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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS:
DATE
RESTRICTION
1
Briefing
re: MBFR and CES
12/1/71
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/1
PER RAC REVIEW
SANITIZED
3/4/2009
2
Memo
Odeen to HAK
11/30/71
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/2
3
Paper
Issues Paper on MBFR and CES
12/1/71
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/3
DECLASSIFIED Per Ltr. 4/26/2013
4
Report
MBFR Analytical Summary
n.d.
B
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST: NLN 04-H-02/4
EXEMPTED Persec. 3.3(b)(5)(6); Ctr. 9/7/2012
FILE GROUP TITLE
Box H-32
NSC Institutional Files, Meeting Files
FOLDER TITLE
[06] NSC Meeting CES/MBFR (NATO Ministerial) December 1, 1971
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
Policy
commercial or financial information.
B. National security classified information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
an individual's rights.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14021 (4-85)
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
Te: MBFR and CES
12/1/71
A
(briefing)
2
Odeen to HAK
11/30/71
A
(memo)
3
Issues Paper on MBFR and CES
12/1/71
A
(paper)
4
MBFR Analytical Summary
n.d.
A
(report)
FILE LOCATION
H- Files
Box H-32
folder 6
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA 14029 (1-98)
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
I
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
November 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
I.M.
W.H.
FROM:
Jack Merritt/Bill Hyland
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting on NATO
Attached is the draft material for the NSC meeting on NATO. We are
providing this early in order to get the benefit of your guidance in
preparing the final materials which will be available on your return.
We have included:
-- draft Talking Points; and,
-- a draft Issues Paper.
Not included is any reference to Secretary Laird's possible briefing on
burdensharing. By separate memorandum John Court has recommended
you ask Laird to brief. We await your decision on this issue.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 2/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlax
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
national SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
November 30, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Vice President
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
SUBJECT:
Issues Paper for NSC Meeting, December 2.
Attached for your information is an outline paper on MBFR and a
European Security Conference that will serve as the basis for
discussion at the NSC meeting on December 2.
OMA W. Davis
Staff Secretary
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlx
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
DISTRIBUTION AUTHORIZATION
1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: ISSUES PAPER for NSC Mèeting, DEC. 2, 1971
2. SUBJECT: Draft Outline, MBFR and CES
3. DATE: NOVEMBER 30, 19.71
4. CLASSIFICATION: TOP/SECRET/SENSITI
NO. OF
ADDRESSEE
COPIES
RECIPIENT
TIME
DATE
The Vice President
1
The Attorney General
1
Bruth Jan 1:55 11/30/71
Barbara J.Gates 1305 30 Nov 21
The Director, Office of
Emergency Preparedness
1
D. Turner 1235 11/30
Sym
Hah
Kis
MBFR- 600 back into SOR - Came
up many times —
This admin - first to analyze -
Looked at 4 broad
Questi now - shall we his on /
optin a study mal - If we fix
on / it will be segmet- That is bad,
Need to force allie to Hame see
aspects - study ptem
CES - a - First will card
all aspect - May whit n- -
need to incorpate some good idea for State
people
2 levels of delay - Berli or West agreement - Or
1 min also could dely by prelin cant.
Ryan - Can dely - Told in - me of in 1772
want until the protect Brozin - blame Sor An dely
Prez - G me duly into 73
Rye - - yes - but will have me smith -
Not meceining had - can then to advanted -
Prelin cmf. at same point - law level - N.
cny.
Land - Nit McDwill follow our led - But
+ buil land on their stude we should
control was - MBFR. Can get Cary. support
In another you - But we should person
on posits so we can take lead
Rose - Sw. dn't really have an intent in MBFR.
want a cml. Major Fn. Pol. item
Land - Brosin good move - But USSR m Def.
Mina - allie suspect we my to trying to lay bas
In Unit int - also need to keep up
pressure In Free Imp. -Sn. - try to split allin ust
K allies de fear me will bilated negat MBFR
Land
son - Smith spread stay 1 possible In cut
Rogers w hat about Bund Sha
Lard - 4 ways to shore burden - 1 allen
take me resp. 2 improve from 3 offect.
Ryes - will one - Uset chartly But need
to face great I payment
Pay Hilsh
- Land - dn am intent to get them
Jones story - by term. Must keep
pressure all to & more
Money - Some inprove - but spotty
Pres - Warm Part Fore -?
Helm - No Change since last summer
Land Um form in let shape she pre- U.N.
S0,000 ant will hut - 10000.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY council
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
November 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
Bur
FROM:
Philip Odeen/Hal
SUBJECT:
Materials for the NSC Meeting on MBFR and CSCE
(NATO's new term for CES)
Attached are your materials for the NSC meeting on Wednesday,
December 1, 1971. Included are:
1. Your Talking Points.
2. Your memorandum to the President.
3. The President's Talking Points.
4. The Issues Paper.
5. Analytical Summary of the Options Evaluation Report.
6. Analytical Summary of the NSSM 138 (CES) Report.
The nature of the meeting has been changed following the President's
announcements that he will be visiting with the heads of government
of our major Allies in the near future.
The review of U.S. positions on MBFR and CSCE was accordingly set in
a broader framework of Allied concerns. The aim of reaching definitive
U.S. policy positions has been somewhat overtaken by the need for pre-
parations to make the most from the President's consultations with our
Allies.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtly
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
2
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
TOP SECRET
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE --
AGENDA AS NOW ENVISAGED
WARSAW PACT
NATO
1. Renunciation of the threat or use of
1. Principles which should govern
force; respect for existing borders;
relátions between states, in-
cluding renunciation of the use
of force;
2. Expansion of economic, scientific-
2. (a) Economic, scientific, technical
technical, cultural and environmental
cultural and environmental coop-
cooperation;
eration;
(b) Freer movement of people,
ideas and information;
3. A permanent organ" for questions
3.
Possible establishment of a
of security and cooperation in Europe,
permanent body (through publicly
including reduction of armed forces.
stated to date only as a means of
embarking on multilateral nego-
tiations).
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/20
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
TOP SECRET
R76x
HAK TALKING
POINTS
TOP SECRET
HAK TALKING POINTS
NSC MEETING ON MBFR AND CES
December 1, 1971
Mr. President:
In preparation for the NATO Ministerial Meetings in early December
the U.S. should review its positions on MBFR and CES [or CSCE (Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) as it is now called in
NATO].
How we proceed in NATO will be conditioned by:
-- Your meetings with several of our Allied heads of government,
-- Any Pact initiatives which result from the Warsaw Pact meeting
on MBFR and CSCE on Tuesday, November 30, 1971,
-- The status of the NATO Explorer's Mission to Moscow.
The major issues we should discuss are those issues on which we
will be questioned by our Allies in December:
-- Our response will be sought at the Meetings to the analysis
of MBFR Options, which we recently transmitted to NATO;
-- Our Allies will want to know any U.S. preferences on when
MBFR negotiations could start and the pace they should take;
-- Finally, they will ask about U.S. attitudes toward a European
Conference, including the relationship of a CSCE and MBFR.
TOP SECRET-
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 21/18/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtbx
TOP SECRET
2
Our NATO Allies will feel justified in pressing us on these topics
primarily for two reasons:
-- We promised the Alliance a report on our study of MBFR
options, but we have not made U.S. preferences clear;
- - Several Allies have maintained that they cannot adopt definitive
policy positions on MBFR or CSCE until the U.S. positions are known.
In fact the actual concerns of our Allies, and notably the Germans,
has been that the U.S. might either be secretly working toward a bilateral
arrangement with the Soviets or that we might be preparing for a unilateral
cut. It is important to give reassurance to our Allies that the U.S. is
not planning such moves.
MBFR Options Evaluation
Let us consider first the status of our evaluation of MBFR Options.
We have recently completed an interagency study of four basic
types of MBFR options which may be categorized as:
-- Limited 10% & 20%] symmetrical percentage reductions in
ground forces with variants including tactical air forces in equal percentages
with ground forces;
-- Major 30%] symmetrical percentage reductions in ground forces
with variants including tactical air forces again in equal percentages with
ground forces;
3
TOP SECRET
-- Common ceiling options based in one case on equipment and
in another on manpower;
-- A "mixed package" option (which is composed of dissimilar
force elements) built on NATO aircraft and Pact tanks.
There were two forms of analysis performed for these options, one
used a computer to simulate a dynamic conflict situation and the other
used static ratios of opposing forces, based on several categories of
manpower and weapons.
Neither of these analyses can be taken as more than very approximate
models of the actual situation. They are limited in many ways, but they
are the best analytical efforts we have been able to produce thus far.
They are still not entirely complete and other analytical approaches
need to be explored. But they do provide useful insights. Both methods
of analysis concurred that there was a detrimental trend for NATO from
symmetrical percentage reductions and that there was a significant
adverse military effect on NATO from large symmetrical percentage
reductions. The analyses diverage somewhat over the military significance
of limited reductions, such as a 10% symmetrical reduction, but NATO
clearly would not gain anything.
The common ceiling options were shown to be
favorable to NATO, because the ceilings were set very close to current
NATO levels. This produced pronounced asymmetrical reductions for
the Pact. The main difficulty with these options is their probable non-
negotiability.
TOP SECRET
4
The mixed package option had to be analyzed using subjective
military judgment, since our computer based models generally cannot
evaluate trade-offs between dissimilar force elements, especially ground
and air elements. However, a static force ratio comparison was made.
Both analyses concluded that the particular mixed packages studied were was so small
(at most
it would involve 42 F-4 aircraft and 899 Soviet tanks) that no significant
military effects would result.
Summing up then, the general conclusion of the existing U.S. analysis
of MBFR options is that no option clearly met the criterion of
undiminished military security for NATO and IS also realistically viable
for negotiation.
This fact strongly conditions what we are prepared to say to our Allies
about our preferences for negotiations. It would be possible for the U.S.
to press, in December, for early negotiations, but the second defeat of
a Mansfield Amendment for Europe has bought us a little time. Unless we
develop a strong Western consensus on what should be sought through MBFR
and how it should be attained, the Alliance will be susceptible to divisive
Soviet negotiating tactics and serious splits could develop.
We are in a position now to set the pace on MBFR; if we concentrate
on explaining our analyses to our Allies, we can build more of a Western
consensus on MBFR and at the same time convey the continuing interest
of the U.S. in the security of Western Europe.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
NA just pare? 5
Weat do we want?
If it was decided to enter any MBFR negotiations early on, the pace
of any negotiations would, in light of what I have outlined, have to be
deliberate and drawn out to give the Alliance a chance to reach agreement
at each step. In any event, a phased approach to negotiations has been
given careful U.S. study, and we have found that it could give us a lot
of flexibility.
Another major issue which we should address is the interconnection
between MBFR and a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
These two topics have been kept on separate tracks, but it is important
to think about them together, regardless of whether we choose to connect
them in practical terms. First let me focus on the Conference specifically.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Timing 6 1talk
CSCE
Nature stalks talks
The issues related to a Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe will almost certainly be high on the agenda of the NATO
discussions, as well as your meetings with European leaders.
The current situation is:
-- If the second phase of the Berlin talks between the Germans
is successful, as seems likely, we will face the question of whether to
move into preparations for a European Conference.
-- Most of our Allies, including the Germans, are willing to
accept the completion of the second Berlin phase, as sufficient progress
to begin the discussion with the East on a Conference.
-- Our position, however, is that the Berlin agreement must be
completely wrapped up, that is, the final four power protocol must be
signed before beginning preparations for a European Conference.
The most immediate issue, therefore, is whether to hold to our
position, or give into the lesser position adopted by some if not all of
the Allies:
TOP SECRET
7
TOP SECRET
-- If we begin conference preparations without full implementation
of the Berlin agreement, we risk losing the Berlin achievements. The
Conference could accomplish Soviet objectives of ratifying the status quo
in Eastern Europe and gaining influence over Western policy -- - that is,
presenting a European security system as an alternative to NATO.
-- On the other hand, sticking to our linkage of the final protocol signa- -
ture as the precondition to beginning the preparatory talks on a Conference
will be difficult to achieve in the face of the European desire to show
progress on a Conference.
-- Moreover, this position, in effect, puts on greater pressures
to ratify the German treaties in the Bundestag especially if the Soviets
continue to insist on implementing the Berlin agreement simultaneously
with the Soviet-German treaty ratification.
If we do prevail in the NATO discussions, the timetable of convening
the first stage of conference preparations might be as late as April, when
the Bundestag completes ratifications of the treaty, or they disapprove it.
We would have to consider whether it would be prudent to delay
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
8
for a short while, e.g., until after the Moscow summit in May.
Character of a Conference
These issues of timing are not merely procedural, because there
is agreement that we are not ready to begin substantive discussions with
the East.
-- NATO preparations thus far have brought out divergent
approaches.
-- For example, some favor a short conference, with longer
preparatory sessions to achieve agreement.
-- Others favor a series of meetings, alternating Ministerial
meetings with working levels session.
However, the basic divergence is over what a Conference would accomplish.
The first alternative is the Soviet approach -- a conference
for the sake of atmospherics.
-- While none of the Allies explicitly favor this, their lack of
agreement on what steps we could take to give a conference some
substance makes the Soviet approach difficult to resist.
A second approach favored by France is to exclude all security
issues, and concentrate on measures of "cooperation;" that is, economic,
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
9
scientific and cultural exchanges.
-- This would circumvent some of the Soviet security issues --
such as a renunciation of force agreement -- but would also be euphoric.
-- Real East-West economic issues are not likely to be resolved
in a Conference of some thirty nations.
A Third Approach would be to try to move from declarations
and agreements to more concrete measures.
-- For example, if the Soviets propose agreement on non-use of
force, we would examine what restrictions on movement of military forces
might be appropriate to implement such a declarations.
-- We might consider establishing some kind of machinery to carry
out agreed measures.
-- This approach is not yet worked out, and would need much more
time to develop with the Allies.
-- In this scenario we would probably want to hold a deputy foreign
minister meeting, say around April, SO that we can work out a common
Western framework for the Conference.
In summary, we have the following questions:
1. Whether to retain the condition that the Berlin agreement must be
fully completed before we can begin any multilateral preparations for a
TOP SECRET
10
TOP SECRET
European Conference.
2. Whether to aim for postponing these preliminary discussions
until after the Moscow summit.
3. What approach to take toward the outcome of a conference:
a. A purely atmospheric conference, minimizing our losses
as proves feasible.
b. A conference that excludes security issues in favor of
cooperation in non-military areas.
c. A conference on both security and cooperation, but with
a set of concrete proposals, rather than broad agreements.
Returning now to the interconnection between MBFR and CES, if
the approach taken toward a CES is to focus on agreements on both
security and cooperation, it would be possible to use such a forum to
reach agreements which precede the type of collateral constraints we
have discussed for MBFR. I am not endorsing such a concept, but it
should be introduced for discussion. It would imply delaying actual force
reductions until after the more general political discussion on European
security had been carried out and some agreements reached.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMO FOR THE
PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger HC
SUBJECT:
NSC Consideration of NATO Issues:
(1) Mutual Force Reductions
(2) European Security Conference
The meetings of NATO Ministers next week (December 8-10) will be
dominated by two issues: the question of a Western position on Mutual
and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and preparations for a European
Conference on Security and Cooperation. On both subjects our Allies will
be looking to the U.S. for an indication of how we wish to deal with them.
-- Both of these issues bear importantly on Western security interests.
If not handled properly the results could be highly dangerous. It is important
that we maintain our focus on the implications for the military balance of any
force reductions and on the substance of European security, rather than drift
into ill-defined negotiations that will only work to the Soviet advantage.
-- On neither of these issues is the Western Alliance in a position to
move ahead; there is no consensus on the aims of either mutual force
reductions or a European conference.
-- We need more time to develop concrete proposals.
-- Finally, multilateral negotiations of this sort on European issues
should come after, not before your meeting in Moscow. Moreover, we
should have some greater assurance of a satisfactory outcome in SALT.
Background
MBFR: The Western initiative, dating back to 1968, for negotiations
on the reduction of forces in Central Europe was largely academic until
last Spring when Brezhnev offered to begin negotiations. As a consequence
of the Soviet response, we have intensified our study of the issues. Within
the Alliance there has been a sharp revival of interest in negotiations
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/18/02
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlx
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
because of: (1) the Soviet response on MBFR; (2) the on-going U.S.
and FRG negotiations with the Soviets; and, (3) the Mansfield proposals
for unilateral reductions.
Our own studies have shown that almost every model for reductions that
would be negotiable with the Soviets would damage the Western military
position. Small reductions that minimize the adverse consequences are
almost impossible to verify, whereas larger reductions do major damage
mainly because the Soviets withdraw only to Western Russia while we
withdraw across the Atlantic.
Though these conclusions are not surprising, they are being submerged
in other considerations. For various reasons MBFR negotiations have
become a highly political issue in Europe.
Many Allies (and some in our own government) believe that our
Congressional critics can be placated by MBFR negotiations.
Others believe that MBFR is an instrument for European detente,
and should be pursued for this purpose.
In addition, some of our Allies suspect that we want to arrange a
bilateral reduction with the USSR and wish to forestall this through early
negotiations.
Our objective, therefore, must be to impress the Allies that we are not
interested in reductions for the sake of a better atmosphere and to assure
them that no bilateral bargain will be made with the USSR. We want to
force our Allies to recognize the problems and implications of MBFR and
to focus on the security consequences to the Alliance's military posture.
Unless maintenance of a military balance is the principal criteria for
judging MBFR, we will be engaged in the impossible task of trading
military security for some vague and undefinable degree of detente.
A Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This issue has been
pressed with varying degrees of urgency by the Soviets since 1954, and for
good reason. As they define it, such a Conference would issue declarations
of non-aggression, recognize existing borders, and agree on increased
economic cooperation. Their aim is to solidify the status quo in Eastern
Europe, while extending their own influence in the Western Alliance.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
On this issue there is growing Allied pressure simply to move to
negotiations. The Alliance consideration of the subjects to be
discussed and what the Western position would be has been limited
and without consensus. Negotiations at this point would almost
certainly result in a Soviet-style conference agreeing on broad
generalities.
We need to redirect the work of the Allies so that principles of
security are translated into specific measures. If we can do this,
a negotiation later may actually enhance the Western position.
Priorities and Timing
We have set no precondition for MBFR, but the Soviets are clearly
dragging their feet by refusing thus far to accept Brosio as the NATO
"explorer" of MBFR principles. Until they do agree to receive Brosio
we need make no further effort to open negotiations; we should use the
time for the Alliance to digest the analytical result of our studies. We
have just completed a major study and transmitted it to NATO. One
approach which deserves further discussion involves phased negotiations,
with extensive discussion of principles in the early stages and prior to
negotiations on reductions.
On a European conference we are committed to begin the preparations
once the Berlin issue is completed. Some Allies, notably Britain and
France, and perhaps West Germany, would be willing to move toward
a conference as soon as the current phase of the Berlin talks, between
East and West German, is completed (perhaps late this week). We
want to stick to the condition of completely wrapping up Berlin. The
Soviets appear to be insisting that Berlin will be held open until their
German treaty is ratified in Bonn. If so, preparations of a European
conference will be put over until the spring and, thus, should be held
up until your meeting in Moscow. In this case, agreement to begin a
European conference might be a summit decision.
Proposed Conduct of the Meeting
Since we can anticipate pressure from the Allies to show "movement"
at the Ministerial meeting, it will be important for you to impress on
the NSC meeting that we will not move until we are assured that in both
issues (MBFR and a conference) we can develop a common Western
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
position that insures that our security interests will be maintained
intact.
(You may wish to say that both issues should be delayed until after
the summit.)
I suggest that you conduct the meeting as follows:
-- Call on Director Helms to brief on the outcome of the November 30
Warsaw Pact meeting on MBFR and the European conference.
-- Call on me to outline the issues and alternatives.
-- Make clear that you do not want a substantive movement on
these issues now.
-- Discuss the conclusions we draw from the MBFR options analysis
and Allied reactions, calling first on Secretary Rogers.
-- Discuss the sequence of MBFR negotiations, once started.
-- Discuss the preconditions (Berlin) for a Conference.
-- Discuss the character of the Conference we want.
Your Talking Points are written in the above fashion.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
PRESIDENTS'
TALKING POINTS
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT
NSC MEETING ON MBFR AND CSCE
December 1, 1971
The purpose of this meeting is to review the results of the U.S.
study efforts on MBFR and CSCE and to examine our positions on these
two topics, especially in preparation for the December NATO
Ministerial Meetings.
I would first like to ask Director Helms to give us a summary
of any information points from the Warsaw Pact meeting.
[Helm's Briefing]
I would like Dr. Kissinger to outline issues and alternatives.
[Kissinger's Briefing]
It seems clear that we need to move very slowly in relation to
both the European Conference and MBFR. We need to develop a
common understanding which clearly maintains security interests.
Let's take up the issues connected with MBFR first of all.
MBFR Options Analysis
What kind of response can we expect from our Allies as they
absorb what we have sent them? Secretary Rogers.
[Rogers' Views]
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[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer,
and Director Helms. ]
I would like your feelings on the proper course for further U.S.
efforts. Secretary Rogers.
[Rogers' Views]
[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, and
perhaps Director Helms. ]
MBFR Negotiations
Secretary Rogers, what is your view of how we might phase the
negotiating process? [That is, do we want a preliminary stage dealing
with principles. ]
[Rogers' Views]
[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird. ]
European Conference
One issue revolves around the preconditions for the start of
multilateral preparations for a European Security Conference. We have
been holding to the final signing of the four power protocol on Berlin
as a precondition.
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Secretary Rogers, what preconditions do you feel we should require?
[Rogers' Views]
[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, and possibly Admiral
Moorer and Director Helms.
]
There are several outstanding proposals within the Alliance for
the form a conference should take, which means this issue would have
to be resolved before substantive discussions with the East are begun.
But I want to know what form of a European Conference could serve
U.S. interests ? Secretary Rogers. [e.g. a conference involving
(1) only detente; or, (2) economic cooperation; or (3) substantive
security issues ?]
[Rogers' Views]
[You will then want to call on Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer and
Director Helms. ]
This has been a most interesting and useful meeting. I will
consider the issues and your remarks and let you know my decisions
soon.
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ISS UES
PAPER
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
ISSUES PAPER
NSC Meeting on MBFR and CES
December 1, 1971
The major purpose of this meeting is to review the positions on MBFR
and CES the United States should take at the NATO Ministerial Meetings
set for December 8-10; the topics of MBFR and CES will be major
issues for discussion within the Alliance. In particular, U.S. thinking
will be solicited on MBFR in conjunction with the U.S. analysis of four
MBFR Options recently transmitted to NATO.
The principal issues to be considered by the NSC are as follows:
-- the U.S. response to our MBFR Options analysis;
-- whether we favor early MBFR negotiations;
-- what pace MBFR negotiations should follow;
-- the attitudes toward a CES.
Allied Attitudes
Our NATO allies expected more definitive inputs from the U.S. on MBFR
by the end of summer; in particular, we had promised to transmit to
NATO papers on MBFR Elements and MBFR Options. The Elements
paper was largely overtaken by the development of the NATO Principles
and Guidelines for the NATO "Explorer" on MBFR, Manlio Brosiol/.
There was, however, still great interest in the U.S. Options Paper.
The interest turned to anxiety and that to "angst", especially on the part
of the FRG, as the U.S. continued to delay its options study. Strong
European concerns have been voiced that the U.S. might either be gear-
ing up for a bilateral agreement with the Soviets, or planning a unilateral
disengagement from Europe.
1 / Brosio has not yet been received by Soviets. They are expected to
receive him eventually, but appear in no hurry, even though they have
been informed of the desire to have him report his findings at the Decem-
ber NATO Meetings.
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Internally these pressures from our Allies for clearer indications of
U.S. intentions on MBFR were interpreted as an Allied desire for clear
U.S. leadership, including a preferred U.S. option. To the contrary,
it seems more plausible that the Allies, quite properly, are fearful of
the potential of a mishandled MBFR; they want to be reassured that they
will be consulted, and that MBFR will move at a pace consistent with a
Western understanding of and consensus on MBFR.
MBFR
A. Introduction
The U.S. has promised NATO that it would transmit its analysis of MBFR
options; the options studied may be stated briefly as follows:
Limited (i.e. 10% & 20%) symmetrical percentage reductions
in ground forces with variants including tactical air forces in equal per -
centages with ground forces;
-- Major (i.e. 30%) symmetrical reductions in ground forces
with variants including tactical air forces in equal percentages with
ground forces.
-- Common ceiling options based on (1) equipment (tanks and
aircraft) and (2) manpower, both at about current NATO levels;
--"Mixed packages" (Options composed of dissimilar force
elements) of NATO aircraft and Pact tanks.
Two types of analysis have been performed for these options and their
variants. One analysis (called a "dynamic" analysis) used a computer
based model of opposing forces in aggregated terms which makes adjust-
ments as each pe riod of time passes in a simulated conflict. Another
analysis (called "static force ratio" analysis) used comparisons both of
the ratios of numbers of men and equipment and ratios of weighted weapons
values (such "values" or weapons scores reflect the performance of a
weapon).
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A subjective military assessment was made on the mixed package options
in lieu of a dynamic analysis. Also dynamic analysis has not yet been
performed for common ceilings based on manpower.
A set of nuclear options has also been developed, but has not yet been
analyzed in detail. Nuclear options as such have not been mentioned in
discussions with the Allies. U.S. nuclear policies have been a sensitive
subject within the Alliance, and there is an agency consensus that although
we should study nuclear options, we should not be the ones to raise the
subject without extremely compelling reasons.
The Verification Panel met on November 19, 1971 to consider the basic
issues of MBFR in the light of our analytical findings. It was determined
that the NSC should consider:
-- What preferences the U.S. has among options,
-- Whether we want early MBFR negotiations,
-- What negotiating pace we favor if negotiations are undertaken.
Additionally the Verification Panel decided what should be sent to NATO.
It was decided to send the complete package of analytical results to NATO
following appropriate editing of the text from the MBFR Options Evalua-
tion Report. It was also decided not to send any of our options with a
nuclear focus, although further internal work will be performed on these
options.
A. Results of U.S. Analysis
The following results were the outcomes of models which are quite limited
in their reflection of actual military situations. The models do, however,
provide some quantitative framework for comparison and discussion. No
single definitive measure was produced for weighing the various MBFR
options; results were presented which required the reader to make his
own evaluation of the relative risks or benefits involved.
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In addition there were the standard caveats relating to the choice of
detailed assumptions which had direct bearing on the results received.
This could not be summarized, but the assumptions were debated thoroughly
at the working level. As many reservations as there may be with respect
to these analyses, they can be argued carefully, based on the assumptions
that were made. The U.S. analyses represent the most advanced work
available on this subject.
1. Dynamic Analysis
The variables selected as critical indicators of NATO's ground capability
were the simulated times for the movement of the Front Edge of the
Battle Area (FEBA) to the Rhine River and to the Weser River. Similarly
the measures of effectiveness for the air campaign were assumed as the
time to local air superiority (which was defined for analysis as an overall
force ratio of 1.5 to 1), the time totheater air superiority (requiring a
force ratio of 3 to 1), and the net percent Pact advantage in close air
support delivered during the simulated war. [The Pact had local air
superiority at D-Day, with a ratio of 1.7 to 1 and retained it throughout
the conflict. ]
The results for the dynamic analysis are currently only available for
a scenario where the Pact had a two week lead in mobilization and attacked
NATO after three weeks (i.e. D-Day is Pact M+21 and NATO M+7).
The results for the dynamic analysis of the symmetrical percentage
reduction options indicated a degradation of NATO's simulated military
situation which increases with the size of ground force reductions. Only
the common ceiling option (6, 000 tanks and 1, 200 aircraft) does not degrade
NATO's military capability; however, this option was judged to be virtually
non-negotiable.
The dynamic analysis also indicated that with symmetrical percentage
reductions there would also be an increasing degradation of NATO's
reserve force capability. Alternatively NATO could reconstitute its
reserve forces by thinning forces along its defensive frontage, but
neither approach avoids some detrimental effects.
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The dynamic air analysis was evaluated separately from the ground
campaign, although there was interplay between the two in the war gaming
models. The results are quite similar to those found for ground forces.
The air reduction area was taken as the NATO Guidelines Area (which
was used for ground reductions) and the UK, Denmark, France, and
Hungary. The reason was to get approximately the same number of
aircraft for NATO and the Pact in a reduction area. On reflection this
area has some political and tactical disadvantages, so that an alternative
area should be studied.
Option 4, the limited mixed package was assessed on the basis of subjective
military analysis. The evaluation was that with strategic warning available
no reduction in NATO and Pact capabilities would occur. This evaluation
was qualified, however, as follows:
-- It was limited to 50 NATO aircraft,
-- It assumed that the withdrawn U.S. squadron would be
maintained as a dual-based unit in a high state of readiness,
-- It assumed verification of Soviet tank reductions,
-- It assumed completion of sufficient shelters to protect re- -
maining NATO tactical aircraft and dual based squadrons.
2. Static Force Ratio Analysis
Analysts performing the static force ratio analysis felt that the inter- -
agency definitions of reductions were not precise enough to identify
specific forces. Their reductions in ground forces were accordingly
independently structured in three different ways:
-- Reduction in Total Manpower. This reduction is accomplished
by reducing first the personnel not assigned to identifiable combat or
support units and then if necessary personnel assigned to service support
units. It was not possible to identify unassigned personnel for stationed
Soviet forces and consequently reductions for these forces were taken
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from service support units.
-- Reduction in Manpower Assigned to Combat Units. This
reduction was accomplished by reducing combat units of divisional, brigade,
or battalion size whose total manpower is the appropriate percentage of
the total manpower in major combat units.
-- Reduction Keyed to Medium Tanks. This reduction was made
by reducing combat units of divisional, brigade, or battalion size whose
total count is the appropriate percentage of the total number of tanks in
the major combat units of each country. This excluded reductions of tanks
in war reserves.
It was confirmed that the selection of the particular units to be reduced
tends to determine how given MBFR options govern the ratios present
following reductions as much as the nominal options themselves.
The static force ratio results can be summarized as follows:
-- 10% reductions in total manning have no predictable effect
on military security unless more restrictions on the units to come out
are made, since reductions can often be carried out using support of national
command manpower which does not contribute directly to the combat cap-
ability of forces in war or result in any major reduction in equipment.
-- 10% reductions in major combat unit manpower favor NATO
in that they would involve a higher cut in the number of Warsaw Pact com-
bat manpower and medium tanks reduced than in NATO forces without
necessarily weakening NATO security.
-- 10% cuts in medium tanks strength can be accomplished by
the Pact in a way that would result in NATO having to cut more manpower
than the Pact since some Pact units have a much higher ratio of tanks to
manpower than most NATO units.
-- Option 1A would probably favor the Warsaw Pact more than
Option 1 since it would increase the number of U.S. and U.K. force cuts
relative to other forces.
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-- Option 2 (30% symmetrical) produced changes in total force
ratios with roughly the same trends as the analysis of Option 1 and Option
1A, but with more pronounced effects.
-- The common ceiling options were all favorable to NATO, but
again their negotiability was strongly questioned.
-- In Option 4, either the trade of 589 Soviet medium tanks (with
their associated manpower and equipment) for one squadron of U.S. F-4s
(24 aircraft), or the trade of 899 Soviet medium tanks for one U.S. and
one U.K. squadron of F-4s ( a total of 42 aircraft), would improve NATO's
M-Day land force position relative to the Warsaw Pact. They could, how-
ever, be carried out by cutting only two to three Warsaw Pact divisions
and would not significantly correct NATO's present inferiority in tank
strength.
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B. U.S. Conclusions and Intentions on MBFR
Timing of Negotiations
It would be possible for the U.S. to press for early negotiations on
MBFR at the December NATO Ministerials. The argumentation on
this issue is given below:
Advantages
-- It would help ease Congressional pressures for troop reductions
in Europe (but following another Senate defeat, these pressures are
temporarily in check).
-- It would allow the U.S. and NATO to retain the initiative on
MBFR.
Disadvantages
-- The NATO Alliance would be very susceptible to Soviet propa-
ganda in negotiations unless there were a strong Western consensus
on what would be sought through MBFR and how it was to be attained.
-- Although the Allies wish to know what the U.S. wants to do on
MBFR, a move toward early negotiations, without a clear indication
of the specific objectives envisioned, especially reduction objectives,
would probably alarm them.
-- The general conclusion of our analysis is that no option can
clearly meet the criterion of undiminished military security for NATO
and is also realistically viable for negotiation.
-- We are in a position to set the pace on MBFR; if we concentrate
our efforts on explaining our analysis to our Allies, we can help to
build more of a Western consensus on MBFR, while at the same time
serving to convey the U.S.'s continuing interest in the long run security
of Western Europe.
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Pace of Negotiations
If negotiations should be undertaken, then the pace of negotiations
could be regulated both by the process for negotiations and the ultimate
reductions aims sought. MBFR which is a gesture of good will on the
part of the West might involve token reductions and be negotiated
relatively briefly with a minimum of discussion on principles and
collateral constraints. Our analysis has shown that such cuts are not
attractive from a military standpoint, but it might be preferable to
dropping the whole subject if the Soviets are interested in MBFR
primarily for the purpose of a platform for propaganda.
Another general alternative would be for some limited reduction aims
which could be pursued through deliberate and protracted discussions,
perhaps including formal agreements on principles and collateral
measures. This approach would be attractive if the Soviets are seriously
interested in improving the political climate between East and West,
but are not especially interested in large changes in force levels.
Finally a protracted negotiation approach would be essential for
discussions which aim toward major force reductions in a serious
spirit of arms control. Such negotiations run the risk of reaching an
impasse or having to fall back to some form of token reduction.
From a U.S. point of view, the concept of phasing MBFR negotiations
and reductions can have several potential advantages:
-- It could permit the negotiating process to start without initial
reference to actual reductions.
-- It could permit the U.S. and the West some control -- perhaps
a large measure -- over the pace of negotiations leading to reductions,
and of the reduction process itself.
-- It could permit reductions of different nationalities or different
categories of forces to be handled sequentially or simultaneously.
-- It could permit progressively greater stabilizing measures and
constraints, as well as clauses allowing reentry of forces in time of
crisis, to be sought as progressively greater reductions are discussed.
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In addition, a phased approach can be a useful means to meet certain
Allied concerns with MBFR. It could provide time to develop a
Western Caucus on MBFR stages in light of the results of each
preceding stage. It could also provide a means to meet the problem
of participation in the negotiating process. For example, an "inner
circle" of other interested countries could participate in an assess-
ment phase following each stage of reductions.
There are also potential disadvantages:
-- The Warsaw Pact may be reluctant to agree to constraints
before any reductions are agreed to, since NATO stands to gain more
from the constraints that have been considered.
-- The other side or our allies could also seek to control the
process to accelerate or slow down reductions at a time when it was
not to U.S. advantage.
-- A discussion of principles, or of constraints, could involve
subjects we might wish to avoid at that stage (e.g., Forward Based
Systems).
Further Work
The most promising area for further study of alternatives for MBFR
appears to be the exploration of more ways to address those force
elements which both sides see as destabilizing. This approach would
concentrate attention on making reductions in offensively oriented
weapons, that is weapons systems which can project military power
into the territory of the other side.
We know that the Soviets are concerned about our forward based strike
aircraft, and we know that the Allies are fearful of Pact tanks and
missiles. Our first "mixed package" options (involving dissimilar
force elements) involved NATO aircraft and Pact tanks, but they appear
too small. The analysis of such options is inherently very complex
and to date we have no standardized methods to analyze such reductions.
This means we would have to rely to a large measure on subject military
judgment to evaluate such options militarily.
Also this kind of reduction would inherently involve arduous negotiations,
since the force to be reduced are not easily comparable. Such
negotiations could run the risk of reaching an impasse or having to
fall back to a token cut.
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C. MBFR in a CES?
The possibility exists for negotiation of MBFR as a part of a CES.
The arguments are given as follows:
Advantages
-- It would allow European nations not directly involved to have
a voice;
-- It would give a broader more political framework for force
reductions;
-- It would give a very substantive focus to a security conference.
Disadvantages
-- Pan-European discussions of security would be unwieldy and
immensely complex.
-- Nations not having a direct role could cause problems with
little to lose from their standpoint.
-- Many of the topics would be too sensitive to be suitable for
discussion generally at a security conference, and would have to be
handled separately anyway.
The consensus of the agencies is to avoid placing MBFR in a CES,
although mention of MBFR at a CES would be unavoidable.
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CES
A. Introduction
An overview of the issues surrounding a Conference of European
Security are the following:
-- What should our basic attitude be toward a CES, if we assume
early completion of all phases of the Berlin negotiations make CES
a live issue in the next months.
Our choices seem to be:
1. A Conference that simply promotes detente, as the Soviets
propose.
2. A Conference that excludes security issues in favor of European
"Cooperation. " (The French approach.)
3. An approach that emphasizes more security issues and practical
measures of implementation including the possible establishment of
follow-on machinery.
The underlying issue is what U.S. interests can be served by CES,
where it fits into larger scheme of SALT, summit, MBFR and East-
West detente.
What we are really deciding is not only whether to hold MBFR or CES,
but whether to organize East-West relations in multilateral framework
for the inevitable second stage after Berlin, or whether to allow bilatera-
lism to grow. MBFR and CES are highly risky, but may be manageable.
Bilateralism adds the risks of loss of U.S. influence and control and,
perhaps most important may contribute to a fission of U.S. and Western
Europe and division within Western Europe. If we believe these are
real risks -- i.e., that Ostpolitik will drive the French into the arms
of Russia and split Britain and France from Germany -- then we should
be willing to accept the risks inherent in CES and MBFR.
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B. Alternative Forms for a CES
If we continue along our present lines we will end up with either (1) a
Conference on the Soviet type -- with no substantive meaning or (2)
with some agreed declarations that seem to safeguard our positions,
but in fact will probably be of no great value and may be sources of dispute
over interpretation.
-- If we continue along this line, the only saving grace is that we
can stay in line with most of our Allies, who, for differing reasons,
are willing to have a Conference. In particular, the French see the
Conference as a means to defer hard security issues of troop levels
and divert attention into "cooperation"; only after a long period of relaxed
atmosphere would they approach security issues. (The French, of
course, are not adverse to ratifying the status quo, especially in
Germany.)
-- The Germans, on the other hand, see both CES and MBFR as
part of a "process" of testing the Soviets and establishing detente by
stages. The Conference would have to deal with some security issues
and not be consigned to cooperation questions only. In reality the
Germans are under pressure to "accelerate" a Conference as the next
installment payment to Moscow for the treaty.
-- In addition there is a procedural split: the French want several
stages but the Germans are inclined to complete preparations, including
actual agreements, and then have one meeting. We incline to the
German position, but the French are gaining support for a compromise
of reasonably thorough preparations, then first ministerial, followed
by subcommittee work, and final ministerial.
One alternative within the context of our present course is to try to add
agenda items such as freer movement of people which supposedly limits
the damage of Soviet gains on a non-use-of-force agreement.
-- The Allies do not oppose this outright but have little stomach
for debate with the Soviets or confrontation; the French would solve
this by dealing only with economic, cultural, scientific exchanges, etc.
Agenda
If there is no shift from this course we will go into preparatory talks
with the following agenda.
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WARSAW PACT
NATO
1. Force renunciation and
1. Principles which should govern
respect for existing borders;
relations between states, in-
cluding renunciation of the use
of force; but some disclaimer
on borders;
2. Economic, scientific, technical,
2. (a) Economic, scientific, techni-
cultural and environmental co-
cal, cultural and environmental
operation;
cooperation;
(b) Freer movement of people,
ideas and information;
3. Establishment of a permanent
3. Possible establishment of a
"organ" for questions of
permanent body (not agreed in
security and cooperation in
NATO).
Europe.
Alternatives to the Present Course
1. Transform Conference into European Cooperation only --
economics, culteral, etc.
2. Adopt an approach to emphasize security issues, and creation
of follow-on machinery.
The alternative of a Conference on European Cooperation might circum-
vent problems in dealing with the Soviet proposals on non-use-of-force
and territorial integrity, but some euphoric fall-out is still likely from
any conference; the main issues of cooperation are not suitable for a
CES, but more plausible for the EC dealing with CEMA or even the ECE.
The U.S. would be a spectator in this proposal and such a conference,
if it dealt with economic relations, might raise divisive issues if the
West had not straightened out its monetary and trade problems.
Emphasis on Security
-- Under this approach we could take a more positive attitude towards
CES, in effect embracing it in order to press for (a) some element of
arms control principles in the various conference declarations, which
would then serve as a bridge to practical control measures of constraints
on force movements, maneuvers, etc.; (b) to establish post-conference
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machinery that would institutionalize the U.S. role in European security
and provide a forum for Eastern Europeans to exercise some freedom
of action and perhaps to influence Soviet policy.
-- Disadvantages are that the Allies might be apprehensive that we
were trying to go too far in placating the Soviets by establishing a new
security "system" as a new device for U.S. disengagement.
-- In addition, the Soviets would be in a position to force their
demands, and then stall actual implementation of any practical measure
and render any "machinery" ineffective.
In sum, the Alliance is not substantively prepared for a Conference
other than the Soviet model. We need to reduce the rhetorical approach
to concrete proposals before entering into East-West contacts.
Preconditions for a Conference
We are committed by NATO legislative history to begin multilateral
talks in preparation for an actual Conference after the Berlin negotiations
are completed.
The question is: does this mean all phases of Berlin negotiations ? The
French, British, and perhaps the Germans would be willing to begin
preparations for CES after the inner-German talks are completed, even
if the final Berlin protocol is delayed by Soviet linkage to the treaty
ratification.
The Soviets accept the Berlin condition in practice, but are mounting
pressures for a firm commitment to a Conference "as early as 1972"
and moving to preliminary talks immediately. This is one motive in
speeding up the inner-German negotiations.
-- If we expect the Conference to have any chance of achieving
substantive results we should also defer preparatory talks until Berlin
is completely wrapped up.
In addition there is advantage in waiting until after the Moscow
summit to begin CES preparations.
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D. MBFR and CES
Our position is that the two issues should be kept separate but this is
up to the Soviets. They can drag out MBFR until Berlin is finished
and then press for an immediate start toward CES. They probably
will not turn down having MBFR begin first if we seriously press them,
but they are certainly in no hurry.
The real issue is which of these two potential disasters we wish to
address first.
-- MBFR is at least a substantive issue and deals with security;
whereas CES is largely atmospheric.
-- On the other hand, our losses in MBFR are tangible and not
to be recouped, whereas CES could be managed.
-- If MBFR risks serious losses, then there is much to be said
for holding it off as long as possible: one means to do it is to switch
to CES as the first East-West negotiation, after the summit, with MBFR
deferred until after CES, which would form an umbrella of endorsement
for MBFR.
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ANALYTICAL SUMMARY OF
OPTIONS EVALUATION REPORT
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLRN Form 101 (revised 5/09)
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
OF NSSM 138 REPORT
SECRET
NSSM 138
A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY
(ANALYTICAL SUMMARY)
I.
Assumptions, Objectives: CES Perspective
Following is a capsule summary of the present state of play:
-- We and the Allies have a commitment to begin multilateral phase of
preparations for a Conference "as soon as feasible" after completion of the
Berlin agreements (all phases);
-- Acceleration of Berlin talks makes CES a live issue; decisions at
this NATO session and in the next 2-3 months will determine the direction
of Allied policy.
-- Almost all West Europeans favor CES in some degree; French are
willing to begin preparations now; Germans commited to "accelerate"
preparations, but will not do so until Berlin is wrapped up, and preferably
until their treaties are ratified; British inclined to believe CES is an
unavoidable evil, to be disposed of as quickly as possible.
As it now stands, the Soviets will make some clear gains in such a
Conference: ratification of political and territoríal status quo in East Europe,
greater influence in West Europe, possible deepening of trends toward
American withdrawal, etc.
-- On the other hand, East Europeans -- Romania, Yugoslavia, and
perhaps Poland -- want a conference to create psychological barriers to the
Brezhnev doctrine.
Our objectives: (assuming a Conference is inevitable)
-- To avoid allowing issues of a Conference to split US from Allies;
-- Minimize damage to Alliance that flows from atmospherics of detente;
-- Institutionalize US role as European power and participant in the East-
West dialogue;
-- Provide some help for East Europeans.
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II. Alternative Approaches to CES
Assuming the US could delay, but not arrest, movement toward CES,
there follow three illustrative approaches:
1. CES as Now Envisaged
a. A Conference for the sake of detente;
b. A Conference making some concessions but protecting Western
interests.
2. A Conference on European Cooperation (i. e., without security issues).
3. A New Approach -- designed mainly to emphasize security issues and
follow on machinery.
A. CES as Now Envisaged
1. The Agenda
WARSAW PACT
NATO
1. Force renunciation and respect
1. Principles which should govern
for existing borders;
relátions between states, in-
cluding renunciation of the use
of force;
2. Economic, scientific, technical,
2. (a) Economic, scientific, technica
cultural and environmental
cultural and environmental coop-
cooperation;
eration;
(b) Freer movement of people,
ideas and information;
3. A permanent "organ" for questions
3. Possible establishment of a
of security and cooperation in Europe.
permanent body (through publicly
stated to date only as a means of
embarking on multilateral nego-
tiations).
Pact and Allied positions on these items are:
a. Principles Governing Relations Between States. The core of the con-
ference, from the Soviet viewpoint, is the first Warsaw Pact agends item
which would pledge respect for existing frontiers in Europe and force renun-
ciation. To broaden the scope of this item, NATO Ministers proposed that
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CES discussions should treat, in addition to force renunciation, general
principles governing interstate relations, such as sovereign equality,
political independence and territorial integrity, non-interference and
non-intervention in internal affairs. Allied Ministers have affirmed that
these principles would apply "regardless of political and social systems. "
A declaration that reaffirmed such principles in a conference where the
GDR was a full participant could have adverse implications for Quadripartite
rights and responsibilities in Germany as a whole and Berlin, as could a
declaration on frontiers. There would have to be disclaimer about non-
recognition of the GDR and about non-recognition of frontiers by US, UK
and France.
b. Cooperation. None expect that CES could negotiate specific agree-
ments on economic, technical and scientific exchanges or environmental
cooperation, though some believe discussions in CES, and also in a perma-
nent body established by CES, might stimulate bilateral and multilateral
efforts, as in ECE.
c. Freer Movements of People, Ideas and Information. The Soviets
would resist any concrete concessions in this area, though there are tactical
and propaganda advantages in keeping the issue in play, and there might be
some significant Soviet concessions, if the Allies press firmly. We have
suggested that the Allies, at CES and preliminaries, urge the Warsaw Pact
states to:
-- end radio jamming;
-- relax exit restrictions on their nationals;
-- permit freer circulation of books, magazines and periodicals; and
-- allow foreign journalists normal working conditions.
Many Allies, however, would prefer to treat only easier issues, seeking
initially little more than minor improvements in the closely controlled pro-
grams of East-West cultural exchanges, and hoping reduced tensions following
CES would abet further progress.
d. Permanent Machinery. The Pact in June 1970 proposed that CES create
a permanent "organ" to discuss questions of security and cooperation.
An illustrative US proposal (Annex I), tabled but not yet discussed in NATO
suggested that either a permanent secretariat, or a negotiating forum with
procedures roughly similar to those of:the Committee of the Conference on
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Disarmament (CCD) might be considered. A permanent body could not
assume meaningful responsibility for maintenance of European security,
but could open the way toward a continuing East-West dialogue.
2. Procedural Approaches
We prefer careful explorations followed, if appropriate, by more
structured preparatory talks, at official level, that would draft agreed
texts, leaving a minimum of disputed points for resolution at a short
Ministerial conference.
The French favor shorter preparatory talks mainly on procedure and
not on draft texts of possible agreement, leading to an initial meeting where
Foreign Ministers would discuss the issues and establish official-level
working groups. Thereafter, Foreign Ministers would reconvene to nego-
tiate themselves the questions unresolved by the working groups. The
French have gained more Allied support for this approach, which is con-
sistent with France's general preference to enhance the appearance of an
independent status in relations with the East.
3. Possible Results of CES as Now Conceived: Two Variants:
a. A Conference for the Sake of Detente. After extensive discussions
touching only marginally on fundamental East-West differences, Ministers
would agree on declaratory texts on general themes that do not bind
participants to specific actions, and that
-- affirm generally accepted principles governingrelations between
states, including force renunciation and respect for existing frontiers;
-- declare the intent of participants to promote cooperation in all
fields; and
-- establish a permanent body.
Participants might also express their views on regional disarmament
questions, including MBFR.
Assessment. This approach, in effect, accepts the Soviet concept. The
likely results would meet immediate political goals of the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europeans, and correspondes to the current aims of France, most
neutrals, and the smaller, more detente-oriented Allies states. Once an
nter-German modus vivendi is reached, the FRG, too, will likely seek to
enhance the detente climate by avoiding confrontation with the East.
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b. A Conference Making Some Concessions but Protecting Western
Interests. In this damage-limiting approach, the Allies would decline to
meet major Soviet aims, including a declaration of respect for existing
frontiers, unless the Soviets also make significant concessions, agreeing,
for example, to freer movement. Preparatory sessions would be prolonged
and probably marked by heated discussions, reflected in media reporting.
Substantively, the conference might result in
-- a compromise, in which the Soviets make some concrete concessions
on freer movement and accept a declaration on principles that would apply
regardless of political or social systems, while the Allies agree to a formu-
lation pledging "respect" for existing European frontiers.
-- modest Soviet concessions on freer movement;
-- agreement to pursue issues of economic and technical cooperation; and
-- establishment of permanent machiner.
Assessment. Some minimum goals of major participants would be met
as a result of public reports of East-West debates in the course of CES, and
the results of the conference would be portrayed as Western acceptance of
the territorial situation in Eastern Europe, but not Soviet political domination.
B. A Conference on Cooperation in Europe
An alternative CES approach could entail limiting the agenda of the meeting
to issues of cooperation in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and
environmental spheres. Issues of security, including renunciation of the use
of force and principles governing interstate relations would be specifically
excluded, and the title of the conference changed.
The conference would result in declarations of intent to promote cooperation
leaving detailed agreements to subsequent bilateral and multilateral nego-
tiations in other fora.
Assessment. The Soviets would probably resist an Allied proposal to
change the terms of reference and to make such a change publicly clear.
They might charge the Allies with bad faith, noting repeated public statements
in NATO Ministerial communiques of willingness to begin preparations for a
"conference on security and cooperation in Europe" under proper circum-
stances. Most Allied governments might also oppose such a change, fearing
charges from important sectors of domestic opinion that NATO was reneging
on a commitment at the very moment when fulfillment of the precondition (a
satisfactory Berlin agreement) seemed in sight.
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COMMENT: The idea that we can limit damage by introducing contentious
issues such as freer movement of peoples, etc., is probably an illusion.
Once Soviets pocket concessions about frontiers, non-use of force, etc.
they have achieved their purpose and will probably be able to resist any
major change in intra European cooperation. Damagelimiting strategy
which is in effect our current policy is a weak rationale.
If a conference is inevitable (this is not necessarily so) and Allies really
want it for the atmospherics of detente, there are stronger arguments for
playing along rather than putting up weak and ineffective rear guard action.
In this case, the French approach seems sound: move to a Conference with-
out long wrangling session and close it out as soon as feasible.
The main tactical problem is that the heart of the Conference will be a
declaration on non-use of force and respect for current borders; some of
the Allies have already made this concession: in the Soviet and Polish
treaties, the French Declaration of Principles, the Canadian-Soviet com-
munique; and in effect, the Berlin treaties which include non-use of force.
The main Soviet aim is to gain American signature. Present Allied position
more or less concedes this Soviet position.
C. A New Approach: CES as a Step Toward Maintaining a US Role in
Europe.
This new concept of CES departs from the damage-limiting approach we
are now pursuing. It would entail a new US initiative in NATO and inter-
national CES planning aimed at:
-- increased emphasis on permanent machinery to provide an institu-
tional framework involving the US intimately in a long-term process of East-
West negotiation of issues of security and cooperation, while maintaining
and improving present Western security; and
-- added weight to issues of security -- MBFR, and other arms control
and disarmament matters.
Under this concept, moreover,
-- the US would exert leadership in approaching CES;
-- we could help offset Allied fears that the US is on the verge of
massive disengagement, at a time when their doubts are reinforced by
current international economic difficulties;
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-- CES would be considered a positive step in the longer process of
strengthening the transatlantic community, and maintaining its defenses,
while the US and our Allies seek further relaxation of East-West tensions
designed to enhance European stability on a basis that accords with Allied
objectives by making clear the importance they attach to issues of
security, and to progress in East-West cooperation in non-security matters,
such as freer movement of people, ideas, and information, and economic
and technical exchanges.
1. Agenda. To meet these objectives, the Allies could propose in the
December 1971 Ministerial Communique the following CES agenda as an
alternative to that advanced by the Pact:
a. Issues of East-West Security
(1) continuing arms control and disarmament efforts and renunciation
of the use of force and universal respect for principles governing relations
between states, regardless of political or social systems. It is possible
that any consensus that emerged might be embodied in an East-West
declaration, which might be pursued in permanent machinery established by
CES (See Part II CIC, below).
(2) associated with the foregoing, or separately, statements of
support for MBFR. If MBFR negotiations had begun prior to CES, reference
could be made in CES to progress to date, based upon reports by partici-
pating MBFR states. Otherwise, CES could encourage states directly in-
volved in MBFR to negotiate. Although MBFR could also operate under the
"umbrella" of a CES (see Part III), the conference would have no authority
to direct or approve the form or substance of MBFR negotiations.
b. Issues of East-West Cooperation
(1) freer movement of people, ideas, and information, stressing the
importance the Allies attach to this issue:
(2) economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental
cooperation. Economic issues for discussion could include a range of
improvements on both sides to encourage increased trade and possible
ties to Western international economic institutions. In the environmental
sphere, support could be sought for strengthening ECE efforts. Beyond
this, enhanced bilateral contacts in the other areas could be encouraged,
as well as efforts in UN and other appropriate fora.
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c. Permanent Machinery Established by CES
(1) Possible Functions
The US has tabled in NATO illustrative views on permanent machinery
(Annex I). We proposed that such machinery might discuss problems of
security, cooperation and arms control and disarmament, along the following
lines:
(a) Security
-- as a framework for quiet diplomacy to resolve disputes
endangering European security; and
-- for dealing with grievances, permitting states to raise actual
or potential violations of a possible CES declaration on principles that should
govern interstate relations.
(b) Cooperation
-- for discussion of policy issues that impede East-West coop-
eration in various fields, leaving detailed implementation to the ECE or other
appropriate fora.
(c) Regional Disarmament
-- in connection with MBFR, while this issue undoubtedly would
be referred to in CES, actual negotiations have been envisaged in a body
comprising states directly concerned. Results of MBFR negotiations, how-
ever, could be reported by the states directly involved in MBFR negotiations
to CES for noting, as appropriate; and
-- if agreed among the Allies, for discussion of complaints of
non-compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements; and for
examination and dissemination of reports produced under any arrangements
that may eventually be developed on verification and collateral constraints.
Beyond the foregoing, it is possible that permanent machinery could
evolve further, embracing additional functions in a continuing East-West
dialogue. However, the USSR and others should not be allowed to manipulate
or characterize CES permanent machinery as a substitute for NATO, or as
superceding Western security arrangements generally.
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2. Assessment.
US adoption of a positive approach to CES could entail the following
advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages
-- would conform to the realities of the situation in Europe by giving
at least equal attention to security issues;
-- because it would explicitly assert the continuing US role in the
evolution of Europe, it would deny the Soviets their basic objective of getting
the US out of Europe;
-- by emphasizing the continuing character of East-West negotiations
Allied defense expenditures might be more easily sustained;
-- the basic situation of the East European states would not be
altered, but their desire for a more independent voice in discussions sur-
rounding a conference would be met;
Disadvantages
-- there likely would be no immediate concrete results beyond those
possible under other suggested approaches to CES;
-- a possible CES declaration on arms control and disarmament
might strengthen public reluctance, in Allied countries, to support the sub-
stantial force improvements we seek; and
-- other disadvantages at worst could approximate those flowing
from a conference making some consessions but protecting Western interests,
but would be far less than from a conference for the sake of detente or a
conference on cooperation.
3. Developing Allied Consensus.
A positive approach to a CES conforms more closely with the majority
Allied view than our present approach. Therefore, we anticipate no difficulty
in gaining Allied concurpence. Discussion of arms control and disarmament
at CES conforms to current Allied thinking, and therefore poses no problem.
Reference in CES to MBFR will be welcomed by most Allies.
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The following illustrative steps would facilitar building an Allied
consensus around a US preference:
-- the US could underline the Berlin precondition, and clarify its
attitude toward CES, and perhaps toward economic and defense aims generally,
in a major address on European affairs by the Secretary sometime in
November;
-- the US position would be conveyed to the Allies in time to allow
for consultations at NATO in advance of the December Ministerial meeting:
-- the US would introduce into the Council draft formulations for the
December Ministerial communique;
-- depending on the status of the Berlin agreement, NATO Deputy
Foreign Ministers could meet in April 1972 to assess prospects for opening
multilateral East-West talks and to discuss the substance and procedures
for multilateral East-West talks; and
-- after conclusion of the Berlin accord, and following the President's
visit to Moscow, East-West multilateral talks could open.
COMMENT: The basic issue here seems to be along the following lines: If we
must go to CES, is there any conceivable way it can be turned to our marginal
advantage, recognizing that in the short turn, .least, the Soviets will score
major gains?
This "new" approach is, of course, an old idea favored by many observers.
Its essence is that we use the inevitable Soviet "þrinciples" as a bridge to some
more practical measures; i.e., if the Soviets claim non-use of force, we
propose restraint on force movements, possibly European observer teams, pre-
announcement of manuevers -- in short, many of the MBFR collateral measures
In this way, we at least give some substance to the vacuous declarations of a
Conference.
Second, we establish an institution which will have little real power, but
will have some psychological benefit for the East Europeans in that they can
invoke the permanent machinery in times of tensions or crisis.
If there is anything in this proposal for a change in attitude, it is mainly
in the possible longer term gains that would tend to blur the sharp divisions in
Europe. Why the Soviet's would agree to such potential danger is another
issue, but it is, after all, their conference, and this "new" approach puts
them on the tactical defensive. If introduced early in the prepàrations, it
would certainly protract the preliminary. discussions -- another possible
advantage.
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As reported in the study, the concept is still too vague; it lacks pre-
cision in what the Conference would produce in terms of arms control
statements, practical implementation measures and the authority of the
permanent machinery. If adopted, this would have to be clarified in some
detail.
The disadvantages are understated, presumably because this is the
favored option. The real disadvantages are
-- First, our Allies may well misconstrue our new enthusiasm as
another form of superpower collaboration; they might be rather unimpressed
by the claims that we would gain some concrete security measures; they
would still think in terms of atmospherics, and conclude we were only
looking for a rationalization of the same objectives.
-- If it became clear that we meant business, and really wanted some
practical achievements, the Állies might retreat since the last thing they
want is that CES become a contentious meeting.
-- The second disadvantage is that regardless of our aspirations we
must deal with the Soviets who are not about to allow their pet project to
be turned against them. Their interest is still in the fact of the Conference,
rather than its concrete measures. We will still have to go through a first
phase of declarations and pledges to get to the second stage or applications
of arms control measures or a permanent institution. The Soviets will see
to it that nothing effective happens.
In short, this is a gamble. But we would be no worse off for having
made the attempt than if we supinely drift into the Soviet stype conference
that now appears unavoidable.
In many ways, this approach to a CES is less damaging than the current
prospects for two losers: MBFR and then a meaningless CES. If we were
to move in this new direction on CES, logic would suggest that MBFR be
deferred, and the CES would endorse it, though not control it. MBFR would
thus be a tangible result of CES, and, if it dealt with principles of force
reductions, these might be taken ovér by all Europe.
Operationally,
-- CES would not begin until after the Moscow summit: then preliminaries
would take a few months and the actual conference would meet in, say, late
1972 or early 1973.
-- MBFR might begin before that, but if we chose to, we could use the
CES as a means to defer MBFR.
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III. CES and MBFR
Most Allies and non-aligned states wish to establish a connection now
between MBFR and CES. At the same time, most recognize that CES
would be too unwieldy a forum for negotiation of so complex and sensitive
a subject as MBFR, and that actual negotiations should be restricted to
the states directly concerned.
The US has preferred to keep the two issues on separate tracks, in
effect assuming that the tracks might cross at some point, but leaving open
the option of separately initiating either CES or MBFR discussions. Our
approach to MBFR, moreover, has recognized that
-- MBFR addresses the military confrontation of major powers. whose
forces and territory are directly involved; other states, though interested,
have less at stake in such negotiations, and many would likely mount
pressures for reductions without necessarily insisting on essential safe-
guards; and
-- involvement of non-aligned countries would complicate and delay
MBFR negotiations, causing inter alia possible Congressional pressures
for unilateral reductions.
Given the general preference expressed over. .past weeks by our Allies,
however, for including MBFR in some fashion on a CES agenda -- based
largely on their view that MBFR would provide a concrete issue of security
for CES in discussion and evidence of movement toward detente we are
virtually isolated on this issue, and will likely need to deal with it at
Ministerial level in December.
Since we cannot prevent participants in CES from referring to MBFR,
the alternatives are: (a) to strive for agreement among the Allies (and
perhaps with the Soviets) for procedural arrangements to be made in the
initial phase of CES that would avoid more than general reference in CES
to MBFR; or (b) to deal with the substance of MBFR in CES.
COMMENT: Clearly, the latter is a non-starter and a potential disaster.
IV. CES and SALT
Provided there is a satisfactory resolution on Berlin, the issue arises
of the relationship between CES and SALT. The possibilities lie between the
following alternatives:
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-- linkage 'between achieving success in SALT and proceeding with
CES; and
-- considering SALT along with other issues as part of the complex
of US/Soviet relations which needs to be taken into account in assessing
Soviet intentions in regard to CES.
Linkage would have the following implications:
-- while it may be argued that Soviet interest in CES could provide
additional leverage in SALT, it is unlikely that this interest would affect
the Soviet position on SALT issues, since they deal with fundamental
matters of state security;
-- such linkage would run a considerable risk of damaging SALT at a
stage in which the negotiations are both delicate and nearing fruition.
Since we have consistently eschewed linking SALT with extraneous issues,
a reversal on our part would cause the Soviets to question our basic
objectives in SALT, thus delaying and diverting the talks -- - precisely the
opposite of what would be intended.
COMMENT: This part of the discussion is badly rigged by State and ACDA
who are deathly afraid that SALT will be endangered. Yet, it makes
absolutely no sense to think about European security in any real sense if
the US and the USSR cannot make even a limited arrangement on strategic
arms control. The original idea of including this discussion in the study
was to emphasize this point, so that the US could at least tell the Allies
of our reluctance to proceed with the actual CES if SALT had not reached
some agreement. In fact, this is not a revolutionary position. Until the
last NATO meeting, our preconditions for CES were the Berlin agreement
and "progress" on other East-West issues, which was specifically defined
to mean SALT. This latter condition was dropped under French pressures.
All that would be involved in reviving it would be rather clear warnings
that CES could not be expected to achieve anything if SALT was stalemated.
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