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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nnot\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nNUMBER\nTYPE\n01\ncable\nFrom Helms to HAK\n1/10/69\nB,A\n03\nReport\nSelection of Professional Personnel in CIA\nN/D\nB\n04\nmemo\nto HAK\nn/D\n8\nPeR RAC REVIEW\nSANITIZED\n6/13/2008\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nHAK\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\n11.\n*U.S.GPO:1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nF-ile-Moore\nC4\n19 August 1968\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD\nSUBJECT:\nInterview of General V. Clifton, by Dr. Legere and\nDick Moose, July 29, 1968\nGeneral Clifton's office, Washington, D. C.\nGeneral Clifton had readily agreed to this interview on the\nbasis of a phone call. When we arrived at General Clifton's office\nwe found him very eager to talk. He had set up a tape recorder to\npreserve our conversation for his own records. He explained that\nhe hopes eventually to write a book. Clifton had apparently heard\nof our study from Brom Smith.\nTransition from Eisenhower to Kennedy\nThere was very little interchange between the Kennedy and\nsiie\nEisenhower staffs prior to January 20th, 1961. Eisenhower and Kennedy\niii\nhad met, and McGeorge Bundy had talked some with General Goodpaster.\n0\nHowever, on the morning of January 20th, the new staff assembled and\nstarted \"practically from scratch\" to sort things out.\nClifton confirmed that General Goodpaster, at Kennedy's request,\nhad stayed on to effect a smooth team for Bundy and Clifton. Eventually\nZla,\nGoodpaster's \"secretary of the general staff type functions went to\nZI\nBundy. Clifton observed that Goodpaster under Eisenhower had worn\nmore hats than any man either before or after. He handled practically\nevery type of subject. Bundy slowly began to absorb the Goodpaster\nfunction taking certain papers and saying 'I'll take care of this kind\nof thing from now on.\" The intelligence function exercised by Goodpaster B\nwent to Clifton, working closely with Bundy.\nKennedy and Intelligence\nFor the first ten days of the Kennedy administration, Goodpaster\nbriefed Kennedy, accompanied by Clifton. Differences in style between B,Zo,\nEisenhower and Kennedy became immediately apparent in this period.\nKennedy preferred to read rather than to listen to oral briefings.\nClifton noted in this respect Kennedy's phenomenal reading speed and\nhis unusual powers of retention. Kennedy also wanted more depth of\n21\ninformation than Eisenhower had. He wanted the source documents as\nwell as the summary items. When this occurred, Clifton would go back\nto the agencies for more material. Clifton performed an over-all\nintelligence liaison function which he exercised until General Taylor\ncame on board in August, 1961. Clifton continued to exercise the\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWORKING PAPER\nC4\n2\n2\nprimary briefing function until Kennedy's assassination. Clifton\n11/1\nand Bundy agreed that Clifton would attend the NSC meetings so that\nhe would not duplicate in his intelligence briefing items which the\nPresident heard about in council briefings. The intelligence base\nfrom which Clifton worked consisted of the CIA summary (CIB), two\nState Department summaries, a DIA summary, plus individual summaries\nfrom the services, a small AEC input, and the Watch Committee report.\nTo supplement this regular flow of summary material, Clifton developed P\ncontacts in the individual agencies. These were people who called\nClifton when they had something particularly hot or something too\nsensitive for inclusion in the summaries.\nClifton noted that it was important to have a single contact\npoint for the intelligence agencies at the White House. This was\n1\nespecially true when President Kennedy, after about six months in\noffice, began to travel a little bit more. Clifton initiated the\npractice of having the morning CIA summary sent to the President by\nteletype wherever he was. Eisenhower had not done this. For example,\nwhen word of the construction of the Berlin wall was received, Clifton\nwas the only person out of the national security area with the President.\nHe gave the President the word, and the President talked with the\nSecretary of State within four minutes after Clifton had informed him\nof the event.\nBy February, 1961, President Kennedy felt that he was getting\nmore material from Clifton than he could effectively handle and he\nasked for the preparation of a special booklet which would summarize\nthe material received each morning. A format was devised by Clifton,\nBundy, and Brom Smith consisting of headlines and short blurbs, with\na place for Kennedy to indicate if he wanted more information on a\nparticular subject. The latter feature gave rise to the name \"Checklist\".\nWhen he did, Clifton, in coordination with Bundy, would go back to the\nintelligence agencies for follow-up material, if time was available,\nor alternatively, Bundy and his staff would respond to the President's\nrequest. The Checklist was prepared by CIA between 3 and 4 in the\nmorning in two copies by 7 am. After Kennedy began to use it, he some-\ntimes would call the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense\nM\nabout an item in the Checklist and discover they were unaware of it.\nAs a consequence, the two Secretaries were added to the distribution\nlist as was General Taylor when he joined the White House.\nWhenever possible Clifton would go over the Checklist with Bundy\nthe first thing each morning, and Bundy would give Clifton additional\nmaterial which he and his staff had either selected or had developed\nthemselves. This latter raises an interesting difference between the\nGoodpaster and the Bundy operation. Goodpaster never created memoranda\nCZI\nor analyses of his own; he had always called upon the agencies to do\nthis. (From our subsequent interview with Art McCafferty we confirmed\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWORKING PAPER\nC4\n3\n3\nthat Clifton, Bundy and Brom Smith worked very closely together\non this briefing function and that the potential conflicts and con-\nfusion that might have come from their joint handling of this respon-\nm\nsibility -- a danger alluded to by General Goodpaster -- was avoided\nbecause of the good personal relationships which existed between\nClifton and the others.\nThe Situation Room\nAfter the Bay of Pigs episode, McGeorge Bundy moved from the\nEOB to the White House to be closer to the President so that he could\nB.25\nbe available whenever the President needed him. The President was in\nthe habit of having impromptu meetings. Sometimes Bundy couldn't get\nWM\nfrom the EOB over to the Oval Office for short meetings on brief notice.\nSimultaneously there was a growing recognition of the need for a White\nHouse facility to keep track of fast-breaking developments. Consider- P,W\nations of space and security led them to choose the West Basement. The\nNavy built the Situation Room because it had the funds. (Clifton's\ncomments about the creation of the Situation Room corresponds to Art\nMcCafferty's).\nAs 1961 wore on, the amount of material handled became so large\nthat Clifton could not handle it by himself. This led to more involve-\nment of Bundy and his staff in the information and intelligence area.\nAlso the potential difficulties with separate lines of communication\nbecame more apparent. Clifton stuck very strictly to intelligence\nbusiness, while Bundy and his staff expanded their activities in the ZI,N\nsubstantive operations area. Bundy had enlarged his staff in order\nto be able to respond to the President's requests. As noted, Bundy\nwas preparing his own memoranda, but he did this very carefully. When\nputting together a paper on a subject he very clearly identified his\nown opinion. He would say, in effect, \"Here is the paper you need\nzla,C\nto make the decision. The Secretary of State sees it in this way, and\nthe Secretary of Defense might say the following:\nAfter\na\nmeeting\nto consider such a paper Bundy would do a directive to the departments\nand agencies if the President's decision did not exactly fit the alter-\nnatives in the departmental papers.\nClifton said that crisis intelligence came to be handled apart\nfrom his regular briefings. It went to the President, and to members\nof ExCom (not ExCom as such, but to members of the inner circle).\nClifton was also cut in on this flow.\nIn concluding this portion of the interview, Clifton emphasized\nthe importance of having someone to carry forward the intelligence\nbusiness from one administration to the next and to advise the President OB\non intelligence matters preferably as Goodpaster had done with Kennedy.\nHe also emphasized the importance of having an individual to serve as\n21\na corporate memory in the way that Bromley Smith has.\nCONFIDENTIAL WORKING PAPER\nC4\n4\n4\nJohnson and Intelligence\nWhen he became President, Johnson did away with the regular\nintelligence briefing of the type Kennedy had received. The material\nwhich had previously reached Kennedy in those briefings now went to\nPresident Johnson in his night readings. As a result, no one ever\nB,Zo,u\nknew what he had or had not read. (Comment: \"This seemed consistent\nwith what Art McCafferty had told us concerning the period at which\nKennedy had turned down the Aide's proposal to run the Situation Room.\nThe President's Military Adviser\nGeneral Taylor's study of the Bay of Pigs led the President to\nVVV\nthe conclusion that he needed a military adviser. Clifton suggested\nthe President did not have confidence in the JCS - either the Chairman 20,21,X\nthe following reasons for this conclusion: (1) following the crisis\nor the Chiefs; (2) The Secretary of Defense had not yet worked out\nhis own arrangement or rapport with the JCS. Clifton noted that this\nwas a violent period in their relations. Dr. Legere interjected the\nx6\ncomment that this was the period of the \"71 trombones\"; (3) Both\nKennedy and Bundy understood that the President needed to have the\nX5\n\"five men in uniform\" on his team. Upon taking office, Kennedy said\nhe wanted to get acquainted with the Chiefs and indicated he wanted\nthe Chairman of the Chiefs to regularly attend the NSC and not be\nlimited to an \"advisory\" capacity. The President specifically wanted\nhis own separate contact with the Chiefs and had instructed Clifton\nto work at this liaison activity. Kennedy had told Clifton that he\n(Kennedy) was not well enough acquainted with the military system\nand he didn't know the questions to ask the military and the military\ndidn't know what the President should know; (4) if the President had\nlost confidence in the Chiefs and if they did not communicate well,\nhe needed a means of making up for this, therefore in effect, General\nTaylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.\nThe reaction of the men in uniform to the President after the M\nBay of Bigs was one of suppressed resentment. After the Bay of Pigs,\nMcNamara was a long time in excusing the Chiefs, whereas President\nKennedy had publicly taken the blame.\nNew President Needs Military Adviser: President - JCS Relationship\nClifton said this suggested that any new President should have\na military representative in order to establish and develop his rela-\nO,Zo\ntions with the JCS and to help him at least through the difficult\ninitial period of his Presidency. Clifton noted that President Johnson\nhad not wanted a military aide between him and the Chiefs. Johnson\nZI,X\nhad wanted to work with his two principal secretaries and with Mac-\nBundy. He turned the Departments over to these two men and expected\nvv\nthem to run policy. He noted in passing McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy\nhad invented the Tuesday lunch, and that it had not originally in-\ncluded a military man. President Johnson had felt that the Secretary\n23,X6\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWORKING PAPER\nC4\n5\nS\nof Defense represented the JCS. In time, President Johnson and\nthe Chiefs came to understand each other better and learned how\nto communicate with one another. By the time of the Johnson admin-\nistration, of course, Secretary McNamara had asserted his power\nover the chiefs.\nKennedy and McNamara and the JCS\nKennedy and McNamara had never really agreed over Kennedy's\nrelations with the Chiefs. Kennedy had often sent General Clifton\nrevizo\nto the heads of the respective services and to the Secretaries of the\nServices. McNamara resented the President's reaching beyond him\ndirectly to the services, but had been unable to do anything about\nx5.X6\nit. For example, President Kennedy once instructed Clifton to seek\nthe views of the Army Chief of Staff and the Director of the Selective\nM\nService System, General Hershey, concerning proposed revisions in\nthe draft. He did this although he had already asked McNamara to give\nhim a report on the subject. Clifton was President Kennedy's man\nwith the services. He wanted to know for example \"what the Navy\nreally wants,\" not what McNamara said they needed.\nClifton's position was ticklish not only with the Secretary\nof Defense, but also with the military aides at the White House.\n21\nUltimately, Kennedy designated Clifton as Defense Liaison Officer.\nEisenhower had General Goodpaster but Eisenhower's aides had\nbeen junior officess. Eisenhower knew the military system, but Kennedy\nhad a problem in this respect. Clifton had helped him some, serving\nas more than a mere baggage carrier, but he was not in the position\nto do the kinds of things that a three or four star general that\nTaylor was later able to do.\nWhite House Staff - DOD Relations\nThe foregoing discussion led us to consideration of the question\nof why Bundy and his staff had not been involved with the Defense Depart\nment, why in fact there had been no Defense representative on his staff.\nClifton said that the Kennedy-Bundy group was fascinated with foreign\npolicy but that President Kennedy had not been particularly interested\nZI,X\nin military matters until after the Cuban crisis. Kennedy had not\nrealized to what extent the activities of the Defense Department influ-Zo influ-\nence foreign policy. One of the connections in which this first became\nevident to the Kennedy people was during the Berlin crisis when they\ndiscovered that in order to find out what was going on in Berlin they\nwould have to call a General. Clifton pointed out, nevertheless, that\nB\nKennedy was more aware of Defense potential than the other people\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWORKING PAPER\n6\naround him. Another reason why the Kennedy people had spent less\ntime on Defense was that they had to spend more time on State because\nit was not responsive in a disciplined way, as was the Department of\nDefense under McNamara.\nBundy had dealt directly with McNamara or Gilpatric, rather\nthan dealing with the Defense Department in the same way that he and\nhis staff were dealing with the State Department. In Clifton's opinion\nm\nKennedy and Bundy early on decided to be, collectively, Secretary\nof State. At this point, Clifton digressed briefly and posed the\nquestion: \"Who does an American ambassador represent -- is he the\nPresident's or the State Department's man?\" The President may have\ngiven him his appointment; however, his next job is more likely to\ncome from the State Department. He is therefore divided in loyalty\nand if he wants a next appointment, he had to keep his lines straight\nwith the State Department. Clifton noted that as Vietnam developed,\nour Ambassador to South Vietnam developed a direct link to the Presi-\ndent.\nDr. Legere asked Clifton whether he thought President Kennedy\nhad relied to a great extend on General Taylor for the Defense input\non foreign policy. Clifton's reply was not altogether clear but he\nseemed to feel that Taylor's presence had strengthened the military\naspect of Bundy's summary presentations.\nZo,\nPresident Johnson; upon taking office, had begun by shoving\nthe military away from him. He didn't want to meet with the JCS and\nhe didn't want a Defense Liaison Officer. He preferred to deal with\nZo,\nMcNamara. In this sense, Clifton felt that McNamara had been happier\nwith Johnson than he had been with Kennedy. Toward the last, Johnson\nhad made it clear that any Chief could see him whenever he wanted.\nClifton was present for the presentation of the first Defense\nbudget to President Johnson at the lunch on December 30, 1963. The\nChiefs were present at that occasion as they also were the following\nyear. Along with the Chiefs were Secretary McNamara and Deputy Sec-\nretary Vance. It was Clifton's belief that after 1964 the President\ndealt exclusively with McNamara on the Defense budget.\nIn summary, General Clifton recommends that a new President\nneeds (1) a military advisor and (2) an intelligence advisor.\no,ziy\nClifton intends to pass these ideas to the two nominees.\nR. Moose\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWORKING PAPER\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 01\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT. OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR_A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER 03\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT. OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\nELLIGENCE\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nACENCY CENTRAL\nWASHINGTON, D. C. 20505\nOFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR\nUNITED STATES CR AMERICAN\nMEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry Kissinger\nSUBJECT\n: The Future Role of the White House\nSituation Room\n1. The Situation Room has become, and should remain,\nan operating arm of the Presidency. There are functions which\nmust be carried out in and by the White House, and the Situation\nRoom is the logical organization for these assignments. They\ninclude:\na. Providing a White House terminal for the\n\"hot lines\",\n25X2\nPresidential-action State traffic, the LDX network,\netc.\nb. Providing a channel for the routine dissemina-\ntion of finished intelligence to the President and his\nimmediate personal staff.\nc. Providing an around-the-clock alerting\ncenter for the White House.\n2. These functions are essential; there may be others\nwhich can usefully be performed. On the other hand, President\nJohnson, Mr. Rostow, and the Vietnam war have in combination\ncaused the Situation Room to acquire certain other functions\nwhich can be better performed elsewhere. The White House is\nreceiving, on a routine basis, a considerable flow of raw intel-\nligence reporting--CIA TDCS's, NSA reports and translations,\nPRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF NSC EQUITY\nSECRET\nIS REQUIRED JUS 2/16/2012\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\nDefense Attache reports, routine State traffic. (There is also a\nmassive flow of military operational traffic related to the war. )\nThese materials cannot be properly used without selection and\ninterpretation by trained analysts in a variety of specialties.\nIn fact, this task is the primary mission of the intelligence com-\nmunity in Washington. At the least, the present practice con-\nfuses management lines; worse, it is dangerous and, ultimately,\nexpensive.\n3. If the Situation Room is to serve only the President\nand his immediate senior advisers, this flow of raw intelligence\nshould probably be stopped. The President should receive only\nfinished intelligence, and CIA can undertake to supply his intel-\nligence needs, through the Situation Room, at any time in any\nform. The problem of raw material in the White House becomes\nmuch more complicated, however, if the Situation Room is\nalso to serve the \"NSC Staff\", or whatever apparatus replaces\nit. Normally such a staff will include men of considerable\nsubstantive background, men who would expect and probably\nneed to read selected raw traffic for background. Thus,\ndefinitive arrangements on this aspect of the Situation Room\ncannot be made until we are advised by you as to your staff\nrequirements.\n4. The fact of the Situation Room as an ongoing institu-\ntion becomes a factor in the pattern of White House organization.\nIt provides a source of national security materials for the\nPresident. For these to reach him, however, they must be\nchanneled through one of his senior staff. I assume this officer\nwill either be you or someone designated by you.\n5. On this assumption, the Situation Room will be under\nyour control, but you will need someone to run it for you.\nThere are considerable advantages, both to you and to us, in\nhaving this someone be a CIA professional. The job requires\n-2-\nSECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\ndeep experience at information-handling in support of policy,\nobjectivity in regard to policy issues, and sensitivity both to\nsecurity and to the idiosyncracies of senior government\nofficials. The CIA senior duty officer system turns out in-\ndividuals at the GS-14/15 level with precisely these qualities.\nWith such a man in charge, I could assure you of a professional\noperation, directed at the President's interests (and your own),\nand fully independent of the Departments.\n25X1\n6. In any case, I can assure you the present CIA\nstaffing of the Situation Room is worth the\nit costs\nus. From the White House view, we are the only source of\nproperly trained watch personnel. From our own view, our\npeople profit from the added experience and the broadened\nvariety of assignments the arrangement provides.\nMicharditelm\nRichard Helms\nDirector\n-3-\nSECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-HAK-2-12-3-2\nCAPTAIN ROBERT 0. WELANDER, USN\nPRESENT DUTY: Military Fellowship Program of the Council on Foreign\nRelations\nEDUCATION:\nU. S. Naval Academy, 1945, BS Degree (Naval Science)\ngraduated 22 out of\nAir War College, 1962\n1046\nGeorge Washington University, 1962, MA Degree (Foreign Affairs)\nSUBSPECIALTY: International Affairs (9902P)\nDefense Intelligence (9501P)\nYEAR GROUP:\n1945\nAGE: 44\nHOME STATE: New York\nRELIGION:\nProtestant\nFAMILY STATUS: Married to the former\nPatricia Ann Benson of San Diego, Cal-\nifornia. They have two children; a son\nage 17 and a daughter age 12.\nLANGUAGE:\nFrench\nPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:\nHeight: 72½\"\nWeight: 184 lbs.\nHOBBIES:\nNone\nDECORATIONS: Republic of Viet Nam Navy\nGallantry Medal with Gold\nAnchor (Foreign Award)\nBronze Star\nNavy Commendation Medal\nMeritorious Unit Commendation\n(USS FOX (DLG-33))\nPREVIOUS DUTIES:\nGunnery Officer, USS PURVIS (DD-709)\n7/45 - 3/46\nCommunications Officer, USS CECIL (DD-835)\n3/46 - 6/48\nStudent, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida\n6/48 - 6/49\nStudent, Naval Air Auxiliary Station, Corpus Christi, Texas\n6/49 - 10/49\nGunnery Officer, USS LSMR 401\n10/49 - 6/51\nPost Graduate Student, Naval Intelligence School,\nWashington, D. C.\n7/51 - 6/52\nAssistant Naval Attache, Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand\n6/52 - 7/54\nCommunications Officer, USS BALTIMORE (CS-69)\n10/54 - 5/56\nPersonal Aide and Administrative Assistant to Deputy Chief of\nNaval Operations (Logistics)\n5/56 - 12/57\nAide and Flag Lieutenant, Commander in Chief, U. S.\nPacific Fleet\n1/58 - 8/59\nExecutive Officer, USS EPPERSON (DD-719)\n9/59 - 6/61\nStudent, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama\n6/61 - 8/62\nPREVIOUS DUTIES (Cont'd)\nThis is a particularly significant assignment\nwhich I would like to describe in detail.\nAssistant for Special Projects, Office of the Chief of Naval\ny\nOperations (90)\n6/62 - 6/64\nCommanding Officer, USS SEMMES (DDG-18)\n6/64 - 12/65\nCommanding Officer, USS FOX (DLG-33)\n1/66 - 5/68\nTemporary Assignment as Member of Politico-Military Policy\nDivision, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations\n7/68 - 9/68\nNavy Member, Military Fellowship Program of the Council on\nForeign Relations\n9/68 - present\nFITNESS REPORT EXCERPTS ON CAPTAIN ROBERT 0. WELANDER, USN, 448060/1100\nRear Admiral Ralph W. COUSINS, USN, Commander Carrier Division FIVE/\nCommander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN\n\"Although the period covered by this report is a relatively short one,\nit should be noted that the employment of Captain WELANDER's command, USS\nFOX (DLG-33) was particularly arduous and demanding from every standpoint.\nDuring this time, with the FOX performing both as PIRAZ (CTU 77.0.2) and\nNorth SAR ship in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain WELANDER's performance of duty\nwas outstanding in every respect. From my personal observation I can at-\ntest that Captain WELANDER maintained his ship in superb material condition\nand trained his crew to a high peak of readiness, achieving the very finest\nperformance through the use of the highly technical electronic equipment\nwith which his ship was specially equipped.\nThe FOX made several significant recommendations for improvement in\nPIRAZ procedures. Captain WELANDER also helped develop the Strike Support\nShip concept and FOX was acting in that capacity when our fighters were\nclose-controlled to intercept and destroy two MIG aircraft, a first in TF-\n77 history. Also, Captain WELANDER performed most effectively as SAR com-\nmander, handling fast-moving and dangerous situations in a top-notch manner.\nAs a result of FOX's fine performance in the northern reaches of the\nTonkin Gulf I have recommended the ship for the Navy Unit Commendation.\nIn my opinion Captain WELANDER would make a fine flag officer and I\nearnestly recommend his consideration therefor.\"\nRear Admiral W. V. COMBS, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH\nFleet\n\"Although I have not been able to personally observe Captain WELANDER\nfrequently, I have been in a good position to witness and evaluate the out-\nstanding performance of his ship in her outstanding performance in one of\nthe most demanding assignments in the Tonkin Gulf, that of PIRAZ ship. In\nbrief, as PIRAZ ship it was FOX's responsibility to keep tract of all friend-\n1y air traffic in the Tonkin Gulf-numbering frequently in the hundreds at\nany instance. To successfully command such a sophisticated and complex ship\nas FOX is a challenge in itself to do so with distinction, as Captain WE1-\nANDER has done, in the high tempo and demanding operational environment of\nthe Tonkin Gulf today, is the mark of an outstanding naval officer. In ad-\ndition to PIRAZ Captain WELANDER has commanded FOX equally well in assign-\nment on Northern SAR station. He also is imaginative and productive in the\ndevelopment of new operational concepts which will concurrently more fully\nutilize the great capabilities of his ship and the installed NTDS system\nRear Admiral W. V. COMBS, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH\nFleet (Cont'd)\nand extended range radar. Several such concepts are in the middle stages\nof implementation in SEVENTH Fleet with a resultant substantial improve-\nment in efficiency and effectiveness of the attack career strike force op-\nerations being carried out in the air over the Tonkin Gulf and North Viet-\nnam. Captain WELANDER has demonstrated his outstanding abilities. It is\nnow the Navy's opportunity to benefit further by his assignment to future\ndemanding positions of increasing responsibilities. He is strongly recom-\nmended for early selection to flag rank.\"\nRear Admiral George R. MUSE, USN, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla ELEVEN\n\"Captain WELANDER is without a doubt one of the finest and most compe-\ntent young Captains in the fleet today. His performance of duty as Command-\ning Officer, USS FOX has been outstanding in every respect. He is dedicated\nand highly motivated. Precept and example are the means by which he very\neffectively leads his personnel. This officer is highly respected by seniors\nas well as juniors. He is by nature aggressive, without offending, and in\nhis approach to all problem areas, has the capability of knowing the details\nwithout getting lost in the details, resulting in satisfactory solutions\nto even the most complex of problems. Captain WELANDER is acutely aware\nof the needs of his ship and his personnel, both officer and enlisted, who\nso proudly man her. He leaves no stone unturned in attending to these needs.\nDuring the period of this report, USS FOX has been exposed to a par-\nticularly strenuous schedule which had to be condensed and tight-fitting to\nmeet an unexpected earlier-than-anticipated WestPac deployment. It has\ntaken Captain Welander's dynamic leadership to persevere successfully over\nall obstacles under difficult and demanding conditions. He has personally\nand very effectively directed the planning efforts of the ship in preparing\nfor Ship Qualification Acceptance Trials (SQUAT), Final Acceptance Trials\n(FAT), Post Shakedown Availability (PSA), Shakedown Training and Fleet ex-\nercises. In addition, FOX was exposed to many inspections in preparation\nfor deployment on 7 June 1967. Among these inspections was a Nuclear Weap-\nons Acceptance Inspection, which had to be split up in two sections since\nthe JCS safety rules for ASROC in the DLG 26-Class were not available. FOX\nprevailed beautifully in all the above and enjoys a fine reputation. Since\nCaptain Welander personally directs the efforts of his ship, it is largely\nbecause of his close interest and attention to detail that FOX has enjoyed\nso many successes at this point in her short history. FOX has recently\nheaded West for her first deployment. It is with the knowledge of Captain\nWelander's strong and effective leadership that his Flotilla Commander ex-\npects to hear even greater successes in the future for this fine ship. He\nis complemented by a charming and attractive wife, and together they form\na highly effective husband-wife team. Captain Welander is an officer with\nmarked potential for higher and broader responsibilities and is one who\nshould be among those considered for early selection to Flag Rank.\"\nCaptain William M. MONTGOMERY, USN, Commander Destroyer Division SIX TWO\n\"CDR WELANDER has continued to perform in the same highly professional\nand totally competent manner demonstrated during the previous reporting\nperiod. His exceptional capabilities have again been demonstrated both in\nhis personal achievements and those of his ship.\nSEMMES participated in the highly successful project F/R-69 for which\nperformance she was commended with the participating Task Group. In May\nand early June, during the DOM REP Contingency OPS, CDR WELANDER and SEMMES,\nby magnificient seamanship and superb shiphandling under adverse conditions,\nsaved the derelict merchant ship SS SAN CARLOS from imminent beaching. CDR\nWELANDER was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal for this accomplishment.\nIn July 1965 SEMMES was declared the winner of her second consecutive\nDESRON SIX Battle Efficiency pennant as well as Engineering and Weapons\nDepartmental awards (both second's) for excellence during the FY 1965 com-\npetitive year. This performance is in great measure due to CDR WELANDER's\ninspired personal leadership, as well as to his outstanding professional\nability.\nThe level of CDR WELANDER's performance is amply documented by the\nenclosures hereto (not included with excerpts). The depth of his leader-\nship is further indicated by the wonderful esprit which permeates SEMMES\nand is reflected in a first cruise reenlistment rate above the force \"tar-\nget\", and a 66 percent success rate (including three E-8's) on the last\nenlisted advancement exams.\nIn his collateral duty as Chairman of the DESRON SIX Operations Board\nof Analysis, he has ably directed the efforts of the Squadron Operations\nOfficers in analyzing mutual problems and recommending solutions for the\nSquadron Commander's action, lending his drive and initiative to spark\ntheir effort and his experience and sound judgment as a stabilizing influ-\nence.\nCDR WELANDER is a truly outstanding Naval Officer with immense poten-\ntial for further advancement. He was selected for promotion to Captain\nby the last board to meet. He should soon be a prime candidate for flag\nrank.\"\nRear Admiral H. A. RENKEN, USN, ACNO (General Planning and Programming)\n\"Commander Welander is one of the most able officers of his rank in\nthe Navy. His understanding of Navy problems and his grasp of the proper\nmanner of solving them are extraordinary. He is very convincing in his\noral and written explanations and recommendations. He is a hard and will-\ning worker whose results are invariably outstanding. A great deal of his\ntime has been spent in responding directly to tasks laid upon this office\nby CNO; the satisfaction of CNO with his abilities and performance is\nreflected in the commendatory memorandum appended. He is particularly\nqualified in matters relating to program matters before Congress and the\nOffice of the Secretary of Defense. He has a brilliant mind which he uses\nto the best interests of the Navy. His discretion and loyalty are equalled\nonly by his determination to perform consistently and well. His appearance\nand personal life are above reproach. Commander Welander is destined for\npositions of great importance and responsibility in his future career.\"\nCAPTAIN REMBRANDT CECIL ROBINSON, USN\nPRESENT DUTY: Commander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE\nEDUCATION:\nGeorge Washington University, Bachelor of Arts Degree\nArmed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia\nSUBSPECIALTY: Politico-Military Strategic Planning (9900S)\nYEAR GROUP:\n1944\nHOME OF RECORD: Clearfield, Pennsylvania\nAGE:\n44\nDECORATIONS AND AWARDS:\nDistinguished Service Medal\nFAMILY STATUS: Married the former\nBronze Star Medal with Combat \"V\"\nJoan Dufton of Clearfield, Pennsyl-\nJoint Service Commendation Medal\nvania. They have two sons ages 20\nAmerican Campaign Medal\nand 17.\nEuropean-African-Middle Eastern Campaign\nMedal\nAsiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal\nWorld War II Victory Medal\nRELIGION:\nPROTESTANT\nNavy Occupation Service Medal with \"Europe\"\nand \"Asia\" Clasps\nChina Service Medal\nNational Defense Service Medal\nPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:\nKorean Service Medal\nHeight: 5' 10\"\nUnited Nations Service Medal\nWeight: 180 lbs.\nKorean Presidential Unit Citation\nVietnam Service Medal with Silver Star\nRepublic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with\nDevice (1960-\n)\nNOTES OF DISTINCTION:\nReceived Distinguished Service Medal in 1968 for exceptional service\non the Staff of Commander in Chief Pacific.\nReceived CNO Leadership Award in 1960 for his performance in command\nof USS BERRY (DE-1035).\nEarly selected for promotion to both Commander and Captain.\nPREVIOUS DUTIES:\nFirst Lieutenant, LST-485\n10/44 - 8/46\nNavigation Officer, LST-1032\n9/46 - 12/46\nGunnery Officer, LST-601\n12/46 - 9/47\nExecutive Officer, LST-912\n9/47 - 7/48\nStudent, Naval School General Line, Newport, R.I.\n7/48 - 5/49\nEngineering Officer, USS ENGLISH (DD-696)\n6/49 - 3/52\nHead, Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Program,\nBureau of Naval Personnel\n4/52 - 9/54\nExecutive Officer, USS WALKER (DDE-517)\n10/54 - 8/56\nPREVIOUS DUTIES (CONT'D):\nStudent, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia\n8/56 - 1/57\nAssistant Head, Command Policy Section, Strategic Plans\nDivision, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations\n2/57 - 6/59\nCommanding Officer, USS BERRY (DE-1035)\n8/59 - 11/60\nCommanding Officer, USS BRADFORD (DD-545)\n12/60 - 1/62\nObjective Plans Officer, Strategic Plans Division, Office\nof the Chief of Naval Operations\n2/62 - 8/64\nCommander in Chief Pacific\nAssistant Head, Southeast Asia Plans and Policy Section\n9/64 - 6/65\nExecutive Assistant and Aide\n7/65 - 9/68\nCommander Destroyer Squadron THIRTY-ONE\n9/68 - Present\n2\nEXCERPTS FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF CAPTAIN REMBRANDT C. ROBINSON, USN\n1. Excerpts from Performance Records (Fitness Reports) submitted on\nCaptain ROBINSON while serving as Executive Assistant and Aide to Admiral\nU. S. G. SHARP, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific from July 1965 to Septem-\nber 1968. For his exceptional performance during this period he was awarded\nthe Distinguished Service Medal. (Copy of CINCPAC's recommendation for Dis-\ntinguished Service Medal and Citation attached.)\n\"In summary, this energetic, forceful, brilliant and dedicated officer\nis the best captain with whom I have ever had the pleasure of serving. He\ngives every indication of being one of the great naval leaders.\"\n\"Captain Robinson has continued his superb performance as my closest\npersonal adviser. He is intimately involved in all matters which reach the\nCINC level from my staff and from other echelons. Officers of all ranks and\nall Services constantly seek his advice and counsel. Despite his own heavy\nworkload, he never seems too busy to help them. The smooth and efficient\nfunctioning of my very large staff and indeed the outstanding team work in\nthe Pacific Command as a whole is due in no small measure to Captain Robinson's\ntireless, close attention to the countless matters which the Commander in\nChief must deal with. His understanding and judgment is the type you expect\nof an officer who wears four stars. The wartime direction of the Pacific\nCommand has required constant seven-day week attention. In three years as\nmy Executive Assistant, Captain Robinson has been on a seven-day week with\npractically no time off. The durability of his enthusiastic, completely\ncompetent and spectacular performance under these conditions has been amazing.\nIt would be virtually impossible to duplicate the rich professional back-\nground and experience he has gained during the past three years. He has\naccompanied me to almost every major strategy conference. He has been in\nattendance when I have held sensitive policy discussions with my component\ncommanders and with General Westmoreland and General Bonesteel. He partici-\npated in three presidential meetings in the Pacific, and has read and absorb-\ned almost every command level message and directive concerning the war in\nSoutheast Asia. I can think of no comparable exposure of an officer in the\nfields of strategic and operational planning. During over 600,000 miles\nthat we have traveled together Captain Robinson has become known by all of\nour American Ambassadors in the Far East as well as the military leaders of\nour Asian Allies. He is admired throughout the Pacific.\"\n\"Knowing his exceptional talents, I made a great effort to have him\nassigned as my Executive Assistant. When he took over this assignment, my\nworkload decreased 25 percent. His great intelligence, astute judgment\nand ability to express himself with clarity both orally and in writing make\nhim invaluable to me.\"\n2. Excerpts from performance records while serving in the Strategic Plans\nDivision of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations from February 1962\nto August 1964:\n\"I have watched this young officer for many years engaged both in opera-\ntional commands at sea and in demanding planning jobs ashore and am continu-\nously impressed with this officer's brilliant, outstanding performance, re-\ngardless of the job assigned. His exemplary performance of duty has been and\ncontinues to be characterized by a wide professional background and experience,\nsound judgment, and brilliant intellect coupled with intense initiative, un-\nlimited energy and extraordinary discernment.\" Signed by RADM W.F.A. WENDT, USN\n\"He has the qualifications of intelligence and wisdom and the qualities\nof initiative, industriousness and attention to detail required of the senior\nranks in the Navy. He has the rare capability of doing a truly superlative\njob regardless of the task assigned, the shortness of the deadline, or the\nstress imposed. He shows unusual acuity to separate the important aspects\nfrom the unimportant.\" Signed by RADM W.F.A. WENDT, USN\n(Excerpt from letter to then VADM U.S.G. SHARP from Dr. Thomas C. Schelling\nof Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, regarding the per-\nformance of then Commander ROBINSON as a member of an Interdepartmental Long\nRange Study Group) \"I am sure I need not explain to you what a superbly\nhelpful and reliable colleague he can be. I am also sure that his record\nis replete with evidence of his fitness. But I would like the privilege of\ncontributing to that record.\nCommander Robinson joined the project expressing his readiness to serve\nin whatever capacity I might choose to make use of him. I ended up choosing\nto make use of him in many more ways than I expected at the outset. He was\na full-fledged and responsible member of the group. He was also, frequently,\na source of advice and information to me on how to get things done, and done\nproperly, in an environment that I was not entirely used to. He also perceived\nearly that I needed more reliable administrative support than I had, and he\npersonally took it on himself to remedy that deficiency, did so in a tasteful\nmanner, and proceeded to teach me what a comfort it can be to have an absol-\nutely reliable executive officer.\nIn a group like mine, spending an intensive ten weeks together, personal\nqualities can make a lot of difference. I know that everybody in the group\nliked and appreciated Commander Robinson, and I am sure I am not the only one\nin the group who looks forward to continuing a personal friendship with Comman-\nder Robinson.\nIf I am ever asked to take on another project like that one, I can think\nof only one condition that I would insist on--that I be permitted to ask the\nNavy for Commander Robinson again. \"\n3. Excerpts from performance records while in command of USS BRADFORD\n(DD-545) from December 1960 to January 1962 and USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035)\nfrom August 1959 to November 1960. He was selected for the CNO Leadership\nAward for his performance as Commanding Officer, USS BERRY (DE-1035):\n2\nAs Commanding Officer USS BRADFORD (DD-545) \"In reporting upon CDR\nROBINSON's personal characteristics and performance of duty, one is moved\nto the use of superlatives. He is unquestionably one of the most outstanding\nofficers presently in command of a ship of this Force. His daily performance\nof duty is characterized by tremendous and tireless energy and drive skill-\nfully directed to the achievement and maintenance by his command of the highest\ndegree of readiness, utility, morale and well-being. His ship is smart, taut,\nspotlessly clean throughout and literally ready for inspection at any hour of\nthe day. Discipline, highest morale and pride in the ship are manifest from\nstem to stern. CDR ROBINSON is an exceptionally broad-gauge, brilliantly\ncapable and thoroughly dedicated naval officer, perceptive, resourceful and\ndecisive. I consider it to be in the best interest of the naval service that\nCDR ROBINSON receive an accelerated promotion. \" Signed by Captain John M.\nALFORD, USN\n\"Inasmuch as CDR ROBINSON has command of one of the Pacific Fleets\nmost obsolescent destroyers and is being evaluated in comparison with comman-\nders of our newest missile frigates there is no factor of lucky assignment\noperating in his case. CDR ROBINSON has tremendous energy, excellent judgement,\nexceptional ability, confidence in his own ability, and an appropriate degree\nof humility. His ideas are excellent and he possesses the ability and the push\nto make them work. His officers and men have never worked harder or been\nhappier as evidenced by their high morale, enthusiasm and confidence. CDR\nROBINSON hashad a profound effect for the good on every activity in the BRADFORD\nfrom general mess and wardroom to material and operational readiness. He is\nan articulate speaker and fine writer. He and his family would represent the\nNavy and the United States with distinction in any position. A truly outstand-\ning officer who should be seriously considered and is strongly recommended for\ndeep selection. Signed by Captain B. A. SMITH, USN\nAs Commanding Officer USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035) \"The superlative\nperformance during the Philippine \"goodwill cruise\" and in the \"People-to-\nPeople\" program have contributed in bringing considerable credit and respect\nto the U.S. Navy and improving U.S. Relations in these areas. ROBINSON is a\ndynamic personality; extremely conscientious, industrious and enthusiastic.\nHe runs a very smart ship; the cleanest ship this officer has ever seen.\nROBINSON's dynamic personality is reflected throughout the crew. \"\nSigned by Captain J. P. RIZZA, USN\n\"LCDR Robinson is not only an outstanding officer, but the best in\ngrade I have ever been associated with. His performance and that of his\nship during deployment to the SEVENTH Fleet was spectacular and led me to\nrecommend him for the CNO Leadership Award which was given him. \"\nSigned\nby Rear Admiral J. W. LEVERTON, Jr., USN\nExcerpts from CNO Leadership Award:\n\"It gives me great pleasure to\ninform you that you are the officer selected to receive the Chief of Naval\nOperations Leadership Award for 1960 from among the many outstanding officers\nin the U.S. Pacific Fleet.\nI have noted the outstanding performance of your command in practically\nevery area in which it can be judged. This, of course, is truly the reflec-\ntion of the leadership qualities of the Commanding Officer. General Order\nNo. 21 states that leadership is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of\nhuman understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and\n3\nmanage a group of people successfully. It is significant that you were\nable to achieve the results you did through the elements and aspects of\nleadership contained in this General Order. I am confident that the re-\nsults of your inspirational leadership will be reflected in the character\nof your people and will extend far beyond your present and forthcoming\nassignments\n\"\nSigned by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN\n4\nCOMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC\nFPO SAN FRANCISCO 96610\n00\nSer\n2300\n11 JUN 1968\nFrom:\nCommander in Chief Pacific\nTo:\nSecretary of the Navy (Navy Department Board of\nDecorations and Medals)\nVia:\nChief of Naval Operations\nSubj:\nDistinguished Service Medal; recommendation for\nRef:\n(a) SECNAVINST P1650. 1C\nEncl:\n(1) Proposed Citation\n1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), it is recom-\nmended that Captain Rembrandt C. Robinson, USN, 410647/1100, be\nawarded the Distinguished Service Medal for exceptionally meritorious\nservice and distinguished performance of duty during three wartime\nyears from July 1965 to July 1968 in an assignment of great trust and\nresponsibility.\n2. Captain Robinson assumed duties as Executive Assistant to the\nCommander in Chief at a time when U. S. forces were first being\ncommitted to combat in South Vietnam, when a logistics base in\nSoutheast Asia was practically non-existent, and when our air cam-\npaign against North Vietnam was in its initial stage. Throughout\nthe subsequent force buildup and ensuing conduct of combat operations\nhe served as my principal assistant, closest personal adviser and as\na key member of the staff. His assistance, recommendations and\ncontributions in the field of basic policy formulation and strategic\ndirection of forces have been incisive, professional and in a measure\nof value far beyond his grade or seniority.\n3. Throughout his tenure he demonstrated the finest sense of loyalty\nto me as the Commander in Chief as well as to the many elements of\nthe Pacific Command with which he was in daily contact. His skillful\nassessment of problem areas, his forcefulness, and his perceptive\nvision served as cohesive and motivating forces to the 650 officers on\nthe CINCPAC staff, many of whom sought his advice and counsel on a\nXERO\nXERO\nFinish File Pers-G25\nXERO\nXER\nCOPY\nCOPY\nCOPY\nCOP\ncontinuing basis. His retentive memory and broad professional\nbackground were of incalculable assistance in providing continuity,\ndirection of effort, and imaginative new approaches to staff actions.\nIn the process he instilled in the members of the staff a dedication\nand creativity reflecting much of his own vitality and superior per-\nformance.\n4. His exceptional knowledge and fine judgment are recognized by\nsenior military officers in all Services, as is the imaginative man-\nner in which he exercised the wide latitude I accorded him. A unique\ncombination of tact and executive ability enabled him to execute his\nduties in a forceful and confident manner. His interest, diligence,\nattention to detail, and sheer ability made him invaluable as my\nclosest personal adviser in the development of plans and policy for\nthe execution of the war in Southeast Asia, and in the achievement\nof teamwork and balanced readiness throughout the Pacific Command.\nHe was my personal troubleshooter, expediter and contact with the\nstaff, initiating many measures to improve a smooth and efficient\noperation. His imprint will remain throughout the CINCPAC staff\nfor many years.\n5. With a broad background in the principles, doctrines and pro-\ncedures of joint operations, Captain Robinson made one of his most\nenduring contributions in the field of command relations. Since 1964\nhe has personally drafted and in many cases expedited and guided\nthe preparation of all CINCPAC policies on command arrangements,\ninterpreting each specific situation within the framework of the\nNational Security Act, the Functions Paper, and pertinent directives\nof the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief Pacific. When\ncombat operations commenced in Southeast Asia he was of great\nassistance in the initial drafting and development of my position that\nall allied forces should remain under national command - a policy\nthat has been endorsed repeatedly at the highest levels of government\nduring the past four years. The allied and joint U. S. relationships\nwhich govern combat operations in Southeast Asia are based on the\nprinciples of command set forth by CINCPAC, and are a testimony to\nthe persistent and thorough manner in which Captain Robinson has\nreviewed and helped formulate dozens of operation plans. On one\noccasion he worked in closed session with the American Ambassador,\ndrafting key sections of the terms of reference for the U. S. com-\nmander in Thailand. The final product was approved by me, by the\nJoint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Secretary of Defense without change.\n2\nXERO\nXERO\nFinish File Pers-G25\nXERO\nXEI\nCOPY\nCOPY\nCOPY\ncon\n30\nHis singularly successful efforts to indoctrinate officers of all\nServices in the principles of unified command and the inherent\nService responsibilities within this body of doctrinal policy have\nbeen of great assistance. Combat operations in Southeast Asia\nhave provided a real test of the Unified Command Plan and the\nover-all concept of joint and combined planning and operations.\nWhen a future analysis is made of our wartime command struc-\nture I feel that it will validate these principles of command as\nexercised by the responsible commanders. In large measure\nit will also reflect Captain Robinson's persistent efforts as my\npersonal representative to ensure the proper interaction of these\ncommand arrangements during an unprecedented period in our\nmilitary history.\n6. It would be possible to document countless areas in which\nCaptain Robinson's recommendations contributed directly and\nmaterially to the effective conduct of combat operations by U. S.\nforces in the Pacific. This was nowhere more evident than dur-\ning my inspections to all parts of the command. Captain Robinson\naccompanied me on fifty-two trips, covering over 600, 000 miles.\nHe was in attendance at almost every major strategy conference\nin the Pacific, including three Presidential meetings. Many of\nthe position papers which I took on trips were a product of Captain\nRobinson's perceptive ability to forecast problem areas. He took\ndetailed notes at every stop and during all briefings. His com-\nprehensive trip reports provided the basis of my debriefings for\nthe four-star component commanders, and for follow-on staff\nactions. During these trips he became known to all of our American\nAmbassadors in the Far East as well as the military leaders of our\nAsian allies. He is admired throughout the Pacific.\n7. I am aware that the Distinguished Service Medal normally is\nawarded to individuals at the peak of their careers, and that its\npresentation to officers in the grade of captain is reserved for\ninstances of unusually distinguished service. I have given long\nthought to this action in this light, and consider Captain Robinson's\nperformance to be unsurpassed. He brought to his duties a degree\nof determination, wisdom and consummate professional skill which\ncontributed directly to the efforts of U. S. and allied forces in\nSoutheast Asia and to the over-all Pacific Command. By his\nresourcefulness and devotion to duty throughout an extended and\nsingularly demanding tour in which he worked without leave and\n3\nFinish File Pers-G25\nXERO\nXERO\nXERO\nXEF\nCOPY\nCOPY\nCO\nvirtually without respite for over three years in a position of\ngreat trust and responsibility, he rendered invaluable service\nto his country and upheld the highest traditions of the United\nStates Naval Service. His enduring contributions to the Pacific\nCommand were of a nature normally expected and received from\nflag officers only. I know of no one more deserving of this award.\n8. The facts as contained in the proposed citation are personally\nknown to me.\n9. Captain Robinson has been awarded the Bronze Star Medal\nwith Combat V for service during the Korean War.\n10. The estimated date of his detachment from present assign-\nment is 1 August 1968.\nU.S.G. SHARP\n4\nFinish File Pers-G25\nXERO\nXERO\nXERO\nXE\nCOPY\nCOPY\nCOPY\ncor\nTHE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY\nWASHINGTON\nThe President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting\nthe DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL to\nCAPTAIN REMBRANDT C. ROBINSON\n416647/1100\nUNITED STATES NAVY\nfor service as set forth in the following\nCITATION:\nFor exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United\nStates in a position of great responsibility as Executive Assistant to the\nCommander in Chief Pacific, from July 1965 to July 1968. Exercising\noutstanding professional ability, perception, and creativity, Captain\nRobinson was responsible for providing personal assistance and advice to\nthe Commander in Chief Pacific in matters ranging from current combat\noperations to the long-range aspects of national and international strategy\nand policy. During his tenure, more than 500,000 United States troops\nwere deployed to Southeast Asia and a logistic base superior to any in\nhistory was built to support these forces; other free-world troops were\ndeployed and their capabilities integrated with those of the United States\nand Government of South Vietnam; and U. S. Navy and Air Force forces\nincreased significantly in both strength and firepower. By his interest,\ndiligent attention to detail, and sheer ability, Captain Robinson filled at\nsignificant role in the development of plans and policy for the execution of\nthe conflict in Southeast Asia and in the achievement of teamwork and\nbalanced readiness throughout the Pacific Command. He was singularly\nsuccessful in his efforts to ensure the uniform application of the principles\nof unified command and joint doctrine on all plans and operations during\nan unprecedented period in our military history. As a close personal\nadviser and principal staff assistant to the Commander in Chief Pacific,\nCaptain Robinson provided continuity, direction of effort, and imagination\nto the total scope of staff planning. His professional knowledge, sound\njudgment, organizational ability, and loyal devotion to duty were of inesti-\nmable value to the nation, and reflect great credit upon himself and the\nUnited States Naval Service.\nPERSONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION\nMEDALS & AWARDS BRANCH\nFor the President,\n938-68\nCopy to:\nJUL 08 1968\nCitation Files\nJUL 9 1968\nPers-16 (4)\nAM\nPM\nPAUL R. IGNATIUS\nAll Hands\n789212123456\nSecretary of the Navy\nSecretary of the Navy\nRef: SecNav 1tr of 27 June 68 (bd ser 59361\nFinish File Pers-G25\nXERO\nXERO\nXERO\nCOPY\nCOPY\nXER\nCOPY\nCOP\nCOLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., USA\nPRESENT DUTY: Deputy Commandant, U.S. Corps of Cadets, West Point,\nNew York\nEDUCATION:\nNotre Dame, Indiana College, 1944\nU.S. Military Academy, 1947, BS Degree (Military Science)\nColumbia University, 1955\nNaval War College, 1960\nGeorgetown University, 1962, MA Degree (International\nRelations)\nU.S. Army War College, 1966\nYEAR GROUP:\n1947\nAGE: 44\nHOME STATE: Pennsylvania\nRELIGION:\nRoman Catholic\nFAMILY STATUS: Married to the former\nPatricia A. Fox of Washington, D.C.\nThey have three children; two sons\nages 16 and 15 and a daughter age 11.\nLANGUAGE:\nNone\nPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:\nHeight: 71\"\nWeight: 186 lbs.\nHOBBIES:\nNone\nDECORATIONS:\nDistinguished Service Cross\nSilver Star (1 Oak Leaf\nCluster)\nDistinguished Flying Cross\n(2 Oak Leaf Clusters)\nLegion of Merit (1 Oak Leaf\nCluster)\nBronze Star Medal for Valor\n(1 Oak Leaf Cluster)\nAir Medal (23 Oak Leaf\nClusters)\nArmy Commendation Medal\nPurple Heart\nCombat Infantry Badge\nNational Order of Viet Nam,\n5th Class (Foreign Award)\nGallantry Cross with Palm\n(Foreign Award)\nPREVIOUS DUTIES:\nStudent Officer, The Ground General\nSchool, Ft Riley, Kansas\n6/47 - 1/48\nStudent Officer, The Armored School,\nFt Knox, Kentucky\n1/48 - 8/48\nPREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)\nPlatoon Leader, Troop F, 8th Cavalry,\nFar East Command\n8/48 - 8/48\nPlatoon Leader, Headquarters Troop,\n1st Cavalry, Far East Command\n8/48 - 12/48\nAthletics and Recreation Officer,\nService Troop, 8th Cavalry, Far\nEast Command\n12/48 - 4/49\nAthletics and Recreation Officer,\nHeadquarters and Headquarters Company,\n8th Cavalry, Far East Command\n4/49 - 4/49\nAdministrative Assistant, Office of the\nChief of Staff, Headquarters, Far East\nCommand\n6/49 - 9/50\nAide-de-Camp, Headquarters, X Corps,\nFar East Command\n9/50 - 6/51\nAide-de-Camp, Headquarters, Far East\nCommand\n6/51 - 8/51\nCompany Commander, Headquarters, Headquarters\nand Service Company, 131st Tank Battalion,\nFt Knox, Kentucky\n8/51 - 11/51\nCompany Commander, Company B, 131st Tank\nBattalion, Ft Knox, Kentucky\n11/51 - 6/52\nTraining Inspector, G3 Section, Ft Knox,\nKentucky\n6/52 - 9/52\nStudent Officer, The Armor School, Ft Knox,\nKentucky\n9/52 - 6/53\nTactics Instructor, Combined Arms Detachment,\n1802d Special Regiment, West Point, New York\n6/53 - 9/53\nTactical Officer, U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S.\nMilitary Academy, West Point, New York\n9/53 - 6/55\nCompany Officer, Midshipman Company, U.S. Naval\nAcademy, Annapolis, Maryland\n6/55 - 8/56\nBattalion S-3, Headquarters and Service Company,\n899th Tank Battalion, US Army Europe\n8/56 - 12/57\nLogistics Staff Officer, Installations Branch,\nG-4 Division, Headquarters, US Army Europe\n12/57 - 6/59\nStudent Officer, Naval War College, Newport,\nRhode Island\n8/59 - 6/60\nMember, Staff and Faculty, Naval War College,\nNewport, Rhode Island\n6/60 - 8/60\nStudent Officer, Georgetown University,\nWashington, D. C\n9/60 - 2/62\nPREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)\nStaff Officer, Intelligence and Policy Planning\nDivision, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff\nfor Operations, Washington, D. C.\n2/62 - 7/63\nMilitary Assistant to the Secretary of the Army,\nWashington, D. C.\n7/63 - 2/64\nMilitary Assistant, Office of Assistant to the\nSecretary of Defense (Cuban Affairs),\nWashington, D. C.\n2/64 - 5/65\nMilitary Assistant to the Special Assistant to\nthe Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,\nWashington, D. C.\n5/65 - 6/65\nStudent Officer, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,\nPennsylvania\n8/65 - 6/66\nG-3, 1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam\n7/66 - 10/66\nBattalion Commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry,\n1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam\n10/66 - 4/67\nBrigade Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,\nViet Nam\n4/67 - 5/67\nCommanding Officer, 3d Regiment, US Corps of Cadets,\nUS Military Academy, West Point, New York\n7/67 - 6/68\nDeputy Commandant, US Corps of Cadets,\nUS Military Academy, West Point, New York\n6/68 - Present\nEXTRACTS FROM EFFICIENCY REPORTS ON COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., USA, 050790\nPosition: Commander of 3d Regiment,\nDate: June 1968\nU. S. Military Academy\nEvaluator: Colonel A. J. Hughes,\nDeputy Commandant,\nWest Point\n\"An affable, well mannered officer Polished and erudite, he is an\noutstanding organizer; is adept at handling a great amount of detail smoothly\nis a perspicacious and analytical thinker who works hard, plans ahead, and\ngets results\nHe is long on good sound common sense. Possesses an outstanding\nknowledge of military and world affairs and he speaks and writes well\nan\nextremely capable Colonel who is definitely General officer material for he\nhas the qualifications, the drive, and the ability. He will stand out at or\nnear the top of the list in any competition\nof resolute character and high\nmorals and he is a fine husband and father. Recommended for key positions,\nstaff or command, at the very highest echelons in the Army and the Defense\nEstablishment\n\"\nEvaluator: Brigadier General Bernard W. Rodgers\nCommandant of Cadets, West Point\n\"I have served with Colonel Haig in previous assignments, to include\ncombat as well as staff assignments at the highest level. In all types of\nassignments, Colonel Haig performs in a manner which is truly outstanding\nand better than any other officer I have known.'\nPosition: Battalion Commander,\nDate: March 1967\n1st Infantry Division, Vietnam\nEvaluator: Colonel William B. Caldwell III,\nBrigade Commander\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding Infantry Battalion\nCommander I have seen in combat in Vietnam. He is articulate, intelligent,\ncourageous, and is possessed of high personal and professional standards\ndedicated to the accomp lishment of his mission\nFor his actions against two\nViet Cong Regiments during Operation Junction City, 31 March thru April 1967,\nLieutenant Colonel Haig was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross Because\nof his outstanding performance of duty, he was selected on the field of battle\nto be a Brigade Commander when the former Brigade Commander was wounded.\nLieutenant Colonel Haig is General officer material and should be given posi-\ntions of great responsibility.\"\nEvaluator: Major General J. H. Hay\nCommanding General\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is without doubt one of the finest combat leaders\nthe United States Army has produced during this war. He possesses all the\nqualities that such a leader should have; namely, great professional knowledge,\ninitiative, perserverence, aggressiveness, and the ability to elicit from\nsubordinates maximum effort in their performance of duty He is erudite,\narticulate, imaginative, and refuses to accept any form of mediocrity.\nLieutenant Colonel Haig has the capability and potential to rise to positions\nof great authority and responsibility in the military establishment\n\"\nPosition: Battalion Commander\nDate: February 1967\n1st Infantry Division, Viet Name\nEvaluator: Colonel Sidney B. Berry Jr.\nBrigade Commander\n\"Colonel Haig possesses to an unusual degree the intellectual, personal,\nand professional qualities which make him equally effective as a high level\nstaff officer or as a battlefield commander\nHe is capable of serving in\npositions of highest responsibility and is a potential three or four-star\ngeneral.\n\"\nEvaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy\nCommanding General\n\"He has already demonstrated beyond any doubt that he is a masterful\ntactician, a cool and courageous combat leader, and I now regard him as the\nbest battalion commander in the division I expect lieutenant colonel Haig\nto rise high in the ranks of general officers. I strongly recommend that he\nbe considered for selection to brigadier just as soon as possible and well\nahead of his contemporaries. \"\nPosition: G-3, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam\nDate: November 1966\nEvaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy,\nCommanding General\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is one of those officers who should one day wear\nfour stars. As the G-3 of this division, he was the primary moving force in\nplanning and in operations. He is brilliant, extremely courageous, a 24 hour-a-day\nworker and a man of complete integrity and high moral character\nColonel Haig\nhas all the tickets to go all the way and the Army should be very careful to\nmanage his future assignments and to accelerate his promotion so that the\nArmy and our country can enjoy the benefits of what this officer has to offer.\"\nSchool: US Army War College\nDate: June 1966\n(student)\nEvaluator: Major General Eugene A. Salet,\nCommandant\n\"A highly intelligent, well-informed officer who freely, cheerfully and\nenthusiastically participated in all curricular and noncurricular activities\nof this installation. Quiet in manner, he displays an excellent sense of\nhumor and a very pleasant personality\nIn all respects he exhibited superior\nleadership qualities. He demonstrated complete objectivity when considering\nmatters of national significance, and is considered fully qualified for\nassignment to joint, combined, unified, allied, or OSD staffs\nHis poise,\npersuasiveness, and professional maturity mark him clearly as one of the\noutstanding members of his class. During the academic year, he and his family\nhave made an outstanding contribution to this military community. He assisted\nin the Boy Scout Program and the Catholic Youth Program. He organized and\nconducted a Horse Show; and he actively participated in adult athletic programs.\nHis wife served as a Gray Lady and was active in many programs sponsored by\nthe Officers' Wives Club\nHe is general officer material.\"\nPosition: The Military Assistant to The Special Assistant Date: April 1965\nto the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense\nEvaluator: Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,\nThe Special Assistant to the\nSecretary and Deputy Secretary\nof Defense\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding officer of his rank I\nhave ever worked with. In a post which I consider one of the most difficult\nand demanding in the Department of Defense, he has worked day and night,\nunder extreme pressure with total dedication, in duties which cover the full\nspectrum of the Department of Defense\nHis duties as military point of\ncontact between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the\nPresident required him to deal with a large number of important Government\nfigures. This he did with great tact and competence. I have counted on him\nto handle White House correspondence of personal interest to the President,\nto pass on most of the cases himself, and to select those few which needed my\npersonal attention. He was personally selected by the Secretary of Defense\nto develop and prepare briefings which the Secretary gave to the highest\nofficials of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. The\nPresident personally commented on the excellent work on important matters\nperformed with the White House staff\nLieutenant Colonel Haig is the most\noutstanding Lieutenant Colonel of any service whom I have ever known.\"\nEvaluator: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance,\nDeputy Secretary of Defense\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig has performed his important mission in a\nmanner that could be expected of very few officers. He is one of the most\noutstanding military men with whom it has ever been my privilege to be\nassociated. The depth of his professional background in political and mili-\ntary affairs, the total nature of his integrity and dedication and the\nsensitivity of his judgement have made him an invaluable assistant. He is\na tremendous asset to the Army and to the country.\"\nPosition: Staff Officer, Politico-Military\nDate: August 1963\nBranch, International Policy\nDivision; Office, Deputy Chief of\nStaff for Military Operations\nEvaluator: Major General C. E. Hutchen, Jr.\nDirector of Strategic Plans and\nStudies\n\"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is outstanding. He has poise, an incisive\nintellect, a fine sense of humor, and a remarkable ability to look ahead.\nHe is polished, sociable and obviously physically fit\nhe demonstrated an\nunusual grasp of both international affairs and staff procedures\nDemon-\nstrated mature judgement and finesse. A man of high standards, he took a\ngreat interest in his family and his community. A pillar of strength in\nplans - a topnotch team player, an accomplished planner -- this officer should\nbe specially marked for positions of great responsibility\n\""
}