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SECRET
- 32 .
The Soviets would have, of course, achieved one of their
highest objectives for the Berlin operation: They would
have split the alliance. They would not yet, however,
have driven the United States out of Europe.
It might be possible in this moment of extreme disas=
ter and Russian triumph to propose and have accepted a
very large measure of North Atlantic political unity, but
the chances would be heavily against it. The Europeans
might believe that we had brought them to the verge of
annihilation and be unwilling to trust the United States
with the even greater powers which it would gain by
Atlantic union. The people of this country might feel
that our allies had weakened at the vital moment and that
they had no fight in them. Our world position would
suffer heavily.
It should, however, be noted on the other side that
the loss of our prestige and position of leadership would
be much less if our allies showed an unwillingness to
fight than if we, as a government and people, led them in
that submissive direction.
Second Failure might come from the precipitation
of general war before it was necessary, thus losing the
important deterrent effect of the non-nuclear military
measures which had been planned to precede it.
Nuclear war could occur from mischance. In a broader
sense, this is a risk inherent in human nature, in any period
of great tension and crisis. In a more specific sense this
risk is intensified by the possibility, which has already
been mentioned, of premature and unauthorized local use
of nuclear weapons in Europe; this possibility can be
diminished by tightening up custody and control.
Nuclear war could also occur from miscalculation as
to the imminence of the other side's attack. Understandably,
the pressure from those responsible for SAC and its Russian
equivalent will be very great to have the first strike,
and the tendency will be to resolve all doubts in favor
of
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 32 .\nThe Soviets would have, of course, achieved one of their\nhighest objectives for the Berlin operation: They would\nhave split the alliance. They would not yet, however,\nhave driven the United States out of Europe.\nIt might be possible in this moment of extreme disas=\nter and Russian triumph to propose and have accepted a\nvery large measure of North Atlantic political unity, but\nthe chances would be heavily against it. The Europeans\nmight believe that we had brought them to the verge of\nannihilation and be unwilling to trust the United States\nwith the even greater powers which it would gain by\nAtlantic union. The people of this country might feel\nthat our allies had weakened at the vital moment and that\nthey had no fight in them. Our world position would\nsuffer heavily.\nIt should, however, be noted on the other side that\nthe loss of our prestige and position of leadership would\nbe much less if our allies showed an unwillingness to\nfight than if we, as a government and people, led them in\nthat submissive direction.\nSecond Failure might come from the precipitation\nof general war before it was necessary, thus losing the\nimportant deterrent effect of the non-nuclear military\nmeasures which had been planned to precede it.\nNuclear war could occur from mischance. In a broader\nsense, this is a risk inherent in human nature, in any period\nof great tension and crisis. In a more specific sense this\nrisk is intensified by the possibility, which has already\nbeen mentioned, of premature and unauthorized local use\nof nuclear weapons in Europe; this possibility can be\ndiminished by tightening up custody and control.\nNuclear war could also occur from miscalculation as\nto the imminence of the other side's attack. Understandably,\nthe pressure from those responsible for SAC and its Russian\nequivalent will be very great to have the first strike,\nand the tendency will be to resolve all doubts in favor\nof\nSECRET"
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