreement on these other goals and press toward\ntheir fulfillment with all possible despatch. The MRBM issue should,\nin the view of this Government, be left for later resolution.\nThe possibility of a Berlin crisis should bring home to all of us the\nforesight and wisdom that you have shown in guiding the Alliance\ntoward early force improvements. The Secretary of Defense will be\ndiscussing with you the actions that we propose to take, and ask our\nallies to take, to this end.\nI want you to know that you have the full confidence of this Government\nin these continuing efforts to strengthen and unify the Alliance. I want\nparticularly to commend the views which you expressed on July 7 to\nthe French Chief of Staff, General Olie; they coincide fully with my\nown. You were wholly right in indicating that the U.S. desire to\naccord priority to conventional forces should not cause any one to\ndoubt the U.S. will to use nuclear weapons If need be.\nI am writing you these views without in any way wanting to Interject\nmyself into the chain of command between you and the Joint Chiefs\nof Staff and the Secretary of Defense, nor to set up a channel of\ncommunication outside that chain of command. I felt, however, that\nthe Berlin crisis was of such over-riding importance that it would\nbe useful to pass on my thoughts to you at this time.\nSincerely,\nJohn F. Kennedy\nGeneral Lauris Norstad,\nSupreme Allied Commander Europe,\nParis, France.\nSECRET"
}