Ask the Scholar
Page 24 of 38
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
SECRET
- 9 -
C. Military Preparations
The military preparations should be of three distinct
types:
1. Preparation of non-nuclear forces for substan-
tial use on the ground and in the air in Europe and on
the high seas. Examples of the actions to be taken to
this end, subject to further military judgment and to
questions of order and priority, are:
(a) Seeko by measures initially short of
partial mobilization, to compress the time needed to
bring necessary units of reserve components to a state
of battle-readiness, so that they could be called up in
the event force had to be used over Berlin. Encourage
our allies similarly to increase the readiness of their
reserves, and offer to help supply such equipment as we
can and as is needed for this purpose.
sling to
(b) Bring US forces in Europe up to full
strength. Try to persuade our allies similarly to raise
the manning levels of their existing forces on the
continento
(c) Move some STRAC and USAF units to Europe,
gradually raising the level of forces there and replacing
the forces despatched there from the US by calling up
Guard and reserve units.
(d) Improve our ability to transport and
deploy additional forces to Europe.
more slip =
(e) Move equipment needed by our forçes in
Europe to the continent, and build up stocks of combat
supplies on the continento
(f) Increase US stocks of non-nuclear
production
ammunition.
(g) There is one further step of the utmost
importance which should be taken in preparing for
substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe: that
is to tighten SACEUR's physical custody and control
over nuclear warheads in Europe. The whole purpose of
a substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe would
be defeated if it should escalate into general nuclear
war by Western action, before this was intended. To
prevent this, it is necessary to ensure that NATO
nuclear
SECRET
Page data
- Page
- 24
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- e4bf783860891b0e
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 6037283
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "6037283",
"label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "6037283",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-003.jpg",
"imageCount": 38,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
"naId": 6037283,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 28,
"logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
"month": 6,
"year": 1961
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 24,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/83/372/6037283/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-15/Memorandum-For-The-President-June-28-1961-011.jpg",
"mediaId": "e4bf783860891b0e",
"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 9 -\nC. Military Preparations\nThe military preparations should be of three distinct\ntypes:\n1. Preparation of non-nuclear forces for substan-\ntial use on the ground and in the air in Europe and on\nthe high seas. Examples of the actions to be taken to\nthis end, subject to further military judgment and to\nquestions of order and priority, are:\n(a) Seeko by measures initially short of\npartial mobilization, to compress the time needed to\nbring necessary units of reserve components to a state\nof battle-readiness, so that they could be called up in\nthe event force had to be used over Berlin. Encourage\nour allies similarly to increase the readiness of their\nreserves, and offer to help supply such equipment as we\ncan and as is needed for this purpose.\nsling to\n(b) Bring US forces in Europe up to full\nstrength. Try to persuade our allies similarly to raise\nthe manning levels of their existing forces on the\ncontinento\n(c) Move some STRAC and USAF units to Europe,\ngradually raising the level of forces there and replacing\nthe forces despatched there from the US by calling up\nGuard and reserve units.\n(d) Improve our ability to transport and\ndeploy additional forces to Europe.\nmore slip =\n(e) Move equipment needed by our forçes in\nEurope to the continent, and build up stocks of combat\nsupplies on the continento\n(f) Increase US stocks of non-nuclear\nproduction\nammunition.\n(g) There is one further step of the utmost\nimportance which should be taken in preparing for\nsubstantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe: that\nis to tighten SACEUR's physical custody and control\nover nuclear warheads in Europe. The whole purpose of\na substantial use of non-nuclear force in Europe would\nbe defeated if it should escalate into general nuclear\nwar by Western action, before this was intended. To\nprevent this, it is necessary to ensure that NATO\nnuclear\nSECRET"
}