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    "localId": "6037283",
    "label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
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        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
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    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n- 7 -\nAlong with these preparations should go constant education as\nto the real nature of the Berlin issue, assertion of our continued\nreadiness to meet and discuss this issue with the Soviets, and frank\nelucidation why basic interests are not negotiable.\nThe preparations, and the subsequent action, suggested here will\nrequire the closest consultation and planning with our allies, first\nwith the British and French and then with all our NATO allies. This\ngovernment should lead the joint planning both in proposals and, more\nimportantly, in action to put them into effect. The British, especially,\nand perhaps the Germans, too, will be more ready to follow action rather\nthan to accept proposals. The latter can be delayed and frustrated by\nendless debate and refinement. Our unilateral action should generally\nbe timed so as to spur decision and action by our allies.\nWe should not argue publicly with our allies if they hesitate\nto go as far and fast in their preparations as we do; this would only\nadvertise divisions in the Western camp. Nor should we decrease the\nextent or speed of our preparations, to correspond to theirs.\nIf it becomes clear that our preparations are causing our allies\nto defect from the basic Western position regarding Berlin, we should,\nf course, reconsider the matter. Barring this eventuality, however,\nwe should move forward vigorously and seek to persuade our allies to\ngo as far as possible with us, rather than join those who will be\nclamoring for a face-saving surrender to Soviet demands.\nSo far as positive help is concerned, the Germans are probably\nthe most important of our allies and the French, for logistic reasons\nif nothing else, second. If West Germany should collapse along the\nway, the Western position would be in bad shape. A \"damage control'\noperation would be in order and should be in the plans. (See Chapter V)\nB. The Stages of Preparatory Action\nPreparatory action should be taken in three stages, increasing\nboth in seriousness and in being pointed directly at the Berlin crisis.\n1. The first stage should be between the Fourth of July and the\nGerman elections on September 17th.\n2. The second stage should be between September 17th and the\nsigning of a USSR-GDR peace treaty.\n3. The third stage should comprise the period between the\nsigning of the peace treaty and the turning over to the GDR of control\nof access to Berlin.\nBy the\nSECRET"
}