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C. Suggested Defense Position
1. Support Acheson approach.
II. Size of Non-Nuclear Force to be Used
A. Acheson
1. Start modestly, with a division or two, prepared
to expand.
2. Larger force gains more time for deterrent to
operate.
3. Larger force more convincing evidence of both
determination and possibility of escalation to
general nuclear war.
4. Must preclude any possibility of US looking
ludicrous, as by GDR alone stopping a ground
operation.
5. Strong troop reinforcement beforehand is necessary,
US and Allied.
6. No upper limit of force should be set beyond which
US goes nuclear.
B. JCS
1. Allies cannot "win" in non-nuclear ground conflict
(implicit assumption that any Bloc resistance means
total Soviet resistance).
2. Any conflict with Soviets in Europe almost inevitably
becomes general nuclear war.
3. Allied divisions used toward Berlin would be chewed
up.
4. Mal-deployment - for general war results from use of
much force.
C. Suggested Defense Position
1. Object of ground operation is to change Soviet
decision, not destroy forces.
2. Prior reinforcement based on still earlier mobiliza-
tion can raise capability and avoid ill-effects of
changed deployment.
3. Using stronger ground forces improves chances of
success short of general nuclear war.
III. Military Preparations
A. Acheson
1. Twofold object: forestall crisis, and prepare to
meet it.
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16
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Support Acheson approach.\nII. Size of Non-Nuclear Force to be Used\nA. Acheson\n1. Start modestly, with a division or two, prepared\nto expand.\n2. Larger force gains more time for deterrent to\noperate.\n3. Larger force more convincing evidence of both\ndetermination and possibility of escalation to\ngeneral nuclear war.\n4. Must preclude any possibility of US looking\nludicrous, as by GDR alone stopping a ground\noperation.\n5. Strong troop reinforcement beforehand is necessary,\nUS and Allied.\n6. No upper limit of force should be set beyond which\nUS goes nuclear.\nB. JCS\n1. Allies cannot \"win\" in non-nuclear ground conflict\n(implicit assumption that any Bloc resistance means\ntotal Soviet resistance).\n2. Any conflict with Soviets in Europe almost inevitably\nbecomes general nuclear war.\n3. Allied divisions used toward Berlin would be chewed\nup.\n4. Mal-deployment - for general war results from use of\nmuch force.\nC. Suggested Defense Position\n1. Object of ground operation is to change Soviet\ndecision, not destroy forces.\n2. Prior reinforcement based on still earlier mobiliza-\ntion can raise capability and avoid ill-effects of\nchanged deployment.\n3. Using stronger ground forces improves chances of\nsuccess short of general nuclear war.\nIII. Military Preparations\nA. Acheson\n1. Twofold object: forestall crisis, and prepare to\nmeet it.\nTOP SECRET\n16"
}