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{
    "localId": "6037281",
    "label": "Briefing Paper for NSC Discussion on Berlin, 29 June 1961",
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    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037281"
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{
    "id": "6037281",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037281",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Briefing Paper for NSC Discussion on Berlin, 29 June 1961",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037281",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037281",
    "naId": 6037281,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
        }
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    "recordType": "description",
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{
    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/81/372/6037281/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Briefing-Paper-29-June-1961-005.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\naspects of Berlin, the symbolic aspects are profoundly important,\nas the early portions of the paper so powerfully affirm. The\nworld's eyes are on Berlin; governments and publics alike are\nwatching, in allied, and neutral, and unfriendly states. Not\nonly sophisticated statesmen watch, who can perceive the reality\nbehind the appearance of a Soviet gain. There are others, too,\nwhose illusions come easier. To them the appearance of Soviet\ngain is the reality of US loss in a place where we have said we\nwill not lose. The consequence, in terms of our national influence\nabroad vis-a-vis the Soviets', is no different whether our loss\nbe real or only apparent.\n2. More specifically, we must for psychological as well as\nmilitary reasons be most cautious about arrangements touching on\nAllied garrisons and intelligence activities in Berlin. To\naccept limitations on garrison strength is to imply a tacit\nceiling on the protection offered the West Berliners. It is\nto suggest some Soviet control over the degree of US and NATO\ncommitment to defend them. Psychologically it would disturb those\ntwo and a third million people whose whole pattern of confident\nindustriousness stems from implicit, unexamined faith in the un-\nlimited nature of Allied protection. Militarily a strength limita-\ntion could inhibit somewhat our ability to deal with the possibility\nof disorders and violence by infiltrated goon-squads, and it could\nmake matters awkward as the periodic improvements in organization\nand equipment necessitate unit reorganization.\n3. The impact of US acquiescence in the permanence of the\nOder-Neisse is dealt with rather lightly. West Germany, which\nnow furnishes half NATO's Shield strength and much of its momentum,\nfinds that quite offensive. What would be the cost to NATO and\nour security of this major stride toward formalizing the Soviet\nconsolidation of Eastern Europe, including a pair of Germanies?\nTOP SECRET"
}