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    "ocrText": "DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\n1\nmemcon\nHassan, HAK et al.\n11/5/13\nB\nDECLASSIFIED perttr 6/18/2012\n2\nmemcon\nHassan, HAK, et. al\n11/6/73\nB\nSANITIZED\nper Hr 6/18/2012\n3.3(b)(1)\n3\nmemo\nScowcroft to the President\n11/9/73\nB\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr 6/18/2012\n4\nmemcon\nFaisal, HAK, et. al.\n11/8/73\nB\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr. 6/18/2012\n5\nmemcon\nHAK, Saqqaf, et al.\n11/8/73\nB-\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr 6/18/2012\n6\nmemcon\nFahd, HAK, etal.\n11/8/73\nB\nDECLASSIFIED per Hr. 6/18/2012\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nHAK\n139\nFOLDER TITLE\nLs\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\n*U.S.GPO;1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nI\nmemcon\nHassan, HAK, et. al.\n11/5/73\nB\n2\nmemcon\nHassan, HAK, et. al.\n11/6/73\nB\n3\nmemo\nScowcroft to the President\n11/9/73\nB\n4\nmemcon\nFaisal, HAK, et. al.\n11/8/73\nB\n5\nmemcon\nHAK, Saqqaf, et. al.\n11/8/73\nB\n6\nmemcon\nFahd, HAK, et. al.\n11/8/73\nB\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nHAK\n139\nFOLDER TITLE\n5\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\n*U.S.GPO; 1989-235-084/00024\nNA 14021 (4-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nA. TRIP REPORT\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHAK TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST\nNOVEMBER 5 - 10, 1973\nA. TRIP REPORT\nB. HAK MEMCONS (DAILY REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT)\n1. HAK/Hassan - Rabat\nNovember 5 - 6\n2. HAK/Bourguiba - Tunis\nNovember 6\n3. HAK/Sadat = Cairo\nNovember 7\n4. HAK/Hussein - Amman\nNovember 8\n5. HAK/Faisal, Fahd, Saqqaf -\nRiyadh\nNovember 8\n6. HAK/Shah - Tehran\nNovember 9\n7. HAK/Bhutto - Rawalpindi\nNovember 9\nC. RELATED MEM CONS\n1. Sisco/Saunders Briefings in Tel Aviv\nNovember 8\n2. Sisco Briefings - Mideast, Europe\nNovember 10 - 16\n3. Newsom - Addis Ababa\nNovember 8\nD. PRESS COVERAGE\n1. HAK, McCloskey Briefings\n2. FBIS - Arab Coverage\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY. HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n1120\n19NOV\n7321862\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFrom Henry A. Kissinger\nSubject: Summary Report on Middle\nEast Trip\nSupplementing my reports to you on individual stops\nduring the Middle East portion of my trip, I want to summarize\nwhat I see as the principal accomplishments and what lies\nahead in our search for Middle East peace.\nCeasefire and POW Exchange\nWhen I left Washington, the immediate need was to\nstabilize the ceasefire on the Egyptian-Israeli front, a\nproblem which in turn had become linked to an Egyptian-\nIsraeli POW exchange. The groundwork had been laid in my\ntalks in Washington with Foreign Minister Fahmi and Prime\nMinister Meir, but the positions of the two sides were still\nfar apart.\nThe initial breakthrough came in Cairo, with the announce-\nment of the resumption in principle of U.S. -Egyptian diplomatic\nrelations and President Sadat's agreement to a six-point\nproposal that represented about ninety-five percent of what\nMrs. Meir had told me Israel wanted. Most importantly for\nIsrael, it finessed the issue of an Israeli return to the\nmilitary positions they occupied west of the Canal when the\nOctober 22 ceasefire went into effect and before they\ncompleted their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army\nand the town of Suez. The agreement simply provides that\nthis thorny question will be discussed between the two sides\nin the context of discussions on the disengagement and\nseparation of forces, thus providing a means for subsuming\nit in the broader issues at an early peace conference.\nIsrael also got agreement on a full Egyptian-Israeli POW\nexchange.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nXGDS-1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nThe main benefit for Sadat was the establishment of\nUN-supervised arrangements for the non-military resupply\nof the Third Army and for meeting the essential civilian\nsupply needs of the Suez inhabitants. While Sadat was\nunwilling to include specific reference to lifting the\nundeclared Egyptian blockade of the southern entrance to\nthe Red Sea at Bab al-Mandab, he agreed that the blockade\nwould quietly be relaxed.\nI sent Joe Sisco from Cairo to Israel the same day to\nexplain the proposal to Mrs. Meir and her colleagues,\nincluding Sadat's assurance about relaxing the blockade,\nand to obtain their approval. Both sides cooperated in\nexpediting Sisco's travel; the Egyptians gave him a special\nplane to Cyprus, where the Israelis picked him up and flew\nhim to Tel Aviv. In Israel, Sisco concluded a confidential\nMemorandum of Understanding with the Israelis, designed\nprimarily to meet their concern about participating in\nthe inspection of non-military cargos destined for the\nThird Army once they had turned over their checkpost on\nthe Cairo-Suez road to the UN. Having after some difficulty\nobtained Israeli agreement, Sisco made an unprecedented\ndirect flight from Israel to Saudi Arabia in one of our\nMAC airlift planes and rejoined me in Riyadh.\nOver the next three days, as I went from Saudi Arabia\nto Tehran, Islamabad, and on to Peking, Israeli and Egyptian\nmilitary representatives met regularly in the presence of\nthe UN commander at Km. 101 on the Cairo-Suez road to work\nout the detailed arrangements for supplying the Third Army\nand Suez town and for beginning the POW exchange. I was\nin frequent contact with both Foreign Minister Fahmi and\nPrime Minister Meir as various difficulties came up but\nheld firmly to the position that these had to be ironed\nout in the direct negotiations between their military\nrepresentatives in coordination with the UN commander.\nThe agreement was finally signed on November 11. There\nfollowed more differences over its implementation between\nIsrael on the one hand and Egypt and the UN on the other,\nrelated largely to Israel's desire to limit the UN presence\nand to maintain a more visible control and use of the\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nsegment of the Cairo-Suez road in the area they occupy\nthan was acceptable to Egypt. On November 14, however,\nthe Israeli position became markedly more flexible, and\non the 15th the turnover of Israeli checkposts to the UN\ntook place and the POW exchange began.\nI find encouraging the progress made over the past\ntwo weeks in stabilizing the Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire.\nThe fact that Egyptians and Israelis are talking directly\nand pragmatically with each other at the military level is\na hopeful sign psychologically for the forthcoming political\nnegotiations. Furthermore, both sides clearly reflected a\nwillingness to reach accommodations on the ceasefire and\nPOW issues in order to move to the next stage of a peace\nconference.\nWhile negotiations related to the six-point ceasefire\nagreement were a principal preoccupation and produced the\nmost concrete results during my Middle East trip, I also\nconcentrated on two other matters.\nArab Oil Pressures\nOn the question of Arab oil pressures, I made the point\nin each Middle Eastern capital that the Arabs need our help\nif they are to get a fair settlement, and that continuation\nof such pressures will make effective help from us impossible.\nAs I reported to you earlier, King Hussein was in full agree-\nment and said he has been making the same point to other\nArab leaders. The key country in this regard is, of course,\nSaudi Arabia. While Faisal made no commitment to relax the\noil restrictions, he clearly feels himself in an agonizing\ndilemma. I gave him considerable food for thought, and I\nhave reason to believe I made some headway with his key\nadvisors and ministers. Much will depend on whether we\ncan keep up the momentum already established.\nPeace Conference\nWith that in view, I also explored--particularly in\nCairo and Amman--the question of how to get a peace conference\nlaunched. In Cairo, Foreign Minister Fahmi and I came to a\ntentative understanding on the following largely procedural\npoints:\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n4\n1. During the week of November 19, 1973, the United\nStates and the Soviet Union will inform the United Nations\nSecretary General and others about the modalities of the\nconference.\n2. The United States and the Soviet Union will\narrange for a meeting of the Security Council, and the\nUnited States will declare that according to its under-\nstanding Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Syria have agreed to\nattend the first stage of negotiations dealing with\ndisengagement and other related matters for a peace\nagreement.\n3. Furthermore the parties agreed that this conference\nwill be convened under the auspices of the United Nations\nwith the participation of the Secretary General in the\nopening phase of the negotiations.\n4. They furthermore agreed that the conference will\nbe under the co-chairmanship of the United States and the\nSoviet Union.\n5. The conference will be convened on December 8 or\n9, 1973 in Geneva. The opening session will be at the\nForeign Minister level.\n6. The question of the participation of the Palestinians\nand Lebanon will be discussed during the first stage of the\nconference.\nAssuming I receive Fahmi's confirmation, which I\nrequested from Tokyo, that the foregoing still represents\nthe way Egypt wants to proceed, I shall begin this next\nweek to seek the views of others concerned including the\nSoviets. The objective is to get the parties engaged in\na negotiating process that will relieve pressures both for\na new recourse to the Security Council and for a resumption\nof the fighting. Once a conference is underway, our aim\nwill be to get it to focus on the question of disengagement\nof Egyptian and Israeli forces as a first step, and to avoid\nseeking to come to grips at the outset with the fundamental\nissues of territory and the Palestinians, which would lead\nto an immediate deadlock.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n5\nRealistically, there can be no progress in any peace\nconference until after Israel's December 31 elections, but\nthe appearance of negotiations even without the substance\nwill be helpful on the Arab side. Once substantive negotia-\ntions begin, moreover, we must expect a series of impasses\nwhich will require us to work behind the scenes with Egypt\nand Israel, and probably with Jordan and Israel as well,\nto try to overcome them. As we get into the substantive\nnegotiating phase early next year, we can anticipate some\ndifficult times with the Israelis. For this, we will need\ncapital in the bank with them. The fact that we achieved\na ceasefire agreement for them with Egypt largely on Israeli\nterms, that we earlier had achieved Soviet and Egyptian\nagreement to negotiations which Israel has sought for twenty-\nfive years, and that we are continuing our military and\neconomic support will all help in this respect.\nWhile my efforts to date have focussed largely on the\nEgyptians, Jordanians, and Israelis, I am seeking to establish\nan ongoing dialogue as well with the Syrians. They have come\na long way but still promise to be the most difficult factor\nin any negotiation. And, unlike the Egyptian-Israeli front,\nno agreement has been reached or is in prospect between\nSyria and Israel to stabilize the ceasefire and exchange\nPOWs.\nFinally, we have filled in the Europeans on the results\nof my Middle East trip and in a general way on our thinking\nabout the future. I intend to keep them reasonably briefed\nas we go along, in order to minimize to the extent possible\ntheir inclination to take unhelpful initiatives which can\nhave a negative impact on our own efforts.\nFuture Prospects\nIn assessing future prospects we can, I think, be\ncautiously optimistic about getting peace negotiations\nstarted. Sadat has apparently decided to take a chance\non us and to be accommodating with respect to the ceasefire\nagreement in order to enlist our help once negotiations are\nunderway. The Israelis are reasonably reassured of our basic\ncommitment to their security, but with a bit of underlying\nnervousness that we may seek to press them to modify their\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library:\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n6\nnegotiating positions at the peace conference. The\nJordanians are ready for negotiations, although worried\nthat Egyptian and Palestinian interests may be accommodated\nat their expense. The Palestinians, in fact, are in some\nconfusion, with sentiment growing for them to abandon\ntheir opposition to dealing with Israel and join the\nnegotiations in order not to be left with nothing in the\nend. The Lebanese also want in at an early date.\nFinally, the Soviets are playing an ambivalent role.\nOn the one hand they want to work with us in arranging\njoint U.S.-Soviet auspices, and we are being careful to\nconsult generally with them while pursuing our more\nsubstantive efforts bilaterally with the parties. At\nthe same time, they have adopted a harder line than the\nEgyptians on restoration of the October 22 ceasefire\npositions and seem to be encouraging the Palestinians to\nplay a more active role, which could greatly complicate\nthe job of getting meaningful negotiations started.\nAs we move into the complex situation that lies ahead,\nthe next month or so promises to be one of the most important\nperiods in the search for peace in the Middle East since the\nSix-Day War of 1967.\nNovember 17, 1973\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDistribution approved\nby LSE in S, 12/04/73\n5\n7322860\nTHE WHITE house\nWASHINGTON\nDC\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nNovember 9, 1973\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nZulfikar Ali Bhutto, President of Pakistan\nAbdul Hafeez Parzada, Minister of Law\nAziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign\nAffairs and Defense\nAgha Shahi, Foreign Secretary\nHenry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nSidney Sober, US Charge d'Affaires\nJoseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State\nHarold H. Saunders, NSC Staff\nOPIES TO:\nDATE AND PLACE:\nFriday, November 9 in the Conference Room\nof Prime Minister Bhutto's Residence in\nSC\nRawalpindi, Pakistan\nEA\nODIS\nBhutto:\nWe are delighted to have you here. This is a most\nFiles\nimportant visit, and we wish you every success--you\npersonally, your government and your people. We would\nlike to see the US play the primordial part in a settlement\nin the Middle East.\nKissinger:\nWe are grateful to you for some of the exchanges we have\nhad during the war. Your links to your friends in the Arab\nworld are extremely helpful. Our strategy is very close to\nwhat you put in your letter to the President.\nBhutto:\nWould you like to tell us about your trip so far?\nKissinger:\nWe believe time is ripe for a major effort to achieve peace\nin the Middle East. The way I have been putting it in my\ntalks in the Middle East is that, while the Soviets can supply\nweapons, only the US can bring peace. The Soviets are not\nin a strategic position to provide the outcome that the Arabs want.\nXGDS - 1\nDECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.\nBYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger\nSECRET/NODIS at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 2 -\nKissinger:\nYou, Mr. Prime Minister, are not unfamiliar with some\nof the issues which this situation poses in the United States,\nalthough there have been some interesting paradoxes in\npositions that some of our Senators have taken. One\nSenator, for instance, who had been extremely critical of\nthe secret bombing in Cambodia, suggested that we give\nweapons to Israel secretly. Others who, in 1971, had\nsupported the principle that the US should back India because\nit is the larger power in South Asia immediately during\nthe Middle East war cited the principle that Israel was vastly\noutnumbered and therefore should be defended.\nMore seriously, you will recognize, Mr. Prime Minister,\nthat whatever the origins of the war, some of the principles\nwere not so dissimilar from those in South Asia in 1971.\nParticularly, a victory for Soviet arms would have catas-\ntrophic consequences for world peace. This is one of the\nprincipal reasons why, after a major Egyptian mistake in\nnot accepting our original proposal for a ceasefire, the US\nhad no choice but to maintain the military balance when the\nSoviets began a massive airlift of equipment to Egypt and\nSyria.\nNow we are in the situation where President Sadat feels\nthat this war cannot end with just another armistice. We\nwill have inevitable differences with our friends in Israel\nas we proceed. Let me tell you what it is we are trying\nto do.\nThe first phase of our efforts has been to try to help\nstabilize the ceasefire. We have now achieved agreement\nbetween Egypt and Israel on some general principles for\nestablishing the ceasefire in a more stable way. Here is\nthe text of the six points which we worked out. [The Secretary\nhanded the Prime Minister a copy, and the Prime Minister\nindicated that he had seen it. ]\nThe way we presented the issue was that all of us faced a\nchoice. Either we could spend two months arguing for the\nOctober 22 lines and maybe get Israel to withdraw to them,\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 3 -\nor we could take a more farsighted view and stabilize\nthe ceasefire now, meeting the necessary humanitarian\nrequirements for the Egyptian Third Army. If the latter\ncourse were chosen, then most of our effort could be\nconcentrated on a broader program of disengagement.\nI was quite well impressed with President Sadat. He\nshowed wisdom in accepting something that was less\nthan all of what he wanted--or even all of what he was\nentitled to.\nThis agreement has been published today and in the next\nday or two the two sides will begin negotiations to work\nout the details of implementation. There will be diffi-\nculties in this process. Assuming good will, however,\nwe hope it will be possible to proceed.\nOnce the ceasefire is stabilized, it will then be possible\nto move on to the next phase--the peace talks. In the\nfirst stage of those talks, we envision that the participants\nwould be Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Israel and that they\nwould discuss a broader program of disengagement of\nforces. Later, the participation might be expanded to\ninclude Lebanon and some Palestinian representatives.\nOur hope is that the first phase of the talks could begin\nin the first half of December, but no date has yet been set.\nWe all must recognize that there are a number of realities\nin the situation which will have to be overcome. For one\nthing, Israel has always moved forward, not back. Although\nIsrael probably has no need to stay on the West Bank of the\nCanal, any withdrawal will be difficult. Moreover, the\nbalance between security and legitimacy will not easily be\nestablished.\nA second problem is Arab romanticism and impatience.\nI have personally found it moving and worrying suddenly\nto be a heroic figure in the Arab world. They assume that\nmy past successes will produce miraculous new successes\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 4 -\nin the Middle East. But the problem is that the Arabs\nlook at the last week of other negotiations I have conducted\nand they want to start with those results in the first week\nof their negotiations. They forget that each past success\ntook months if not years to achieve.\nIn other negotiations that we have conducted, the US has\ncontrolled some of the assets. That is not the case in\nthis negotiation.\nOur Arab counterparts must learn some patience. They\nmust learn to think specifically about how we get from here\nto there.\nFinally, we must consider our domestic situation. It is\nnot possible to say, on the one hand, that the US supports\nIsrael for domestic reasons and then to say, on the other\nhand, that if we just flicked a finger, Israel would obey.\nThe very factors which produce conditions which provide\nour influence, also produce the conditions which make it\ndifficult for us to use that influence. The Arabs must give\nus some time to organize domestic support. Already, the\npress is accusing us of having somehow harmed Israel in\nthe agreement that was worked out this week. Yet, we have\nnot done anything yet. We must prevent the merging of the\ncomplex of domestic issues that are called \"Watergate\" and\nthe pressures that can be mobilized on behalf of the Zionist\ncommunity.\nOne subsidiary problem we face is the Arab oil boycott.\nThis is not so much an economic issue for us. Originally,\nthere was some utility in the boycott because it underlined\nthe goals of the Arab world and the fundamentals of the\nenergy problem. Now, it has assumed negative dimensions.\nIt is not crippling. If it were, a great country like the US\ncould not accept it. But it is extremely annoying. And if it\ncontinues, it will be used in our intense domestic debate\nfirst by those who seek any weapon to use against the\nPresident and then by those who are opposed to an Arab-\nIsraeli settlement and will claim the US should not submit\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 5 -\nto Arab blackmail. The only way we can position our-\nselves toward this problem is to say that an Arab-Israeli\nsettlement is in the national interest and in the interest\nof world peace. We do not want repeated in the Middle\nEast what was done in the subcontinent. We do not want\nthe Soviets to increase their prominence in the Middle East.\nWe are prepared to make a move toward peace if the Arabs\ncan show patience and let events mature. But to do this,\nwe need their cooperation. We need to do what must be done\nas an act of free will. Before we will yield to blackmail,\nwe will join with the Soviets and impose a settlement.\nFrom my last few days in the Middle East, I am happy to\nreport that there is a great deal of good will. What I cannot\njudge at this early time is the staying power or how the Arabs\nwill handle the pressures on them. Having spent two long\nevening discussions with Prime Minister Meir, I assure\nyou there will be very tough going on that side. When\nMr. Sisco went to Israel the other day, all he did was to\ntake to the Israelis a proposal they wanted, and even that\nwas difficult. It is in Israel's interest to bring about a\nsituation where the Arabs are disillusioned with us, With\nyour knowledge of the US, perhaps you can give the Arabs\nsome insight.\nBhutto:\nThank you. Your confidence in making these remarks will\nbe respected.\nFirst, I do not want to tell you what your own interests are.\nI want you to know that, as Prime Minister of one of the\nlargest Muslim states, I have very good relations with the\nArabs, with Turkey, and with Iran. Pakistan is committed\nto a policy of friendship with those countries--but above all\nwith the US.\nIn 1956, Pakistani public opinion became, as now, spon-\ntaneously worked up. In 1967, the same thing happened.\nWe tried, but it was impossible to keep feelings under control.\nI came back from the US with every intention of consolidating\nrelations. Then the war broke out and there was great concern\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant. to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 6 -\nfor the Arab countries and for what the US was doing for\nIsrael. Our response was to give assurances that we were\nbeing helpful. Several days after the war began, we were\nbeing badgered with requests from Syria and Egypt for\nsupport. We have pilots in Syria, Jordan, and the Persian\nGulf. They wanted to use our pilots but I refused initially.\nFinally, I said that they could fly if they volunteered, but\nprivately I sent them instructions not to be in a hurry to\nvolunteer, so they gave excuses. Finally, they pressed for\narms and pilots, and we did send some pilots. I want to\ntell you exactly what happened. I do not want to be in a\nposition of not telling you the truth.\nKissinger:\nIt will be a new day in diplomacy when everyone tells truth.\nBhutto:\nThe Egyptians and Syrians as well as the other Arab countries\ndeeply appreciate what we did.\nThe Tunku then came to us and proposed an Islamic settlement.\nHe showed me a call for a summit which stated as one objective\nof the conference strong criticism of the US role. I want to\nsponsor such a conference, but I told him that the objective\nwould have to be differently stated. So he had the letter\nchanged and on that basis, I agreed. He has talked to King\nFaisal and to the Shah.\nKissinger:\nThe Shah, after our discussions, concluded that this might\nnot be the most opportune time for such a conference. The\nreason is that the parties to the conference would just inflame\neach other. We are in such a delicate phase trying to get\nthe peace conference started. We recognize that it will\nprobably deadlock and that it will have to go into secret\nchannels. This kind of Islamic conference may be better than\nan Arab summit, but it would be better a couple of months\nfrom now.\nBhutto:\nThis is not our initiative. We are not particularly enthusiastic\nabout it.\nKissinger:\nThe Shah favored an Islamic to an Arab summit.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library:\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 7 -\nBhutto:\nWell, we will not press this now. Going back to the\nmain point, we want a settlement, and we recognize there\nwill have to be give and take to achieve this. We are\nhappy to help promote what you are doing.\nKissinger:\nThe Arabs will not get all they want. We will take the\nliberty to keep you informed.\nBhutto:\nPresident Sadat and the Syrian President may visit here\nsoon. I am trying to help get them closer together.\nKissinger:\nTell the Syrian President for me that we are prepared to\ntalk at any level he wishes. We recognize that Syria is an\nessential component of a peace settlement. I did not go to\nSyria this time because the opportunity arose too late.\nBhutto:\nI hope you will be the architect of this peace.\nKissinger:\nI will make a strong personal effort. We will have to\nappoint a negotiator to be at the peace conference full time,\nbut I will supervise it personally.\nBhutto:\nYou have overcome the problem of whether there should be\nwithdrawal first or negotiations first?\nKissinger:\nIt always pains Joe Sisco to hear me say this, because\nhe negotiated Resolution 242. But the essence of 242 is that\nno one can understand what it means.\nBhutto:\nWill Israel insist on a geographical concept of security?\nThere is no question that the war should have taught them\nthat this is not a workable concept.\nKissinger:\nTheir philosophy has been: Why should we pay? We won the\nwar. The US is not interested in having massive Soviet\nintervention, and we stopped it. In one sense, Israel has\nlost because a protracted war will wear Israel down even if\nit wins every battle. Geographical security is not enough,\nespecially now that there are surface-to-surface missiles\nin the area. Israel has to understand that frontiers alone\ndo not guarantee security. President Sadat has some ideas\non this score, which, while not entirely acceptable to Israel,\nwill provide something to work with.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS(XGDS)\n- 8 -\nBhutto:\nHe is a reasonable man. What about Jerusalem? I assume\nyou have heard a great deal about this from King Faisal.\nKissinger:\nFaisal discussed his philosophy of history with me and the\ncommon interests that exist between Zionism and Communism.\nHe also discussed the nature of the Jewish conspiracy in the\nworld. Finally, he described his concern for Jerusalem.\nIt seems to me that we have to tackle Jerusalem last.\nLogically, a solution would be easy because there is no\nreal security threat to anyone from Jerusalem. It would\nbe possible to work out arrangements where the city could\nbe Arab and Jewish alike. Hussein is reasonable. All he\nwants is a little stake in Jerusalem.\nHussein feels this will be very difficult. When he said all\nhe wanted was access to some of the holy places, Israel\nwould not hear of it. They have their religious parties to be\nconcerned about it. So the best approach seems to be to put\nthis issue at the end of the process.\nBhutto:\nHow does the detente with the USSR hold?\nKissinger:\nTo the Soviets, it is a tactical device. We need it for our\ndomestic situation and for peace in a nuclear age. We were\nnot astonished that the Soviets tried to gain some advantage.\nWe were surprised at the provocation that produced our alert.\nThey demanded that we join them in intervening to consolidate\nthe ceasefire and threatened to intervene alone if we refused.\nIt was a very strong letter and we had no choice. But for\nour own reasons, we will go back to detente.\nBhutto:\nWe will welcome it if detente works. In September, I had a\nemonition that the Soviets might try to get away with\nsomething. One can make two points: One can argue that\ndetente made it easier to reach a settlement. One can also\nargue that without detente there could have been a confrontation\nlike that over Cuba.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\n- 9 -\nIn our own area, the Soviets are showing interest in\nAfghan military matters. We have information that a\nSoviet military team has been on the Afghan-Pakistani\nborder. On the other hand, the Soviets have told us that\nthey are urging restraint in Afghanistan.\nAhmed:\nYes, a team of Soviet military experts did inspect the\nborder area and observed a series of night exercises.\nKissinger:\nWe would certainly not look lightly on any outward push\nfrom Afghanistan.\nAt this point the meeting broke and the Prime Minister and the Secretary\nspent twenty minutes alone together before parting to attend Prime Minister\nBhutto's dinner for the Secretary at the Guest House next door to the\nresidence.\nH.A.\nHarold H. Saunders\nSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nINFORMATION\nWASHINGTON\nNovember 7, 1973\nSECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nB\nSUBJECT:\nMeeting with Sadat\nWe have just received a brief report from Secretary Kissinger upon\nthe conclusion of a three-hour session with President Sadat of Egypt.\nAgreement has been reached on the following proposal, which will\nbe communicated to the Israelis.\n1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the\nceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.\n2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will\nbegin immediately to settle the question of the return to\nthe October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on\nthe disengagement and separation of forces.\n3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food,\nwater and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of\nSuez will be evacuated.\n4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of\nnon-military supplies to the East Bank.\n5. The Israeli check points on the Cairo-Suez road will\nbe replaced by UN check points. At the Suez end of the road,\nan Israeli officer can participate with the UN to supervise\nthe non-military nature of the cargo.\n6. As soon as the UN check points are established on\nthe Cairo-Suez road, there will be an exchange of all POWs,\nincluding wounded.\nSECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be e declassified.\nSECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nThere is also an oral understanding which states that Egypt undertakes\nto ease the blockade at Bab El-Mandab. Assistant Secretary Sisco\nis flying to Tel Aviv now to seek the concurrence of the Israeli\nGovernment.\nAn oral message has also been transmitted from you to Prime Minister\nMeir in advance of Assistant Secretary Sisco's arrival.\nSecretary Kissinger has informed me of the agreement he\nhas worked out with President Sadat and which has been\nsent to you for your consideration. In addition, there is\nan oral understanding between the United States and Egypt\nregarding the blockade at Bab El-Mandab which Assistant\nSecretary Sisco will convey to you. Having read the\nrecords of your conversation with Secretary Kissinger, it\nis my firm conviction that the agreement reached will be\nsatisfactory to you.\nAgreement has also been reached in principle on the resumption of\ndiplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States, and the\nfollowing announcement will be made by Ron Ziegler at noon today.\nThe Governments of the United States and of Egypt have\nagreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an\nearly date. The two Governments have also agreed that\nin the meantime the respective interests sections of the\ntwo countries will be raised immediately to the Ambas-\nsadorial level. The Government of Egypt has named\nAmbassador Ashraf Ghorbal. The United States has\ndesignated Ambassador Hermann Eilts. They will take\nup their posts promptly.\nSECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been, determined to be declassified.\nNov. 7, 1973\nRevised\n1. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the\nceasefire called for by the UN Security Council.\n2. Both sides agree that discussions between them will\nbegin immediately to settle the question of the return to\nthe October 22 positions in the framework of agreement on\nthe disengagement and separation of forces under the\nauspices of the United Nations.\n3. The town of Suez will receive daily supplies of food,\nwater and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town\nof Suez will be evacuated.\n4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-\nmilitary supplies to the East Bank.\n5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez Road will\nbe replaced by UN checkpoints. At the Suez end of the\nroad, Israeli officers can participate with the UN to\nsupervise the non-military nature of the cargo at the\nbank of the Canal.\n6. As soon as the UN checkpoints are established on the\nCairo-Suez Road, there will be an exchange of all POWs,\nincluding wounded.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nNovember 9, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSecretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting\nwith King Faisal:\nI met with King Faisal for three hours at the Royal Palace in Riyadh,\nlate Thursday evening November 8.\nFirst I gave him word of the agreement we had worked out with the\nEgyptians and Israelis to stabilize the ceasefire and ensure relief\nsupplies to the Egyptain Third Army. He was pleased at the news.\nI then outlined again the strategy you intended to pursue in the coming\nweeks: to prepare the ground carefully in order to move dècisively\nin the near future. Faisal was encouraged by this and assured me\nseveral times of his confidence in you and of his friendship for the\nUnited States.\nIn this context I raised the matter of easing the oil boycott. An\nenergy crisis in America, I told him, would make your position very\ndifficult. It would only strengthen the hand of those forces in the U.S.\nwho were resisting a just settlement and who were seeking to under-\nmine Presidential authority generally. I made the point subtelly that\nwe could handle an oil shortage economically but that its real signifi-\ncance was political and psychological as I described.\nKing Faisal assured me that nothing would please him more than to\nbe able to maintain and even increase oil supplies to his American\nfriends. But he emphasized he was under pressure from the radicals.\nHe pointed out that all Arabs were united on the basic issues and he\nhoped we would move as expeditiously as possible toward a settlement.\nHe did indicate that he would do his best to overcome his dilemma.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nImmediately after our meeting the King sent his two principal advisers\none after the other to encourage us in our present course. Prince\nFahd, his Second Deputy Prime Minister, came by for a half hour, and\nForeign Minister Saqqaf then met with me for an hour. Fahd said he\nwould do his best to get the oil flowing again. The Foreign Minister\nsaid that Saudi Arabia was looking for an excuse to get out of its\nuncomfortable position of confrontation with the United States.\nForeign Minister Saqqaf came by again this morning, November 9,\nbefore my departure. He said Saudi Arabia needed some pretext to\nchange its position. He thought the announcement of the opening of\nthe peace negotiations (now planned for November 20) could be the\noccasion for a formal communication by you to Faisal on the oil boycott.\nHe thought the result might well be favorable.\nI invited King Faisal to Washington on your behalf. He said he could\nnot come until after some more progress had been made towards peace.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nB. HAK MEMCONS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTRP SENSITIVE/MISC\nS/S-7322239\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS: King Hassan\nSecretary Kissinger\nAlec Toumayan (Interpreter)\nDATE AND TIME: Monday, November 5, 1973 11:00 p.m. to 12:15 a.m.\nPLACE: Office of the King\nThe King's Private Residence\nRabat, Morocco\nHIS MAJESTY: Morocco feels very deeply, and I feel it\nparticularly deeply myself, that your country and President\nNixon are showing a mark of consideration towards us in this\nvisit that you are now paying our country. Under the present\ncircumstances this is a gesture that is unforgettable. My\nsmall country will do all it can do to facilitate the task of\nthe United States. Consider our support as granted to you.\nDR. KISSINGER: I appreciate your courteous words very much.\nYou are aware of the great importance we attach to our rela-\ntions to Morocco. I want to express in particular our deep\nappreciation for your assistance in setting up the meeting which\nGeneral Walters just had and on which he has reported to me\nfully.\nHIS MAJESTY: We have a number of items on the agenda: our\nbilateral relations; the Middle East; Africa and the Medi-\nterranean. We can talk about them tonight and tomorrow. How\ndo you wish to proceed?\nDR. KISSINGER: I think we should cover all of these and you\ndecide the order. Perhaps we could have a preliminary dis-\ncussion on the Middle East tonight and go on tomorrow. I also\nwant to talk about our bilateral relations, and in particular\nthe plans for Your Majesty's visit to the United States in 1974.\nHIS MAJESTY: We shall then talk about the Middle East first.\nDR. KISSINGER: I should welcome Your Majesty's impressions.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nNLN09-01/11000 Per Hr. 6/18/2012\nBy RS 1m/H NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nHIS MAJESTY. I will be brief because by now the problems\nhave become clear. You will encounter three categories of\nleaders: those who want peace who have the courage to say so;\nthose who want peace but will wait for others to speak first;\nand those who do not want peace because peace is their domestic\nenemy.\nDR. KISSINGER: Who falls into each category?\nHIS MAJESTY: Those who want peace are first Morocco. Then\nTunisia, Egypt, Syria.\nDR. KISSINGER: I'm not going to Syria.\nHIS MAJESTY: Also Jordan. In the second category are those\nwho want peace but will not say so.\nDR. KISSINGER: Who, for example?\nHIS MAJESTY: Saudia Arabia. But it will follow. Kuwait.\nAlgeria. But it will follow also. Then there are those\nfor whom peace will be a problem although they understand\nthat peace is needed: Iraq and Israel.\nLet's take the last point first. In Morocco we are very\ntolerant on religious matters. I was brought up that way\nby my father, Mohamed V. We were not an independent\ncountry and the Germans wanted us to treat the Jews in\nMorocco as they were treated in France, but my father re-\nfused. He said the Jews in Morocco were totally Moroccan\ncitizens. This is our tradition. We were nursed by Jewish\nnurses. Some of our associates are Jews. I am very tolerant\nmyself.\nBut Israel's problem has become a distinct problem since the\nemigration from Socialist countries has penetrated so deeply\ninto Israel. You see, when Abba Eban speaks in Arabic over\nthe radio, his Arabic is as good as mine. Moshe Dayan did\nnot lose an eye fighting the Arabs. He lost an eye in the\nBritish Army. Tomorrow we can sit down together eating the\nsame food with our fingers, and there will be absolutely no\ndifference between us. We both respect Jerusalem. We respect\nit because of its Mosques. They respect it because of Solomon's\ntemple. We both respect it because of the Holy Sepulchre of\nChrist. But Socialist emigrants do not have this respect and\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nunderstanding. Furthermore, they constitute a danger\nto the United States if 30,000 of them come in to Israel,\n10 of them will be eligible for a U.S. visa and will come\ninto your country as spies.\nDR. KISSINGER: You feel they are all under Soviet discipline.\nHIS cadres. MAJESTY: Yes, I do or, if not all of them, at least the\nDR. KISSINGER: We asked ourselves why the Soviets allowed\nthe emigration to go on even during the war.\nHIS MAJESTY: They are in conflict with the Palestinians on\nthis point. The Palestinians do not agree with them on allow-\ning this emigration. Israel has been at war since it has\nexisted. It is easy to govern a country at war. It is very\ndifficult to govern a country in peace time because of the\nrestriction in customs and attitudes. In war time you see a\nDo Not Enter sign and you obey it strictly. In peace time you\nlook at it and disregard it.\nDR. KISSINGER: We see it now in Israel after the cease fire.\nTheir domestic problems are coming to the fore.\nHIS MAJESTY: In 1965 at the Arab leaders meeting in Casablanca,\nI told my Arab colleagues, \"You can choose between war now or\npeace now. If you choose peace, then you must take Israel in\nmillion. This created a scandal.\nthe Arab \" league. They will be four million. You will be eighty\nDR. KISSINGER: But you were right.\nHIS MAJESTY: I was right and I'm still right today.\nDR. KISSINGER: I told Abba Eban that I thought Israel would\njoin the United Arab Republic. It has a calling as a Middle\nEast nation, not as an appendage of the United States.\nHIS MAJESTY: This is a natural destiny for Israel. But today\nIsrael is more of a U. S. problem than an Arab problem. Why\ndo I say that? The Arabs have just had a test against Israel;\nthe United States will now have a test with Israel.\nDR. KISSINGER: I agree with everything you have said SO far.\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nHIS MAJESTY: We, as a friend of the United States, want\nto help you win that test.\nDR. KISSINGER: At this point we need the support of the\nArab leaders who are moderate and who understand the West.\nHIS MAJESTY. One must not confess to be moderate rather\nthan to be wise. I consider myself wise but not moderate.\nWhen you play cards, there is one card called the Joker and\nif you have it, you can win the game. I think we have this\ncard in those who met with General Walters. The Palestinian\nissue has always been an aphrodisiac for the Arabs, for Nasser,\nfor the Syrians, the Iraqis and the Algerians. We have\nhelped the Palestinians as far back as 1965, but no one has\nknown of it. We don't need to have it spread about.\nDR. KISSINGER: What is your assessment of General Walters'\nopening demarche?\nHIS MAJESTY: Excellent! He is honest, straightforward, open.\nHalf an hour after their conversation began, and I had left the\nhouse, one of my officers, Dlimi, (Col. Dlimi, Intelligence\nChief) heard a lot of commotion in the room. He ran back think-\ning they were fighting, but they were clapping one another on\nthe back and laughing. They acknowledged to me that if they\nhad listened to me in 1969, they would not have wasted a lot of\ntime. Then I met with Nahum Goldmann at length; Goldmann asked\nme to arrange a face to face meeting with the Palestinians.\nThey let that opportunity slip and lost much time. At this\nmeeting General Walters made them happy. In two hours he\ncreated, they told me, a human contact that they had not\nattained with Le Duc Tho in a year and a half. I told them\nthat that was because Le Duc Tho was yellow and Abraham had\ncreated the Arabs, the Christians and the Jews, but not the\nyellow race.\nGeneral Walters will tell you that the Palestinians want more\ncontacts after you come back from Peking.\nDR. KISSINGER: We will continue to use General Walters for\na while. We have to, so that if it becomes known, we can\nsay that it is an intelligence mission, not a diplomatic\nmission, and we can say we are using him for information, not\nfor negotiations.\nHIS MAJESTY: I repeat that the Palestinian is the Joker in\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nthe deck of cards. No one will dare do anything against\nthem. General Walters told them the Russians can give you\nweapons but only the United States can give you land.\nDR. KISSINGER: I told him to say that to them.\nHIS MAJESTY: They understood that very well. General\nWalters said there were three conditions. They can have\nno dreams such as pushing Israel into the sea. They must\nwork things out with King Hussein, and they cannot ask the\nU.S. to do anything against Hussein. And if there are any\nacts of violence, the contacts will be broken. They agreed.\nI talked to the Palestinians again and they are greatly\nworried that Iraq and Lebanon will now stage actual violence\nagainst the Palestinian leaders to further divide the front\nfor the benefit of Habash. Iraq is spending some six million\ndollars in Beirut. General Walters confirmed that the Russians\nare spreading news in Lebanon that the U.S. is about to attempt\nsomething against the Palestinians. The Palestinians said,\nin Beirut?\" and General Walters said he was giving them his\n\"Is the United States involved in these goings on against you\nhe knows you cannot shoot down ideas with bullets.\nword as a soldier that the U.S. was not involved. He said that\nDR. KISSINGER: We have absolutely nothing to do with this.\nHIS MAJESTY: Yesterday I had again information from the two\nPalestinians that they feared for their safety in Lebanon. In\nEgypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon the leftists are spend-\ning some six million dollars to wipe them out. If the U.S. can\nconvince Israel that in law as well as in politics a\narrangement is better than a good trial and a poor peace poor is\nbetter than a good war if the U.S. can demonstrate to the\nPalestinians that they can trust the U.S., then no Arab nation\nwill fail to follow. They all speak of Resolution 242 and of\nthe Palestinian rights and there is no third condition\nResolution 242 is well known. The Palestinian rights were anymore. not\nand known, and if you take that issue out, peace will then slowly\narduously return to the Middle East. It will be a long\nprocess and you and President Nixon will have to be very patient.\nFor DR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with your analysis, Your Majesty.\nthat thirty years Israel asked for direct negotiations, and\nested. we are offering them, they do not appear to be inter- now\nis Israel faces quite a domestic problem from peace, very and it\ndifficult for Israel to understand that the U.S. wants to\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nmake peace. Israel is so used to the U.S. being its un-\nconditional ally that the fact that now we want to make\npeace comes as a psychological shock for them, and this\nis a most important point.\nHIS MAJESTY: Let us not be hard; in their place I would\nreact in exactly the same manner.\nDR. KISSINGER: Even if they believe the insanity of an\nArab government, they can see the prospect of Habash ruling\nin ten or fifteen years. They always look at the worst pos-\nsible consequence. We cannot leave things to go on as they\nhave been up to 1973. We have need now of some time and con-\nfidence on the part of the Arab nations, because if the Arab\nnations demand too much too soon, they will get nothing. We\nmust have time to organize ourselves and take care of our\ndomestic situation, and I do not mean Watergate. We cannot\ntackle the Israeli problem without firming up our domestic\nsituation. Right now I have no plan. We need a direction in\nwhich to go and a strategy to apply, and then we can set up a\nplan. We cannot begin by having a plan.\nHIS MAJESTY: You want to be a pragmatist?\nDR. KISSINGER: I could go to Cairo with a plan, as Secretary\nRogers did in 1971, and then the plan would be published and\nafter three months there would be nothing. My tactic is not\nto lay down a plan but to organize all the points and then\nafter that to move very quickly. I could talk about Resolution\n242 or 338-these are all generalities. We can resolve the\nproblem with the cooperation of the Arab countries.\nHIS MAJESTY: You can count on two countries, Egypt and Syria.\nSadat has proved himself ready to abandon the Russians. I\nhave known him for a long time and I know him well. He is a\nvery serious man and a Moslem. Nasser was an atheist; Sadat\nis a Moslem. He will do all he can to help you.\nSyria has given even more evidence than Egypt because for two\nyears it has withstood pressures from the Soviets to sign a\ntreaty of peace and friendship. My troops and my officers\nwho have been there have seen those pressures to get Syria to\nsign the same kind of treaty as Iraq and Egypt had signed. But\nyou see Egypt and Syria are capitalist countries, and the in-\ntelligentsia is capitalist and cannot be leftist. Your problem\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nTOP SECRET\nis not that of Dr. Kissinger versus Sadat, or Dr. Kissinger\nversus President Assad. Your problem is to make up for lost\ntime, time that the U.S. has lost. They will believe you,\nand they will ask you for the beginning of some evidence from\nthe U.S. with which they can carry their people.\nEgypt has a Communist party, and it has some Maoists. Syria\nhas the extremist Baathists which want to merge with Iraq.\nThey need help. If I were the United States I would try to give\nthem evidence of my good will. I admit that the gap is very\nwide--it is not an ideological gap; it is a sentimental gap. It\nis therefore both deep and easy to bridge, just as milk boils quickly\nand overflows but subsides just as quickly. You have a very small\ncore to the problem.\nDR. KISSINGER: We need about one month to organize ourselves in\nthe United States. For instance, everyone knows that a convoy is\non its way to the Third Army and that I personally insisted upon\nthis to Israel. All understand that I talked to Israel about the\nprinciple of October 22. The morning before I left I received\nfifteen calls from Congressmen criticizing me.\nYour Majesty, we have to choose the battle we want to fight and\nwhen we want to fight it. We cannot expend all our armament.\nThe strategy of the Egyptians is to pick a small point and wage\nan epic struggle, and after three weeks everyone has lost sight\nof the issue. We cannot have our energies absorbed in trivia.\nBecause while the Arabs are thus in a state of confrontation with\nus, Israel then makes no concessions at all. We are determined\nWe not to permit world policies to be shaped by three million people.\nwant the security of Israel to be insured. We will\nIsrael to make major concessions and not stay where they press are. I\nagree with your assessment that the Palestinian is the Joker in\nthe deck and that we must carry on that approach very secretly.\nMinisters and meeting so I could tell them, \"Let us fight Israel\nHIS MAJESTY: This was my reason for asking for the Foreign\nlet us not fight the United States. Israel begins\nagainst the United States.\nand if the Arabs do not watch out, Israel will pit the Arabs\nflict and then leaves the Arabs in confrontation with the a U.S., con-\nDR. in KISSINGER: That is why I say that an oil embargo is\nthe interests of the Arab countries. I believe we must not\nsee this tapering off. If houses are cold in the States this now\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nwinter and people are short of fuel, this will arouse public\nopinion against the Arabs.\nHIS MAJESTY: If there is no fuel in Europe and the Europeans\ndo not have their cars to drive, this will certainly provoke\nthem against the Arabs.\nI wish to turn to what I see as a serious domestic problem in\nthe United States. Since 1942 the United States has not de-\nmobilized. You went to war in Europe, then in Korea, then in\nViet-Nam and you have armed the Middle East. For thirty years\nthe arms industry of the United States has operated at 100 per-\ncent of its capacity.\nDR. KISSINGER: Let us say about 50 percent.\nHIS MAJESTY: Well, 50 to 75 percent. It should be part of your\npolicy, and President Nixon should say this, that you would tell\nyour people, \"For thirty years we have armed the world; let us\nstop being the gendarme wherever a conflict arises. \" Perhaps\nI am a poet. I recently reread the history of the United States.\nIt is not your calling to be the world's gendarme. It is your\ncalling as a nation to welcome men of good will and intelligence\nand honesty, and it would certainly help your way of life.\nDR. KISSINGER: This is indeed our historical calling, but we\nwere trapped by the enfeeblement of Europe where in a few years\nwe had to take the place of the UK and France and Germany and\nlater of Japan. The rapid transition from isolation to the\nfirst power in the world brought a trauma. I don't think we\ncan ever go back to the innocence that preceded the two world\nwars. But we can indeed reduce our involvement and be\nselective in the areas where we want to become involved. If\nwe look at it now, there is no law of nature that says that the\npolitical future of South Viet-Nam matters to the United States.\nBut once an American administration had become involved, to\nlose was different from never having entered. President Nixon\nis attempting to reduce our involvement and will continue to do\nSoviet penetration.\nso, but we must withdraw very carefully so as not to permit\nHIS MAJESTY: The Soviets are attempting right now to gain the\ngood will of the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat did not come to\nthe meeting with General Walters because they had just received\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n9\nTOP SEGRET/NODIS\na document from the Soviet Union which tells them that the\nSoviet Union will impose their presence and be in effect\ntheir sponsor at the Peace Conference. The Palestinians told\nme and General Walters that they can never become a Communist\nstate. Historically the Palestinian people are the keepers of\nthe holy places of Jerusalem. It is inconceivable that they\nwould set up a lay state. They can only set up a Moslem nation,\nand they will never go over to the Russians. On Jerusalem, they\ntold me this morning that at the very least, they would want to\nretain the former Arab Jerusalem and would let the Israelis\nkeep the Jewish Jerusalem. This means that the Mosque of el-\nAqsa, the Holy Sepulchre, would be under the Palestinians, and\nthe Israelis would have Jewish Jerusalem.\nDR. KISSINGER: Jerusalem is the most difficult issue of all. I\nused to think it would be easy to give up a Mosque, but it is\nalmost impossible for the Israelis to give it up.\nHIS MAJESTY: This will create a very serious problem. A number\nof African countries have already broken with Israel because\nof Egypt, which is an African nation. If Israel maintains itself\nin Jerusalem, the entire Moslem world will focus on this and will\ndevelop a fixation. The Shah of Iran will say, \"I don't know\nthe Arabs and I don't know the Palestinians, but I do know\nJerusalem,\" and this will spread all the way to Nigeria.\nThis will become a much more serious problem because it is a\nreligious problem, not a political problem. In the Twentieth\nCentury it is a shame to continue to have wars of religion.\nThe Israelis will find this is more serious than fighting inch\nby inch for a border and they will lose a great deal of support-\nnot only the Shah of Iran who claims to be a descendant of\nDarius and therefore an Aryan, but they will also lose the\nMoslem populations of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, of\nIndia, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the so-called Moslems of the\nPhilippines; add the Black Muslims to this, perhaps, and you\nhave total turmoil.\nIsrael says that it wants secure borders, but does half of\nJerusalem constitute a secure border?\nDR. KISSINGER: The point is that the religious orthodox\nJewish party has the balance in their congress and has an\nobsession on this point. I used to think the Jerusalem\nproblem was easy; now I'm convinced that Jerusalem is the\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n10\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nmost difficult problem and should not be taken up first.\nHIS MAJESTY: Let us look at it from another angle. We will\nsettle the problem with Israel when it has leaders who belong\nto our generation.\nDR. KISSINGER: I fully agree with you.\nHIS MAJESTY: I can talk to an Israeli of my age and we under-\nstand each other. So the problem is inside Israel. Golda\nMeir, Moshe Dayan--their generation is the obstacle.\nDR. KISSINGER: Once the peace process is in motion I feel that\nGolda Meir will leave.\nHIS MAJESTY: I emphasize the Jerusalem problem because you\nare going to encounter it everywhere and in particular will\nyou encounter it with great rigidity from King Faisal and sub-\nsequently from the Palestinians themselves.\nDR. KISSINGER: We have to begin with one big step. The Israelis\ncannot give up one inch. We have to get a big step to begin.\nHIS MAJESTY: We need enough oxygen to sustain us throughout\nthat period and have a period of calm.\nDR. KISSINGER: I advocate starting up the negotiation process\nin December and having the negotiations begin in January.\nHIS MAJESTY: The important thing is to put your foot in the\nstirrup and be up in the saddle. Once you saddle up, your on\nyour way. For years I have had the experience of negotiating\nwith the French and the Spanish, and it was not easy.\nDR. KISSINGER: Your country is the first Arab country that I\nvisit. Will Sadat understand the strict need for secrecy and\nconfidence?\nHIS MAJESTY. With your pledge to him, he will.\nDR. KISSINGER: But can he keep quiet? Because my guarantee\n1S useless if he repeats it. I have consistently said I will\nnot promise what I cannot do. I will therefore promise less\nthan the Russians promise, but we will deliver on what we promise,\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n11\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nand I have never broken my word.\nBut my promises cannot\nbe broadcast over Cairo Radio.\nHIS MAJESTY: I was surprised to see that in his press con-\nference Sadat broke the news about your coming two days in\nadvance of the date, the Thursday, on which it had been agreed\nto announce your coming. Of course, Sadat is carrying a\nheavy legacy, Nasser's legacy. But I respect Sadat, and I\ndid not respect Nasser. With King Faisal I don't know how\nthings will go for you. He has changed much in the last two\nyears.\nDR. KISSINGER: King Faisal has it in his power to destroy\neverything, because if he persists in his attitude, we will\nwithdraw our diplomacy. We cannot expose ourselves to black-\nmail.\nHIS MAJESTY: He does not govern alone. He has princes and\nadvisers; there is a Syrian adviser, Dr. Rashin Pharaon, Prince\nSultan and Prince Fahd. Perhaps you could have them contacted\nor reached.\nI want to congratulate you on your brilliant strategy in\ninviting the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister to Washington.\nFor six months, as you know, we have had Moroccan troops in\nSyria and our influence has been such that Syria is less\nradical now. We had no diplomatic relations before, It is\na difficult, uphill fight for President Assad all the way.\nI know that you have studied the Arab world, but you have to\nlive in it to understand that it is even worse than the tropical\nforest in which you hack a path today and it is covered over the\nnext day so you have to keep it open every day. It is full of\ncontradictions, where you see a capitalist country going Commu-\nnist and a free country following a path of single party and\nsingle trade union regime. All the countries have lied to\ntheir people for fifteen years. They said they would throw\nIsrael into the sea, and it is hard for them to say now that\nthey were in error. This can go on for four or five years but\nnot indefinitely. As Lincoln said about fooling all of the\npeople all of the time. So we live in a very special world-\nI am an Arab myself, I am of this world, and it is very much\nlike a pilot coming in for a landing and having to execute a\ntotally different approach to the runway. The approach is\ndifferent as you reach Tunisia. It begins to change.\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n12\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nDR. KISSINGER: Will you be contacting some of the leaders\nthat I shall meet after I leave you?\nHIS MAJESTY: I will do so if you wish.\nDR. KISSINGER: If you would, it would be extremely valuable\nto impress upon them the necessity not to act out of any\nromanticism but to act in a cool, calm, calculated manner.\nThe Arab leaders believe I can do something. Strangely\nenough, they believe that because I am a Jew I cannot be\naccused of anti-Semitism and can settle things where others\nhave not. Perhaps this is true. But they look only at the\nlast week of negotiations and not at the many months that\npreceded the last week of negotiations. You referred to your\nown experience of negotiations, Your Majesty, and you know\nthat it is a very difficult, complicated process.\nHIS MAJESTY: I cannot reach Sadat over the telephone because\nthe lines are tapped. When will you see him?\nDR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow night.\nHIS MAJESTY: I can cable my ambassador to Cairo, ask him to\nseek a meeting with Sadat, and my ambassador will convey the\nfollowing message to Sadat: \"I have met with Dr. Kissinger.\nIt is my impression that he is a charming person but on matters\nof issue he is very exact and precise; he is not inclined to be\na romanticist or a poet. He wants to look at an issue from the\nangle of success, not failure.\" I will further say that my\nimpression is that Dr. Kissinger is an honorable man and can be\ntrusted. I believe this, and I will tell Sadat SO,\nDR. KISSINGER: It is essential at this point to build con-\nfidence.\nHIS MAJESTY: I will emphasize to Sadat that you have told me of\nthe importance of preserving confidence, and I will tell him\nthat those are the impressions I have formed after meeting you.\nDR. KISSINGER: This would help tremendously.\nHIS MAJESTY: This message will go out right away and will get\nto Cairo before you arrive.\nYou must understand that our people are very sensitive to the\nlyrical quality of Arab speech. The Germans respond to music,\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n13\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nthe French to perfume and cuisine, the Arabs respond to\nlyricism. That is why it is said that nothing can excel\nthe Koran, because that is the highest point reached by\nthe language. You can sweep a crowd with a speech. You\ncan sweep it into the Suez Canal, where they will all sink.\nA great deal of will power is needed to restrain oneself from\nmaking speeches. But I know that the hour is late and the\njet lag makes itself felt after a long trip. Tomorrow, as\nI have indicated, we shall meet with some of your associates\nand some of mine for about fifteen minutes and then we will\nresume our tete-a-tete.\nDR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow we can talk some more about this\npoint and then about our bilateral relations and about\nAfrica.\nHIS MAJESTY: I will now walk you back to the villa. It\nwill give me a little exercise.\nTOP\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTRP SENSITIVE\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\n7327134\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS\nKing Hassan, II\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nAlec Toumayan, Interpreter\nTIME AND DATE\n10 50 a. m. to Noon\nTuesday, November 6, 1973\nPLACE\nThe Royal Palace\nRabat, Morocco\nSUBJECT\nSecond Tete -a Tete Meeting\nKing Hassan I would like to read to you the text of a message I\nwill send to President Sadat if you concur\n\"Following my meeting with Secretary Kissinger, we are\nhappy to give Your Excellency our first impressions, our first\npersonal impressions of the man himself. In light of the importance\nSecretary Kissinger attaches to our problem, it is my feeling that\nhe is equipped with considerable goodwill and good intentions. We\nare convinced, Your Excellency, that if he reaches the stage of\nmaking a commitment, that he will do all in his power to honor his\ncommitment. It further appears to us that he does not follow classic\ndiplomatic intentions and he prefers to remain far from emotions\nand imagination, preferring to tackle problems and realities in a\ncool, calm and objective fashion. We insist upon our chief impression\nthat if he gets into a commitment, he will honor it 11\nSecretary Kissinger Thank you, Your Majesty, this is extremely\nuseful.\nKing Hassan This will go out in three or four hours to my Ambassador\nin Cairo with instructions to deliver immediately to President Sadat.\nShall we now talk about the United States and Africa.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nBy R/WIH NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n2\nSecretary Kissinger The area I know least is Africa. We have not\npursued a very active policy there. It would be helpful if Your Majesty\ngave me his thoughts. The African States are like no others. Their\npolitical structure is less clearly defined. Their foreign policy listens\nmore to emotions. In that part of the world there are more countries\nwhose origin is accidental than anywhere in the world and I am uneasy\nabout the emergence of very small states. You have that kind of problem\nin your own area with the Spanish Sahara. We have no global policy\ntowards Africa.\nKing Hassan. I will be brief. When Africa was becoming independent,\nthe U.S. suffered 10 or 12 years ago from the acts of its NATO allies\nin that U.S. arms were used against liberation movements. The U.S.\nlodged protests on this with its own allies also. In those days Nassar\nwas very active and the Russians used him to penetrate into Africa\nand so in 1958-59-60 we faced an Africa in turmoil and an Africa that\nwas calm. The former were more active than the latter more calm\nAfrican countries. Fortunately, we witnessed a few unfortunate\nexperiments such as Guinea; Algeria, which in four or five years will\nface a very difficult economic situation. Tanzania; Mali: and\nCongo\nBrazzaville becoming Socialists. You must first be rich and then you\nbecome poor again.\nSecretary Kissinger: When you visit a Socialist country, you find it\ndifficult to understand how anyone could become Socialist. They are\ndull, boring and poor.\nKing Hassan But they become cheerful when they leave their countries.\nAt the UN and at the OAU these countries became very militant but now\nthere is a reversal in the trend with Africa becoming more aware of the\nproblems.\nIn addition, the Chinese play a quiet but powerful role. They are deeply\nentrenched in Tanzania, Madagascar and also in Mauritania, where they\noccupy a large number of medical positions and, as you know, since we\ndo not have the confession in our religion, the family doctor becomes the\nconfessor to whom you tell everything\nThe Russians are trying, through a system of very flexible loans, but we\nare a mature country with thirteen centuries of independence and not\neasily deceived by the Russians.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n3\nThe U.S has no global policy in Africa. You have traditional relations\nwith Morocco, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, to a lesser degree\nwith the Sudan and with Tunisia. But no general context. Once the\nMiddle East problem is settled, Africa may, because of its geographical\nlocation deserve a more global policy on the part of the United States.\nAfrica could receive another 200-300 million people.\nSecretary Kissinger. How does one conceive a global policy for Africa ?\nKing Hassan: The U.S. could choose five or six countries in Africa\nwhich are known for their seriousness and their influence and help those\ncountries which in turn will help the others. The U.S. will not then\nappear directly involved. Surely it is not in the interest of the United\nStates to have Algeria penetrate into Chad, Niger, etc. It is more\ntraditional for Morocco to do it because if we open a school in Dakar or\nin Chad, we are not bringing Communism whereas Algeria exports its\nideas and Algeria has an underdeveloped form of Communism The U S.\ncan pick four or five countries and cover all Africa from there. The\nRussians have also wanted to have a port on the Atlantic and they hope\nto do it now with the Algerians.\nSecretary Kissinger Besides Morocco, which countries would you advise\nus to choose ?\nKing Hassan: Sudan, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, which\nis a very serious country. It is like having a number of strategic bases.\nSecretary Kissinger\nWhat about Zaire?\nKing Hassan Yes, Zaire is a very important country. Mobutu is a very\ngood man though very blunt.\nSecretary Kissinger Yes, in his case appearances are not misleading.\nKing Hassan I worry more over Africa because I see both the\nMediterranean and the Atlantic aspects. The future of Europe is not in\nEurope, it is in Africa. I am afraid that the Europeans have a nostalgia\nfor their former colonies, and how will they come back into Africa?\nThey will come back via Morocco, Algeria,and Tunisia.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n4\nSecretary Kissinger. The Europeans are never farsighted. They\nare always very nearsighted. They see only immediate objectives.\nThey have consistently behaved like scavengers picking up bits falling\nfrom our table.\nKing Hassan The Europeans are already well-introduced into Africa\nbecause Africa has a shortage of trained personnel and in many independent\nAfrican countries English and French cadres remain very active.\nWhen the Europeans asked us to come into the conference on the\nMediterranean, at first I refused. If all the African countries told the\nUnited States and the Soviet Union to get out of the Mediterranean, how\ncould we enforce our requests? To speak very frankly, it is not in the\ninterest of Morocco to see the Mediterranean become a bathtub. When\nMadison Square Garden is full, it matters a great deal who stands\nat the turnstile. When it is empty, it doesn't matter at all. Tunisia\nand Algeria went to Helsinki for the Mcditerranean neutralization talks\nbut the United States and the Soviet Union turned them down. We have\ntalked to Spain about this, and they agree with us.\nSecretary Kissinger: How are your relations with Spain?\nKing Hassan Very difficult, because it is a very emotional, lover\nrelationship. The Spaniard is very succes d'estime and has enormous\npride. They have created a fantastic problem about the Sahara. They\nmust understand that it is an error to create an artificial state.\nSecretary Kissinger: I fully agree.\nKing Hassan I have offered a convention to them on a 50-50 basis for\nall the resources. I have even offered to give them two bases for 20-25\nyears so they can protect the Canaries. I have said, let us have a referendum\nand be done with it. The Sahara will revert to Morocco, We will share\nthe resources on a 50-50 basis and you will have the bases.B ut Spain\nrefused.\nSecretary Kissinger Why?\nKing Hassan. Because the Spanish Government is a government of very\nold men very much set in their ways. Both General Franco and Admiral\nCarrero Blanco began their military careers in Spanish Sahara.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n5\nSecretary Kissinger\nWhy then make it independent and have it\ncome under the domination of Algeria?\nKing Hassan It is a psychological problem. Spain after Franco will\nnever be the same. I tell the Spaniards if they give independence to\nSpanish Sahara, there are 30 thousand inhabitants, all\nNomads,\nwho roam about wherever they find a grass to graze. I can not have\nan artificial state like that in my backyard. And I reacted as you did\nwhen the Soviets put missiles in Cuba. This is my Cuba. Have you\nmet the new Spanish Foreign Minister?\nSecretary Kissinger\nOnly once.\nKing Hassan: Lopez Bravo was a much better man.\nSecretary Kissinger: Does Your Majesty know that Jobert admires you\ngreatly?\nKing Hassan: We became good friends. He was born in Meknes and\nlived here almost 40 years. He is a very straight man.\nSecretary Kissinger: He can not do everything he would like to do. He\ndoes not have my flexibility. I like Jobert very much. There are so\nfew foreign ministers who are really intelligent.\nKing Hassan Jobert has always spoken very highly of you. I will tell\nhim that your feelings toward him are the same.\nI understand very well that the first priority for the United States is\nto settle the Middle East.\nSecretary Kissinger We must settle it but not under Russian pressure.\nIf there is Russian pressure, we will switch back to Israel because we\nmust demonstrate that the Soviet Union can not settle the problem. There\nis no pressure from the Soviet Union now. For a week we tried not to\ndo anything. If the Soviet Union had stayed out, we would have stayed\nout. When the Soviet Union began sending arms, then it was no longer\nan Arab versus Israel conflict. It became a matter of survival of the\nreasonable Arab countries.\nKing Hassan: We could not have survived.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n6\nSecretary Kissinger: Our airlift to Israel was just as much in the\ninterest of the moderate Arab countries.\nKing Hassan: Yes, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, trans-Jordania, Morocco,\nTunisia all would be pushed out.\nSecretary Kissinger: It is also in the interest of President Sadat,\nbecause he does not want to become like the President of Czechoslovakia.\nKing Hassan When Sadat asked for the departure of the Russians, his\ntiming was very poor. Tell him that you regret that he timed it so poorly.\nSecretary Kissinger: Can I speak to Sadat frankly or will he repeat\neverything to the Soviets?\nKing Hassan: When Secretary Rogers met with Nassar and then with\nSadat, the fact that Nassar's offices were stuffed with microphones\nwas discovered by the United States agents sent in advance by Secretary\nRogers. Nassar himself did not know it,and he dismissed his Chief\nof Intelligence. You will have to talk to Sadat in a garden or have a\nelectronic sweep of the premises carried out.\nSecretary Kissinger Will he repeat everything to the Soviets ?\nKing Hassan: Not if you ask him not to. I can call my Ambassador and\nask him to talk to Sadat before you arrive and stress the importance\nyou attach to confidentiality and the danger of leaks. I can not guarantee\nthat secrecy will be maintained. You can talk to Sadat because he wants\nto give leadership to the Arab world and he can do it only with peace.\nSecretary Kissinger I was impressed with his courage, It took courage\nto start the war ,and he did not lose sight of the political realities. He\ndid not try to make the U.S. the villain. Nassar played the Israeli\nstrategy in making the U.S. into an enemy of the Arabs.\nKing Hassan The Palestinians have put a problem to me. President\nSadat has been extremely correct with them. If the contact is to remain\nsecret, they will not talk. But if Sadat has to learn of it, they want to\ntell him themselves.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITTVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n7\nSecretary Kissinger What is your opinion? As for myself, I will\nnot tell Sadat.\nKing Hassan Then we say nothing. The Palestinians are not in a\nhurry anyway but it is in the U. S interest to make it known that they\ndo not ignore the Palestinians (but not to say how or where because\nyou will encounter demagoguery in the Middle East about the Palestinians\nand it is best to clear up that burden).\nSecretary Kissinger: King Hussein is our friend. We do not want to\ngive the impression that we discard him. Politics is hard, but loyalty\nis very important.\nKing Hassan: But the three points that General Walters made to the\nPalestinians are\n(1) Israel remains Israel.\n(2) Nothing must be done against King Hussein.\n(3) There must be no acts of violence.\nThe United States has been loyal towards King Hussein, and he can be\nreassured.\nSecretary Kissinger That is true. I will talk to King Hussein in very\ngeneral terms day after tomorrow and I will communicate with Your\nMajesty again. You and I can communicate directly through General\nWalters thus insuring total secrecy of communication.\nKing Hassan: You could tell Hussein that you guarantee his country,\nbut that it is necessary to have contacts with the Palestinians. I\ncould send a message to him. It would not be good to have that message\ncome to him from King Faisal because they are not on good terms, but\nwith me he is very much at ease. He is my cousin. He knows that I\nam fond of him. There is full confidence between us.\nSecretary Kissinger I will contact you in two weeks and I will tell you\nwhether it is desirable to tell Sadat. My instinct is that it is.\nKing Hassan If you tell Hussein about the contacts, then after that\nyou must tell Sadat.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE\nFILES-139-5-2-SANITIZED COPY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n8\nSecretary Kissinger\nI will not tell Hussein on this trip.\nSANITIZED\nKing Hassan: So we have a total blackout on that.\n3.3(b)(1)\nSecretary Kissinger: I will say that we have been approached and I will\nask for his opinion and nothing more. The Palestinians approached us\nin Beirut but we ignored it.\nThen they called\nagain to ask if there would be a reply.\nKing Hassan When was that?\nSecretary Kissinger: The first message came on October 10, the second\non the 21st. Each time it came at the same time as the message sent\nthrough you. We preferred to deal with someone we know and trust.\nKing Hassan. The Palestinian organization is divided into many factions.\nSecretary Kissinger. Yes ,but we have confidence in you and in your\ncontacts and if later on you should form any impressions or arrive at any\nconclusions, we would be grateful if you would share them with us.\nKing Hassan: The Israelis approached us but we told them that it was\ntoo risky and that the timing was wrong. Once the talks began, we said\nthey could contact us then. Their Rome office contacted us.\nSecretary Kissinger What do you think of the contact with Syria now\nand of future contacts?\nKing Hassan. I told you you did extremely well. I think they must\nrenew diplomatic relations with the United States, and I think I have some\ninfluence on them. As you know, my army was the first Arab army into\nSyria and it has been there for four months now. At any Arab summit\nmeeting Morocco can look anyone straight in the eye and has to make\nexcuses to no one.\nSecretary Kissinger: It is in the interest of Syria to come closer to the\nUnited States and not adopt a posture of hostilities, because this is playing\nthe Soviet and the Israeli strategy.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nSANITIZED COPY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n9\nKing Hassan\nSyria has a very good reason to renew diplomatic relations\nwith the United States at this time. The ceasefire was brought about\nby both the Soviet Union and the United States. Syria can not ignore\nhalf of the ceasefire arbitrator. My Foreign Minister will go to Syria\nDamascus, Riyadh and Amman; do you wish me to send a message\nto Assad\nSecretary Kissinger. You could tell him what you tell Sadat and point\nout that we would not refuse their approach. I see Riyadh as the creation\npoint. We can do without Middle East oil, which only represents 10%\nof our imports. We will have to have some rationing. But we will begin\na vast national research project on\ncoal liquefaction.\nThe country that put a man on the moon in ten years can turn coal into\ngas. We have the technological know-how; it is only a problem of\nengineering. Then in three to five years we will be independent of oil\nimports. If this looks like the result of Arab blackmail, it will have a\nvery bad influence on American public opinion. King Faisal has made\nhis point, he should now relax for about six months. I can assure\nYour Majesty that some people in the United States are saying that we\nshould take the oil by military means and can not allow Abu Dhabi to\nblackmail us. Those are our domestic pressures. The Watergate\nproblems we can handle But with the very strong pressures from the\nJewish Community, which is very powerful in the press, television and\nbanks, if the impression is created that there is a national crisis\ncaused by the Arabs, this will create a very difficult situation.\nKing Hassan\nCan you get King Faisal to understand that?\nhim. Secretary Kissinger I don't know him. I will speak very frankly with\nKing Hassan Yes, you must. He is an old man and he mixes politics\nwith mysticism even though in our religion it does not mix. You can\nreach him through the advisor I mentioned last night, Rachaid Frahmoun.\nI canask Sadat to reach him and he can also be contacted through\nAl Achan who is King Faisal's Chief of Intelligence. At this point Sadat\nwants very much the friendship of the United States, and he will not do\nanything to alienate you.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNLN-HAK OFFICE FILES-139-5-2-9\nTOP\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n10\nSecretary Kissinger: What is the possibility the Russians will not\nintervene directly?\nKing Hassan In Korea, you intervened and the Russians did not. In\nVietnam, the same occurred and in Lebanon also.\nSecretary Kissinger Two weeks ago we received a letter from Brezhnev.\nHe wrote demanding the sending of joint Soviet-U.S. expeditionary forces.\nHe said you must adhere to this or else WC will act unilaterally and he\nalso demanded an immediate and urgent reply. Well, first of all, we\nsent no reply and,in the second place, we put our troops on alert and then\nthe Security Council approved the sending of forces excluding Soviet and\nU.S. troops. The Soviets will never run the risk of war in the Middle\nEast. Such a war would be a disaster for the Middle East because the\nSoviet Union has never left a country where it has sent troops.\nKing Hassan: King Faisal is the one who stands to lose the most. There\nis no freedom at all in his country, not even trade unions. When\nSaudi Arabia blows up, it will be very serious. Right now it is a\npressure cooker. My Foreign Minister will leave tomorrow and he will\nbegin where you end. He will start with Iran, then go to King Hussein,\nKing Faisal, Damascus, and Cairo.\nSecretary Kissinger The Shah of Iran admires you greatly. He never\nfails to state his feelings. He is a remarkable man.\nKing Hassan He has a great art and is very sensitive. He has a\nglobal vision. I want to go back to what you said about U.S. research\non energy. This is bad for Morocco, which is looking for oil.\nSecretary Kissinger: It may take ten years. We have coal reserves\nfor 300 years. If we learn to liquify it, we will no longer need to import\noil and we also must learn to extract the oil from the oil shale. By 1977\nproduction should begin, and should be well along by 1980 if a massive\neffort is made. The final decision has not yet been made. If we are\nforced to do it because of what appears to be an Arab campaign, and if\nat the same time we bear this costly effort and we are asked to help the\nArabs, this will create a very ambiguous situation for public opinion.\nKing Hassan If King Faisal decides to hold off, Kuwait will follow suit.\nYou probably want to get back to the Villa for a short time before long\nSecretary Kissinger\nI had hoped to gain a quick visual impression of\nRabat.\nKing Hassan\nI will arrange it immediately.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nKing Hassan, II\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nAlec Toumayan, Interpreter\nTIME AND DATE:\nAfter Luncheon Meeting\nNovember 6, 1973\nPLACE:\nSUBJECT:\nBrief After Luncheon Meeting\nSecretary Kissinger: Whenever I am in China I conduct a review of world\naffairs with Chou En-lai. Although we differ ideologically, we tend to\nagree on some things for practical reasons. For instance, on the issue\nof Chinese subversion into Iran and the Gulf States, I had told him he\nshould send his Foreign Minister to Iran and that he should tone down\nChinese subversion in that part of the country. Later on he did that. If\nyou think it would be helpful, I could give him my evaluation of your\nviews.\nKing Hassan: We had excellent contacts wntil the Chinese prohibited\ncircumcision on the Mosem children, ordered them to burn Koran and forced\nthem to eat pork publicly. The Chinese are not very wise in Morocco.\nThey move about a great deal and import considerable amounts of subversive\nliterature. Mr. Ceausescu who seems to have developed a great deal of\naffection for me also advised to balance carefully the Chinese and the\nRussians.\nSecretary Kissinger: I wish to thank you for the extraordinary courtesy\nyou have extended to me.\nKing Hassan: It is an expression of the esteem which we have for you\npersonally. We feel that you have acquired experience in record time in\nwhat is not an easy task. I am convinced that you have begun this effort\nwith the will to succeed and furthermore, you represent a man for whom\nI have great friendship and esteem.\nSecretary Kissinger: I have found my talks with you extremely useful and\nI am very happy that I began my trip in the Arab countries with a visit\nto you.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n2\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\naH Ten\nTRP SENSITIVE\nSECRET/NODIS\n7322145\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nROVED:\nS - Mr. Eagleburger\nMemorandum of Conversation\nDATE: November 5, 1973\nTIME: 11:00 P.M.\nSUBJECT: Conversation with King Hassan\nPLACE: Rabat, Royal Palac\nPARTICIPANTS:\nUS\nMOROCCO\nSecretary Kissinger\nKing Hassan\nAsst. Secretary Newsom\nPrime Minister Osman\nAsst. Secretary Sisco\nForeign Minister Benhima\nMr. Saunders, NSC\nAmbassador Senoussi\nChief of Royal Protocol General\nMoulay Hafid al-Alaoni\nCOPIES TO:\nKING HASSAN: We are happy to welcome Secretary and his staff and\nto continue frequent contact. We know current problems of President\nNixon and send our warm regards to him. Our common interests dictate\ncommon lines of policy.\nYou and I have already exchanged views on the Middle East situation.\nThe last war between the Arabs and Israelis was a test for the Arabs.\nThe Arabs consider they have succeeded. Now peace is possible with\nunderstanding and a sense of justice. With the interest of the\nPresident and the Secretary, this objective can be achieved. No task\nis too difficult. What is difficult is to find justice among so many\ntendencies. The situation has changed in the Near East. The Arabs\ndid not previously accept the existence of Israel. Now they have gone\nbeyond. The problem now is to find how Israel can live with the\nArabs. The Arabs are strengthened by a unity of religion and a unity\nof language, but I am worried about the effect of massive immigration\ninto Israel on this balance. With the heavy immigration of Jews from\nEastern Europe, Israel will be neither Mediterranean nor American and\nwill be, therefore, less subject to influences by either. The young\npeople of Israel will not know the young people of the Arab world.\nAF: DNewsom\n(Dot office and Officer)\nDS 1254\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2.\nIsrael must become integrated into the Arab community. It could\nbecome one of the richest regions in the world in agriculture and in\nindustry. The fertile crescent could become a reality. This\nmarriage will not come easily. The Syrians will be particularly\nnervous.\nFinally there is the fundamental aspect of the Palestinians. We\nnoted the special mention of this problem by both President Nixon\nand Brezhnev. We are certain that they will give reality to their\nword. It is necessary that a Palestinian entity be planted in a\ngeographic area acceptable to all and with access to Jerusalem.\nI appreciated very much the latest message from President Nixon. I\nunderstand he wants to give a new look to relations between Morocco\nand the US. I would like to have a meeting at the end of the year\nor the beginning of the next with a fixed agenda leading to a\ndetermination of our level of relationship. We will not discuss\nthis now since you are preoccupied with other problems. You are most\nwelcome here, and we want you to come back for an official visit of\ntwo to three days. We wish you great success in your current mission.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I appreciate the extraordinary welcome here in\nRabat. I have always considered Morocco friendly, but what had been\na political thought is now a human reality.\nRegarding bilateral relations, we are looking forward to your visit\nin 1974 at a time we can arrange after my return. You and President\nNixon will find much to talk about. I will try to give a date within\ntwo weeks of my return. President Nixon has great respect for you\nand admires your courage. We will seek a date in late spring after\nI have consulted the President's calendar.\nIt is highly desirable to begin talks on our bilateral relations,\nand Secretary Newsom is prepared to return at the end of his present\ntrip for a preliminary exchange and a definition of the agenda. My\ninstructions to him are that it is essential that it be known that\nthe US appreciates its friends. We are prepared to cooperate fully\nwhere there are common interests and a constructive spirit. We\nshould begin to shape the future jointly.\nOur views on the Middle East are very similar. Israel may have won\nbattles, but diplomatically and strategically the situation has\nchanged fundamentally. The Arabs have restored their dignity and are\nnow in a position to make peace. We can look at the future not with\nslogans but with reality.\nIsrael must undergo a profound reexamination of its policies. It is\nno longer possible for them to depend on strength. For thirty years\nIsrael has relied on military prowess and the transition to a differe\npolicy will be difficult, especially because it is sudden and\nunexpected. Israel will come to a realization that the negotiations\nSECRET/NODIS\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 Library. and has been determined to be declassified.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential\nSECRET/NODIS\nit has sought will give it an opportunity to be a part of a wider\ncommunity. It is a rare opportunity. It requires patience and\nperseverance. Every negotiation goes through difficult periods,\nout success is possible when there is a clear view of the ultimate\nobjective and the confidence of all parties.\nI am happy to begin my trip in a friendly country such as Morocco.\nI believe Your Majesty can play an important psychological role.\nThere is no question about the heroism of the Arab world. Its\npatience, however, remains to be tested. The Arabs must also under-\nstand the delicacy of the problem created by Israel and the US\ndomestic situation. We agree on the general course proposed by\nYour Majesty leaving aside details. A violent onslaught on this\npolicy is certain to come in the US. It is not for nothing that we\nbecame so closely attached to a small nation of three million people,\nseven thousand miles away. These factors cannot be changed over-\nnight. The existence and security of Israel cannot be negotiated.\nWhat can be negotiated is a just and durable peace. A long-term\npeace can be maintained only if both sides believe it to be just.\nOur friends can help us to achieve this by pointing out to others\nthat we are sincere and have decided to make a major effort, but\nthat we cannot reach a final destintion in one leap. To try in one\nleap plays into the hands of those that want no peace. Those opposed\nto peace want confrontation between the US and key Arab countries.\nOur key mission is to create an atmosphere of confidence.\nIf peace is to come, and if the US is to play a crucial role, it is\nmore likely to come through policies followed by Your Majesty than\nby pressures and blackmail. We are engaged in this effort. not\nbecause of pressure, but because of our conviction that unless there\nis peace the situation will lead to the domination of the area by\noutside powers with other interests. If the US is to be treated\nas an enemy, we cannot play a role with good will and a determination\nto succeed. We have endeavored to tell the truth, to speak frankly\nand to keep our promises.\nKING HASSAN: Here is one problem which is posed in a brutal and\nrealistic form. This is the question of defending the rights of\nfive million Arabs who have no land. The US has ignored the Palestini the\nproblem for twenty-five years. If the US would make contact with\nPalestinians, it would advance the peace. The occupied countries\nsay, \"free our territories first, then help the Palestinians.\" The\nnon-occupied countries say the reverse.\nThe problem is more simple and can be negotiated.\nYou spoke of internal US difficulties. We consider the internal\ndifficulties of the US to be artificial. Watergate is too small\nmatter to be true. I think Watergate is a vast conspiracy against\na the equilibrium of the US and the role of the US. I would suggest\nyour security services investigate the Senate and others because\nthis is a plot against the US not against the administration.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n4.\nThe Arab press has not given much importance to these scandals,\nand this is a good thing. I might also say privately that I am\nglad Nixon fired Cox because the head of state must control what\nhe does.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree that these internal difficulties\nproduced by Watergate have been given a prominence out of propor-\ntion to the causes. It is true in our country that for a decade\nand a half there has been an attack on our institutions. That we\ncan contain.\nThere are other internal difficulties produced by a highly\norganized minority over a span of thirty years. That internal\ndifficulty will become very relevant as we proceed to a solution of\nthe Middle East problem. One mistake in the Arab world is to belive\nthat the US needs only to give an order and problems can be solved.\nWe are going to have difficulties in getting even to the point of\nmaking a recommendation. It is a difficulty we can solve, but for\nwhich we must have time. Watergate is a temporary thing, but it\ndangerous. could merge with these deeper problems, and that could be\nWith respect to the Palestinians, we have learned more from Your\nMajesty than from any other source. Never before have I heard\nfriendly. the matter presented by a leader whom we consider wise and\ne can form conclusions about the retention of Arab territory, and\nie can affirm in principle the rights of the Palestinians. But if\nthese rights are defined too extremely, the consequences would be\nto push Israel into the sea. You cannot introduce five million\nPalestinians into Israel without that result.\nKING HASSAN: I did not intend that they should be all settled in\nIsrael. This is a question one must pass to the Palestinians\nand ask them what they propose. If they say a small part of\ntwo or three different countries, this might be a solution.\nThe King and Secretary adjourned for a private meeting.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been, reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTRP SENSITIVE\nSECRET/NODIS\nS/S 7322270\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMemorandum of Conversation\nDATE November 6, 1973\nTIME: 6:30 P.M.\nSUBJECT:\nSecretary Kissinger's Conversation\nwith President Bourguiba\nPLACE: Carthage Palace\nTunis, Tunisia\nPARTICIPANTS:\nUS\nTUNISIA\nSecretary Kissinger\nPresident Bourguiba\nAsst. Secretary Newsom\nPrime Minister Nouira\nAsst. Secretary Sisco\nForeign Minister Mohamed Masmoudi\nAmbassador Seelye\nDirector of Cabinet Ali Hedda\nAmbassador McCloskey\nSecState for Foreign Affairs\nInterpreter Alex Toumayan\nAbdelaziz Hamzaoui\nTunisian Ambassador to Washington\nSalheddime El Goulli\nCOPIES TO:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I look forward to your visit to the\nUnited States next year.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I am very grateful to President Nixon for\nthe gift he sent me, the moonrock with Tunisian flag, that Ambassador\nSeelye just brought me. Since we have little time we will begin right\naway. I hope your tour of Arab capitals will be fruitful and that\nyou will succeed in your historical mission and your attempt to find\na solution to bring peace back to the region. I don't know if you\nhave a plan. I had proposed a plan to the Israelis; it was simple\nand correct and involved a great sacrifice on the part of the\nPalestinians in returning to the line of 1947. Any other solution\nwill not be a solution but will keep wars going. The Palestinians\nhad accepted the '47 line, which takes away 54 per cent of Palestine.\n242 and its implementation after '67 will have no result since it\ncame about as the result of a war between states and makes no\nreference to the Palestinians. More and more people come to realize\nthe importance of the Palestinians. Even today the nine European\ncountries said that the crux of the problem is Palestine. Having\nhelped Israel, the United States can pressure it. The war has\nAF:DNewsom\n(Drafting Office and Officer)\nFORM\nDS 1254\n2 65\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY. HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2.\nrevealed that the Arab soldier, if properly armed, knows how to\nfight and die.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: This is not surprising if you look at the\nhistory of the Arabs.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: After '67 no one took them seriously.\nThey had fled without shoes. But you must tell President Nixon\nthat after this war the Soviet influence has grown. They are\nmore and more in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Egypt, Aden\nand Southern Yemen, and they are also in Iraq and Syria and in\nIndia. I am sure that little by little Southeast Asia will fall\nprey to yellow communism, as in Cambodia, or Russian communism, as\nin Vietnam. We know that behind the iron curtain they hold their\nown people very tightly, as witnessed by the Sakharov protest,\nand we see it clearly here when cooperation agents from the iron\ncurtain countries wanted to remain here after their assignments.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Many countries have had that experience.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The United States and the United States\nGovernment being young and enthusiastic trust their partners, but\nthe Russians are consistently moving forward.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I can assure you that we have no\nillusions about Soviet policy.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: In the recent Pakistani war when Nixon\nsent the Seventh Fleet on a maneuver similar to the Kennedy\nmissile crisis when Khrushchev pulled back, this time Brezhnev\ndid not move. The Soviets hold sway over India and Bangladesh,\nwhich owes its life to the Soviets and now Afghanistan sides with\nthe Russians too. We feel the danger very acutely, having\nchosen democracy. I made my own choice back in 1940 through my\nfriends. US Consul Doolittle gave me a visa to come to the United\nStates in 1946. It is thanks to him that I am alive.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We know that you are a long-time friend\nof the United States.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I decorated the officers of the\nSixth Fleet, I told them you do not defend only Southern Europe,\nyou must also defend North Africa. In World War II, I sent a\nletter to the people of Tunisia from jail on August 8, 1942 in\nwhich I said that the Germans would surely lose the war. This\ncame as a shock to the Tunisian people who suffered from\nrepression. I was freed from jailoby the Germans. For three\nmonths I was Mussolini's guest in Rome. He wanted my support.\nI said there was only one condition, to recognize the independence\nof Tunisia. But that's not what they were fighting for. So we\nwaited for the Allies. Mr. Doolittle came back and told General\nJuin that he knewBourguiba and that Bourguiba had been with the\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n3.\nAllies since 1940. So you see it all goes way back. I think\nalso of the role played by Bob Murphy and the Bizerte Resolution\nwhich passed 66 to zero because no one wanted to vote for France.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I remember it very well. I have followed\nwith great interest and admiration your entire career and your\nmore recent declarations on this immediate problem of the Middle\nEast. You showed great courage in speaking of negotiations at a\ntime when it was not fashionable.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I was almost torn apart. Dean Rusk\ncalled me and said that my action called for great courage and\nnot only physical courage. Now they are all saying if we only\nhad listened to Bourguiba.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: The mistake that you never made and\nthat the Arab world made after '67 was to think that it could gain\nthrough hostility toward the United States.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: That was a very poor idea. Since 1946,\nwhen I worked with the joint US-UK commission, I travelled\nthroughout Palestine and I said that there was no solution except\ndezionization of the Jews. We have nothing against the Jews.\nWe respect all religions. The Koran respects all religions. We\nare all monotheists.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: In this phase, the United States is\nprepared to make a joint contribution towards peace in the Middle\nEast and if you analyze the situation you will conclude that only\nthe United States can do this. Others can give weapons, but only\nthe United States can give territory. It is important that the\nArab countries show an understanding of our problems as we show\nnow an understanding of their problems. It is not accidental\nthat for 30 years the United States has supported a small country\nseven thousand miles away with a small population surrounded by\nhostile populations.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: It is this attitude of hostility which\nis a major error committed by the Arabs.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Those factors which produced the United\nStates' engagement must be taken into account as we attempt now\nto conduct a more balanced policy. Nothing would please more\nthose who are opposed to peace than to create opposition between\nthe Arabs and the United States. Friendship between the Arabs\nand the United States is a natural thing. In this new phase\nwe need a reasonable amount of time to organize ourselves. The\nEuropeans can make all the declarations they want, it is pure\nrhetoric. The United States alone can produce results. I have\nnothing against their declarations, but what we need now is\nprogress.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n4.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Europeans see their oil supply cut\ndown and prices going up.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER! It is not greatest form of heroism that\nhistory has witnessed, but is a fact. One word about oil because\nit is double-edged weapon. If at a time when we are making a\nmajor effort to bring peace and we are determined to do this and\nwe face a serious domestic struggle, if at this same time we are\nconfronted with rationing and shortages which can be blamed on\nthe Arabs, it will strengthen our opponents, it will not fortify\nour positions We will start an emergency program to substitute\ncoal for oil through the technology of liquefaction and this costly\nprogram can be blamed by some upon the Arabs. The Arab countries\nmust attenuate their pressures upon us and give us time to develop\nour policy.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I know that Arab oil only accounts for\n6 per cent of US consumption.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: 12 per cent and you see it is large\nenough to be noticable and annoying, but not large enough to be\ndecisive. Besides we do not need the pressures of oil because we\nare determined to strive toward a just and durable peace.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They use whatever weapons they have. They\nwould use Phantoms or Migs, but it will have no effect, it may\neven have reverse impact.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: The danger lies precisely there. We are\nacting now not because of oil but because of the reason President\nNixon gave. A continuation of the conflict will mean that\npowers external to the area will become dominant, and this is not\nin the interest of the world and certainly not in the interest of\nthe people of the Middle East.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Soviet Union has already assumed a\nposition of dominance. Now with Sadat they will have a base in\nAlexandria.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: If they have assumed a position of\ndominance, then we have no incentive to act.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: You see you miscalculated in your efforts\nfor detente. You did not take the Middle East into account and\nas a result those people who for six years had had neither peace\nor war decided to strike.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not forget because of detente:\nan excess of emotionalism is not one of our characteristics.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n5.\nBeing occupied in Vietnam we did not want to handle two crises\nsimultaneously. We knew that the Middle East could not be settled\nwithout a major crisis. I told many Arab Foreign Ministers with whom\nI talked before the war that we intended to take a determined\naction after the Israeli elections sometime in November. So it\nhad been our intention all along to act at about this time, but\nthe recent war has given even more impetus to our intention.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The Palestinians will never agree to\nlose part of their territory by force. This is against inter-\nnational law, it is against honor. Before the war you thought\nthe Arabs could not fight.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I never believed this myself. I am a\nhistorian. I know the history of the Arabs. The Koran was\nspread by armies not by missionaries. For centuries the Arab\narmies inspired fear.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: They felt they had a divine mission.\nThe US knows of the preparations that are made, but they didn't\nfeel the Arabs would do so well.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We felt we had more time. We did not\nthink the crisis would come so fast. It came two weeks after I\nbecame Secretary.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: Egypt has made a number of friendly\ngestures to the United States but to no avail. It has awarded\nthe pipeline to US firms.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER! I don't think economic considerations\nare that important, policies and general philosophy are more\nimportant. During this last war Sadat behaved very wisely, not\nlike Nasser who focussed hatred upon the United States. Sadat\nkept communications open and showed great wisdom.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: He got nothing in return for his\ngestures.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: When he dismissed the Soviet advisers\nthe intention was good, but the timing was unfortunate because it\nhappened during an American electoral campaign and you cannot do\nanything in the United States at that time because of the Jewish\nelectorate. As to how long it will take, the problem is to find\nthe right moment. If we move too quickly we will obtain nothing.\nIf we move too slowly there will be another explosion. We must\nfind a reasonable time, and I do not believe it will take too\nlong, but we want to move decisively. We think it's a matter of\na few weeks.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n6.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I wish you success, but I see no solution\nas long as the Arab countries see part of their territory occupied\nby the Israelis. This will be a stumbling block with a \"no peace -\nno war situation. There will only be peace if Israel shows less\ngreed and accepts what the UN offered it. Each country must\ndefend its territories. The Palestinians were robbed of their\nlands. They agreed with the UN Resolution under which they lose\n54 per cent of their lands. If Israel does not yield, it will\nbehave as Hitler did in grabbing the Sudetenland and Czechoslvakia\nunder the pretext of securing German borders. That is not a way\nout.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I told your Foreign Minister that in\nthe next few weeks the negotiations can start and that process\nwill help to define the borders.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: The war is not over. Even today each\nside accuses the other of violating the cease-fire line which is\na very vague line.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: But with your satellites you and the Russians\nknow where the line is.\nFONMIN MASMOUDI: The Egyptians know where it is and the\nIsraelis know where it is and so do you and the Soviets. But the\nEgyptians and the Israelis don't want to say where the cease fire\nline is.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: On the cease fire line, I know that a\nnumber of people would like to debate that question because it has\nno final consequence. We can discuss the line of October 22nd for\nsix months, and it will only bring a delay for the start of the\nreal peace negotiations. I spent two evenings with Prime Minister\nGolda Meir and we spent 90 per cent of our time on the question\nof the cease fire line and where it was. If the Israelis are still\non the line of October 22 in a year then we have failed. If they\nare not, then it does not matter where the line is.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: When I come to the United States, hope-\nfully in May, I will see the President, and I will be ready to give\na press conference.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We are sorry to lose Ambassador El Goulli\nwho has done a fine job in Washington.\nPRESIDENT BOURGUIBA: I want to reiterate the importance of\nthe Palestinians. They come to see me, and I talk with them.\nThey are not an enemy, they are an unhappy people who have been\nwronged.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n7.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: You can be sure we will do our best to\nmake peace. Our public opinion will be very important and we\nmust have it with us. It will take us time to prepare that\nopinion.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTHE president HAS SEEN\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET\nNovember 9, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nSecretary Kissinger has sent you the following report of his meeting\nwith King Hussein:\nI had an extremely cordial and relaxed two and a half hour meeting\nwith King Hussein in Amman today. He sends you his warmest regards\nwhich I reciprocated on your behalf.\nThe King explained in some detail the difficult choice he faced in the\nrecent war and spoke with some satisfaction of the way he had avoided\nthe twin dangers of full involvement, on the one hand, and isolation\nthrough total non-participation, on the other. He reflected a basic\nconfidence in his position and in the correctness of his policies. At\nthe same time he reiterated many of his old underlying concerns:\napprehension about the Soviet position in Iraq, worry that other Arabs\nwill make separate settlements with Israel which leave him out, and\nsuspicion that some Arab leaders may be working for a separate\nPalestinian state at his expense. He said Sadat had told him even the\nU.S. and Soviets favored this -- an idea of which I immediately disabused\nhim.\nThe King introduced an interesting new concept with regard to the\nPalestinian question; instead of an immediate return of the West Bank\nto Jordan following Israeli withdrawal, an international presence would\nbe introduced in Gaza and the West Bank. A plebiscite would then be\nheld offering the Palestinians there the choice between independence,\nfederation with Jordan in a united Arab kingdom, or reintegration into\nthe Hashemite Kingdom. I told him that we had always envisaged the\nPalestinians remaining a part of Jordan but said that his concept was\nan interesting one which could be kept in mind as the negotiations proceed.\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-01/11002 Per Hr. 6/18/2012\nSECRET XGDS (3)\nBy RS/WLH NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A, KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n2\nI briefed the King fully regarding the proposal I negotiated with Sadat\non the ceasefire and prisoner of war question (Israeli acceptance had\nnot yet been received at the time I left Amman). I also gave him in\nsome detail our ideas for getting a peace conference started under\nUS-Soviet auspices in early December. I assured him that we were\nnot being taken in by the Soviets and had no secret understandings\nwith them. Rather, we felt that the joint auspices idea offers the least\ndifficult and most manageable approach among the available alternatives.\nIn response to my point that the Arabs could not expect help from us\nin bringing about a settlement while we were subjected to pressure on\nthe oil issue, the King said he fully agreed with me and had said so to\nother Arab leaders.\nTowards the end of our meeting, the King brought up his need for\nadditional military assistance. I was frank about the Congressional\nlimitations on our ability to be helpful but assured him we would do\nour best. I was able to convey to him our decision on rapid resupply\nof his tank losses in the war, which was helpful, but it is clear that\nhe has in mind a more ambitious program and more sophisticated\nequipment than we have provided Jordan so far. This will be discussed\nwith his military people next month, and I said I would tell the Defense\nDepartment to be sympathetic.\nAfter the meeting the King hosted a small informal reception laced with\nhumor, anecdotes and further examples of our common strategic\napproach to the Middle East. I reassured him once again that we would\nalways check with him if and when we talked to the Palestinians. I\nnoted that Jerusalem would probably prove to be the most difficult issue,\nthe Israelis showing no sign of give. The Jordanians underlined again\nthe importance of this question; we both agreed that the city could\nideally serve as a bridge between Israelis and Arabs. The King stated\nthat he had good relations with such common friends as Iran and Turkey\nwho share our overall approach to the region.\nOnce again it was clear from this visit that the King highly values his\nrelationship with you. He wants to cooperate closely with us to reinforce\nour common interests in the area and wants to be sure his policies and\nactions meet with your approval. I assured him they did.\nThe King capped our extremely warm reception by flying me to the airport\nin his helicopter, and providing us with a fighter escort.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been-reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTRP SENSITIVE\nSECRET/NODIS\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nMemorandum of Conversation\nDATE November 8, 1973\nSUBJECT:\nMeeting between Secretary Kissinger and King Hussein\nPARTICIPANTS:\nSecretary Kissinger\nAmbassador Brown, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan\nMr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. Deputy Assistant\nSecretary, Bureau of Near Eastern and South\nAsian Affairs\nKing Hussein of Jordan\nCrown Prince Hassan\nPrime Minister Zaid Rifai\nle King opened the conversation with a comment about the an ouncement\nof the resumption in principle, at an early date, of diplomatic re-\nlations between Egypt and the United States.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We had always taken the view that we were\nprepared to renew relations when Egypt was. We saw no need to\nmake concessions, and we did not do so. President Sadat has\nunderstood that a hostile attitude toward the U.S. will not achieve\nthe results he seeks. If he is hostile, he can get arms from\nthe Soviets, but it won't satisfy his aspirations. The Egyptians\nare beginning to understand this as Your Majesty always has.\nI believe we have reached a solution of the ceasefire issue,\nassuming we get Israeli agreement. (The Secretary then handed\nthe King a copy of the six-point agreement negotiated in Cairo,\nemphasizing that he was doing so on a confidential basis.) This\nagreement deals only with the ceasefire. It means an end to the\ndebate about where the October 22 lines are.\nKING HUSSEIN: Does it establish the lines?\nNEA ALAtherton, Jr. /hlk/11/19/73\nDrajiing Office and Officer)\nRM\nDS- 1254\nSECRET/NODIS\n65\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: It does not call for a return to the October\n22 lines. What it does is to remove Israel from the checkpoints\non the Cairo-Suez road and provide that the UN will move in.\nThere will be unlimited non-military supplies to the Third Army.\nThere will be Israelis at the one checkpoint at the Suez end of\nthe road, together with the UN, to supervise the off-loading.\nThere will be an exchange of POWs, and harassment of shipping\nin the Red Sea will be relaxed. I think the ceasefire problem\nwill be resolved.\nKING HUSSEIN: This is gratifying. The situation was becoming\ndangerous.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We thought it futile to debate where the\nOctober 22 lines are. If there is a peace settlement soon, this\nwill be irrelevant.\nKING HUSSEIN: How was the visit of Golda Meir?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty has had experience in dealing\nwith her. Flexibility is not her outstanding attitude. Making\npeace will be a big adjustment for Israel.\nKING HUSSEIN: I agree, but it is a last chance. The Israelis\nmust put themselves in the position of viewing matters from\nthe point of view of others.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: The history of Israel is a history of\nstruggle. They are not used to peace.\nHow shall we proceed?\n(The King indicated he had no preference.) I would welcome Your\nMajesty's views.\nKING HUSSEIN: (Reading from a prepared brief) Ever since the\n1967 war Jordan has done all it could to achieve a just and\nlasting peace. I warned that unless Israel's position changed\na resumption of the war was inevitable. I expected this last\nwar and passed on to you information we had about Egyptian and\nSyrian plans. I did not know the date, but I knew the situation\nwas explosive. I hoped that there would be efforts to prevent\nit and expected Israel to make some adjustments in its position.\nBefore this last war Sadat told me his purpose was not to destroy\nIsrael.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: If I may interrupt Your Majesty, how long\nbefore the war did he tell you this?\nKING HUSSEIN: I was told personally when I was last in Egypt\nthat something must be done. The situation was changing on\nthe ground and in the world. Sadat did not tell me when he\nwould go to war, but I had the impression following the re-\nestablishment of diplomatic relations between ourselves and\nEgypt and the institution of political coordination among us\nthat any military moves would be coordinated. It did not work\nthat way, but I had heard from Sadat of his need to improve his\nnegotiating position.\nThis tragic deterioration of the situation should not have been\nallowed to happen. It put Jordan in a difficult position. I\ndid not wish to participate in the war but could not remain\nentirely out. Jordan is the Arab country most involved in terms\nof both land and population. Participation in the war could\nhave led to the destruction of Jordan and the creation of a\nvacuum which radical elements would have filled. Non-participation\ncould have led to the total isolation of Jordan and to our becoming\nthe scapegoat. Despite our participation some are still trying to\nmake us the scapegoat. I have heard this from some on my recent\nvisit to Arab countries -- for example from been Sadat, Saudi Arabia,\nand Kuwait. They said that things would have different if\nJordan had permitted the Fedayeen to operate from its territory\nand put pressure on Israel.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: No such comment was made to me by Sadat.\nKING HUSSEIN: If we had done this, we would have had to\nconcentrate on our very survival. Instead, we chose a formula\nwhich avoided both dangers and enabled us to be a counter-\nbalance to the Israelis in Syria.\nI am pleased with the ceasefire and accepted it before the\nSyrians did. When Syria accepted, I considered pulling our\ntroops out of Syria but feared an Iraqi move to take over.\nThe Iraqis have now withdrawn and Jordanian troops are back to\nthe third line. I have told the Syrians I need to withdraw\nmy forces as soon as possible and am waiting to hear from them.\nWe are now in the post-war period and there is need for a solution\nto the problems of the Egyptian Third Army, the POW issue, and\nthe problem of Israeli occupation of additional Syrian territory.\nObviously we are now facing the battle of peace. I want to\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nagree with the United States on where we go and how.\nOur situation is different from that of Syria and Egypt, which\nare not connected with the Palestinian problem and which already\nhad international boundaries before the 1967 war. Jordan's\n1967 border was the armistice demarcation line. The West Bank\nis both Jordanian territory and part of Palestine. The population\nis Jordanian and Palestinian. The rights of the Palestinians\nhave to do not with the West Bank and Jordan but with Israel.\nThe question is who represents the Palestinians. Our position\nis that the West Bank is Jordanian-Palestinian territory\noccupied by Israel. It is Jordan's duty to recover that\nterritory with minor changes on a reciprocal basis. In addition,\nwe cannot give up responsibility for the Moslem and Christian\nparts of Jerusalem which should, however, remain a unified\ncity.\nWe are ready for a settlement based on Resolution 242.\nNegotiations should be between one Arab side and the Israeli\nside. I do not mind if others reach agreement first, provided\nthe settlement is implemented as a package.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I want to be sure I understood. Is Your\najesty saying that any implementation must await a settlement\nNY all parties?\nKING HUSSEIN: This is my preference. Progress in one area should\nnot impede progress in others. The Syrians feel the same.\nOn the question of having a Palestinian delegation at the\nnegotiations, I do not oppose this but they cannot claim to\nrepresent all Palestinians. I would not object provided they\nrepresent those Palestinians outside the West Bank. Some Arab\ncountries are trying to use the Palestine Liberation Organization\nto establish an independent Palestine consisting of the West Bank\nand Gaza. I do not accept this. Once the West Bank is returned,\nI will give it self-determination provided Israel withdraws to\nan international presence.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Could Your Majesty explain?\nKING HUSSEIN: I want to give the Palestinians the right for\nthe second time to say what they want.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: You do not seek withdrawal to Your Majesty's\ncontrol?\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n5\nKING HUSSEIN\nNot immediately. I would give the population a\nchoice under the supervision of an international presence\nbetween a separate Palestinian state, federation in a united\nArab kingdom, or again becoming part of the Hashemite Kingdom\nof Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom will respect any choice the\npopulation makes in a free popular expression of its wishes.\nIt is difficult now to see how a free choice can be made.\nThere are many tendencies and influences from the Palestine\nLiberation Organization and other Arab states. Jordan has\na responsibility to seek to recover its territory; if it is\nnot returned directly to Jordan, then to some international body.\nWe need to find the way to lasting peace.\nIf the Soviet Union gets the Palestine Liberation Organization\nto challenge Jordan's claim to the West Bank, this means\nJordan would no longer be a party to the conflict. This would\nbe dangerous, since a separate peace under such circumstances\nwould create a new radical entity and violate Resolution 242.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a constructive idea (i.e., a\nWest Bank plebiscite under an international presence) I\nwant to tell you in confidence that I have discussed with\nadat and with the Soviets the question of auspices for the\negotiations. We think U.S. Soviet auspices would be best.\nIf we invited the British and French, we must invite China\nwhich would then fight with the Soviets, and the British and\nFrench would fight with us. We have no special love for the\nSoviets but think the Israelis are more likely to accept them\nthan others. Any other auspices would be more complex. The\nUN Secretary General could participate or at least preside.\nIn the first stage, we foresee the participation of Syria,\nJordan, Egypt, and Israel to discuss the disengagement of forces.\nI told Sadat that the participation of others, meaning Lebanon\nand Palestine, should be discussed during the first stage. We\ndid this to protect Your Majesty. President Sadat has agreed\nto this procedure. This makes Your Majesty a charter member,\nand the question does not arise whether Jordan is a party.\nAlso, we need not face the question of who represents the\nWest Bank; only Jordan represents them The Palestinians could\nbe introduced at a later stage. I advise Your Majesty not to\nget into this question now.\nKING HUSSEIN: The other Arabs want the Palestinians included.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n6\nECRETARY KISSINGER: That is true, but they know they need us.\nWith regardito the ultimate disposition of the West Bank, I\nhave not formed an opinion, but I hold the firm view that\nfriends of the United States should not be penalized. We have\nacted, as in the Indian-Pakistani War, to make clear that our\nfriends will not be forsaken.\nIf the disposition of the West Bank becomes an issue, I find\nyour three-option, international-presence proposal interesting.\nBut this is not the U.S. position, which remains what it has\nbeen in the past. However, we should keep Your Majesty's idea\nin the back of our minds for the negotiations. I have not yet\ndiscussed the question of the peace conference with Israel.\nWe think, however, that it should start in Geneva around\nDecember 7, 8 or 9.\nIncidentally, if there are many more pictures of me with my\narms around Arabs, I will be in difficulty. After this trip,\nI won't be able to go to New York.\nIn my view, this may be the last chance for peace; it is\ncertainly the best chance. But there are several factors to be\ntaken into account: (1) Israel cannot make a rational decision\nuntil after its elections; (2) there is the problem of the basic\nsraeli position; (3) there is the domestic situation in the\nU.S. and some related difficulties of the President; (4) there\nis the Arab mentality which has a kind of romanticism about it.\nThis is attractive, but it leads to impatience. An idea one\nday becomes a proposal the next day and a plan the next. I\nhave been appealing to all to keep in mind that in every\nnegotiation I have conducted I have recognized the need for\ncareful preparation. If we push too fast, we can destroy the\nopportunity. We recognize the need to make progress. From\nthe Arabs we need patience and a sense of responsibility,\nthough I do not need to say this to Your Majesty. We need\ntrust between the Arabs and ourselves.\nI told Sadat there is no way the Arabs can achieve what they\nwant through hostility toward the U.S. If the Arabs want to\nwork with us, we are prepared. One problem here is the oil\npressure. I must tell you that under no circumstances will we\naccept pressure from the Europeans. They can freeze to death\nand we will not yield. Furthermore, we cannot accept the idea\nthat we can be blackmailed into doing our duty. We want peace\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n7\nbecause the situation in its absence is too dangerous and the\narea will be radicalized. But as for the oil pressure, we get\nonly 12 percent of our oil from the Middle East; the embargo\nis a nuisance, but we can manage. But if we have six months\nof oil shortages, we cannot also be asked to make a major diplomatic\neffort and to take on the Jewish community. If the oil pressures\ncontinue, nothing I have said will hold. We are not asking\nfor a formal end to the embargo, but we need to have it relaxed.\nWe need to be given time to conduct our diplomacy.\nKING HUSSEIN: On the question of the Palestinians, we are\nalmost certain of what the results of a plebiscite will be,\ngiven the close feelings between Palestinians and Jordanians.\nWe feel that any solution must deal with all territory re-\ncovered, not only the West Bank but Gaza as well. It must\nall be under one umbrella. Giving the West Bank and Gaza a\nchoice about their future will satisfy Jordan.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We will keep your idea in mind. We have\nnot discussed a Palestinian solution with the Israelis, and it\naffects their interests. We have no objection to self-determina-\ntion but will want to discuss the question with Israel. We\nhave always felt that the best thing for Israel is to keep the\nWest Bank under Jordanian rule.\nKING HUSSEIN: We are thinking in terms of the future. My\nconcept of giving the Palestinians a choice is offered as an\nidea.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Just thinking out loud I doubt that Israel\nwants the Palestinians to participate, but at the same time\nyour offer would ease Palestinian pressures.\nZAID RIFAI: Do you think what His Majesty has been saying\nwould come in the second stage?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. The first stage discussions will\ndeal with military disengagement.\nZAID RIFAI: Would the second stage also include withdrawal?\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n8\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: There would be some in the first stage\nand some in the second, but the question of participation of\nothers, by which we mean Lebanon and Palestine, would only be\ndiscussed in the first stage.\nI assume that you feel that Iraq should not participate. We are\nopenminded.\nKING HUSSEIN: You should not be.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I was joking.\nFrom the American and Israeli viewpoint the best solution would\nbe a Jordanian West Bank. This would make it easier to carry\nout demilitarization and other measures. But most of the\nproblems for Your Majesty do not come from the U.S. and Israel\nbut from the other Arabs.\nZAID RIFAI: Have you discussed settlement terms with the Soviets?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Of Course the Soviets will seek to\ngive the impression that we are partners. The Soviets talk\nmuch about detente, but for us this is a practical, not an\nemotional question, produced in part by our domestic situation\nand by nuclear realities. We think it will be easier to work\nwith the Soviets than not to do so, but we have made no agree-\nments with them except on the question of auspices. We are\nprepared to hold discussions bilaterally with the Arabs. The\nU.S. has no interest in the spread of Soviet influence. I\ndo not need to make this clear in Anman, but I have said this\nto Sadat. For a week after the ceasefire Sadat sent his\nmessages to us through the Soviets. We have told him to send\nthem directly to us.\nKING HUSSEIN: Sadat has said there is a U.S. -Soviet agreement\nabout a Palestinian state.\nSECRETARY KISSINCER: This is not true.\nThe Soviets have made all kinds of offers: a joint U.N.\nemergency force, a joint expeditionary force, joint representa-\ntives in Cairo for the ceasefire. But it would be stupid for\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n9\nus to cooperate in these ways and thus let the Soviets in.\nWe intend to work directly with all concerned.\nZAID RIFAI: We are puzzled by something Ambassador Salah\nin Washington reported that Mr. Sisco said to him. Salah says\nthat Sisco asked whom Jordan preferred to have represent it\nthe U.S. or the Soviet Union. (The Secretary asked Atherton\nif he knew about this. Atherton said he was present at the\nconversation referred to, and Salah's report was not exactly\nwhat Sisco had said. Sisco had said that he assumed Jordan\nwould prefer to have the U.S., rather than the Soviet Union,\nact as its lawyer.)\nZAID RIFAI: The Soviets would be a nuisance. We want the\nU.S. to speak for us.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree the Soviets will be a nuisance,\nbut joint auspices with them are necessary.\nKING HUSSEIN. Did Sadat speak for the Syrians when you were\nin Cairo?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We prefer to speak to them directly.\nZAID RIFAI: The Syrians told us that they would have welcomed\na visit by you.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we made a misjudgment. Please tell\nthe Syrians we want to be in touch with them. I will be pleased\nto see them when I go to NATO. Tell them to send any high-level\nrepresentative and I will be pleased to meet him. I have\nalready seen Ismail (Syria's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs).\nThe Syrians must understand that the U.S. has no animosity\ntoward them.\nKING HUSSEIN: Jordan's interests are parallel with those of\nthe United States. How do you see Jordan's position in the\narea as a whole? Can we rely on the help of the United States?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Our interest in the Gulf has, if anything,\nincreased. Within the limitations of Congressional restraints\nwe will be delighted to help.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n10\n.NG HUSSEIN: On the oil question, I have told the other\nArabs that their pressures are a mistake.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: They will backfire. Groups in the\nUnited States who are opposed to the Arabs will say that the\nArabs are all with the Soviets and they (the Arabs) are\nresponsible for the oil shortage. Many of the Jewish press\npeople traveling with me have been hostile to our agreement in\nprinciple to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt. The\nagreement on the ceasefire and the POWs is favorable to Israel,\nbut the press people have assumed the worst.\nZAID RIFAI: Has Sadat accepted your line of reasoning?\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but he says that many of the rulers\nof oil-producing states are uncontrollable.\nZAID RIFAI: Sadat is pressing them to use the oil lever. When\nyou deal with Sadat it is difficult to get an agreement that\nsticks.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: He can't get away with it, if he wants\nsupport from us.\nING HUSSEIN: You will have a problem when you go to Saudi\nArabia.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether our personalities\nwill harmonize.\nKING HUSSEIN: You will hear a lecture on Zionism and Communism.\nThe younger ones in Saudi Arabia, for example Prince Fahd, will\nbe good ones to see.\nCROWN PRINCE HASSAN: I want to say something on the question\nof the Palestinians. Jordan has been the only one to put\nforward a plan. Most of the Palestinians are in Jordan. We\nneed to find a way that U.S. help can be channeled to help the\nPalestinians, but this is a case where the more that is done\nand the less that is said is the better. It is important to\navoid international consortia and public visibility.\nKING HUSSEIN: This is a continuation of what the U.S. is doing.\nAfter the Soviet threat in the area, the next threat is from Iraq.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n11\nECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I had heard that the Iraqis were\nreturning to Syria.\nKING HUSSEIN: This is not clear. But there is a solid Soviet\npresence in Iraq which can create difficulties in the Gulf and\neven on the energy question.\nI have another problem to raise on the economic side. The war\nhas affected us adversely. We need to continue to play an\neffective role. To do this, we need to take a new look at our\nmilitary planning. We were not aware until this war of how\nfar behind we were in sophisticated equipment. With regard\nto our previous planning on deliveries and types of equipment\nand in the light of your airlift to Israel, Jordan has a\nproblem.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: We are prepared to replace your losses\nimmediately through delivery of the M-60 tanks and of M-48A3\ntanks -- with 32 or 38 of them, I am not sure which. Beyond\nthat we are sympathetic to discussing any additional requirements\nin addition to our previous planning. But we have an almost\nuncontrollable Congressional problem resulting in a sharp re-\nduction of funds.\nAID RIFAI: We need a planeload of TOWs to show our army that\nyou are taking care of us.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I am told we have pretty well run out of\nthem, but I will look into this --- at least with regard to\nsending a token supply.\nKING HUSSEIN: We will need to review all of our military planning\nin the next talks between our military people.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: I will instruct the Defense Department to\nbe forthcoming.\nZAID RIFAI: Their approach must be different this time. In the\npast we have spent three days discussing the delivery of some\nitems three years in the future.\nKING HUSSEIN: Jordan will be helpful to you with respect to\nstudying Soviet weapons; a new kind of surface-to-air missile --\nI think it is a SAM-2D -- landed in our territory from Syria\nduring the war, and we are cooperating with your team which is\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n12\nadying it.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: What is your impression of the Syrian army?\nHUSSEIN: They have high morale. Their losses in armor\nKING heavy, but these are being replaced. They have a new this class\nwere of graduating. They did much better in the field it\ntime pilots than last. Their planning is not as effective as could\nbe. They have lots of Soviet experts with them with whom\nour boys had a chance to discuss military tactics.\nSECRETARY KISSINGER: Your Majesty, do you have any information\nabout the presence of Soviet combat forces in Syria?\nKING HUSSEIN: We have nothing recently.\n(At this point the King and the Secretary continued the discussion\nin private.)\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nKing Faysal ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud\nPrince Fahd ibn 'Abd al- 'Aziz Al Sa'ud, Second\nDeputy Prime Minister and Minister of\nInterior\n'Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign\nAffairs\nDr. Rashad Pharaon, Royal Adviser\nShaikh Ibrahim al-Sowayel, Saudi Arabia\nAmbassador to the United States\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nJoseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for\nNear Eastern and South Asian Affairs\nAmbassador James Akins\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\nIsa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy,\nBeirut (interpreter)\nTIME AND DATE:\nThursday, November 8, 1973\n8:45 - 10:25 p.m.\nPLACE:\nThe Royal Palace\nRiyadh, Saudi Arabia\n[At the opening of the meeting, the members of the party were introduced\nto the King. There was a brief photo opportunity. After the photographers\nwere dismissed, servants entered and served cups of coffee spiced with\ncardamom.]\nFaysal: I hope you have had no difficulties on this trip.\nKissinger: No, Your Majesty, I've had a very good trip and a trip I hope\ncan contribute to peace in the Middle East.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nNLN09-01/11003 Per Hr. 6/18/2012\nBy RS/WIH NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nTOP SECRET XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-2-\nFaysal: This is our hope also, that it will lead to peace.\nKissinger: I have had the benefit of some of your reflections on peace in\nthe Middle East, Your Majesty. I wonder if there are some additional\ncomments you would care to make that I could transmit to President Nixon.\nFaysal: Of course our deepest hope is that peace and stability will reign\nin the Middle East, and Your Excellency is aware of my views in the past:\nin essence, that there will be no stability and peace unless Israel withdraws\nfrom the occupied territories and the Palestinians go back to their own\nhomes. And that is why we sincerely hope that it will come about as expedi-\ntiously as possible, and that the Arabs will be permitted to return to\nfriendship with their American friends. And we also hope that this in itself\nthe restoration of peace and stability, and of friendship will automatically\nlead to a shrinking of Communist influence in the area.\nKissinger: Would Your Majesty like me to describe first what we did on\nthis trip, and then describe where we proceed?\nFaysal: As Your Excellency would like.\nKissinger: I remember vividly, Your Majesty, your visit to the United States,\nwhen you pointed out to our President some of the dangers you saw in the\nsituation. And many of the predictions of His Majesty have come true.\nI thought it would be useful if I explained to His Majesty what our thinking\nis, so that even if he disagrees with us in some details he can understand\nus and perhaps contradict us where we are wrong.\nFaysal: Please.\nKissinger: Between 1967 and 1973, Your Majesty, the United States did\nnot succeed in doing something decisive about the problems in the Middle\nEast. My predecessor, Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Sisco made an\neffort for some two years, but it did not have the full organized power of\nthe United States behind it which was not their fault. The difficulty for\nus, Your Majesty, has been that until this year, most of our domestic\nattention was focused on the war in Viet-Nam, and we did not find it easy\nto take on the domestic upheaval that it would represent domestically.\nAfter the end of the war in Viet-Nam, Your Majesty, the President\ndirected me to turn my attention to the Middle East and I must say,\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-3-\nYour Majesty, that he did this before the way, at the end of August and in\nearly September.\nWhen I met Your Majesty's Foreign Minister in New York, at the end of\nSeptember, I pointed out to him that we would make a major effort at the\nend of November, and we discussed how the U.S. could cooperate with\nthe Arab world. Then the war broke out, and accelerated all developments.\nNow the war presented us, Your Majesty, with a particular problem. I\nknow some of our actions embarrassed some of our old friends. While we\nmay not gain your approval, perhaps I can explain to you why we acted as\nwe did.\nFrom the first day we say that the war proved the indispensable necessity\nof finding peace. And President Sadat will confirm to you, Your Majesty,\nthat we exchanged correspondence with him every day, even in the most\nbitter days, when we were doing things that were most painful for Egypt.\nAnd we always told President Sadat what I'm saying to Your Majesty --\nthat when the war is over, the U.S. will use its influence for peace, no\nmatter what we do during the war.\nOur motivation during the war, Your Majesty, was to prevent the increase\nof Communist influence. And when the Soviet Union poured arms into the\narea, then we believed we had to react to that. I know Your Majesty doesn't\nagree with this, but I thought Your Majesty would want to understand our\nmotivations during the two weeks of war.\nBut now the war is over. We were instrumental in bringing about a cease-\nfire, even though the Israelis wanted to continue fighting. We have been\ni nstrumental in fact, we have been decisive - in bringing about the\nresupply of the Third Egyptian Army. And when I met with President Sadat\nyesterday, he and I agreed on a settlement to the ceasefire problem, which\nnow has been accepted under great pressure by Israel. This makes\nit possible to open peace negotiations.\nIncidentally, if Your Majesty wi shes, we can leave a text of the agreement\nwith your Foreign Minister. It will be announced tomorrow evening.\nFaysal: [nods] I am grateful to Your Excellency for these elaborations and\nexplanations, and I would like to mention the fact that you know - that\nin the past I repeatedly explained to President Nixon and Secretary Rogers\nthe pressing need for the U.S. to bring pressure on Israel to withdraw from\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-4-\nthe occupied territories -- worrying about the inevitable explosion I\nforesaw.\nKissinger: His Majesty turned out to be correct.\nFaysal: Because the Communists, as you know, would like the situation\nto remain as it is, because it is fertile ground to penetrate further. We\nknow the U.S., throughout its history, has always stood up against the\naggressor. Your Excellency recalls vividly in the last war when the Nazis\ncast avaricious eyes and moved against Poland and Czechoslovakia, the\nU.S. without hesitation moved against them, with the British and French.\nIn 1956, the U.S. did not hesitate to line up against the British and French\nallied with Israel which committed aggression.\nIf the United States after the 1967 war had immediately taken steps not\nonly to stop Israeli advances but to move back to the lines of June 4, 1967,\nwe wouldn't have seen these recent developments.\nAs I have explained, Your Excellency, and as I have made it clear to\nPresident Nixon, my thoughts are that unless the Israelis withdraw from\nthe occupied territories and permit the refugees to return to their homes,\nthere will be no peace. Once this happens, there will be peace.\nI am speaking frankly, of course, as a friend. Actually it saddens me, it\nis painful to me to have to take steps which not only cause an imbalance\nin our relationship, but harm our friendship.\nBut as you recall, I read in 1967, events opened up more avenues for the\nCommunists to advance. And what did they do? They ran around stirring\nup trouble, spreading the idea that Saudi Arabia is in cahoots with Israel.\nBecause the Communists know that we are their biggest obstacle in the\nCommunists' path in this area, that's precisely why they are ceaselessly\nstirring up trouble to remove us.\nKissinger: I agree with Your Majesty on the Communist political and\nsecurity purposes.\nFaysal: But unfortunately Israel seems to be preparing the ground for\nthe success of these designs. That is why I say, and I would like to\nrepeat, that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories and permit\nthe return of those who have fled. Without these two practical steps, there\nwill be no guarantee of peace in the area.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-5-\nSaqqaf: I want to point out that some have the impression that His Majesty\ndoesn't care any more about the issue of Jerusalem. This is, of course,\nnot true.\nFaysal: It is unfortunate that among those of the Jewish faith there are\nthose who embraced Zionism, and this will be to the detriment of the\nJewish people. Before the advent of Israel, of the Jewish state, there was\nnothing to harm the good relations between them. The Arabs had no reason\nto resist them. There were many Jews living in Arab countries, we called\nthem Arab Jews. When the Jews were persecuted in Spain, for example,\nthe Arabs protected them. In Spain, the Romans also drove the Jews from\nthese areas, but the Arabs welcomed them.\nThese are problems created by Israel, aided and abetted by the intrigues\nand designs of Israel.\nAt the Yalta Conference, President Franklin Roosevelt's meeting with\nStalin, the President and Churchill wanted to do something for the Jews, and\nit was Stalin who said: \"No, we must have a state for them. \" And the\nSoviet Ambassador at the UN accused the U.S. of placing obstacles to the\ncreation of the Jewish State.\nAf ter 1947, in the ensuing negotiations, Count Bernadotte sent a representa-\ntive urging that the territory be rescinded. It was the Soviet Union then\nthat opposed the ceasefire.\nSo this points out the Communists' designs. Doubtless, Your Excellency\nis aware of all these points. What is needed now, at the risk of repeating\nmyself, is Israeli withdrawal as soon as possible from the occupied territories,\nand allowing the Palestinians to go home. If these two things can be\ndone, it can happen that peace and stability can be restored.\nThe U.S. always stands up against the aggressor, and many regard Israel\nas the aggressor. From 1958 to 1967, there was never any act of aggress-\nion against Israeli territory, in spite of the fact that after 1949 Israel was\noffered a certain defined territory, as you know.\nI present this argument for a major effort. I therefore urge my American\nfriends that they should not abet this tendency in Israel. We actually think\nthe U.S. has the most of its friends in the Arab world. And we sincerely\nhope once the U.S. gives up its out-and-out support for Israel\nwhich\nis not even in your country's interest.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-6-\nAs a friend of the U.S., I hold close to my heart U.S. interests, almost\nas close to my heart as my own country's interest.\nBut unfortunately, and Your Excellency will realize it immediately, it is\ninconsistent with your interests. We always want to establish this, and\nit is painful also to hear that there are in America elements -- and outside\nthe Jews -- who support Israeli superiority. There is no reason to continue\nthis. We feel it is incumbent on the U.S. to realize this.\nIt is not a question of racism but a question of loving one's patrie. We\ndeal, even in the Arab world, with people on the same level, whether Jews\nor not. There must be established in Palestine, by agreement, a mixed\nJewish-Moslem state. No one refers to the U.S. as a \"Christian state. \"\nThey will open it up to all in a democratic process.\nHow is it conceivable to witness the driving away of an indigenous people\nfrom their homes and territory, and at the same time bring in people\nwho don't really belong there [but bring them in only] because of their\nreligion? Now the greatest part of the immigration is from the Soviet\nUnion. They seem to want to establish a Communist base right in the\nmiddle of this region. As you know, the Communists are against the\nbeliefs of any kind. All faiths believe in a deity, but the Communists don't.\nKissinger: Your Majesty, the problem the U.S. now faces is how we can\ngo from the present situation what we recognize is intolerable to the\nArabs -- to a genuine peace.\nFaysal: Start by having Israel withdraw.\nKissinger: I agree, Israel has to make withdrawals. But it is a problem\nfor the U.S. how to bring this about. If you permit me, Your Majesty, I'd\nlike to put before you our thoughts on this.\nFaysal: I must draw your attention to my deepest thought, that Israel\nwould withdraw the moment Israel saw that you would no longer protect it,\ncuddle it.\nKissinger: I have examined His Majesty's thinking on this subject, and I\nmust say it has considerable merit.\nThe problem is that the Communists can give arms to the Arabs but only\nthe U.S. can bring peace for the Arabs. His Majesty pointed out that the\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-7-\nU.S. can influence Israel to choose a course of peace. I believe His\nMajesty is right.\nThe United States can do it, but it is a very difficult enterprise for the\nUnited States. Because the conditions that produce the American relation-\nship to Israel have a very profound significance within the United States in\ncertain domestic groups. The reason why in the past many initiatives have\nnot succeeded is because they were treated as foreign policy problems and\ninsufficient attention was devoted to handling the domestic situation.\nI'm speaking very candidly to His Majesty.\nFaysal: I appreciate your frankness and I reciprocate when I say it is\nincumbent on the citizens of a country to be loyal to that country.\nKissinger: That may be true, but it is a fact that many people in key\nplaces in our Government, including many in Congress, identify U.S.\ninterests with Israel's interests.\nFaysal: I repeat, we can't see it. What interests does the United States\nhave? On the contrary, as far as we can see, Israel is a liability to the\nAmericans, costing you much.\nKissinger: Regardless of the pressures, the important thing is that the\nPresident has now decided to make a major effort to bring about a settle-\nment. Contrary to 1967, the President is prepared to fight the battles\nthat are necessary to bring this result. I told your Foreign Minister this,\nand in honor of His Majesty I confirm it to you today.\nFaysal: We are very hopeful that our way of thinking\nthat you will see\nyour way to go along with these suggestions.\nKissinger: We want to move in that direction. But I would like His Majesty\nto understand certain problems on our side. We have in recent weeks\ngiven considerable proof that we're moving in the direction that His Majesty\nindicated: We saved the Egyptian Third Army. And we have brought about\nan agreement that will now be signed tomorrow or the day after on\nstabilizing the ceasefire. And we have agreed with President Sadat on the\nopening of a peace conference and on the direction we will move in a\npeace conference. And we are going to establish friendly relations with\nevery Arab country that is prepared to do it. And His Majesty will\nremember that I specifically mentioned Syria at the dinner table.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-8-\nFaysal: Incidentally, before I mention Syria, I should say that I asked a\nSyrian friend whether Syria would have anything against a visit by you to\nSyria. He said instantly, \"On the contrary; we would welcome it. \"\nKissinger: That was a misunderstanding. The principle of a visit to\nSyria is accepted, and we will maintain contacts.\nFaysal: This was Syria's reply to my message to our Ambassador in\nSyria, and we got an answer back from their Foreign Minister.\nKissinger: We will keep this very much in mind, and I want to make clear\nwe do not intend to exclude Syria from contact at a very high level on an\nequal basis.\nFaysal: This is absolutely right, because Syria cannot be ostracized.\nKissinger: I assure Your Majesty that we will deal with Syria with great\nseriousness, and any advice His Majesty has on this will be greatly\nappreciated.\nFaysal: We confirm that the Syrians are anxious to meet with you and\nreceive you at the highest level.\nKissinger: We will reestablish contact with them immediately on my\nreturn to the U.S. On this trip my schedule was absolutely fixed but, I\nrepeat, we will establish contact at the highest level. When I come to\nEurope in December, perhaps I can use the occasion to meet with the\nPresident of Syria.\nFaysal: Yes.\nKissinger: Let me point out some of our problems. We will move in the\ndirection I indicated but we must be given the opportunity to organize our\ndomestic situation or our effort will fail. We must prevent the combination\nof the attacks already being made on the President from other reasons with\nthe attacks from certain religious groups from becoming overwhelming.\nTherefore, we will begin to organize our support in Congress and in the\nnewspapers and elsewhere. This will take us some weeks.\nFaysal: We wish you every success in this regard, and we hope you will\nmove as expeditiously as possible.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-9-\nKissinger: I have been told that His Majesty is a man of his word and that\nhe respects people who act the same way.\nFaysal: Of course, I appreciate that, but I also would appreciate and I\nwould shout it from the rooftops if I could that Americans will become\naware of their interest.\nKissinger: His Majesty will see in the next months that we will make a\nmajor effort to make progress.\nFaysal: A few months will be a bit much for the impatient, but let's hope\nit can be weeks. To get rid of Communism once and for all.\nKissinger: Let me touch on a subject about which I know nothing and our\nAmbassador knows a great deal. This is the question of the embargo on\noil by certain Arab states. We understand the emotions that produced this,\nand we are not debating those.\nFaysal: This is precisely what makes me red hot with anxiety to expedite\nthis as fasttas possible, so we can go not only to rescinding the ban but to\nincrease our production.\nIt has been almost calamitous to my nerves to have to take this action with\nmy American friends. My colleagues can confirm that yesterday I nearly\nwas incapacitated because of my nerves, but I controlled myself and was\nable to receive you. Yesterday I received the credentials of your Ambas-\nsador, and parenthetically, these two things are not related I nearly\nhad a nervous breakdown. My doctor told me to rest. Thanks be to God,\nI recovered and was able to receive you.\nTherefore, I repeat, I am most anxious that this happen most expeditiously,\nso that we can not only go back to the status quo but increase our produc-\ntion.\nKissinger: But I want to put before His Majesty the following proposition:\nThe decision has had enormous effect not economic, because we can\nhandle it economically, but psychologically, coming as it did from an old\nfriend of the United States.\nFaysal: That is precisely why I have suffered even more than you.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-10-\nKissinger: And we take it very seriously. But now we face a new situa-\ntion. The strategy of those who oppose peace has been to portray the\nArab world as basically hostile to the United States and therefore to\nmobilize public support for opposition to the peace effort. Over the next\nperiod, Your Majesty, we are prepared to move in the direction of peace,\non a course we already discussed with President Sadat. It will be very\ndifficult if now in America we face a situation where we have to ration gas\nand in winter have to limit the heating of our housing. In this situation,\ntwo things will happen: First, President Nixon's authority will be further\nweakened, because he will be blamed whatever the reason. And as his\nauthority is weakened, his ability to act decisively in other fields is\nweakened. Second, certain forces will be able to use this to generate\nhostility to the Arab world in general. And since these forces have a great\ndeal of influence on the press and TV anyway, it makes it enormously diffi-\ncult. And this is why I wanted to put, for the consideration of Your\nMajesty, [the idea] not of reversing the principle, but of limiting its\napplication. If what I say is not realized, His Majesty will be forced [to\nreimpose it]. But what I am suggesting is the possibility of limiting this\ndifficulty, to ease the task of those moving towards peace.\nI've discussed this problem frankly with President Sadat, and he has said\nhe would not oppose such a decision.\nFaysal: Of course it would be a great pleasure to us to be in a position to\nrescind it immediately. But you understand the difficulty we are in, and\nthe embarrassment to us. This decision has been in our mind for a long\ntime. But in order to come to a happy medium and achieve what you are\nasking, it would be for the United States to announce immediately that\nIsrael must withdraw from the territories and allow the return of the\nPalestinians and and this is a new thing that if Israel does not do so,\nyou will no longer support it.\nKissinger: May I say something, not with the idealism of His Majesty, but\nin its practical aspects? If we make a dramatic announcement, we will\ncreate a domestic upheaval. We have to move step-by-step toward a goal.\nIf I can say something here in strict confidence that will not be repeated\nthat in the next few days we are planning to end the airlift that was started\nduring the war.\nFaysal: That is something that should be.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-11-\nKissinger: But we can do certain things, but if we announce total programs\nit will be very dangerous for us.\nFaysal: That is exactly why you are on the right path, and I am urging\nonly speed.\nKissinger: That is the situation, Your Majesty, and we will move with the\nspeed that the situation permits. But if I can urge His Majesty to\nconsider -- not for a decision here but he will want to reflect on it but\nto resort not to pressure now but to a way to make our task easier. And\nif we don't product results, His Majesty is free to return to the previous\npolicy.\nOur Ambassador, who is an expert on the oil problem, will be able to\nconfirm to His Majesty that in the next period, when diplomacy will be\nmost active, the oil restrictions will be annoying but not decisive. But\nthey can be used by our opponents to mobilize public opinion with the view\nthat we are yielding to Arab blackmail -- which we can already see in the\nnewspapers in Israel and certain U.S. papers. And it is important to\nwhat we should see as a common objective.\nFaysal: This is our own predicament -- the other side of the coin -- that the\nCommunists are accusing some Arab elements of going along with U.S.\npressure.\nKissinger: One reason we are having the Soviet Union in the peace confer-\nence is not because they can bring peace but to make it harder for them to\ndo mischief during the conference.\nFaysal: Yes, but I'd also like to forewarn you that they cannot be trusted.\nKissinger: Your Majesty, I can assure you that we have no illusions about\nthe Soviet Union. I don't have to remind you that the Soviet Union is our\nenemy.\nFaysal: In essence, I repeat, if we aim at the right path by getting Israel\nto withdraw and permit the people to return, then the Soviet Union will have\nno leg to stand on.\nKissinger: That is why we want to mobilize support. Your Ambassador can\nconfirm that it is essential not to further weaken the authority of the Presi-\ndent. The President will have to spend all his time explaining why he\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-12-\ndidn't foresee the energy crisis, why there has to be rationing, etc. It\nwill strengthen our opponents who do not want peace and weaken your\nfriends who do want peace. And if it doesn't come about, unintentionally,\nyou can return to your previous policy. That is understood.\nFaysal: I offer a ready answer with which to hit those who want to accuse\nyou of succumbing to Arab blackmail -- it is to say that the only reason the\nArabs are doing this is our support for the enemy of the Arabs.\nKissinger: Your Majesty, it won't work this way. Our best propaganda\nin the United States is to say that we are on a responsible course, not\nbecause we are anti-Israel or pro-Arab but because we are interested\nin peace in the Middle East and the national interests of the United States.\nThat's the only argument they will understand. If we debate the\nmerits of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there will be more people defending\nthe Israeli side than the Arab side, even if His Majesty is right. That is\nwhy we want to raise the level of argument to the level of the American\nnational interest, and that cannot be debated.\nFaysal: Of course I appreciate your valid explanations. But at the same\ntime I wish Your Excellency to appreciate the position of Saudi Arabia,\nwhich was a decision not of ours alone but as part of a joint decision. We\nare part of the Arab family. What I need is the wherewithal to go to my\ncolleagues and urge this. Therefore, first I need speed, and second to\nannounce it [your position] publicly.\nKissinger: We will do this at various stages of the negotiation. But if\nwe do it before the negotiations, it will defeat itself. If we do it before the\nnegotiations, we will be less effective in the negotiations.\nI have in the past not made promises to Arab leaders because I was not\nsure I could deliver anything. Since September I have spoken with many\nArab leaders and I don't want to promise more than I can deliver.\nFaysal: We sincerely hope you'll achieve this goal and we wish you\nsuccess.\nKissinger: I know His Majesty wouldn't wish to make a decision on this\nsubject while I'm here. I would just wish that after I've been here, His\nMajesty might bear in mind this that pressure could make the task\ndifficult, or impossible. And I hope His Majesty might consider that the\nefforts we have done already -- bringing about a ceasefire, bringing about\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\ntoo\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-13-\nthe relief of the Third Army, bringing about stabilization of the ceasefire,\nand ending the airlift next week - - would be evidence of the direction in\nwhich we are moving.\nFaysal: We pray to Almighty God that He will continue to grant you success\nin all these noble efforts. I spoke very frankly to Your Excellency because\nI respect your proven ability and wisdom.\nKissinger: I appreciate His Majesty putting his problems before us. Our\nAmbassador can pursue this subject at a later period.\nFaysal: We will of course welcome discussions with His Excellency the\nAmbassador always.\nI repeat our supplication to God and our prayers that all these problems\nwill be removed as expeditiously as possible.\nKissinger: I give His Majesty the assurance that we will make a major\neffort, with all the dedication of which we are capable, for our friends in\nthe Arab world.\nFaysal: And I wish you the greatest success.\nKissinger: I don't want to tire His Majesty, but of course I am at His\nMajesty's disposal. Should we continue?\nFaysal: I appreciate your consideration.\n[The meeting then ended at 10:25 p.m. ]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\n1 Umar al-Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign\nAffairs\nDr Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\nJames Akins, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia\nIsa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy\nBeirut (interpreter)\nTIME AND DATE:\nThursday, November 8, 1973\n11:03 - 11:57 p.m.\nPLACE:\nDr. Kissinger's Suite\nGuest House\nRiyadh\nSaqqaf: I don't think we have much more to say after the long discussion\nyou had with His Majesty. You both were difficult, as far as I can see.\nBut this was among friends. You will see results.\nKissinger: I didn't think there could be an answer.\nSaqqaf: Secondly, there are some Americans who seem to think he is\nnot really interested in Palestine but only in Communism and radical-\nism.\nKissinger: Who is SO stupid?\nAkins: Jackson said that.\nSaqqaf: He makes so many bad statements. He said \"They can drink\ntheir oil or swim in it. We don't need it. \" This doesn't help\nDECLASSIFIED\nKissinger: He's running for President.\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-01/11004 Per Hr. 6/18/2012\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nBy RJ/WIH NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-2-\nSaqqaf: What you said today is true -- that the so-called oil pressure\nwill help your opponents. But what the King said\nKissinger: Is also true.\nSaqqaf: The King has never wanted to hurt the U.S. But he kept saying\nthis for years. He said it a long time ago.\nIsa: He said it to President Kennedy in 1962.\nSaqqaf: He said we should let Palestinians return, and end it.\nAkins: Eban told Congressmen Steele and Ryan that the boycott\nmeant nothing, that we didn't need the oil, and that three weeks after\nthe boycott, Saudi Arabia would be reduced to poverty.\nKissinger: That's not true.\nSaqqaf: You said to me the second time I met you in State Department,\n\"What do the Arabs want? 11 I said, \"We're not that powerful. We\ncan't destroy Israel. All we want to do is shake public opinion. \"\nIt's in your records.\nKissinger: Exactly.\nSaqqaf: What the Soviet Union gives them is only drops some\nweapons -- then they leave.\nThe Arabs achieved some thing very great. The complex of always\nbeing defeated is gone\nKissinger: That's good.\nAkins: That's very good.\nSaqqaf: What Russia sent wasn't the way it was done by the U.S.\nThey sent it by slow ships, and only small things came in planes.\nTo punish Syria and Egypt. To show their dependence.\nKissinger: Quite frankly, Mr. Foreign Minister, you and I knew\nthe Israelis were winning [when the ceasefire was declared].\nSaqqaf: Of course. And Aly Sabry would have come in.\nOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-3-\nKissinger: Yes. We stopped Israel from destroying the Third Army.\nSaqqaf: You helped that.\nKissinger: But if Arab radicals win with Soviet arms, you yourself\nwould be threatened.\nSaqqaf: But on this issue we are united.\nKissinger: Of course.\nSaqqaf: If they win, what happens before is forgotten I saw the people\nin the street; they were angry at the ceasefire. Every country's people\nwas pushing its government to keep fighting So we are paying for it,\nnot Syria When a Phantom destroys a refinery in Syria, it's we who\npay for it, and Russia who gets the hard currency\nLet me tell you what Boumedienne told me. Don't write this down\nBoumedienne saw Brezhnev in Moscow. Brezhnev said to him frankly,\n\"We don't want long-term peace or long-term war. We want things\nto erupt, and then calm down. Now we want a ceasefire \" That's\nwhat he said. So Boumedienne said: \"Why tell me ? I'm not fighting. 11\nBrezhnev said, \"Tell Sadat. \"\n\"Why should I? said Boumedienne,\n''it's not my business. 11\nYou know Brezhnev is a very nervous type. He was getting up all\nthe time, and scratching his arm. Then at one point, Boumedienne\nsaid, \"We've got some money for you. 11 Immediately Brezhnev\nperked up: \"We want some arms, 11 Boumedienne said. Brezhnev\nimmediately had the money in a Soviet bank\nThey want us to go this way\nKissinger: Will you?\nSaqqaf: No There will be no Russian arms in Saudi Arabia. That's\nwhy the King was very ill yesterday He has influenza. It's painful\nto him not to defend his country. But when he defends the U.S., he\nfeels like someone standing alone. Nobody's with you. If I look\nwith a microscope, only Rhodesia is with you. All of Africa has\ncut diplomatic relations I don't know what problems you have, but\nwe have a problem. Kenya, Ethiopia, who all had good relations\nwith Israel, cut relations without even approaching them first.\nIf these countries do this, how can we refuse? We were called to\na meeting in Baghdad; we had to accept the decision. And once we\nOP SECRET Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASS This documenthas beey to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-4-\ngive our word we have to keep it.\nIraq refuses to attend the meeting. Do you know why? Because they\nhad to accept in advance the decision to cut relations with the U.S.\nand nationalize companies.\nWhat can we do? We, also, live in a crazy area.\nKissinger: We both have dilemmas.\nSaqqaf: The difficult time will come not now, but later.\nKissinger: Three months from now.\nSaqqaf: When we get to problems like Jersalem, moving across the\nSuez.\nKissinger: That's right\nSaqqaf: I understand this is the only way you can do it.\nSome of them think it's all solved. I saw Sadat yesterday. He said,\n\"It's all settled. We have diplomatic relations; the Israelis will\nwithdraw\n11\nKissinger: Really?\nSaqqaf: They really think that.\nKissinger: We have to have patience. The Israelis still have to under-\nstand what happened to them. They need a few weeks.\nSaqqaf: And they have an election. And both sides need to learn that\nthe other doesn't want to kill them. Now it's a vicious circle.\nSo we want your help. We want something we can feel.\nKissinger: If you look at what we've done in the last few weeks, it's\nquite a lot. And it's preparation for something more.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n5 -\nSaqqaf: All those who have met you have felt you're sincere. And\nyou don't say that what you can't do you can do We heard this when\nyou met King Hassan and when you met President Sadat. We heard\nthis from Morocco, from Egypt.\nKissinger: That's interesting.\nSaqqaf: We heard this from Benhima. But they were all more opti-\nmistic than they should be. They told me it was encouraging, I\nsaid, \"Let's wait. 11\nSadat said the same thing: You were a wise man, very calm, very\npatient to hear, never annoyed, that you never stop anyone from\ntalking, that you talk at the beginning about what you can do and\nwhat you can't do. But still they are Arab, thinking more than they\nshould.\nKissinger: And Arabs are romantic anyway\nSaqqaf: Yes.\nIsa: If you will permit me, this brings to mind a line of Arab poetry.\nA poet once said about the triangle of love, about what he was suffering:\n\"We fell in love with Leila\" the lover of that poet -- which is the\nUSA. \"But she was in love with someone else¹¹ -- Israel. \"And yet\nthere is a third party in love with us but we don't want her\" -- the USSR.\nSaqqaf: There are many sayings like this in Arabic about our relations\nwith the U.S.\nAs the King said, we're friends and remain friends.\nThere was an Iraqi broadcast after the last OAPEC meeting. \"Who\ncan say Saudi Arabia will stop the oil? There must be something to\nstop oil to the West; there must be a conspiracy. 11\nAkins: Because Saudi Arabia is a tool of the U.S.; therefore the\noil boycott must be a plot to hurt Iraq.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-6-\nKissinger: Amazing\nSaqqaf: [takes out paper] These are my talking points. I think\nwe've covered everything in our talks:\nWhat Saudi Arabia wants.\n-- Why the U.S. helps Israel SO much.\n- What conditions make Israel so arrogant, SO difficult.\nWhy America is always silent for 25 years.\nIt is up to the U.S. to try to straighten out what has gone askew. When\nyou went all-out to help the Zoinists, what did you get in return?\nThe Arabs are one hundred percent united on this issue, and Faisal\nis way out in front on this. The policy of Saudi Arabia in twenty-\nfive years has not changed. His Majesty has constantly drawn the\nattention of the U.S. to this. I personally never met an American\nin this country without spelling it out. We urge you not to consider\nthat our fear of Communism is a weakness on our part. Sure, we\nare against the Communists, but we are also against the Zionist\noccupation, and the occupation of the holy places.\nWe want to dispel the myth that there is no connection between oil\nand the problem in the Middle East. Some have come and reiterated\nthis myth with some audacity. We won't be subjected to threats. We\nare familiar with what happened in 1962, when the U.S. was urging\neverybody to recognize Yemen. And we were almost alone The\nAmbassador here was Hart; he subsequently realized he was wrong.\nI wanted to reiterate to you and assure you that there is no desire to\ndestroy Israel In our country we have people who are from central\nAfrica; the Middle East is really a kaleidoscopic region. We're not\nagainst Judaism as a religion. No Muslim can be. I could not be\na good Muslim if I maligned Judaism. This isn't my personal opinion;\nit's in the Koran. Arab history books are replete with references\nto Jewish writers and scholars. We don't want the Nazi complex of\nhatred of the Jews to be imposed on us Jewish poets in Arabic are\ntaught in our schools.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-7-\nAkins: There is an Arabic saying \"As faithful as Samuel. 11\nSaqqaf: Permit me to say this. We've been so rich with promises,\nour political wealth is a stack of IOU's. This doesn't refer to you\nYou told me it before the war S tarted; I told it to my King, and the\nArabs know it. But it is an Arab saying: \"I am rich, but my wealth\nis promises. 11\nWe hear threats in the U.S. about grain cereals. We know it's not\nU.S. policy.\nKissinger: We should not have a confrontation.\nSaqqaf: We are against it. We are your friends Help us.\nKissinger: We say the same thing to you. And on oil, if we don't\nkeep our promise, we will still need the oil next year.\nSaqqaf: We were watching you two from the side; we thought he [the\nKing] lost.\nKissinger: With all due respect, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I don't\nbelieve!\nSaqqaf: Another point: Detente between the great powers should not\nbe permitted to work to the detriment of the Third World.\nKissinger: Of course Letme assure you the Soviet Union will try\nto give the impression that we and they have prearranged it all. It\nis not true. It's a game they play\nSaqqaf: We say that to the Arabs.\nI want to repeat that it's important to have contact with Syria.\nKissinger: We didn't want to be refused. But now that we understand\nthe situation, we will reestablish contact.\nSaqqaf: That's good. I will tell them. I'm going around to different\ncapitals. They are important to Arabdom. You should see the des-\ntruction wrought there; it will cost us millions and millions of dollars.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-8-\nAkins: And the Russians couldn't possibly havepproduced the ceasefire,\nor relief of the Third Army.\nSaqqaf: We're aware of that. Since Sadat became President, six\nmonths afterwards, we've been in contact. He's a wise man. He\nknows what he can do and cannot do.\nKissinger: He impressed me.\nSaqqaf: He knows the limits. He's not ambitious. If Nasser was alive,\nhe'd be shouting\nKissinger: And he'd fail.\nSaqqaf: Of course. The man was never normal -- he'd read a book\nand change his style of government completely A semi-educated\nofficer can't run a state\nI don't want to keep you.\nOur contact, between us\nKissinger: Let's maintain the channel May I write you for your\nopinion?\nSaqqaf: Of course.\nKissinger: If you see something I should know, or some thing I should\nnot have done, please -- seriously -- tell me.\nSaqqaf: I've done this on Syria.\nKissinger: That was the first time I understood their position.\nSaqqaf: Do you have a copy of the agreement?\nKissinger: Yes. [Tab A]\nSaqqaf: Theirs is longer.\nKissinger: This is the six points on the ceasefire Then there are\nseven points on negotiation.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRool aol pelol\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n-9-\nSaqqaf: Yes.\nThe Arabs have confidence in you and therefore they have confidence\nthat everything will come out right.\nKissinger: That may be too much. But it shows their good intentions.\nSaqqaf: They said there would be negotiations in December.\nKissinger: Yes. December 8 And they wanted the Foreign Ministers\nThey wanted my personal presence.\nSaqqaf: It's some visible movement. It's important.\nNo country in the Middle East can afford like Egypt to lose six\nmillion pounds every three years.\nKissinger: These six points will be announced tomorrow. The seven\npoints will be announced about November 20\n[The meeting ended with warm handshakes. The Secretary\nand the Foreign Minister walked downstairs together, their\narms around each other. ]\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nPrince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-¹Aziz, Second Deputy\nPrime Minister and Minister of Interior\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nJames Akins, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia\nPeter W. Rodman, NSC Staff\nIsa Sabbagh, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Beirut\n(Interpreter)\nTIME AND DATE:\nThursday, November 8, 1973\n10:35 - 11:00 p.m.\nPLACE:\nSecretary Kissinger's Suite\nGuest House\nRiyadh\nFahd: I don't want to overburden Your Excellency by taking up more of your\ntime, but I want to express appreciation for your visit.\nKissinger: I want to thank you, Your Highness. I was looking forward to\nwelcoming you to the U.S.\nFahd: I'm very pleased, and still look towards it.\nI would like to take this opportunity to express the hope that the\nfriendship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia which was strong in the past\nwill remain strong.\nKissinger: This is our hope.\nFahd: And these things that have come between us I would like to consider as\nthings that are transitory and not permanent in nature.\nAnd of course I appreciate listening to your explaining so brilliantly\nto His Majesty the King the difficulties for the U.S. and the particular difficulties\nthat would not be understood by those who do not know the U.S.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nDECLASSIFIED\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nE.O. 13526, Section 3.5\nNLN09-01/11005 Per 6/18/2012\nBy (WIH NARA, Date 11/16/2016\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n- 2 -\nAnd I would assure Your Excellency that I for one will be instrumental\namong those who will help you on the path you have marked out.\nKissinger: If this cannot be done, my path will be immeasurably more difficult.\nBecause when the whole atmosphere in the U.S. becomes focused on what will\nappear as a domestic problem, it will be impossible to mobilize ourselves\nfor a difficult foreign struggle.\nFahd: That's actually what I am saying -- that while we feel at ease hearing\nyou outline the steps you have embarked upon, I feel inevitably the results\nwill be good. And we appreciate the fact that things cannot be done overnight\nand have to be done step-by-step, but expeditiously.\nKissinger: I appreciate your understanding.\nFahd: I'm known for looking at things from a practical point of view, not in\nthe clouds.\nKissinger: That is the only way to get things solved.\nFahd: And now we are beginning to feel in the air, after a long time, the thread\nof a solution that would be acceptable to the Arabs and Israel.\nKissinger: I have the same sense. A year ago I thought the time was not right;\nnow I feel the time is right.\nFahd: Of course I appreciate that difficulties will be felt by people in Japan\nand the United States and Europe. But every cloud has a silver lining the\nthread has now appeared.\nAkins: I want to emphasize one point that the Secretary said to His Majesty --\nthat the present effort did not begin when the war started, but before the war\nstarted, and certainly before this boycott. I was with the Secretary in\nNew York and he said specifically that we would make a major effort.\nKissinger: Thank you.\nFahd: I heard that declaration myself and was very impressed.\nThe first step, as the Secretary said, was easing of relocation of the\nThird Army.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n- 3 -\nKissinger: Right. And it was very difficult.\nFahd: It was very difficult. Because these are exactly the kind of steps that\nthemselves could be used for telling our friends: Look at what the U.S. has\ndone, and the U.S. is willing to do more.\nKissinger: Yes.\nFahd: And we hope that at the peace conference that you mentioned will be the\nfirst of next month, a further tangible step will come that will help further.\nKissinger: Inevitably. I'm looking at it from the diplomatic point of view.\nBut please tell His Majesty that if we are to move effectively at the conference,\nit will help if some easing had already taken place. Otherwise it will get\nconfused in our domestic problem.\nFahd: I appreciate that. I will personally do what I can to bring this about.\nKissinger: It will help tremendously in our common effort.\nFahd: I appreciate that very much.\nThis is something touching on the situation in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq\nand southern Arabia. We have evidence that keeps coming to us -- certifiable\nthat there seems to be a pincer movement around Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.\nThe Chinese from the south, the Soviet Union from Iraq. That is why we\nanticipate that once this immediate problem is solved, the Communists will\ncontrive something to happen in Saudi Arabia.\nKissinger: That is why it is essential that between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia\nthere be no misunderstanding. You are the principal target. If you isolate\nyourselves you are losing one of your best supporters. I told His Majesty at\ndinner that we are prepared to be helpful with respect to the threat from the\nsouth. And of course we can cooperate with regard to the threat from the north.\nPerhaps when Your Highness comes to the United States we can consult further\non this.\nFahd: In fact we are in dire need to organize our armed forces -- the army,\nnavy, air force -- not with any aggressive intent but to defend ourselves.\nKissinger: Exactly.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\n- 4 -\nFahd: I had intended to talk with President Nixon about our Navy, which is a\nspecial problem.\nAkins: They have a money problem.\nKissinger: A money problem!\nAkins: We told them first that the program would cost $200 million. Then we\nsaid, \"Sorry, there's been a miscalculation. It will cost $650 million. \" Then\nwe said later, \"No, it will be $900 million. 11 They think we're not serious.\nKissinger: I don't have the facts. But we take this very seriously. We intend\nto strengthen your forces. In fact, we will send our Deputy Secretary of Defense\nClements here, who is a great lover of Saudi Arabia. When do you intend to\nvisit the U.S.?\nFahd: When you get a chance to relax. I want to give you a chance to relax first.\nKissinger: That may not be so soon!\nFahd: Seriously, when you sense and I feel that things are moving in the right\ndirection again.\nKissinger: Some time in the next month, then.\nFahd: I don't want to burden you. I will do my utmost to remove the obstacles\nto strengthened relations.\nKissinger: I'll do my utmost to work in the direction and spirit that I have\ndescribed.\n[With warm handshakes, the meeting ended. Secretary Kissinger\naccompanied the Prince downstairs to the door, where the\nForeign Minister was waiting.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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