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SECRET -14 - 8 2. Economic. Preparations for economic counter- measures should also have considerable deterrent effect. Such measures proved surprisingly effective in response to recent East German pressures on civil access to Berlin. Again, the crux of the matter is a clear allied de- cision that the measures will be adopted. If such a decision is taken at the highest level of the governments concerned, it would be incongruous not to make specific and detailed preparations to give it effect. Failing the decision, however, the preparations will not carry conviction. These economic couter=measures would be designed for execution at the time that East Germany blocked ground access to Berlin. They might include some or all of the following: (a) Cutting off trade between NATO countries and the Bloc. (b) Denying Bloc ships the right to stop in NATO ports. (c) Denying Bloc aircraft the right to touch down in NATO countries. (d) Denying Bloc nationals and goods the right to transit NATO countries or to be transported aboard carriers of NATO countries. The US should lay specific plans for carrying out such measures, insofar as US territory and facilities are con- cerned. It should inform its allies of its intention and propose that they make similar plans. Firm agreement should be sought this summer. 3. Eastern Europe. The Soviets might be deterred from a Berlin crisis if they believed that it would result in greater instability -- rather than stability in Eastern Europe. The US should try to convince the USSR that it would and could, in event of a Berlin crisis, stir up dissidence in East Germany and Eastern Europe. The steps to be taken to instill this conviction are matters of expert judgment, which lies beyond the competence of this report. There are two points to be emphasized: SECRET (a)

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-14 - 8\n2. Economic. Preparations for economic counter-\nmeasures should also have considerable deterrent effect.\nSuch measures proved surprisingly effective in response\nto recent East German pressures on civil access to Berlin.\nAgain, the crux of the matter is a clear allied de-\ncision that the measures will be adopted. If such\na\ndecision is taken at the highest level of the governments\nconcerned, it would be incongruous not to make specific\nand detailed preparations to give it effect. Failing the\ndecision, however, the preparations will not carry conviction.\nThese economic couter=measures would be designed for\nexecution at the time that East Germany blocked ground\naccess to Berlin. They might include some or all of the\nfollowing:\n(a) Cutting off trade between NATO countries\nand the Bloc.\n(b) Denying Bloc ships the right to stop in\nNATO ports.\n(c) Denying Bloc aircraft the right to touch\ndown in NATO countries.\n(d) Denying Bloc nationals and goods the right\nto transit NATO countries or to be transported aboard\ncarriers of NATO countries.\nThe US should lay specific plans for carrying out such\nmeasures, insofar as US territory and facilities are con-\ncerned. It should inform its allies of its intention and\npropose that they make similar plans. Firm agreement should\nbe sought this summer.\n3. Eastern Europe. The Soviets might be deterred from\na Berlin crisis if they believed that it would result in\ngreater instability -- rather than stability in Eastern\nEurope. The US should try to convince the USSR that it would\nand could, in event of a Berlin crisis, stir up dissidence\nin East Germany and Eastern Europe.\nThe steps to be taken to instill this conviction are\nmatters of expert judgment, which lies beyond the competence\nof this report. There are two points to be emphasized:\nSECRET\n(a)"
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