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    "localId": "6037286",
    "label": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
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    "id": "6037286",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
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        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
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    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
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        {
            "day": 26,
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    "ocrText": "you\nTOP SECRET\ne. Based on the above figures, the total US and Allied\n1\nforces available by M+4 are estimated to be:\n2\nCountry\nArmy Forces\nAir Force Forces 3\nUS\n13 divisions\n22 wings\n4\nUK\n10 divisions\n19 wings\n5\nFrance\n6 divisions\n12 wings\n6\nFRG\n20 divisions\n10 wings\n7\nTOTAL\n49 divisions\n63 wings\n8\nf. The Navy indicates that the 10 MSTS transports now\n9\nin operation in the Atlantic can move a total of 148,400\n10\ntroops during a four month period. Since it is assumed that\n11\nthis is an administrative move, not forceably opposed by\n12\nthe Russians, the movement of additional men and cargo is\n13\nonly contingent on the charter, requisition, and reactivation 14\nof additional bottoms to carry the required personnel and\n15\ntonnage. The sealift capability can be increased to more\n16\nthan meet the total contemplated lift requirements.\nAir-\n17\nlift would be available to handle priority movements and\n18\nadvance echelons.\n19\n3. Soviet Capabilities. The Russians presently have 20\n20\nDivisions in East Germany. It is estimated that they have the\n21\ncapability of reinforcing their forces in East Germany at the\n22\nrate of four Divisions per day for the first ten days and\n23\nthree Divisions per day for the remainder of the first month\n24\nafter D-Day for a total of about 128 Divisions. Additionally\n25\nthese Divisions would be supported by 1000 tactical aircraft\n26\npositioned in East Germany and backed by another 2500 tactical\n27\ntype aircraft located in Western USSR alone.\n28\n4. In view of the foregoing, the following points are\n29\nconsidered appropriate:\n30\na. It is impossible for the US to carry out this operation 31\nwithout necessary Allied cooperation. In addition to pro-\n32\nviding a united front to the Soviets with the attendant\n33\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex to\nAppendix C\nJCSM-431-61\n33"
}