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-6 -
II. Preparations
To convince the Soviets that we are in earnest about defending
Berlin we must be in earnest about it.
This means that the military, economic, and political power
needed for this defense should be made ready for use. Measures to
this end should be begun immediately and should be increased over
the time available.
It is not necessary that all military preparations have been
completed by the time that East German personnel are expected to
replace Soviet personnel along the access routes. The use of force
might be deferred for some time after this, while final military
preparations are being completed. This would enable us to avoid steps
which would prematurely raise tensions, at a time when this might
divide the alliance and circumscribe Khrushchev's flexibility in
negotiations -- thus hindering attainment of our basic purpose. The
more drastic of our preparations will be more impressive to Moscow,
and perhaps, have a less disturbing effect on our allies if taken
later on as the crisis deepens, when they will be more S uited to the
immediacy of the threat.
The purpose of the preparatory measures will be twofold: (1) to
put us in a position, at an appropriate time, to use the power necessary
to achieve our purpose; and (2) to convince the Soviets, by the extent
of our preparations and of our commitment, that we have determined to
go to the use of force, including nuclear war, rather than submit.
If these preparations are to have their full and essential
effect, they must be wholly authentic and real. They must not be
affected or deflected by alleged psychological considerations designed
to impress the Russians. Both to impress the Soviets and, later on,
to preserve this nation, the preparations must be as solid and sound
as time permits. The phoney is easily recognized and almost surely
will be disastrous.
We should neither conceal nor dramatize our preparations. To
conceal them would be impossible. To dramatize our preparations
would be self-defeating, both in suggesting to the Soviets that
these preparations were designed primarily for effect and in frightening
our own people, our friends, and neutrals. Announcements should be
made in a low key and related to world tensions rather than to Berlin
alone, so as to avoid giving the appearance of laying down a direct
challenge to Khrushchev on this issue.
Along
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n-6 -\nII. Preparations\nTo convince the Soviets that we are in earnest about defending\nBerlin we must be in earnest about it.\nThis means that the military, economic, and political power\nneeded for this defense should be made ready for use. Measures to\nthis end should be begun immediately and should be increased over\nthe time available.\nIt is not necessary that all military preparations have been\ncompleted by the time that East German personnel are expected to\nreplace Soviet personnel along the access routes. The use of force\nmight be deferred for some time after this, while final military\npreparations are being completed. This would enable us to avoid steps\nwhich would prematurely raise tensions, at a time when this might\ndivide the alliance and circumscribe Khrushchev's flexibility in\nnegotiations -- thus hindering attainment of our basic purpose. The\nmore drastic of our preparations will be more impressive to Moscow,\nand perhaps, have a less disturbing effect on our allies if taken\nlater on as the crisis deepens, when they will be more S uited to the\nimmediacy of the threat.\nThe purpose of the preparatory measures will be twofold: (1) to\nput us in a position, at an appropriate time, to use the power necessary\nto achieve our purpose; and (2) to convince the Soviets, by the extent\nof our preparations and of our commitment, that we have determined to\ngo to the use of force, including nuclear war, rather than submit.\nIf these preparations are to have their full and essential\neffect, they must be wholly authentic and real. They must not be\naffected or deflected by alleged psychological considerations designed\nto impress the Russians. Both to impress the Soviets and, later on,\nto preserve this nation, the preparations must be as solid and sound\nas time permits. The phoney is easily recognized and almost surely\nwill be disastrous.\nWe should neither conceal nor dramatize our preparations. To\nconceal them would be impossible. To dramatize our preparations\nwould be self-defeating, both in suggesting to the Soviets that\nthese preparations were designed primarily for effect and in frightening\nour own people, our friends, and neutrals. Announcements should be\nmade in a low key and related to world tensions rather than to Berlin\nalone, so as to avoid giving the appearance of laying down a direct\nchallenge to Khrushchev on this issue.\nAlong\nSECRET"
}