Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense - Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent (S)
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OCR Page 1 of 16D'D SEGRONT
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(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero
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alert and on a "crash" basis. .
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(2) Sealifted Division ( )
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Troops
Cargo
Movement to Port and)
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Loading Time
6 days
6 days
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Steaming Time
9 days
11 days
15 days
17 days
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b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 7
facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days,
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considering air movement for two battle groups and sea
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movement for the division minus is:
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(1) Army
4,000,000
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(2) Navy
428,500
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(3) Air Force
12,600,000
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Total
$17,028,500
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5. Logisitcal support for the deployed forces would be pro-
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vided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies
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from CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany
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indefinitely, additional logistical support units would be
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required.
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6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of
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airborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however,
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they are not discussed in this paper.
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IMPLICATIONS
7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US
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capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in
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other areas.
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8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM
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units would be required. This would have a serious effect on
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those units in Europe which would be displaced at the major
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training areas.
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9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability
3C.
to support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required
3J.
to execute contingency operations.
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10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.
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11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed
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airlift support of Department of Defense requirements.
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JCSM-385-61
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Appendix B
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