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MASSACHUSETTS OF DETEND
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
JCSM-349-60
UNITED STATES OLAMERKA
12 AUG 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)
T5513
1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above,
dated 10 June 1960 requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
furnish you a checklist of those measures which will require
your attention and decision, to include, where appropriate, the
estimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.
2. As a result of action by the U.S. Coordinating Group for
Berlin Contingency Planning on 23 May 1960, a Working Group
composed of representatives from the Department of State, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central
Intelligence Agency have prepared a "Checklist of Possible Mili-
tary and Non-Military Measures - Berlin Contingency Planning."
The primary purpose of this checklist is to comply with the in-
structions of the President resulting from the National Security
Council Meeting of 23 April 1959, and to facilitate the action
of the U.S. Coordinating Group in making recommendations to the
President regarding the selection and timing of appropriate
measures in light of the political-military situation existing
at the time.
3. It is believed that this checklist, forwarded as the
Appendix hereto, provides in large measure the information
requested in the referenced memorandum. The checklist does
not, however, indicate those measures which require your per-
sonal attention and decision inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would apprise you of such matters on a case-by-case
basis as circumstances warrant.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
n.F. minicg N. F. TWINING,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Attachment (20 pages)
/
Copy
of
9
Copies each
of
/
pages series
"A"
SECRET
15307/60
SEC DEF CONT NO 80/
issepte)
SECRET
APPENDIX
CHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES,
BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING
BACKGROUND:
As a result of the 23 April 1959 NSC Meeting, the Presi-
dent approved in principle, Studies related to further Berlin
Contingency Planning under the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin
Contingency Planning. The Group is chaired by the Under Secre-
tary of State for Political Affairs with representatives of the
Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for
NSC Affairs. The President specifically charged this group
with responsibility for "the development of general political,
economic, and Military measures as outlined in the studies,
with particular reference to Selection and Timing, with major
decisions being referred to the President for approval as
necessary."
PURPOSE:
This list has been prepared to facilitate the action of
the U.S. Coordinating Group in making its recommendations to
the President regarding the selection and timing of appropriate
measures in light of the political-military situation at the
time.
EXPLANATION:
1. The list is divided into six groups corresponding with
the possible developments of the Berlin situation, should the
Soviets act in a manner now envisioned. The fact that a par-
ticular measure is listed does not indicate in any way a commit-
ment to carry it out and does not signify any rigidity of
sequence or priority.
SECRET
Appendix
JCSM-349-60
- 1 -
frults
SEC DEF CONT NO 801
SECRET
2. The implementation of any one of the measures listed will
be dependent upon the circumstances. The measures listed in
the check list may be executed singly, in groups, or in any
order not shown in the list.
3. It is anticipated that the attached check list will be
added to as additional measures are planned, specifically in
the area of indirect countermeasures and possible harassment
of German civilian access.
4. The column on the check list, "Approx. Time to Execute
(days)", is construed to be an estimated time to implement a
specific measure once agreement or decision has been reached.
5. The column on the check list, "Responsible U.S. Agency",
is construed to mean the government agency that will have pri-
mary responsibility for implementing the specific measure once
the agreement or decision has been reached.
6. It should be borne in mind that many of these specific
measures will undoubtedly require tripartite agreement prior
to execution or in lieu thereof consultation with or notifica-
tion to tripartite, NATO, or other friendly nations.
7. Covert activities in support of all appropriate measures
will be provided by CIA and other government agencies.
SECRET
Appendix
JCSM-349-60
- 2 -
CHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES
Appendix
A. EAST-WEST TENSION INCREASED AND/OR SOVIET TURN-OVER IMMINENT:
PURPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
1.
Continue efforts to seek tripartite agreement on all de-
Continuing
State
tails of measures implementing 4 April 1959 paper.
2.
Continue close consultation with Congressional leaders and
Variable
State and offi-
frequent reports to the American people by the President
cials concerned
and other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin
situation.
3.
Public relations actions to obtain support for U.S. views
Variable
State, Defense &
Exchange visits by prominent
and to demonstrate U.S. determination.
USIA
Germans, people-to-people ar-
rangements involving U.S.-
Berlin; publications, public
correspondence, etc.
4.
Utilize frequent opportunities to inform leaders of
Variable
State & USIA
State to provide guidance to
friendly and uncommitted countries about the Allied posi-
diplomatic posts through cir-
tion on Berlin and Germany.
cular instructions, texts of
I
important speeches and other
[=]
appropriate background infor-
R
mation. Be alert to accept
and exploit voluntary declara-
[x]
tions of solidarity with Allied
S
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
Appendix
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
aims made by non-Allied free
world leaders, e.g. exploit
opportunities to influence
favorably newly independent
nations particularly those
emerging in Africa.
5.
Conduct a coordinated world-wide information campaign aimed
Variable
State & USIA
Campaign must be carefully
at popularizing positive aspects of the Allied position on
coordinated with our allies,
Berlin and Germany, including self-determination.
particularly the Federal
Republic of Germany.
4
6.
Report to NATO on progress of our planning to extent required.
1-2
State
To maintain a state of readi-
I
ness to approve tripartite actions
and, if necessary, to support
them actively.
7. Provide continuous air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland,
and the U.K. line.
3
JCS
Inform, and/or consult as appro-
priate, Tripartite and NATO
authorities.
8.
Execute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits If Gibraltar
7
JCS
Inform, and/or consult as appro-
and in the Turkish Straits, with visible patrolling.
priate, Tripartite and NATO
authorities.
I
SECRET
AT
9.
Seventh Army to conduct exercises in Central Europe.
5
JCS
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
B
10.
Utilize air corridors at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet.
1
State & JCS
A political decision is re-
I
quired and tripartite and NATO
S
authorities will be informed
and/or consulted prior to execution.
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
Appendix
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
11.
Seventeenth Air Force to conduct exercises in Europe.
2
JCS
12.
Sixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in Central and
1
JCS
Eastern Mediterranean.
13.
Leak the existence of a tripartite military staff responsi-
10
JCS
Other implementing agencies to
ble for tripartite military planning and operations.
be determined after decision
is made to execute.
14.
Conduct a tripartite military exercise which could be
2
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement must be
easily identified with the problem of forcing access
reached.
I
to Berlin via the autobahn.
5
15. Have key military leaders of France, the U.K., U.S., and
2
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement must be
West Germany meet with General Norstad at the time polit-
reached.
ical negotiations over the Berlin issues reach an impasse.
16.
Assemble key tripartite commanders at Paris for readiness
2
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement must be
conference.
reached.
17.
Wighten control over Soviet Bloc personnel at U.S.
2
State & other
As appropriate, seek Tripartite
frontiers, ports, and airports as evidence of increased
U.S. agencies
and NATO cooperation in exten-
caution.
sion of restrictions. Require
additional documentation,
inspection, or other techni-
I
cal requirements to delay or
E
inconvenience Soviet Bloc
R
shipping.
C
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
18
Increase air activity along USSR radar barrier.
2
JCS
S
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
Appendix
Ilo.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
19.
Seek UN Security Council Resolution.
1
State
Tripartite agreement must be
reached. Draft resolution
in hands of West UN Permanent
Representatives. Might need
revision.
20.
Intensify planning for appropriate economic measures.
Variable
State
State will prepare such measures.
21.
When imminent turnover of checkpoints is announced
Variable
State
To be delivered and/or
by the Soviet Government, issue public statement
published at time turnover
covering proposed allied intentions and send note
is officially confirmed,
to Soviet Government.
an agreed draft may be
amended from time to time
and in light of actual
9 I I
Soviet/GDR statements and
actions.
S E R 3 T SECRET
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
B. SOVIETS TURN-OVER TO THE GDR: PURPOSE - TO CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED
Appendix
DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN RIGHTS AND TO FORCE SOVIETS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR
BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
1.
Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or
Appropriate agencies
if not already executed, for implementation.
2.
If turnover occurs without prior announcement by Soviets,
1
State
To be delivered and/or published
dispatch a note to Soviet Government and public statement
at time turn-over is officially
I
covering proposed Allied actions.
confirmed. Agreed draft may be
amended from time to time and in
light of actual Soviet/GDR state-
ments and actions.
3. Establish anti-submarine barrier patrol along Greenland-
14
JCS
Inform tripartite and NATO
Iceland-U.K. line.
authorities, and/or consult as
appropriate, and request U.K.
to maintain Faeroes-U.K. portion
of barrier.
4.
Execute identification, checkpoint, and BASC procedures.
1
State & JCS
Identification and movement order
forms for surface travel on hand
in Berlin and Bonn. Western
E+
BASC controller's statements
SECRET
E
tripartitely agreed.
R
5.
Produce and stockpile appropriate maps.
10
JCS
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
E
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
6.
Bring appropriate U.S. military forces in Europe to full
30
JCS & State
Urge U.K. and France to do like-
strength.
wise. Advise NATO. This selec-
tive reinforcement will seriously
Appendix
degrade the combat effectiveness
of other forces from which these
resources are diverted. There-
fore, consideration must be given
and decision made at this time
as to alternative methods of
building up active duty forces
to compensate for this action.
7.
Place SAC and other selected military forces on a higher
1
JCS
Urge U.K. and France to do like-
degree of alert.
wise. Advise NATO.
I
8.
Suspend normal military personnel rotation policy to and
7
OSD
8
from Europe, and stop dependent travel to Europe.
I
9. Alert selected elements of reserve components as to pos-
5
OSD
sibility of recall, warning them to put personal affairs
in order.
10.
Augment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on
2
JCS
trains and at Allied airfields in Berlin.
11. Initiate tripartite military police patrols of the auto-
2
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement must be
bahn, on a 24-hour basis, announcing tripartite assump-
obtained.
tion of responsibility for traffic to and from Berlin.
12.
Organize all military autobahn traffic to and from
2
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement must be
obtained.
S E R E SECRET T
Berlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed MP's
equipped with two-way communication equipment.
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
13. Increase tripartite utilization of the autobahn and
2
State & JCS
air corridors to Berlin.
Appendix
14. Utilize increased military traffic to Berlin to
Variable
JCS
increase the stockpile of weapons and ammunition.
C. GDR/SOVIET ACTIONS RESULT IN FORMALITIES OR CONTROLS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES:
PURPOSE . TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION
1.
Review foregoing measures for. continuation, reiteration,
or if not already executed, for implementation.
2. If not already under discussion, seek early agreement
2- 5
State
Once initiated would probably
I
with the U.K. and France on precise nature and timing
require continuous consultation
6
of further steps to be taken in the UN, e.g., action
until action completed.
I
in General Assembly.
3. Increase frequency of consultation and reports to NATO
Variable
State
Tripartite agreement is
to insure close support of NATO Allies on all phases
required.
of the Berlin issue.
4.
If appropriate, consult with SEATO, CENTO and/or OAS
Variable
State
to gain support for all phases of proposed allied
action on Berlin.
5. Alert CONUS-based forces for possible deployment
1
JCS
Et
6.
SECRET
Alert appropriate agencies for civil defense readiness.
1
OSD - OCDM
7. Review plans for mobilization of industry.
30
OSD - OCDM
[-]
8. Make known to free world governments, as appropriate,
2
State
Reprisal may include economic
certain U.S. reprisal measures that may be executed.
or limited military measures.
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
9. Conduct global countermeasures to exert pressure on
Variable
State, OSD, JCS,
Tripartite and possibly NATO or
Appendix
Soviets to cease harassments against Berlin.
and other appro-
other regional organizational
priate agencies.
consultation, as appropriate.
10.
Utilize appropriate channels to convince the Soviet
30
OSD, JCS, CIA, AEC,
To be implemented only if
Union that the U.S. has made atomic weapons available
and other appropri-
authorized by proper author-
to the military forces of West Germany and France.
ate agencies.
ity, and if the facts indi-
cate this is a true statement.
11.
Prepare to reinforce EUCOM with appropriate mili-
Variable
JCS
This selective reinforcement
tary forces.
will seriously degrade the com-
bat effectiveness of other forces
from which these resources are
diverted. Therefore, considera-
tion must be given and decision
10 I
made at this time as to alterna-
tive methods of building up
active duty forces to compen-
sate for this action.
12. Move the following military forces under cover of
JCS
rotation, and/or scheduled exercises:
a. Army combat forces augmentation equivalent to
30
division strength with essential logistic units to
Europe.
b. Elements of 2d Fleet to war stations, exercising
10
Size of force dependent upon
from U.K. ports and in Norwegian Sea.
situation at the time.
L
SECRET
E
R
C. Fleet Marine Force augmentation to the
10 - 18
Size of force dependent upon
Mediterranean.
situation at the time.
E
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
d. ASW augmentation forces to Mediterranean.
10 - 18
Size of force dependent upon
situation at the time.
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons
2
to Europe.
Appendix
f. Troop carrier squadrons to Europe.
2
Size of force dependent upon
situation at the time.
13. Hints of the possible nature of resort to force contemplated
10
State, OSD, JCS,
by the Allies should be leaked.
and other appro-
priate agencies.
14. Step-up reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.
7
JCS
15.
Consider the occupation of the Steinstuecken exclave and
2
JCS
Presumably we would want
the exercise of the rights of access thereto.
British to do same with ex-
claves of their sector. Requires
basic decisions as to usefulness
11 I I
and timing.
16. Intensify and coordinate reconnaissance activity
10
JCS
(electronics and visual), hinting at increased techno-
logical capabilities for surveillance.
17. The tripartite military powers in Europe implement
5
State, OSD, & JCS
Tripartite Powers agreement to
appropriate alert measures to include, but not
be secured with information to
limited to:
NATO.
a. Intensification of security against sabotage and
5
subversion.
I
SECRET
E
b. Bringing of air defense systems up to strength.
5
R
c. Reinforcement of frontiers and refugee control.
5
a
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
Appendix
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
d. Implementation of the first stage of the ACE Communi-
2
cations-Electronics Plan.
e. Preparation of selected forces for deployment.
5
18. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place
15
JCS
exercises.
19. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.
10
All appropriate
agencies
20. Control radio traffic over European area to indicate
2
JCS
increased alert.
12 I I
21. Augment and vary pattern of detectable communications
5
JCS
activity.
22.
Increase troop information programs in units.
2
JCS
23. Intensify atomic training of tripartite and other allied
7
State & JCS
Will require tripartite agree-
forces.
ment.
24.
Turkish Forces with U.S. and U.K. submarines to conduct
30
State & JCS
Turkish and U.K. agreement must
exercises in Black Sea and along Turkish Coast within
be reached. NATO informed.
terms of Montreaux Convention.
STORET I 31 R II
25.
Request active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits
10
State
Italian agreement must be
of Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with
reached. NATO informed.
particular attention to submarine activities.
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Appendix
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
26. Increase degree of alert for all combatant commands.
1
JCS
27.
Movement and reinforcement of British, French, and Cerman
Variable
State
military forces.
28.
Take further action to pre-stock airfields.
10
JCS
29.
Resolve, at least temporarily, special weapons storage
Variable
State, OSD, & JCS
problems affecting readiness.
30. Accelerate deployment of missile units to West Germany.
Variable
State & OSD
31.
Issue appropriate maps on a limited scale.
10
JCS
13 I I
32. Arrange for temporary storage of weapons in additional
15
State, OSD, & JCS
delivery units.
33.
Take preliminary steps to arrange for U.S. access to
10
State
foreign ports, staging areas, airfields, communication
facilities, etc.
34. Withdraw military dependents and non-essential personnel
5
State, OSD & JCS
Announce that evacuation is
from West Berlin.
designed to permit forces
greater freedom of action.
35.
Discontinue tourist and non-essential traffic to Europe.
5
State
Tobe executed concurrently
with above item.
E T SECRET
36.
Supplemental funding to meet the requirement imposed by
Variable
OSD
the period of heightened tension.
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
D. UNACCEPTABLE CONTROLS HAVE RESULTED IN INTERRUPTION OR SUSPENSION OF TRAFFIC (AIR OR GROUND):
Appendix
PURPOSE - TO EXECUTE A PROBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE USSR/GDR WILL USE FORCE TO PREVENT
ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
1.
Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,
Appropriate agencies
or if not already executed, for implementation.
2.
Step-up active national defense measures world-wide.
5
JCS
3.
Step-up Civil Defense Measures.
15
OSD & OCDM
14
4.
Final tripartite determination of size and composition of
3
State & JCS
forces to be used in the context of existing political-
military situation.
5.
Promulgate a Presidential declaration of a national
1
White House
Detailed measures of all appro-
emergency.
priate government agencies,
including military measures
in accordance with current
plans, would accompany such
a recommendation.
6.
Initiate appropriate mobilization.
30
OSD
L
SECRET
[-]
7.
Deploy additional forces to Europe.
Variable
JCS
R
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
E
Approx. Time
Appendix
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
8.
Inform NATO in advance, seeking resolution or other
3 - 5
State
Special attention should be
evidence of solidarity in support of contemplated ground
given to problems such action
action.
would raise for BENELUX and, if
necessary, additional consulta-
tion arranged.
9.
Immediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces
2
State
The force will be instructed
into the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this
not to fire unless fired upon.
force will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn
Would be desirable to have
route to Berlin.
U.K. and French Governments
make announcements simultaneously.'
10. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.
2
State
15 I
11.
Withdraw non-essential personnel, including dependents, from
30
State, OSD & JCS
Europe.
12.
Execute appropriate psychological and unconventional warfare
Variable
OSD, JCS, & CIA
operations.
13.
Deploy tripartite force to Helmstedt area.
3
State & JCS
14.
Deploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to
3
JCS
BAOR area.
15.
Step-up and practice alert and combat procedures.
2
JCS
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
SECRET
16.
Improve state of readiness of BACR and RAF/Germany to include
Variable
State
movement of combat service support units, and strategic
reserve from U.K. to continent.
Approx. Time
Appendix
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
17.
Establish air courier service between Paris and major
3
State & JCS
tripartite headquarters in Europe and U.K.
18.
Reinforce ADIZ measures and extend them to the Austrian
2
JCS
border.
19.
Execute aircraft squadron dispersal plan.
2
JCS
20.
Be prepared to execute demolition and mining plans.
1
JCS
21.
Increase border patrol activity and surveillance.
3
JCS and other appro-
priate agencies
16 I I
22.
Execute SAC airborne alert.
1
JCS
23.
Execute the probe.
2
JCS
24. Initiate a garrison airlift if appropriate
2
State and JCS
substitute military for civilian aircraft to
maintain airline services to Berlin.
E-1]
SECRET
3
R
I
S
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Appendix
E. FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND ALLIED TRAFFIC IS STILL OBSTRUCTED:
PURPOSE - TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND TO DEMONSTRATE
ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
1.
Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,
Appropriate Agencies
or if not already executed, for implementation.
2.
Final tripartite determination of the size and composition
3
State & JCS
Tripartite agreement to be
of forces to be used in the context of the existing
reached on decision to execute.
political-military situation.
3.
Seek support of all riendly nations, for contemplated
14
State
17 I 1
substantial military effort.
4.
Review U.S. preparations for rationing.
30
OCDM
5.
Direct unified and specified commanders to implement selected
1
JCS
alert measures contained in their respective alert plans.
6.
Consult and inform friendly nations and allied orgeniza-
14
State
tions, including NATO, SEATO, and CENTO of the seriousness
of the situation and urge they take appropriate action
including selected alert measures.
I
M
7.
Execute electronic countermeasures.
2
JCS
R
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
14
S
Appendix
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
8.
Execute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR
Variable
State-OSD-JCS and
Tripartite and possible NATO
shipping as follows:
other appropriate
or other regional organizational
agencies
consultation, as appropriate.
a. Protracted delay of ship's servicing (bunkering,
provisioning, etc.)
b. Regulate the movement of Bloc ships in Allied
2
ports.
C. Increase charges to Bloc shipping for bunkering,
5
lightering, piloting and repairs in Allied ports.
d. Refuse to charter shipping to Bloc countries.
2
18 I I
e. Intensify surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing
2
fleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.
9.
Partial or complete evacuation of hospital patients
3
JCS
from forward areas in Europe.
10.
Execute operation to reopen access.
3
JCS
S E SECRET T
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
F. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT GENERAL WAR MEASURES*
Appendix
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
(days)
Agency
Remarks
No.
Measure
1.
Review foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,
or if not already executed, for implementation.
Alert Congressional leaders to the imminent likelihood of
2
State, OSD & JCS
The President to inform the
2.
people of the gravity of the
war, and seek Congressional authorization for use of
situation.
forces.
Diplomatic measures to keep all free governments informed
30
State
3.
of allied position.
19 I I
4.
Harass and impose increased security restrictions on Soviet
5
State
military personnel.
2
State-OSD-JCS and
Tripartite and possibly NATO
5.
Refusal of ship's servicing to Bloc shipping.
other appropriate
or other regional organiza-
agencies
tional consultation, as
appropriate.
6.
Take civilian political and economic steps in accordance
15
State, OSD, and
other appropriate
with current plans.
agencies
I
SECRET
E
2
State
Tripartite and possibly NATO
R
7.
Close allied ports to Bloc shipping.
or other regional organiza-
tional consultation, as
appropriate.
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
Approx. Time
to Execute
Responsible U.S.
Appendix
No.
Measure
(days)
Agency
Remarks
8.
Reinforcement of forces on the European continent.
Variable
JCS
9. Mobilize.
60
OSD, JCS, OCDM &
other appropriate
agencies
10. Take any additional and final measures to achieve full
30
All appropriate
U.S. military and civilian defense readiness for
Government agencies
general war.
11.
Present an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.
2-3
State
20 I I
12.
Conduct military operations in accordance with current
3
JCS
plans.
* General War Measures could be unilaterally implemented at
any appropriate time. However, this goes beyond current
tripartite planning.
S E+ [:] [=] &
SECRET
JCSM-349-60
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"ocrText": "MASSACHUSETTS OF DETEND\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nSECRET\nWASHINGTON 25, D.C.\nJCSM-349-60\nUNITED STATES OLAMERKA\n12 AUG 1960\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nSubject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)\nT5513\n1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above,\ndated 10 June 1960 requesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nfurnish you a checklist of those measures which will require\nyour attention and decision, to include, where appropriate, the\nestimated lead time from decision to achievement of capability.\n2. As a result of action by the U.S. Coordinating Group for\nBerlin Contingency Planning on 23 May 1960, a Working Group\ncomposed of representatives from the Department of State, Office\nof the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Central\nIntelligence Agency have prepared a \"Checklist of Possible Mili-\ntary and Non-Military Measures - Berlin Contingency Planning.\"\nThe primary purpose of this checklist is to comply with the in-\nstructions of the President resulting from the National Security\nCouncil Meeting of 23 April 1959, and to facilitate the action\nof the U.S. Coordinating Group in making recommendations to the\nPresident regarding the selection and timing of appropriate\nmeasures in light of the political-military situation existing\nat the time.\n3. It is believed that this checklist, forwarded as the\nAppendix hereto, provides in large measure the information\nrequested in the referenced memorandum. The checklist does\nnot, however, indicate those measures which require your per-\nsonal attention and decision inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of\nStaff would apprise you of such matters on a case-by-case\nbasis as circumstances warrant.\nFor the Joint Chiefs of Staff:\nn.F. minicg N. F. TWINING,\nChairman,\nJoint Chiefs of Staff.\nAttachment (20 pages)\n/\nCopy\nof\n9\nCopies each\nof\n/\npages series\n\"A\"\nSECRET\n15307/60\nSEC DEF CONT NO 80/\nissepte)\nSECRET\nAPPENDIX\nCHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES,\nBERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING\nBACKGROUND:\nAs a result of the 23 April 1959 NSC Meeting, the Presi-\ndent approved in principle, Studies related to further Berlin\nContingency Planning under the U.S. Coordinating Group for Berlin\nContingency Planning. The Group is chaired by the Under Secre-\ntary of State for Political Affairs with representatives of the\nDepartment of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelli-\ngence Agency, and the Special Assistant to the President for\nNSC Affairs. The President specifically charged this group\nwith responsibility for \"the development of general political,\neconomic, and Military measures as outlined in the studies,\nwith particular reference to Selection and Timing, with major\ndecisions being referred to the President for approval as\nnecessary.\"\nPURPOSE:\nThis list has been prepared to facilitate the action of\nthe U.S. Coordinating Group in making its recommendations to\nthe President regarding the selection and timing of appropriate\nmeasures in light of the political-military situation at the\ntime.\nEXPLANATION:\n1. The list is divided into six groups corresponding with\nthe possible developments of the Berlin situation, should the\nSoviets act in a manner now envisioned. The fact that a par-\nticular measure is listed does not indicate in any way a commit-\nment to carry it out and does not signify any rigidity of\nsequence or priority.\nSECRET\nAppendix\nJCSM-349-60\n- 1 -\nfrults\nSEC DEF CONT NO 801\nSECRET\n2. The implementation of any one of the measures listed will\nbe dependent upon the circumstances. The measures listed in\nthe check list may be executed singly, in groups, or in any\norder not shown in the list.\n3. It is anticipated that the attached check list will be\nadded to as additional measures are planned, specifically in\nthe area of indirect countermeasures and possible harassment\nof German civilian access.\n4. The column on the check list, \"Approx. Time to Execute\n(days)\", is construed to be an estimated time to implement a\nspecific measure once agreement or decision has been reached.\n5. The column on the check list, \"Responsible U.S. Agency\",\nis construed to mean the government agency that will have pri-\nmary responsibility for implementing the specific measure once\nthe agreement or decision has been reached.\n6. It should be borne in mind that many of these specific\nmeasures will undoubtedly require tripartite agreement prior\nto execution or in lieu thereof consultation with or notifica-\ntion to tripartite, NATO, or other friendly nations.\n7. Covert activities in support of all appropriate measures\nwill be provided by CIA and other government agencies.\nSECRET\nAppendix\nJCSM-349-60\n- 2 -\nCHECK LIST OF POSSIBLE MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY MEASURES\nAppendix\nA. EAST-WEST TENSION INCREASED AND/OR SOVIET TURN-OVER IMMINENT:\nPURPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n1.\nContinue efforts to seek tripartite agreement on all de-\nContinuing\nState\ntails of measures implementing 4 April 1959 paper.\n2.\nContinue close consultation with Congressional leaders and\nVariable\nState and offi-\nfrequent reports to the American people by the President\ncials concerned\nand other high U.S. officials on the developing Berlin\nsituation.\n3.\nPublic relations actions to obtain support for U.S. views\nVariable\nState, Defense &\nExchange visits by prominent\nand to demonstrate U.S. determination.\nUSIA\nGermans, people-to-people ar-\nrangements involving U.S.-\nBerlin; publications, public\ncorrespondence, etc.\n4.\nUtilize frequent opportunities to inform leaders of\nVariable\nState & USIA\nState to provide guidance to\nfriendly and uncommitted countries about the Allied posi-\ndiplomatic posts through cir-\ntion on Berlin and Germany.\ncular instructions, texts of\nI\nimportant speeches and other\n[=]\nappropriate background infor-\nR\nmation. Be alert to accept\nand exploit voluntary declara-\n[x]\ntions of solidarity with Allied\nS\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nAppendix\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\naims made by non-Allied free\nworld leaders, e.g. exploit\nopportunities to influence\nfavorably newly independent\nnations particularly those\nemerging in Africa.\n5.\nConduct a coordinated world-wide information campaign aimed\nVariable\nState & USIA\nCampaign must be carefully\nat popularizing positive aspects of the Allied position on\ncoordinated with our allies,\nBerlin and Germany, including self-determination.\nparticularly the Federal\nRepublic of Germany.\n4\n6.\nReport to NATO on progress of our planning to extent required.\n1-2\nState\nTo maintain a state of readi-\nI\nness to approve tripartite actions\nand, if necessary, to support\nthem actively.\n7. Provide continuous air surveillance along Greenland, Iceland,\nand the U.K. line.\n3\nJCS\nInform, and/or consult as appro-\npriate, Tripartite and NATO\nauthorities.\n8.\nExecute anti-submarine surveillance at Straits If Gibraltar\n7\nJCS\nInform, and/or consult as appro-\nand in the Turkish Straits, with visible patrolling.\npriate, Tripartite and NATO\nauthorities.\nI\nSECRET\nAT\n9.\nSeventh Army to conduct exercises in Central Europe.\n5\nJCS\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nB\n10.\nUtilize air corridors at altitudes in excess of 10,000 feet.\n1\nState & JCS\nA political decision is re-\nI\nquired and tripartite and NATO\nS\nauthorities will be informed\nand/or consulted prior to execution.\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nAppendix\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n11.\nSeventeenth Air Force to conduct exercises in Europe.\n2\nJCS\n12.\nSixth Fleet to conduct carrier operations in Central and\n1\nJCS\nEastern Mediterranean.\n13.\nLeak the existence of a tripartite military staff responsi-\n10\nJCS\nOther implementing agencies to\nble for tripartite military planning and operations.\nbe determined after decision\nis made to execute.\n14.\nConduct a tripartite military exercise which could be\n2\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement must be\neasily identified with the problem of forcing access\nreached.\nI\nto Berlin via the autobahn.\n5\n15. Have key military leaders of France, the U.K., U.S., and\n2\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement must be\nWest Germany meet with General Norstad at the time polit-\nreached.\nical negotiations over the Berlin issues reach an impasse.\n16.\nAssemble key tripartite commanders at Paris for readiness\n2\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement must be\nconference.\nreached.\n17.\nWighten control over Soviet Bloc personnel at U.S.\n2\nState & other\nAs appropriate, seek Tripartite\nfrontiers, ports, and airports as evidence of increased\nU.S. agencies\nand NATO cooperation in exten-\ncaution.\nsion of restrictions. Require\nadditional documentation,\ninspection, or other techni-\nI\ncal requirements to delay or\nE\ninconvenience Soviet Bloc\nR\nshipping.\nC\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\n18\nIncrease air activity along USSR radar barrier.\n2\nJCS\nS\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nAppendix\nIlo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n19.\nSeek UN Security Council Resolution.\n1\nState\nTripartite agreement must be\nreached. Draft resolution\nin hands of West UN Permanent\nRepresentatives. Might need\nrevision.\n20.\nIntensify planning for appropriate economic measures.\nVariable\nState\nState will prepare such measures.\n21.\nWhen imminent turnover of checkpoints is announced\nVariable\nState\nTo be delivered and/or\nby the Soviet Government, issue public statement\npublished at time turnover\ncovering proposed allied intentions and send note\nis officially confirmed,\nto Soviet Government.\nan agreed draft may be\namended from time to time\nand in light of actual\n9 I I\nSoviet/GDR statements and\nactions.\nS E R 3 T SECRET\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nB. SOVIETS TURN-OVER TO THE GDR: PURPOSE - TO CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED\nAppendix\nDETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN RIGHTS AND TO FORCE SOVIETS TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR\nBASIC RESPONSIBILITIES\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n1.\nReview foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration, or\nAppropriate agencies\nif not already executed, for implementation.\n2.\nIf turnover occurs without prior announcement by Soviets,\n1\nState\nTo be delivered and/or published\ndispatch a note to Soviet Government and public statement\nat time turn-over is officially\nI\ncovering proposed Allied actions.\nconfirmed. Agreed draft may be\namended from time to time and in\nlight of actual Soviet/GDR state-\nments and actions.\n3. Establish anti-submarine barrier patrol along Greenland-\n14\nJCS\nInform tripartite and NATO\nIceland-U.K. line.\nauthorities, and/or consult as\nappropriate, and request U.K.\nto maintain Faeroes-U.K. portion\nof barrier.\n4.\nExecute identification, checkpoint, and BASC procedures.\n1\nState & JCS\nIdentification and movement order\nforms for surface travel on hand\nin Berlin and Bonn. Western\nE+\nBASC controller's statements\nSECRET\nE\ntripartitely agreed.\nR\n5.\nProduce and stockpile appropriate maps.\n10\nJCS\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nE\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n6.\nBring appropriate U.S. military forces in Europe to full\n30\nJCS & State\nUrge U.K. and France to do like-\nstrength.\nwise. Advise NATO. This selec-\ntive reinforcement will seriously\nAppendix\ndegrade the combat effectiveness\nof other forces from which these\nresources are diverted. There-\nfore, consideration must be given\nand decision made at this time\nas to alternative methods of\nbuilding up active duty forces\nto compensate for this action.\n7.\nPlace SAC and other selected military forces on a higher\n1\nJCS\nUrge U.K. and France to do like-\ndegree of alert.\nwise. Advise NATO.\nI\n8.\nSuspend normal military personnel rotation policy to and\n7\nOSD\n8\nfrom Europe, and stop dependent travel to Europe.\nI\n9. Alert selected elements of reserve components as to pos-\n5\nOSD\nsibility of recall, warning them to put personal affairs\nin order.\n10.\nAugment military guards at autobahn checkpoints, on\n2\nJCS\ntrains and at Allied airfields in Berlin.\n11. Initiate tripartite military police patrols of the auto-\n2\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement must be\nbahn, on a 24-hour basis, announcing tripartite assump-\nobtained.\ntion of responsibility for traffic to and from Berlin.\n12.\nOrganize all military autobahn traffic to and from\n2\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement must be\nobtained.\nS E R E SECRET T\nBerlin in tripartite convoys escorted by armed MP's\nequipped with two-way communication equipment.\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n13. Increase tripartite utilization of the autobahn and\n2\nState & JCS\nair corridors to Berlin.\nAppendix\n14. Utilize increased military traffic to Berlin to\nVariable\nJCS\nincrease the stockpile of weapons and ammunition.\nC. GDR/SOVIET ACTIONS RESULT IN FORMALITIES OR CONTROLS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES:\nPURPOSE . TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE DETERMINATION\n1.\nReview foregoing measures for. continuation, reiteration,\nor if not already executed, for implementation.\n2. If not already under discussion, seek early agreement\n2- 5\nState\nOnce initiated would probably\nI\nwith the U.K. and France on precise nature and timing\nrequire continuous consultation\n6\nof further steps to be taken in the UN, e.g., action\nuntil action completed.\nI\nin General Assembly.\n3. Increase frequency of consultation and reports to NATO\nVariable\nState\nTripartite agreement is\nto insure close support of NATO Allies on all phases\nrequired.\nof the Berlin issue.\n4.\nIf appropriate, consult with SEATO, CENTO and/or OAS\nVariable\nState\nto gain support for all phases of proposed allied\naction on Berlin.\n5. Alert CONUS-based forces for possible deployment\n1\nJCS\nEt\n6.\nSECRET\nAlert appropriate agencies for civil defense readiness.\n1\nOSD - OCDM\n7. Review plans for mobilization of industry.\n30\nOSD - OCDM\n[-]\n8. Make known to free world governments, as appropriate,\n2\nState\nReprisal may include economic\ncertain U.S. reprisal measures that may be executed.\nor limited military measures.\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n9. Conduct global countermeasures to exert pressure on\nVariable\nState, OSD, JCS,\nTripartite and possibly NATO or\nAppendix\nSoviets to cease harassments against Berlin.\nand other appro-\nother regional organizational\npriate agencies.\nconsultation, as appropriate.\n10.\nUtilize appropriate channels to convince the Soviet\n30\nOSD, JCS, CIA, AEC,\nTo be implemented only if\nUnion that the U.S. has made atomic weapons available\nand other appropri-\nauthorized by proper author-\nto the military forces of West Germany and France.\nate agencies.\nity, and if the facts indi-\ncate this is a true statement.\n11.\nPrepare to reinforce EUCOM with appropriate mili-\nVariable\nJCS\nThis selective reinforcement\ntary forces.\nwill seriously degrade the com-\nbat effectiveness of other forces\nfrom which these resources are\ndiverted. Therefore, considera-\ntion must be given and decision\n10 I\nmade at this time as to alterna-\ntive methods of building up\nactive duty forces to compen-\nsate for this action.\n12. Move the following military forces under cover of\nJCS\nrotation, and/or scheduled exercises:\na. Army combat forces augmentation equivalent to\n30\ndivision strength with essential logistic units to\nEurope.\nb. Elements of 2d Fleet to war stations, exercising\n10\nSize of force dependent upon\nfrom U.K. ports and in Norwegian Sea.\nsituation at the time.\nL\nSECRET\nE\nR\nC. Fleet Marine Force augmentation to the\n10 - 18\nSize of force dependent upon\nMediterranean.\nsituation at the time.\nE\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nd. ASW augmentation forces to Mediterranean.\n10 - 18\nSize of force dependent upon\nsituation at the time.\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\ne. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons\n2\nto Europe.\nAppendix\nf. Troop carrier squadrons to Europe.\n2\nSize of force dependent upon\nsituation at the time.\n13. Hints of the possible nature of resort to force contemplated\n10\nState, OSD, JCS,\nby the Allies should be leaked.\nand other appro-\npriate agencies.\n14. Step-up reconnaissance flights in the air corridors.\n7\nJCS\n15.\nConsider the occupation of the Steinstuecken exclave and\n2\nJCS\nPresumably we would want\nthe exercise of the rights of access thereto.\nBritish to do same with ex-\nclaves of their sector. Requires\nbasic decisions as to usefulness\n11 I I\nand timing.\n16. Intensify and coordinate reconnaissance activity\n10\nJCS\n(electronics and visual), hinting at increased techno-\nlogical capabilities for surveillance.\n17. The tripartite military powers in Europe implement\n5\nState, OSD, & JCS\nTripartite Powers agreement to\nappropriate alert measures to include, but not\nbe secured with information to\nlimited to:\nNATO.\na. Intensification of security against sabotage and\n5\nsubversion.\nI\nSECRET\nE\nb. Bringing of air defense systems up to strength.\n5\nR\nc. Reinforcement of frontiers and refugee control.\n5\na\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nAppendix\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\nd. Implementation of the first stage of the ACE Communi-\n2\ncations-Electronics Plan.\ne. Preparation of selected forces for deployment.\n5\n18. Cancel routine out-of-area exercises and increase in-place\n15\nJCS\nexercises.\n19. Intensify security restrictions on indigenous employees.\n10\nAll appropriate\nagencies\n20. Control radio traffic over European area to indicate\n2\nJCS\nincreased alert.\n12 I I\n21. Augment and vary pattern of detectable communications\n5\nJCS\nactivity.\n22.\nIncrease troop information programs in units.\n2\nJCS\n23. Intensify atomic training of tripartite and other allied\n7\nState & JCS\nWill require tripartite agree-\nforces.\nment.\n24.\nTurkish Forces with U.S. and U.K. submarines to conduct\n30\nState & JCS\nTurkish and U.K. agreement must\nexercises in Black Sea and along Turkish Coast within\nbe reached. NATO informed.\nterms of Montreaux Convention.\nSTORET I 31 R II\n25.\nRequest active patrolling by Italian light forces in Straits\n10\nState\nItalian agreement must be\nof Otranto to maintain surveillance of Albanian ports, with\nreached. NATO informed.\nparticular attention to submarine activities.\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nAppendix\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n26. Increase degree of alert for all combatant commands.\n1\nJCS\n27.\nMovement and reinforcement of British, French, and Cerman\nVariable\nState\nmilitary forces.\n28.\nTake further action to pre-stock airfields.\n10\nJCS\n29.\nResolve, at least temporarily, special weapons storage\nVariable\nState, OSD, & JCS\nproblems affecting readiness.\n30. Accelerate deployment of missile units to West Germany.\nVariable\nState & OSD\n31.\nIssue appropriate maps on a limited scale.\n10\nJCS\n13 I I\n32. Arrange for temporary storage of weapons in additional\n15\nState, OSD, & JCS\ndelivery units.\n33.\nTake preliminary steps to arrange for U.S. access to\n10\nState\nforeign ports, staging areas, airfields, communication\nfacilities, etc.\n34. Withdraw military dependents and non-essential personnel\n5\nState, OSD & JCS\nAnnounce that evacuation is\nfrom West Berlin.\ndesigned to permit forces\ngreater freedom of action.\n35.\nDiscontinue tourist and non-essential traffic to Europe.\n5\nState\nTobe executed concurrently\nwith above item.\nE T SECRET\n36.\nSupplemental funding to meet the requirement imposed by\nVariable\nOSD\nthe period of heightened tension.\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nD. UNACCEPTABLE CONTROLS HAVE RESULTED IN INTERRUPTION OR SUSPENSION OF TRAFFIC (AIR OR GROUND):\nAppendix\nPURPOSE - TO EXECUTE A PROBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE USSR/GDR WILL USE FORCE TO PREVENT\nALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n1.\nReview foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,\nAppropriate agencies\nor if not already executed, for implementation.\n2.\nStep-up active national defense measures world-wide.\n5\nJCS\n3.\nStep-up Civil Defense Measures.\n15\nOSD & OCDM\n14\n4.\nFinal tripartite determination of size and composition of\n3\nState & JCS\nforces to be used in the context of existing political-\nmilitary situation.\n5.\nPromulgate a Presidential declaration of a national\n1\nWhite House\nDetailed measures of all appro-\nemergency.\npriate government agencies,\nincluding military measures\nin accordance with current\nplans, would accompany such\na recommendation.\n6.\nInitiate appropriate mobilization.\n30\nOSD\nL\nSECRET\n[-]\n7.\nDeploy additional forces to Europe.\nVariable\nJCS\nR\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nE\nApprox. Time\nAppendix\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n8.\nInform NATO in advance, seeking resolution or other\n3 - 5\nState\nSpecial attention should be\nevidence of solidarity in support of contemplated ground\ngiven to problems such action\naction.\nwould raise for BENELUX and, if\nnecessary, additional consulta-\ntion arranged.\n9.\nImmediately preceding the entry of the Allied ground forces\n2\nState\nThe force will be instructed\ninto the Soviet zone, the President should announce that this\nnot to fire unless fired upon.\nforce will seek peacefully to transit the established autobahn\nWould be desirable to have\nroute to Berlin.\nU.K. and French Governments\nmake announcements simultaneously.'\n10. Provide advance notice to all friendly governments.\n2\nState\n15 I\n11.\nWithdraw non-essential personnel, including dependents, from\n30\nState, OSD & JCS\nEurope.\n12.\nExecute appropriate psychological and unconventional warfare\nVariable\nOSD, JCS, & CIA\noperations.\n13.\nDeploy tripartite force to Helmstedt area.\n3\nState & JCS\n14.\nDeploy northern atomic task force wholly or partially to\n3\nJCS\nBAOR area.\n15.\nStep-up and practice alert and combat procedures.\n2\nJCS\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nSECRET\n16.\nImprove state of readiness of BACR and RAF/Germany to include\nVariable\nState\nmovement of combat service support units, and strategic\nreserve from U.K. to continent.\nApprox. Time\nAppendix\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n17.\nEstablish air courier service between Paris and major\n3\nState & JCS\ntripartite headquarters in Europe and U.K.\n18.\nReinforce ADIZ measures and extend them to the Austrian\n2\nJCS\nborder.\n19.\nExecute aircraft squadron dispersal plan.\n2\nJCS\n20.\nBe prepared to execute demolition and mining plans.\n1\nJCS\n21.\nIncrease border patrol activity and surveillance.\n3\nJCS and other appro-\npriate agencies\n16 I I\n22.\nExecute SAC airborne alert.\n1\nJCS\n23.\nExecute the probe.\n2\nJCS\n24. Initiate a garrison airlift if appropriate\n2\nState and JCS\nsubstitute military for civilian aircraft to\nmaintain airline services to Berlin.\nE-1]\nSECRET\n3\nR\nI\nS\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nAppendix\nE. FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED AND ALLIED TRAFFIC IS STILL OBSTRUCTED:\nPURPOSE - TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO REOPEN ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND TO DEMONSTRATE\nALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR RIGHTS\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n1.\nReview foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,\nAppropriate Agencies\nor if not already executed, for implementation.\n2.\nFinal tripartite determination of the size and composition\n3\nState & JCS\nTripartite agreement to be\nof forces to be used in the context of the existing\nreached on decision to execute.\npolitical-military situation.\n3.\nSeek support of all riendly nations, for contemplated\n14\nState\n17 I 1\nsubstantial military effort.\n4.\nReview U.S. preparations for rationing.\n30\nOCDM\n5.\nDirect unified and specified commanders to implement selected\n1\nJCS\nalert measures contained in their respective alert plans.\n6.\nConsult and inform friendly nations and allied orgeniza-\n14\nState\ntions, including NATO, SEATO, and CENTO of the seriousness\nof the situation and urge they take appropriate action\nincluding selected alert measures.\nI\nM\n7.\nExecute electronic countermeasures.\n2\nJCS\nR\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\n14\nS\nAppendix\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n8.\nExecute naval countermeasures against Soviet and GDR\nVariable\nState-OSD-JCS and\nTripartite and possible NATO\nshipping as follows:\nother appropriate\nor other regional organizational\nagencies\nconsultation, as appropriate.\na. Protracted delay of ship's servicing (bunkering,\nprovisioning, etc.)\nb. Regulate the movement of Bloc ships in Allied\n2\nports.\nC. Increase charges to Bloc shipping for bunkering,\n5\nlightering, piloting and repairs in Allied ports.\nd. Refuse to charter shipping to Bloc countries.\n2\n18 I I\ne. Intensify surveillance of Soviet Bloc fishing\n2\nfleets in North Atlantic and North Pacific.\n9.\nPartial or complete evacuation of hospital patients\n3\nJCS\nfrom forward areas in Europe.\n10.\nExecute operation to reopen access.\n3\nJCS\nS E SECRET T\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nF. DECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT GENERAL WAR MEASURES*\nAppendix\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\nNo.\nMeasure\n1.\nReview foregoing measures for continuation, reiteration,\nor if not already executed, for implementation.\nAlert Congressional leaders to the imminent likelihood of\n2\nState, OSD & JCS\nThe President to inform the\n2.\npeople of the gravity of the\nwar, and seek Congressional authorization for use of\nsituation.\nforces.\nDiplomatic measures to keep all free governments informed\n30\nState\n3.\nof allied position.\n19 I I\n4.\nHarass and impose increased security restrictions on Soviet\n5\nState\nmilitary personnel.\n2\nState-OSD-JCS and\nTripartite and possibly NATO\n5.\nRefusal of ship's servicing to Bloc shipping.\nother appropriate\nor other regional organiza-\nagencies\ntional consultation, as\nappropriate.\n6.\nTake civilian political and economic steps in accordance\n15\nState, OSD, and\nother appropriate\nwith current plans.\nagencies\nI\nSECRET\nE\n2\nState\nTripartite and possibly NATO\nR\n7.\nClose allied ports to Bloc shipping.\nor other regional organiza-\ntional consultation, as\nappropriate.\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60\nApprox. Time\nto Execute\nResponsible U.S.\nAppendix\nNo.\nMeasure\n(days)\nAgency\nRemarks\n8.\nReinforcement of forces on the European continent.\nVariable\nJCS\n9. Mobilize.\n60\nOSD, JCS, OCDM &\nother appropriate\nagencies\n10. Take any additional and final measures to achieve full\n30\nAll appropriate\nU.S. military and civilian defense readiness for\nGovernment agencies\ngeneral war.\n11.\nPresent an ultimatum to the Soviet Government.\n2-3\nState\n20 I I\n12.\nConduct military operations in accordance with current\n3\nJCS\nplans.\n* General War Measures could be unilaterally implemented at\nany appropriate time. However, this goes beyond current\ntripartite planning.\nS E+ [:] [=] &\nSECRET\nJCSM-349-60"
}