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    "localId": "6037283",
    "label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
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    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nI. Foreword\nA. The Nature of the Issue\nThe issue over Berlin, which Khrushchev is now moving\ntoward a crisis to take place, so he says, toward the end\nof 1961, is far more than an issue over that city. It is\nbroader and deeper than even the German question as a whole.\nIt has become an issue of resolution between the U.S.A. and\nthe U.S.S.R., the outcome of which will go far to determine\nthe confidence of Europe -- indeed, of the world -- in the\nUnited States. It is not too much to say that the whole\nposition of the United States is in the balance.\nUntil this conflict of wills is resolved, an attempt\nto solve the Berlin issue by negotiation is worse than a\nwaste of time and energy. It is dangerous. This is so\nbecause what can be accomplished by negotiation depends on\nthe state of mind of Khrushchev and his colleagues.\nAt present, Khrushchev has demonstrated that he believes\nhis will will prevail because the United States and its\nallies will not do what is necessary to stop him. He cannot\nbe persuaded by eloquence or logic, or cajoled by friendliness.\nAs Sir William Hayter has written, \"The only way of changing\n/the Russians'/ purpose is to demonstrate that\nwhat\nthey want to do is not possible.\"\nUntil that demonstration is made, no negotiation can\naccomplish more than to cover with face-saving devices sub-\nmission to Soviet demands.\nOnce the demonstration has been made, negotiation can\nresolve the issue in a number of ways, from face=saving for\na Soviet retreat to mutual concessions on non-vital matters.\nSolutions of this nature are outlined in Chapter III, below.\nTo offer any concessions now, however, will only result\nin an appearance of weakness and real impairment of future\nnegotiating position.\nAmbassador Thompson has stated the principal objectives\nof the Berlin offensive:\n1.\nTo stabilize the regime in East Germany and\nprepare the way for the eventual recognition of\nthe East German regime;\n2.\nTo\nSECRET"
}