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Item 2 TOP SECRET June 28, 1961 BRIEFING PAPER FOR NSC DISCUSSION ON BERLIN 29 June 1961 A paper prepared by Mr. Acheson analyzing the Berlin situation and recommending main lines of US action is expected to be the focus of discussion. The Acheson paper has been rapidly produced, with little opportunity for revision. NSC participants will have had the benefit of only brief study and relatively little staffing. The JCS will not have time to establish a formal position. Much of the subject matter has had close examination, however, and there are JCS positions on many features of the problem. Set out in outline form below for some key issues are elements of Mr. Acheson's approach, of the JCS approach, and of a suggested Defense position. I. Nuclear Weapons and the Berlin Problem A. Acheson 1. Credibility of our nuclear deterrent must be restored, by actions. 2. Use of SAC transcends and cannot solve the Berlin problem. 3. General nuclear war might grow from initially non-nuclear conflict. 4. US must face this risk, and make it convincing to Soviets. 5. US must be prepared to use whatever force is necessary. 6. US should raise nuclear threshold. 7. Tighter policy control over warhead use is now essential. B. JCS 1. US determination is the main issue. 2. Clear political decision to "go all the way" needed beforehand. 3. Past pattern of manifesting nuclear threat is sound and should be intensified. 4. Visible intent to use large non-nuclear force may cast doubt on our determination. 5. Viable alternatives to general nuclear war being desirable, initial nuclear use should perhaps be restricted to a handful of purely military targets. downgraded AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS: NOT TOP SEGRET declasSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

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    "ocrText": "Item 2\nTOP SECRET\nJune 28, 1961\nBRIEFING PAPER FOR NSC DISCUSSION ON BERLIN\n29 June 1961\nA paper prepared by Mr. Acheson analyzing the Berlin situation\nand recommending main lines of US action is expected to be the focus\nof discussion.\nThe Acheson paper has been rapidly produced, with little\nopportunity for revision. NSC participants will have had the benefit\nof only brief study and relatively little staffing. The JCS will\nnot have time to establish a formal position. Much of the subject\nmatter has had close examination, however, and there are JCS positions\non many features of the problem. Set out in outline form below for\nsome key issues are elements of Mr. Acheson's approach, of the JCS\napproach, and of a suggested Defense position.\nI.\nNuclear Weapons and the Berlin Problem\nA. Acheson\n1.\nCredibility of our nuclear deterrent must be\nrestored, by actions.\n2. Use of SAC transcends and cannot solve the\nBerlin problem.\n3. General nuclear war might grow from initially\nnon-nuclear conflict.\n4.\nUS must face this risk, and make it convincing\nto Soviets.\n5. US must be prepared to use whatever force is\nnecessary.\n6. US should raise nuclear threshold.\n7. Tighter policy control over warhead use is\nnow essential.\nB. JCS\n1.\nUS determination is the main issue.\n2. Clear political decision to \"go all the way\"\nneeded beforehand.\n3. Past pattern of manifesting nuclear threat is\nsound and should be intensified.\n4.\nVisible intent to use large non-nuclear force\nmay cast doubt on our determination.\n5. Viable alternatives to general nuclear war\nbeing desirable, initial nuclear use should\nperhaps be restricted to a handful of purely\nmilitary targets.\ndowngraded AT 12 YEAR\nINTERVALS: NOT\nTOP SEGRET\ndeclasSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10"
}