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POR SKORKE
TOP SECRET
recommended to the President for implementation in order both
1
to restore the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and to
2
achieve as early as possible a military posture which would
3
permit the United States and its Allies or the United States
4
unilaterally, to apply substantial nonnuclear force against any
5
Soviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground access to Berlin; and
6
concurrently to prepare for the ultimate risk of general war
7
which such actions involve.
8
5. The sequence of military actions which are envisaged is
9
set forth in Annex C together with corresponding political
10
actions and pertinent remarks with regard to implementation.
11
6. An inspection of the sequence of events in Annex C
12
readily indicates that the actions envisaged amount to a
13
"crash" program within the time limits assumed within this
14
study (i.e., 31 October 1961). However, this aspect does not
15
invalidate the over-all deterrent effect which may be expected
16
from implementation of these measures.
17
7. While the execution of the measures envisaged in
18
Annex C to Appendix A, whether on a US unilateral basis or
19
Allied basis, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect
20
on the Soviets, conceivably it could have an adverse and
21
opposite effect on the Soviet Bloc, i.e., instead of deterring
22
them from a blockade of West Berlin, it could cause them to
23
take military counteractions to pre-empt US and/or Allied
24
efforts to protect West Berlin.
25
8. For example, if the United States and its Allies
26
mobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear ground forces to
27
Europe, as a minimum it may be expected that the Soviet Bloc
28
will respond in kind. In addition, it may be expected that the
29
Soviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of
30
deliberately preparing for aggressive war in Central Europe
31
for the purpose of destroying the German Democrat Republic (GDR) 32
TOP SECRET-
Annex B to
Appendix A
JCSM-431-61
6
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"ocrText": "POR SKORKE\nTOP SECRET\nrecommended to the President for implementation in order both\n1\nto restore the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and to\n2\nachieve as early as possible a military posture which would\n3\npermit the United States and its Allies or the United States\n4\nunilaterally, to apply substantial nonnuclear force against any\n5\nSoviet Bloc attempt to blockade ground access to Berlin; and\n6\nconcurrently to prepare for the ultimate risk of general war\n7\nwhich such actions involve.\n8\n5. The sequence of military actions which are envisaged is\n9\nset forth in Annex C together with corresponding political\n10\nactions and pertinent remarks with regard to implementation.\n11\n6. An inspection of the sequence of events in Annex C\n12\nreadily indicates that the actions envisaged amount to a\n13\n\"crash\" program within the time limits assumed within this\n14\nstudy (i.e., 31 October 1961). However, this aspect does not\n15\ninvalidate the over-all deterrent effect which may be expected\n16\nfrom implementation of these measures.\n17\n7. While the execution of the measures envisaged in\n18\nAnnex C to Appendix A, whether on a US unilateral basis or\n19\nAllied basis, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect\n20\non the Soviets, conceivably it could have an adverse and\n21\nopposite effect on the Soviet Bloc, i.e., instead of deterring\n22\nthem from a blockade of West Berlin, it could cause them to\n23\ntake military counteractions to pre-empt US and/or Allied\n24\nefforts to protect West Berlin.\n25\n8. For example, if the United States and its Allies\n26\nmobilize and deploy additional nonnuclear ground forces to\n27\nEurope, as a minimum it may be expected that the Soviet Bloc\n28\nwill respond in kind. In addition, it may be expected that the\n29\nSoviet Bloc will accuse the United States and the West of\n30\ndeliberately preparing for aggressive war in Central Europe\n31\nfor the purpose of destroying the German Democrat Republic (GDR) 32\nTOP SECRET-\nAnnex B to\nAppendix A\nJCSM-431-61\n6"
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