Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848690
label
DINITZ June 4-October 31, 1973 [2 of 3]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848690
contentType
document
title
DINITZ June 4-October 31, 1973 [2 of 3]
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Henry A. Kissinger's (HAK) Office Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848690
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
14cbe85bd9c783db
ocrText
HAR sun has
October 25, 1973
9a.m.
Mr. Secretary:
from Sonnent 1dt
Re your press conference.
I think it would be a mistake to emphasize the element
of confrontation with the Soviets, which I gather Sisco
would have you do by quoting from the letter to Brezhnev.
The Soviets have the letter, SO they need no further
signal: they also know of our DEFCON.
The emphasis should be on
-- need to implement cease-fire:
--- desirability of continuing promptly to get UNTSO teams
in place and of augmenting them where necessary: (exprsss
support for UNEF proposal in SC if that has been decided on);
-- repeat that while we and Soviets have crucial role to
play as sponsors of the SC cease-fire resolution and because
of our influence in Cairo and Tel Aviv, WE do noth think
it approriate for our forces to be involved. (hold open
possibility of US and Soviet personnel serving temporarily
as part of UNTSO:
--- stress that since WE do not approve of US and Soviet
forces intervening, WE certaibly do not approve of any
unilateral intervention:
- - our alerts are entirely for precautionary purposes:
-- stress that WE have been in constant diplomatic
touch with Soviets and no useful purpose would be served by
talking about it in public: all our actions are designed to
make the cease-fire stick, not to seek some sort of
confrontation. In fact, cease-fire can only work if WG act
in harmomy, without intervention, rather than at cross-purposes:
-- of course, there must be no effort at unilateral
advantage in this complex situation:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-- stress our information that situation relatively stable
on the ground: main thing now is to interpose the UNTSO
teams:
--- once this is accomplished we would hope to proceed to
other parts of SC 338; this, too, can only be done in calm
atmosphere without threats of intervention or pressure.
(Throw in guarded warning to Arabs re oil boycott.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Recd 25 Oct 13
1505 HRS
HAK
SCOWCROFT
October 25, 1973
SECRET
HAK:
The following is a message to you from the Prime Minister
through Dinitz:
1) I am sorry to hear that the US does not find
it possible to object to the paragraph which calls for
a return to the October 22 lines. This.more specific
demand is more serious than the similar statement
in the previous resolution.
2) I appreciate the situation in which the US finds
itself in the face of Soviet moves. I do not want the
Secretary to think that 1 belittle the seriousness of the
situation.
3) I have taken note of the Secretary's words that
he would "do his best to support Israel on the inter-
pretation of the paragraph." The Secretary knows that
there is no possibility to fix the location of the previous
line; it has never been verified and it has never been
demarcated. Therefore, I expect serious discussions
will evolve as to the location of the previous lines. I
ask the Secretary to be prepared for such discussions
and to be helpful to Israel in them.
4) I place great importance on the composition of
the international force. It is an obvious point that it
must not be composed of nations with no diplomatic
relations with Israel. A number of important points
will have to be worked out relating to the international
force and its terms of reference, including for example
authority to dismiss the force. Therefore I ask the
Secretary that no finalizing of arrangements be made
BEFORE FSRAEL IS GIVEN AMPLE TIME By THE us to REVIEW
the situation. I ask that Ambassador Seall and
Ambassador Tekoah discuss the details in New York,
but that finalization be between Ambassador Dinitz and
the Secretary so that I may have a direct influence on
the final decision.
LSE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NIN 01-31/3 'pp.
AUG 1 2007
Exempted per sec. 1.4(c)( (d) EO 12958 Hr.
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3
ON EITHER THE
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA
FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122)
LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 3/04)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
116
HAK
BULLETIN
<<
U.N. MIDEAST (TOPS 111)
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. (AP) - THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTED TODAY TO SEND A
U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT SOVIET, AMERICAN OR
OTHER BIG POWER TROOPS.
THE VOTE WAS 14-0, WITH CHINA NOT PARTICIPATING.
WE321PED OCT 25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Revised Security Council Resolution Incorporating
Amendments Accepted by Non-Aligned Cosponsors
October 25, 1973 1:30 p.m.
actopted, approx 10/2>
"The Security Council
"Recalling its resolutions 338 of 21st October 1973
and 339 of 23rd October 1973,
Noting with regret the reported repeated violations
of the ceasefire in non-compliance with the
resolutions 338 and 339,
"Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's
report that the United Nations observers have not yet
been able to place themselves on both sides of the
ceasefire line,
as (1) Demands that immediate and complete ceasefire
be observed and that the parties return to the
positions occupied by them at 5,50 GMT on 22nd
October 1973,
1650
" (2) Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate
step, to increase the number of UN observers on both
sides,
"(3) Decides to set up immediately a United Nations
Emergency Force under its authority, to be composed
of personnel to be drawn from states members of. the
UN except the permanent members of the SC, and requests
the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on
the steps taken to this effect,
= (4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on an urgent and continuing basis of the
state of implementation of this resolution as well as
resolutions 338 and 339,
" (5) Requests all member states to extend their full
cooperation to the UN in the implementation of this
resolution as well as resolutions 338 and 339."
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Ambassador Dinitz Situation Report (as dictated by Larry Eagleburger)
1. There were battles throughout the night in the Suez City area.
At 5:30 a.m. local time the Egyptians announced their acceptance of the
ceasefire; the ceasefire took effect at 7:00 a. m. At that time the Israelis
were in complete control of access routes to the Egyptian third army.
2. Dayan met with Silvaso, the UN TSO Chief to agree upon observation
posts. Silvaso then left to establish the posts.
3. Shortly thereafter a local battle started along the Canal, with the
Egyptians trying to break the siege. One Egyptian force attacked eastward
toward Mitla and succeeded in making moderate advances. The Israelis
then attacked with artillery to block the advance. The Egyptian force is
still some distance from its original attack positions.
4.
Around noon local time the Egyptians decided to break out towards
the Canal and northward (at the southern end of Bitter Lake). These attacks
were combined tank, artillery and Air Force operations by the Egyptians.
During the course of the battle the Israelis shot down 15 of the 30 Egyptian
aircraft involved. There were no Israeli losses.
5. In sum there has been no fighting on the west side of the Canal;
two of the three divisions (Egyptian divisions) on the East Bank are engaged
with Israeli forces eastward; the third division is trying to break out westward
and northward.
6.
Dinitz emphasizes that Israeli instructions are that their forces are
to do nothing but block and contain Egyptian forces.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
TIME SENT
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE LDX NR 393
SITUATE HOUSEM
CIA
DIA/G
STATE
X
DIA/H
NMCC
DASA
'73 OCT 24 PM 4: 48
ANMCC
NPIC
NSA
NUMBER OF PAGES 2
DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:
SECRET/EYES ONLY
FROM: GEN. SCOWCROFT
TO: LARRY EAGLEBURGER
RECEIVED
DATE/TIME:
BY:
1651
WS.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
RECD 25 OCT 73
1505 Hes
October 25, 1973
SECRET
HAK:
The following is a message to you from the Prime Minister
through Dinitz:
1) I am sorry to hear that the US does not find
it possible to object to the paragraph which calls for
a return to the October 22 lines. This-more specific
demand is more serious than the similar statement
in the previous resolution.
2) I appreciate the situation in which the US finds
itself in the face of Soviet moves. I do not want the
Secretary to think that 1 belittle the seriousness of the
situation.
3) I have taken note of the Secretary's words that
he would "do his best to support Israel on the inter-
pretation of the paragraph." The Secretary knows that
there is no possibility to fix the location of the previous
line; it has never been verified and it has never been
demarcated. Therefore, I expect serious discussions
will evolve as to the location of the previous lines. I
ask the Secretary to be prepared for such discussions
and to be helpful to Israel in them.
4) I place great importance on the composition of
the international force. It is an obvious point that it
must not be composed of nations with no diplomatic
relations with Israel. A number of important points
will have to be worked out relating to the international
force and its terms of reference, including for example
authority to dismiss the force. Therefore I ask the
Secretary that no finalizing of arrangements be made
ISCFORE ISRAEL 135 GIVEN AMPLE TIME By THE us TO REVIEW
the situation. 1 ask that Ambassador Seall and
Ambassador Tekoah discuss the details in New York,
but that finalization be between Ambassador Dinitz and
the Secretary so that I may have a direct influence on
the final decision.
LSE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed*pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
LDX
SECRET/EYES ONLY
October 24, 1973
Deliver immediately to:
LARRY EAGLEBURGER
Per our phone conversation.
Bo
Brent Scowcroft
Attachment
SECRET/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
ED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to b
SECRET
October 24, 1973
Ambassador Dinitz Situation Report (as dictated by Larry Eagleburger)
1. There were battles throughout the night in the Suez City area.
At 5:30 a. m. local time the Egyptians announced their acceptance of the
ceasefire; the ceasefire took effect at 7:00 a. m. At that time the Israelis
were in complete control of access routes to the Egyptian third army.
2.
Dayan met with Silvaso, the UN TSO Chief to agree upon observation
posts. Silvaso then left to establish the posts,
3. Shortly thereafter a local battle started along the Canal, with the
Egyptians trying to break the siege. One Egyptian force attacked eastward
toward Mitla and succeeded in making moderate advances. The Israelis
then attacked with artillery to block the advance. The Egyptian force is
still some distance from its original attack positions.
4. Around noon local time the Egyptians decided to break out towards
the Canal and northward (at the southern end of Bitter Lake). These attacks
were combined tank, artillery and Air Force operations by the Egyptians.
During the course of the battle the Israelis shot down 15 of the 30 Egyptian
aircraft involved. There were no Israeli losses.
5. In sum there has been no fighting on the west side of the Canal;
two of the three divisions (Egyptian divisions) on the East Bank are engaged
with Israeli forces eastward; the third division is trying to break out westward
and northward.
6.
Dinitz emphasizes that Israeli instructions are that their forces are
to do nothing but block and contain Egyptian forces.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DINITZ- FILE
General,
Eaghlerger epats: (call from Denity)
/. Dinitz says that as of 1038 EDT fiving has
ceased I sradis hope That Egypture
have deeded to alide by class fire.
It is Dagan's hope That fightig is over
2. Haig called D inity and saidPres upset,
would have to Tase dratic actions
descrissorating self from brads.
D possed an enfor in paragraphy
Haig passed to Pres who is "Thandful
and relieved", according to what
Dinity Told. strong warring recteraled.
JIN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TELCON
Dinita/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Oct. 24, 1973
3:40 p.m.
K: We have just been told by the Soviets; I'm not saying this
is true; but I want to bring you up to date -- that your forces
are still continuing to attack.
D: I have just talked to Israel about 5 mins. ago and they
told me all is quiet and we cancelled the blackout in Israel
today.
K: I want to inform you of our strategy at the UN.If the meeting
is called we will take the following position: 1) We will support
the strongest call for an observance of the ceasefire; 2) we will
SMP totally oppose introduction of American and Soviet forces
(unless you are for it).
D: No. No. No.
K: 3) We will strongly favor strengthening of UN observers
by bringing people in like the Scandanavians and elsewhere.
4) On the question of return to the original line we strongly
support the principle but have no thoughts on how to apply it.
Scali will be instructed to delay and confuse it. O.K. ?
D: Fine. Do you have any idea if anyone is going to propose
a resolution.
K: No. I have no word. I have seen that the Egyptians and
Syrians are calling a meeting. I am seeing Dobrynin at 4:00
and another matter and I will tell them not to propose it because
we will oppose it. Give us as much assurance as you can that
you are not taking any military actic
D: I called 5 minutes ago. I will tell the Prime Minister about
the strategy and repeat the concern that the Russians expressed
to you.
K: Thank you.
D: Thank you.
END
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10/23/73; 11:47 am
Message for General Scowcroft from Minister Shalev:
At 11:00 p.m. on the 24 of October Israel time the Red Cross
representative in Tel Aviv transmitted to them an Egyptian request to transfer
to the hospital in the city of Suez a supply of blood and that this would be done
by an Egyptian representative who would appear at the ceasefire line. Within
an hour we gave our agreement and also suggested our assistance in transportation.
at 10:30 this morning, Israel time, an Egyptian officer appeared at the ceasefire
line with the plasma and I suppose other medicines. We permitted him to go
into the city of Suez and deliver the medical supplies and he has already left
and gone back from where he came.
This morning on the 25th of October at 4:00 a.m. Israel time we
received another request, also from the Red Cross representative in Tel Aviv,
who was transmitting a request of the Foreign Minister of Egypt and this time
the request was to permit an Egyptian helicopter to fly over our positions bring
similar supplies to the 3rd army (plasma and medicines). We were told that
this helicopter would only contain one representative and two unarmed pilots.
We did not agree to this suggestion and at 10:20 this morning we gave them a
negative reply to that. At 11:50 a.m. on October 25 the representative of the
Red Cross in Tel Aviv said that in view of the urgent need for plasma in the
area of the 3rd army, the plasma will be transmitted there directly by the
Red Cross representative in Tel Aviv himself.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
referring
The Security Council reassuring to its resolution 338 of October 22
1973
(1) Confirms to its decision about immediate cessation of all fire
and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be
withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of
the decision on ceasefire.
(2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately
take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation
of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first
of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present at Cairo.
"withdraw to the line that they occupied" -- delete
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
With respect to the observers, our position is that the same
principle should apply as to the force, but we are willing to entertain
a request from the Secretary General for a small number, provided
the distinction between the observers and the force is strictly
maintained.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
From the Prime Minister
The situation in the front is such that the Egyptians in fact have not
observed the ceasefire in the very beginning, except for a very very
short time. They have resumed firing - first with artillery and then
throughout the night it was fighting. This morning Israel time, they
were even trying to capture places that did not capture before. The
ceasefire which we (they) accepted and honestly observed must be mutual -
reciprocal. She wants personally to tell Dr. Kissinger subsequent to
their conversations they had that the Egyptians who initated an open fire
are responsible for all the fighting. She is going to the Parliament today
and she will explain Israel's good faith in accepting the ceasefire and
their intention to observe it but she will also say that as long as they are
shooting at us they will shoot at them.
Your Military Attache in Israel is constantly being brought up to
date on every single incident. Until now there are 17 violations by Egyptians.
She asked me to deliver this message personally to the Secretary.
She wants Dr. Kissinger to believe her it was the result of the Egyptian
initiative and none on their part.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
"The Security Council:
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all
firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later
than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision,
in the positions they now occupy.
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after
the cease fire the implementation of SC Resolution 242 in all of
its parts.
3. Decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease
fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under
appropriate auspicies aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East. 11
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
DATE:
Sunday, October 21, 1973
PLACE:
Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House
General Scowcroft began the meeting by reading the agreed text of a reso-
lution which the U.S. and the Soviet Union had jointly agreed to submit to
the Security Council that evening. General Scowcroft pointed out that the
resolution:
-- Leaves all Israeli forces in -place.
-- Contains no reference to withdrawal, only a general reference
to Resolution 242.
-- Calls for direct negotiations between parties with joint U.S. /
Soviet auspices to facilitate.
-- Includes a joint U.S./Soviet commitment to use maximum influence
to bring about an exchange of prisoners.
General Scowcroft indicated that a call for a Security Council meeting
would be initiated at 6:00 p.m. that evening. The only response made
by the Ambassador was that the timetable was very tight.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
TO HAK
October 21, 1973
TO:
LARRY EAGLEBURGER
FRR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
Dinitz just called with a message for you from the Prime
Minister. She alaks that you come by Israel on your way home
from Moscow, independent of any position they may take on the
SC Resolution. That is, they would not delay taking a position on
the resolution pending completion of your trip. I told Dinitz I would
pass the message to you immediately. He requests our urgent
reply.
Warm regards.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYESONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
October 21, 1973
TOHAK
FLASH
TO:
LARRY EAGLEBURGER FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
have
Dinitz just called to inform me that the IsraMi decided to
accept the resolution. The Prime Minister is writing to the President to ask
clarification on a number of points related to the resolution, but Dinitz
has stated clearly that the Israeli acceptance is not contingent on the
answers to the questions, sho-pased. I will pass the Prime Minister's
letter as soon as it arrives.
Warm regards.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET EYES ONLY
TOHAK
October 21, 1973
TO:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
Deliver in a sealed envelope to Lawrence Eagleburger
Reference HAKTO 08 Dinitz was informed within five
minutes of receipt of cable from you. The fact is that the press
report came out in early afternoon and your report of meeting did not
arrive until 10:00 p.m. None of your messages are held, regardless
of the hour at which they are received.
Reference your cable to Ziegler, I had told Jerry Warren, who
confirmed it with Haig, that he could say the President was in continuing
contact with you and also with Brezhnev. The specifics were inserted
at the last minute and I was not aware of that. You should know that there
was no way repeat no way to have avoided a press statement yesterday.
Warm regards.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10/21/73
"The Security Council:
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all
firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later
than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision,
in the positions they now occupy.
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after
the cease fire the implementation of SC Resolution 242 in all of
its parts.
3. Decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease
fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under
appropriate auspicies aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East. "
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE SECRE SENSITIVE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, OC. 20520
FOR: SCOWCROFT/EYES. ONLY
FROM: EAGLEBURGER
FYI AND RECORDS.
SCY, LSE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.'
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
COPY 12 OF 15 COPIES
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
SECRET
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
Z 242030Z CCT 73
FM AMEMEASSY TEL AVIV
CONTROL: 7009Q
S
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 266
RECD: 24 OCT'73 5:51PM
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8575
HAK
SCOWCROFT
NODIS
LL
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER MEIR
REF: DAC MSG 1950 241620Z CCT 73
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. ICALLED ON PRIMIN MEIR AT 1730 LOCAL TODAY AT THEIR
REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE GEN ZEIRA, CHIEF CF IDF
INTELLIGENCE, MORDECHAI GAZIT, DIRGEN PRIMIN'S OFFICE AND DC.
S
2. MRS. MEIR INITIATED CONVERSATION BY STATING SHE HAD
ASKED ME TO COME TO RECEIVE PERSONAL BRIEFING FROM GEN ZEIRA
AS CONCERNS SITUATION IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT AND
SUBSEQUENTLY TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH HER BECAUSE "SOME OF
YOUR PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON SEEM TO EE WORRED; THEY ARE NOT SURE
WE ARE DOING THE RIGHT THING" ON THE SUEZ FRONT. GEN
ZEIRA THEN GAVE ME BRIEFING ALONG LINES REPORTED REFTEL
DURING WHICH HE AND MRS. MEIR PARTICULARLY CITED INTERCEPT
MESSATE BETWEEN MINISTER OF WAR IN CAIRC AND COMMANDER
OF THIRD ARMY AS EVIDENCE CAIRC ORDERED INITIATION OF
HOSTILITIES IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT.
3. MRS. MEIR EMPHASIZED ISRAEL HAD NO SECRETS FROM U.S.,
INTELLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE, AND SHE HAD GIVEN ORDERS THAT WE
BE GIVEN ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION IN POSSESSION OF GOI WHICH
BORE ON MILITARY SITUATION. IN THIS SPIRIT, she INVITED MY
DATT WITH OTHER DAO PERSONNEL TO GO TO THE SINAI AND SEE SITUATION
ONTHE GROUND. SHE REITERATED THAT ISRAEL HAD NOTHING TO HIDE.
I EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT DATT GOINC TO AREA AT THIS
S
TIME, ALTHOUGH I APPRECIATED SPIRIT BEHIND OFFER. SHE REPLIED
THIS WAS CUR DECISION, BUT SHE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE GOI HAD NOTHING
TO HIDE.
4. TO SUPPORT HER CASE THAT ISRAEL- DID NOT TAKE INITIATIVE TO
VIOLATE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH, MRS. MEIR NOTED THAT SYRIAN
FRONT IS TOTALLY QUIET, ADDING THIS PROVES "WHEN THEY DON'T
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SEGRET OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
OF
SECRET
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
-2- TEL AVIV 8575, 24 OCT'73
SHOCT, WE DON' T SHOOT. (DEPPRIMIN ALLON MADE SAME POINT IN
CONVERSATION JUST PREVIOUS TO MY DISCUSSION WITH MRS. MEIR-
SEE SEPTEL).
5. I ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER WHAT MAD HER THINK THE
USG DOUBTED ISRAEL'S CONTENTION THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE INITIATED
THE WIDESPREAD CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN ZUEZ
SECTOR? SHE REPLIED THAT HER FEAR WAS THAT "SADAT AND HIS FRIENDS"
AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO THE SOVIETS) WERE UNDOURTEDLY TRYIING
TO CONVINCE US THAT IT WAS ISRAEL RATHER THAN EGYPT THAT WAS
AT FAULT. SHE THEN EXPLAINED THAT SHF HAD SPENT LCNG HOURS
YESTERDAY PEFORE KNESSET DEFENDING THE CEASE FIRE. THE
OPPOSITION IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENTS
DECISION, ASSERTINC THIS WAS A MAJOR MISTAKE WHICH WILL
COST ISRAELI LIVES. ONE CF THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS SHE HAS
BEEN USING IN DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IS THAT
CEASEFIRE WOULD SAVE LIVES. SHE DOESN'T CARE ABOUT VIEWS OF
OPPOSITION, BUT SHE HAS TO CARE ABOUT LIVES OF HER SOLDIERS.
SHE POINTED OUT SHE ASSUMED THE us REALIZED THE ISRAELI
SOLDIERS AHD TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, AND WHEN 30 EGYPTIAN
PLANES ATTACK, ISRAEL CANNOT BE BLAMED FOR SHOOTING DOWN 14
S
IN SUBSEQUENT AIR BATTLES. MRS.
MEIR THEN CONFIRMED THAT SHOOTING IN SOUTH ENDED ABOUT 1700
HOURS AND EMPHATICALLY STATED ISRAEL DID NOT RPT NOT WANT
IT TC START AGAIN.
6. MRS. MEIR THEN COMMENTED ON GREAT APPRECIATION OF
ISRAELI PEOPLE TO THE us AND TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY,
N
NOTING "ONLY WE REALLY RECOGNIZE HOW MUCH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS
DONE FOR US.
7. MRS. MEIR THEN ASKED ME TO MAKE CERTAIN THE PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL VALUEL THE AMERICAN
RELATIONSHIP AEOVE ALL THINGS AND COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT.
IMPERIL CUR SUPPORT BY TAKING INITIATIVE TC VICLATE THE
CEASEFIRE. "PLEASE TELL THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY WE WOULD
NOT DO THIS TO THEM. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL HAD ONLY
TWO REAL PRIORITIES AS A NATION: ONE, SURVIAL AND SECURITY AND,
TWO, THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US IN GENERAL
AND THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY IN PARTICULAR.
S
8. I TOLD MRS. MEIR THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND SHE AND
ISRAEL WERE TELLING US THE TRUTH AND I HAD COMMUNICATED THIS
TC WASHINGTON. I ASSURED HER THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATE
HER VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY.
SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTOHEIALTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
=3- TEL AVIV 8575, 24 OCT'73
9. COMMENT. I HAVE TRIED TO SUMMARIZE A VERY LONG CONVERSATION
IN WHICH MRS. MEIR REPEATED HER CENTRAL THEME - CONCERN OVER
THE INTEGRITY OF THE CREDIBILITY LINK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE
U.S. - OVER AND OVER AGAIN. I DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL WOULD
THREATEN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH US FOR A FEW MORE MILES OF DESERT.
WHILE WE HAVE NOT BEEN WILLING TO ALWAYS CREDIT 100 PERCENT
WHAT THE GOI HAS TOLD US ON VARIOUS SUPJECTS, ON THIS CRUCIAL
ISSUE I AM CONVINCED THEY ARE TELLING THE TRUTH. I THEREFORE
RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO REASSURE MRS. MEIR THAT
THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY DO NOT QUESTION HER VERACITY AND
FRIENDSHIP FOR THE U.S. IT IS OBVICUS THAT A ERIEF, QUICK
MESSAGE OF THIS NATURE WILL CO A LONG WAY TO SUSTAIN HER
IN A MOST DIFFICULT PERIOD. YOU MAY WISH OF COURSE EVEN WISH
TO CONTACT HER DIRECT.
KEATING
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECL/ SCIFIED This has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Passed to and Diritz
by am
1515,210.5
Dear Madame Prime Minister:
Since the attack on your forces on October 6, we have worked
tirelessly for an end to the fighting and bloodshed on terms that
would enable you and your neighbors to make a new beginning towards
peace.
Today, we have concluded discussions with the Soviet Union,
the results of which I want to communicate to you urgently for the
concurrence and support of your Government.
Secretary Kissinger whom I sent to Moscow in response to an
urgent Soviet request, has reached agreement with Mr. Brezhnev on
a resolution which we and the Soviets would plan to introduce this evening
in the Security Council. This resolution has only three operative para-
graphs and nothing else which: (A) calls for an immediate ceasefire
in place, the ceasefire to come into effect no later than 12 hours after
(B)
the Security Council decision has been taken; / a second paragraph makes
a general call upon the parties to implement Security Council Resolution
242 in all of its parts after the ceasefire; and (C) it is linked to a third
paragraph which calls for negotiations between the parties concerned
under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East. In addition, the Soviets have agreed to join
us in strongly urging an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
Madame Prime Minister, we believe that this is a major achieve-
ment for you and for us and supportive of the brave fighting of your
forces. It would leave your forces right where they are: There is
absolutely no mention whatsoever of the word "withdrawal" in the
resolution; third, for the first time, we have achieved the agreement of
the Soviet Union to a resolution that calls for direct negotiation without
conditions or qualifications between the parties under appropriate auspices.
At the same time we and the Soviets have agreed privately to make our
joint auspices available to you and to the Arabs to facilitate this process,
if this is agreeable to the parties.
I wish there had been time for fuller consultations but with the
bloodshed continuing, with Israel in such a favorable position on the
ground, with the risks increasing by the hour as substantial supplies
are being poured in by both major powers, we felt it was imperative that
an understanding be reached promptly.
We are planning to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a meeting
of the Security Council at 9:00 p.m. this evening. The Soviet Union
will join us in this request as well as in the submission of the resolution.
Finally, Madame Prime Minister, I want to say a word about the
Arab reaction. We do not know whether this proposal will be accepted
by the other side because among other things it is a far distance indeed
from the five-point Sadat program announced the other day.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
I hope, therefore, that you and your colleagues will reply
promptly to this message and that we have your full support in this
matter.
With my best wishes,
Sincerely,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Hand
and Dinity
am, 70/22/93
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 21, 1973
Dear Madame Prime Minister:
Since the attack on your forces on October 6, we have
worked tirelessly for an end to the fighting and blood-
shed on terms that would enable you and your neighbors
to make a new beginning towards peace.
Today, we have concluded discussions with the Soviet
Union, the results of which I want to communicate to
you urgently for the concurrence and support of your
Government.
Secretary Kissinger whom I sent to Moscow in response
to an urgent Soviet request, has reached agreement
with Mr. Brezhnev on a resolution which we and the
Soviets would plan to introduce this evening in the
Security Council. This resolution has only three op-
erative paragraphs and nothing else which: (a) calls
for an immediate ceasefire in place, the ceasefire to
come into effect no later than 12 hours after the Security
Council decision has been taken; (b) a second paragraph
makes a general call upon the parties to implement
Security Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts after
the ceasefire; and (c) it is linked to a third paragraph
which calls for negotiations between the parties con-
cerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing
a just and durable peace in the Middle East. In addition,
the Soviets have agreed to join us in strongly urging an
immediate exchange of prisoners of war.
Madame Prime Minister, we believe that this is a major
achievement for you and for us and supportive of the
brave fighting of your forces. It would leave your forces
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
right where they are: There is absolutely no mention
whatsoever of the word "withdrawal" in the resolution;
third, for the first time, we have achieved the agreement
of the Soviet Union to a resolution that calls for direct
negotiation without conditions or qualifications between
the parties under appropriate auspices. At the same
time we and the Soviets have agreed privately to make
our joint auspices available to you and to the Arabs
to facilitate this process, if this is agreeable to the
parties.
I wish there had been time for fuller consultations but
with the bloodshed continuing, with Israel in such a
favorable position on the ground, with the risks
increasing by the hour as substantial supplies are being
poured in by both major powers, we felt it was
imperative that an understanding be reached promptly.
We are planning to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a
meeting of the Security Council at 9:00 p.m. this
evening. The Soviet Union will join us in this request
as well as in the submission of the resolution.
Finally, Madame Prime Minister, I want to say a word
about the Arab reaction. We do not know whether this
proposal will be accepted by the other side because
among other things it is a far distance indeed from the
five-point Sadat program announced the other day.
I hope, therefore, that you and your colleagues will
reply promptly to this message and that we have your
full support in this matter.
With my best wishes,
Sincerely,
Richard
Her Excellency
Golda Meir
Prime Minister of Israel
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Given to HAK
by Dinitz
Oct.19,1973
Main points of Heikal article in AL-AHRAM, October 19, 1973.
At this moment it is difficult to envisage an
early end of the fierce battles now raging on the
Syrian Heights and in the sands of Sinai.
Even if the fighting will cease before we have
reached our objective - and I don't think it will -
I have to state now in advance that from here on
Israel will not wait for long before once again
opening fire and renewing the conflict. Although
there are some who think that Israel will agree to
a cease-fire with the Egyptian forces remaining in
the positions that they have reached east of the
Canal, it must be borne in mind that an Israel agree-
ment to such a cease-fire should not be mistaken for
acceptance by Israel of the existing situation but
rather as a way of gaining time.
I will not discuss here the ultimate aim of the
Arab/Israel conflict but it is important to pay
attention to the question of what is the aim of our
war against our enemy and of the enemy's war against
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
us. The aim in the present stage is not an area in
the Golan or the entire Golan, a part of Sinai or all
of it. Nor is the question that of the connection
with Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza or the rights of
the Palestinian people. The aim is in short, the
Israel Defense doctrine, the urge to prove that this
doctrine is wrong. The raising of doubts about the
Israel Defense doctrine will not in the present
stage restrict the dimensions of the Israel/Arab
war and will not go far in the forthcoming stages.
The question is not that of the liberation of the
Arab territories conquered after June '67 but rather
more and more that of the future of Israel even if
this does not seem feasible at the present moemnt.
If the Arabs will succeed in liberating the terri-
tories which were conquered on June 5 '67 by war
what would prevent them from conquering in the next
stage Palestine itself by the force of arms. The
main problem is that of the balance of force and
it is there that the danger for Israel lies.
If all this goes on, what will happen to the
immigration to Israel, the call for which was based
not only on religious legen but also on the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
opportunities offered by Israel and the security that
it offers. The philosophy of Israel Defense and its
expressions in fact are therefore the contents and the
framework of the armed conflict and 10 kms north or
south, 20 kms. east or west, are not really relevant.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
to Scowek OF By
AT
45pm
10/20/73 Summary "A"
The situation on October 20 at 1600 Moscow time
EGYPTIAN FRONT
1. THE FORWARD THRUST OF OUR FORCES CONTINUES.
WE ARE ENGAGED IN THE DESTRUCTION OF LARGE PARTS
OF THE LOGISTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE TWO EGYPTIAN
ARMIES HOLDING THE CANAL LINE, AS WELL AS OF THE
MISSILE SITES SYSTEM PROTECTING THESE ARMIES FROM
AIR ATTACK. ABOUT 20 MISSILE BATTERIES HAVE
BEEN DESTROYED IN THE LAST 48 HOURS WITH ROUGHLY
ONE HALF (IN THE BRIDGEHEAD AREA) AS A RESULT OF
THE ARMOURED THRUST, THE OTHER HALF (BETWEEN
PORT SAID AND ISMAILYA) AS A RESULT OF OUR AIR
FORCE'S ACTION. ONE OF OUR COLUMNS' FORWARD
UNITS HAS AT ONE POINT CUT THE NORTHERN SUEZ-
CAIRO HIGHWAY.
RUNNING PARALLEL TO AND NORTH OF THE RAILWAY LINE,
TO THE WEST, OUR PENETRATION IS OF ABOUT THIRTY KMS.
TO THE NORTH, WE ARE MOPPING UP THE AREA IMMEDIATELY
TO THE WEST OF CANAL AND SOUTH OF THE ISMAILIYA
AGRICULTURAL CANAL. THE CORRIDOR LEADING TO OUR
BRIDGEHEAD IS BEING WIDENED AND CONSOLIDATED, WITH
THREE BRIDGES IN OPERATION. ON THE EASTERN BANK
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
OF THE SUEZ CANAL, WE ARE EXERTING SOME PRESSURE
ALL ALONG THE EGYPTIAN POSITIONS BOTH NORTH AND
SOUTH OF THE BREACH.
2. EGYPTIAN FORCES ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN THE
REGIONS OF JEBEL AWEYBID, JEBEL UM KATIB, ABU
SUWEIR IN AN EFFORT TO CONTAIN THE ADVANCE ISRAELI
THRUST. THE BRUNT OF THIS IMPROVISED DEFENSE IS
CARRIED BY UNITS FROM THE 4th ARMOURED DIVISION
WHICH FORMED THE RESERVE OF THE THIRD ARMY, HOLDING
THE CANAL LINE BETWEEN THE SMALL BITTER LAKE AND
SUEZ. UNITS FROM THE THIRD MECHANIZED DIVISION
PROTECTING THE CAIRO AREA HAVE BEEN MOVED FORWARD
AND ARE BLOCKING THE ISMAILYA-CAIRO HIGHWAY. THE
SECOND ARMY, HOLDING THE CANAL LINE ON THE EAST
BANK NORTH OF OUR CORRIDOR IS DEPLOYING UNITS ALONG
THE ISMAILYA AGRICULTURAL CANAL AND IS MAKING
UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO ATTACK OUR CORRIDOR FROM
THE NORTH.
3. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE AN ACCURATE ESTIMATE
OF THE SIZE OF THE EGYPTIAN FORCE WITHDRAWN FROM THE
EAST BANK OF THE CANAL AND ENGAGED IN THE DELAYING
ACTION ON THE WEST BANK. HOWEVER, A ROUGH ESTIMATE
WOULD HAVE IT THAT 20 PERCENT OF THE FORCE ORIGINALLY
ON THE EASTERN BANK ON OCTOBER 15TH HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
4. WE ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TANKS AS
FOLLOWS :
SECOND ARMY SECTOR : 250 EAST OF THE CANAL, 70 WEST
OF THE CANAL. THIRD ARMY SECTOR : 200 EAST OF THE
CANAL, 150 WEST OF THE CANAL. UNITS ON THE WESTERN
FRINGES OF THE BATTLE ZONE (REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE
CAIRO AREA) 180 TANKS.
5. SUMMARIZING THE PRESENT SITUATION, WE HAVE
COMPLETELY SEIZED THE INITIATIVE, CAUSING CONFUSION
AND DISLOCATION TO THE ENEMY. A WEDGE HAS BEEN
INTRODUCED IN THE EGYPTIAN FRONT AND THE TWO ARMIES
ARE PRACTICALLY SEPARATED FROM EACH OTHER. A
THREAT OF ENCIRCLEMENT IS DEVELOPING IN THE REAR
OF THE THIRD ARMY.
THE PROGRESSIVE DESTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES PROVIDES
OUR AIR FORCE WITH INCREASING FREEDOM OF ACTION IN
THE BATTLE AREA. THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE IS MEANWHILE
CARRYING OUT LARGE-SCALE FIGHTER ATTACKS ON OUR
BRIDGEHEAD, EXPOSING ITSELF DANGEROUSLY TO ISRAELI
ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE (44 PLANES LOST IN THE LAST 48
HOURS).
6. OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE INFLICTION OF
MAIMING LOSSES ON THE EGYPTIAN FORCES IN ORDER TO
DESTROY THEIR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. WHETHER OR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
NOT WE SHALL INDEED ACHIEVE THE ULTIMATE AIM, NAMELY
THE COLLAPSE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, WE HAVE ALREADY
ACQUIRED SOME NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE THANKS TO OUR
ACHIEVEMENTS so FAR. WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE
TO THE ACQUISITION OF SOME MORE LEVERAGE IN THE
NEAR FUTURE THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF FURTHER
INITIATIVES. AT THE SAME TIME ALL OUR ACTIONS
HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE
POSSIBILITY OF A RAPIDLY APPROACHING CEASEFIRE/
STANDSTILL. WHEN THE CEASEFIRE COMES INTO FORCE
IT SHOULD FIND US HOLDING A LINE. THAT MAKES SENSE
FROM A POLITICO-MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THE FURTHER
DRIVE THAT WE STILL HAVE TO DEVELOP WILL BE MADE
POSSIBLE BY THE MAGNIFICENT FIGHTING SPIRIT OF OUR
FORCES. HOWEVER, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THEY
HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN HEAVY COMBAT ALMOST INCESSANTLY
SINCE OCTOBER 6TH.
THE SYRIAN FRONT
1. ESSENTIALLY THIS HAS BEEN A STATIC FRONT THROUGH-
OUT THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, THE BULGE HAS CONTINUED TO
BE THE FOCAL POINT OF DAILY ATTACKS BY THE MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCES REINFORCING THE SYRIAN ARMY. WE
HAVE INFLICTED SERIOUS DAMAGE ON THESE VARIOUS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5
CONTINGENTS (ABOUT 100 IRAQI, 20 JORDANIAN AND
60 SYRIAN TANKS HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN THE LAST
week).
THERE HAS BEEN A SMALL FORWARD MOVEMENT BY OUR FORCES
IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE THE LINE IN THE UM BATNA AREA
(IN THE SOUTH-WEST CORNER OF THE BULGE).
2. SOVIET SHIPMENTS AMOUNTING TO 400 TANKS HAVE
REACHED SYRIA AND THE TANKS ARE AT PRESENT BEING
DISTRIBUTED TO THE UNITS, INCLUDING FRONTLINE UNITS.
RUSH COURSES FOR ARMOUR PERSONNEL ARE BEING HELD.
3. WE MAY OR MAY NOT DEVELOP SOME FURTHER INITIATIVES
ON THIS FRONT BEFORE THERE IS A CEASEFIRE.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
October 24, 1973
HAK:
In addition to the bit of information on
Cairo radio and POWs that I passed in to you
during your meeting with Dobrynin, Dinitz
had the following other points to make:
1) He has passed your message to the
Prime Minister. Her answer to you is that
she reassures you that peace prevails and
that therefore Russian suspicions are
unfounded.
2) The Israelis will have between 2 and 3
thousand POWs including senior officers and
pilots. Israeli prisoners in enemy hands
number about 80; some 290 Israelis are MIA
(some obviously may be prisoners). The
Israelis are willing to exchange all the POWs
they hold for all Israeli POWs held by the
Arabs.
LSE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECL IED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3COWCROFT
SANITIZED COPY
3
TRANSMITTED BY:
ONLY
(Date & Time Stamp)
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
Operations Center
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
15 Fill 12 57
'73 OCT 15 PM 1:08
FS. Hyney
S/S #
APC
LDX MESSAGE NO. 314
,
CLASSIFICATION SECRET /SENSITIVE NO. PAGES 3
DESCRIPTION OF MSG.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
FROM: EAGLEBURGER
5
,
Officer
,
20968
,
7234-A
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
W. H. # GEN. SCOWCROFT
,
2255
*
SITROOM
,
,
,
,
,
,
.
,
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE
/
/
INFORMATION
1
/
PER REQUEST
COMMENT
/
REMARKS:
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR SCOWCROFT
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Executive Secretariat or Officer
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 01-31/4 per see. 3.3(b)(1) Hr. AUG 1 2007
By Be NARA, Date 5 0ct.07
[B of 4]
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: L.S. EAGLEBURGER
DCG FOR LSE
INLN 01-31/4:2]
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 15, 1975
HAK:
Dinitz just called. He says that the head of Jordanian
intelligence has just sent the following message to the head of
Israeli intelligence:
"I have shown the content of your message
last night to the King, and it is with deep
regret that after studying your map coordinates
we have to advise you to consider our expeditionary
force of the 4th armored brigade as hostile as of
yesterday morning.
"The King and his headquarters have been under
pressure directly from his opposite number to
the north to either withdraw the 4th brígade or
have it carry out its military duties at what waa
then the 8th day of the war. The 4th brigade
is within the danger zone you indicated, and was
not. to date, in action. It inevitably will be.
The King, with heavy heart, has asked me to
advise your military to consider it as hostile
since yesterday. As for the probable reference
to its position, it has been given so many
contradictory orders that it is nearly impossible
to predict where it will be at any given moment.
SANITIZED
"Best wishes."
3.3(b)(i)
Dinitz tells me that this same message will be passed
The Israeli understanding is that the Jordanian brigade will be
working in coordination with the Iraqi force. That is, it is becoming
a part of the Iraqi movement in the area.
Under these circumstances, according to Dinitz, ' the least
harm would be done if in addition to this force, no additional force
was sent into action in this region or any other region of the front:
[NLN -31/4 :3]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
with Jordan, and trust that the existing force there will receive
instructions not to engage heavily in battle. This is said with
the hope that the engagement should it occur will be limited."
Dinita went on to say, however, that naturally the Israelis
will be forced to fight when they are attacked. He then asked
whether we would do everything within our power to impress
upon the Jordaniana the objectives stated above.
LSE
plegram
Breut - Sisco es doney a
Ao Brown.
or
HALISNHS/LTHOGS
[NLN a - 31/ 4:4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
Dinite file upstairs
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
October 16, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER RODMAN
SUBJECT:
Arikpo and Israel
When you see Arikpo, there is still time, if you wish, to make an
effort to head off a Nigerian break in diplomatic relations with Israel.
Shalev made an urgent appeal to us the other day, thinking the break
was then imminent (Tab A). A few days later you concluded it was
then OBE. But as of this morning the break has not yet been made.
The Nigerians are obviously under pressure but they are also obviously
resisting the pressure too.
Therefore you may wish to make this point to Dr. Arikpo:
-- The independent stand of major countries like Nigeria is what gives
these countries special weight in the non-aligned world. At a
delicate moment like the present, it is especially important that
a major country like Nigeria not do something which inadvertently
upsets the situation.
-- In the aftermath of this crisis, the US will move vigorously to
promote a settlement. Nigeria, which has friendly relations with
both sides, will be in a key position to help this effort. Your
courageous stand of independence will be vindicated.
-- We have heard reports that you are under pressure to break relations
with Israel. We think Nigeria will gain more by maintaining its
current position.
At Tab B is a briefing paper which Shalev gave us on Gowon a few weeks
ago.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 11, 1973
OBE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN pm
SUBJECT:
Nigeria May Be About to Break Relations
with Israel
General Gowon has summoned the Israeli Ambassador in Lagos in for
an appointment tomorrow. This is an extraordinary step, since
Gowon rarely sees Ambassadors, and the Israelis are convinced this
is the occasion for a break in diplomatic relations.
The Israelis (Shalev) are asking you personally to intervene with
the Nigerians tonight to try to head this off.
They have heard you have an appointment with Foreign Minister
Arikpo tomorrow, but this will probably be too late. Arikpo is
tonight in New York with their UN delegation.
The Israelis hope you can convince him that such a step, in the
middle of a conflict, by such an important country, is a kind of
interference in the Mideast conflict, and would be damaging to free
world interests.
They hope you can do this without
revealing the source!
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
From Shalev
16/3/73
GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON
NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE
As the most populous black African country, the
relative political stability it has achieved since
the Civil War ended, and with its natural resources
(oil), Nigeria plays a key role in African affairs.
Gowon is the current chairman of the Organization of
African Unity.
Gowon (who is a Christian) has been under strong
pressure by some sectors of the Moslem community in
his country, and by the North African Arab countries,
to break relations with Israel. At least in formal
statements he has accepted the Arab interpretation of
Resolution 242 (although there is some doubt whether
this reflects his personal views).
On the other hand, Israel maintains relatively
strong economic ties with Nigeria and large parts of
the non-Moslem population are sympathetic to Israel.
If Nigeria should succumb to Arab pressure and
break relations with Israel, the result would be not
only detrimental to Israel. Such a development would
greatly reinforce the destructive trend in African
affairs, and would weaken the moderate countries' ability
to pursue their policy of constructive development and
of opposition to the radical and pro-Communist forces.
Gowon, as the leader of Nigeria, would also be
the natural leader of a moderate Africa, which would
devote its resources and capabilities to its own
progress, rather than engage in sterile political
propaganda.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON,
page 2.
It should be impressed upon him that an anti-Israel
policy, i.e., giving in to Libya, Algeria, etc., would
be a grievous blow to Nigeria's standing and its potential
leadership of Black Africa.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
dorael
P.M.
18 oct. 73 18
Following are preliminary remarks which I was
instructed by the Prime Minister to bring to your
personal attention as her first reflections on the
conversation I had with General Scowcroft and the
subsequent telephone conversation I had with you :
The Prime Minister appreciates your remark that
we can be sure that the United States will not accept
any proposal which refers to the '67 lines. But she
has to call your attention that any mention of 242
in connection with the cease-fire can be interpreted
by the Egyptians and the Arabs as a reference to the
'67 lines.
The battle is not over yet and the Soviets are
already trying to dictate to Israel political moves
designed not only to save their client States but
also to reward them. We will not be a party to such
a move. This was a terrible war. Our casualties
in dead, if we calculate them in terms of the popula-
tion of the United States, are in the magnitude of
the losses that the United States suffered in Korea
or Viet Nam wars that lasted, of course, a much
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
longer time. It was a very cruel war and it is not
over yet. The Prime Minister is sure that K. will
understand and believe her when she says to him again
what she told him on several occasions in the past,
that during a serious peace negotiation she will have
no hesitation to bring before the Government, the
Knesset and the people, any difficult decision that
will be necessary. But as long as there is not even
a serious proposal on a cease-fire, and as long as we
are far from peace negotiations - she does not see
any justification for the mention of 242.
It is important to remember that the decision on
the cease-fire in '67 did not mention the Armistice
Agreements of 1949. Just as the cease-fire resolu-
tion of '67 did not mention or refer to previous
documents or resolutions but stood on its own, so
also now a resolution on cease-fire in '73 (after an
additional war initiated by the Arabs and backed by
the Soviets) must stand on its own feet.
Moreover, Resolution 242 refers explicitlyyto
the conflict of '67 and now we are discussing cease-
fire resulting from the war of '73.
We never believed that Resolution 242 is a panacea.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
We agreed to accept it in specific circumstances
prevailing at the time, circumstances which do not
exist any more.
For further clarification : We do not object
that a resolution on cease-fire there will also
include a call for negotiation for peace. But
we object to the mention of a specific resolution
which refers to circumstances which do not exist any
more.
She will not go into detail on the pitfalls
and difficulties of Resolution 242, difficulties
which are not confined only to the question of with-
drawal and borders.
The Prime Minister is anxious that K. understands
that she says these things before a final position of
Israel has been formulated. She is sharing her
thoughts with him. She will have to consult with
the Government. (There is a specific Government
decision that the Cabinet must be convened and con-
sulted before a policy on the cease-fire is fixed).
Since we do not have yet any specific draft of a
Soviet proposal, the discussions in Jerusalem at
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
this stage must of necessity, be of a general nature
and deal with matters of principle only. But the
Prime Minister found it necessary to bring to his
attention that the very possibility of a mention of
242 lights up a red light for us.
The Prime Minister has instructed me to tell you
that she has invited the Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban,
to return promptly to Jerusalem in order to take part
in these discussions and in the discussions on the
situation in the front.
From the point of view of the time-table, we see
no reason for undue haste. So far there are only
feelers from the Soviet side. As far as the situa-
tion in the front is concerned, we have no reason for
any speed-up of the diplomatic moves.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.