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more TOP SECRET TAB TO ANNEX TO APPENDIX B CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF ACTION AND SOVIET REACTION 1. The preparations of mounting seriousness taken by the 1 United States and Allies will have alerted the Communist Bloc and 2 they will have intensified efforts to determine the number and 3 disposition of additional US troop units in Europe. 4 2. Since the action taken to block access would most probably 5 be taken subsequent to the signing of a peace treaty between 6 USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the question of 7 the location of Soviet divisions is important. It is possible, 8 after the signing of the treaty for the Soviets, with much fan- 9 fare, to move its divisions out of the GDR. This is unlikely 10 because the existence of the GDR regime appears dependent upon 11 the presence of Soviet divisions, and also because it puts the 12 Soviets in a less advantageous posture for combat in Western 13 Europe. Therefore, it should be assumed that Soviet divisions 14 presently in the GDR will remain generally in their present 15 locations. 16 3. The study forwarded to the Secretary of Defense* on 28 17 April 1961, gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff views of the possiblel8 sequence of US action and Soviet reaction. Although this con- 19 cerned a two-division force probe, the sequence could remain 20 substantially unchanged. If is assumed that the Soviets will sign21 a peace treaty with the GDR before the GDR adopt an intransigient22 attitude over access to Berlin. This appears to be the most 23 likely course of action. However, access to Berlin may not be 24 denied by the GDR for some time after a GDR-Soviet treaty and 25 the United States must be prepared for such an eventuality. 26 27 * JCSM 287-61 Tab to Annex to TOP SECRET Appendix B JCSM-431-61 26

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    "ocrText": "more\nTOP SECRET\nTAB TO ANNEX TO APPENDIX B\nCONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE SEQUENCE OF\nACTION AND SOVIET REACTION\n1. The preparations of mounting seriousness taken by the\n1\nUnited States and Allies will have alerted the Communist Bloc and 2\nthey will have intensified efforts to determine the number and\n3\ndisposition of additional US troop units in Europe.\n4\n2. Since the action taken to block access would most probably\n5\nbe taken subsequent to the signing of a peace treaty between\n6\nUSSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the question of\n7\nthe location of Soviet divisions is important. It is possible,\n8\nafter the signing of the treaty for the Soviets, with much fan-\n9\nfare, to move its divisions out of the GDR. This is unlikely\n10\nbecause the existence of the GDR regime appears dependent upon\n11\nthe presence of Soviet divisions, and also because it puts the\n12\nSoviets in a less advantageous posture for combat in Western\n13\nEurope. Therefore, it should be assumed that Soviet divisions\n14\npresently in the GDR will remain generally in their present\n15\nlocations.\n16\n3. The study forwarded to the Secretary of Defense* on 28\n17\nApril 1961, gives the Joint Chiefs of Staff views of the possiblel8\nsequence of US action and Soviet reaction. Although this con- 19\ncerned a two-division force probe, the sequence could remain\n20\nsubstantially unchanged. If is assumed that the Soviets will sign21\na peace treaty with the GDR before the GDR adopt an intransigient22\nattitude over access to Berlin. This appears to be the most\n23\nlikely course of action. However, access to Berlin may not be\n24\ndenied by the GDR for some time after a GDR-Soviet treaty and\n25\nthe United States must be prepared for such an eventuality.\n26\n27\n* JCSM 287-61\nTab to Annex to\nTOP SECRET\nAppendix B\nJCSM-431-61\n26"
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