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Year of Europe Memcons (originals)-- NATO, EC, OECD
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Year of Europe Memcons (originals)-- NATO, EC, OECD
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Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
cable
Brussels to the White House
3/21/74
B
2
memo
HAK to Rumsfeld
9/1/73
B
3
memcon
The President, HAK, NATO Ambassadors
6/30/73
B
4
memcon
HAK, Eagleburger, Luns
6/9/73
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK
54
FOLDER TITLE
5
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION the Richard Nixon Presidential
NA 14021 (4-85)
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHORAWAL RECORD
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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2 copies
SECRET
July 27, 1973 11:30 a. m.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Henry A. Kissinger
Emile van Lennep, Secretary General of OECD
Robert D. Hormats
HAK:
I am pleased to have the opportunity to see you again. What brings
you to Washington?
Van Lennep:
I am actually here for the Committee of Twenty meeting.
HAK:
Did you just come from Europe?
Van Lennep: No, I have been in Japan for the last week. I left yesterday.
HAK:
How long is it from Europe to Japan?
Van Lennep: It is about twenty hours. Actually, I was originally booked
on the flight that was hijacked, but I postponed my flight one day quite
fortunately as it turned out.
HAK:
I may go to Japan from Europe in the fall or from Europe to Japan,
but you say it is nineteen or twenty hours! Where do you stop - in India?
Van Lennep: No, the quickest way is through Moscow.
HAK:
My Chinese friends would really let me haveit if I stopped in
Moscow.
Van Lennep: It is not a very pleasant trip. It is very difficult to sleep.
HAK:
It is hard for me to recall. I haven't been on a commercial plane
for a long time so I have had no experience with this. I use a military
plane because they think a commercial flight might be hijacked.
Van Lennep:
I understand the problem- quite well now.
HAK:
What is your view of European-US relations at the moment?
Van Lennep:
That is a very broad question.
HAK:
Well, I am willing to discuss whatever you wish. What's on your
mind?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
2
Van Lennep:
I would very much like to hear your views on the relationship
between economic, political and defense cooperation and how they relate to
the "Year of Europe". I am interested to see more clearly what the US view
is on these matters. At the OECD I have stressed the need for taking a
political view of economic problems and believe that the comprehensive
approach you have outlined is quite valid.
HAK:
We are getting restless at the European's behavior toward our
initiative. Let me be very frank with you on this. We thought we were mak-
ing a proposal almost unilaterally in Europe's interest. Now we are accused
of hegemony, blackmailing Europe in the defense field, and other similar
motives. European behavior is now reaching the point where it is based on
such mistaken assumptions about American motives that things are tending
to get out of hand. It is my feeling that unless we can get a hold on these
issues things could lead to catastrophe. We are getting bored with all these the
accusations and technical discussions.
(At
this
point
Dr.
Kissinger
left
room to take a telephone call.)
HAK:
As I was saying, the whole debate is being put on a level totally besid
the point. We are getting frustrated. To be very candid, the President and
I are committed strongly to the Atlantic relationship. The President is the
one man on the whole American political scene most committed to that rela-
tionship. We wanted to create an enduring relationship with Europe which
would survive his presidency. We wanted to create a way of dealing with the
various issues we have with Europe. If we wanted to have an economic con-
frontation with Europe, all we have to do is let Shultz and Flanigan conduct
an economic negotiation. That would certainly lead to confrontation. We
don't need a "Year of Europe" for that. If we wanted to remove our troops,
all we would have to do is let the Congress do that for us. We don't need a
"Year of Europe" for that. We want a symbolic success so that we can resist
pressures for confrontation. That is the purpose of the "Year of Europe".
Instead we are accused of blackmailing Western Europe by dealing with the
USSR, of attempting to exert hegemony over Europe and attempting to provoke
a financial confrontation. On the financial aspect let me add that I think in
this case that Europe is more right than we are.
But instead of getting European cooperation on this we have gotten no substan
tive response from Europe since my speech in April. Every reporter who
goes to European chancellery is given a list of European complaints against
us. All of our domestic opponents want to pursue an isolationist policy and
this gives them all the ammunition they neèd to do so.
We are tempted now to drop the whole thing and let Europe see where they
are. I am just not going to explain this to Europeans any more. We wanted
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
3
a set of political goals stated so that that could guidecconomic and security
considerations. This would have enabled us to take a generous and far-
sighted approach. It would have provided a restraint which would diminish
the possibility for confrontation. You will recall that with the Connally
problem in 1971 the President and I intervened, giving primary importance
to our foreign policy relationships. That could have led to disaster if we
had not done so.
These are my frank views. I hope that in relating this to others you will
not use the same hard language but I certainly have no objection to your con-
veying the tone of my remarks.
Van Lennep:
No, I come personally, not in an institutional capacity. May
I make a few comments as I see the issue.
I believe we should talk substantively and not procedurally. We should not
talk about the OECD, NATO or EC but on ways of reaching major goals.
As I see it, there are two aspects of our relationship between the US and
Europe. First, we all share fully a belief in market economies as opposed
to centrally planned economies. We all believe that a market economy is
the best way of organizing ourselves to meet domestic needs. We work
together on procedures to strengthen market economies and to guide them to
reach fundamental objectives. We cooperate to avoid circumstances in which
the
rich
got
richer
and
the
poor
get
pooror.
And,
we
work
together
to
better
serve the basic national interests common to all market economies and with
which the governments of those countries have to deal.
We all know that sectoral influences and institutions if left to themselves
would pursue their own objectives which are not necessarily the same as
overall objectives. If left to the monetary people alone, monetary problems
would result in a very serious economic and political situation. I firmly
believe that the crisis in 1971, in addition to leading to a political confrontation
would have had serious economic results. Your intervention in that prevented
both a political and an economic disaster. We must see to it that sectoral
problems are put under an overall political framework. A monetary crisis
if left only to monetary people will result in an overall crisis in relationships.
There is thus a need for the US and Europe to reaffirm the basic necessity
to defend our market economies. We need an overall political setting so that
individual negotiations lead to overall objectives and so that their conduct can
conform to the goals in our overall relationship. These goals can be set based
on agreement among all market economies.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
4
HAK:
It is hard for us to be accused by Europe, which contribues only
between three and four percent of its GNP to its defense, and to whose
defense we contribute so much that we are betraying them on defense matters.
Van Lennep: There is, as you say, a need to link political and military
considerations with these. economic objectives--sharing of the defense burden.
I believe we should draw up principles of market economies which can be
signed by all market economies.
At the same time we should build up a declaration of security cooperation
which includes the need to redefine the necessity for detente and defense as
well as to keep market economies moving in the right direction. We need
three groups:
A re-definition of the overall political approach for guiding market
--
economies. This should reaffirm the need for the US and Europe to pursue
multilateral cooperation.
At the same time NATO countries should reaffirm the need for military
--
cooperation in an era of detente. This is politically difficult to sell in an era
of detente but quite necessary.
At the same time the US and the EC can make a bilateral reaffirmation
:
of the necessity and means of cooperating in the future.
I do not believe we should limit the first category of principles only to the EC.
It is important to bring in Japan in a way that it is not embarrassed by being
associated with NATO-oriented aspects of the declaration but at the same
time in such a way that is inclusion does not necessitate a watering down of
the NATO aspects. One way of handling this which fits in to what I mentioned
earlier is to have one section on economic and overall relations among market
countries and a separate security oriented section on NATO.
HAK:
Can you write a declaration on economic issues?
Van Lennep: Certainly.
HAK:
When can you do it? Can you get it done in August?
Van Lennep:
I was planning to have a vacation in August.
HAK:
Where are you going?
Van
Lennep: I am just staying at home with my family.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSI This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
5
HAK:
Well, I would rather have a good declaration in September than
a hurriedly done declaration in August. I am not very competent in
technical economic issues.
Van Lennep: It will be a politically oriented document. It would help me
to know what plans you have for dealing with this in the future.
HAK:
I have agreed to giving a talk in Brussels some time between
September 10 and September 12. I may come over for that or I may cancel
the talk. At that time I was thinking of going around to other capitals. I
probably won't do that now. We have decided not to take another initiative.
Van Lennep: I would certainly be glad to do this.
HAK:
That would be excellent. We have to move on this fairly promptly.
You read about the Mansfield amendment pressures. We can probably get
through this session of Congress without cuts, but we won't be able to get
through the next. And the international situation will change. We will have
MBFR, the European Security Conference and another trip by the President
to the Soviet Union. This will bring about a situation in which detente policies
will so overwhelm relations with Europe that it will be difficult to get things
going again. Then we will have to wait quite a while until we can pick things
up.
Van Lennep: I am concerned that in dealing with Europe things will explode
if we do not reach a solution soon.
HAK:
It is a political necessity for this country and for all of us to put
these issues in a political framework. Pompidou makes eloquent statements
to us about international monetary cooperation yet they attack us in every
forum. That is hardly conducive to constructively resolving the problem.
Van
Lennep: Yes, I have heard how Pompidou criticizes Giscard for not
taking political considerations into account. He says Giscard deals too much
with his monetary people without appreciating the broader political situation.
Iam worried that unless we have resolved the monetary problem by November
we will be in for a bad situation. As economic growth rates slow down, the
problem will become acute.
HAK:
When you go back to Europe remember that this idea is being pro-
posed by the people in this country who are dedicated to the Atlantic relation-
ship. I don't mind if you convey the strong tone of my remarks.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
6
Van Lennep:
I was pleased that you could intervene in December of 1971.
It was highly constructive. Now I agree that we need a coherent approach
in economic issues. We should not leave trade and monetary discussions
to develop on their own without a political overview. We need to get to- -
gether on this.
HAK:
Well, if you could provide your draft by early September that would
be helpful and I would very much appreciate it.
Van Lennep:
I thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss this
with you. It has been very helpful.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Henry A. Kissinger
Vicomte Etienne Davignon, Belgian
Foreign Office
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
$
DATE:
June 30, 1973
PLACE:
San Clemente
Kissinger: I am glad to see you here. I have heard a lot about you but
we have never met. I know you have some questions.
Davignon: Well, I am glad you could see me and that it was possible
for me to come out here. The question is what are you going to get out
of the French. If you want to get them to work with the Eight and then
with NATO, that is OK. But if they merely tell us they can get what
they want directly from the US, then it becomes very difficult.
Kissinger: Well if the French strategy is to extort from us what we want
anyway we don't care. It would be OK. But if the French strategy is
based on the idea that they can drive a harder bargain with us than with
the other Europeans can, then there would be trouble. But that kind
of victory would not be worth it for them.
Now as you know, if we wanted a tough economic bargain we would not
do what we are doing. We could just let the economic agencies run wild.
That's what they want to do. But what we are trying to do is to create
a political context that will make it possible to be flexible. So the
criticism in Europe of our proposal is exactly the opposite of the truth.
In regard to the Year of Europe, we don't insist on doing it with the Nine.
This is up to the Europeans. We could do it individually but frankly, we
would prefer to do it with the Nine.
You should understand that there is no popular demand here for the Year
of Europe. In fact, we will have a big brawl with Congress over troop
SECRET/SENSITEEduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
commitments and we could drop the whole thing without losing any
prestige. But we are doing it to stop the erosion and to get a sign of the
real vitality of the Atlantic relationship. But if we have to fight and
bleed for it it simply isn't worth it. So if the French want to fight
interminably, Europe will be the loser because we will have troop cuts
imposed on us just like the Cambodian resolution. We are willing to
go so far with the French but not beyond. We cannot penalize our
supporters and we won't. We very much appreciate what the Belgians
and you personally have done.
Davignon: Well, I agree with what you have said. It is very true; there
is no domestic demand on either side. But it would be very unwise to
let things drift on.
Kissinger: In the long term it would be disastrous. It would create
strong nationalist tendencies; in fact they are already present in the FRG.
And where would the French go?
Davignon: Yes, and the small countries would all become neutralist
like Denmark is already tending to do. But of course they would stay
in the Alliance -- and go neutralist within the Alliance.
Kissinger: Right. It has become very fashionable to do it inside the
Alliance.
Davignon: I agree. Now on the bilateral versus the multilateral. In
the Nine, we are trying to do something on diplomacy and then later on
defense. I am quite convinced that if we do not do it in the next two and
one half years or so we will have missed the opportunity. You know I do
not think that Jobert is a lost cause. I find that he listens and I think he
could move. Of course there are others in France who are much more
difficult. But we have to know that you Americans want a multilateral
effort.
Kissinger: I can flatly assure you that we do. We are only using the
bilateral approach tactically. My own impression is that Jobert is
willing to go along but wants the credit. Now of course if this is wrong
it could be done by confrontation.
Davignon: We have lived with French "inventions" for years. So if he
wants the credit it is OK with us. But there has to be a sign of the
existence of Europe.
SECRET/SENSITEEduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Kissinger: In a declaration of principles we are willing to affirm in the
strongest terms support for European unity. And we will be happy to see
the Europeans affirm their identity. But we can't say that Atlantic
relations can only be conducted on that basis. We can't say it must
be a united Europe. We would be delighted if it were and it would be
the rational way. But this is really between you and the French. We
will do nothing to undermine your efforts and you have our complete
sympathy. We are trying to discuss bilaterally with the French a
declaration that would embody strong references to a united Europe.
But if this is just a phrase, then the basic problem is really your problem.
Davignon: Well, not entirely, because there is the question of what happens
afterwards -- the follow up. If we just go back to where we were before
and do nothing but discuss procedures it would be very bad.
Kissinger: Well, I agree with that.
Davignon: If we all go into bilateral talks with you we will never get this
effort into a global context.
Kissinger: And we would all lose our sanity.
Davignon: Would it be possible at some point to say: "Dr. Kissinger is
going to some place; could we not have an informal meeting with the Nine. 11
Kissinger: At what level? It certainly is not excluded. In fact, I am
playing with the idea of going to Europe in late July. If you can get all the
Nine to come I could do it. Or maybe in September. Our thinking right
now is to have a few more bilaterals and then move to a multilateral
forum. We are quite willing to deal with the Nine if they can organize
themselves. And that, incidentally, also applies to the President, when
he goes to Europe.
Davignon: What we have to try to do is to tame Jobert so that he can
feel he can talk within certain limits.
Kissinger: You mean you are afraid that he will present things as a
French victory.
Davignon: No, that we can live with. We are used to it. But we are worried
that France wants to do it bilaterally only, whereas we want to do it
multilaterally.
SECRET/SENSITEduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Kissinger: You mean multilaterally, US-Europe?
Davignon: Yes.
Kissinger: With the Nine or with everybody?
Davignon: Well, we can get them to NATO probably but I am worried
that the French will say that they can get all they need bilaterally.
Kissinger: To what extent can the US foster the multilateral approach?
Davignon: It would be wrong to do it as explicit US policy. It is quite
true that it is basically our problem. But you should say to the French
that others want to participate and that the US is ready for this.
Kissinger: Yes. You know, I think a summit will become inevitable
if enough people want it.
Davignon: It must be clear that when the French say that the US does not
want a multilateral forum, we can say that this is not so. We should be
able to say that the US will not ram it down our throats but it does prefer
it.
Kissinger: Well, that is our position. But we just want to make it easier
with the French.
It would be total absurdity if the President goes to Europe in the "Year of
Europe" and then does not meet with its leaders. On the other hand, our
dignity does not allow pleading for such a meeting. If this initiative fails
there will be economic confrontation, military disengagement and great
power diplomacy. On the other hand, if the Europeans maintain their
desire to move ahead with us we will support it. We are now in the
preparatory phase and we definitely intend to go to a multilateral forum,
to multilateral talks. If that fails, there is bound to be confrontation;
but if it succeeds, so much the better.
Davignon: But you shouldn't wait with multilateral talks until the last
comma.
Kissinger: Obviously, The only issue at the moment is should there
be fifteen or nine when we go multilateral.
SECRET/SENSITHEue at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
Davignon: It would be a more restricted context in NATO.
Kissinger: That's true. Maybe we should think of an ad hoc group of
fifteen. Whether the Nine organize themselves within such a group is
up to the Europeans. But we don't want to confine the discussions only
to defense which is what would be likely in NATO. I have just told Luns
this. NATO itself should of course deal with defense. We want to aim
for an ad hoc group of fifteen or, I guess, 16 including Ireland. But we
won't conclude anything bilaterally. We want the issues delimited
bilaterally, so we know what we are up against.
Davignon: That does not harm us. It's fine.
Kissinger: You know, without your multilateral efforts our bilateral
efforts would not stand a chance.
Davignon: Well, as long as we can continue fencing with the French in the
Nine and say that the bilateral talks are a part of the whole, it's OK.
Kissinger: You can be sure that we will insist on multilateral talks and
that we won't enter them with a finished product. We simply want to
determine what we are up against bilaterally. You can communicate
with Strausz-Hupe or Rumsfeld if you think we are overemphasizing the
bilateral talks.
Davignon: I will have some firmer impressions to convey after we talk
in Helsinki where all the ministers and political directors will be going
next week. And then we will have the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in
late July.
Kissinger: It really would be helpful for me to know your impressions
before I go to Europe. Maybe I should even go before the Foreign
Ministers of the Nine. Well, let's exchange ideas after Helsinki. Let
me just say again that we favor multilateral talks but we have do decide
on the precise organ for multilateral talks, on a multilateral forum. It
would be very odd for the President to come to Europe and not to meet
the leaders. Once we have a document they should meet.
Davignon: It would be very damaging for us in Europe if a Nixon trip
this year were to be the same as the trip five years ago. We have to
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
show that there is progress. What we will say now is that it is incorrect
to conduct bilateral talks with the US without coordination.
Kissinger: That is no problem for us. That's find.
It has been very good to see you here. I appreciate your coming.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
3
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHORAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHORAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
YEAR OF EUROPE
THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMCONS
(originals)
1973
-- NATO
Belginn
-- EC
-.OECD
X
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.