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you TOP SECRET psychological advantages it is necessary to have the use of 1 ports, airbases, staging areas, and assembly areas. As a 2 minimum we must obtain approval by the Federal Republic of 3 Germany and at least tacit agreement by the French and 4 British. It is very apparent that it is to our advantage 5 to obtain the cooperation and participation of as many of 6 our NATO Allies as possible in this operation. 7 b. Another factor which would seriously affect the 8 current capability of the Allied forces, particularly the 9 US Forces, is that capability and concept are based on the 10 use of tactical nuclear weapons rather than matching the 11 Soviets man for man. If the use of these weapons is denied 12 to our own forces, the conventional bomb and artillery 13 support which could be made available for this operation 14 would be far below levels that were employed and considered 15 necessary in Europe during World War II. 16 C. The US Forces that have been mentioned in this study 17 are earmarked in current mobilization plans for deployment 18 to Europe. In addition to these forces the United States 19 has both ground and air forces which are now earmrked for 20 deployment to other areas. These additional forces could 21 be sent to Europe; however, this would have an adverse 22 effect on our world-wide general war posture. 23 d. The equipment and related material needed to 24 initially outfit the additional mobilized forces required 25 in this study must necessarily be drawn from war reserve 26 stocks which are inadequate for a force of this size. 27 Additionally logistical support of deployed forces of this 28 magnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear war would create 29 further critical shortages in certain conventional weapons 30 and ammunition. No reliance can be placed on the war pro- 31 duction base for major items of combat equipment that are not 32 in production on M-Day and in most categories in which 33 TOP SECRET Annex to JCSM-431-61 34

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    "ocrText": "you\nTOP SECRET\npsychological advantages it is necessary to have the use of\n1\nports, airbases, staging areas, and assembly areas. As a\n2\nminimum we must obtain approval by the Federal Republic of\n3\nGermany and at least tacit agreement by the French and\n4\nBritish. It is very apparent that it is to our advantage\n5\nto obtain the cooperation and participation of as many of\n6\nour NATO Allies as possible in this operation.\n7\nb. Another factor which would seriously affect the\n8\ncurrent capability of the Allied forces, particularly the\n9\nUS Forces, is that capability and concept are based on the\n10\nuse of tactical nuclear weapons rather than matching the\n11\nSoviets man for man. If the use of these weapons is denied\n12\nto our own forces, the conventional bomb and artillery\n13\nsupport which could be made available for this operation\n14\nwould be far below levels that were employed and considered\n15\nnecessary in Europe during World War II.\n16\nC. The US Forces that have been mentioned in this study\n17\nare earmarked in current mobilization plans for deployment\n18\nto Europe. In addition to these forces the United States\n19\nhas both ground and air forces which are now earmrked for\n20\ndeployment to other areas. These additional forces could\n21\nbe sent to Europe; however, this would have an adverse\n22\neffect on our world-wide general war posture.\n23\nd. The equipment and related material needed to\n24\ninitially outfit the additional mobilized forces required\n25\nin this study must necessarily be drawn from war reserve\n26\nstocks which are inadequate for a force of this size.\n27\nAdditionally logistical support of deployed forces of this\n28\nmagnitude engaged in an extended nonnuclear war would create\n29\nfurther critical shortages in certain conventional weapons\n30\nand ammunition. No reliance can be placed on the war pro-\n31\nduction base for major items of combat equipment that are not 32\nin production on M-Day and in most categories in which\n33\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex to\nJCSM-431-61\n34"
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