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NSSM 202 [3 of 3]
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NSSM 202 [3 of 3]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
/
u.s. Non - Proliferation Treaty
9/27/74
A
Report
FILE LOCATION
NSC H Files Box H-205 Folder 3
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NA 14029 (1-98)
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
/
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
2120
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET
May 24, 1974
NSC-U/SM-13B
TO:
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
By National Security Council Study Memorandum
202 of May 23, 1974, the President has directed
that the Under Secretaries Committee undertake a
review of US policy concerning the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The study should
review present US policy concerning non-prolifera-
tion and the NPT in the light of changed conditions
since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular,
in light of India's announcement of its underground
nuclear test. The terms of reference are provided
in the attached copy of NSSM 202.
The study will be conducted under the joint
chairmanship of the Department of State and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Addressees
are requested to designate their representative
as soon as possible to Mr. Jerome Kahan, Policy
Planning Staff, Department of State, whose telephone
number 632-8980.
The study together with a covering memorandum
for the President should be completed no later than
Thursday, June 6, 1974 for circulation the
membership.
to rave.
Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director
Attachment:
As stated
SECRET
GDS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET - GDS
May 23, 1974
National Security Study Memorandum 202
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SUBJECT:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation
and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of
NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its
underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range
of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture
toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future
U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S.
should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to
it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how
and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public,
congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.
The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13
and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in
preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take
into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating
currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.
The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SECRET - GDS
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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SUBJECT: U SEC Com RPT U/Sm - 013B re Nuclear
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ACTION
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SUBSEQUENT ACTION required (OR taken):
CY TO
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MICHAEL GUHIN IS NSC REP. CODAL CONCURS.
30 Mar
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
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NSC/S DISP INSTR
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
PA
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DECLASSIFIED
(NBC-74-21)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
back upar
6225
DAVU
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FVI
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also put SM202,
January 3, 1975
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
a
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ACDA Recommendations on U.S. Enrichment Policy
ACDA was requested by an NSC Memorandum dated
December 19 to submit its comments and recommendations
on the interagency study U.S. Policy on Enriched Uranium
prepared in response to NSSM 209 and on the earlier drafts
submitted by AEC and State. This study, in contrast to
earlier drafts, does reflect a heightened awareness of
the foreign policy, non-proliferation, balance of payments,
and international energy aspects of the decisions facing
the U.S. in the area of future enrichment policy. The
discussions and the range of options now proposed for con-
sideration should provide an adequate basis for a decision
on this important problem.
ACDA's views on the serious impact on our non-
proliferation efforts of our past enrichment policy as
well as the consequences of further delay in the U.S.
commitment to the 4th and 5th major increments of enrichment
capacity were outlined in our Memorandum to you of November 25.
In view of the urgent need to resolve at an early date the
present uncertainty surrounding the U.S. enrichment policy,
ACDA believes that the non-proliferation interests of the
United States would be best served by a modified version of
option "b", proposed in the interagency's study, i.e.
"Defer private entry and obtain authorization for
government construction of, at least, the next two
enrichment plants."
The decision on the timing and technologies to be used
should be based on a comprehensive and updated review by
AEC of the projected supply and demand for enriched uranium.
ACDA does not believe that a decision on the ultimate role
SECRET
(GDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
-2-
of private ownership need necessarily be made at this time
so long as our ability to continue international cooperation
in uranium enrichment is not forced to await that decision.
This recommendation would permit the U.S. Government
to take at the earliest possible time those actions necessary
to assure both domestic and foreign customers of à reliable
and continuous supply of enriched uranium. Most important,
it would be fully responsive to our foreign policy require-
ments. For example, it would permit prompt implementation
of the currently stalled NSDM 255 recommendation to initiate
consultations aimed at encouraging, where appropriate, the
construction of multi-national reprocessing and enrichment
plants. Furthermore, it would be possible to apply the
recommendations of the NSSM 202 study, if approved, to
strengthen the NPT by implementation of the preferential
treatment feature of Article IV of the Treaty. The ability
of the U.S. to influence the application of effective safe-
guards and to control the spread of enrichment technologies
among the non-nuclear weapon states would be significantly
enhanced.
The U.S. efforts to influence enrichment developments
abroad by encouraging multi-national enrichment plants,
effective export agreements, improved safeguards, and controlled
sharing of enrichment technology will continue to erode unless
the United States is prepared in the near future to build the
next major increment of enrichment capacity.
Fred C. Ikle
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified