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    "ocrText": "MEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nGolda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel\nYigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister\nMoshe Dayan, Minister of Defense\nAharon Yariv, Prime Minister's Office\nJoseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA\nHarold H. Saunders, National Security Council\nSenior Staff\nKenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel\nNicholas A. Veliotes, Deputy Chief of Mission,\nAmerican Embassy, Tel Aviv (joined after break)\nDATE & TIME:\nWednesday, November 7, 1973, 7:30 p.m. -\nMidnight\nPLACE:\nPrime Minister's Guest House\nHerzliyya, near Tel Aviv\nSisco: Well, Madame Prime Minister, I am here to tell you the story.\nAllon: In Israel we talk about the oral Torah. You are here to give us\nthe oral Torah.\nSisco: Since our talks in Washington last week, Madame Prime Minister,\nI have tried to do my homework. You are an old school teacher. Let us\nsee whether we have earned a gold star.\nFirst, let me set aside quickly the announcement that has just\nbeen made that the U.S. and Egypt have decided in principle to resume\ndiplomatic relations. This means that we will upgrade our Interests\nSections so that they will be headed by men at the ambassadorial level.\nPrime Minister: These men have not been appointed ambassadors yet?\nSisco: They have the rank of ambassador but will serve as heads of\nthe Interests Sections until full diplomatic relations are formally\nresumed. Our man in Cairo will be Hermann Eilts. I want to tell you\nSECRET/NODIS\nSECRET - XGDS (3)\nCLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nthat he has a well-balanced view on this problem. That is why the\nSecretary picked him. The Egyptian in Washington will be Ashraf\nGhorbal, who was in Washington for five years and is now a counselor\nto President Sadat.\nMost of the meeting with Sadat concentrated on the proposal\nwhich you have before you [copy attached]. A little time was spent on\nthe resumption of relations and on ideas for a peace conference.\nWe put to President Sadat your Saturday night proposal. The\nEgyptians agree on all points in every important respect. There is\none point which has taken a somewhat different form, and I will come\nto that in a moment.\nThe proposal calls for each side to observe the ceasefire.\nYou will note that it avoids mention of any specific UN resolution. We\ndid that in order not to be so explicit about the issue of the October 22\nlines.\nThe second point, as you suggested, leaves the question of\nreturn to the October 22 lines to the time when you discuss disengagement.\nYou will note that the word \"immediately\" is used. The\nEgyptians have in mind that the first item on the agenda of the peace\nconference will be disengagement. You can slow down that process\nbetween now and the peace conference. We talked in terms of a\nconference to begin the first week in December.\nPrime Minister: Then what does \"immediate\" refer to?\nSisco: It refers to the whole paragraph.\nThe proposal would establish UN checkpoints upon the Cairo/\nSuez road. The Egyptians were particularly interested in the check\npoints at Kilometers 102 and 109.\nPrime Minister: The road remains status quo?\nSisco: Your checkpoints are replaced by UN checkpoints. At the\noffloading point you would participate in the inspection.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n-3-\nAllon: The whole road, then, remains part of the territory we occupied?\nSisco: We did not go into detail on that. We assume that you would be\noff the road. But this agreement does not get into the question of where\nthe lines are.\nPrime Minister: Remember our discussion Saturday night. I said that\nnothing must change on the road. But I did say that as far as the first\ncheckpoint is concerned, I was prepared to suggest to the Government\nthat the UN would make the inspection and that we would be there. At\nthe unloading point, we would make the inspection and they would be there.\nThere is no question of handing over the checkpoints completely because\nthat would amount to handing over the road.\nAllon: This will need further clarification.\nSisco: At this point, Ambassador Keating arrived. Ken, I had just begun\nto explain this proposal which we are putting forward based on our Saturday\nevening conversation. In our judgment, it meets all essential Israeli points.\nIn essence, return to the October 22 lines is left to the time when the parties\ntalk about disengagement. The principle of non-military supply is estab-\nlished, and UN checkpoints are set up. Then there will be an exchange of\nprisoners.\nI was just about to make the point that the blockade is not in the formal\nproposal but is the subject of an oral understanding. Egypt has under-\ntaken to ease the blockade at Bab-el-Mandab. This means that ships\nwill be permitted to go through the strait, but Egypt expresses the hope of\nof moderation on the number of ships. Sadat feels he cannot take domes-\ntically and in the Arab world making concessions on both the October 22\nlines and the blockade. Therefore, he would hope for no publicity on\nthe easing of the blockade.\nWe believe this formula meets your essential requirements. Also, the\nEgyptians are ready to lift the blockade in the context of an agreement\non disengagement. Both the issue of the October 22 lines and the formal\nlifting of the blockade will be considered in the context of the discussion\nof disengagement.\nWe attach great importance to the question of guaranteeing that non-\nmilitary cargoes get through to the Egyptian Third Army. We have\ngiven our assurance to Egypt on this point.\nBearing in mind\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n4\nthe possible terrible alternatives that we discussed Saturday night, we\nlike you want to avoid giving the Soviets the opportunity to act by them-\nselves or in concert with others. I have been asked by the Secretary\nto stress the importance we attach to this and to tell you of the assurance\nwe have given to the Egyptians that non-military cargoes would not be\nimpeded.\nFrankly, as we told you in Washington, the Egyptians are\nstill fearful that once the prisoners of war are returned there\nis no return to October 22 lines--you can shut off the food at will.\nThey are very concerned about this, and this is one of the reasons\nwhy our assurances were given.\nThe Egyptians want to talk about disengagement at the first\nstage of the peace conference.\nIf your government agrees to this proposal, we are prepared to\noppose Security Council resolutions on return to the October 22 lines.\nFrom a procedural viewpoint, if this proposal is agreeable to\nyou, your military representatives would meet with Egyptian\nrepresentatives Friday along with a UN officer to put this agreement\ninto effect. The US would send a letter to the UN Secretary General\ninforming him of our understanding that the governments of Israel and\nEgypt had agreed to this proposal. We would ask him to assure that a\nUN representative would meet with the Egyptian and Israeli representa-\ntives and receive the confirmation that both sides had agreed. This\nagreement would be ratified by the Security Council.\nReaching agreement on this proposal proved a difficult task.\nWe think we are bringing you what you asked for Saturday evening.\nMadame Prime Minister, your persuasive powers are well known.\nSo are the Secretary's. He used them all today. We think this moment\nis to be seized quickly so that we can bring about the ceasefire you and\nwe want. We hope for your prompt approval.\nMost of the time with Sadat was spent on this issue. There\nwas a little bit spent on the resumption of relations and on the peace\nconference. They indicated a desire to meet in the first week of December.\nGeneva is agreeable to them. They backed away from the idea of\nNew York. This seems to be one minor indication that they are serious.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n5\nAllon:\nThey wanted Geneva because the UN is there?\nPrime Minister: No, just the UN agencies are there.\nSisco: The composition of the conference would include Syria, Egypt,\nJordan and Israel. Lebanon has indicated some interest in participating.\nWhether that is necessary at the outset is a question that can be left to\nthe Lebanese.\nPrime Minister: Do the Syrians want to participate?\nSisco: We didn't get into that. What we are talking about here are\nSadat's ideas.\nPrime Minister: Are the Soviets acquainted with this proposal?\nSisco: They will be informed at some point soon in Washington. I\ndon't recall the exact timing.\nPrime Minister: Secretary Kissinger in Washington placed great\nstress on his desire to persuade President Sadat to use his influence\non the question of oil.\nSisco: We are confident he will use his influence. Frankly, our first\ninterest is in gaining acceptance of this proposal and in seizing the oppor-\ntunity to stabilize the ceasefire. But we would also like to use the\nagreement when we arrive in Riyadh tomorrow afternoon. We would\nhope to use this agreement--plus the fact that King Hussein and\nKing Hassan are being helpful-- to erode the oil boycott. I may be\nover-optimistic, but I have the feeling that the Arabs may be slowly\ncoming to the view that blackmail is not the way to deal with the US.\nThis is just my personal view, but Sadat seems interested in\ndisengaging from too close a relationship with the USSR. He insisted\nthat we come directly to Cairo to know Egyptian positions and not go\nthrough Moscow.\nJust to give you one small vignette of Egyptian thinking on this\npoint, one of the Egyptians was talking today about the possibility of\nthe US joining the talks between the Egyptian and Israeli military\nrepresentatives. But he thought a moment and decided that if the US\nwere there, it would raise the Soviet question. And he didn't want that.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n6\nAllon: Did they tell you how many Soviets are there now? Is the\nnumber increasing?\nSisco: The Soviets sent those 70 observers without telling the\nEgyptians. We now have an agreement to provide 36 US and 36 Soviet\nobservers. The Egyptians are going to send the other 34 home.\nPrime Minister: Let me ask you this. Tomorrow at the Cabinet\nmeeting I will have to understand clearly what the understanding on\nthe blockade means. What does it mean that the Egyptians hope that\nonly a limited number of ships will pass?\nSisco: I don't believe the word \"limited\" was used. I said that the\nEgyptians hoped you would be moderate in the number sent through\nthe strait.\nPrime Minister: We don't send boats just to make Sadat unhappy.\nThere are quite a few that will have to come through. This has to\nbe very clear. Another thing: If the formal raising of the blockade\nwill depend on the first phase of discussions in December, what will\nhappen if they break down? Does that mean another blockade? We\nare at the mercy of Sadat. What am I going to say when someone gets up\nin the Knesset and asks what I have done about the blockade?\nAllon: Word will get out that the ships are getting through.\nSisco: It will become known.\nPrime Minister: Then we will be accused of a breach of confidence. A\nmore serious question is that all we have is an oral promise from the\nEgyptians to you. We know this is how things go. We run to you and tell\nyou our complaint and Sadat will tell you his story. I can't imagine that\nwe can accept this. So much depends on the freedom of shipments there.\nWe and Iran have put enormous amounts of money into the flow of oil.\nAnd yet we are leaving this dependent on Sadat. He will stop the flow;\nhe will find some excuse.\nSisco: There is no limit that he has placed on the number of ships.\nHe simply expressed the hope that you will be moderate in the number\nyou send. Some of the points that might be made publicly in dealing\nwith this issue are that the question of October 22 lines and the formal\nlifting of the blockade will be left to later discussion. Second, we\nattach importance to the assurance Sadat has given us, and I am sure\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n7\nyou do also. Finally, the realities on the ground are such that if the\nblockade is reactivated, you will have a great deal of leverage since\nyou have not been forced back to October 22 lines. The other side is\nkeenly aware of this.\n[At this point, a message from the Secretary of State was\ndelivered to Mr. Sisco saying that new messages were coming and\nthat he should avoid making any approach until they had been received.\nThe meeting broke for about an hour and a half while the messages\nwere awaited and while dinner was served. When the meeting resumed,\nMr. Sisco informed the Prime Minister of the following two messages\nfrom the Secretary in Cairo:\nSECTO 34\n\"1. You should make clear to the Israelis that the\nonly military movement required under the agreement\nis away from the checkpoints. They may stay both sides\nof the road and therefore this takes care of Major General\nYariv's concern about cross-country movements.\n\"2. If the Israelis have trouble with the blockade and\nbelieve it is a difficult issue, you may assure them that I\nhave no objection to a unilateral statement at the time of\nthe signing of the document which makes clear that the\nceasefire includes all repeat all military actions on the\npart of both parties and therefore includes the blockade\nat the straits of Bab El-Mandeb. 11\nSECTO 43\n'1. Further to Para 2 of SECTO 34 re blockade,\nForMin Fahmi informs us that Egyptian position is as\nfollows: Since blockade was never declared, it cannot\nbe formally lifted, but orders for its relaxation have\nbeen issued.\n\"2. You may use foregoing as additional point to\nmake with GOI. 11\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n8\nHe then read the draft letter that we would propose sending to the UN\nSecretary General advising him of the Egyptian and Israeli agreement\nto the proposal. On the basis of a telephone paraphrase of another\nmessage, he advised the Prime Minister that we wished to change the\nword \"officer\" to the plural in paragraph 5 of the proposal. The\nexchange then resumed with the mood visibly relaxed and attention\nturned to clarifying various points. ]\nPrime Minister: What exactly happens on the road? We are in charge\nof the road. At the point where the Egyptians cross to our part of the\nroad and change drivers to UN drivers, that is now our checkpoint. At\nthis point the UN inspects with our people there. Then they go on to\nthe Canal and unload. The inspection there is done by the Israelis\nwith the UN looking on.\nSisco: Wait a minute, I don't know whether we are talking about the\nsame thing. I don't want to go into detail about this. Point 4 in the\nproposal says that there shall be no impediment to the movement of\nnon-military supplies to the East Bank.\nAllon: That should say \"to the Third Army. 11\nPrime Minister: That needs to be certain.\nDayan: I can understand why you don't want to get into details. I can\nsee you only want to deal with matters of principle. But we must be\nclear. I would just like you to be aware of some of the complications\ninvolved. For instance, there is one isolated Egyptian position at the\nhead of Little Bitter Lake. It has received no supplies for the last two\nweeks. We expect them to give in. It is part of the Third Army. They\nhave even asked us to evacuate some of their people. We refused to let\nfood in.\nSisco: Sadat is sensitive about mentioning the Third Army. The\noriginal language in this paragraph was \"the Third Army. \"\nDayan: I am not trying to negotiate with you. I just want you to\nunderstand some of the complications.\nThe second point is that there will be daily supplies going into\nSuez City. But the Third Army is on the East Bank. We do not want\nthe two to be linked. We control the connection only by fire. So if we\nopen fire to avoid Egyptians establishing a connection, you will understand.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n9\nPrime Minister: We have to reach some conclusion on the blockade.\nWe could make this declaration that is proposed when we sign the\nagreement. What happens when Sadat says no, or do you have an\nunderstanding with him?\nDayan: One cannot say that a ceasefire is in force if a blockade is\nstill maintained.\nSisco: This message indicates that the Egyptians have already given\nthe order to relax the blockade. They are serious. I think you have to\nwait to see how it works.\nPrime Minister: Moshe [Dayan] is making the Egyptian point.\nDayan: A ceasefire cannot include a blockade.\nAllon: Verbally this is all right. But you should know that although\nemotionally the prisoners come first, politically and strategically, the\nblockade comes first.\nSisco: What do you mean \"politically and strategically?\"\nPrime Minister: This is not different from Sharm El-Sheikh in 1967,\nonly worse. It is smothering us.\nSisco: Everything that you wanted in substance, you have.\nAllon: If they turn back a ship, it is war.\nSisco: We ought to make that clear to them. If they reimpose the\nblockade you are saying that you will have a free hand.\nDayan: I have two technical points and one major one.\nFirst, we need maps agreeing on where each party is. Yet I\nfear Egyptians will not feel like putting anything on paper. The Syrians\nhave done so.\nPrime Minister: A map without political implications.\nSisco: Do you really want to get into the process of delineation? This\nraises the question of the October 22 lines.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n10\nDayan: Unless it is clear, some Egyptian will come swimming over,\nwe will fire and there will be no more ceasefire.\nSisco: Can't you make this orally when your representatives meet?\nDayan: Yes, that is what I am saying. Our aim is to prevent the Egyptians\nfrom the Third Army from continuing to try to establish themselves on the\nWest Bank in hopes of being in place when the UN shows up. If they do\nkeep up, we shoot and there are problems for the ceasefire.\nSisco: It seems to me the formula is good enough the way it is. The\nonly military movement required of Israel is to move away from the\ncheckpoints. I can see you are talking about how to avoid bumping into\neach other, but I would be very cautious about drawing lines. All I am\nsaying is to be careful.\nDayan: The UN is already putting current positions on maps.\nAnother technical issue is an agreement on supply to the Third\nArmy. There is no number of trucks yet agreed. Something must be\nagreed. For example, we have already agreed to let 7 trucks a day go\nto Suez City.\nThe big point I would like to make is that we should not transfer\nthe issue of disengagement to the peace conference. We should see two\nphases in the present negotiations: agreement about the ceasefire and\nresupply; and then from that basis, negotiations about disengagement\nonly with Egypt. It would be wrong to postpone the talks on disengagement\nto the peace conference.\nSisco: But we hope that the question of the October 22 positions will\nbecome academic. The Secretary has put it well to you: if we are able\nto discuss the next move, the question of October 22 lines will become\nmeaningless. If not, there is a serious risk of another war.\nPrime Minister: Why not let Yariv talk about disengagement?\nDayan: I am not for leaving this to the peace conference.\nSisco: All we are doing is to suggest that maybe you would want to\nslow the process down. It is complicated. I do not have hard views on\nthe issue. The other side seems to prefer to discuss it at the outset of\nnegotiations at the conference.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n11\nI will say that you and they have one thing in common: you\nboth want to talk about the subject of disengagement. Let us leave it\nat that.\nDayan: Let us let Yariv go on with this subject.\nAllon: I support Dayan's position but add this argument: If disengage-\nment becomes the first phase of the peace talks, the presence of the\nSoviets and Syrians could kill the negotiations. We have hope that some\nagreement might be achieved there.\nSisco: Don't take this too literally.\nPrime Minister: The Generals can go on talking about this.\nAllon: Some members of the Cabinet who are not as in love with the\nSoviets as you might raise a question about involving the Soviets in the\nissue of disengagement.\nPrime Minister: The Americans are not in love with the Soviets. They\nare pursuing a philosophy of detente. But they are not in love.\nAllon: Why can't we insist that diplomatic relations between Israel and\nthe USSR be restored in principle before the Soviets play a role in peace\ntalks? Otherwise an enemy will be presiding over the talks.\nSisco: If the day comes when relations are restored, it would be a good\nthing. We have told the Soviets this.\nPrime Minister: It is a good thing to have in mind.\nAllon: Wouldn't it be wiser to negotiate with each Arab country separately?\nBy getting them all together we just compound the problems.\nSisco: We are talking about a broad strategy which would allow separate\nnegotiations. We envision the initial meeting with Waldheim and all the\nparties there. But our notion is that informally the talks would begin to\nbreak down into separate areas. We intend to play an active role, and\nwe do not want the Soviets, for instance, to play a role in relation to\nJordan. Neither does Hussein. Our formula gives you the flexibility\nyou want.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n12\nAllon: It is important to separate Syria and Egypt.\nSisco: The Egyptians are not anxious to have the Syrians there either.\nAllon: You referred to the first week in December. But we will be\non the verge of an election then. The opposition would say we don't\ndare negotiate before we have a mandate. Also, I think the prospect\nof negotiation is an asset, but if we start too early and get stuck too\nearly, we are in trouble. This is another argument for giving more to\nYariv's talks. I don't think negotiations should begin before mid-January.\nPrime Minister: I don't usually care what the opposition says if I am\nnot convinced they are right. But in this instance, they have a case.\nThey will ask how we know we are going to win the election.\nAllon: Some of the coalition parties may oppose negotiations.\nPrime Minister: Our religious party will say, what about Judea and\nSamaria? We will be in trouble. Our difficulty is that they are right.\nSisco: I have two observations. I can appreciate this problem. We\nhad this in mind and early December does represent a stretching out.\nWe felt this was the best we could do. But we have to keep in mind that\neven if discussions start in early December they could be handled so\nthat nothing much happens during those first weeks. I will report to the\nSecretary but we could not say January.\nPrime Minister: I would like on this point to simply have an understanding\nbetween the US and Israel. I just want the Secretary to understand our\npredicament. I do not want to make too much of this issue because I do\nnot want to raise a question in Egyptian minds about our ability to follow\nthrough on the present agreement to stabilize the ceasefire.\nSisco: We will be helpful. Sadat is a very keen political leader. He\nunderstands these things.\nPrime Minister: The big question is what can we do about the prisoners\nin Syria.\nSisco: We transmitted Yariv's message.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n13\nPrime Minister: There is a terrible horror story from Geneva today.\nSisco: When this agreement is announced, if you agree to it, this\ncould put pressure on the Syrians. Then we could follow up on Friday\nwith the Soviets if we don't hear from them. I do not think either of\nus should play this too eagerly.\nDayan: The Syrians have 15, 000 peasants who left their villages. We\nmust deal with both of these issues together.\nPrime Minister: That must press on them. This may be a political or\neconomic problem which they are anxious to solve. You might speak to\nthe Soviets.\nSisco: I feel this agreement will help. If we have not heard from the\nSyrians in a few days, we will follow up with the Soviets.\nAll on: What shall we do about the Cabinet?\nPrime Minister: It will meet tomorrow at 10:00 a. m.\nSisco: May I make an out-of-place suggestion? Could it meet at\n8:00 a. m.? I had hoped for agreement tonight but I can understand the\nneed for a Cabinet meeting.\nPrime Minister: I promised the opposition leaders I would meet with\nthem before the Cabinet meeting. I will call them in at 8:00 a. m., and\nwe can have the Cabinet meet at 9:00 a. m.\nSisco: When do you think I would hear the results?\nPrime Minister: 11:00 - 12:00 noon.\nSisco: I am trying to catch up with the Secretary's party in Amman.\nPrime Minister: We will call you around 10:30 a.m. and let you know\nhow things are going. Yariv will arrange for a helicopter to the Allenby\nBridge.\nWe have one other issue that concerns only one person. When\nwe put together the list of prisoners we will have to add 10. Nine of\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n14\nthem are from the war of attrition. Then there is one--Barukh Mizrachi-\nwho was arrested a year ago in Yemen for intelligence activities. We\nhave to get him out.\nDayan: There is one other technical point. Perhaps you could urge\nthe Egyptians to start preparing their lists and machinery for the prisoners\nexchange, especially the wounded. The POW exchanges should take place\nas soon as possible and preliminary work should be done.\nSisco: I will request the Secretary to pass this to the Egyptians.\nAllon: How will the UN ratification of this agreement happen?\nSisco: I will suggest to the Secretary that the Secretary-General consult\ninformally with the Security Council members and simply report a\nconsensus. That would avoid debate.\nAllon: Can we also expect close cooperation between Jerusalem and\nWashington on the terms of a permanent solution?\nSisco: Of course!\nAllon: Just to review on the checkpoints. There is one check post at\nthe entry point into Israeli-administered territory. The UN inspects,\nand we are there. We control the road. The second inspection point\nis when the unloading takes place.\nPrime Minister: When the trucks come to the check post between\nEgyptian and Israeli-administered areas, the drivers change.\nSisco: The only two points mentioned to us were those at Kilometers 102\nand 109.\nYariv: Those would be inside our territory.\nDayan: It doesn't matter whether they are inside our territory or not.\nWhere the checkpoints are doesn't effect where the line is.\nSisco: My only caution is don't raise any questions needlessly.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n15\nPrime Minister: The one thing that must happen for Sadat's good is that\nthe first checkpoint that the Egyptians come to is a UN checkpoint. And\nwe will be there.\nDayan: Wherever the checkpoint is doesn't change the line.\nPrime Minister: We must be clear. Instead of making this a UN road,\nwe will make the first checkpoint under the UN. The UN will make the\nfirst inspection.\nAllon: The Egyptians will reject our role in that inspection.\nPrime Minister: What is inspection? If there is a tank or artillery\npiece then we have a basis for objecting. But we are not going to go\nthrough each truck. When the trucks are unloaded, however, that is\nwhere we want to inspect.\nSisco: How many posts are there?\nYariv: The only one is at the ceasefire line.\nSisco: Then there is one post there and one at the offloading point?\nAllon: There is one final problem. The UN Secretary General is\nasking us a lot of questions about the role of the UNEF.\nDayan: If we agree about disengagement then there will need to be an\nemergency force between.\nPrime Minister: Then the UNEF should take a long vacation.\nAllon: It is just a point to keep in mind.\nSisco: I found no great desire on Sadat's part for an active role by the\nSecretary General. He has shifted the talks from New York to Geneva\nand he laughed about the SYG saying that he supposed that he would have\nto be there.\nPrime Minister: Did you find Sadat different from a couple of years ago?\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n16\nSisco: He has aged. He seems a little more subdued. Two and a half\nyears ago there seemed to be a wild streak in him, and I do not see that\nnow. He is serious. He doesn't want to rely on the Soviets.\nSirri, one of the Egyptians you met with, General Yariv,\ndescribed what a moving human experience it was for him to shake\nIsraeli hands and to meet Israelis. He said that if Egyptians and\nIsraelis could talk they could sort this problem out.\nAs far as I am aware, Sadat never raised the question of direct\nnegotiations. He spoke of the peace conference with everybody present.\nSisco: What shall I report to the Secretary, Madame Prime Minister?\nPrime Minister: You can tell him that we will meet with the Cabinet\ntomorrow morning. I hope we will have no difficulty. If so, we will try\nto overcome it. Give him my best and tell him this is a fantastic\nachievement.\nSisco: You will remember that he told you he would try.\nPrime Minister: But he made my life miserable by telling me that he\ndid not see aghost of a chance.\nYariv: I won a lunch from the Prime Minister. I said I thought it had a\nreasonable chance.\nPrime Minister: Yariv was the only one.\n[At this point, Yariv received a copy of the press report from\nCairo announcing Mr. Sisco's trip to Israel. It was agreed that the only\ncomment would be that the talks had been useful. Just as the meeting\nwas breaking up Mr. Sisco received a message suggesting a final modification\nin the language of the proposal. The principal one was the suggestion that\nthe words \"under the auspices of the UN\" be added to paragraph 2. Also\nit was suggested at the end of paragraph 5 that the words \"at the bank of\nthe Canal\" should be added. There was no disagreement about this, but\nthe Prime Minister urged that the idea of UN auspices be dropped. She\nfelt that throwing the issue into the UN would create a \"terrible mess. \"]\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n17\n[At this point, Dayan intervened to explain that the Egyptians\nwere probably simply trying to describe the same procedures that\ngovern the present talks among the Generals. They describe these\ntalks as under the auspices of the UN even though the UN fellow is\nfar away. ]\nSisco: I will communicate this to Cairo as your understanding of the\nmeaning of \"UN auspices. 11 If I hear differently I will let you know.\n[At this point, the meeting ended with warm handshakes all\naround. ]\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nC. RELATED MEMCONS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nFARD\nSECRET\nClassification\nUNITED STATES or AMERICA\nDepartment of State\nCN: 9034\nTELEGRAM\n8 NOV 73\nINDICATE:\nLLECT\nFrom:\nAmembassy TEL AVIV\n3:30 AM\nARGE TO\nTel Aviv\nE.0.11652\nXGDS\nTAGS\nPFOR, IS, EG\nSubject:\nMiddle East Situation\nDISTRIBUTION\nACTION:\nUSINT CAIRO FLASH\nINFO:\nSecState WASHDC FLASH\nVIP5\nSLCRET TEL AVIV\n9034\nNODIS/CHEROKEE\nAMB\nNODIS\nCHRN\nFOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO\n(D)\n1. Meeting with PM Meir took place at Guest House where\nyou visited on your stop in Israel. Allon, Dayan and Yariv\nOUTGOING\nalso present on Israeli side. Keating and Saunders joined\nme on US side. Meêting took place in two parts, divided\nby break I asked for while we waited for arrival of your\nthree flash messages. Actual meeting time was about three\nhours.\n2. I had just completed my point by point discussion of\nTel Aviv\nprovisions in proposed agreement when word of your messages\narrived. During that part of discussion, two main issues\nimmediately aroused Israeli concern:\n(a) First, PM was concerned that turning inspection\nover to UN on road amounted to turning road entirely over\nto UN. I simply agreed to come back and clarify this\npoint at completion of general run-through of proposal.\nDRAFTED BY:\nDRAFTING DATE\nTEL. EXT\nAPPROVED BY:\nHSaunders/JSisco/csl\nOUTGOING\nCLEARANCES:\nClassification\nFORM FS-413(H)\n39-F\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECREY\nPage 2\nof\nTEL AVIV\n9034\nClassification\nMRN\n(b) Point that really concerned PM was question\nAfter explaining Egyptian willingness to ease blockade\nof oral understanding on blockade. /\nTel Aviv\nmeant letting ships go through, I added that Egyptian hope was\nthat because Israel will use moderation ships 12 transiting.\nas to number\nShe acôt asked: What does \"in moderation\" mean?\nCan Sadat determine that Israel has exceeded some\nundefined limit on the number of ships and renege on\nunderstanding? If he does, there will be no record at\nUN or elsewhere; Israel can complain to US but US may\nnot be in position to help. How can Govt reply when\nOUTGOING\nKnesset members ask what we did about blockade? What\nif news of oral understanding with US on easing blockade\nbecomes public, will Israel be accused of violating a\nconfidence and will that be used as excuse for reimposing\nblockade? Later Allon added that prisoners are number\none issue emotionally but blockade is number one issue\npolitically and strategically. PM said it raised same\nTel Aviv\nissues as Sharm-el-Sheikh in 1967, only worse.\n3. KE Leaving question of road until later, I responded on\nblockade as follows: I suggested PM could say that questions\nof Oct 22 lines and formal lifting of blockade would be\ntaken up at later stage between the two parties--i.e. in\ncontext of discussion on disengagement. I also stressed\nthat realities on the ground on West Bank would give Israel\nleverage if easing of blockade not effective since proposed\nagreement did not force Israel back to Oct 22 lines. Egypt\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)=\nCONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPage\n3\nof\nTEL AVIV\n7039\nClassification\nMRN\nkeenly aware of these realities and Israel's continuing\ncapacity under this agreement to turn a tap on or off\nTel Aviv\nwith respect to supplies for Third Army. Finally, I said\nwe attached importance to Sadat's assurance to us and I\nhoped Israel would give similar weight to this assurance.\n4. Following receipt your messages, mood of conversation\nchanged. I had previously made point but stressed again\nto\npursuant to your message Isreeli\nthat only /military movement required\nunder agreement is away from the checkpoints. Then your\nOUTGOING\nmessage that Israel could make unilateral statement that\nend of\nceasefire included/all military actions and therefore\nincludes blockade was very well received. This capped off\nby helpful X Fahmi message that orders for blockade's\nrelaxation already issued and thatsince blockade never formally\ndeclared, it cannot be formally lifted. Also informed her\nof proposed letter to SYG as means of explaining procedures\nTel Aviv\nanticipated. PM and colleagues relaxed considerably and\nturned attention to sharpening their understanding of\nexactly what agreement would mean for them.\n5. First issue was road. PM finally summed up as follows:\nimportant point is that when Egyptian trucks reach Israeli\nadministered area, first checkpoint should be UN checkpoint\nwith Israelis observing but not participating in inspection.\nSecond checkpoint would be at the point of unloading and\nthere Israel would participate in the inspection.\nSECRET\nClassification\nRM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPage a 4 of TEL AVIV\n9034\nClassification\nMRN\n6. Dayan pointed out on several occasions that question\ncomplicated by a number of technical details which would\nTel Aviv\nhave to be worked out on the ground. For instance, he\nnoted that one small segment of Third Army isolated at\nhead of Little Bitter Lake who so far excluded from\nresupply. He also felt their need to map present positions\nof parties. He said he not introducing these as subject\nof negotiation with us but simply to illustrate that\nGenerals would have serious issues to discuss and to be\nOUTGOING\nsure US understands these complications. I agreed these\nissues would have to be discussed on the ground and\ncautioned strongly against getting too precise about mapping\npresent positions since that would reopen issue of Oct 22\nlines. Dayan understood and PM agreed very strongly with\nmy statement re dangers inherent in trying to delineate lines.\n7. PM turned to declaration on blockade. Dayan said it\nTel Aviv\nlogical to take position suggested that ceasefire naturally\nPM readily agreed. He\ncovers all military actions including blockade. /in\nalso added\n/it would be inconsistent to say that ceasefire in force and\nyet maintain blockade. I called attention to fact that\nFahmi said order to relax blockade already issued and stated\nmy view that Egyptians serious about easing blockade by\nletting ships through. PM indicated satisfaction with idea\nof unilateral statement. Allon cautioned that if Egyptians\nOUTGOING\nturn back a ship, that would amount to breach of ceasefire\nand war.\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPage 5 of\n9034\nClassification\nmrn\n8. Dayan then хнікий raised major point on negotiating strategy,\nHe suggested that issue of disengagement be dealt with in\nTel Aviv\ntalks between the Egyptian and Israeli generals and not be\ndeferred until peace conference. Le felt it easier to deal\nwith this as Israeli/Egyptian issue than to get Syrians\nand others involved. I stressed our hope to make discussion\nof October 22 lines academic and our desire to give Israel\nan opportunity to have some time before facing this issue.\nI emphasized importance of fact that both sides prepared\nOUTGOING\nto discuss disengagement. PM and Allon both supported\nidea of letting Yariv discuss disengagement with Egyptian\ngeneral. Allon added argument that if disengagement\nbecame first phase of peace talks, presence of Soviets and\nSyrians on this issue could kill negotiations at outset.\nAlso pointed out that some members of Cabinet would object\nto Soviet involvement in this issue. I simply noted their\nTel Aviv\nview, agreeing we did not have to settle it tonight.\nI leave it to you as to whether Egyptians should be made\naware that Israeli military representative apt to raise\ndisengagement matter at some early meeting.\n9. On subject of peace talks, Allon felt it would be\nwiser for Israel to negotiate with each Arab country\nseparately. Trying to negotiate with all at once would\njust compound difficulties. I outlined our notion of\nplenary opening session of peace conference to be\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(133HS LNOC)\nAviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECL ASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTel Aviv\nSECRET\nPage 6 of\nClassification\nMRN\nfollowed by real negotiations that likely to break down\nquickly into smaller groups and issues. We do not, for\nTel Aviv\ninstance, want Soviets involved in any serious way in\nJordanian negotiations. I said I thought such formula\nwould provide flexibility Allon asking. PM Meir again\nstrongly agreed.\n10. Allon stated and PM seconded view that peace conference\nin early December too early in view of Israeli electims\non December 31. PM said she could understand opposition\nOUTGOING\nargument in that government should not negotiate until its\nmandate confirmed. I said we had stretched timing as far\nas we could with Israeli problem in mind but did not want\nto propose January. . Felt early December was best we could\ndo. PM accepted this point but said she would merely like\nunderstanding with U.S. about Israeli predicament. On\nother hand, she did not want to make too much of this\nTel Aviv\nargument for fear of raising question in Egyptian minds about\ndurability of present argument on stabilizing cease-fire.\nI said I would report this to you and felt myself that Sadat is\na keen enough politician to understand problem. I concluded\nsaying we would try to be helpful in the few weeks before\nthe Israeli election, bearing their concerns in mind\n11. PM then turned to prisoners in Syria. I urged that\nneither we nor Israel appear over-eager on this issue and\nOUTGOING\nsuggested that we wait for announcement of present\nSECRET\nClassification\nFOR\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPage 7 of\n9034\nClassification\nMRN\nagreement to have its effect on Syria. PM Meir suggested\nwe follow up with Soviets, and I agreed we would in a few\nTel Aviv\ndays if we have not heard from the Syrians by then. Dayan\nnoted that Syrians have 15,000 peasants whom they want to\nreturn to occupied villages, saying that could be a counter-\npressure on prisoner issue. I said I felt Israeli offer\nto Syrians on civilians and POW's was constructive.\n12. PM originally had in mind calling Cabinet at 10:00 a.n..\nI asked if she could make it earlier, stressing importance\nOUTGOING\nof maintaining momentum and concluding agreement before we\nmeet with Saudis. She agreed. PM will call in opposition\nleaders at 8:00 a.m. tomorrow and the full Cabinet at\n9:00 a.m. Said she would try to give me final answer by\n10:30-11:00.\n13. PM said she wanted us to know that Israel will have\nto add to its list of prisoners ten more. Mine of them\nTel Aviv\nfrom the War of Attrition. Tenth is Barukh Mizrachi, who\narrested for intelligence activities in Yemen and trans-\nferred to Egypt. In this general connection, Dayan noted\nthat, while arranging checkpoints on the Cairo-Sumz road\nwould take only a few minutes, the exchange of prisoners\ncould take some time and he asked us to suggest to\nEgyptians that they begin preparing lists And machinery\nso that exchange can get started at earliest possible\nOUTGOING\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)o\nCONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPage 8 of\nClassification\nMRN\ntime, especially for wounded. Suggest you make this point\nin your final meeting with Egyptians.\nTel Aviv\n14. In response to question on how I envisioned UN\nratification of this agreemènt, I said I would recommend\nto you a procedure which àid not involve formal debate and\nvoting. The SYG would consult members of Security Council\ninformally and report consensus.\n15. At several points in conversation, PM showed consider-\nable interest in Sadat personality. Said on at least two\nOUTGOING\noccasions she would like to meet him. I stressed ХИКМЯ\nSadat's desire to work through us rather than through USSR.\nPia seemed genuinely pleased over announcement of resumption\nof relations in principle.\n16. I described the format regarding the UN conference,\ni.e. Geneva, US-USSR auspices, Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian\nand Israeli composition with Lebanon to decide for itself\nTel Aviv\nwhether to participate. PM voiced no difficulty\nwith any of the above, just nodded approvingly.\n17. As meeting about to conclude, I asked what I should\nreport to you. PM asked me to tell you that the Cabinet\nwould be meeting in the morning. She hoped there would\nbe no difficulties but if there were, she would overcome\nthem. She asked me to give you her best and to tell you\nKMaxK that this is a \"fantåstic achievement.\"\nOUTGOING\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)c\n(CONTINUA TION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified,\nSECRET\nPage 9 of\nClassification\nMRN\n18. Just as meeting breaking, final suggestions on changes\nbrought in. When PM heard suggestion of adding \"under\nTel Aviv\nauspices of UN\" at end of paragraph 2, she felt Israel\nshould not accept that. She began to lambast UN involve-\nment in familiar fashion. At this critical point, Dayan\nintervened, explaining that Egyptians describe present\nauspices for talks between Egyptians and Israeli generals\nas being under UN auspices even though UN representative\nnot present. Dayan felt Egyptians simply seeking way to\nOUTGOING\nindicate that similar procedures would continue to be\nfollowed. We agreed that this change would be İkke\nincorporated, the Israeli understanding of this change\nbeing it refers to auspices similar to those under which\npresent talks between generals taking place. I said\nI would let them know in the morning if I got any\ninformation that would be contrary to this information.\nTel Aviv\n19. M eeting ended at midnight with very warm feelings\nall around.\nA\nKEATING\nOUTGOING\nSECRET\nClassification\nFORM\n4-68\nFS-413(H)a\n(CONTINUATION SHEET)\nTel Aviv\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nTel Aviv\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nX Or OTHER\nDepartment of State\nAE TEL AVIV\nTELEGRAM\nSTATES OF I\nACT AMB\nINFO CHR (DUMMY()\nSECRET!/ NODIS\nCN 11422\nZ 071415Z NOV 73\nClassification\n7 Nov 73\nFM USINT CAIRO\n5:57 pm\nTO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3404\nINFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANMAN FLASH 2745\nRUEHO/SECSTATE WASHDC 4243\nBT\n3 E : C R E I CAIRO 3395\nNODIS/CHEROKEE\nNODIS\nSECTO 29\nFOR AMBASSADOR KEATING FROM SISCO\nEO 11652: XGDS\nTAGS: PBOR, IS, JO\nCHRON\nSUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS\n1. I AM FLYING IN TO ISRAEL IN ABOUT THREE HOURS.\n1 EGYPTIAN PLANE IS TAKING ME TO CYPRUS AND AN ISRAELI PLANE \"IS\nCKING ME UP IN CYPRUS TO TAKE ME TO ISRAEL.\n2. I WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER A PROPOSAL\nWHICH HAS BEEN AGREED TO BETWEEN PRESIDXNT SADAT AND SECRETARY\nKISSINGER. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO MEET ME AT THE AIRPORT SO THAT\nI CAN FILL YOU IN BEFORE YOU AND I AND HAL SAUNDERS MEET WITH\nTHE PRIME MINISTER.\n3. PLEASE TELL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO\nMEET WITH HER AS SOON AS I ARRIVE AND WOULD LIKE TO COME TO\nHER OFFICE FROM THE AIRPORT.\n4. FOR YOUR INFORMATION MY ARRIVAL WILL BE PRECEDED BY A\nPRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSAL.\n5. I WILL BE SEEKING 41, ANSWER TO THE PROPOSAL FROM THE\nISRAELI GOVERNMENT THIS EVENING.\n6. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, MY TENTATIVE PLANS ARE TO STAY\nOVERNIGHT AND HAVE THE ISRAELIS DRIVE ME TO THE ALLENBY\nBRIDGE WIERE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE TO HAVE THE JORDANIAN\nGOVERNMENT DRIVE ME TO AMMAN TO REJOIN THE SECRETARY'S PARTNOM\n7. FOR AMMAN: THIS IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION\nAND YOU SHOULD DO ABSOLUTELY NOTHUNG AT THIS TIME: ALL OF THE\nOVE MUST BE STRICTLY HELD.\nMISSINGER\nof\n#3395\nSECRET/NODISPCHEROKEE\nClassification\nFORM\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAMOUNTMENT or STATE\nDepartment of State\nAVIV\nAMERICA assin\nTELEGRAM\nACT: POL-3\nSTATES OF\nINFO: AMB DCM VIP5 ECO DAO CHRN USIS\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCN: 11430\nClassification\nZ 071829Z NOV 73 ZFF4\n7 NOV 73\nFM SECSTATE WASHDC\nTO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8286\n6:32 PM ++\nBT\nC ONFIDENTIALSTATE 219569\nE.O. GDS\nTAGS: OVIP (SISCO, J.)\nFOR SISCO FROM PICKERING\nTWO FLASH MESSAGES, ONE FROM SECRETARY, OTHER CONTAINING\nSLIGHT WORDING MODIFICATIONS, BEING SENT TO YOU. DO NOT\nMAKE ANY APPROACH UNTIL YOU RECEIVE MESSAGES. KISSINGER\nBT\n#9569\n++ advance on receipt to duty officer.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nClassification\nFORM\nFS-412(H)\n4-68\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\nE.0.11652: XGDS\nTAGS: PFOR, IS, EG\nSUBJ: Middle East Situation\nACTION: USDEL RIAD\nFLASH\nhich Ismelis would observe\nINFO:\nSECSTATE WASHIC\nFLASH\nwould be worked out on\nfor and\nSECRET TEL AVIV\nenformal understay,\nNODIS/CHEROKEE\nbut not a changes\nFOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO\nbasis document.\nground\n1. Day began when Yariv arrived at Embassy with text of\n\"memorandum of understanding between Israeli Govt and\nUSG on the agreement between the Govts of Egypt and Israel\nconcerning the ceasefire.\" This was presented to us by\n(d) point from checkpoint\nYariv as Israeli interpretation of each of the articles in\ngenerally\ndel\nthe basic proposal. however All were ^ acceptable to us although the\nthat would\nrequire some work to arrive at discribe statement\nnot create problems when me nero go together's\nprinciples that would govern UN manning at inspection points\nbetween on military reps that while Instin might by outs\nthe road.\nI also made clear that in\nPoint which two ment time related to anmin at\nsoggestime 2. Toursdation points fine ~ soul. arrived This portan of enformal meno\n\"Inspection of the non-military supply to the East Bank up!\nwill be according to the following procedure:\na. The Western checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road\nwill be manned by UN personnel. The vehicles carrying non-\nmilitary supplies and driven by UN drivers will be inspected\nby UN officers with Israeli officers observing.\nother and interputation ance we did not , could not get\nsome of then pints, that this was not\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\ninto detail at Salat level. create differention\nsuch spenfu ml John Invelis not\nwhich que that could an name alp question of good intention.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nb. At the Bank of the Canal the unloaded supplies\nwill be inspected by Israeli officers with UN officers observing.\"\n3. During this discussion, Yariv in touch with PM who asked\nthat we come to her office to go over final understanding\nand to discuss how exactly proposal would be implemented.\n4. Meeting with PM began with Allon, Yariv, Dayan, one of\nDayan's aides and Mordechai Gazit of PM's office present.\nAmbassador Keating and Saunders accompanied me.\n5. Meeting with PM began with above formulation reviewed\nand agreed In this discussion, I made three points which\nI ashed be recorded as vew.\n(a) Exact location of inspection checkpoints would be\nleft to be worked out on the ground Sudul had mentral\n102° a 1090.\n(b) Question of whether a third checkpoint apart\nfrom ones at Western end of road and at unloading point\nnecessary would be left to parties;\n(c) We could not object if Israelis insisted on trying\nto negotiate presence of Israeli liaison officer with refruement, each\nconvoy along road, but if Egyptians resisted this\nwe\ncomed\nmarstand on.\n6. PM then went over what she would sday say on blockade.\nHer final formulation developed along following lines:\nIsrael had agreed to scrupulous observance of ceasefire,\nwhich of course includes all actions in the air, on the ground\nappreciate how they would\nbut Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 1 we Library. was not\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nportune of support for Inveli view.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nand on the sea. She noted that she could not guarantee that\nnewsmen would not get wind of private understanding on this\nsubject. Also, newsmen would begin to see boats arriving in\nEilat. I urged her to tell us when first boats would be coming\nthrough so that we could pass word to Eghptians and hopefully\nminimize incidents or misunderstandings.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7. PM asked exactly what Israelis needed to do and what U.S. would\ndo regarding announcement of agreement. She would like to go on\nthe air at 8:30 p.m. Friday Israeli time. I told her I would cable\nprocise of action after I talked to in Riyadh.\nyou and that a menage would be sent to her re thing\n8. At this M meeting seemed about to end with total agreement\nthen\na\nand PM said that agreement would create a new mood foxx if prisoners\nwere promptly exchanged and if X boats began coming through Straits.\napparately\n9. At this point, however, she realized that the paper that would be\npublished tomorrow would be basic document presented to her last\nnight and not informal US-Israeli memo of understanding discussed this\nmorning. She professed to believe that basic agreement would be\nchanged to reflect wording of memo of understanding. She said that\nthe Cabinet had approved memo of understanding basic recement.\nThen me same another pout.\nbasin dount lain document\nMain sticking point as word \"replaced\" in statement that UN would\nShe felt this was bad domestrially for her smile he\nreplace Israeli checkpoints on road For almost 30 minutes, she\nopponents\nmaintained that she would have to dall another Cabinet meeting and\nwould\nmake\nurged us to go back to Sadat changing wording of that point to say that\nwhile the change has important substantly\nmuch\ncheckpoint would be manned by UN personnel. I stated firmly that we\nunderment now without messurg 1\nof\ncould not accept changes without delay and Msk of upsetting whole\n\"yo\nat deart a 4 hom delay reopening entire pet.\nI argued strongly that she not reopen the negotiations.\ntoking over of\n10. Break in impasse came with suggestion that she employ tactic\nfrom the\nsimilar to one you suggested on blockage, and she finally agreed that\nInstin\nin speech to Knesset she would state as a fact her understanding of what\nwas objectmentle, she mind\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\nbe necessary agrand\nowner steps would be taken en the ground to effect change on the\nI amhed not\nroad. All on was useful at this point, saying that she could tell Knesset\na\nthat question of special corridor not at issue and that there would be\nno change in fact of control over the road since Invilis not at\n11. PM acquiesed with understanding that she could state her inter- protone.\nrequired A move k n\npretation of principle elements of agreement as contained in US-Israeli\nmemo of understanding but without referring to that memo. Points\n$12 would 12 In be Famel die made castion as BUT hers of what of alone. should informal be said memo to pres of on understanding our meeting; Leing\nsent\nregosted that Hill state simply that we had had useful talks and that I\nmy way to Riyadh to report to the Secr clary. PM asked\nreptel.\nwhether T could say that 14 was optimistic. At her request I agreed\nto do this. Brief three-xxixxote sentence statement to reporters along\nthese lines made as NO left PM's office.\n13 Thus we have final Israeli agreement to basic proposal which you\nsent with / Isunel\nto le too spenfic, party out that\nof regulation talk, diffult\nthey want a get some of then public number\nspecificy at mentary will only make at more\nfor the other side,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.\nDECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}