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CORRESPONDING
MILITARY MEASURES
POLITICAL MEASURES
REMARKS
7. Air Actions
Air Force and Naval Air actions which can be
taken to demonstrate US resolve and determina-
tion:
a. Conduct air operations through corridors
a. Executive approval required to
a. Could provoke Soviet in-
to Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet with
cease adherence to self-imposed restric-
terception and possible attrition
fighter escort when appropriate.
tions upon use of corridor airspace.
of aircraft. Equal possibility
transit would be unchallenged.
b. Establish continuous air surveil-
b. Will require some-augmentation
b. Enhance warning of hostile
lance and an ASW barrier patrol along the
of US forces in the Atlantic, and UK
air, or submarine penetrations of
support in providing coverage for UK-
this line.
Greenland-Iceland-UK line.
Faroes portion of the line.
C. None.
c. Enhance deterrence and
C. Augment SAC airborne alert as
provide strategic indication of
deemed necessary.
US resolve.
d. Increase ELINT and photographic sortios
d. - h. Executive approval re-
d. - h. Risk of attrition
around Sino-Soviet periphery.
quired depending upon action to be
and possible capture of US person-
taken.
nel. Risk of Soviet propaganda
gain in UN and world opinion.
e. Resume U-2 flights.
Soviets could respond in kind
over Aretic and Europe. On balance,
1. Increase reconnaissance flights
US will derive net advantage, with
in Berlin air corridors.
public opinion risks offset by
g. Fly-over of Soviet Siberia and Arctic
increased respect for US deter-
mination and improved US intelligence.
stations.
Effort can be sustained for pro-
tracted period or terminated at
h. On selective basis, destroy Soviet
Bloc aircraft which attempt to interfere
our option.
with our operations.
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"ocrText": "CORRESPONDING\nMILITARY MEASURES\nPOLITICAL MEASURES\nREMARKS\n7. Air Actions\nAir Force and Naval Air actions which can be\ntaken to demonstrate US resolve and determina-\ntion:\na. Conduct air operations through corridors\na. Executive approval required to\na. Could provoke Soviet in-\nto Berlin at altitudes above 10,000 feet with\ncease adherence to self-imposed restric-\nterception and possible attrition\nfighter escort when appropriate.\ntions upon use of corridor airspace.\nof aircraft. Equal possibility\ntransit would be unchallenged.\nb. Establish continuous air surveil-\nb. Will require some-augmentation\nb. Enhance warning of hostile\nlance and an ASW barrier patrol along the\nof US forces in the Atlantic, and UK\nair, or submarine penetrations of\nsupport in providing coverage for UK-\nthis line.\nGreenland-Iceland-UK line.\nFaroes portion of the line.\nC. None.\nc. Enhance deterrence and\nC. Augment SAC airborne alert as\nprovide strategic indication of\ndeemed necessary.\nUS resolve.\nd. Increase ELINT and photographic sortios\nd. - h. Executive approval re-\nd. - h. Risk of attrition\naround Sino-Soviet periphery.\nquired depending upon action to be\nand possible capture of US person-\ntaken.\nnel. Risk of Soviet propaganda\ngain in UN and world opinion.\ne. Resume U-2 flights.\nSoviets could respond in kind\nover Aretic and Europe. On balance,\n1. Increase reconnaissance flights\nUS will derive net advantage, with\nin Berlin air corridors.\npublic opinion risks offset by\ng. Fly-over of Soviet Siberia and Arctic\nincreased respect for US deter-\nmination and improved US intelligence.\nstations.\nEffort can be sustained for pro-\ntracted period or terminated at\nh. On selective basis, destroy Soviet\nBloc aircraft which attempt to interfere\nour option.\nwith our operations."
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