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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
HAK to the President
6/28/71
A
(memo)
FILE LOCATION
H-Files
Box H-31
folder 5
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NA 14029 (1-98)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Restricted NSC Mtg
MEMORANDUM
on Mideast - June 29, 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
June 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Harold H. Saunders Hal
Richard T. Kennedy
SUBJECT:
Briefing Book for NSC on Mid-East
Your book is an exact duplicate of the President's.
Your memo to him at the next tab explains the present problem in an
nutshell and proposes a series of questions to pose in discussion
following briefings by Cushman and Sisco.
The President's talking points embody this approach and conclude
by suggesting that he ask that Secretary Rogers prepare a game
plan for the rest of the summer, including especially how to play
the aircraft issue with Israel.
The analytical memo is built around the memo discussed with you
earlier but presents a somewhat broader picture since that one
concentrated heavily on details of the Canal proposal.
The last memo in the book is a memo done for you earlier on the
latest intelligence on Soviet military shipments to the UAR, revised
for the President.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMO TO
THE PRESIDENT
UNCI TOP ASSIFIED
RESTRICTED MEETING
June 29, 1971
Middle East Review
THE PRESIDENT
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
UNCLASSIFIED TOP
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Reproduced at the Richard (flex
Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
SEUNCLASSIED CEDAR
June 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM.
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT
Restricted NSC Meeting on Mid-East--Tuesday, June 29
The purpose of this meeting is to assess where our diplomatic initiatives
in the Mid-East stand and to begin to sort out a strategy from here.
The situation is described more fully in the paper at the tab marked
"Analytical Memo. " In short the problem is this.
The gap between Israeli and Egyptian positions on an interim
Canal settlement is still wide. What was originally conceived as
a minimal move has now been built into a half-step to an overall
settlement. That decreases likelihood of Israeli agreement.
The Israeli aircraft pipeline is about to run dry. There is no
clear plan for what Israel must do to turn the tap back on.
The Jarring mission is in suspense and is considered by some
to be dead.
The Soviet position in the UAR continues to grow steadily. There
is no plan for involving the USSR in the diplomatic process.
The only active proposal for moving this impasse now is the State
Department's proposal to invite UAR Prime Minister Fawzi to Washington
to probe for flexibility in the UAR position. Unless there is some
realistic prospect for bringing the two sides closer, this would dramatize
the interim settlement negotiations more than prospects for success
warrant.
In conducting the meeting, I suggest asking
General Cushman to describe the latest on the Soviet presence
in the Mid-East.
Secretary Rogers or Mr. Sisco to brief on the diplomatic state of
play.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
SECUNSLASSIED
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR UNCLASSIFIED
- 2 -
Then you might lead a general discussion of the following questions
- - Is a Canal settlement now felt to be possible? What would it
take to close the gap?
- - What is the intention on Israeli aircraft requests? What
specifically do we want Israel to do before we give them more
aircraft? How would we explain our present stance publicly if
Congressional pressure mounted?
- - What should be our response to Soviet arms shipments to
Egypt? To the buildup in the Soviets' own position?
Your talking points at the next tab reflect this approach. In addition
to the fuller analytical memo on the situation, you will find a memo
at the last tab detailing the latest intelligence on the Soviet shipments
to the UAR and presence there.
Your talking points conclude with the suggestion that Secretary Rogers
be asked to provide you with a game plan for the next three months
(until the fall UN General Assembly session). This should deal care-
fully with the Israeli aircraft issue. Without a precisely drawn strategy,
there is danger of stumbling soon into an open confrontation with Israel.
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
June 28, 1971
TALKING POINTS
Middle East
1. Several trains of events are coming together which make this a
good time to take stock of where we are and where we are going in
the Mid-East. There has been active diplomacy on the Canal settle-
ment, the Soviet-UAR treaty, new intelligence on the Soviet military
relationship with the UAR. The Israeli aircraft pipeline is about to
run dry.
2. Ask General Cushman to brief, particularly on Soviet activity in
the Mediterranean and the UAR.
3. Ask Secretary Rogers and Mr. Sisco to brief on the state of
diplomatic play.
4. Pose the following questions for discussion.
- Do Secretary Rogers and Mr. Sisco feel the gap can be closed
on a Canal settlement? What would it take?
- - If it is doubtful the gap can be closed, should Fawzi be invited
to Washington?
- The Israeli aircraft pipeline is about to run dry. What do we
want Israel to do before it is turned back on?
- - It looks as if the Soviets are further strengthening their own
position in the UAR. How will they read our suspending aircraft
shipments to Israel?
- Should we involve the USSR more in our diplomacy?
Ask Secretary Rogers to send you a game plan for the rest of the
summer (until the UN General Assembly).
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
UNCLASSIFIED
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlex
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ANALYTICAL MEMO
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
SECRET
UNCI NODIS ASSIFIED
June 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtx
SUBJECT:
Current State of Play in the Mid-East
The purpose of the NSC meeting on the Mid-East is to assess the
present situation and to set a strategy for the next several months,
at least until the fall UN General Assembly.
The present situation contains these elements:
The Jarring mission is in suspense. Jarring in February asked
both sides to commit themselves on the two key issues in a final
settlement, peace and territory. Israel is not able now to make
that commitment. The alternative would have been to try for a
partial settlement first.
--Progress toward an interim settlement on the Canal seems near
impasse. What started as a proposal for modest mutual pullback
has now become, at least in Egyptian eyes, a half-step to complete
Israeli withdrawal.
-Sadat has strengthened his position and shown readiness to work
with the US, but with no movement following Secretary Rogers' trip
the Egyptians are increasingly voicing disillusionment.
--Soviet military shipments and the Soviets' own position in the UAR
also continue to grow steadily. There is no plan for relating the
USSR to our diplomatic efforts.
The aircraft pipeline to Israel runs dry in June (Phantoms) and
August (Skyhawks). When this fact becomes known, the Arabs and
Soviets will be encouraged to think that we are beginning to squeeze
Israel. Yet the Israelis do not see any US request to which they can
accede without, in their view, undercutting their negotiating position.
--If diplomatic efforts stall, the prospect is for UN debate in the fall
General Assembly and possibly rewriting of the basic UN resolution.
Beyond that, if there is no promise of further diplomatic progress,
UNCLASSIFIED Sadat' schoice whatever Soviet restraint may be exerted will
SECRE NODIS/CEDAR Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECUNOLASSIED
- 2 -
govern whether and when some UAR military effort is undertaken.
If a UAR move appears imminent, an Israeli move is likely.
Since the effort to achieve an interim settlement on the Canal will be the
focus of discussion, it is worth looking at how that idea evolved.
Given flat Israeli refusal to negotiate a peace based on withdrawal to
essentially pre-war borders, the idea of an interim settlement was broached
to Mrs. Meir in October. The purpose was to stabilize the Suez front,
thereby to buy time for peacemaking and for developing some confidence
that the two sides could work out reasonable agreements together.
Since both Egyptians and Israelis took up this idea in January-February,
it has been transformed from a modest mutual pullback and thin-out of
forces along the Canal into a withdrawal on the way to an overall settle-
ment along the lines of the "Rogers Plan. 11 From its beginnings as a
time-buying alternative to Jarring netotiations it has been transformed
in the State Department concept to a way-station in the Jarring negotiations.
Whereas Sadat in January seemed willing to consider any kind of movement,
he has since been encouraged to insist on movement only asspart of a
Jarring settlement. Israel's hard negative response to Jarring March 26 --
coupled with US diplomacy -- contributed significantly to the hardening
of his position.
During and following Secretary Rogers' trip, Israeli and UAR positions
were clarified. Eachside was given indication of some US understanding.
Sisco returned to Cairo with clear understanding that Israel would not
withdraw east of the key Sinai mountain passes; Bergus in Cairo con-
tributed ideas to a UAR paper which would extend UAR control east of
those passes. The positions now are:
The UAR would extend its control east of the passes (40-60 miles
east of the Canal), extend the ceasefire six months with a possibility of
renewal, send UAR military forces across the Canal, state that this is
the first stage in a settlement along the lines of the Rogers Plan. 11
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET UNCLASSIFIED
- 3 -
- --Israel is thinking of a very small withdrawal (10-40 miles) staying
west of the key passes, insists on indefinite ceasefire, refuses to
permit UAR military forces across the Canal, resists any linkage
between an interim Canal settlement and an overall peace settlement.
The situation now is that, by pressing for concessions that Israel is
unwilling to consider now, we seem to have lost the opportunity to
work out an interim settlement and buy time.
The question today is whether and, if so, how to try to salvage an in-
terim settlement or whether to turn to some other course.
State Department is considering two related moves: (a) inviting Prime
Minister Fawzi to Washington to explore with him whether there might
be enough flexibility in the UAR position to give us a basis for trying to
persuade Israel to make further concessions, (b) putting forward a US
proposal defining a possible compromise between UAR and Israeli posi-
tions.
The argument made for this approach is that Fawzi is the most reasonable
Egyptian to talk to and only by getting him here Sadat earlier offered
to send him can we talk to him rather than Sadat or Riad. The argu-
ment is also made that it is necessary to show more movement. On
putting forward a US position, the point is made that the two sides will not
move closer by themselves.
The argument against this approach is that, whereas our objective in
pursuing an interim settlement was to slow the pace of diplomacy, this
would speed it up. Unless we are prepared for a major contest of wills
to press Israel back behind the passes, if that is possible, having Fawzi
here with little prospect of further movement would just leade to letdown.
On putting forward a US position, the Israelis have told Sisco this would
end the US role as go-between.
The tactical alternatives to the approach the State Department is con-
sidering are quieter diplomatic approaches:
UNCLASSIFIED SECRE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
- 4 -
--One would be to conduct further discussions with the Egyptians
in Cairo through normal channels.
-Another would be to find a way for a heart-to-heart approach
to the Israelis indicating the need for movement but giving them
their choice.
--Atthird, which would risk strong Israeli reaction if Israel were
not aboard first, would be to see whether the Soviets would work
toward UAR concessions.
On a broader front the issue is whether to seek some Israeli concessions
now or to make some move -- further aircraft for Israel or strengthening
our own forces in the area to strengthen Israel's position and wait for
further Egyptian concessions with the risk that the ceasefire will break
down in six months or so.
The argument made for seeking some Israeli concessions now is to give
Sadat something to justify prolonging the ceasefire. More fundamentally,
it is that steady entrenchment of the Soviet position as the Israelis stand
fast brings the US and USSR closer to confrontation.
The argument against seeking Israeli concessions now is that it is
doubtful the US could win a confrontation of wills in the short run unless
the concessions were too minor to do any good.
Only when this question is decided will there be a rationale for allowing
a hiatus in the shipment of aircraft to Israel or continuing shipment.
UNCLASSIFIED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SOVIET PRESENCE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
I
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.