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SECRET
- 2 -
2.
To legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;
3.
To neutralize Berlin as a first step and pre-
pare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;
4.
To weaken if not break up the NATO alliance;
and
5.
To discredit the United States or at least
seriously damage our prestige.
It is plain that, if carried to its conclusion, the
Berlin offensive strikes at the power and world position of
the United States. Even its more limited purposes are gravely
damaging to the United States and the Western Alliance. This
is the nature of the crisis which confronts us; not the fate
of a city, or of its two and one-half million people, or even
the integrity of our pledged word.
So long as issues of the magnitude outlined are sought
by the U.S.S.R., and believed by them to be within their grasp,
real negotiation is impossible. Only by winning the test of
will can we change the Soviets' purpose. Only thus can we
demonstrate that what they want to do is not possible.
B.
The Nature of the Demenstration
West Berlin has been protected, in the last analysis,
by the fear that interference with the city, or with access
to it, would result in war between the United States and the
Soviet Union. War, as used here, means eventually muclear war.
If Khrushchev now contemplates embarking on a course of
interference, and later does so, it means that his fear of
war resulting has declined. He has been queted as saying as
much.
The capability of U.S. nuclear power to devastate the
Soviet Union has not declined over the past two years. The
decline in the effectiveness of the deterrent, therefore, must
lie in a change in Soviet appraisal of U.S. willingness to
go to nuclear war over the issue which Khrushchev reiterates
his determination to present.
This being so, thei problem is how to restore the
credibility of the deterrent -- that is, how to cause
Khrushchev to revise his apparent appraisal of U.S. will-
ingness to resort to muclear war, rather than to submit to
SECRET
Soviet
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 2 -\n2.\nTo legalize the eastern frontiers of Germany;\n3.\nTo neutralize Berlin as a first step and pre-\npare for its eventual take-over by the GDR;\n4.\nTo weaken if not break up the NATO alliance;\nand\n5.\nTo discredit the United States or at least\nseriously damage our prestige.\nIt is plain that, if carried to its conclusion, the\nBerlin offensive strikes at the power and world position of\nthe United States. Even its more limited purposes are gravely\ndamaging to the United States and the Western Alliance. This\nis the nature of the crisis which confronts us; not the fate\nof a city, or of its two and one-half million people, or even\nthe integrity of our pledged word.\nSo long as issues of the magnitude outlined are sought\nby the U.S.S.R., and believed by them to be within their grasp,\nreal negotiation is impossible. Only by winning the test of\nwill can we change the Soviets' purpose. Only thus can we\ndemonstrate that what they want to do is not possible.\nB.\nThe Nature of the Demenstration\nWest Berlin has been protected, in the last analysis,\nby the fear that interference with the city, or with access\nto it, would result in war between the United States and the\nSoviet Union. War, as used here, means eventually muclear war.\nIf Khrushchev now contemplates embarking on a course of\ninterference, and later does so, it means that his fear of\nwar resulting has declined. He has been queted as saying as\nmuch.\nThe capability of U.S. nuclear power to devastate the\nSoviet Union has not declined over the past two years. The\ndecline in the effectiveness of the deterrent, therefore, must\nlie in a change in Soviet appraisal of U.S. willingness to\ngo to nuclear war over the issue which Khrushchev reiterates\nhis determination to present.\nThis being so, thei problem is how to restore the\ncredibility of the deterrent -- that is, how to cause\nKhrushchev to revise his apparent appraisal of U.S. will-\ningness to resort to muclear war, rather than to submit to\nSECRET\nSoviet"
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