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Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
001
telecon
Kissinger and Packard
4/21/1969
B
(appeal)
MR Case NLN 07-13; Doc. ID 2040
Pages: 1
SANITIZED
per 3 .3(b)(1),HR.5/11/17
FILE GROUP TITLE
HAK Telephone Conversation Transcripts
Box
0001
FOLDER TITLE
[07] April 15-22, 1969
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 9:45 AM
P said he would not be at 303 Committee meeting today because he
has to go to the Hill with Mel. P said on Hexagon/MOL program
the consensus is solid that Hexagon should not be cancelled - MOL
needs a little more study and unless K is on tight time bomb
P would like a couple of more days. K agreed.
K said State is concerned that our planes don't start shooting up
ships in our rescue area. P said he and Mel had talked about this
and they concur - P will make sure instructions are given to
this effect.
K said Mel said his people are running around giving orders and that
is not true. K's people are under strict orders NNX to go thru P's
office or Mel's - there is no intention to bypass either of them.
P said he did not know about this. P asked if there was anything
they should be doing. K said Mel said he is sending over some
contingency plans and X K asked if they could be gotten over as
quickly as possible - particularly the one for kither fighter escort
for reconnaissance mission.
jm
TELCON
Richard Sneider
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 9:48 AM
K said the North Koreans have asked for an Armistice Commission
Meeting on the 18th and S is to tell State not to go until we have
agreed to it. K will turn off the 18th with Defense. K asked S
for a paper on the pros and cons on closing down Panmunjom.
jm
TELCON
Captain Wilson (Packard's Office)
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
9:50 AM
K said he was calling about the Armistice Commission meeting
on the 18th - he wants to make sure we do not go until there is
a consideration of it in the White House. W said there is a message
in from Bonesteel asking for Washington guidance before reacting.
K said to tell Bonesteel not to react one way or the other. W said
he would take care of it.
K asked for a paper on the pros and cons of (a) going to the
Armistice Commission meeting and (b) closing down Panmunjom
altogether. W said he would do and K asked that it be done kixxx
fairly quickly (thru the Secretary's office, of course).
jm
TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
10:00 AM
K said he wanted to tell him that specific orders given by the President
that these planes cannot fire on anything unless they are attacked.
K said it was a very strong point of R's and he told the President
immediately.
R said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K said President
does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to
protest - he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men.
R said he was coming over soon and would talk to the Pxxxx President.
K said he thinks the Prxi President is inclined to play this in low key
and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed.
R repeated that he is going to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save
the men. R said he might also tell him we have asked that no
ships engaged in rescue mission be fired on. K said he saw no harm
in that.
jm
TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 12:40 pm
Rogers asked if HAK had had a chance to talk to the President about
Harlan Cleveland and Italy. HAK said he would do it immediately--
he was sure the President would be favorable. At the end of the
conversation, HAK said he would let Rogers know about this by tomorrow.
(another subject)
R: I'm upset about a memo he wrote us about what George Meany said,
and what Bud Wilkinson said. This business about what I said about the plan--
that we have no magic formula. I couldn't say we didn't have a plan.
K: What you said was right. Where the Vietnamese were off their rocker
was to think we had a plan which we were proposing to someone.
R: If there's anyone who should understand that the press doesn't report
things accurately, he is the one. In my situation, it's all a matter of record.
R: Bud Wilkinson- I bet he's never read any of these press conferences!
I don't mind a memo which indicates a line he wants to follow. And if
it appears there's some lack of emphasis
HAK: This he dictated on his own over the weekend. I got my copy yesterday.
R: I don't mind criticism as long as it's based on fact. If we have Bud
Wilkinson and someone in Saigon criticizing us for something we didn't say,
and if the President takes it seriously
HAK: I also made a p. c. statement which in effect said the President
knows what he is doing. It didn't mean we are submitting a plan to Hanoi.
R: I wanted to make it clear we had no magic formula; we think things are
progressing; that kind of stuff. You can't say "we don't have a plan,"
or "no comment. 11
HAK: His basic concern was with the positive parts where he felt what
the line should be rather than with the critical part.
R: The only thing I've said that I would have said differently is a question
I was asked in the Senate committee about disarmament. They asked about
whether ABM would affect adversely the disarmament talks, and I said no,
I felt sure if the Soviet Union, for example, said, let us get out of the
defensive missile business altogether, we would be pleased about it. I said
-2-
obviously they're not going to tear down all their ABM's. But it was
interpreted maybe we weren't serious about defense against the Chinese
threat. From that standpoint it would have been better the other way.
HAK: I don't think this is a commitment that you will ever be called on
to make good.
R: It strengthened our argument if the Soviet Union wanted to make a big
play this way we would be in the market for considering it.
I'm writing a memo back to him
HAK: I wouldn't do that. This was done over the weekend at Camp David
and I think really his major concern is to put out some guidance so
everyone says essentially the same thing.
R: I think that's a wise idea.
HAK: I didn't have the sense of any lingering unhappiness there.
R: Why the hell did he attach a memo from Bud Wilkinson? Have I got
to take my foreign policy direction from a football xardx coach?
H: I don't even know what he does.
Telecon
April 15, 1:30 p.m.
Secretary Laird
Laird said he had been in the Arms Services Committee all morning.
HAK said he had talked to Packard since he tried to reach Laird and
it only concerned the matter of making sure our planes in the area
had orders not to fire on rescue ships.
Laird said he had put out the order this morning. He said that ship
they were trying to find is at sea but it has Dutch crew. They switched
the crews from Korean to Dutch when word got around at the time of
the Pueble thing that we might thak take the ship.
HAK said the President wanted to devote the NSC meeting tomorrow
to this subject. He will want to have all the military and diplomatic
options. Laird said he ought to get himself and Wheeler out of the
Committee tomorrow. HAK agreed this should most certainly be done.
Laird said there was a question as to where the orders were coming
from. HAK said unless they came directly through Laird, they were
not official. WH brders.
Laird mentioned the letter brom Bud Wilkinson and was rather shocked
at it. He (L) said he had never talked about reductions and had held a
pretty hard line saying this wasn't the time to discussi it. HAK said
it was necessary to put out a letter to alot of people to get the point to
a few. HAK said anyway, now that we have the President's philosophy
on record, we will be able to take action on deviations.
HAK said the briefings should be short and fairly general. A more
detailed plan can be put to the President in smaller groups. Laird said
he would list the options and not go into detail.
TELCON
Irwin Miller
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 2:15 p. m.
Irwin Miller will be in Washington on Wed. , 23 April, and asked
if HAK would be able to see him. HAK said certainly they can
get together and told him it would be best if Miller's secy would
call here on Monday; we would set aside a half hour for that purpose. on Wed.
HAK said it would be very good to see Miller again.
##
Telecon
McGeorge Bundy
April 14.5 1969 1:45 p.m.
Re the Harvard situation, Bundy said he had a call from Goodwin.
HAK said he hoped Goodwin didn't think he agreed with him because
he didn't. Bundy said the problem wasn't going to be solved by
Goodwin. Bundy thought they hald the best possible mediator in
Merill (sp) but they don't seem to have anybody that enough people
can trust.
HAK said he had talked to the President about Bundy's memo. The
President is willing to go ahead with the project and secondly that he
feels if Bundy would be willing to see it through the next stage this
would seem the most efficient way of proceeding and then we can
decide later on where to go. Bundy suggested that since Frank Long
would be taking over the NSF, he would be a good candidate for the
U.S. representative. Bundy said he would do it though. The President
also agreed that it would be o.k. to go ahead with the plan to tell the
British to go ahead with the first stage planning.
On the Korean situation, Bundy said it was a terribly thing. They
(recon.) are essential but terribly overdone. HAK said it was well
off the coast. Bundy said these are people who will do what they can
do and whether you are technically right doesn't help. HAK said we
have asked everyone to keep quiet on this and Bundy said that would
last only for awhile. He added that you have to be philosophical about
these things.
HAK agreed to see Bundy next week and said he would appoint Osgood
to be the staff man for Bundy to work with. (This was actually at
Bundy's suggestion and HAK thought it was an excellent idea).
TELCON
The Vice President
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 2:15 p.m.
The Vice President called and said he is ready to go out of town;
he has a press conference this afternoon and is sure he is going to
be asked about the airplane incident, and wants to know what's to be
said and what's not. He thought it best to come over to see HAK--
and he did so at about 2:20 p.m.
TELCON
Alex Johnson
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
4:00 PM
K said we are putting this whole business through the NSC tomorrow.
President is concerned that once working level at State gets hold
of some of these hoptions, there would be leaks. K said he told
President he would have a talk with some of the senior people
at State to make sure we could handle this WXXIX without its leaking.
K said he just wanted to appeal to J. J said Win Brown is working
on this and he will speak to him - K can assure the President that
it will not leak.
jm
TELCON
Ambassador Waller (Australia)
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
5:30 PM
W said he had just talked with Mr. Sneider - it is about proposed
joint facility at (could not understand what he said). W said full
story is reaching newspapers and some of technical journals
have published all technical details. Reuters now has garbled version
re ground station. W said they now feel they should more or less
say what the station is and have made a proposal to Hilbert of
Department of Air. K asked if they had to go beyond what
we agreed to and W said yes. W said he thinks K will have to take
a look at it and Sneider will have whole story. K asked whether W
had been informed that the Agriculture Dept. W interrupted to say
yes, everything has been taken care of.
jm
TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 5:40 p.m.
P: Anything further on the plane ?
K: Nothing further yet, no.
P: It should be daylight there pretty soon.
K: We should be getting word within two hours.
P: Probably no survivors.
K: Or picked up -- strong probability no survivors.
We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they're
very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch
registry, and Dutch crew and flag--so it's almost impossible to
seize that.
P: Check with the Dutch; they ought to want to help us.
It's a question of doing that or something else.
Xxxxxxxxx Why not pick up a half-dozen fishing boats?
K: They don't come out in the open seas.
P: No North Korean ships on the high seas at all?
K: The largest ship is the PUEBLO and of course they're keeping that in the
port. It hasn't been out at all since they captured it.
P: Well, the more I think about -there has to be some reaction here.
I have a feeling they're testing us.
K: That's clearly true.
P: I'm not among those who think that this matter may not be pretty
directly related to the other side.
K: It could be related. Domestically, there will be among the intellecturals
considerable heat if we do the other thing. Curiously enough, some
of the members of my staff feel we ought to do what yo& and I were
talking about earlier. They feel to let this one go again will be taken
very seriously. There was an intelligence report of Nasser's
conversation with Hussein to the effect, "After all, it isn't SO risky
txx
-2-
to defy the United States -- look at North Korea and the PUEBLO. "
P. And look at Peru. No, I think that's right. OK, I certainly lean
in that direction.
K: I'm going to have a complete plan for this over to you this evening.
P: I wonder what the situation is on.
K: And we won't present it to the NSC.
P: Rogers is going to be before the press tomorrow editors -- at noon.
Don't put this before the NSC.
K: We will pres ent to the NSC what happened and a whole list of actions
on what could be taken, but with no emphasis on any one, and
no details.
K: I talked to Rogers about Cleveland and he would prefer him as Ambassador
to Italy.
P; That wouldn't bother me.
TELCON
Ambassador Ortona
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
5:50 PM
K said he was stuck here for a while on this airplane that has been
brought down - O asked where. K said Korea. K said if he is
not there by 8:30 this evenin g to go ahead with dinner and he will
come whenever he can. If K cannot come, he will call at a reasonable
hour. O said they never go to the table until 8:45 and that can be
delayed. K said he hopes to be able to make it by then.
jm
TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 6:25 PM
K said S was trying to see him yesterday. & said he was trying
to show him draft paper but wanted Packard to see it to make sure
he had no trouble with arithmetic and he has
not gotten it back from Packard yet. S said if K has a few minutes
tomorrow he would like to come over and bxsk show it to him.
K said he would see how the aircraft business is going. K is becoming
anit-Korean as it is ruining his schedule. K said there is less you
can do against a little country than a big one. S said he was glad he
does not have to make decision - K said he was going to pass it to the
SecState.
jm
Telecon
The President
April 1969 6:30 p.m.
The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was.
HAK said they still haven't located it yet. It has been reported to be n the high
seas. The P said he would assume HAK has chedked with the lawyers but not
the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon
as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were
that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be
taken. The President said it was impossible to pick up the Pueble too but
they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When
they give us the Pueblo, we'll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship
it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said
O. K., "I think we should just pick the darn thing up. " We should check with the
Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be
willing to take heavy criticism for this.
HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President siad
to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great
nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have
concluded that we won't just sitzi sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The
President said even if the peaceniks on HAK's staff didn't agree. HAK said he
didn't have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding.
HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The
President said the thex price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you
recall Nasser's statement and said "I just think we have to do something here.
If we don't face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action. " HAK said
the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses.
They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the
line that recon plans are fair game. This was not a regular recon plan, was it?
HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for
15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it.
They were moving two mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular
to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has
said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was
15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers
would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with and
that he probably wouldn't be able to attend the NSC meeting. HAK said the
President wouldn't be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The
President said, "no, no, I won't even discuss it, just listen. "
- 2 -
The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We'll just tell
the Dutch we'll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.
The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on X his staff. HAK
said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted
to know if Justic would do anything. HAK said yes, I'll try them. The
President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. "Illl
let you talk to him".
Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn't have the
full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The
N.K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about
picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President
wants to know if its illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew
the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea. HAK said
we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper
Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements.
HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad.
Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on
the high seas but that hasn't been confirmed as yet.
The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he
has determined overrule in his ownmind that we are going to do something "even if I
have to 0XXXX0XXX everybody in the State Department. "
HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it
public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise
it might come off as a bluff.
The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said
NEX no. The President said he thought HAK's conversation with Dobrynin was
good. HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The
President said how about doing the lunch plan and getting caught. They took
the ship SO we get Cambodia. HAK said the lunch plan would be used only if
they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane
into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go
careful on this. The President agreed. The President said it should be easy
to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were
working on the location.
The President called back to say that HAK should call Loyds of London; they
should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hauge and thell
him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he
would follow through.
TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
8:15 PM
President asked if K still in the Sit Room - K said no, meeting
had just broken up. Theywill reassemble in another hour or so.
President asked K to come to Lincoln Room and he would have
something there for him to eat.
jm
Telecon
April 15, 1969 9:30 p.m.
Prof. Doty
HAK opened the conversation by saying that Doty was probably calling
to tell him to take strong measures against North Korea.
Doty said (the Russian) was in Cambridge. He was originally
scheduled to go to Mexico but that was cancelled buthe decided
to come to Boston anyway. MIT had asked him to do a small
seminar. He would be in Washington this weekend and would very
much like to see HAK. HAK said he would love to see him and they
agreed that HAK could probably do it Saturday morning. The dinner
was almost over and he had hoped to talk to HAK before to get an idea
of what to ask him. HAK wanted to know what they did discuss.
The Russian said when the agreement comes he hopes it can be very
simple and more matters of principle. Doty said his (HAK) idea about
an annual review or exchange once a year seemed to go over very well.
It should be made understandable and executable. Doty said he would
get more out of him before he left for Washington and keep HAK posted.
(They went on to discuss the Harvard situation)
Doty asked about the Frank situation. HAK said he was having lunch
with Lee tomorrow. He didn't want to discuss it on the phone.
TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69
10:00
PM
President said another option had occurred to him with greater
symbolic meaning - a Navy blockade of the one port of significance.
K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to
Cuban blockade and said question is how long can it be maintained.
K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the
impact. President said people say it does not me an anything, but it
means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there
is something specific that you want to get done - there is nothing
they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages.
President said that is what he meant - we want that and the return
of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that
place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out
either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live
so there is something going in and out. President referred to three
Polish ships which have to come in - they could be kept out. K said
they could unload elsewhere and ship down by mail. K said he would
have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that
has symbolism - that is what we are talking about. President said it
could be signal of what we are going to do down below. President said
we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything.
K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every
day - harrassing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the
President pros and cons tomorrow.
K said he has some more information on ship - it is in the area of
Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to
Korea. Told President about payment breakdown - 20% down payment
had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed
by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not
think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to
compensate the Dutch Government 5 1/2 million dollars. President
said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas.
President said there is a lot OS symbolism in that.
K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting
President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade
one at them too. K said o.k. - all of this will be discussed at 3:00
meeting tomorrow. K said the Cuban blockade worked because they
thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it
is not on all fours at all.
-2-
President said he was just looking over military plans. They want to
hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border.
President said there is something to be said about fields not so close
to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President
all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose -
K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought
blockade was better than mining.
President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively
brief. K agreed.
jm
TELECON
Dr. Kissinger to
Dr. Kramer
11:00 p. m. , 4/15/69
K - - Asked Kramer how much he would press for strong action
in the current situation.
Kramer - - Recommends immediate reaction in the strongest possible
fashion in order that it would avoid that this would be repeated. Believe
that any indication of our not immediately reacting strongly will only
lead to further action on the other side.
K - - My worry is the domestic situation.
Kr The nation will essentially follow strong leadership
regardless of what certain people or certain groups will do. Sixty -
five per cent will follow the President of the United States if he goes
before the people and says, 'this is the situation I had to act. 1
Thirty-five per cent will be against the President. I don't think we can
take it because otherwise we will be involved in the Mid-East, in
Korea, in South Vietnam, in Berlin and in Latin America by more
or less coordinated action against us. I feel we should react immediately
and strongly. Have you talked to General Woodward?
K I know what to do. My problem is, is it psychologically wise?
Kr You will find the NY Times and the Washington Post against
you, but not the nation. Talk, for example, to Meany. People like
that have untold members, who will endorse strong action. There
will not be a reaction in this country that will be averse to the
President except for that small percentage which would be averse
anyway. I would not be afraid of that, and I don't say it because of
my well-known prejudices, but based on an objective analysis of
the situation. Even if you read today's NY Times, the nation will
follow a strong leadership. The President doesn't have anything
to fear. He will only find the same critics who would criticize him
anyway. I recommend you talk with M/Gen Woodward who for years
has negotiated with the North Koreans. He is a cynic, but unbelievably
brilliant. He is very unpleasant but very bright and realistic. In
this country, nobody will be able to do any harm to the Commander-in-
Ehief. I, for instance, have been of the opinion that if, in Vietnam,
you should be relatively statesmanlike, we would have a crisis in
Korea. It is one of the crises I have predicted next the Middle
East. These are interconnected. North Korea might hit, but they
2
can't continue it. Talk with General Yarborough. I'm sure you
will get the same answer as from me. I assure you of one thing.
If ever we seem willing to give in one area, we will immediately
be in greater difficulties than ever in all others.
K -- However, there is a domestic problem here which I think
Haig has explained to you.
Kr -- Referenced the NYTimes article again -- concerning various
members of Congress -- everybody is willing to give President
Nixon some time to think it over. Even the most hostile members
of Congress. The nation would definitely go along. If you do not
react immediately, then these probing actions from the other side
will finally lead to something that goes beyond probing action --
then you are in a real crisis. I will be here at Ft. Benning for
the next two or three days -- please feel free to call me.
AMS
TELCON
Gov Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69
12:42
PM
Discussed President's OAS speech - R said he thought it went
off very well. H e stayed and had coffee with Ambs and then
lunch with Galo Plaza who thinks things are going very well.
R said he was pleased and grateful to K.
K said President feels strongly that R's mission will be something
that can put his Latin American policy on a new basis. R said
he was sure it will contribute to good will. R plans to say he is
going to listen and to report to the President - he will not get into
policy. R said if his mission results in suggestions that will
be useful, fine - then the President can announce policy.
R said he is pleased with way it is ha shaping up. K said re
Guatemala he has special intelligence estimate that there is some
chance that Castro groups theire will make an effort to do something.
K has mentioned this to President because he did not think R should
be put in position of being concerned about his bxxwx own safety.
President does not think R should run any risks at all. K said it
could be dropped and we could find something else - we will do
whatever R wants. K said if R does not go to Guatemala WX it
will be because of Presidential orders. R said he thought Secret
Service and CIA should appraise situation down there. R brought
up possibility of helicopter and K said we could probably get one
from Canal Zone. R said he could fly to some spot, meet and make
it a short visit. K agreed that it should be short and that R should
not stay overnight by any means. R said if this cannot be done, the
alternative would be to meet with the five Central American countries
together because they are in the common market. K said that is what
he thought too. R said he would like to go through with Guatemala
if possible - if Guatemala is skipped then another country should be too.
K agreed. K said excuse should be that R is cutting own trip. R
said no - it would be that he wanted to meet with five together.
K said he has talked to the head of tex the Secret Service and they are
giving it high priority.
R said he had a couple of questions: Asked about substituting
Sam Gould for Jim Hester. K said he would run by the President.
R said this fellow KNx Knight is a possibility (from Miami), but
he would like to get more people from West Coast. R mentioned
Buff Chandler (the mother). K said the Chandlers are good friends
of President and he could clear that one. R was apparently reading
something and said he noticed that George Woods is against
-2-
Mrs. Chandler - she is a wonderful woman but no one else can get
a word in when she's aKTxaKcx around. R said he thinks she's great.
R said on the business side, there is Arthur Watson of IBM and
Beverly Murphy, President of Cambell Soup (Woods recommending
latter). R said maybe K could check those names out. K said he
would let him know by tomorrow evening. R then mentioned
Dr. Emile Merk(?) who is at U of California at Davis - President
of the Agricultural College.
R said re ABM Commission, he does not see how he could take on
anything else. K said he was not k aware of this - had he been
called? R said yes, he was asked to chair a commitee and he just
cannot - he is in an awful bind. K said BeLieu must have called
him and he would talk to BeLieu. K said if someone could talk
to Goodell it might help - R said he would be glad to do so.
R said Ted Braum has made a suggestion about forming a women's
committee - they could talk about defending their homes, etc.
K said that was a very good idea. K asked R if he thought we should
fight for this - R said yes. K said Percy is giving us a hard time.
R said he would talk to him, but K said it would not do any good.
R said he was coming down for FIAB. K said he looked forward to
seeing him
jm
TELCON
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69
1:30 PM
K said he wanted to get Y's judgment on Korea and UN. Y said simplest
way is sending letter from President to Security Council explaining what
has happened, giving our point of view, etc. K asked if skoxxtxexte someone
would then call a SC meeting. Y said no it would be circulated than
published. Y said more formal procedure would be to ask for urgent
meeting of SC and present case. Y said we would, of course, know
from the beginning there would be no substantive action - all we would get
would be a forum to present our case. K said President's concer
is that he does not want the Soviets to go on record against us, if he can
XXXX avoid it - he is eager to keep four-power talks going if possible.
Y said if we go into SC and make our speech, the Soviets will bxexx feel
obliged to make skpxexcxxbx speech for other side. Y said also that he is not
sure we could get nine votes and Soviets would veto. Y said this would
mean a confrontation between us at a time when we have these other things
cooking. K asked if there is some way Y could get his views to the
President. Y said he would send a telegram right away.
K said the President is pleased with the wy Y has been handling the four-
power talks. K said at early opportunity he is going to try to get
Y in to see President for first-hand appreciation of what he has been
doing. Y said he would be in town on Wednesday of next week. K said
he would try to get an appointment for Wednesday axpx afternoon or
Thursday morning.
jm
TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 2:10 p.m.
Laird said they have picked up two pieces of fuselage which had bullet
and shrapnel holes in it, and that really confirms it was a shoot-down.
They also picked up a flare. But no survivors. HAK noted "so it
wasn't a missile. 11
When HAK asked if Laird should put out that info, Laird said no, not
until it is confirmed by another sai rce. He wants to wait and make sure
the report is verified. HAK agreed, and wondered if we shouldn't ask
the Russians to return to us the pieces of airplane they 've got -- wouldn't
that be a good ploy? Laird said yes, he would check into that.
Laird asked, "What do you think about this afternoon?' HAKSsaid he
was musing about it, that the President and he talked for a bit after the
meeting. HAK asked, "What do you really think?'
Laird: Well, if there was some way we could hit one of their aircraft
or ships, I would do it in a minute. I think the next thing we can do is
to go out. that second airfield. I am going to think about this tintil
3:00. But I have got concerns over what this might mean from the
standpoint of our force commitments in that area, and we must bear
in mind that we can't put ourselves in a position where we are forced
to pull back, as far as Vietnam is concerned. But I'm also concerned
about how this might be interpreted by the people in Paris, particularly
the North Vietnamese.
HAK: Yes, you stated the case exactly -- that's exactly the problem.
Laird: And this problem concerns me. I'm not worried about the public
opinion. We'll have a bad reaction here wither way. What we're trying
to do is get the war in Vietnam over with.
HAK: Either these guys are getting irrational and we better settle it; or
now they're in the same mess as their predecessor and we don't have
to settle it.
Laird: The statement has to be very strong/and get some of their planes
out their on the reconnaissance, and if we had a chance to knock a few
planes down it would be terrific. I don't think we'll get that chance.
HAK: You stated the issue exactly.
Laird and HAK said they would see each other at 3:00.
-2-
( Another subject)
Laird said he got HAK's letter about Haig and agrees with HAK 100%.
HAK said anything he or Wheeler could do would be appreciated.
##
Telecon
The President
2:35 p.m. April 16, 1969
HAK said he wanted the President to know that our destroyers had
picked up some of the debris and it had bullet holes and shrapnel
in it. Now we have incontrovertible evidence that it was shot down.
HAK said we might ask the Soviets to return the debris of the
weeckage they picked up also. The President said he wondered
whether it was worth it or not and added that we might request it
in a low key but wasn't sure. HAK said we could hold off on this
and if no other action is contemplated this might be one avenue.
The President mentioned that his 3:00 meeting would be delayed
to 3:15.
TELCON
Joseph Alsop
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 6:15 p.m.
HAK referred to a comment Alsop made to Rogers at lunch, which
Rogers repeated to the President, and the President wants to know what
Alsop really thinks. Alsop at first didn't recall what he had said to
Rogers, and HAK reminded him that he said "whatever we did would have
public support. " Alsop said, with respect to North Korea, Yes, I think
that's correct.
HAK said the President wants to know what Alsop thinks we should do.
Alsop's first answer was: I don't know. Then he went on to say he
thinks you have to start by asking the motive of this behavior. He is
inclined to believe that from the beginning the policy of North Korea
is primarily to take pressure off the North Vietnamese. HAK said,
"so they would like us to divert ourselves up there--so that would be
a sign of weakness. " Alsop said the situation that would confront them
in North Korea if the North Vietnamese have to cease and desist. China
is in chaos. The old Wave of the Future has come to a dead halt. And
in both countries you have the contrast of economic disaster and tyranny
in the North; and economic progress and a better life in the South.
Alsop thinks this is what bugs them.
HAK said his advice, then, is ignore them essentially and concentrate
on Vietnam.
Alsop said VNam certainly is most important at the moment. Any
serious diversion from VNam is a mistake. Win in Vietnam and you
win the ball game.
HAK said he followed that reasoning, and they had thought that's one
of the things Alsop might have had in mind, but we just wanted to be sure.
Alsop said whatever we do he'll support us. Alsop also suggested that
Dean Acheson is the man to get an opinion from--"he is a wiser man
than I am by far. I rather think one war at a time, is what he would say. "
HAK: Well, I don't think one's tendency to take on another war is
overwhelming at this moment. You don't find people trying to break
down the President's door in order to urge him into another war.
Alsop said that he can well believe. Alsop extended every kind of
good luck to the President. HAK thanked him saying he appreciated
this, and he would be seeing the President in a little while.
TELCON
Max Frankel
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69
6:25 PM
F said aside from the two obvious - UN and MAC - he could not
think of any options - is he overlooking anything? K said no,
we have not made any alarming statements. F said quite to the
contrary. K said our present view is we do no see any sense in a
lot of diplomacy if we do not know what we want to accomplish.
There has been a lot of protesting in the past. What we have been
trying to do is find out where things stand and try to get
as good an assessment as to what happened as possible. K said we
knew yesterday what had happened but to know in exact detail
took a little more time. K said we will be talking to people
diplomatically fairly soon. F asked if we were under much pressure.
Referred to clips of President on campaign trail - restore respect for
America, etc. K was unaware of clips. K said he thinks the President
feels on this he has to do what is right. K said we have been looking
at it carefully. We go over these reports and look at situation
but we are not going to have a huge trauma in any sense. K said
we are talking for background. F said absolutely. K said unless you
know what you are trying to do and what you are trying to achieve -
we have had meetings; we did talk to Dobrynin about it yesterday.
F said they have been helpful. K said they have been helpful in
rescue operation and that is all we have talked about. There is not
much we can ask them to do at this moment - there is also not much
we can ask the Russians to ask them to do. K said he did not know
whether this conversation was very helpful but would give F something
of our mood. K said our mood is that we do not like to say things we
do not do and do not like to imply things just to prove our manhood.
F said conversation was very helpful. K said we of course talked
to our Korean people to get their judgment and we have been collecting
judgments on motives, etc. We will make a decision on a specific
course of action. F referred to concern about lingering possibility
of President hemmed in by his own rhetoric.
K said he could not say what final conclusions will be reached - no
decision now and no crisis atmosphere here. F said there certainly is not.
K said we meet and discuss and we had an NSC meeting. K said he worked
last night trying to lay out all options and that is where we are right now.
F said K might not think he has said much, but he has said enough and
F appreciates it. K said quite frankly yesterday was spent detexaming
determining whether there were any survivors.
jm
TELCON
David Rocexx Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69
6:40 PM
R said he was seeing King Hussein and wondered if there was anything
special he should be aware of. K said no, we had good seesions with him
here. Basic problem is what we need from Arabs is maximum commitment
to state of peace. The more commitment they can make the more we
can press the Israelis to be reasonable. K said he thinks Hussein is willing
to go as XX xx far as Nasser. K said we are not inclined here to bring
pressue on Hussein to go in a way that would jeopardize his position.
R said one of his colleagues has been talking to Saunders on K's staff
about an idea he has re Saudi Arabia and Libya. Both countries have
recently discovered wells and underground rivers. If those areas could
be developed and a certain number of refugees taken, this would help
Israeli problem. R said there was some indication that if Saudi Arabia
and Libya were willing to take the refugees, some negotiation might
be possible with respect to Jerusalem. R asked whether K had any objections
to his mentioning this to the King. K said he would take it easy on
Jerusalem - that is most complicated issue. R said what amazed him
was that there was any favorable response from Israel that there was
room for negotiation. R said he would just say he had a friend who had
mentioned this to him.
R asked whether there was any chance of K's going to the next meeting of
their group in Paris. R asked whether K was going to Bilderberg.
K said he has not decided yet, but it is on his calendar and barring any
crises, he is hoping to go. R said K. might consider staying over and
attending meeting in Paris the following Tuesday. K said he would try.
(FYI - Bilderberg is week end of May 8)
jm
TELCON
Prince Bernard
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 6:45 p.m.
Prince B asked if HAK were coming to the Bilderberg meeting.
HAK replied that he would love to come, but it depended on his work-
load here, and on whether or not there is a crisis going on at that
moment. HAK went on to say that he requested an appointment for
the Prince, and he would call the Prince about it in the morning.
The Prince asked if HAK were free for lunch tomorrow (Thursday)
or on Saturday, and HAK said perhaps on Saturday. The Prince
mentioned that if he were to see the P it would be on an informal
basis, and HAK said that is clearly understood. HAK said there
was absolutely no problem about the appointment, but the Pres'
schedule has been thrown off by the fact of his press conference on
Friday for which he needs time to prepare, and also by this Korean
incident of the plane shoot-down.
Prince said if HAK can't make lunch, could he let him know in
the morning when he could come in to see HAK for a moment?
HAK clarified that lunch would be with him alone, not with the President,
and the Prince understood that, and what he had in mind was lunch at
the Embassy.
Prince said he was leaving at 10:30 but would be back at 12. And he
admonished HAK not to overwork himself--he knows how quickly it
can happen.
###
TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69
7:05 PM
K said he had personal view (not Presidential) about Panmunjom business.
K said he thinks we should not show a nd say nothing - no explanations,
no complaints. R said that is what they are going to do - he has already
told his people. R said they will have a letter that could be sent to
U Thant or SC getting on record - very low key.
R asked if K had seen statement by FM of Japan about retaliation. K said
no.
TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69
8:10 p.m.
Richardson decided he would go later on tonight to Airlie, getting
there around 9:30. He was disappointed not to get the straight dope
on our foreign policy, because he could afford a little guidance.
HAK said that what Richardson would say, HAK would probably
agree with.
Richardson is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
tomorrow afternoon for a briefing on the shoot-down. He feels it is
probably better that he do it before the President talks than afterwards.
HAK said the President doesn't want to imply that there will be a clear-
cut decision; he doesn't want to have the impression that we're building
up for a climactic decision one way or the other. Richardson said he can
duck that. What concerns him most is that they will undoubtedly focus
on the process by which decisions like this are made, who is consulted,
etc. (referring to the 303 business); did the President know, and, if
not, who in the White House, etc. ? HAK said he would tell them the
truth. He would say there is a monthly review.
Richardson said that's what he'd like to do. HAK said it's the only
thing to do. They can't expect the President to know every individual
mission. But he thinks it's essential that we say that this has had
full political clearance, so it doesn't look as if the military are running
loose. Richardson said he agrees 100%. Richardson asked if HAK
reports to the President on 303 decisions. HAK said the Pres gets
a minute of every meeting, which he approves. On top of that, HAK
gives him every disagreed item and every item that might embarrass
him, even if it is agreed.
Richardson ask what would you want me to say about his participation,
knowledge or approval. HAK would say the WH chairs this committee.
HAK will check it with the President in the morning to be absolutely sure.
He wouldn't give the name of the committee--but it doesn't make any
difference. Richardson said he thinks it would be a good idea if HAK
would check it. He doesn't think there's anything to be apologetic about.
HAK said he thinks it's a very conscientious system, and he certainly
looks at every one of these things, and he thinks Richardson probably
does before he goes to these meetings. Richardson has been to one,
but Alex, of course, is there. HAK said the book they get goes thru
another committee-- the Joint Reconnaissance-or-something committee.
-2-
Richardson said he kept waiting for General Steakely to tell them
this morning what the value of this intelligence was, but he decided
not to raise the question. HAK thinks this is a question we ought to
ask when this is over. It won't help us now.
Richard had a conversation with someone from which he got the
impression that in the conduct of this study there's a lot of US invest-
ment in hardware and US personnel abroad which isn't subject to
anyone's review in terms of justification. HAK said the problem is
once a thing like this is approved it goes on forever. He spoke of
putting a terminal date on every operation -- this would force an
automatic review every six months. Richardson said that doesn't
go far enough. He referred to 24, 000 US personnel in West Germany,
in this business, and over 12, 000 in Okinawa. HAK said of course that
sort of thing is not reviewed.
HAK asked if they were luncheing tomorrow, or was R preparing for
the meeting. R said he was counting on lunch.
HAK asked R to give the group at Airlie his apologies -- (he has to work
on the press conference). R said he would apologize to the group for
having to take a watered-down and second-hand version. HAK said
"and then you will deny it if they put our stories of White House
dominance over State. " Richardson said of course. In this con-
nection, he was interviewed by Peter Lisagor, and he told Peter how
well the system is working, and how smooth our cooperation is, and
how firm our mutual understanding. He said Lisagor seemed to
believe it.
###
TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 8:45 p.m.
The President felt the stuff in the briefing book on the Korean thing was not
adequate for the press conference. First question asked will be: What
are the facts ? What are you going to do about it? How many Americans
are stationed in South Korea? The fact the number of missions the first
three months was 90. The material doesn't show something that needs to
be in there something with regard to the number of Americans that have
been lost already. HAK said we are getting that right now.
P: There are 50, 000 Americans there. The North Koreans threatened them, etc.
As a matter of fact, over the past two years
men have been killed.
I have the responsibility for the safety of these men. They (the flights)
have been made and they will continue.
that's the kind of thing.
Then you go on to the other question: What are you going to do now?
I'd like a view of what we're planning to do. For example, there's no
question and answer here: What are you going to do diplomatically
What are your diplomatic options? UN. Panmunjom. Have you
protested.
H: I'll have it over within an hour.
P: I think that's right. Just sit down and figure out questions
I need
to know about the Panmunjom thing.
Has it been put out to the press?
H: It was supposed to be put out by State simultaneously.
P: There's too much of a buildup for this press conference. That would be
a dead giveaway we will do something. Better to fuzz it up a little.
We are checking with the UN. Leave that little crumb bun for them.
H: You ordered your Ambassador to file a protest with the President of the
Security Council.
P: The Ambassador of the UN--I have asked him also to explore any other
ways the UN could help.
How are you going to react? What are you
going to do? I'm not going to announce that decision. What's your
suggestion as to how that has to be handled?
H: You could say we will announce measures as they
are being taken for the time being. We have taken the following steps, and
not indicate that there will be others.
P; Plan it in your own mind. Sort of talking points rather than questions
and answers. In answer to the first question, I might talk 3 or 4 minutes.
-2-
H: On the Panmunjom meeting, it's supposed to begin at 9 o'clock our time.
We won't be signing our protest until 11 tonight. It won't be released until 11.
P: We have filed a protest. I have instructed our Ambassador to the UN
to file this protest with the President of the Security Council. I'll be able
to do the toe-dancing. Talking points in the light of what we are preparing
to do. Get talking points to lay the foundation for later action. If you say
too little they' going to know damn well you're going to do something.
On the other hand, fuzz it up. Let them think we are just going to explore
the possibilities.
P: Suppose they ask are our aircraft carriers being sent up there ?
H: I think you could say certain precautionary alert measures have been taken.
P: I think we should say that such measures will continue. How about
saying such measures will continue in this area and such measures will be
protected. There will be reaction in event there is any attack on them.
Give the warning thing. Use Game Plan II. That will be a good cover.
H: If you take Option 2, you can wind it down at that point. You can leave
it right there. You don't have to make another announcement.
P: That's not our intention, you understand. It's a way to keep Option 1
more of a shocker.
H: I've talked to John and Bob about it. John wants to think about it overnight.
Bob leans toward option 1.
P: Have you talked to Rockefeller yet ?
H: No. I will do it first thing
I will do a draft speech for Monday, too.
TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-17-69
9:05
AM
K said President just wanted to make sure that none of them speculate
how far plane was from shore. R said K did not have to caution him.
K said he knew that but President asked him to call all Departments
and make sure. R said he had some reservations about issuing Mel's
proposed statement - not much has been said about it. R said Richardson
is testifying today before SFRC. K said he was not too crazy about
it (statement) yesterday when it first came up. R said it was o.k. if
a question came up, but did not think much of putting out as a special
satement. R said it is in the paper this morning because it was in the
Defense paper. K said he thought that was enough. R said XX he and
Elliot talked last night about what he might say and they tentatively
agreed he should just say what the procedure is; interdepartmental
group at under secretary level, etc.
K said the Ressident President asked him to put together some sort
of contingency plans for the various things to be done in connection
with yesterday afternoon's discussion. K asked whether R could give
him the name of someone at State (perhaps Alex Johnson) to deal with.
R said he would let K know.
jm
Telecon
The President
9:25, April 17, 1969
P - In terms of the reaction - speaking of public handling, do you think
some kind of diplomatic protest should be made?
K - I am exploring now what would happen if we were to go to the UN.
We won't get a favorable vote. I'm doing this on a very low key. We
can go to the Security Council on Saturday. We really would have done
everything possible at that point.
P - The unsophisticated citizen might feel, why don't we make them
pay for the plane, thinking back to the Pueblo. We should at least make
a gesture. We are not going to get our selves into a long debate over this.
K - I wouldn't go to the UN unless we are going to do the othe r thing.
P - Oh, we'll do the other thing. but suppose the UN says they are
going to investigate?
K - I have a call in to Joe Sisco who handled these matters before.
This is not in full authority, but if we don't press too hard, they might
be glad to wind the whole thing up.
P - Is there some other way.
K - We can launch a formal protest and demand compensation.
P - I have a feeling thats better. The UN is not going to do anything
about this. We can do something so that they will turn it down fast.
P - Thats why the Panmunjom thing might be a good idea. H - I don't
think we should show up there.
(something missing here)
K - I told Rod, subject to my checking with you, that he could indicate
bit more concern so that everyone does not think the crisis is over.
P - Tell them I met with you and members of NSC staff until after
midnight last night - I think it would be a good thing to do.
- 2 -
I
K - We do not want this thing to cool before we act but we have to
have some thin thread of trying.
P - - o.k. The UN thing worries me - they will take a week to debate.
K - - I am going to check on what happendd when we had the Pueblo. I'll
check other diplomatic possibilities.
President and K discussed idea of formal protest. - decided should not
be done with Soviets. K said it would be sign of distain if we did
thru Poles, for example. K said protest thru Hungary or some minor
country would get us on record. P said what about Romania.