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(a) The Western powers would declare that their rights
and Soviet obligations remained unchanged, that they intended to
keep their forces in West Berlin, and that they would deal with
East German personnel regarding ground and air access on the same
terms as they had previously dealt with Soviet personnel,
(b) The East Germans would declare their intention to
respect existing access procedures, except that these would hence-
forth be performed by German personnel. The Soviets would associate
themselves with this East German declaration,
There would not be much in this for the Soviets: Solution "C"
would merely give them what they could get anyway by telling the
East Germans not to alter existing access procedures after a treaty -
plus the slightly heightened status involved in the GDR being per-
mitted to make a declaration, This is probably not enough to make
a bare-bones Solution "C" negotiable de even with a chastened Khrushchev.
It may be necessary, therefore, to add on some additional face=
saving elements:
you
(a) A Western declaration that espionage and subversive
activities would not be permitted in West Berlin - in return for
a comparable East German statement regarding East Berlin. These
activities in West Berlin are an irritant and potential liability
in terms of world opinion; the damage they do in these respects
probably exceeds any direct benefit, If restraints on these
activities were stated in a unilateral Western declaration, this
would give the Communists less of a pretext for interfering in
the internal life of West Berlin than if the restraints were
stated in a formal agreement,
(b) A Western declaration that no nuclear weapons would
be introduced into West Berlin, (This would be harmless, since
the Western powers have no intention of introducing such weapons.)
(c) A Western declaration that Western forces in Berlin
would not exceed a level approximating their current combat
strength.
(d) Stationing UN observers in Berlin and along the access
routes to inspect and report on fulfillment of the reciprocal
declarations
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 20 em\n(a) The Western powers would declare that their rights\nand Soviet obligations remained unchanged, that they intended to\nkeep their forces in West Berlin, and that they would deal with\nEast German personnel regarding ground and air access on the same\nterms as they had previously dealt with Soviet personnel,\n(b) The East Germans would declare their intention to\nrespect existing access procedures, except that these would hence-\nforth be performed by German personnel. The Soviets would associate\nthemselves with this East German declaration,\nThere would not be much in this for the Soviets: Solution \"C\"\nwould merely give them what they could get anyway by telling the\nEast Germans not to alter existing access procedures after a treaty -\nplus the slightly heightened status involved in the GDR being per-\nmitted to make a declaration, This is probably not enough to make\na bare-bones Solution \"C\" negotiable de even with a chastened Khrushchev.\nIt may be necessary, therefore, to add on some additional face=\nsaving elements:\nyou\n(a) A Western declaration that espionage and subversive\nactivities would not be permitted in West Berlin - in return for\na comparable East German statement regarding East Berlin. These\nactivities in West Berlin are an irritant and potential liability\nin terms of world opinion; the damage they do in these respects\nprobably exceeds any direct benefit, If restraints on these\nactivities were stated in a unilateral Western declaration, this\nwould give the Communists less of a pretext for interfering in\nthe internal life of West Berlin than if the restraints were\nstated in a formal agreement,\n(b) A Western declaration that no nuclear weapons would\nbe introduced into West Berlin, (This would be harmless, since\nthe Western powers have no intention of introducing such weapons.)\n(c) A Western declaration that Western forces in Berlin\nwould not exceed a level approximating their current combat\nstrength.\n(d) Stationing UN observers in Berlin and along the access\nroutes to inspect and report on fulfillment of the reciprocal\ndeclarations\nSECRET"
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