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    "localId": "6037283",
    "label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
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    "id": "6037283",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-27 em\nthe Communists. The onus for initial use of force would\nhave been clearly placed on them. If they fired on our\naircraft, we would fire on theirs. If thefr ground\nbatteries tried to interdict our airlift, we would attack\nthose batteries from the air. Such an air war would\nalmost certainly end in Western defeat if the Soviets\nthrew in their full strength. If it became clear that\nthis was the Soviet intention, the Western powers should\nabandon the air effort and prepare for a large scale use\nof ground force.\n(d) The GDR might cut off civil ground access.\nIn this case, we could move the civil traffic initially\nby aircraft. There would probably be little political\nsupport in Europe for large scale use of force to move\ngoods and persons on the ground, until the option of air\nmovement had been exhausted. The French have recently\nvoiced this view, which has probably always been the\nBritish position.\nIn starting the civil airlift, we should also move\nto the all-out application of economic ounter=measures\ncutting off trade with the Bloc, and forbidding Bloc\nships and planes from using NATO ports or airfields.\nThe full scale US defense build-up discussed in Chapter\nIII would come into action: X billion would be added to\nthe US defense budget, and US force ceilings would be\nraised appreciably. Our naval vessels would begin shadowing,\ndelaying, and otherwise harassing Bloc shipping, preparatory\nto a full-scale blockade, All these pressures would be\napplied in mounting intensity, if the Communists continued\nto block civil ground access,\nA civil airlift could move enough goods to keep the\nBerlin economy functioning at full blast, unless the\nSoviets resorted to passive counter=measures. In this\nevent allied naval forces would immediately begin to\nblockade the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Soviet\nPacific coast. They would require all Soviet vessels\nseeking\nSECRET"
}