Ask the Scholar
Page 29 of 41
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TOP SECRET
safety of seaborne movements against Soviet interference. I
Navy mobilization should be concurrent with the other
Services to bring ships to wartime complements and to pro-
vide the planned ASW augmentation in ships and aircraft
from Ready Reserve.
2. Summary of Capabilities
a.. Present forces in Europe are as follows:
Country
Army Forces
Air Force Forces
US
5 divisions
15 wings
UK
4 divisions
15 wings
(reduced strength)
France
4. divisions
10 wings
FRG
12 divisions
(reduced strength)
10 wings
The forces of UK, France and FRG have a capability for
limited defensive operations and little or no offensive
capability.
b. The current JSCP indicates that during the first
four months of full mobilization after declaration of a
national emergency by the President the US has the capability
of moving 10 Divisions to Europe, including the three STRAC
Divisions and one Marine Div/Wing Team which can be moved
at any time but which normally would be moved during the
first 30 days after mobilization,
c. The US Air Force would move 23 squadrons to Europe
during the first 30 days after mobilization. This includes
the CASF which can be moved at anytime. During this same
period of time Allied contributions to the air force in
Central Europe would amount to an estimated additional 6
wings.
d. It is estimated that by M:4 months our principal Allies
in Western Europe could make the following additional forces
available:
Country
Army Forces
Air Force Forces
UK
6 divisions
4 wings
France
2 divisions
2 wings
FRG
8 divisions
none
TOP SECRET
SHGRE
JCSM-431-61
32
Annex to
Appendix C
Page data
- Page
- 29
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 46aef45292bd1b94
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 6037286
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "6037286",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"imageCount": 41,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "6037286",
"label": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "6037286",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Berlin Contingency Planning (U)",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
"collections": [
"Robert S. McNamara Papers",
"Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
],
"subjects": [
"Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-023.jpg",
"imageCount": 41,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037286",
"naId": 6037286,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 26,
"logicalDate": "1961-06-26",
"month": 6,
"year": 1961
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 29,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/86/372/6037286/content/arcmedia/research/1961-berlin-crisis/932006-3-4-16/Memo-For-SecDef-June-26-1961-037.jpg",
"mediaId": "46aef45292bd1b94",
"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nsafety of seaborne movements against Soviet interference. I\nNavy mobilization should be concurrent with the other\nServices to bring ships to wartime complements and to pro-\nvide the planned ASW augmentation in ships and aircraft\nfrom Ready Reserve.\n2. Summary of Capabilities\na.. Present forces in Europe are as follows:\nCountry\nArmy Forces\nAir Force Forces\nUS\n5 divisions\n15 wings\nUK\n4 divisions\n15 wings\n(reduced strength)\nFrance\n4. divisions\n10 wings\nFRG\n12 divisions\n(reduced strength)\n10 wings\nThe forces of UK, France and FRG have a capability for\nlimited defensive operations and little or no offensive\ncapability.\nb. The current JSCP indicates that during the first\nfour months of full mobilization after declaration of a\nnational emergency by the President the US has the capability\nof moving 10 Divisions to Europe, including the three STRAC\nDivisions and one Marine Div/Wing Team which can be moved\nat any time but which normally would be moved during the\nfirst 30 days after mobilization,\nc. The US Air Force would move 23 squadrons to Europe\nduring the first 30 days after mobilization. This includes\nthe CASF which can be moved at anytime. During this same\nperiod of time Allied contributions to the air force in\nCentral Europe would amount to an estimated additional 6\nwings.\nd. It is estimated that by M:4 months our principal Allies\nin Western Europe could make the following additional forces\navailable:\nCountry\nArmy Forces\nAir Force Forces\nUK\n6 divisions\n4 wings\nFrance\n2 divisions\n2 wings\nFRG\n8 divisions\nnone\nTOP SECRET\nSHGRE\nJCSM-431-61\n32\nAnnex to\nAppendix C"
}