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    "ocrText": "WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nDOCUMENT\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nI MEMO\nFROM HENRY A KISSINGER To THE PRES DENT (4pp.)\n9/23/70\nA\n2 NOTE\nNOTE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL To THE\n[9/70]\nA\nGOVERNMENT OF THE us (2pp.)\n3. PAPER\nFAPER ON SRAEL (5pp.)\n[9/70]\nA\n4 REPORT\nREPORT ON CUBA (17pp.)\nSANITIZED\nPER RAC REVIEW\n9/22/70\nA\n3/2009\nFILE LOCATION\nH FILES Box H-29 FOLDER 6\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions the Pibrary DECLASSIFIED\nNATIONAL ARCHIVEShNDROT misweusant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNA 14029 (1-98)\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\n1 MEMO\nFROM HENRY A KISSINGER To THE PRESIDENT (4pp.)\n9/23/70\nA\n2 NOTE\nNOTE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL To THE\n[9/70]\nA\nGOVERNMENT OF THE us (2pp.)\n3. PAPER\nPAPER ON ISRAEL (5pp.)\n[9/70]\nA\n4 REPORT\nREPORT ON CUBA (17pp.)\n9/22/70\nA\nFILE LOCATION\nH FILES Box H-29 FOLDER 6\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ARMINISTRATION Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nNA 14029 (1-98)\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nSeptember 22, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nSUBJECT: WSAG Actions - Jordan\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nRFCx\nThe following actions have been taken:\nDiplomatic\n--Jordan - We advised King Hussein that we would look promptly\nand with sympathy on requests for material assistance.\n--Ambassador Brown has informed the King that his request\nfor help is being actively discussed.\n--Iran - Ambassador MacArthur has seen the Shah and has exchanged\nviews on the situation with him.\n--Israel - We are getting regular Israeli assessment of the situation\nand are obtaining reconnaissance and intelligence data from the Israelis.\nUSSR and UAR - In response to the September 18 Soviet approach\nindicating that they believe all states both within and outside the\nregion should avoid intervention and seek to bring an end of the\nfighting, Assistant 'Secretary Sisco conveyed an oral note September 20\nurging the USSR to press the Syrians to withdraw. No further\napproaches to the Soviets have been made.\nThe UN - The Jordanians have decided not to go to the UN for now.\nThis action is in abeyance. After review, we still seeno advantage\nin pressing.\n--A diplomatic scenario has been prepared and reviewed in the WSAG\nfor actions the U.S. would have to take if the Israelis strike.\n--A scenario and talking points for Congressional briefing have been\nprepared, both a factual briefing before a strike and a policy briefing\nafter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n-2-\nMilitary Supply\n-Defense has prepared a package of material which Hussein might\nneed; the material has been identified and can be shipped quickly.\nDefense and CIA have developed plans for air shipment of this material\nto Jordan if this is needed.\n--A contingency plan has been prepared for the equipment Israel\nmight need if the Israelis strike the Syrians and if the cease-fire\nbreaks down on the Suez line.\n-Contingency plans for coping with a possible Soviet counter to an\nIsraeli attack on the Syrians have been reviewed in the WSAG.\nMilitary Measures\n--A \"heads up \"message has been sent to all commands to increase\nintelligence watch and general readiness.\n-Airlift - Five C-130s have been moved from Incirlik to preposition\nthem for evacuation; ten additional C-130s have been moved to Europe.\nThe Fleet - Major elements of the Sixth Fleet have been positioned\nin the Eastern Mediterranean.\nThe Saratoga and Independence are south of Cyprus along with\nthe amphibious force with one Marine battalion landing team\nembarked.\nThe Guam with another Marine unit embarked and with helicopters\nwill pass through Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, 26 September.\n- The Carrier Kennedy is enroute to the Mediterranean and will\npass through Gilbraltar Straits on 25 September.\nAn additional tanker and four destroyers have been ordered to the\nMediterranean to support the Kennedy.\nSix additional land-based ASW aircraft have been positioned in the\nMediterranean area.\n-Officers from the Sixth Fleet flew Sunday night to Tel Aviv for a\nvery successful intelligence exchange on target information.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n-3-\nThe Fleet has been instructed to prepare plans for\nreconnaissance of the battle area and for attacking Syrian\nforces.\n-\nArmy Forces\nAirborne Brigade is on alert in Germany, one battalion could\nbe in Jordan in less than 8 hours.\n- Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg are on\nalert.\nOther Steps\n-CIA/State have completed a study of likely outcomes of the\ncontest between the King and the Fedayeen, the impact on the\nMiddle East peace initiative and the implications for U.S.\npolicy and action.\nPress guidance is being coordinated with State and Defense.\nContingency statements have been drafted for use if Israel\nstrikes.\n-Sitreps are being issued every four hours.\n- A paper on possibilities for providing economic assistance to\nJordan has been prepared.\nHospital units have been prepared for shipment US aircraft\nhave been earmarked to carry them to Jordan.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMEMO TO PRES.\nAn originally-planned NSC meeting\nturned into a\nMeeting of Principals of WSAG\non Jordan\n9/23/70\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNSC Way\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL folden\nSeptember 22, 1970\nGENER AL HAIG\nAdmiral Moorer would like to bring\nGeneral Vogt to the NSC meeting tomorrow.\nAppr\nove\n2\nDisapprove\nrus\nJeanne W. Davis\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas\nTHE WHITE house\nwashington\nNSC\nRogers wonts\n0 bring Sisco\nfor ME. portion\napprove\nDisapprove\nPer Jeann Davis\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\ncument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla\nLIST OF INVITEES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nWEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1970, 9 30 A.M - CABINET ROOM\nSecretary of State William P Rogers\nSecretary of Defense Melvin Laird\nDeputy Secretary of Defense David Packard\nAssistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco\nAdmiral Thomas H Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nDirector of Central Intelligence Richard Helms\n?\nLt. General John W. Vogt, Director, J-3 (Operations), Joint Staff\nHenry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President\nGen. Alexander M Haig, NSC Staff\nHarold H. Saunders, NSC Staff\n(Mr. Clinton B. Conger, CIA, to set up charts)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n22110\n9/23 NSC duty\nTHE WHITE house\nWASHINGTON\nSeptember 17, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER\nFROM\nALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD\nSUBJECT\nNational Security Council Meeting\nThe purpose of this memorandum is to confirm the message passed\nto your office by telephone earlier this morning -- that the NSC\nmeeting previously scheduled for 3 00 P.M. Friday, September 18,\nhas been postponed until 9 30 A.M. Wednesday, September 23.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNUMBER\nMO\nDA\nHR\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE\n22110\n09\n18\n10\nTO: PRES\nFROM: ELIOT\nCLASSIF:\nU\nx\nEXDIS\nHAK\nx\nROGERS\nC z\nNODIS\nLAIRD\nlou\nEYES ONLY\nDOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nS\nRES DATA\nDOC DATE: 09/17/20\nButterfield, A.\nTS\nCODEWORD\nSENSITIVE\nPARIS MTG\nNO FORN\nSUBJECT:\nPastponent of NSC meetry from 3: PM Sept. 18 to\n9:30 AM Sept 23\nENCLOSURES: (\n)\n(\n) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nACTION REQUIRED\nNAME: Mrs.Daves\nMEMO FOR HAK\n(\n)\nACTiON\nINFO\nRCD CY\nMEMO TO PRESIDENT\n(\n)\nADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG\nFOR:\nREPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE\n)\nx\nREPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE\n(\n)\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO\nTO\n(\n)\ndir SECRETARIAT\nSECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION\nRECOMMENDATIONS\n(\n)\nSUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\nJOINT MEMO\n(\n)\nNR EAST/NORTH AFRICA\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\n(\nx\n)\nEUROPE/CANADA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY\n(\n)\nLATIN AMERICA\nCONCURRENCE\n(\n)\nUNITED NATIONS\nECONOMIC\nDUE DATE:\n09/18/20\nSCIENTIFIC\nPLANNING GROUP\nCOMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nACTION REQUIRED\nTurnmer leas been\nwoufirs -\nINTERNAL ROUTING\nAND\nMICROFILM DATA\nDO.\nINIT.\nDATE\nSEP 211970\nORIG) NSC.\nTO PAE\nWHC\nDISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO\nNSC\nSTAFF approval\nSUBF\nDISPOSITION\nPAF\nHAK APPL\nWHC\nx\nNOTIFY:\nHAK MARGINALIA\nSUBF\nX\nx NS3 FORM REQUIRED\nCOPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\n* GPO: 1970-385-803\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nSeptember 18, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nDICK KENNEDY\nPETE VAKY\nJEANNE DAVIS\nFROM:\nA1 Haig\n@\nSUBJECT:\nWednesday's NSC Meeting\nThe President desires that next Wednesday's NSC meeting include\nthe following agenda items with the approximate time allocations\nas shown:\nEurope Topic Originally Scheduled\n-\nApproximately 30 minutes\nbrfg\nSituation in Jordan\n-\nApproximately 30 minutes\nno\nProblem in Cuba\nI\nOne hour\nPlease give me recommendations for setting up the meeting, brief-\ning and participants. During the last two agenda items, participants\nshould be held to the minimum - - perhaps only the briefer and the\nprincipal members of the NSC. There is to be no wide circulation\nof the fact that the last agenda item has been added to the meeting.\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nR76x\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nEd -\nI imagine this will go in a regular briefing\nbook - so here is a copy for your files.\nnancy\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\ncument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla\nThe addition in conference of a dollar ceiling under section 501 of\nthe Defense Procurement Act would seriously erode my position at a time\nwhen the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and volatile\nA large ceiling would be widely misunderstood as the actual amount\nof aid to Israel. It would be received in the Arab world (and perhaps\nat home) with dismay It would be seized upon by the Soviets in their\neffort to drive even deeper the wedge between the United States and the\nmoderate Arab states.\nA small ceiling, on the other hand, would be a serious blow to my\nposition with respect to the Soviets Moreover, in the context of the\nstatutory language of 501, it would imply that the United States will\ncounteract Soviet aid only up to some specified sum This would be a\nfurther inducement to the Soviets to continue and perhaps increase the\nextent of their military support to the UAR, Syria and Iraq. It would\nencourage the Soviet strategy of a war of attrition with Israel. It would\ncomplicate our delicate relations with the Israelis with whom we are at\nthis moment negotiating military credits in anticipation of the authority\ncontained in section 501. A small ceiling might induce Syrian and Iraqi\nintervention in the open conflict in Jordan, a conflict whose outcome is\nvital to the United States\nIn the extreme crisis with which I must deal on an hour to hour basis,\nalteration of 501 now, by the addition of a ceiling, would be a disastrous\nhandicap. I urge in the strongest possible terms that section 501 be\nretained in conference without a specified dollar limit\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nI appreciate that this is not the normal method of authorizing military\ncredit, but this is not a normal situation. Moreover, section 501 is\nthe only statutory authority I have with which to assist Israel's defense\neffort.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNSC Ed\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nSeptember 18, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nDICK KENNEDY\nPETE VAKY\nJEANNE DAVIS\nFROM:\nAl Haig 15/\nSUBJECT:\nWednesday's NSC Meeting\nThe President desires that next Wednesday's NSC meeting include\nthe following agenda items with the approximate time allocations\nas shown:\nEurope Topic Originally Scheduled\n-\nApproximately 30 minutes\nSituation in Jordan\n-\nApproximately 30 minutes\nProblem in Cuba\n-\nOne hour\nPlease give me recommendations for setting up the meeting, brief-\ning and participants. During the last two agenda items, participants\nshould be held to the minimum -- perhaps only the briefer and the\nprincipal members of the NSC. There is to be no wide circulation\nof the fact that the last agenda item has been added to the meeting.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON & 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nR7lx\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNSC\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nSeptember 23, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: This Morning's NSC Meeting on Jordan\nI have been informed that State has prepared a draft response to\nthe Israeli \"note verbale. 11 They have done this without giving us\nan opportunity to carefully assess its implications. I therefore\nrecommend that at this morning's meeting of principals we confine\nourselves to the general approach that should be taken with respect\nto the Israeli note and that you instruct State to pass their draft\nresponse to the Washington Special Actions Group for more thor-\nough and coordinated staffing.\nI will probably promptly convene the WSAG and provide you on a priority\nbasis with a detailed inter-departmental assessment of the State\ndraft with the view toward insuring that no precipitous action is\ntaken until all aspects of this crucial issue have been thoroughly\nvetted.\n4/16/02\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nDECLASSIFIED/REASEDSCHION DECLASSIFIED/REASEDINGSIO DECLASSIFIED/REASED CANON of the R76x NSC\nunder provisions of E.O.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHAK:AMH:ilp:9/23/70\nSensitive\nNSC\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nSeptember 23, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: NSC Meeting, September 23, 1970\nThe regular agenda for the meeting includes:\n-- The situation in Jordan.\n-- Cuba.\nI have provided a separate meeting book for each subject.\n-- The Jordan paper is in the Red book; the Cuba paper is in\nthe Blue book.\nI recommend that youstructure the meeting by discussing the Jordan\nsituation (Red book) first--this discussion would be essentially in the\nnature of an updating of the situation and a discussion of the Israeli\nresponse to our answers to their questions.\nI recommend that the discussion begin with a briefing by Mr. Helms.\nI suggest also that you ask Admiral Moorer to brief on our current\nmilitary readiness. Then you might want to turn to the Secretary of\nState.\nAt the conclusion of the discussion on Jordan, I recommend that you\nturn to the subject of Cuba. This discussion also would begin with a\nbriefing by Mr. Helms. Following the briefing, I suggest that you\nask each of the participants for their interpretation of the situation.\nIf you wish, I will sum up the discussion after everyone has spoken,\non the basis of the memo I am attaching to the Blue book for your\nuse only.\nI recommend that you do not make any decision at the meeting on our\nposition on the Cuba problem until you have had time to read again the\nmemorandum I have given you (in the Blue book).\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nДОР SECRET / SENSITIVE/FYES Reproduced at the Richard Nixon ONLY Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nR7G\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM.\nHenry A. Kissinger 1K\nSUBJECT\nNSC Meeting, September 23, 1970\nThe regular agenda for the meeting includes\n- - The situation in Jordan.\n- Cuba.\nI have provided a separate meeting book for each subject.\n- The Jordan paper is in the Red book, the Cuba paper is\nin the Blue book.\nI recommend that you structure the meeting by discussing\nfirst the Jordan situation (red book). for about 30 minutes - this\nstay\ndiscussion would be essentially in the nature of an updating of the\nsituation and a discussion of the Israeli response to our answers\nto their questions.\nI recommend that the discussion begin with a briefing by\nMr. Helms. I suggest also that you ask Admiral Moorer to brief\non our current military readiness Following the troductory\nbriefings, I would summarize the issues as a prelude to general\ndiscussion by the participants.\nyou\nthen,\nAt the conclusion of the discussion on Jordan, I recommend\nmany\nany\nthat you turn to the subject of Cuba This discussion also would\nthen\nbegin with a briefing by Mr Helms Following the briefing, I\nsuggest you ask each of the participants for their interpretation of\nState\nthe situation. If you wish, I will sum up the discussion after\nSaway\n& for your use only,\neveryone th line has hank spoken an in haves my in mem am Marling\nI recommend that you do not make any decision at the meeting\non our position on the Cuba problem until you have had time to read\ncarefully again the memorandum I have given you (in the blue book)\nand we have had time to discuss it further.\nTOP SECRETSE ato the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT. NSC Meeting, September 23, 1970\nThe regular agenda for the meeting includes\n-- The situation in Jordan.\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\n-- Cuba.\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nR7Cx\nI have provided a separate meeting book for each subject.\n-- The Jordan paper is in the Red book, the Cuba paper is\nin the Blue book.\nI recommend that you structure the meeting by discussing\nfirst the Jordan situation (red book) for about 30 minutes -- this\ndiscussion would be essentially in the nature of an updating of the\nsituation and a discussion of the Israeli response to our answers\nto their questions.\nI recommend that the discussion begin with a briefing by\nMr. Helms. I suggest also that you ask Admiral Moorer to brief\non our current military readiness Following the introductory\nbriefings, I would summarize the issues as a prelude to general\ndiscussion by the participants.\nAt the conclusion of the discussion on Jordan, I recommend\nthat you turn to the subject of Cuba. This discussion also would\nbegin with a briefing by Mr. Helms Following the briefing, I\nsuggest you ask each of the participants for their interpretation of\nthe situation. If you wish, I will sum up the discussion after\neveryone has spoken.\nI recommend that you do not make any decision at the meeting\non our position on the Cuba problem until you have had time to read\ncarefully again the memorandum I have given you (in the blue book)\nand we have had time to discuss it further.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMEMO TO O PRES.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SI EET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n2\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nISRAELI NOTE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSNOLLOW\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\nTALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS\n-- Since our peace initiative was launched in June, the\nPalestinian guerrillas and those Arab Governments, including\nSyria, opposed to a settlement with Israel have sought to\ndestroy our initiative.\n--- The situation came to a head in Jordan when King Hussein,\nwho along with Nasser had accepted the US initiative, sought\nto assert control over the fedayeen \"state within a state\"\nin Jordan.\n-- By September 19 the King was slowly gaining the upper hand\nIraq, although it has a large number of troops in Jordan and is\npro-fedayeen, has remained passive; the UAR has avoided choosi\nsides; and the Soviets have limited themselves to exhortations\nfor an end to the civil strife and against outside intervention\n--- Beginning late September 19 a new situation has been create\nby a massive invasion of Jordan from Syria (300 tanks plus\nartillery and infantry). The invading forces have established\nthemselves in northern Jordan where the fedayeen have beèn\nstrong.\n--- At stake is the regime of King Hussein, a moderate Arab\nleader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can\nto make peace with Israel. If he falls, : the prospects are for\nradicalization and possible partition of Jordan among elements\nhostile to Israel and the United States If Hussein falls,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon CLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be deelassified.\nSECRET/NODIS\n2\nthere will remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settle-\nment in the foreseeable future.\n-- On September 20 we urged the Soviets to prevail upon\nthe Syrians to withdraw from Jordan, warning that if they\ndid not there was danger that the conflict would be broadened.\nand affirming our own decision to avoid this. The Soviets\nhave been totally unresponsive.\n--- In these circumstances we have been consulting with other\ngovernments, including the British, the French and the\nIsraelis.\n-- We have been informed that Israel has decided to move\nmilitarily against the Syrian forces in northern Jordan in\nview of the threat which would be posed to its security by\na radical regime and a large Syrian military force on its\neastern border.\n--- We view sympathetically this Israeli position to defend\nits national interests. We will be helpful in quietly pro-\nviding Israel materiel assistance, while seeking minimal\npublic association with this Israeli action in order to pro-\ntect to the extent possible our interests in the Arab world.\n-- We see our principal responsibility as keeping the Soviets\nfrom intervening. We are informing the Soviets that we have\nno plans or our own to intervene, and are warning them against\nintervening. We are making clear that the problem results\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\nSECRET/NODIS\n3\nfrom Syrian aggression and that the solution lies in Syrian\nwithdrawal from Jordan. We will of course also support\nwithdrawal of Israeli troops once the military occupation operation\nis completed should the Israelis feel that they must go\nin on the ground as well as in the air.\n-- As for possible actions we might take, we are making\ncontingency plans should it become necessary to evacuate\nUS nationals from Jordan. If, contrary to our expectations,\nthe situation should require a larger direct US role, we\nwill consult the Congress in advance.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nII\nSECRET/NODIS\nWe have just learned that Israeli armed forces have commenced\naction against Syrian military forces which had invaded Jordan.\nThis invasion by Syria, we were aware, would be considered\nby Israel as a threat to Israel's security, and we have been\nworking and will continue to work intensively in diplomatic\nchannels to bring about Syrian withdrawal.\nWe wish to note that Syria has long rejected a just settlement\nof the Arab-Israel dispute on the basis supported by the\noverwhelming majority of the world community, the UN Security\nCouncil Resolution 242 of November 1967. More recently Syria,\nunlike the UAR, Jordan and Israel rejected our peace initiative\nbased on that resolution. The military action of Syria has\nnot only posed a threat to the security of both Jordan and\nIsrael, but has placed in further jeopardy the slender hopes\nthe people of the area and men of good will everywhere had\nplaced in the initiative based on the November 1967 resolution.\nWe look to the early withdrawal of all troops from Jordan not\nthere at the request of the Jordan government so that those\ncountries of the area which want peace can press ahead in\ntheir efforts to make it. We have no intention of embarking\non other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting\nunless powers. outside the area become involved.\nSECRET/NODIS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nISRAELI STRIKE\nPROS AND CONS OF\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis dumn has been to Executivo Order 13526 and has been to bei\nNIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT\nDOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD\nITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER\nA RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM\nTHIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED\nAND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY\nNUMBER\n3\nON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD\n(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET\n(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER\nA sanitized copy substituted for an original item which\ncontains information restricted under the Privacy Act\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nCUBA C U B A\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\n22 September 1970\nDCI BRIEFING FOR\n23 SEPTEMBER NSC\nSOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN CUBA\n(Locator Map, Chart of Cienfuegos Bay, and Photo)\nI. Mr. President, the Soviets are developing a\nfacility at Cienfuegos--on the south coast of\nCuba--to support their naval operations in the\nCaribbean and the Atlantic. There is clear\nevidence of this in the port improvements and\nconstruction activity we have observed during\nthe past month, and the work has proceded to\na point making it possible that Soviet naval\nunits--including nuclear-powered submarines--\nmay soon be operating regularly from Cienfuegos.\nA.\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nNo Objection Jou Deal as siticati 003/03/03 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\n1. Other port improvements include the in-\nstallation of three anti-aircraft sites,\nand a new long-range communications\nfacility is under construction on a\npromontory north of Cayo Alcatraz, an\nisland in the eastern portion of the bay.\n2. At this facility, holes for a large an-\ntenna array have been dug some time\n25X1\nsince August 15.\n3.\n25X1\nB. On Cayo Alcatraz, new barracks and recreation\nfacilities have been built, probably for Soviet\nnaval personnel.\n-2-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection signation 200813603 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nB. Ships of a Soviet naval task force-the\nthird to visit Cuban waters in the past 14\nmonths--are still at Cienfuegos, and their\nactivities provide further indications that\nthe Soviets intend to make more permanent\n25X1\nuse of the port.\n1. One of the seven Soviet ships which reached\nCienfuegos on September 9 and 10 was an\nAlligator-class amphibious landing ship,\nwhich brought to Cuba two 84 - foot barges.\n2.\n25X1\n3. A Soviet cruiser and destroyer, both armed\nwith guided missiles, left Cienfuegos on\nSeptember 15, in company with a merchant tanker,\nbut the other ships of the task force--the\nlanding ship, the submarine tender, and two\nsalvage ships--are still in the harbor.\n+ LeNA\n-3-\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nNo Objecta likb 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nII. No Soviet submarines have been detected with this\ntask force, but the first Soviet squadron to operate\nin Cuban waters in July, 1969, included a nuclear-\npowered N-class attack submarine and two F-class\ndiesel units.\nA. A second task force which visited Cienfuegos\nlast May included an E-Two class nuclear\ncruise missile submarine and two more diesel\ntypes.\nB. We have been receiving and checking out reports\nof Soviet submarines and submarine bases in\n-including underground submarine pens--\nsince the Soviets first began moving into\nthe island early in 1962, but none of these\nreports could be substantiated until that first\ntask force visit in July of 1969.\nC. During the 1962 missile crisis, we knew that\nseveral Soviet diesel submarines were headed\nfor Cuba. We cannot judge whether the USSR\nactually intended to establish a submarine\n25X1\nforce in Cuba at that time,\n-4- -\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Da RSifica 2009/03/03 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nIII. There has already been some review of the U.S. -Soviet\nnegotiations during and after the 1962 crisis, to\ndetermine whether any of the understandings reached\nat that time would have a bearing on the latest\ndevelopments.\nA. There was, of course, no formal bilateral\nagreement putting an end to the crisis,\nbecause President Kennedy conditioned a\nno-invasion pledge on adequate inspection\nprocedures to verify the removal of offensive\nweapons and guard against their re-introduction.\n1. This, the Cubans and the Soviets never\naccepted.\nB. The understanding between President Kennedy\nand Chairman Khrushchev made no reference to\nsubmarines.\n1.\nThe Soviets now would no doubt contend--\nand correctly--that they made no under-\ntakings except to remove the missiles\n11)\nand the bombers.\nC. Unilaterally, however, the U.S. Government\nsurrounded the settlement with statements\nwhich went much farther than this. The\nPresident's public statements and formal\ncommunications at that time refer explicitly\n-5-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection the 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nto the unacceptability of the presence in\nCuba of any offensive weapons capable of\nstriking targets in the United States, without\ndistinction as to delivery systems or whether\nthey are nuclear or conventional.\n1.\nTo cite a specific example, President\nKennedy said in a press conference on\nSeptember 13, 1962: \"If Cuba should\nbecome an offensive military base of\nsignificant capacity for the Soviet Union,\nthen this country will do whatever must be\ndone to protect its own security and that\nof its allies. \"\n2. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told a press\nS\nconference on April 23, 1963: \"President\nKennedy has made it utterly clear that we\nwould not accept a re-introduction into\nCuba of weapons which could strike at its\nneighbors, including the United States. \"\nIV. The current Soviet naval activity in Cuba coincides\nwith a general warming trend in Cuban-Soviet rela-\ntions, and with recent statements by Fidel Castro\nto the effect that Cuba would welcome closer\nmilitary ties with the Soviet Union.\n-6-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nA. The Cienfuegos project probably was discussed\nwhen Soviet Defense Minister Grechko was in\nCuba last November, and again when Raul Castro\nvisited the Soviet Union in April of this year.\nV. The only full-fledged submarine base the Soviets\never established on foreign soil was the one in\nAlbania in the late 1950's, before the Albanians\nsplit with Moscow.\nA. The Soviet Navy has demonstrated in Alexandria,\nEgypt, however, that it can support submarine\noperations from friendly ports without estab-\nlishing actual bases overseas.\n1. Soviet diesel submarines now operate in\nC\nthe Mediterranean on six-month patrols,\nthanks to a three-week stop in Alexandria\nmidway in the deployment.\n2. The distinction between support facilities\nand an outright naval base is important to\nthe Soviets because of their long-standing\npropaganda against so-called \"imperialist\nand colonial exploitation\" \" of overseas\nbases.\n-7-\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nNo Objection sificati Library\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nB. It is possible that the Soviets intend to use\nCienfuegos primarily as a harbor, making little\nuse of shore facilities. With the ships they\nnow have in position there, they can make minor\nrepairs and provide limited service to submarines\nof any type.\n1. The capabilities of the support ships--\ntogether with the facilities now available\nat Cienfuegos- such as pier space, mooring\nE-\nbuoys, fuel storage, barracks, and recreation--\n11,\ncan substantially extend the range and duration\nof Soviet submarines patroling in the Atlantic\n-\nand the Caribbean.\nVI. To be specific, a. Cuban support facility will save\nSoviet submarines about-2,500 miles of transit\ncruising to and from potential patrol areas off\nthe east coast of the United States, compared to\noperations from the Northern Fleet bases near Mur-\n25X1\nmansk.\nA.\n-8-\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nNo Objection.To.Deslasificat DECL 1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\n1.\n25X1\nB. Similarly, cruise missile and torpedo attack\nsubmarines could increase their time on-station\nby operating from Cienfuegos.\n1. These submarines might also take advantage\nof the longer patrols to carry on surveil-\nlance and other intelligence operations\nalong the U.S. east coast.\nC. The existence of a Cuban support facility would\nalso give the Soviets the option- in the event\nof a crisis--of prepositioning submarines and\ntheir support ships outside the areas where\nAmerican anti-submarine warfare coverage is\nmost effective.\n1. In this context, the Soviets have shown\nconsiderable interest in seaborne support\nof submarine operations in the equatorial\nwaters of the Atlantic near Cape Verde.\n-9-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo ibrally DECLASSIA1\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\n2. In preparation for such mid-ocean resupply\nand maintenance, the Soviets have acquired\nmore than seven years of merchant marine\nexperience in supporting their fishing\nfleets off Newfoundland from a base in\nHavana Bay.\n3. It is also worth noting that Soviet sub-\nmarines operating from Cienfuegos could\npatrol the Gulf of Mexico without having\nto enter through one of the narrow passages\ninto the Caribbean from the Atlantic\n25X1\nD. On the negative side, of course, Cienfuegos\nis relatively vulnerable to close surveillance\nby the United States, and equally vulnerable\nto attack in time of war.\nVII. If the Soviets intend to develop Cienfuegos into\na permanent base for the support of ballistic\nmissile submarines--similar to our installations\nat Holy Loch and Rota--they will need additional\nfacilities which are not there now.\n-10-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\n25X1\nA. A ballistic missile submarine requires repair\nshops and storage for nuclear weapons, as well\nas special missile loading equipment.\n1. Certain repairs for ballistic missile\nsubmarines also require specialized\nmissile support ships, or missile\nhandling facilities ashore.\nB. As yet, we have detected no preparations at\nCienfuegos for facilities such as these.\n-11-\n25X1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n25X1\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\nDehied\nPage\nNo Objection To Declassification 2009/03/03 NLN-H-29-6-4-1\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMO TO PRES.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary DECI ASSIFIED\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\n(non-log)\nWASHINGTON\nSeptember 22, 1970\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Soviet Naval Facility in Cuba\nI.\nThe Current Situation\nA. The Soviet Facilities\nPhotographic intelligence indicates the USSR is constructing a\nnaval support base, apparently for submarines, in Cienfuegos Bay,\nCuba. Definite identification of this activity was first made from\nU-2 photography taken September 16.\nThe facilities at present consist of a Soviet submarine tender moored\nto four heavy buoys in the bay. Two Soviet submarine support barges,\na landing ship, a heavy salvage vessel, and a rescue vessel are in the\nharbor. Other ships that had been there-- a tanker and two missile\nanti- submarine warfare (ASW) ships--have departed. Construction\non Cayo Alcatraz, an island in the bay, consists of two single story\nbarracks, sports area (soccer field, basketball and tennis courts),\nan offshore wharf and a swimming area. Three AAA sites and a\ncommunications antenna array are also in the harbor area.\nNone of this construction or naval activity was in the area on August 15,\nthe last prior date on which U-2 photography of the bay was available.\nAll of this was thus accomplished in the intervening four-week period,\nsuggesting that it was done on a crash basis.\nThe installation is similar to what we have in Holy Loch, and is of\nsemi-permanent nature. It would appear at this point to have the\ncapability of servicing submarines, including nuclear subs, and of\nproviding rest and recreation facilities for naval crews as well as\npermanent support personnel. No other naval support capabilities\nare evident at this point.\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nRHx\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 2 -\nB. The Background\nCircumstantially, this construction appears to be part of a series of\nevents involving Soviet-Cuban military relations which have stretched\nover the last year:\n-- In July 1969 a Soviet naval group, including a nuclear submarine,\nvisited Cuba for two weeks.\n-- The Soviet Minister of Defense visited Cuba for eight days from\nNovember 12-19, 1969, the first visit by a Soviet Defense Minister\nto the Western Hemisphere.\n- - Raul Castro, the Cuban Minister of the Armed Forces, visited the\nUSSR for one month from April 4 to approximately May 13.\n- - On April 22 and again on August 23 Castro made public remarks\nwelcoming close military ties with the Soviets.\n-- Three flights of Two TU-95 Bear surveillance/reconnaissance air-\ncraft were made to Cuba on April 18, April 25 and May 13.\n-- A Soviet naval task force paid a two-week visit May 14 to Cienfuegos,\nTwo units called at Havana subsequently for a ceremonial visit.\n-- On August 4, in a note for you, the Soviets complained of new exile\nactivities and asked if the 1962 understanding was valid, we replied\nthat it was.\n-- The current ships now in Cienfuegos were first noticed moving to\nthat area on August 28.\nII. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE\nThere is a wide spectrum of views regarding the military significance of\nthis development. The JCS believe that the military impact would be\nsignificant equating, in the case of submarines, because of increased on-\nstation time, to approximately one-third of the size of the Soviet Ballistic\nMissile Submarine (SLBM) force. Additional advantages they cite include:\n-- The establishment of SLBM patrol stations in the Gulf of Mexico,\n-- The option of keeping all missile submarines (SSBN) in port at Cienfuegos\nand either launch from port or deploy rapidly as the situation dictates,\n-- The lessening of personnel hardship and the concommitant increase of\nSSBN crew effectiveness by significantly decreasing at-sea time.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 3 -\nII. Military Significance (cont inued)\nThe JCS further believe that this action fits into an overall Soviet pattern\nwhich indicates increasing Soviet hostility toward the U.S. and a willing-\nness to take greater risks in pursuing their objectives. In support of\nthis contention they note, among other Soviet actions, the following:\n-- the continued construction of strategic missiles and SSBNs during\nSALT,\n- - dramatic increases in Soviet naval forces and operations in the\nMediterranean and Indian Ocean,\n-- virtual Soviet control of UAR on defense and the challenge to the US\npeace initiative by violation of the standstill provision with a massive\nbuildup of missiles along the Suez Canal,\n-- the Soviet fleet visits and flights of TU-95/Bear D reconnaissance\naircraft to Cuba, and\n-- improvements in Soviet military capabilities across-the-board while\nostensibly cooperating in a number of diplomatic moves.\nI share the JCS's concern with Soviet intentions. I also share their con-\ncern over the increasing Soviet military capabilities vis-a-vis the U.S.\nand this is a matter which we are carefully analyzing. However, I believe\nthe development of the port of Cienfuegos into a base capable of supporting\nnuclear submarines would add only marginally to the total Soviet capability\nfor attacking the US with nuclear weapons. The fact of the matter is that\nthere are always some Soviet subs off our East Coast with the capability to\nlaunch missiles against most targets in the U.S. If they want, the Soviets\ncan increase ths number at any time by simply increasing their force levels.\nHaving a base at Cienfuegos makes it easier to achieve such an objective\nbut at considerably higher risks considering past U.S. reactions to Soviet\nmilitary activities in Cuba. Unlike 1962, the Soviets have a massive land\nbase missile capability which continues to grow.\nIf my view that the increase in military capabilities of the Cienfuegos base\nwould be only marginal is correct, then the Soviet action becomes even\nmore puzzling Why run such high risks for such low returns in increased\nmilitary capability? This strongly suggests that this Soviet move is perhaps\nmore politically-motivated than militarily.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 4 -\nIII. SOVIET INTENTIONS\nThere are several basic questions:\n-- Why, at this time, have the Soviets embarked on a venture that they\nshould know has a low flashpoint in terms of American sensitivity?\n-- Why, beforehand, did the Soviets seek to reaffirm the 1962 post\nmissile crisis understanding on the flimsy pretext of the threat to\nCuba?\nHaving reaffirmed the essentials of the 1962 understanding, why did\nthe Soviets almost immediately proceed to violate the spirit if not\nthe precise letter of that understanding?\n- Finally, how does the move into Cuba relate, if at all, to the larger\nposture of Soviet behavior, especially in the Middle East?\nThere are several possible explanations:\n1. It could be that this move in Cuba is simply to show the flag, perhaps\nto impress Latin America generally, having done that, the venture\nwill be terminated, in other words, there would be no longer-term\nimplications or consequences intended.\nThe main problem with this interpretation is that establishing a semi-\npermanent facility goes well beyond showing the flag. No Soviet leader\ncould imagine that such a move could be passed over by an American\nadministration.\n2. It could be a move in the SALT context, to establish a presence to be\nbargained away for the removal of US forward bases which the Soviets\nhave pressed for in SALT.\nThe problem with this argument is that the prospective SALT agreement\ncurrently on the table is one that, in itself, is quite attractive to the\nUSSR. To raise the sensitive issues of Cuba risks upsetting SALT, at\na minimum, it would establish a far more belligerent atmosphere for\nnegotiations. If the Soviets did accept a trade-off in the end, it would\nonce again demonstrate to Castro and Latin Americans generally, that\nthe Soviets exploited Cuba for their own strategic purposes.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOSECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 5 -\nIII. Soviet Intentions -- possible explanations (continued)\n3 A deliberate confrontation. If the above two explanations are implau-\nsible, we must assume that the Soviets are well aware of the crisis\npotential of their action It is possible that the Soviets some time ago\nlooked ahead and saw the Middle East escalating to a dangerous point.\nThey could have reasoned that it was to their strategic advantage to\nwiden the arena of potential conflict with the US, in part to put pres-\nsures on us from at least two points.\n-- They could foresee that these two crisès would come to a head in a\npre-election period, when the US might be under some internal\nconstraints\n-- They lied to us asin1962 to create an \"understanding\" for the record\nbeforehand, later to be used against us in some distorted fashion.\n- - In this scenario, the Soviets, typically, have not thought through\ntheir tactics of a double cricis, but in their arrogance, will brazen\nit through.\nIt could be argued that for some years, now, as their strategic power\nhas grown, the Soviet leaders have wanted to even the score from the\nhumiliation of 1962.\nA double crisis of this magnitude, however, has always been an intriguing\ntheory but a dangerous strategy. No one can foresee the consequences\nof inter-actions between two areas of contention. There is not only the\ndanger of uncalculated escalation but the significant risk of a double\ndefeat.\nMoreover, Cuba would seem the last place the Soviets would want to\ninvoke in a Middle East crisis. Cuba is, after all, still an area where\nwe have immense tactical advantage.\n4. Soviet expansionism. This interpretation fits the Cuba move into the\npattern of the projection of Soviet power to various points around the\nglobe, and expansionism symbolized primarily by a naval presence.\nUnder this theory the Soviets have been in the process of testing us for\na reaction, and having estimated that we were relatively complacent,\nhave decided to take a further step, following their earlier naval visits\nto Cuba and flights of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft.\n-- The primary purpose of the Cuban move is not to create another\nconfrontation, but to establish step-by-step the Soviet right to\nestablish a naval presence in the area, much as they have done\nReproduced the RichardNixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIEDNLY\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 6 -\nin the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf (not to\nmention the now-regular on-station patrolling of Y Class sub-\nmarines within range of the East Coast)\n-- The Soviet actions are demonstrative and political for their own,\nnot Cuban objectives, to show that the balance of power is now\nsuch that we can no longer effectively block Soviet power even\nin our own sphere of influence.\n-- The Soviets may have reasoned that it would be prudent to reaffirm\nthe basic 1962 understanding, as a test of the limit of our permissive-\nness.\n-- The Soviets may have concluded that the Middle East crisis inhibited\nany forceful US reaction, especially in a pre-election period.\n-- In this interpretation, however, there is room for tactical retreats\nwhen the Soviets judge that the temperature is rising above that of\ntolerable level.\nMy own view is that this explanation, a test of expansionism, is\nprobably the right one. In the last six months the Soviets could have\nconcluded they could move forward without major risks as long as they\ndid it piecemeal. If they are successful, however, as the news leaks\nout, the Soviets can demonstrate to much of the world that the corre-\nlation of forces has shifted significantly since their defeat in Cuba\nalmost exactly eight years ago. In short, this is a calculated but\nhighly significant political challenge.\nThe fact that on two separate occasions the Soviets have deliberately\ndeceived us may be an important symptom of the mood of the Soviet\nleaders, and an index of their assessment of us. It suggests an ominous\ncontempt and a judgment that we are not likely to react quickly or vigor-\nously to Soviet challenges. Why they should hold such a view, if they do,\nis never easy to understand. It could relate to what they may perceive\nas our excessive eagerness in SALT and MBFR or perhaps their view\nof the domestic effects of Vietnam, or their distorted views of our\nsocial-economic \"crisis\".\nIn any case, the Soviets have been moving aggressively, first inthe\nMiddle East, and now in Cuba. They are likely to continue to do so\nuntil they receive clear and unmistakable warning signals.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 7 -\nIV. THE CUBAN ANGLE\nWhy did Cuba agree to lend its territory for this purpose? What does\nCastro get out of it?\nConceivably Castro may have asked for such a facility to obtain a more\ndemonstrative show of support, or the base decision could have been the\nresult of mutual initiative based on mutually perceived advantages How-\never, a more plausible thesis is that this was a Soviet initiative. The\nSoviets clearly have the leverage to obtain Cuban cooperation--either by\nblackmail in threatening to stop essential economic support or by bribes\nin the form of more economic and military aid. This would explain a\nnumber of otherwise puzzling reports we have received over the past\nyear or so. For example, there have been increasing reports of Soviet\nattempts to increase their control and influence within the Cuban regime.\nThere have been reports of Castro's uneasiness at this, and of his alleged\ncomments about Soviet \"coldbloodedness and ruthlessness\". Failure of\nCastro's highly touted effort to harvest ten million tons of sugar is a heavy\nblow which damaged his charisma and control. The Soviets could well\nhave felt that they could pressure him without being as concerned about\nhis sensitivity as they have been in the past. In any event, they appear\nto have more influence and authority in Cuba now than at any time in\nrecent years.\nWhatever the case, the Cubans do receive. in return for use of their\nterritory -Soviet military presence with its implicit promise of Soviet\nsupport and protection. They could conceivably use an expanded Soviet\nnaval presence in the area to cover their clandestine subversive move-\nments. They presumably have received expanded economic and military\naid.\nV. MEANING IN LATIN AMERICA\nExistence of a Soviet base and Soviet naval power in the Caribbean is likely\nto be seen by Latin America as a sign of US weakness, especially if seen\nin conjunction with the recent Chilean elections. It would strengthen Soviet\nefforts to increase their influence in the region. It would encourage indigenous\nradical left elements while discouraging their opponents It may tempt many\nof these American nations to become neutral vis-a-vis US or to turn to the\nSoviets to hedge their bets.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 8 -\nVI. ALLIED ACTIVITIES\nMost of our allies have little taste for a major confrontation with the\nUSSR, especially in an area quite remote from Europe, and over a\nsituation that they may not perceive as a serious strategic threat.\nWe could expect, as in 1962, little support and considerable advice\nto restrain. our responses.\nThe main Europeans have a vested interest in the beginnings of\ndetente. In the longer term, however, the Europeans and our other\nAllies could conclude that Soviet success in Cuba was an important\nindex of the balance of power. At the same time, the Soviets also\nhave a vested interest in the new German treaty and may also be in-\nhibited from a deliberate confrontation with us.\nVII. OPTIONS\nIf as I have suggested this is a serious political major challenge, then we have\nno choice but torespond. In my view, our/options are:\n1. Pursue a purely diplomatic effort to get the Soviets out. We would tell\nthem that we know of their activity and remind them of our 1962 under-\nstandings which we expect them to respect and wait for their reply.\nThe advantages of this course are that the chance of immediate\nconfrontation is minimized and we might be ableto strike a bargain\nwhich would get them to leave, thus solving the immediate problem.\nIf this strategy succeeds and the Russians leave in response to an\noffset to which we agree, Castro may even see himself as a pawn\nin the USSR game and be less likely to play in the future.\n-- The disadvantages are that if we bargain to get their withdrawal\nthe Soviets may see this kind of action as an easy route to follow\nfor other concessions they want in the future. If they are testing\nus they may be willing to bargain yet engage in prolonged bargain-\ning. Moreover, our low-key reaction may prompt them to go\nahead on this project and even to make further waves in the Hemisphere\nor elsewhere With the passage of time during our talks, we may end\nup facing Soviet submarines and weapons in Cuba -- a result similar\nto that in 1962.\n2. Pursue a diplomatic course with Castro We would tell him that we\ncannot permit this kind of Soviet base in Cuba and that we expect him\nto get it out.\n-- The advantages would be similar to those above but would include\nalso the avoidance of the need to strike a bargain with the Russians\nand delay further the time of confrontation. If Castro believes we\nare Reproduced at the Mard DECLASSIEN than the Russians.\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n- 9 -\nIt is Russian interests which are primarily at stake.\n-- The disadvantages are that we might have to strike some bargain\nwith Castro which would be no less easy for us than striking one\nwith the Soviets. Moreover, if the Soviets induced or pressured\nCastro into standing firm, the chances of a fait accompli would\nbe great and we would face it without yet having made our position\nclear to the Soviets They could take our delay in approaching\nthem as a sign that we are unwilling to push them hard.\n3. Move decisively diplomatically, making clear at the outset we are\nprepared to move to confrontation. We would tell the Russians\ndirectly and at a high level that we consider their action intolerable,\nthat we expect them to remove the facility without delay and that we\nexpect a prompt reply If a satisfactory reply is not forthcoming we\nconsider the entire 1962 understanding invalid. As a follow-up, we\ncould call off SALT and go to the OAS as we did in 1962 -- either\nbefore or simultaneously with our approach to the Soviets. Some\nmilitary steps--e.g., increased surveillance, sea patrols off shore,\ndeployment of additional tactical air to the Southeast US - would\nsignal our resolve and willingness to move to confrontation.\n-- The advantages of this course are that our resolve would be clear\nto the Soviets from the outset, but they could still move out without\nlosing face (if we had not gone to the OAS). We would have made\nclear that we would not bargain for their withdrawal.\n-- The disadvantages are that if they are testing us, they may still\nnot belie our determination short of an ultimatum. We will have\ntaken more time and will still have to confront them. If they really\nwant a base, as if they are seeking some concession from us, they\nmay be willing to sacrifice SALT and accept confrontation as a means\nof getting a concession for withdrawal. If we went to the OAS and\nwere unsuccessful in getting Soviet withdrawal we would be losing\ntwice.\n4. Confront the Soviets immediately. We would give them an ultimatum\nand take immediate military measures to emphasize our intention to\nprevent their use or retention of the facility. If they did not respond\nwe would publicly demand their withdrawal and within a short time, if\nthey did not do so, take military action against the base.\nThe advantages of this course of action are that our intentions would\nbe unambiguous and the consequences clear to the Soviets from the\noutset It would minimize the likelihood that the base would become\noperational and heavily defended It would be easier for the Soviets\nto withdraw now when their investment is relatively small than it might\nbe later with a more developed facility.\nReproduced at the Richard TOP Nixon SECR Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED ONLY\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY -10-\n-- The disadvantages are that a crisis could be precipitated early\nduring a period when our forces are heavily oriented toward the\nMiddle East. A public ultimatum gives the Soviets no graceful\nway out and we will have played our last card and foreclosed\nother options.\nIn my view the slow diplomatic approach has serious risks. It may\nseem safer but most likely it would result in a gradually escalating\ncrisis leading ultimately to confrontation. At the same time, moving\nimmediately to military confrontation may be need'lessly risky until\nwe have probed to see what the Soviets intentions really are. But\nwhatever our initial course, we must be prepared to move toward\nconfrontation if this is the price of Soviet withdrawal.\nI recommend that you hear out all of the views on this subject but\nthat you do not make a decision at today's meeting.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nRN TALKING POINTS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nreviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nTHE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS\nNSC MEETING - CUBA\nSeptember 23, 1970\nThe purpose of this meeting is to get an assessment of the\nsignificance of the Soviet naval facility in Cuba, the issues this raises\nfor the United States and the range of choices open to us. The meeting\nis not intended to result in a decision -- this will require considerably\nmore study and analysis. ]\n1. I want to discuss now the Soviet naval facility in Cuba.\nFirst I would like to have Director Helms report on what we know and\nhis assessment of this Soviet move. Then I would like each of you to\ngive me his interpretation.\n2. [Ask Mr Helms to brief on the situation and give his\nassessment. ]\n3. [Ask each participant in turn for his interpretation. ]\n4. [Ask Dr. Kissinger to summarize. ]\n5. I will not make any decision today. We need to consider our\ncourse carefully and should meet again on this question.\nDECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02\nby NARA on the recommendation of the NSC\nunder provisions of E.O. 12958\nR76x\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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