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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
/
From: NSSM 202 Study Gouy
md.
A
Report
2
Gathright to Chair- NSC under Secretaries
12/2/74
A
Memo
Committee
w/attach.
3
Distribution Lists
5/23/74
A
Memo
FILE LOCATION
NSC H-Files Box H-205 Folder 2
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary
NA 14029 (1-98)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER /
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
4578
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
NPT FILE
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
396
SECRET
NSC-U/SM-13D
October 3, 1974
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, US Information Agency
SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NSSM-202)
The attached revised draft Memorandum for
the President and the revised study which it
transmits are forwarded for your comments and/or
concurrence which may be telephoned to Mr. Jerome
Kahan, Department of State, 632-8995. These
revisions reflect comments received on the pre-
vious version of the study and also incorporate
new issues which have surfaced during the past
few months. Your response is requested by
c.o.b. Wednesday, October 16, 1974.
Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director
Attachments:
As stated
SECRET
GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
10/1/74
DRAFT
SECRET
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy
NSSM 202 directed a review of present U.S. policy con-
cerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in light of the Indian nuclear test. A recently up-
dated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on
the specific options open to us in dealing with India. The
policy recommendations in NSDM 255 concerning the need for
multilateral supplier controls over transfers of nuclear
materials, technology, and equipment, have been taken into
account in this review.
On the basis of the review done pursuant to NSSM 202,
the Under Secretaries Committee, recognizing that the pro-
liferation problem is at a crucial juncture, recommends an
intensified program to inhibit the further spread of in-
dependent nuclear explosives capabilities. This program
would exploit the common interest of many key countries in
inhibiting proliferation by providing for concerted action.
The U.S. could both support such action and, where appropriate,
catalyze more effective international coordination.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
2
In the short run, the most effective approach to slowing
down the spread of nuclear weapons is for the advanced nuclear
industrial states to tighten controls on weapons-grade
material and related production capabilities. Proliferation
can also be limited through maintaining and making more widely
applicable the legal and political barriers to acquisition of
national weapons capabilities. In addition to the policy
actions presented below, a successful non-proliferation
strategy will be affected by perceptions of non-nuclear weapon
states regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations
and particularly by the confidence of these states that their
security needs can continue to be met without recourse to
independent forces.
As a series of near-term non-proliferation steps, it is
recommended that:
1. Through consultations with nuclear industrial states,
particularly the USSR and France, and a conference of such
states, the U.S. pursue coordinated policies designed to:
-- Ensure that international safeguards are both effective
and widely applied to peaceful international nuclear cooperation
by seeking to strengthen the political, financial, and technical
base of the IAEA safeguarás program, and by requiring that such
safeguards be placed on nuclear material and equipment exported
by these states or material derived from these exports,
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
3
consistent with guidelines issued by the Zangger (Nuclear
Exporters') Committee.
-- Restrict the spread of independent national uranium
enrichment and chemical reprocessing facilities through: (a)
reaching common principles regarding the supply of sensitive
enrichment technology and equipment or supply or assistance
in the construction of national reprocessing facilities;
and (b) encouraging multilateral plants capable of satisfying
future world demands for reliable and economic commercial
services in these fields. In this connection, non-proliferation
considerations should be factored into the review of U.S.
policy with respect to future availability and supply or
uranium enrichment services.
- Impose special conditions on nuclear exports to coun-
tries in sensitive regions, such as the Middle East, in order
to minimize the accumulation of plutonium and other special
nuclear material.
-- Establish specific physical security standards to be
included as a condition of nuclear cooperation, and strengthen
international efforts to achieve widespread adoption of mean-
ingful physical security measures on nuclear material. In
this connection, a physical security convention, drafted by
the IAEA, should receive U.S. support.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
4
-- Minimize the risk of indigenous "peaceful" nuclear
explosive (PNE) development in non-nuclear weapons states
not party to the NPT through: (a) agreeing not in any way
to assist any NNWS to develop or acquire PNEs; (b) requiring
explicit confirmation that nuclear material exported, or
derived from the use of exports, will not be used for any
nuclear explosives; (c) establishing that all nuclear
materials subject to IAEA safeguards may not be used for any
nuclear explosives; and (d) agreeing on the need to establish
within the IAEA framework further mechanisms for the assessment
of PNE applications and the provision of PNE services by
nuclear-weapon states,
2. In conjunction with other NPT proponents, the U.S.
intensify efforts in support of the treaty and in seeking early
ratification by key non-nuclear weapons states, through:
-- Support for the FRG, UK and other European countries
in their high-level contacts with the Italian Government
to convey both the importance of early NPT ratification and the
relationship of such ratification to the ability of NPT parties
to continue nuclear supplies to the European Communities.
-- High-level communications with the Japanese designed
to remove any doubt about the continued importance of such
ratification to the U.S. and other NPT proponents as an
essential contribution to international stability and long-
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
5
term progress toward nuclear arms control, and as helping
to ensure a maximum role for Japan in international nuclear
commerce and at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.
--- Appropriate actions designed to achieve ratification
by other prospective NPT participants, and encouragement of a
common recognition by nations unlikely to adhere to the treaty
in the near-term that the further spread of independent nuclear
explosives capabilities endangers the security of all states.
--- Establishment of visible ways, consistent with the
policies set forth in recommendation 1 above, in which
preferential treatment will be given to NPT parties in such
areas as: (a) the availability of commercial nuclear
facilities, fuels, and technological support; (b) potential
PNE services; and possibly (c) credit terms. In connection
with PNE services, the U.S. should continue to support an
active IAEA role and take a more positive stance with respect
to implementing Article V of the NPT, but be prepared to
highlight the limitations as well as the potential benefits
of PNEs.
-- Completion of negotiations with the IAEA on the
agreement implementing the Presidential offer to permit the
IAEA to apply safeguards to U.S. facilities in order to
facilitate ratification by FRG, Japan, and others by demon-
strating that the U.S. is not seeking a commercial advantage.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
6
3. Coordinated multilateral approaches to be developed
to ensure that the Indian nuclear explosion does not hasten
further proliferation in Pakistan and elsewhere, by:
-- Endeavoring to persuade India to place IAEA safe-
guards on its nuclear exports and not to export nuclear ex-
plosive technology or devices, or assist others in building
national chemical reprocessing plants.
--- Seeking to dissuade India from undermining the NPT
and deferral of any further Indian explosive tests, parti-
cularly in the period prior to the Review Conference.
--- Avoiding the implication that India's status as a
world power has been substantially enhanced as a result of
its nuclear test.
- Seeking to hold India to its peaceful protestations
and minimize the scope, pace, and military dimensions of
its nuclear explosive program, through Indian acceptance of
such measures as: (a) accountability for weapons-grade
material; (b) deferral of further PNE production and limiting
it to specified current needs; and (c) international obser-
vation arrangements.
--- Seeking Soviet and French cooperation in continuing
not to supply India with long-range bombers or other
sophisticated nuclear delivery capabilities.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
7
4. The Under Secretaries Committee should continue to
coordinate, review, and report on non-proliferation policy
actions and plans, and conduct relevant studies needed to
support our efforts in this field.
-- Urgent attention should be paid to further defining
a U.S. policy on preferential treatment and to exploring
the question of security assurances in time for the NPT
Review Conference.
- Studies should be made of sanctions as a deterrent
to proliferation, the use of financing as a supplementary
vehicle for imposing safeguards conditions on nuclear exports,
and the possibility of multilateral controls on sophisticated
nuclear delivery systems.
-- A series of "country studies" should be launched
to investigate in detail the factors affecting potential
nuclear weapons decisions in key NNWS, the preferred strategy
for deterring such decisions, and options for the U.S. in
the event these states acquire independent nuclear explosives.
----- The implications of Congressional concerns and actions
for future U.S. policy on nuclear cooperation and non-
proliferation should be examined.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Draft 10/1/74
SECRET
NSSM 202 STUDY
Executive Summary
U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
In response to NSSM 202, the Under Secretaries Com-
mittee has prepared the attached study which reviews U.S.
policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). A NSSM 156 study, updated in light of the
Indian nuclear test, is a companion paper that focuses on
the specific options and courses open to us in our dealings
with India.
Desirability and Feasibility of Non-Proliferation
Inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been a
consistent and important element of U.S. policy for the
entire nuclear era. The basis for our non-proliferation
interest is the assessment that the danger of nuclear war
as well as world instability would significantly increase
with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons. Acquisition
of nuclear weapons would also give nations a sense of greater
independence, thus complicating international diplomacy,
diminishing American influence, and possibly eventually re-
quiring extensive and costly restructuring of our defense
posture. With additional nuclear weapons states (NWS), it
would become more difficult to negotiate international arms
control agreements, and progress in limiting the bilateral
U.S.-USSR competition would be substantially complicated.
Further spread of nuclear weapons would also provide in-
creased opportunity for sub-national theft and blackmail.
Finally, unless the risk that peaceful nuclear programs
might be used to initiate weapons programs can be minimized,
all nations will face security dangers and the continued
expansion of international nuclear commerce could be
threatened.
The problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
and independent explosives capabilities is now at a crucial
stage. Commercial nuclear power generation is coming into
wider use throughout the world, stimulated by the energy
crisis, and many industrialized nations are becoming sup-
pliers of nuclear material and equipment. Particularly
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
2
as a result of the Indian nuclear test, other non-nuclear
weapon states may rethink their decisions regarding the
acquisition of nuclear explosives. We are in general en-
tering a period when political barriers to non-proliferation
appear to be weakening, given movements toward a multipolar
world and decreasing credibility with respect to security
guarantees. These trends could adversely affect the future
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), through setbacks in
the ratification process in Japan and the European Com-
munity countries, by reducing the longer-term efficacy of
the treaty as a non-proliferation instrument.
Nevertheless, the Under Secretaries Committee has con-
cluded that a policy aimed at deterring further proliferation
can be effectively pursued without incurring significant
costs or risks. In virtually all the important non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS) there is presently a lack of either the
capability or the motivation to develop nuclear explosives.
This offers the opportunity to undertake policies aimed at
deterring further nuclear proliferation through practical
measures which can (i) deny non-nuclear states the full range
of materials and equipment needed to produce nuclear ex-
plosives, and (ii) strengthen the political, legal, and security
inhibitions against proliferation.
The nuclear material, equipment, and technology needed
to produce nuclear weapons are still available only from a
limited number of suppliers who generally oppose proliferation.
Although it is essential that our supplier position and
diplomatic influence be brought to bear, the U.S. cannot by
itself establish an effective and durable non-proliferation
regime. Such a program requires intensified concerted action,
building upon existing international and multilateral mech-
anisms, to exploit the common non-proliferation interests
of key NWS and NNWS.
The USC recognizes that we might only be able to delay
further proliferation, however determined our anti-proliferation
efforts may be, but concludes that U.S. national security
objectives can be well served even with a non-proliferation
strategy that is only partially effective. It would be
desirable to defer the disadvantages associated with an ex-
panded number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while
seeking to create conditions which might ultimately check
such expansion. At the same time, prudence dictates that
the U.S. should begin to explore the problem of how to shape
our security posture in a world environment of larger numbers
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
3
of independent nuclear states as a means of hedging against
the failure to contain fully the further spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities.
This study emphasizes concerted efforts designed to
curb the spread of nuclear weapons, consisting of concrete
actions to contain technical capabilities, to strengthen
legal, political, and security inhibitions, and to deal with
the special issue of peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs).
These measures, which are summarized below, involve reliance
on certain basic functional tools, such as IAEA safeguards,
export controls, and the NPT, as well as approaches tailored
to key countries. However, the success of a non-proliferation
policy will depend in large part on whether NNWS believe
that their security and political needs can continue to be
met without recourse to independent nuclear forces. It
will also depend on their perceptions regarding progress in
U.S.-Soviet arms limitations. Thus, our overall foreign
and defense policy, the relative stability of regions of
potential conflict in the world, and the general structure
of peace in the international system have an important bear-
ing on the longer-term prospects for limiting the spread
of nuclear weapons.
Containing Technical Capabilities
All manufacturers of commercial nuclear equipment and
material, except France (and potentially India), are either
NPT parties or signatories moving toward ratification, and
support efforts to standardize safeguards appli-
cations. France has publicly declared that it will behave
as if it were a party to the NPT, but it has apparently
been lax in practice in adhering to this position in its
nuclear export policy and has been reluctant to cooperate
with other suppliers in developing export guidelines.
There are signs, however, that the new French Government
might be interested in adopting a more positive safeguards
policy. Although this generally favorable situation will
deteriorate to some extent in coming years, as NNWS acquire
greater technical capabilities, it provides potential
leverage for limiting the availability of weapons-grade
material and technologies through nuclear export controls
and international safeguards. Despite its apparent nega-
tive thrust, this approach can benefit all users of peace-
ful nuclear energy by permitting material and equipment to
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
4
be made available within a framework of credible and
effective safeguards controls. Furthermore, selective con-
trols over international transfers of delivery vehicles and
related technologies could be effective in dissuading cer-
tain major powers from embarking on an independent nuclear
arms program.
The U.S. is still the dominant international supplier
of nuclear power plants and fuel, but our leverage in the
international commercial nuclear field is diminishing.
Loss of U.S. dominance in the peaceful nuclear area could
allow customers to deal with other suppliers who impose
less rigorous controls on sensitive material, equipment,
and technology. Accordingly, there is now an urgent need
to upgrade our safeguards and control policies and to con-
sult with other nuclear suppliers on this matter.* Although
informal contacts and the use of existing multilateral
mechanisms should continue to be pursued, a conference of
nuclear industrialized states would provide a unique op-
portunity for realizing such a coordinated approach. A
restricted conference attended by the major current and
potential nuclear suppliers, namely the U.S., France, the
USSR, Japan, the FRG, the UK, and Canada would appear to
be a preferable first-step that could later lead to a L
broader conference which included other nuclear industrial
states. Soviet and French support of such an approach
would be crucial and would dictate the need for advance
consultations with both countries.
The most important substantive non-proliferation objec-
tives to be achieved in a program of consultation and co-
ordination among commercial nuclear suppliers can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. Ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports
of nuclear equipment and material to NNWS, particularly
states who are not NPT parties, and strengthen the poli-
tical, financial, and technical base of the IAEA's safeguards
program. Of immediate importance would be gaining widest
possible acceptance of the Zangger Committee export guide-
lines as well as agreed procedures for codifying, implement-
ing, and modifying these guidelines. Consideration should
*NSDM 255 authorized consultations with other nuclear
suppliers with the aim of minimizing risks of commercial
nuclear transfers of sensitive material and technology.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
740 2064
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET - GDS
May 23, 1974
National Security Study Memorandum 202
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SUBJECT:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation
and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of
NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its
underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range
of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture
toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future
U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S.
should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to
it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how
and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public,
congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.
The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13
and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in
preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take
into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating
currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.
The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.
Kissinger
CC: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET - GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 3
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
2064
LOG #:
NSC DISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENT
RECORD
DATE:
5/23/74
CABLE #:
NSSM 202
Nuc
oliferation Treaty
EMO/LETTER: SUBJECT:
LASSIFICATION: SECRET/GDS
TO:
(CABLES ON
TERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
MR COOPER
SECRETARY KISSINGER
MR BUSHNELL
GEN SCOWCROFT
MAJ MCFARLANE
MR OBER
2'
MR CLIFT
MR JANKA
1 MR SAUNDERS
MR FROEBE
MR FAZIO
MR SOLOMON
MR QUANDT
10
MRS DAVIS
MR APPLEBAUM
MR QUINN
MR STEARMAN
MR BARNUM
1
MISS FARRAR
MR KENNEDY
MR SMYSER
LTC STUKEL
MR SMITH
1
MR LODAL
1
DR ELLIOTT
MR HUBERMÄN
MR GUHIN
COL BOVERIE
MR MOE
CMDR HIGGINS
MR LOW
MR POWERS
MR HORAN
MR LEHMAN
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
Addresee
#Cys
Date
Time
Recipient
VICE-PRESIDENT
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPUTY SEC. OF STATE
1
(Exec. Secretariat) 7224
5/21/74 1755 Jame Holland
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1
DEPUTY SEC. OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, JCS
1
DIRECTOR, CIA
1
Syrone
Chairman, AEC
1
Room 1154 - 1717 H Street
5-24-74
Dircctor, ACDA
1
5/24/74 1:00
m. Holm
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
NSSM on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
In the light of the explosion of a nuclear device in India, it would be
useful to review our policy toward the broad question of nuclear non-
proliferation and the particular question of what we might do in
support of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The last compre-
hensive look at these questions was done in 1969.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize me to sign the attached NSSM to update studies
related to non-proliferation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
SECRET - GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
2064
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
ACTION
May 21, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
RICHARD T. KENNEDY Me
SUBJECT:
NPT NSSM
Mr. Kissinger requested a study of the non-proliferation program. It
should be a comprehensive review of the non-proliferation program.
The NSSM 156 update on the Indian Nuclear Developments appropriately
focuses more specifically on the Indian issue itself. I have discussed the
approach with State (Lord, Grove and Eagleburger). We all agree that the
way to most effectively get what is needed and what HAK wants is to let the
NSSM 156 exercise go forward, and while at the same time drawing on it
and other work, go to the broader question of the worldwide implications
for our policy. The Under Secretaries Committee is the place to do the
latter -- it did the job the first time around and handled several subsidiary
issues following the initial study in 1969.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Mr. Elliot and Mr. Huberman concur.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
May 24, 1974
W/ SECRET ATTACHMENTS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MRS DAVIS
FROM
MAC
SUBJECT:
Precedence Problems
At Tab A is a memo dispatched last night w/incorrect ordering of the
addressees, i.e. the SECDEF is behind the DEP SEC STATE. We didn't
ask for a redo, and resigning, as General Scowcroft has NO signature
matrix, and because of the 6 day suspense. Because of only two
addressees, the Dep Sec State received the ORIGINAL, while the SECDEF
received a xerox copy! We can well hear a small noise about this
from Latimer, et al. (The ACTING SEC STATE would be o.k. for # 1 position!)
At Tab B is a signed NSSM, which either you or Dick Kennedy have for
processing. The addressees are HOPELESSLY out of precedence! I can't
figure what source this came from. It should be retyped, and resigned,
prior to dispatch.
At Tab C is SP 48 on rank order for easy referral
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Bite the bullet on Tab A - leave as is.
2. Redo Tab B (P.S. check rank order of info addees).
3. Return this so we can brief the secretary who typed these. I really
can't expect the substantive staff to check out addressee precedence!
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NSC/SP-48
April 5, 1974
STAFF PROCEDURE
RANK ORDER LISTING OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The following is a revised rank order listing of U.S. Government officials
provided as guidance for the listing of addressees of NSSM's, NSDM's and
other NSC or White House memoranda. This SP supersedes the memo-
randum on the same subject, March 9, 1974.
The Secretary of State (Alternate: Acting Secretary of State*)
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Transportation
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of the Federal Energy Office
Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs
* Acting Secretary of State should be clearly identified and so listed at
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
the top of the action addressees DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET - GDS
National Security Study Memorandum
TO:
1
The Secretary of Defense
should
5
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
4
2
The The Deputy Director Secretary of Central of Intelligence State (or "ACTING" then #
3
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation
and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of
NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its
underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range
of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture
toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future
U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S.
should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to
it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how
and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public,
congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.
The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13
and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in
preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take
into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating
currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.
The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SECRET GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET (XGDS)
May 23, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR
?
Should
ACTING
2
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
1
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT:
Military Supply Policy Toward Pakistan
The Department of State memorandum S/S 7403441 of February 20,
1974, concerning the treatment of certain categories of items under
our existing military supply toward India and Pakistan, has been
considered. The Departments of State and Defense are authorized to
continue to apply the criteria described in the second of the three
options presented in that memorandum, pending a further review of
this matter.
To facilitate a further review and decision, the Departments are
requested to prepare a memorandum examining two additional aspects
of this issue:
--Analysis should be provided as to the types and quantities
of items that might be expected to flow to each of the two
countries under each of the three possible courses of action
outlined in the memo.
The question of whether "components" and "accessories and
attachments" should all be treated under identical criteria
should be considered.
A memorandum amplifying the Department of State's memorandum of
February 20, 1974, and examining the foregoing issues should be sub-
mitted by May 30, 1974, for consideration by the President.
Brent Scowcroit
Major General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine
roduced at the Ridbard Nixbe Presidential Libiarys inger
DECLASSIFIED
Divisnat pursuant to Executive Order P3526 artohas to berdedassified
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PRO LE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
5
21
5
21
19
7402064
FROM: Kennedy
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
kissinger
COLBY, W
OTHER
LOU
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SCHLESINGER, J
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INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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CY
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FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
REPLY FOR
FAR EAST
(
)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
EUROPE / CANADA
)
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
(
)
program ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
Indy
DATE
FROM
TO
S
5/21
Shift
X
Pres /x for deasion (5/30)
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CY TO
5/23
NSC/S
Scowcroft 39d Nasm for Pres
SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
5/23
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(5/30)
5/24
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NSC/S
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/seiD"
sheet
DISPATCH
MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/F'D
BY
special DISPOSITION:
MAY 281974
SF
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HP
NS
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
X
FOLDER:
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WH
EP
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
PA
DY
DECLASSIFIED
(NBC-74-21)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
NSSM 202
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/GDS
June 12, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: JEANNE DAVIS
FROM:
MICHAEL GUHIN
my
THRU:
DAVID ELLIOTT
SUBJECT:
Extension of NSSM Due Dates
As discussed with you yesterday:
-- The due date for NSSM 202, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
should be extended from Friday, June 14 to Friday, June 21, 1974;
and
-- The due date for NSSM 194, Review of Certain Conventional Weapons,
should be extended from July 3 to August 16.
I have discussed this with Dick Kennedy and the key interested agencies.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you inform State (Brandon Grove) by phone that the due date
for the NSSM 202 report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty is extended
to June 21, 1974.
2. That you sign the memorandum at Tab A extending the due date for
NSSM 194.
SECRET/GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
May 28, 1974
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mr. Jerome Kahan, S/P
Co-Chairman, NSSM 202
SUBJECT:
Brandon Grove's Memorandum of May
23 on the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, NSSM 202
As you know, Mr. Charles Van Doren, of
ACDA, has been designated Co-Chairman of the
subject study.
Mil chistster
A. M. Christopher
Special Assistant
CC: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
CLASSIFIED BY
A. M. Christopher
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1982
GOD
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified