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provides a wide range of actions responsive to the problem of
1
deterring the Soviet Bloc from attempts to blockade access to
2
Berlin. In addition, in their memorandum for the Secretary of
3
Defense dated 13 April 1961, as well as in their memorandum
4
for the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint
5
Chiefs of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist" together
6
with the premise on which it is based, i.e. , accepting the
7
risk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial
8
framework for the development of plans for US and Free World
9
response to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free
10
World access thereto.
11
4. For additional facts see Annex A.
12
DISCUSSION
13
5. For discussion see Annex B.
14
CONCLUSIONS
15
6. It is concluded that:
16
a. The early execution by the United States of the
17
measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the
18
time limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961),
19
would be expected to influence the Soviet decision process
20
regarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only
21
if the necessary political decisions required to implement
22
them have been made. Implicit in such political decisions
23
is the acceptance of the risk of general war.
24
b. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A
25
in most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete
26
Allied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the
27
greatest interest in the Berlin question - the United
28
Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
29
United States action alone is feasible only to the extent
30
that the Allies will permit the use of their national
31
territories and that the action contemplated does not
32
TOP SECRET -
Appendix A
JCSM - -431-61 -
2
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nprovides a wide range of actions responsive to the problem of\n1\ndeterring the Soviet Bloc from attempts to blockade access to\n2\nBerlin. In addition, in their memorandum for the Secretary of\n3\nDefense dated 13 April 1961, as well as in their memorandum\n4\nfor the Secretary of Defense dated 28 April 1961, the Joint\n5\nChiefs of Staff reiterated that the \"Checklist\" together\n6\nwith the premise on which it is based, i.e. , accepting the\n7\nrisk of general war, continues to be a satisfactory initial\n8\nframework for the development of plans for US and Free World\n9\nresponse to any Soviet attempt to take over Berlin or deny Free\n10\nWorld access thereto.\n11\n4. For additional facts see Annex A.\n12\nDISCUSSION\n13\n5. For discussion see Annex B.\n14\nCONCLUSIONS\n15\n6. It is concluded that:\n16\na. The early execution by the United States of the\n17\nmeasures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A, within the\n18\ntime limits assumed in this study (i.e., 31 October 1961),\n19\nwould be expected to influence the Soviet decision process\n20\nregarding Berlin. The military actions can be taken only\n21\nif the necessary political decisions required to implement\n22\nthem have been made. Implicit in such political decisions\n23\nis the acceptance of the risk of general war.\n24\nb. The measures enumerated in Annex C to Appendix A\n25\nin most cases depend for full effectiveness upon complete\n26\nAllied cooperation, particularly by the nations with the\n27\ngreatest interest in the Berlin question - the United\n28\nKingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).\n29\nUnited States action alone is feasible only to the extent\n30\nthat the Allies will permit the use of their national\n31\nterritories and that the action contemplated does not\n32\nTOP SECRET -\nAppendix A\nJCSM - -431-61 -\n2"
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