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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
*1
Briefing - Helms to NSC
12/10/69
A
Report
2
Lebanon
n.d.
A
Report
3
Libya
n.d.
A
Report
x 4
Distribution List (2copies)
12/8/69
A
List
[6/27/03 - Copy #2 Not in folder - location
worknown. m]
SANITIZED
PER RAC REVIEW
3/3/2009
5
Lebauon
n.d.
A
Report
FILE LOCATION
H-Files Box H-25 Folder 5
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Reproduced at irsuant the Richard to Executive Nixon Presidential Order 13526 Library and has DECL been ASSIFIED determined to be declassified. NA 14029 (1-98)
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
/
Briefing - Helms to NSC
12/10/69
A
Report
2
Lebanon
n.d.
A
Report
3
Libya
n.d.
A
Report
4
Distribution List (2copies)
12/8/69
A
List
5
n.d.
A
Lebauon
Report
FILE LOCATION
H-Files Box H-25 Folder 5
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14029 (1-98)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
/
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/NODIS
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION 5221
WASHINGTON
December 4, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Harold H. Saunders Hal
SUBJECT: Mid-East Package for NSC
1. Attached are the two papers we have been strugging with:
Tab A:
Your memo to the President cast as an "Issues for
Decision" paper for the NSC.
Tab B:
The longer memo revised as you suggested yesterday.
We need your guidance on the following:
a. Are these papers now ready to be
yes
put in an NSC book (with whatever final
changes you note) ?
no
b. Do you want us to distribute the longer
yes
paper to the NSC members?
no
2. In short, these are the recommendations that these papers lead to:
a. That State be asked to submit a tactical plan for disengaging
from the Four Power talks.
b. That State be asked to submit a plan combining US-USSR
talks and a U.S. mediation effort between Jordan and Israel.
After all this laborious analysis, the real choice boils down to this
question: Should we back off from peace-making efforts and go back
to the 1967-68 policy, or should we make one more try outside the
Four Power talks?
I personally favor taking a hard look at the possibilities for one more
try before giving up. Just for the sake of illustration, I have put down
a tentative course of action at Tab C.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtbx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TAB A
"Issues for Decision" paper -- going with HAK package only.
Copies going through Secretariat for inclusion in NSC books.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TAB B
Memo on "Arab-Israeli Impasse -- Whe re are We Going" included
in HAK package only. Copies going through Secretariat for inclusion
in NSC book.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
TAB C
ELEMENTS OF A TENTATIVE COURSE OF ACTION
Assumption: The U.S. position would be improved if Israel
accepted its position.
Objective: To persuade Israel to accept that position -- Israel
will withdraw if adequate security arrangements are negotiated
-- and to try to mediate an Israel-Jordan settlement.
Assessment: This would require heavy pressure -- or costly
inducement -- on Israel. The odds are probably against success.
But this harder option ought to be examined. Some of its elements
might be:
1. Four Power talks: Stand firm on our present position and plan
to désengage as quickly as possible, though perhaps waiting
until after the Arab summit (December 20). Maybe Christmas
recess is a natural opportunity.
2- US-Israel consultations: Tell Eban that we:
are prepared to désengage from Four Power talks;
-- believe our interests require a settlement;
-- ask Israel to cooperate with us on a Jordan settlement;
-- assure Israel that we will not further change our nego-
tiating position and ask Israel to accept the essentials
of that position (will withdraw if satisfactory security
arrangements negotiated).
At the time of the talks with Eban, we would still be a couple
of weeks short of our military and economic aid decisions.
They would then be considered in the light of Israel's response.
3. US-USSR talks on UAR. Leave these where they are until
after we have sorted ourselves out with Israel. If Israel's
response gave us something to work with, we could tell
Dobrynin -- if there had been no response in the meantime
-- that Israel had done all that could be expected and we
proposed ending the US-USSR talks unless Moscow was in
a position to deliver Egyptian agreement. If we get nowhere
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
PAGE 2
with Israel (as is likely), we can let the USSR talks
stay where they are.
4. US-Jordan consultations: Discuss elements of a Jordan-Israel
Israel. settlement in precise terms to see how far we have to press
SECRET/NODIS
HHSaunders:12/4/69 2 p.m.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting on Middle East, December 10
The NSC meeting is intended primarily as a basic review of
where we have been and where we are going on policy toward
an Arab-Israeli settlement. The meeting also provides, in
the context of broader Middle East issues, an opportunity to
review work done in the Washington Special Actions Group
on the situation in Lebanon where possible shifts toward the
radical Arab side may pose operational problems for us.
As you know, I have been concerned with resumption of the
Four Power talks that we may be walking into a dangerous
situation. We began on State's recommendation that we would
just talk about general principles. Now we have stated a pre-
cise position on the UAR-Israel border. We are now heading
into a situation where we will be asked to impose on Israel
terms of a settlement that, in the Four Power talks, could be
eroded to the point where we would not consider them a balanced
position. We need now to step back and look at the broader
issues and options to get a clear picture of where we are going.
This perspective will enable us to appraise present strategy
and set a new course if necessary.
Attached and tabbed are:
-- Your talking points which will introduce the subject
and structure the discussion. I would propose to lead
off by summarizing the deliberations of the Washington
Special Actions Group concerning possible U.S. responses
to contingencies arising from radical pressures on
Lebanon's moderate government, which you asked me
to report on. Then I suggest you ask Mr. Helms to
brief on the general situation in the Mid East. I would
then outline the Middle East settlement situation and
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Rth
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
settlement situation and issues. When I complete my outline
of the issues, I suggest that you
call on appropriate
participants at the meeting for their views. I recommend that
you not announce our decision at the meeting, but that you
indicate your desire to reflect further on the discussion before
making your decision. Your talking points proceed in this way.
-- An Issues for Decision paper summarizing the major issues
raised by our policy toward an Arab-Israeli settlement.
-- Maps of the Area.
You need to read only your Talking Points and the Issues for Decision
paper. My briefing will summarize the Lebanon paper. An Analytical
Summary of the Middle East negotiating situation and a summary of
the Lebanese contingency considerations of the Washington Special
Actions Group are in a separate background book.
Briefly summarized the topics for discussion are:
1. Lebanon
-- Possible contingencies and U.S. responses.
-- Israeli action as an alternative to U.S. intervention.
2. Middle East Negotiations
The issues as to whether we should
-- Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces
responsibility for the terms of a settlement.
-- Continue the present combination of negotiations.
-- Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
[3. Libya If there is time, I would be prepared to report
briefly on the Washington Special Actions Group
deliberations on Libya. If not, I shall report to you
separately by memorandum. ]
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
POINTS V.I. ONLY NR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
December 10, 1969
Mr. President:
Attached is a revised set of talking points
for your use at the NSC meeting today on
the Middle East. This revised paper
provides for ten-minute briefings by
Secretaries Rogers and Laird on their
European trip.
Henry K A. Kissinger
Attachment
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
SECRET
REVISED PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING - DECEMBER 10, 1969
MIDDLE EAST
1.
Call on Secretary Rogers to give the group a ten-minute briefing
on his European trip.
2.
Call on Secretary Laird to give a ten-minute briefing on his
European trip.
3.
We have begun a new round of Four Power talks (US-USSR-UK-
France) on the Middle East.
4.
I want to review the situation and prospects and to look at our options
as we go into these talks.
5.
[Call on Mr. Helms for a briefing on the situation in the Middle East. ]
6.
[Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Middle East issues.
]
7.
[When Mr. Kissinger has completed his presentation you might wish
to call on Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson for their
views. (Under Secretary Richardson has had the greatest opportunity
to familiarize himself with the details of the current situation.) Then
you might call on Secretary Laird, Ambassador Yost and Assistant
Secretary Sisco. ]
If there is time you may wish to turn to these topics, but it is not essential.
8.
It will be useful also to review the deliberations of the Washington
Special Actions Group concerning possible responses to contingencies
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
in Lebanon:
"
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958 Rtlx
-- Lebanon is quiet now but still under pressure from the radicals.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
9.
[Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Washington Special Actions Group
consideration of Lebanon contingencies.
]
10.
In concluding, you would like to consider these issues before making
any decisions.
11.
[If there is time, ask Mr. Kissinger to outline briefly the Washington
Special Actions Group consideration of Libya. ]
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
THE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING - DECEMBER 10, 1969
MIDDLE EAST
1. We have begun a new round of Four Power talks (US-USSR-UK-
France) on the Middle East.
2. I want to review the situation and prospects and to look at our options
as we go into these talks.
3.
It will be useful also to review the deliberations of the Washington
Special Actions Group concerning possible responses to contingencies
in Lebanon:
-- Lebanon is quiet now but still under pressure from the radicals.
4. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Washington Special Actions Group
consideration of Lebanon contingencies.
5. [Call on Mr. Helms for a briefing on the situation in the Middle East. ]
6. [Call on Mr. Kissinger to outline Middle East Issues.
]
7. [When Mr. Kissinger has completed his presentation you might wish to
call on Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson for their views.
Then you might call on Secretary Laird, Ambassador Yost and Assistant
Secretary Sisco. ]
8.
In concluding, you would like to consider these issues before making any
decisions.
9.
[If there is time, ask Mr. Kissinger to outline briefly the Washington
Special Actions Group consideration of Libya. ]
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
SECRET
R7G
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AT T T XIILI
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
HAK TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING -- MIDDLE EAST
I. Introduction
A. There are two subjects on the agenda:
-- Issues raised by contingency planning that
grew out of the recent crisis in Lebanon.
-- A review of where we stand in our effort to
help achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement.
B. On the first issue, I simply want to report on the contingency
plans which were reviewed and approved by the Washington
Special Actions Group.
C. On the second, as the Four Power talks resume and as we
await the Soviet reply to our last proposal in the US-USSR
talks, it seems a useful time to take stock.
[D. You have said you would brief on Libya if there is time. We
can easily cover this by Memorandum if you do not. ]
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rth
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LEBANON
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
2
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MID-EAST
I
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
III
ARAB-ISRAEL
A. Introduction: With Four Power talks resuming and US-Soviet
talks in suspense, this seems a useful time to take stock.
B. Background: Since January our efforts to achieve an Arab-
Israeli settlement have passed through three phases:
in February, we began exploratory talks with the UK,
France and USSR about a set of general principles that
could be given to Ambassador Jarring to get negotiations
started.
- - In April, we advanced a position on some of the specific
terms of an Israel-UAR settlement--excluding boundaries.
- In October, we advanced a specific position on the UAR-
Israeli border.
C. The present problem: Resumption of Four Power talks opens
the door now to pressure on us to impose a settlement on Israel.
- - It, therefore, seems a good moment to stand back for a
moment and look at our present course and its alternatives
in perspective.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rthx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
D. Preview of options: Just to establish a framework for dis-
cussion of the issues, we have three broad options:
- - Let negotiations peter out.
- - Continue the present combination of negotiations.
- - Develop a new combination of negotiations.
Against that background, here are the main issues.
E. A basic question behind any strategy is an assessment of
whether it is possible to improve the U.S. position in the
Arab world by dissociating ourselves from Israel's positions?
How permanent would that improvement be ? What do the Arabs
really want?
- Some argue that if Israel could just be persuaded to
withdraw to its pre-war borders that would bring peace
with the Arabs and lead to an improvement in our position
in the Arab world.
- Others argue that the objective of the Arab radicals- - -
especially the militant Palestinians - - is to end Israel's
existence as a Jewish state, not just to regain conquered
Arab territory. Thus, even if we engineer a settlement
in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the
settlement is unlikely to last and the U.S. will still be
defending Israel against an Arab crusade.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
F. Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain
our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best
strategy for achieving this ? There are two broad choices:
1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of
a settlement, leaving to outsiders the problem of
guaranteeing those terms once agreed.
-- Those who favor this approach believe that there
will be peace only when the people of the area face
up to the realities of their situation.
-- Those who oppose say that: this is the strategy tried
from November 1967 to January 1969, without
achieving peace. Radical forces have steadily grown
stronger to the detriment of US interests, and the
level of hostilities has intensified.
2. Generate international pressures for the terms of a
settlement.
-- Those who favor this approach argue: The Near
Easterners are too suspicious of each other to
initiate negotiations but might respond to a diplomatic
alternative if it were offered.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 4 -
.
The situation is too dangerous for us not at least to
determine decisively what price each side would be
willing to pay for peace.
- - Those who oppose feel that:
.
International diplomatic action has raised Arab hopes
too high without being able to produce results and
diverted the Arabs from coming to terms with Israel.
If international pressure is generated, the U.S. will
be expected to impose terms unilaterally on Israel--
because in the last analysis there is no significant
international pressure except for U.S. influence in
Israel and Soviet influence in the UAR.
G. Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating whatever
international pressure may be possible, what is the best way of
achieving this ? We have two broad choices:
1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the
terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept (the
USSR pressing the UAR).
- - Those who favor this approach argue that:
.
this is the only way to avoid isolation at the UN and
in the Near East.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 5 -
even if the consensus does not achieve a settlement
now, its mere existence will constitute steady pressure
on the belligerents to reach a political settlement.
-- Those who oppose argue that:
the U.S. is unlikely to achieve consensus on a position
which comes close to meeting Israel's requirements, but
we will be expected to impose it on Israel. Thus the
very process of reaching consensus makes it harder to
persuade Israel to accept.
The belligerents have too much at stake to respond to
vague pressure.
-- or let them peter out - - - -
2. Break off the talks now/to cut our losses but also to
generate pressure on the USSR and the Arabs to face up
to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms.
-- Those who favor this course argue that:
.
Talks which donot produce a package that the belligerents--
if they were inclined toward genuine compromise- could
consider seriously will unnecessarily raise their hopes
and may delay their coming to terms with reality.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 6 -
The negotiating process itself increases our isola-
tion and makes it more difficult to achieve a balanced
position. By breaking out of multilateral negotiations
we would at least cut that loss, and we would somewhat
increase the pressure on the USSR to take a more
reasonable position.
- - Those who oppose this course argue:
.
It is the situation- - not just the talks- - which isolates
us. Breaking the talks without substituting something
in return, especially right before the Arab Summit
(December 20), would increase the Arab sense of
desperation and conviction that they have no course but
heightened military preparation.
The U.S. does not have an interest in another war
over Israel's right to hold its conquered territory. Our
interest is in Israel's security so we should try to put
ourselves in a position where we are holding out only
for Israel's security within unexpanded borders. To
achieve that position will require further negotiation.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 7 -
H. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations what is the
best forum?, The three options reviewed last February remain
the logical choices:
1. Four Power talks.
-- Those who have argued for this course started with
the fact that last January-February the U.S. was
under heavy international- - and special French--
pressure to join in Four Power talks. There was
strong sentiment at that time for taking a more active
role to see whether outsiders could help the belliger-
ents formulate at least a framework to get negotiations
started.
.
The argument now is that having agreed to these
talks we would now take some loss to stop them.
-- Those who have opposed argued that:
.
this is the forum in which the U.S. is most likely to
be pressed to move away from a position that has any
chance of acceptance in Israel.
.
Moreover, the British and French are the least likely
of the Four to help persuade either side to accept, and
the French at least are an anathema in Jerusalem.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 8 -
2. US-USSR Talks
-- Those who argued for entering these talks did so on
three grounds:
a. For global reasons, the U.S. had an interest in
seeing whether it could negotiate seriously on a
range of important issues.
b. The USSR's persistent requests since September
1968 to talk about a Mid-East settlement suggested
that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the Mid-East
and might participate seriously in trying to work
out a reasonable arrangement. While we maintained
a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far
enough to see what was possible.
C. The USSR should pay at least as much of the
price for a settlement as the U.S. in expanding its
influence with its clients.
-- Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the
USSR did not want a real peace; it simply wanted to
persuade us to press Israel to give back the territory
of Moscow's clients. Since the USSR was not likely to
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 9 -
act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the
USSR's role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the
peace table.
3. U.S. mediation
-- Those who argued for felt in general that:
.
The U.S. should exploit its exclusive ability to move
Israel and not share credit for a settlement, if any.
.
Nasser really wanted peace but that he could not say
so publicly so he would welcome a private U.S. medi-
ation effort.
. It made no sense to involve the USSR in any exchange
on a Jordan-Israel settlement.
-- Those who argued against argued that:
.
Chances of success were slight, and the U.S. would
incur the main blame for failure.
The U.S. would also be accused of bad faith if it
.
advanced a proposal, Israel rejected and the U.S.
went on aiding Israel.
I. Issue: If we persist in the US- USSR and Four Power talks, what
should be our strategy? We have two basic choices and two options
for executing each.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 10 -
A.
Let the talks peter out:
Option 1 stick to present position even if Israel rejects it.
- - Some argue that this is the course most likely to
isolate us. It would put us in a position where we
would be pressed to continue military and economic
support for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept
of what would constitute a fair settlement.
- - Others argue that this is the only position that would
avoid a confrontation with Israel. It would enable us to
stand on a position we regard as fair. We could blame
failure on all sides and maintain that we are only pro-
viding enough aid to maintain Israeli security.
Option 2 -- stick to present position, pressing Israel to
accept it.
- - Some argue that this would be the best possible possible
position to be in if possible short of a negotiated settlement.
We would have produced Israeli agreement to a position
we regard as fair.
- Others argue that since Israeli agreement is unlikely,
this course is really the same as the first with all its
disadvantages. We might use a good deal of influence
SECRET/NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS
- 11 -
with Israel- - possibly eroding its position- - and yet not
have produced an Arab offer of peace.
B, Press the talks to fruition:
Option 3 -- achieve big-power consensus but not impose on
Israel.
-- Some argue that it would improve our position with
the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than
our present one.
-- Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our
position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused
to press it on Israel- - and it would be more difficult
than our present position to sell to Israel- - - we would
be called hypocritical.
Option 4 -- achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.
-- Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could
be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is
essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition
on the USSR.
- - Others argue that:
.
The process of achieving consensus would dilute the
substance of the consensus to the point where it would be
all but impossible to impose it on Israel.
SECRET/NODIS
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- 12 -
.
The U.S. would be left with a position it could not
regard as balanced and faced with the question of
whether to go on aiding an Israel which rejected it.
In the unlikely event we succeeded in imposing it
on Israel, we would have in effect made ourselves
responsible for enforcing the agreement.
J. To summarize the options, they are:
1. Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces
responsibility for the terms of a settlement.
2. Continue the present combination of negotiations.
3. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
K. The choice among these must be made in the light of four conflicting
U.S. interests:
1. Arab-Israeli settlement. The U.S. has varied interests in the
area which are more easily pursued in peace than in tension.
2. Not worsening relations with the Arabs. U.S. investment in oil
is heavy and Western Europe and Japan depend on Mid-East oil
supply. Whether or not the Soviets dominate this area depends
on whether the Arabs feel they have a Western alternative.
3. Israel's survival. We are committed to Israel's survival,
though not necessarily in its present expanded borders.
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- 13
4. Avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. Neither the U.S.
nor the USSR wants one. The problem is to avoid situations
where we are forced toward one.
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ISSUES FOR DECISION
SUMMARY
SUMMARY
The Problem. Continuation of the Arab-Israeli impasse is gradually
narrowing broader U.S. options in the Mid-East -- partly because the
U.S. is identified closely with Israel. Those most concerned with our
eroding position believe it is essential, therefore, to dissociate
ourselves from Israel.
The Negotiating Situation. Since January, we have moved from explora-
tory talks on the general principles of a settlement to giving the Soviets
on October 28 a specific position on the UAR Israel border. That
position - regarded as our fallback when we first started talking
specifics with the Soviets in April -- stated that Israel would withdraw
to the pre-war border provided satisfactory arrangements were negotiated
to enhance Israeli security at three sensitive points -- Gaza, Sharm
al-Shaikh and the Sinai. This progression has taken us further from
Israel's position -- but not yet far enough to have dissociated ourselves
from a position as Israel's lawyer.
The Options. Review of the issues leads to three broad options:
1. Back off from negotiations, leaving to local forces responsibility
for the terms of a settlement.
2. Continue the present combination of negotiations.
3. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
The Issues.
1. Analysis of these options boils down to these two propositions:
a. We cannot dissociate ourselves from Israel credibly
without trying to press peace terms on Israel. Even if
we take a stand on peace terms that we regard as fair,
the Arabs will see us as hypocrites if Israel rejects them
and we go on supplying military and economic aid. If we
do that, our position will continue to erode, and events
will drift steadily toward another Arab-Israeli clash.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
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under provisions of E.O. 12958
R7lx
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- 2 -
b.
If we press peace terms on Israel seriously and not just
for the record, this would lead to a confrontation with
Israel. There might be ways of tempering this to some
degree, but it would almost certainly involve at least the
implied threat of not continuing substantial military support
or helping meet the $1. 2 billion balance of payments deficit.
That could trigger an Israeli attack in one last desperate
effort to cut Egyptian forces down and topple Nasser.
2.
If we did decide to press the terms of a settlement on Israel,
what would be the most useful forum to work from? The
analysis isolates these factors:
a.
In the Four Power talks our position will be whittled
away to the point where it will be even less acceptable
to Israel than it is now. Yet the British and the French
have little to contribute in pressing agreed terms on
either Israel or the UAR.
b.
The usefulness of the US-USSR talks will depend on
whether Moscow's reply to our last proposal offers
promise that Moscow is willing to press Cairo toward
balanced terms.
C.
If neither of these forums provides a real opportunity to
probe the positions of the belligerents or to generate
pressure on them, we might be better off trying a
mediation effort of our own. In any case, it makes more
sense to handle the Jordan-Israel settlement by ourselves
than to involve the Soviets, who have no interest in a
Jordan settlement and would only exploit their involvement
by championing an extreme Arab position.
Perspective. The past ten months have given us a number of excellent
means for probing positions on all sides of this intractable problem. Now
the various consultations we have launched are bringing us to the point
where continuing on our present course without deciding what our destina-
tion should be could bring us the worst of two worlds.
SECRET/NODIS
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1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: NSC Membero
No Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-25-5-3-7
30
2.
SUBJECT:
Arab-Israeli Impasse
3. DATE: December 8, 1969
4. CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NODIS
NO. OF
ADDRESSEE
COPIES
RECIPIENT
TIME
DATE
Vice President (K. Crane)
1
0900
12/9/69
1
H.S that
1980
Secretary of State
12-8-69
years
2105
8/12/69
Secretary of Defense
2 yer
1922
8/12/69
Director, OEP
1
Attorney General
1
your Chappelle
9:45
12/9/69
Under Secretary of State
1
Fly
1900
12-8-69
Chairman, JCS
0
4.A.,
1922
8/12/69
25X1
Director, CIA
1
1915
12-8-69
JSC, LTC Lemnitzer
1
Ambassador Yost
Department of State
1
FLy mat
1900
12-8-69
/
Haig
E
1
( Watts q
A
1
Lynn
1
( Osgood
1
Kennedy
1
Saunders
1
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
JHS 5/23/2012 5
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/NODIS
December 8, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Emergency Preparedness
SUBJECT:
The Arab-Israeli Impasse
The attached paper, prepared in this office, is distributed in
order to help focus discussion of the issues that will be considered
at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, December 10. There has been
informal discussion, but this paper has no interagency status and is
being distributed only as a guide to the kinds of issues that will be
dealt with.
A.
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachment
CC: The Attorney General
The Under Secretary of State
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Ambassador Yost
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/12/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
SECRET/NODIS
under provisions of E.O. 12958
R7hx
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SECRET/NODIS
THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE: WHERE ARE WE GOING?
I. Background
A. Steps taken by the U.S. since January.
1. The February NSC review covered two basic options:
letting local forces play themselves out and taking the
initiative to help find a settlement. The first was
rejected, and it was decided to enter a series of
exploratory talks with the UK, France and the USSR
to try to achieve agreement on a set of general principles
to govern a settlement. The objective was to give these
to the UN representative, Ambassador Jarring, as a
basis on which to bring the belligerents together.
2. In April, a proposal was approved to advance in the
US-USSR talks U.S. positions on specific terms of a
settlement other than borders. The talks had concen-
trated on trying to establish a framework for a UAR-
Israel settlement. They had reached a point where an
early impasse seemed likely unless discussions could
become more specific. But the U.S. still refused at
this point to state a position on borders, leaving that
subject exclusively to negotiation between the belligerents.
The Four Power talks recessed in June awaiting results
of the US-USSR exchange.
3. A September-October policy review considered the
proposal to advance in the US-USSR talks a U.S. position
on borders. On October 28 the position was given to the
NSC PAPER
USSR that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel
boundary on the condition that Israel's security require-
ments be met through demilitarized zones in the Sinai and
special arrangements for Gaza and free passage through
the Straits of Tiran. The position on borders -- considered
our fallback position until then was designed to emphasize
to the USSR that Israel could be pressed to withdraw only
if the UAR were pressed to commit itself to arrangements
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE 2
that Israel would regard as providing security somewhat
commensurate to that provided by the present ceasefire,
lines. Our proposal was cast so as to leave the details
of the security arrangements Israel would require for
negotiation between Israel and the UAR.
B. Situation in the area.
1. The June 1967 ceasefire is in effect dead. A situation
of limited warfare exists on the Israeli-UAR and Israeli-
Jordanian ceasefire lines carried out by the military
forces of both sides and by the fedayeen (Palestinian
commandos) on the Arab side. Military action on the
UAR front has intensified sharply since last spring.
The Lebanese crises of the past six months have
increased activity on that front, and it is likely to be
added as a third active front in the months ahead.
2. The fedayeen have steadily increased their influence.
This was demonstrated most fordblyin the Lebanese
crisis when they succeeded in bringing the moderate
Lebanese government ito acquiesce in their guerrilla attacks
from Lebanese soil.
3. Arab frustrations at the lack of a settlement have mounted
and with them the fatalistic attitude that another war is
inevitable. This has strengthened the hand of Palestinian
militants and the more radical governments. In this
atmosphere, the remaining moderate governments feel
increasingly beleaguered and uncomfortable in their close
association with the U.S.
4. The Arab summit which begins December 20 will give
the radicals a forum to press for renunciation of a
political settlement and declaration of an intensified struggle
against Israel.
5. The prospects in the absence of a settlement are for a
gradual acceleration of the present limited, relatively
static war on the ceasefire lines toward more general
hostilities. Israeli occupation of additional Arab territory
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE 3
as a buffer, particularly in Jordan and perhaps in
Lebanon, is probably not imminent but cannot ulti-
mately be ruled out. Israel can be expected to remain
capable of inflicting much greater damage on the Arabs
than it receives, but neither side will be capable of
imposing a clear cut and total military capitulation on
the other.
C. Where we stand now.
1. The US-USSR talks have been dormant since October 28
because the USSR still has not responded to the U.S.
fallback position stated on October 28. It seems unlikely
that Moscow would flatly reject our proposal, although
the UAR would make it difficult for Moscow to accept.
The USSR probably wants to keep the talks going, although
it may regard the Four Power forum as an easier one for
the moment in which to whittle away our position. Moscow
might just leave our proposition unanswered for a time.
2. Four Power talks have just resumed, initially to concen-
trate on aspects of a Jordan-Israel settlement. Israel
has objected sharply to both the resumption and the subject.
The U.S. has told Israel it would not advance a specifi
position until after discussions with Foreign Minister
Eban, but it is now unclear whether that conversation will
take place. In these talks:
a.
The signs are clear that the French will not stand
with us and the British, while wanting to avoid a
break with us, are wavering. They each disagree
with us to some degree in objective, procedure and
substance.
They assess the chances of a settlement as slim
and are mainly interested in bolstering their positions
in the Arab world.
They are much more inclined than we to see
a Four Power consensus as significant pressure on
Israel and the Arabs, but they would expect us to
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PAGE 4
use the full extent of our influence with Israel to
press for acceptance of the consensus.
- - They will press us to move away from our position
on procedures that significant details of the settle-
ment should be left to the belligerents to negotiate.
They will probably even press us to more pro-
Arab positions on the location of borders, demili-
tarized zones and securing free passage through
waterways.
b. The USSR--because it knows the limits on what it can
persuade Cairo to accept- is less eager to rush into details
that it would have to press on the UAR, but would surely
join the UK and France in whittling away our position
on substantive issues insofar as they are dealt with.
3. The U.S. has yet to decide on a proposal that we become
an active intermediary between Israel and Jordan in an
effort to promote a settlement on that front. Israel has
objected sharply to Four Power involvement, partly be-
cause it involves the USSR for the first time in a Jordan
settlement.
II. Purpose of the Present Policy Reappraisal.
A. Before addressing strategy in the coming talks, it is useful to
step back and look again at broader issues and options.
B. From that perspective, we can then address strategy in the
Four Power talks and in the US-USSR talks if they are resumed.
III. A Basic Question: Is it possible to improve the U.S. position in the
Arab World by dissociating ourselves from Israel's bargaining
positions? How permanent would that improvement be? What do
the Arabs really want?
A. Some would argue that the main Arab aim is to regain the terri-
tory conquered by Israel in 1967. Therefore, if Israel could
just be persuaded to return to its 1967 borders, reasonable
Arabs would live and let live with Israel, and the Arab extre-
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PAGE 5
mists would be isolated. While almost no one is optimistic
about the chances for a settlement in the near future, some
would argue that only this kind of approach has a chance of
arresting the trend toward radicalism throughout the area
and erosion of the U.S. position. Even if the Israelis
did not withdraw, it would improve the U.S. position with
the Arabs to speak out in favor of withdrawal.
B.
Others would argue that the objective of the Arab radicals
- -especially the militant Palestinians- is to end Israel's
existence as a separate Jewish state. They would regard
Israel's withdrawal to pre-war borders as just a step toward
their objective. Thus, even if we urge a settlement in
which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement
is unlikely to last. And as long as Israel occupies Arab
territory, the U.S. position is unlikely to improve signi-
ficantly.
C.
The U.S. negotiating position attempts to take both of these
views into account. That position is built around the proposition
that Israel should withdraw only if Arab governments recognize
Israel's existence and commit themselves to control the radi-
cals who would try to undercut a settlement. But two questions
remain:
1. .Can we dissociate ourselves from Israel? Since the
Arabs regard us as the creators of Israel, will theyregard
anything short of cutting off all material support as con-
vincing evidence that we have actually dissociated our-
selves? What the Arabs want at a minimum is return of
the conquered territories. They will be less impressed by
our formal position than by what we will do to implement
it, such as cutting off Israeli military supplies.
2. Has the fedayeen movement acquired so much momentum
of its own that it along with the readical governments
(e.g. Syria). would be capable of toppling any govern-
ment (e.g., Jordan's) that accepted any conditions the U .s.
might be able to persuade Israel to accept? Would that
neutralize any gains the U.S. might make from efforts
to press Israel to accept the terms of a settlement?
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE6
IV.
Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our
objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy
for achieving this?
A. There are two broad choices:
1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a
settlement, leaving to outside powers the question of guaran-
teeing those terms once reached.
2. Generate international pressures on the terms of a settle-
ment themselves.
B. Option 1 - - Letting local forces assume responsibility for a
settlement.
1. Those who favor this approach argue that the only durable
arrangement for Arab- Israeli coexistence will be one that
grows out of recognition on both sides of what is necessary
if they are to live together. As long as the Arabs hope that out-
siders will bail them out, they will not face up to the reality
that Israel is here to stay. As the Arabs learn that no one
but the U.S. can deliver Israel, they will learn to deal with
us, thus enhancing our position.
2. Those who oppose argue that to accept this approach is to
accept the probability of another Arab-Israeli war with all
the dangers that it would have for world peace. Moreover,
on the strictly local scene, they argue that this course rests
on two questionable premises: (a) that the Arabs will be able
to contain their frustration to the point of calculating their
interests rationally and (b) that Israel can maintain sufficient
military superiority to continue to impose high enough costs
on the Arabs to make clear that a rational calculation of Arab
interests would lead the Arabs to negotiate a settlement. Those
concerned for the survival of Israel must question whether in
the long run two million people can hope to outlast eighty million.
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PAGE 7
C. Option 2 Generating international pressures for the terms
of a settlement.
1. Those who favor argue, above all, that the U.S. cannot
sit back without making some reasonable effort to avoid
another war. Beyond that, the U.S. in 1967-68 tried
standing aside and relying on local pressures and no
progress toward peace was made while radical forces
in the Middle East became stronger, threatening U.S.
interests. The belligerents will surely not get together
soon to negotiate if left to their own devices, so if there
is any chance of a settlement at all it can only come with
outside help in breaking the deadlock. Even if the inter-
national effort fails now, it may be useful to have available
an international consensus on a diplomatic settlement if
another war takes place or if the belligerents find the war
of attrition too costly and wish a face-saving way to turn
to negotiation.
2. Those who oppose argue that there is insufficient will
on either side to achieve a negotiated settlement. Out-
side influence where vital security interests are concerned
will remain marginal. It therefore exposes the U.S.
unnecessarily to blame for failure and wastes U.S. influence
when it undertakes an impossible task. If international
pressure is generated, the danger is tha t the U.S. will be
forced to try to impose terms unilaterally on Israel, will
become Israel's defense lawyer if it cannot impose and will
be isolated with Israel.
V. Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating international
pressures for a settlement, what is the best way of achieving this?
Because of its widely varied interests in the Mid-East, the U.S. for
twenty years has tried to maintain a position in all of the rival
camps -- radical, moderate, Arab, Israeli. Continuation of the
Arab-Israeli impasse is making it increasingly difficult to maintain
influence in Arab capitals and leaving the U.S. more exclusively
identified with Israel.
A. Working from where we are today, we have two broad choices:
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE 8
1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the
terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept. (The
USSR would be expected to press the UAR to accept, assuming
the consensus still left some onerous conditions for the UAR
to accept.) This effort would probably lead us to modify our
present negotiating position by: (a) giving up our insistence
on direct negotiations or even (b) possibly giving up our effort
to settle now all the issues in the Palestine question- refugees,
status of waterways, final status of Jerusalem-- trying
simply to arrange Israeli withdrawal and security guarantees
for the borders.
2. Break off the talks now to cut our losses and generate
pressure on the USSR and Arabs to face up to the necessity
to discuss reasonable terms. Whether we stand on our present
position or modify it will have some effect on whether the
talks come to an impasse or not. But the principal decision
now is whether we let the talks peter out as a matter of
conscious policy. This could take one of two forms: (a) simply
backing out of the talks on grounds that they were getting
nowhere, or (b) backing out of the talks with the idea of making
a unilateral effort to bring the parties together.
B. The first approach- trying to achieve consensus and impose a
settlement.
1. Those who urge this approach would argue that this is the
only way to avoid diplomatic isolation and isolation with
Israel in the Near East. They believe that even if the
consensus did not soon result in a settlement it would help
the U.S. position in the area to be on record with the Arabs
in favor of a fair settlement and that such a consensus would
provide an alternative for the belligerents to turn to in the
future as the costs of the war of attrition mount.
2. Those who have reservations about this course point out
that the U.S. would be expected to impose the consensus
on an Israel which would flatly reject it. In order to achieve
a consensus, we would have to make concessions on the very
points which Israel insists upon, so the process of achieving
SECRET/NODIS
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PAGE 9
consensus would make our job of imposing a settlement more
difficult than ever. (For example, Israel insists on a genuine
process of negotiation with the Arabs, but the British and
French consider that unimportant. They are mainly interested
in the borders and--at least the French--have not given detailed
attention to such points as how effectively to enforce demili-
tarization. ) Then the U.S. would be faced with the question of
whether it could go on supporting with military and economic
aid an Israel which had rejected an international consensus to
which we had subscribed. If we continued support, much of
the goodwill earned with the Arabs would be lost, and we
would be accused of hypocrisy. We would be much better off
standing on our present position-- is balanced-
diluting that position and then having to live with it.
C. The second approach--breaking off negotiations or letting them
peter out.
1.
Some argue that the negotiating process itself has isolated
us and breaking it off would cut those losses which stem from
its dramatization of our support for Israel. The negotiating
process leaves us the unpalatable choices of being Israel's
lawyer or imposing a settlement on Israel while leaving us
isolated in a four-power forum whose other members are not
subject to our restraints nor do they have our responsibility.
We have been "Israel's lawyer" in peacemaking efforts.
While that identification is unavoidable because of the past
U.S. role in support of Israel, active negotiations dramatize
it, and the Soviets appear the champion of the Arabs. The
U.S. position would improve marginally if we could at least
lay aside our active role as Israel's lawyer. Moreover,
breaking the negotiations could put pressure on the USSR to
be more forthcoming since Moscow must take seriously the
fact that its client would lose another war and the USSR
would face the choice between helping and confirming Arab
disillusionment with the Soviets. Also, the USSR must try
to minimize the appearance of impotence that comes from
its inability to force Israel to return Arab territory.
2. Others argue that breaking off negotiations by itself--or letting
them peter out--have only limited advantage. It might deprive the
USSR of a means of showing it is trying to get Arab territory back
and of a means of whittling away our position. However, the
USSR probably figures that time is more on the Soviet than
the U.S. side in terms of relative position in the Near East,
Reproduced so the Soviets at the Richard can Nixon afford Presidential to Library wait DE CLASSIFIED 11y since the Arabs
This document has been eviewed pursuant to Executive Order OII 13526 as and a has pro-Israeli been determined act. to be declassified. The
/
U.S.
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PAGE 10
might cut its losses marginally, but it is U.S. support for
Israel and not mainly the talks which isolates the U.S.
The only way the effect of a disengagement from the talks
might be softened is if the U.S. disengaged from material
support of Israel at the same time.
VI. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to contine negotiations, what is the best
forum?
A. In the first NSC review of policy toward the Arab-Israeli
impasse last February, three possibilities were considered:
1. Four Power talks.
a. Some argue that, since international opinion favors this
approach, the U.S. would appear as the obstacle to peace
if it blocked these talks. Involving the principal permanent
members of the UN Security Council, they provide a natural
way for involving the UN while still maintaining some con-
trol over its involvement. If a consensus is reached, the
U.S. could insist that the other three share some of the
burden of pressing it on the principal belligerents (Israel
and the UAR).
b. Others argue that these talks are more a liability than
asset. An international opinion that cannot contribute
in practical ways to bringing the parties together should
have only limited claim on us. The British and French
are leaning away from us in their own effort to curry
favor with the Arabs and contribute nothing in drawing
the UAR and Israel closer to agreement. These talks
also bring the USSR into discussion of a Jordan settlement
where it has no interests but improvement of its own position
as champion of the Arabs. The USSR has no special con-
cern about Jordan's losing another war. These talks are
more irksome to Israel even than the US. USSR talks -
and even less likely to produce a settlement. The British
and French (as well as the USSR) will whittle away our
position so that any consensus reached is even more diffi-
cult to sell to Israel. If the U.S. is going to end up with
the most difficult job pressing the terms of the consensus
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on Israel - we gain little from sharing Arab credit
with the USSR for whatever we may achieve. More-
over, we have moved step by step away from our
January position, and we have to take a stand some-
where.
2.
US-USSR talks
a.
Some argue that this is the appropriate forum because
it represents the only two powers with both significant
interests and significant influence. The USSR is under
some pressure to cooperate since it is under pressure
to help the UAR get its territory back. It would see
its position gradually eroded if it could not get Arab
territory back and seriously jeopardized if the UAR
lost another war, as it inevitably would.
This procedure also offers a way to be sure that the
USSR shares in the dissatisfaction which will follow
any settlement because no settlement can fail to be
unpalatable to both sides. Moreover, any fair
settlement will require almost as much pressure in
Cairo as in Jerusalem; not only does the USSR have
more influence in Cairo than we but also it should be
required to make itself just as unpopular with its
clients as we do with ours.
b.
Others argue that this approach, if it succeeded,
would enhance the position of the Soviet Union in the
Middle East. More important, Israel sees the USSR
as its prime enemy, exploiting Arab resentment toward
Israel to enhance its own position in the area. Israel
argues that any terms Moscow could agree to would
automatically not be in the Israeli or U.S. - interest.
Moreover, eight months of negotiation have not
revealed serious evidence that Moscow is really
interested in anything more than whittling away our
position.
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3.
U.S. mediation. While this is theoretically possible on
the UAR-Israel front, the U.S. has more interest in a
Jordan-Israel settlement because of our friendship with
Jordan. Moreover, with U.S. clients on both sides of
the line, this offers a better prospect for U.S. mediation.
a. Some argue that the U.S. should not commit the
Israel-Jordan negotiation to either the Four Power
or the US-USSR talks because it introduces the USSR
which can have no interest--and make no contribution
--except making propaganda capital by posing as the
champion of the Arabs. Moreover, the Israelis object
sharply to Soviet involvement. Also, the same argu-
ments that apply in general against Four Power talks--
the lack of British and French influence- are reasons
for not relying on them to produce movement toward
agreement.
b.
Others argue that the really difficult issues--the
issues of a Palestine settlement are on this front, and
the U.S. would profit from diffusing the responsibility
for terms on such problems as Jerusalem and the
refugees that no one could accept.
VII.
Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks,
what would be our strategy? We start from a position of
concentrating on working out a framework for negotiation among
the belligerents, leaving the specifics of a settlement for them
to negotiate. The one element of substance we have dealt with
in detail is the proposition that Israel should withdraw to the
pre-war UAR-Israel border provided a satisfactory arrangement
for securing that border can be negotiated.
A. We have two basic choices and two stances in executing each:
1. Let the talks peter out:
-Option 1: Stick to our present position without Israel's
agreement to it.
Option 2: Stick to our present position but press Israel to
accept it.
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2.
Press the talks to fruition:
Option 3: Change our present position to achieve big-
power consensus but not press the consensus on Israel.
- Option 4: Change our present position to achieve
consensus and try to impose that consensus on Israel.
B. Option 1 - - stick to our present position without Israeli agreement
to it, letting talks peter out.
1.
Some argue that this is the only position that would avoid
the unpalatable choice of enforcing a settlement which will
antagonize Israel without gaining the goodwill of the Arabs.
It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair.
We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we
are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.
2.
Others argue that this is the course most likely to isolate
us from the Arabs. It would put us in a position where we
would be pressed to continue military and economic support
for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of what
would constitute a fair settlement. This almost certainly
would end our participation in the peace-making effort to
avoid another Arab-Israel clash.
C. Option 2 - stick to present position, letting talks peter out but
pressing Israel to accept our position.
1.
Some argue that this would be the best position to be in if
possible short of a negotiated settlement, whether or not
the Arabs and Soviets accept. We would have attempted to
produce Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair.
The Arabs and Soviets would be on weak ground if they
rejected it. It would buy U.S some time in the Arab world
and could lead eventually to a real negotiating situation.
It would keep us relatively uninvolved.
2.
Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we started
down this track expecting Israeli agreement. Since Israeli
agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as
the first with all its disadvantages. They point out that
this would not necessarily produce movement toward a
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settlement, so we might have used a good deal of influence
with Israel- thereby eroding its position- - and yet not have
produced an Arab offer of peace. In the absence of a
settlement, it would not help us in the Arab world in the
longer run.
D. Option 3- achieve big-power consensus (either 2 power or
-power) but not impose it.
1.
Some argue that it would improve our position with the
Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our
present one.
2.
Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our
position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to
press it on Israel - and it would be more difficult than
our present position to sell to Israel - we would be called
hypocritical.
E. Option 4- achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.
1.
Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be
achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential
to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the UAR.
2. Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would
dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it
would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel. This
would bring us to a major collision with Israel. Moreover,
the U.S. would be left with a position it could not regard as
balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on
aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event
we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in
effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the
agreement.
VIII. Summary of Options.
A. Letting negotiations peter out, leaving to local forces responsibility
for the terms of a settlement. This could be done for the following
purposes:
1.
to lower our profile while
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a.
continuing to provide military and economic aid
for Israel or
b.
reducing support for Israel either as long-run pressure
or as a demonstration of even-handedness;
2. as a tactical step
a. to produce a shock effect in continuing negotiations
(particularly with the USSR); or
b. to clear the path for a new or untried combination
of negotiations.
B. Continue present combination of negotiations with the
following choice of tactics:
1. stick to our present position without Israel's agree-
ment to it (which could bring the negotiations to an
inconclusive end);
2. stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it;
3. change our present position to achieve big-power con-
sensus on Israel;
4. change our present position to achieve consensus and
try to impose the consensus on Israel.
C. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
1. U.S. mediation (at least on the Israel-Jordan front)
by itself with US-USSR talks in suspense;
2. U.S. mediation in combination with US-USSR talks.
*
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ISSUES FOR DECISION
I. Background
A. Since January our efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli
settlement have passed through three phases:
-- In February, State recommended exploratory talks
with the UK, France and USSR about a set of general
principles that could be given to Ambassador Jarring
to get negotiations started. The position then was
to refuse to get into any details on the terms of a
settlement, leaving them for the belligerents to
negotiate.
-- In April, State recommended that we advance a
ISSUES FOR DECISION
position on some of the specific terms of an Israel-
UAR settlement - -- excluding boundaries -- to keep
the US-USSR talks from stalling. The position then
was to refuse to discuss boundaries but say that the
pre-war Israel-UAR border was not excluded in
negotiation between the belligerents.
-- In October, State recommended that we advance a
specific position on the UAR-Israel border. This
had been regarded as our fallback position in April.
This position stated that Israel would withdraw to
the pre-war border provided satisfactory arrange-
ments were negotiated to enhance Israeli security
at three sensitive points -- Gaza, Sharm al-Shaikh
and the Sinai.
B. Resumption of Four Power talks opens the door now to a
recommendation that we try to impose a settlement on
Israel. Since the UK, France and the USSR differ with
us somewhat on substance and distinctly on procedures,
our position would be so whittled away that it is even
less acceptable to Israel than it is now.
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C.
The purpose of this policy review is to stand back for
a moment and look at our present course and its
alternatives in perspective--at least so strategy in the
resumed talks can reflect our present appraisal.
II.
A basic question behind any strategy is an assessment of
whether it is possible to improve the U.S. position in the
Arab world by dissociating ourselves from Israel's conquests?
How permanent would that improvement be? What do the Arabs
really want?
A.
Some argue that if Israel could just be persuaded to
withdraw to its pre-war borders that would bring peace
with the Arabs and lead to an improvement in our position
in the Arab world.
B.
Others argue that the objective of the Arab radicals--
especially the militant Palestinians-- is to end Israel's
existence as a Jewish state, not just to regain conquered
Arab territory. Thus, even if we engineer a settlement
in which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the
settlement is unlikely to last and the U.S. will still be
defending Israel against an Arab crusade.
C.
My conclusion: As a government, we cannot afford to
give up the objective of a settlement. But we should be
governed in devising our strategy by recognition that the
time for a settlement that could improve our position may
well have passed until some new development alters the
shape of the problem--for instance, evolution of a coherent
Palestinian movement speaking with one voice, or another
Arab defeat. We should not put ourself in the position of
being expected to deliver what is not possible.
III.
Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain
our objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best
strategy for achieving this? There are two broad choices:
A.
Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of
a settlement, leaving to outsiders the problem of
guaranteeing those terms once agreed.
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1.
Those who favor this approach believe that no
outside force can impose peace; there will be
peace only when the people of the area face up
to the realities of their situation.
2.
Those who oppose protest that the one thing
wrong with this strategy is that it was tried from
November 1967 to January 1969, and there is
little evidence that it achieved anything. To the
contrary, radical forces have steadily grown
stronger to the detriment of U.S. interests and
the level of hostilities has intensified.
B.
Generate international pressures for the terms of a
settlement.
1.
Those who favor this approach argue that the Near
Easterners are too suspicious of each other to
initiate negotiations but might respond to a diplo-
matic alternative if it were offered. The situation
is too dangerous for us not at least to determine
decisively what price each side would be willing
to pay for peace--instead of just guessing.
2.
Those who oppose feel that international diplomatic
action has raised Arab hopes too high without being
able to produce results. It has thereby diverted
the Arabs from coming to terms with Israel. If
international pressure is generated, the U.S. and
not any broad international body- will be expected
to impose terms unilaterally on Israel--because in
the last analysis there is no significant international
pressure except for U.S. influence in Israel and
Soviet influence in the UAR. If we cannot impose
terms on Israel, we will become isolated with Israel.
C.
Recommendation: In operational terms, this issue could
be stated this way: Is the purpose of the present diplomatic
effort to produce pressure on the belligerents to negotiate
or to produce an international consensus which would itself
constitute pressure? Our position should be based on the
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following judgments:
1.
The most effective pressures will be the pressures
of the situation. The belligerents will seek a
military or a political solution depending on their
estimate of which is more likely in the situation to
get them what they want at a price they can pay.
Outsiders are working at the margins.
2.
For outside pressures on any belligerent to be justi-
fiable they can be applied only on behalf of terms
that are as fair as possible for both sides and have
some possibility of producing a real settlement.
3.
The first purpose of international consultations
whether bilateral or multilateral, therefore, is
not to produce pressure but to develop the most
reasonable position on peace terms possible for
the belligerents to accept, reject or negotiate over.
4.
Insofar as it is realistic to talk about outside
pressures, it is bilateral- not multilateral--pressure
that has significance.
IV.
Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating whatever
international pressure may be possible, what is the best way of
achieving this? We have two broad choices:
A.
Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the
terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept (with
the USSR pressing the UAR if there are any onerous
conditions left for Cairo to accept).
1.
Those who favor this approach argue that this is the
only way to avoid isolation at the UN and in the Near
East. They believe that, even if the consensus does
not achieve a settlement now, its mere existence
will constitute steady pressure on the belligerents to
reach a political settlement.
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2.
Those who oppose argue that (a) the U.S. is
unlikely to achieve consensus on a position
which comes close to meeting Israel's require-
ments and yet (b) we will be expected to impose
it on Israel. Thus the very process of reaching
consensus makes it harder to persuade Israel to
accept. The mere existence of an international
consensus constitutes little pressure on two
belligerents with interests at stake which they
regard as vital.
B.
Break off the talks now to cut our losses but also to
generate pressure on the USSR and the Arabs to face up
to the necessity to discuss reasonable terms.
1.
Those who favor this course argue that any talks
which do not serve the purpose of producing a
package that the belligerents- -if they were inclined
toward genuine compromise- - could consider
seriously will unnecessarily raise their hopes and
may delay their coming to terms with reality. They
argue that the negotiating process itself increases
our isolation and makes it more difficult to achieve
a balanced position. By breaking out of multilateral
negotiations we would at least cut that loss, and we
would somewhat increase the pressure on the USSR
to take a more reasonable position.
2.
Those who oppose this course argue that it is the
situation-not just the talks-which isolates us.
Breaking the talks without substituting something in
return, especially right before the Arab Summit
(December 20), would increase the Arab sense of
desperation and their conviction that we are
deliberately leaving them alone to face an expansionist
Israel. If no peace-making effort remained, the
Arabs would feel that they have no course but
heightened military preparation. Moreover, the
U.S. does not have an interest in another war over
Israel's right to hold its conquered territory. Our
interest is in Israel's security so we should try to
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put ourselves in a position where we are holding
out only for Israel's security within unexpanded
borders. To achieve that position will require
further negotiation.
C.
Recommendation: In operational terms, this issue
could be stated as follows: Which is more likely to
produce movement toward a settlement--putting pressure
on the USSR and UAR now by threatening to cut off the
talks or going along with the Four Power talks? We
should work from the following position:
1.
Talks are useful if they (a) help refine a position
that the key belligerents might accept (more true
of the US-USSR talks than of the Four Power talks)
and (b) provide a stimulus for useful bilateral
pressures on the belligerents to accept.
2.
Breaking off the talks would be useful if it (a)
increased the likelihood of key negotiators facing
hard decisions and (b) reduced pressure on us to
take popular but unsalable positions. The timing
of this act would, of course, have to be related to
events like the Arab summit.
V.
Issue: If the U.S. wishes to continue negotiations what is the
best forum? The three options reviewed last February remain
the logical choices:
A.
Four Power talks.
1.
Those who have argued for this course started with
the fact that last January-February the U.S. was
under heavy international and special French-
pressure to join in Four Power talks. There was
strong sentiment at that time for taking a more active
role to see whether outsiders could help the belli-
gerents formulate at least a framework to get
negotiations started. There was less enthusiasm
for the Four Power forum per se, and we entered
that forum chiefly for non-Mid-Eastern reasons.
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The argument now is that having agreed to these
talks we would now take some loss to stop them.
2. Those who have opposed argued that this is the
forum in which the US is most likely to be pressed
to move away from a position that has any chance of
acceptance in Israel. Moreover, the British and
French are the least likely of the Four to help
persuade either side to accept, and the French at
least are an anathema in Jerusalem.
B. US-USSR Talks
1. Those who argued for entering these talks did SO
on three grounds:
- - - For global reasons, the US had an interest in
seeing whether it could negotiate seriously on a
range of important issues.
- - The USSR's persistent requests since September
1968 to talk about a Mid-East settlement suggested
that Moscow might be uncomfortable in the Mid-East
and might participate seriously in trying to work
out a reasonable arrangement. While we maintained
a proper skepticism, it made sense to probe far
enough to see what was possible.
The USSR should pay at least as much of the
price for a settlement as the US in expanding its
influence with its clients.
2. Those who opposed this course argued mainly that the
USSR did not want a real peace; it simply wanted to
persuade us to press Israel to give back the territory
of Moscow's clients. Since the USSR was not likely to
act seriously, it did not make sense to formalize the
USSR's role in the Mid-East by giving it a place at the
peace table.
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C.
U.S. mediation
1.
Those who argued for felt in general that the US
held all the cards since moving Israel was the
main job to be done, SO the US should exploit its
role as exclusive peacemaker and not share credit
for a settlement, if any. They claimed that Nasser
really wanted peace but that he could not say SO
publicly SO he would welcome a private US mediation
effort. They also argued that it made no sense to
involve the USSR in any exchange on a Jordan-Israel
settlement.
2. Those who argued against argued that chances of
success were slight, and the US would incur the
main blame for failure. The US would also be
accused of bad faith if it advanced a proposal, Israel
rejected and the US went on aiding Israel.
D.
Recommendation: In operational terms, the question is
whether we are better off continuing the Four Power talks
or finding the least painful way to end them and turning to
the US-USSR talks exclusively or to a combination of those
and a U.S. mediation effort on Jordan. That our position
be based on the following judgments:
1.
The Four Power talks do not meet the criteria for
useful talks established above in that two of the four
(UK, France) cannot accurately reflect the positions
of the belligerents and can contribute little in pressing
them to accept whatever consensus might be reached.
2.
The US-USSR talks would meet those criteria if the
USSR were serious about pressing the UAR closer
to a genuine compromise.
3.
US mediation seems the only appropriate approach to the
Jordan-Israel settlement. But, of course, the US
would have to be prepared to apply bilateral pressure.
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VI.
Issue: If we persist in the US-USSR and Four Power talks,
what should be our strategy? We have four choices:
A.
Option 1 - - stick to present position even if Israel rejects it.
1.
Some argue that this is the course most likely
to isolate us. It would put us in a position where
we would be pressed to continue military and
economic support for Israel while Israel rejects
the U.S. concept of what would constitute a
fair settlement.
2.
Others argue that this is the only position that
would avoid a confrontation with Israel. It would
enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair.
We could blame failure on all sides and maintain
that we are only providing enough aid to maintain
Israeli security.
B.
Option 2- - stick to present position, pressing Israel to
accept it.
1.
Some argue that this would be the best possible
position to be in if possible short of a negotiated
settlement, whether or not the Arabs and Soviets
accept. We would have produced Israeli agreement
to a position we regard as fair. The Arabs and
Soviets would be on weak ground if they rejected it.
2.
Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we
started down this track expecting Israeli agreement.
Since Israeli agreement is unlikely, this course is
really the same as the first with all its disadvantages.
They point out that this would not necessarily
produce movement toward a settlement, so we might
have used a good deal of influence with Israel- - thereby
eroding its position if it agreed- - and yet not have
produced an Arab offer of peace.
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C.
Option 3 -achieve big-power consensus but not impose
on Israel.
1.
Some argue that it would improve our position with
the Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs
than our present one.
2.
Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our
position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused
to press it on Israel- - and it would be more difficult
than our present position to sell to Israel - we would
be called hypocritical.
D.
Option 4 - achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.
1.
Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could
be achieved because imposition is necessary and it is
essential to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition
on the USSR.
2.
Others argue that the process of achieving consensus
would dilute the substance of the consensus to the point
where it would be all but impossible to impose it on
Israel. Moreover, the U.S. would be left with a position
it could not regard as balanced and faced with the
question of whether to go on aiding an Israel which
rejected it. In the unlikely event we succeeded in
imposing it on Israel, we would have in effect made
ourselves responsible for enforcing the agreement.
E.
Recommendation: That our position be based on the
following judgments:
1.
It would be preferable to be isolated with a position
which we regarded as balanced and which Israel might
accept than to take a less balanced position which Israel
would reject. If we have anything to contribute to the
negotiating process, it is our influence with Israel.
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2. That means we should not modify our present
position on significant issues just for the sake
of achieving Four Power consensus. US bilateral
pressure on Israel is more significant than any
general pressure that might be generated by Four
Power consensus.
3. If the U.S. stands close to its present position and
Israel rejects it, the U.S. will face a painful decision
on whether to continue support for Israel.
4. It would put the U.S. in a reasonable position,
therefore, if the U.S. could press Israel to accept
its present position. In practical terms, that would
mean Israel's saying that it does not intend to exploit
its conquests to expand its borders and would withdraw
to pre-war borders provided the Arabs would negotiate
adequate security arrangements.
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE: WHERE ARE WE GOING?
I. Background
A. Steps taken by the U.S. since January.
1. The February NSC review covered two basic options:
letting local forces play themselves out and taking the
initiative to help find a settlement. The first was
rejected, and it was decided to enter a series of
exploratory talks with the UK, France and the USSR
to try to achieve agreement on a set of general principles
to govern a settlement. The objective was to give these
to the UN representative, Ambassador Jarring, as a
basis on which to bring the belligerents together.
2. In April, a proposal was approved to advance in the
US-USSR talks U.S. positions on specific terms of a
settlement other than borders. The talks had concen-
trated on trying to establish a frame work r a UAR-
Israel settlement. They had reached a point where an
early impasse seemed likely unless discussions could
become more specific. But the U.S. still refused at
this point to state a position on borders, leaving that
subject exclusively to negotiation between the belligerents.
The Four Power talks recessed in June awaiting results
of the US-USSR exchange.
3. A September-October policy review considered the
proposal to advance in the US-USSR talks a U.S. position
on borders. On October 28 the position was given to the
USSR that Israel should withdraw to the pre-war UAR-Israel
boundary on the condition that Israel's security require-
ments be met through demilitarization in the Sinai and
d
special arrangements for Gaza and free passage through
the Straits of Tiran. The position on borders -- considered
our fallback position until then -- was designed to emphasize
to the USSR that Israel could be pressed to withdraw only
if the UAR were pressed to commit itself to arrangements
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that Israel would regard as providing security somewhat
commensurate to that provided by the present ceasefire,
lines. Our proposal was cast SO as to leave the details
of the security arrangements Israel would require for
negotiation between Israel and the UAR.
B. Situation in the area.
1. The June 1967 ceasefire is in effect dead. A situation
of limited warfare exists on the Israeli-UAR and Israeli-
Jordanian ceasefire lines carried out by the military
forces of both sides and by the fedayeen (Palestinian
commandos) on the Arab side. Military action on the
UAR front has intensified sharply since last spring.
The Lebanese crises of the past six months have
increased activity on that front, and it is likely to be
added as a third active front in the months ahead.
2. The fedayeen have steadily increased their influence.
This was demonstrated most focibly/in the Lebanese
crisis when they succeeded in bringing the moderate
Lebanese government against its will into the active war
;
against Israel. soil.
3. Arab frustrations at the lack of a settlement have mounted
and with them the fatalistic attitude that another war is
inevitable. This has strengthened the hand of Palestinian
militants and the more radical governments. In this
atmosphere, the remaining moderate governements
el
increasingly beleaguered and uncomfortable in their close
association with the U.S.
4. The Arab summit which begins December 20 will give
the radicals a forum to press for renunciation of a
political settlement and declaration of all-out war
Tgle
against Israel.
5. The prospects in the absence of a settlement are for a
gradual acceleration of the pr esent limited, relatively
static war on the ceasefire lines toward more general
hostilities. Israeli occupation of additional Arab territory
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PAGE 3
as a buffer, particularly in Jordan and perhaps in
Lebanon, is probably not imminent but cannot ulti-
mately be ruled out. Israel can be expected to remain
capable of inflicting much greater damage on the Arabs
than it receives, but neither side will be capable of
imposing a clear cut and total military capitulation on
the other.
C.
Where we stand now.
1. The US-USSR talks have been dormant since October 28
because the USSR still has not responded to the U.S.
fallback position stated on October 28. It seems unlikely
that Moscow would flatly reject our proposal, although
the UAR would make it difficult for Moscow to accept.
The USSR probably wants to keep the talks going, although
it may regard the Four Power forum as an easier one for
the moment in which to whittle away our position. Moscow
might just leave our proposition unanswered for a time.
2. Four Power talks have just resumed, initially to concen-
trate on aspects of a Jordan-Israel settlement. Israel
has objected sharply to both the resumption and the subject.
The U.S. has told Israel it would not advance a specific
position until after discussions with Foreign Minister
Eban, but it is now unclear whether that conversation will
take place. In these talks:
a. The signs are clear that the French will not stand
with us and the British, while wanting to avoid a
break with us, are wavering. They each disagree
with us to some degree in objective, procedure and
substance.
They assess the chances of a settlement as slim
and are mainly interested in bolstering their positions
in the Arab world.
- They are much more inclined than we to see
a Four Power consensus as significant pressure on
Israel and the Arabs, but they would expect us to
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use the full extent of our influence with Israel to
press for acceptance of the consensus.
They will press us to move away from our position
on procedures that significant details of the settle-
ment should be left to the belligerents to negotiate.
They will probably even press us to more pro-
Arab positions on the location of borders, demili-
tarized zones and securing free passage through
waterways.
b. The USSR--because it knows the limits on what it can
persuade Cairo to accept--is less eager to rush into details
that it would have to press on the UAR, but would surely
join the UK and France in whittling away our position
on substantive issues insofar as they are dealt with.
3. The U.S. has yet to decide on a proposal that we become
an active intermediary between Israel and Jordan in an
effort to promote a settlement on that front. Israel has
objected sharply to Four Power involvement, partly be-
cause it involves the USSR for the first time in a Jordan
settlement.
II. Purpose of the Present Policy Reappraisal.
A. Before addressing strategy in the coming talks, it is useful to
step back and look again at broader issues and options.
B. From that perspective, we can then address strategy in the
Four Power talks and in the US-USSR talks if they are resumed.
III. A Basic Question: Is it possible to improve the U.S. position in the
Arab World by dissociating ourselves from Israel's bargaining
positions? How permanent would that improvement be? What do
the Arabs really want?
A. Some would argue that the main Arab aim is to regain the terri-
tory conquered by Israel in 1967. Therefore, if Israel could
just be persuaded to return to its 1967 borders, reasonable
Arabs would live and let live with Israel, and the Arab extre-
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mists would be isolated. While almost no one is optimistic
about the chances for a settlement in the near future, some
would argue that only this kind of approach has a chance of
arresting the trend toward radicalism throughout the area
and erosion of the U.S. position. Even if the Israelis
did not withdraw, it would improve the U.S. position with
the Arabs to speak out in favor of withdrawal.
B.
Others would argue that the objective of the Arab radicals
- --especially the militant Palestinians--is to end Israel's
existence as a separate Jewish state. They would regard
Israel's withdrawal to pre-war borders as just a step toward
their objective. Thus, even if we urge a settlement in
which Israel withdraws to pre-war borders, the settlement
is unlikely to last. And as long as Israel occupies Arab
territory, the U.S. position is unlikely to improve signi-
ficantly.
C.
The U.S. negotiating position attempts to take both of these
views into account. That position is built around the proposition
that Israel should withdraw only if Arab governments recognize
Israel's existence and commit themselves to control the radi-
cals who would try to undercut a settlement. But two questions
remain:
1. .Can we dissociate ourselves from Israel? Since the
Arabs regard us as the creators of Israel, will theyregard
anything short of cutting off all material support as con-
vincing evidence that we have actually dissociated our-
selves? What the Arabs want at a minimum is return of
the conquered territories. They will be less impressed by
our formal position than by what we will do to implement
it, such as cutting off Israeli military supplies.
2. Has the fedayeen movement acquired so much momentum
of its own that it--along with the readical governments
(e.g. , Syria) - would be capable of toppling any govern-
ment (e.g. , Jordan's) that accepted any conditions the U .S.
might be able to persuade Israel to accept? Would that
neutralize any gains the U.S. might make from efforts
to press Israel to accept the terms of a settlement?
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IV.
Issue: Assuming that an Arab-Israeli settlement must remain our
objective no matter how hard to achieve, what is the best strategy
for achieving this?
A. There are two broad choices:
1. Let local forces assume responsibility for the terms of a
settlement, leaving to outside powers the question of guaran-
teeing those terms once reached.
2. Generate international pressures on the terms of a settle-
ment themselves.
B. Option 1 Letting local forces assume responsibility for a
settlement.
1. Those who favor this approach argue that the only durable
arrangement for Arab- - Israeli coexistence will be one that
grows out of recognition on both sides of what is necessary
if they are to live together. As long as the Arabs hope that out-
siders will bail them out, they will not face up to the reality
that Israel is here to stay. As the Arabs learn that no one
but the U.S. can deliver Israel, they will learn to deal with
us, thus enhancing our position.
2. Those who oppose argue that to accept this approach is to
accept the probability of another Arab-Israeli war with all
the dangers that it would have for world peace. Moreover,
on the strictly local scene, they argue that this course rests
on two questionable premises: (a) that the Arabs will be able
to contain their frustration to the point of calculating their
interests rationally and (b) that Israel can maintain sufficient
military superiority to continue to impose high enough costs
on the Arabs to make clear that a rational calculation of Arab
interests would lead the Arabs to negotiate a settlement. Those
concerned for the survival of Israel must question whether in
the long run two million people can hope to outlast eighty million.
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C. Option 2 -- Generating international pressures for the terms
of a settlement.
1. Those who favor argue, above all, that the U.S. cannot
sit back without making some reasonable effort to avoid
another war. Beyond that, the U.S. in 1967-68 tried
standing aside and relying on local pressures and no
progress toward peace was made while radical forces
in the Middle East became stronger, threatening U.S.
interests. The belligerents will surely not get together
soon to negotiate if left to their own devices, SO if there
is any chance of a settlement at all it can only come with
outside help in breaking the deadlock. Even if the inter-
national effort fails now, it may be useful to have available
an international consensus on a diplomatic settlement if
another war takes place or if the belligerents find the war
of attrition too costly and wish a face-saving way to turn
to negotiation.
2. Those who oppose argue that there is insufficient will
on either side to achieve a negotiated settlement. Out-
side influence where vital security interests are concerned
will remain marginal. It therefore exposes the U.S.
unnecessarily to blame for failure and wastes U.S. influence
when it undertakes an impossible task. If international
pressure is generated, the danger is tha t the U.S. will be
forced to try to impose terms unilaterally on Israel, will
become Israel's defense lawyer if it cannot impose and will
be isolated with Israel.
V. Issue: Assuming the U.S. has an interest in generating international
pressures for a settlement, what is the best way of achieving this?
Because of its widely varied interests in the Mid-East, the U.S. for
twenty years has tried to maintain a position in all of the rival
camps -- radical, moderate, Arab, Israeli. Continuation of the
Arab-Israeli impasse is making it increasingly difficult to maintain
influence in Arab capitals and leaving the U.S. more exclusively
identified with Israel.
A. Working from where we are today, we have two broad choices:
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1. Continue the present talks, try to achieve consensus on the
terms of a settlement and then press Israel to accept. (The
USSR would be expected to press the UAR to accept, assuming
the consensus still left some onerous conditions for the UAR
to accept.) This effort would probably lead us to modify our
present negotiating position by: (a) giving up our insistence
on direct negotiations or even (b) possibly giving up our effort
to settle now all the issues in the Palestine question--refugees,
status of waterways, final status of Jerusalem- and trying
simply to arrange Israeli withdrawal and security guarantees
for the borders.
2. Break off the talks now to cut our losses and generate
pressure on the USSR and Arabs to face up to the necessity
to discuss reasonable terms. Whether we stand on our present
position or modify it will have some effect on whether the
talks come to an impasse or not. But the principal decision
now is whether we let the talks peter out as a matter of
conscious policy. This could take one of two forms: (a) simply
backing out of the talks on grounds that they were getting
nowhere, or (b) backing out of the talks with the idea of making
a unilateral effort to bring the parties together.
B. The first approach- trying to achieve consensus and impose a
settlement.
1. Those who urge this approach would argue that this is the
only way to avoid diplomatic isolation and isolation with
Israel in the Near East. They believe that--even if the
consensus did not soon result in a settlement--it would help
the U.S. position in the area to be on record with the Arabs
in favor of a fair settlement and that such a consensus would
provide an alternative for the belligerents to turn to in the
future as the costs of the war of attrition mount.
2. Those who have reservations about this course point out
that the U.S. would be expected to impose the consensus
on an Israel which would flatly reject it. In order to achieve
a consensus, we would have to make concessions on the very
points which Israel insists upon, SO the process of achieving
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consensus would make our job of imposing a settlement more
difficult than ever. (For example, Israel insists on a genuine
process of negotiation with the Arabs, but the British and
French consider that unimportant. They are mainly interested
in the borders and at least the French--have not given detailed
attention to such points as how effectively to enforce demili-
tarization. ) Then the U.S. would be faced with the question of
whether it could go on supporting with military and economic
aid an Israel which had rejected an international consensus to
which we had subscribed. If we continued support, much of
the goodwill earned with the Arabs would be lost, and we
would be accused of hypocrisy. We would be much better off
standing on our present position- which is balanced--than
diluting that position and then having to live with it.
C. The second approach--breaking off negotiations or letting them
peter out.
1.
Some argue that the negotiating process itself has isolated
us and breaking it off would cut those losses which stem from
its dramatization of our support for Israel. The negotiating
process leaves us the unpalatable choices of being Israel's
lawyer or imposing a settlement on Israel while leaving us
isolated in a four-power forum whose other members are not
subject to our restraints nor do they have our responsibility.
We have been "Israel's lawyer" in peacemaking efforts.
While that identification is unavoidable because of the past
U.S. role in support of Israel, active negotiations dramatize
it, and the Soviets appear the champion of the Arabs. The
U.S. position would improve marginally if we could at least
lay aside our active role as Israel's lawyer. Moreover,
breaking the negotiations could put pressure on the USSR to
be more forthcoming since Moscow must take seriously the
fact that its client would lose another war and the USSR
would face the choice between helping and confirming Arab
disillusionment with the Soviets. Also, the USSR must try
to minimize the appearance of impotence that comes from
its inability to force Israel to return Arab territory.
2.
Others argue that breaking off negotiations by itself--or letting
them peter out--have only limited advantage. It might deprive the
USSR of a means of showing it is trying to get Arab territory back
and of a means of whittling away our position. However, the
USSR probably figures that time is more on the Soviet than
the U.S. side in terms of relative position in the Near East,
so the Soviets can afford to wait, especially since the Arabs
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might cut its losses marginally, but it is U.S. support for
Israel and not mainly the talks which isolates the U.S.
The only way the effect of a disengagement from the talks
might be softened is if the U.S. disengaged from material
support of Israel at the same time.
VI. Issue: If the U.S. wishes to contine negotiations, what is the best
forum?
A. In the first NSC review of policy toward the Arab-Israeli
impasse last February, three possibilities were considered:
1. Four Power talks.
a. Some argue that, since international opinion favors this
approach, the U.S. would appear as the obstacle to peace
if it blocked these talks. Involving the principal permanent
members of the UN Security Council, they provide a natural
way for involving the UN while still maintaining some con-
trol over its involvement. If a consensus is reached, the
U.S. could insist that the other three share some of the
burden of pressing it on the principal belligerents (Israel
and the UAR).
b. Others argue that these talks are more a liability than
asset. An international opinion that cannot contribute
in practical ways to bringing the parties together should
have only limited claim on us. The British and French
are leaning away from us in their own effort to curry
favor with the Arabs and contribute nothing in drawing
the UAR and Israel closer to agreement. These talks
also bring the USSR into discussion of a Jordan settlement
where it has no interests but improvement of its own position
as champion of the Arabs. The USSR has no special con-
cern about Jordan's losing another war. These talks are
more irksome to Israel even than the US-USSR talks --
and even less likely to produce a settlement. The British
and French (as well as the USSR) will whittle away our
position so that any consensus reached is even more diffi-
cult to sell to Israel. If the U.S. is going to end up with
the most difficult job -- pressing the terms of the consensus
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on Israel - we gain little from sharing Arab credit
with the USSR for whatever we may achieve. More-
over, we have moved step by step away from our
January position, and we have to take a stand some-
where.
2.
US USSR talks
a.
Some argue that this is the appropriate forum because
it represents the only two powers with both significant
interests and significant influence. The USSR is under
some pressure to cooperate since it is under pressure
to help the UAR get its territory back. It would see
its position gradually eroded if it could not get Arab
territory back and seriously jeopardized if the UAR
lost another war, as it inevitably would.
This procedure also offers a way to be sure that the
USSR shares in the dissatisfaction which will follow
any settlement because no settlement can fail to be
unpalatable to both sides. Moreover, any fair
settlement will require almost as much pressure in
Cairo as in Jerusalem; not only does the USSR have
more influence in Cairo than we but also it should be
required to make itself just as unpopular with its
clients as we do with ours.
b.
Others argue that this approach, if it succeeded,
would enhance the position of the Soviet Union in the
Middle East. More important, Israel sees the USSR
as its prime enemy, exploiting Arab resentment toward
Israel to enhance its own position in the area. Israel
argues that any terms Moscow could agree to would
automatically not be in the Israeli - or U.S. - interest.
Moreover, eight months of negotiation have not
revealed serious evidence that Moscow is really
interested in anything more than whittling away our
position.
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3.
U.S. mediation. While this is theoretically possible on
the UAR-Israel front, the U.S. has more interest in a
Jordan-Israel settlement because of our friendship with
Jordan. Moreover, with U.S. clients on both sides of
the line, this offers a better prospect for U.S. mediation.
a.
Some argue that the U.S. should not commit the
Israel-Jordan negotiation to either the Four Power
or the US-USSR talks because it introduces the USSR
which can have no interest--and make no contribution
--except making propaganda capital by posing as the
champion of the Arabs. Moreover, the Israelis object
sharply to Soviet involvement. Also, the same argu-
ments that apply in general against Four Power talks--
the lack of British and French influence- are reasons
for not relying on them to produce movement toward
agreement.
b.
Others argue that the really difficult issues- the
issues of a Palestine settlement- are on this front, and
the U.S. would profit from diffusing the responsibility
for terms on such problems as Jerusalem and the
refugees that no one could accept.
VII.
Issue: If we persist in the S-USSR and Four Power talks,
what would be our strategy? We start from a position of
concentrating on working out a framework for negotiation among
the belligerents, leaving the specifics of a settlement for them
to negotiate. The one element of substance we have dealt with
in detail is the proposition that Israel should withdraw to the
pre-war UAR-Israel border provided a satisfactory arrangement
for securing that border can be negotiated.
A. We have two basic choices and two stances in executing each:
1. Let the talks peter out:
Option 1: Stick to our present position without Israel's
agreement to it.
Option 2: Stick to our present position but press Israel to
accept it.
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2.
Press the talks to fruition:
- Option 3: Change our present position to achieve big-
power consensus but not press the consensus on Israel.
- Option 4: Change our present position to achieve
consensus and try to impose that consensus on Israel.
B. Option 1 - - stick to our present position without Israeli agreement
to it, letting talks peter out.
1.
Some argue that this is the only position that would avoid
the unpalatable choice of enforcing a settlement which will
antagonize Israel without gaining the goodwill of the Arabs.
It would enable us to stand on a position we regard as fair.
We could blame failure on all sides and maintain that we
are only providing enough aid to maintain Israeli security.
2.
Others argue that this is the course most likely to isolate
us from the Arabs. It would put us in a position where we
would be pressed to continue military and economic support
for Israel while Israel rejects the U.S. concept of what
would constitute a fair settlement. This almost certainly
would end our participation in the peace-making effort to
avoid another Arab-Israel clash.
C.
Option 2 - stick to present position, letting talks peter out but
pressing Israel to accept our position.
1.
Some argue that this would be the best position to be in if
possible short of a negotiated settlement, whether or not
the Arabs and Soviets accept. We would have attempted to
produce Israeli agreement to a position we regard as fair.
The Arabs and Soviets would be on weak ground if they
rejected it. It would buy us some time in the Arab world
and could lead eventually to a real negotiating situation.
It would keep us relatively uninvolved.
2.
Others argue that we would delude ourselves if we started
down this track expecting Israeli agreement. Since Israeli
agreement is unlikely, this course is really the same as
the first with all its disadvantages. They point out that
this would not necessarily produce movement toward a
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settlement, SO we might have used a good deal of influence
with Israel - thereby eroding its position--and yet not have
produced an Arab offer of peace. In the absence of a
settlement, it would not help us in the Arab world in the
longer run.
D. Option 3 - - achieve big-power consensus (either 2 power or
4-power) but not impose it.
1.
Some argue that it would improve our position with the
Arabs just to take a position closer to theirs than our
present one.
2.
Others argue that the Arabs would judge us not on our
position but on what we did with Israel. If we refused to
press it on Israel--and it would be more difficult than
our present position to sell to Israel - we would be called
hypocritical.
E.
Option 4 - achieve big-power consensus and try to impose it.
1. Some argue that this is the only way a settlement could be
achieved because imposition is necessary and it is essential
to have at least the USSR aboard for imposition on the UAR.
2.
Others argue that the process of achieving consensus would
dilute the substance of the consensus to the point where it
would be all but impossible to impose it on Israel. This
would bring us to a major collision with Israel. Moreover,
the U.S. would be left with a position it could not regard as
balanced and faced with the question of whether to go on
aiding an Israel which rejected it. In the unlikely event
we succeeded in imposing it on Israel, we would have in
effect made ourselves responsible for enforcing the
agreement.
VIII. Summary of Options.
A. Letting negotiations peter out, leaving to local forces responsibility
for the terms of a settlement. This could be done for the following
purposes:
1.
to lower our profile while
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a.
continuing to provide military and economic aid
for Israel or
b.
reducing support for Israel either as long-run pressure
or as a demonstration of even-handedness;
2. as a tactical step
a.
to produce a shock effect in continuing negotiations
(particularly with the USSR); or
b.
to clear the path for a new or untried combination
of negotiations.
B. Continue present combination of negotiations with the
following choice of tactics:
1. stick to our present position without Israel's agree-
ment to it (which could bring the negotiations to an
inconclusive end);
2. stick to our present position but press Israel to accept it;
3. change our present position to achieve big-power con-
sensus on Israel;
4. change our present position to achieve consensus and
try to impose the consensus on Israel.
C. Develop an untried combination of negotiations.
1. U.S. mediation (at least on the Israel-Jordan front)
by itself with US-USSR talks in suspense;
2. U.S. mediation in combination with US-USSR talks.
*
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