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[NSC Meeting April 16, 1969]
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266848716
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[NSC Meeting April 16, 1969]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) FORM OF DOCUMENT CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE DATE RESTRICTION / NSC neeting SPP. 4/16/69 A Memo PER RAC REVIEW SANITIZED 1/13/2005 FILE LOCATION N:C H- Files Box H-E 121 Folder 2 RESTRICTION CODES (A Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information. (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document. (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA 14029 (1-98) No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 6 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE offlago 5/2 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON KOREAN SHOOTDOWN INCIDENT APRIL 16, 1969 Following is a list of attendees at subject meeting: The President The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness The Under Secretary of State Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Central Intelligence Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Ambassador Winthrop Brown (Deputy Asst. Secretary of State) Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakley (JCS) Colonel Alexander Haig Mr. Richard Sneider The meeting was initiated with an intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in North Korea. He made the following points: 1. The North Koreans have never made a specific claim as to the extent of their air space. 2. There has been only limited North Korean military alerting concurrent with the shootdown incident. This includes: 25X1 3. Director estimated that The there have been few incidents in the long series of North Korean provocations which have surpassed NSC review(s) JCS review(s) completed. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE completed. No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -2- this one in significance, with the possible exception of the Pueblo seizure. 4. for Director summarized recent provocations, starting with the seizure of the Pueblo, the attempted assassination attempt on the Korean President, coastal infiltration-and DMZ incidents, all suggesting a gradually intensifying pattern. The Director turned next to the recent intelligence on rescue operation; pointing out that there were two Soviet ships in the immediate area which who had been conducting search patterns throughout the night and had been directed to debris specied by U.S. aircraft. The Soviets permitted a low overflight pass by one of our aircraft which photographed debris on the deck of the Soviet destroyer including one of the wheels of the aireraft Her The Director stated there was no indication that there were survivors. summarized the North Korean naval order Mr. the Direchir Helms then of battle, emphasizing that their most potent naval weapons were ten high-speed Comar patrol boats 5 Helms estimated that North Korea and South Korea ground forces were roughly comparable, although the South Koreans had a preponderance in numbers. The North Koreans, pointed 400 air had Ve a decided superiority in modern aircraft but this with U.S/ support TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -3- respective capabilities should balance out. The President then asked about the 1965 U.S. reconnaissance plane incident in the same area and asked whether or not after we had repeated the missions with fighter cover rif there had been any additional provocations. Director ofttto General Steakley/confirmed that there had been none and stated in response to another question from the President that the air cover for these missions had been continued for a period of approximately six months but that the tactics of these missions had been modified to concentrate primarily on night missions where fighter cover was not the considered to be required. Then, at the end of/six month period, the fighter escorts were discontinued. The President asked General Steakley to provide him with a history on the incidents that had occurred in this area, especially during the period following the Korean Armistice - 1953 through 1955. The briefing was then turned over to Brigadier General Steakley, Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center, JCS, who utilized a map EC121 to review the 1 reconnaissance mission. He pointed out that there was an inconsistency in the northern leg of the approved track in that the TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE -4- U.S. reconnaissance aircraft orbited at the northern point of the approved track. He emphasized that this orbiting might have indicated that they were exploiting an electronic pickup and that this exploitation brought them to a point within 38 nautical miles of the North Korean coast He then described how the incident occurred fter making two orbits, U.S. tracking facilities picked up one North Korean aircraft and transmitted a condition 3 alert to the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. A Condition 3 alert signifies "fighters airborne, heads up". Three minutes later, the U.S. trackers picked up a second fighter on an intercept course towards our reconnaissance aircraft. No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5 INVITEES FOR NSC MEETING WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1969 The Vice President William Rogers, the Secretary of State Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Col. Alexander Haig Richard Sneider Brig. Gen. Douglas Steakley No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/13 : NLN-H-121-2-1-5