Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "6037283",
    "label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283"
}

{
    "id": "6037283",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
    "imageCount": 38,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "naId": 6037283,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-027.jpg",
    "mediaId": "23d812a81fec4fdc",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\n- 25 -\nThe difference would be that it would be the East Germans, rather\nthan the Soviets, who would be trying to make the changes. Allied\nunity could probably be more readily secured on defending this\nexisting line than on trying to improve it at the time of a GDR\ntake-over. And parity of treatment for the GDR would be easier\nfor the USSR to accept as an outcome of the crisis, if it had\nbeen deterred and wanted a face-saving \"out\".\nThe East Germans' initial reaction to a pre-treaty announce=\nment by the Western powers along the lines suggested above\n(assuming that negotiations with the USSR had already failed) is\npredictable: They would say that the procedures to be followed\ncould only be détermined in post-treaty negotiations between\nthe Western powers and the sovereign East German regime.\nThe West could not, of course, allow itself to be placed\nin the position of negotiating to secure rights which it already\npossessed -- least of all with a regime which it does not\nrecognize or hold responsible for those rights' fulfillment.\nAt the same time, the West would not want it to appear that\nit was breaking with the Communists over the issue of dealings\nwith the GDR, rather than over the issue of Berlin's freedom.\nThis would be falling into a Communist propaganda trap.\nThe Western powers might, therefore, indicate that\nthey remained willing to negotiate with the USSR about post-\ntreaty Berlin and were willing to inform the GDR of the\nprocedures which they would follow if negotiations did not\nsucceed. The manner of this \"informing\" could be determined\nat the time -- the main object being to choose a manner\nwhich would generate a minimum of divisive doubts and\ndisputes among the Western powers. The proposal for\nreciprocal declarations contemplated in Solution \"C\"\nmight be revived for this purpose.\nBut now suppose that the East Germans reject being\n\"informed\" about procedures, and insist that post-treaty\nprocedures be determined through direct inter=governmental\nnegotiation with the GDR. They might announce that, failing\nsuch negotiation, they would unilaterally specify the new\nprocedures to be followed, and only allow Western military\ntraffic to pass which conformed to these procedures.\nShould\nSECRET"
}