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SECRET
This document consists of 81 pages
No. 10 of 15 Copies, Series
NOV i 1 1974
Classified by:
NOV 1 1 1974
Vance H. Hudgins
Assistant Director
for Politico-Military
Security Affairs
The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
In accordance with NSDM-255, an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative
of the Atomic Energy Commission and comprising representatives of the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has prepared the
enclosed study concerning possible provisions for an international
convention concerned with physical security of nuclear weapons materials
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium.) We focused on the importance
of obtaining international consensus. on the need for physical security
of nuclear weapons materials in situ and in transit, on the need to define
certain elements of international cooperation relative to such security.
and on various approaches to obtaining international adoption of such
security measures as may be agreed.
It was realized that most countries may recognize the dangers but many may
be reluctant to accept obligatory international inspections or enforcement
of standards. Given that, we considered a spectrum of alternatives
ranging from a convention with stringent, specific guidelines and mandatory
international inspections to a convention with more general guidelines and
essentially voluntary provisions. International acceptability is likely
to increase as one moves away from the specific toward the more general
convention, and concurrence is much more likely without a requirement for
verification. The details of the approaches considered are set forth in
the attached executive summary of the interagency report and in the report
itself.
The study recommends that you approve the following approach:
1. Drafting by the IAEA and negotiation of an international convention
by which a large number of countries would subscribe. at least in
principle, to adequate and effective physical security standards
which conform to the extent practicable with specific international
guidelines.
2. U.S. initiatives for the sdoption of common policies by the key
suppliers to assure adherence to the convention through their bilateral
assistance agreements with recipients.
SUBJECT TO GENERAL SIFICATION SCHEDULE OR
NATIONAL SECURITY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATCALLY DOWNGRADED
AT PWO-YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC.
INFORMATION
31
1982
Criminal Unauthorized Sanctions. Disclosure Subject to
SURNAME
lunsen year)
DATE
Reproduced at the SECRET Richard Presidential Library
Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9.53) AECM 0240
GPO
DECLASSIFIED 520-284
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
NOV 1 1 1974
The President
- 2 -
We recognize that such an approach will require a flexible and carefully
executed plan of action and that proper timing is critical to its
successful execution.
It should be noted that there are a number of related activities
currently under way that are directly supportive of or complementary
to the above approach. Of primary importance, the NSSM-202 study of
U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, which is nearing completion, will
recommend an overall strategy which includes consultations with other
nuclear suppliers to obtain concerted action in a number of critical
non-proliferation areas, including physical security. In addition. the
following specific actions related to physical security have been taken
or are currently in progress:
-- The Secretary of State, the Director of ACDA and I, along with senior
members of our staffs, have begun preliminary bilateral discussions with
representatives of other key supplier countries on non-proliferation policy
issues, including physical security.
-- Recent appeals for international action on physical security have been
made by the Secretary of State at the UNGA, and by me before the IAEA
General Conference in September.
-- The Atomic Energy Commission has published regulations and regulatory
guides. covering physical protection of nuclear plants and materials within
the U.S. We also adopted the policy that no new commitments or contracts
will be made to supply foreign countries significant amounts of nuclear
weapons materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) unless adequate
physical security arrangements are assured.
-- The Atomic Energy Commission is holding technical discussions with
nuclear supplier and user countries on physical security measures,
including current standards, R&D, and future plans. This will encourage
maximum cooperation and exchange of information.
In line with the NSSM-202 study recommendations, NSDM-255 guidance, and
other non-proliferation activities currently under way, we recommend the
following additional actions for implementing the approach outlined above:
a. The AEC will continue detailed technical discussions on physical
security questions with nuclear suppliers and users.
OFFICE
SURNAME
DATE
Reproduced at the SECRET Richard Library
Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240
GPO DECLASSIFIED 520.284
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
NOV 1 1 1974
The President
- 3 -
b. The Department of State. in coordination with the AEC and ACDA,
will continue to hold discussions regarding concerted supplier actions
with other supplier countries. In the course of these discussions, we
will surface on a highly confidential basis with the UK. Canada, the FRG
the Soviet Union and France our approach to physical security as outlined
above, and seek their support.
C. The U.S. will undertake initiatives to assist the IAEA to draft
an international convention on physical security standards, and to promote
widespread international adherence. The U.S. might also pursue an UNGA
resolution agreeing. in principle, to the need for physical security
measures and assigning follow-on action to the IAEA.
d. Once the above steps, including the negotiation of an international
convention, are accomplished, we would urge the key suppliers to adopt a
common policy regarding physical security and to develop the mechanics
necessary for the imposition of adequate physical security measures by the
suppliers on the recipient countries.
We will continue our related activities as discussed above pending your
review and approval of the recommended course of action.
Respectfully yours,
Original signed by
Dixy Lee Ray
Chairman
OFF
the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
NSDM 255*
that part dealing with
STUDY OF PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION CONCERNED WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES
AND TRANSFER OF MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
Prepared by an Ad Hoc Group composed of
representatives of the:
Atomic Energy Commission, Chairman
Department of State
Department of Defense
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Central Intelligence Agency
September 1974
*NSDM-255 "Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and
Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries," June 3, 1974
When separated from this document
as
UNDERSONTED
Document Transmitted
Herewith Contains
(Insert proper classification)
Reproduced the Richard Nixon PresideNtaiTLIQANA!. SECURITY INFORMATION
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- 2 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Executive Summary
B. Study of Possible Provisions for an International Convention Concerned
with Physical Security Guidelines
1. Review of Related Material
2. International Approaches to the Problem of Physical Security
a. Bilateral Approach
b. The International Convention Approach
C. The Multilateral Suppliers Agreement Approach
3. Postulated Positions of Other Nations Regarding a Convention on
Physical Security
4. Forums for an International Convention
5. Possible Provisions for International Physical Security Guidelines
6. U.S. Options and Tactics in Orchestrating a Convention
C. Establishment of Information Exchange Internationally on Transfers
of Material, Equipment and Technology
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
E. Appendices
A - National Security Decision Memorandum 255, "Security and Other
Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries,"
June 3, 1974
B - Current U.S. Standards
C - IAEA Recommended Guidelines
D - Projected Improvements in Current U.S. Standards
E - IAEA Safeguards and the NPT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECL ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 3 -
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Purpose: This report is in response to NSDM 255*, dated June 3, 1974,
which directed, in part, an Ad Hoc Group to study "possible provisions for
an international convention concerned with physical security guidelines.' "
The NSDM also directed that the Ad Hoc Group "explore the idea of establishing
better information exchange internationally on transfers of materials, equipment
or technology.
Background: In NSDM 255, the President approved the following actions
which the Under Secretaries Committee (USC) had recommended in response to
NSDM 235 concerning "steps the United States could take with other nations
concerning the problems associated with the increased availability of weapons
usable materials from the growth and dissemination of nuclear power industries":
1. That the U.S. initiate consultations with other countries--
particularly present or potential suppliers of materials, technology,
and equipment--with the objectives detailed in the USC report. The
initial consultations should emphasize but not necessarily be limited
to the need for: (a) establishing agreed international guidelines,
preferably based on U.S. practice, to ensure the physical security of
weapons usable and highly toxic materials whether internationally
transferred or indigenously produced; (b) reaching some common
principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology
or equipment; (c) avoiding or applying stricter terms for supply in
situations where special hazards could be present; and (d) encouraging,
where appropriate, multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication and
reprocessing facilities.
2. That a prompt study of possible provisions for an international
convention with physical security guidelines be conducted by an
Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Atomic Energy
Commission, and comprising representatives of the Departments of
State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group
should explore the idea of establishingbet information exchange
internationally on transfers of materials, equipment, or technology.
The studies directed in paragraph (2) are the subject of this report; however,
it is recognized that the consultations directed in paragraph (1) are closely
related and a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of an international
convention.
*
"Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power
Industries," June 3, 1974 (Appendix A)
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11552
NATIONAL SECURITY
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC 31
INFORMATION
1982
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.
the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 4 -
A distinction must be drawn between international safeguards which are directed
toward detection of and preventing diversion of materials at the naţional level
on the one hand and physical security measures to protect against theft or
sabotage by subnational groups on the other. The objective of IAEA safeguards
is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear
weapons material from peaceful purposes and the deterrence of such diversion
by risk of early detection. A review of IAEA safeguards, their role, status,
effectiveness, and relationship to the NPT is attached in Appendix E. The
IAEA does not now have responsibility for physical security. Each member
State is charged with maintaining a materials accountability and control system;
however, physical security measures are left to their discretion. IAEA has
published physical security guidelines for voluntary use by the member States
(Appendix C).
Discussion: Physical security measures are considered necessary to prevent
acts of theft or sabotage. The U.S. has already published physical security
regulations (Appendix B) and is continually upgrading them with the changing
threat. The Ad Hoc Group believes that standards for physical security measures
should be adopted internationally and should, if possible, be as stringent as
current U.S. standards. The establishment of adequate physical security
measures on a global scale is extremely important as a supplement to IAEA
safeguards. The Ad Hoc Group believes that an essential element in achieving
this goal is common views as to desirable domestic systems in major nuclear
industrial states and subsequently agreement among supplier countries to enforce
stringent physical security measures through bilateral agreements with recipient
countries, in the absence of international agreements.
In addition to national physical security measures, consideration must be given
to necessary elements of international cooperation relevant to physical security.
These include improving exchange of any relevant advanced warnings of theft,
commitments to respond to requests for cooperation in the pursuit and recovery
of stolen material, understandings as to responsibility for physical security
during international shipment, and a commitment to share information on physical
security systems. In this regard, we believe that international procedures should
be established concerning detection and pursuit of offenders, recovery of stolen
nuclear materials, and extradition and prosecution of persons accused of theft
of materials or sabotage of civil nuclear facilities. The establishment of
a mechanism or adoption of existing mechanisms for timely exchange of information
within agencies of the U.S. and with other governments is also necessary to cope
with the problems of theft. These channels could also prove useful in
coordinating pufsuit and recovery efforts in case of a successful theft of
materials.
Three international approaches to the problem of physical secruity were considered:
1. Bilateral where the U.S. could make supply of materials conditional
upon establishment of acceptable physical security measures. This
would not afford protection of materials already possessed, material
which may be acquired from non-U.S. sources, or material produced in
a State. Therefore, a broader approach is required.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECL LASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 5 -
2. International Convention by which a large number of countries would
subscribe, at least in principle, to the goal of adequate and
effective physical security guidelines.
3. Multinational Suppliers Agreement to enforce physical security measures
through bilateral arrangements with recipient countries. This would
presuppose adequate application of physical security in the supplier
States and a common view of the international problem.
All international organizations with a reasonable connection with this problem
have been included in this study. Factors considered included the extent of
global coverage, relevance to past and current involvement in related issues,
effectiveness, ramifications, and whether or not such a forum could expedite
agreement on a physical security convention.
A projection of the postulated attitudes of other nations on an international
convention shows that:
1. There is recognition throughout the world of the dangers inherent
in having nuclear weapons materials fall into the wrong hands.
2. Most countries will be willing to take appropriate physical security
measures and will agree with recommendations for security standards.
3. Many countries may not agree to obligatory international inspections
or enforcement of standards.
4. Most countries will be willing to reach agreement on appropriate
cooperative international arrangements related to physical security.
5. The PRC will not participate.
6. France, India, and the Latin American countries may resist a
convention which limits their freedom of action.
U.S. Options and Tactics in Orchestrating a Convention:
In an International Agreement on Physical Security there are trade-offs
between negotiability and stringency in several key areas. These produce a
spectrum of alternatives ranging from a "hard" convention with stringent and
specific guidelines and mandatory international inspections to a "soft"
convention with essentially voluntary provisions. International acceptability
will increase in moving from "hard" to "soft" provisions.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
LASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 6 -
The possibility of using a subsequent agreement among suppliers as a mechanism
to (a) induce wider adherence to a "hard" convention, or (b) enforce
impelmenting requirements on the to a "soft" convention, adds
additional alternatives.
The following options were considered:
1. A "hard" convention containing precise and stringent provisions
concerning physical security measures, international inspection, and
cooperation in recovery and prosecution.
2. A "hard" convention as in option 1, and a subsequent suppliers
agreement requiring adherence or substantial conformity with the
convention as a condition for further bilateral assistance agreements.
3. A "soft" convention, containing voluntary commitments to institute
physical security measures which conform to the extent practicable
with specific international guidelines, without international
inspection, or inspection on a voluntary basis.
4. A "soft" convention as in option 3, to be followed by an agreement
among key suppliers that bilateral supply agreements will contain
specific mandatory provisions implementing the general obligations
of the convention.
Conclusions: There is a spectrum of forms which a convention might take
and the options discussed illustrate a range of possibilities. Although a
convention with enforcement provisions appears unlikely to be satisfactory to
many of the most important countries, the acceptance of a common view of the
problem and internal application of physical security measures in those
countries is a prerequisite to any international progress. Subsequently, we
believe that obtaining effective physical security measures could rest in part
in the achievement of a supplier's understanding. It is realized that this
understanding is not assured and will require cooperation of several countries,
most notably France. Moreover, effective supplier action should be
non-discriminatory and this implies a willingness by the supplier nations
themselves to accept such international controls as they impose upon their
customers. Since many of the current key suppliers are also major recipients,
initial consultations may be complicated by the possibility that they will
react primarily as consumers. The bilateral consultations approved in NSDM-255
and now under way may provide initial indications of attitudes. It is our
judgment that:
--many nations would resist a convention with mandatory provisions but
might be receptive to a convention that is commendatory in nature;
--wide and effective implementation of standards depends upon acceptance
and enforcement by the major user/supplier nations;
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SECRET
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--in the absence of such a convention, however, such a common policy
among suppliers to impose a stringent, mandatory, and thorough set of standards
is likely to be seen as highly coercive and therefore politically objectionable
to both suppliers and recipients.
--for this reason, a common policy among key suppliers with comprehensive
and stringent standards, in the absence of a broad international agreement,
is highly unlikely in the near term, although some important progress can
probably be made in this direction;
--a broad international consensus on the need for physical security
standards would provide a legal and political base for the adoption by suppliers
of a common policy or imposing mandatory requirements; a convention would
provide such a base.
If these judgments are correct, they suggest that the most effective approach
to the goal of effective international physical security standards would
involve first reaching a common view among the major nuclear states, and then
an international convention and the adoption of common implementing policies
by the key suppliers. In negotiating a convention, a possible U.S. tactic would
be to advocate a fairly "hard" convention initially but be prepared to move
toward softer provisions as required. Since we believe that a suppliers'
understanding is a more likely means of achieving rigorous enforcement than an
international convention, our objective should be to achieve wide international
acceptance of the convention, on the hardest terms which will permit that result.
In addition to physical security standards, the convention should also
include provisions concerning pursuit, recovery and prosecution in the event
of a theft of nuclear materials or sabotage to nuclear facilities. While
provisions of this kind may be politically sensitive, we believe such
procedures are highly desirable and may be more widely acceptable to most
nations than obligations dealing with physical security standards.
We favor the UNGA as the appropriate forum for proposing a convention, although
debate on this issue should be avoided. The IAEA is the appropriate forum for
drafting and negotiating the convention. In addition to specific guidelines
for physical security measures, the convention should also contain provisions
on international procedures related to sabotage, theft, and recovery of nuclear
materials.
The intelligence network and international bodies such as Interpol can
possibly assist in the exchange of information related to theft and récovery
of nuclear materials. Existing export control organizations such as the
Zangger Committee already provide some information on transfers of materials
and equipment and offer the opportunity of increased exchanges by expansion
of membership and responsibilities.
Recommendations:
1. It is recommended that we adopt a two-step approach to deal with the
physical security problem.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 8
a. An international convention by which a large number of countries
would subscribe, at least in principle, to adequate and effective
physical security standards and procedures which conform to the
extent practicable with specific international guidelines. This
would include provisions for defining international procedures
for pursuit, recovery, and extradition and prosecution in the event
of nuclear theft or sabotage of nuclear facilities.
b. Adoption of common policies by the key suppliers to implement and
enforce the convention through their bilateral assistance agreements
with recipients.
It is also recommended that a detailed plan of action be undertaken which
could include the following:
a. Preliminary discussions, as authorized by NSDM-255, with other
major supplier countries on physical security, the supply of
enrichment technology, multinational enrichment and reprocessing
facilities. In the course of these discussions, we should
surface on a highly confidential basis with the UK, Canada,
the FRG, the Soviet Union, and France our two-step approach to
physical security as outlined above. These discussions ultimately
should be coordinated with extensive consultations on the technical
aspects of the physical security problem and the methods which could
be taken to strengthen procedures.
b. An appeal for international action on physical security in the UNGA,
as was made by the Secretary of State on September 23, 1974, possibly
including US support for the concept of an international convention.
This might lead to a UNGA resolution agreeing,
in principle, to the need for physical security measures and assigning
follow-on action to the IAEA if it appears as a result of the above
consultations that it would be useful to do so.
c. Multinational consultations with key suppliers to discuss common
non-proliferation policies in such areas as technology transfer,
additional special arrangements, etc., as proposed in NSSM-202.
This could include discussion of common policies on physical security
as a means of gaining high-level political support in this area.
This might also provide an opportunity to discuss on a confidential
basis with other key suppliers the two-step concept and the eventual
imposition of specific physical security obligations by the suppliers.
d. Drafting of a convention within IAEA; initiative by the US and other
suppliers to obtain widespread international adherence.
e. Agreement among the suppliers to assure adherence to the convention
via bilateral supply contracts. The IAEA seems like the appropriate
agency to conduct the enforcement provisions. We must await, though,
the agreement with the suppliers before we make our final judgment
regarding enforcement, since this matter is of prime importance;
Reproduced at the Richar Nixon Presidential Library
ADECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
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f. Continuing US bilateral requirement for adequate physical security
standards on recipient countries along the lines of the
Israeli/Egyptian model whereby the Agreement for Cooperation in
Civil Uses of Nuclear Energy called for agreed on measures for
security of materials, equipment, and devices.
3. It is recommended that to ensure proper physical security measure are
taken in the transfer of nuclear materials that diplomatic and commercial
channels be used to exchange unclassified information relating to the
transfer. In addition, intelligence liaison channels can be used where
appropriate in exchanging unclassified information relating to thefts and
the recovery of nuclear materials. A system of rewards may be adopted
to assist in the pursuit and recovery of nuclear materials, both
domestically and internationally.
4. U.S. strive for expansion of existing international agreements in control
of nuclear exports, such as the Zangger Committee, to provide for better
exchange of information on the transfer of nuclear materials and equipment.
5. Physical security standards comparable to those used in the U.S. should
be the basis for acceptable measures adopted internationally and enforced
in multilateral supplier arrangements, while taking into account published
IAEA guidelines (Appendix C) and the special needs of other States as
applicable.
Reproduced at th Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECL SSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
- 10 -
B. STUDY OF POSSIBLE PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CONCERNED
WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES
1. Review Of Related Material
The President, following his review of NSSM-150 (United States Policy
on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors), directed
in NSDM-235 that an action program should be developed by the Under Secretaries
Committee to consider the diplomatic and other steps the U.S. might consider
taking with other nations, and in particular other supplier nations, "with
regard to the security, non-proliferation, political and economic aspects
associated with the increasing growth and dissemination of nuclear power
industries, with particular focus on potential problems associated with highly
enriched uranium."
This task was assigned to the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and the proposed
action plan for implementing the program is reported in NSC U/DM-122. In
considering the issues involved in NSDM-235, it became clear that plutonium,
rather than highly enriched uranium, is the weapon material that will become
available in the near term to many nations in sizeable quantities. However,
in the future, widespread distribution of enrichment capability could make
available supplies of highly enriched uranium from non-U.S. sources. Therefore,
the Under Secretaries Committee expanded the scope of the study to include
consideration of the establishment of agreed international guidelines,
preferably based on U.S. practice, to ensure the physical security of all
fissionable materials usable in nuclear weapons whether internationally
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
TDE
This document has been reviewed pursuant utive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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transferred or indigenously produced, and on methods of encouraging all
states to provide physical protective measures for nuclear related facilities.
The proposed action plan concluded that a U.S. effort to induce other nations
to stiffen their standards of physical security might be greeted with reluctance
and, in some cases, with open resistance, since many nations regard physical
security measures for their own nuclear activities as essentially a national
prerogative. Nevertheless, the need for creating adequate physical security
measures to protect highly enriched uranium and plutonium and related facilities
throughout the world from diversions, theft or sabotage is so pressing that
the Under Secretaries Committee recommended, and the President in NSDM-235
has approved, the following actions:
a. That the U.S. initiate consultations with other countries
-- particularly present or potential suppliers of materials,
technology and equipment -- with the objectives detailed in the
USC report. The initial consultations should emphasize but not
necessarily be limited to the need for: (1) establishing agreed
international guidelines, preferably based on U.S. practice, to
ensure the physical security of weapons useable and highly toxic
materials whether internationally transferred or indigenously
produced; (2) reaching some common principles regarding the
supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment;
(3) avoiding, or apply stricter terms, for supply in situations
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
ECLASSFEDT
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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where special hazards could be present; and (4) encouraging,
where appropriate, multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication
and reprocessing facilities.
b. That a prompt study of possible provisions for an international
convention with physical security guidelines be conducted by
an interagency Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the
Atomic Energy Commission and comprising representatives of the
Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of
Defense, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition,
the Ad Hoc Group should explore the idea of establishing better
information exchange internationally on transfers of materials,
equipment, or technology.
The studies directed in paragraph (b.) are the subject of this report; however
it is recognized that the consultations directed in paragraph (a.) are closely
related and a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of an international
convention.
In dealing with the question of physical security, a distinction is drawn
between the physical security measures which might be required of a recipient
country to protect against theft or sabotage by individuals or groups not
associated with the government (subnational level diversion) on the one hand
and those international safeguards measures directed against diversion by the
government of the recipient country (national level diversion) on the other.
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The detailed IAEA-NPT safeguards procedures are silent on matters of physical
security other than to charge the state with the responsibility for establishing
a materials accountability and control system; the IAEA does not now have the
right to impose its physical security guidelines on member states or to verify
compliance. Instead, the principal safeguards procedures developed to date
for use by the IAEA have been designed to detect losses of material through
inventory taking and checking of material balances.* These procedures are
primarily aimed at deterring national level diversion through post facto
detection of loss. Although safeguards and physical security are related
and complement each other, this report concentrates on physical security aspects.
Strong physical constraints are considered necessary in preventing overt acts
of sabotage or theft at the sub-national level and in minimizing the threats
of diversion that could occur while materials are in transit. The improvement
and elaboration of adequate physical security measures on a glóbal scale is
extremely important as a supplement to the IAEA safeguards and control procedures.
However, physical security considerations alone may not be adequate protection
against a determined, organized, domestic or international group which seeks
to acquire highly enriched uranium or plutonium for criminal or political
reasons. Therefore, further consideration must be given to ways of facilitating
advanced warning of thefts being planned by such groups and the pursuit and
* See Appendix E for further discussion.
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DECLASSIFIED
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recovery of the fissionable material in the event of a theft. The establishment
of a mechanism or the adaptation of existing mechanisms for the timely and
orderly exchange of intelligence and counterintelligence information among the
various departments and agencies/ of the U.S. Government as well as the
utilization of the existing positive and counterintelligence liaison channels
with foreign governments are deemed necessary to cope with this problem of
theft. The same channels could prove useful in coordinating pursuit and
recovery efforts in case of international movement of stolen material.
Reproduce at the Richard Nixon residential Library
DECL ASSIFIED
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SECRET
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2. International Approaches to the Problem of Physical Security
There are a number of possible approaches to the goal of an
international convention for physical security. This section considers these
approaches and combinations thereof pointing out some of the advantages and
also the difficulties to be expected in each case.
a. Bilateral Approach
The U.S., throught the extension of its bilateral agreements for
cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, could make the
continued supply of nuclear materials and technology contingent
upon the establishment by the recipient nation of physical security
measures acceptable to the U.S. Measures of this kind have been
proposed by the United States in the current negotiations on
the sale of power reactors to Egypt and Israel. While such
measures would apply only to the protection of U.S. -supplied
materials and nuclear materials produced in such facilities, this
could result in overall increased security measures with added
protection for all materials and facilities within the state.
Nevertheless, there would be no positive assurance that material
of other than U.S. origin or that facilities containing no U.S.
material would receive adequate protection simply as a result of
U.S. bilaterally-imposed measures. A number of problems. are
evident in a bilateral approach. For one, other nations likely
will resent any attempts from the outside to impose standards
in an area regarded as essentially one of national prerogative,
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especially if the standards are being imposed bilaterally, rather
than by an international body such as the IAEA. And, since some
provision will be necessary for supervising the security system
to assure continuous compliance, the inspection program and any
related sanctions will probably be quite onerous to most nations.
Presumably, however, inspections required by bilateral agreements
might be less objectionable if conducted by an international body
(IAEA), under arrangements similar to those now in effect for
trilateral safeguards under Agreements for Cooperation. In
addition, negotiations on a bilateral basis would require
flexibility in individual cases to accomodate differing economic,
political and legal structures in the several states since no
single set of standards would be applicable to all. The obvious
complaint of less-favorable treatment is certain to arise under
these circumstances unless individual understandings are of a
classified nature.
Another question centers on the degree to which specific
requirements would be spelled out in the agreements; the danger,
of course, being that dissemination of complete security plans opens
the way to the compromise of those plans. This would be another point
for consideration in the protection of the confidentiality of
physical security agreements.
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The bilateral extension of our Agreements for Cooperation to
provide physical protection for U.S. -supplied nuclear materials
should receive our serious attention as an option immediately open
to us. However, it must be recognized that, with the increasing
worldwide availability of enrichment services, reprocessing,
fuel fabrication and other nuclear facility capabilities, the
position now occupied by the U.S. as the foremost supplier is
being progressively diminished. Stringent, bilaterally-imposed
protective conditions, in the absence of similar conditions by
other suppliers, might result in some states turning from the U.S.
to other suppliers for their materials, facilities and services,
or toward the development of their own indigenous capabilities,
the results of which would mean increased commercial competition
as well as the erosion of our influence over the security standards
which~might be applied in other states.
It is obvious that the bilateral extension of our Agreements to
provide physical protection for U.S. -supplied nuclear materials and
facilities will not, of itself, afford the desired degree of protection
to other nuclear materials and facilities already possessed or
which in the future may be acquired from non-U.S. sources or
indigenously produced. A broader approach to insuring an acceptable
level of physical security over all weapons-usable material and
nuclear facilities will be required.
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b. The International Convention Approach
An international convention would, in principle, permit the
negotiation and acceptance of a universal standard for physical
security measures by all concerned nations. The convention
might have some or all of the following objectives: (1) to make
more officials in all countries aware that there is a need to
take promptly adequate steps in the area of physical security;
(2) to obtain legal commitments from supplier and recipient
countries to comply with common international guidelines on
physical security procedures to be followed; (3) to establish a
mandatory mechanism for some form of international inspection and
verification of compliance; (4) to obligate parties to prosecute
or extradite persons attempting to steal nuclear materials or
to sabotage protected facilities; and (5) cooperation in the
recovery of special nuclear material. These objectives present
different political and legal problems, and may require somewhat
different approaches, and even different ones for different
countries.
1) International Security Guidelines
It would be theoretically possible to negotiate a set of
international physical security guidelines, and to persuade
recipient and supplier countries to apply them without concluding a
convention on the subject. However, there are several advantages for
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incorporating such guidelines into binding international
agreements, 1) the parties will take them more seriously,
2) they will be more likely to make a genuine political and
material commitment to enforcing them nationally, 3) they will
be more diligent in preventing and correcting violations to
avoid international criticism and 4) they will be less likely
to withdraw from the arrangement without extremely compelling
reasons. In addition, because the guidelines would be applied
uniformly, they would not give rise to economic disadvantages to
complying country.
For these same reasons, however, many recipient countries may
be less willing to agree to relatively detailed, stringent guide-
lines if they were incorporated into binding international
obligations than if they were commendatory. Many countries will
view suspiciously any proposal to accept binding legal obligations
to carry out international rules on such traditionally domestic
problems as internal security and police functions. In this
sense, there may be a trade-off between the stringency and
specificity of the guidelines on the one hand, and the degree to
which recipient countries would be willing to obligate themselves
to carry them out on the other.
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However, there may be ways to reduce this dilemma. For example,
one possible approach might be to obtain broad international
agreement in an appropriate multilateral forum to a convention
obligating all parties to take "appropriate" measures in specified
areas against certain types of threats, taking into account and
implementing to the extent practicable relatively specific and
stringent international guidelines. Parties might also be
obligated to report on the measures adopted by them and to consult
with the IAEA on possible improvements in their procedures. It
might then be possible to obtain a subsequent agreement among the
major nuclear suppliers to require strict adherence to the guide-
lines by recipient countries as a precondition for further nuclear
transfers. The United States would, of course, apply the same
requirements in all future agreements for nuclear sales to other
countries.
2) International Inspection and Verification
It would also be possible, in the absence of a convention, to
put together an entirely voluntary mechanism for international
inspection, under which, for example, IAEA personnel would be
available on the request of any country to conduct an inspection
of its physical security system and offer recommendations for its
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improvement. It is recognized that IAEA is not currently respon-
sible for, or capable of, providing physical security inspections;
however, with the backing of the member countries and the U.N.,
the IAEA could be given such a role.
The advantages of including a system of international inspection
and verification in a convention would be to establish binding
procedures and standards for inspection which countries could not
circumvent or ignore, and to ensure regular and uniform inspection
of all parties on an equal basis.
As in the case of physical security guidelines, there may be a
trade-off between the stringency of inspection procedures and the
degree to which many countries would be willing to accept binding
obligations. Even if all military installations were completely
exempt from inspection and verification, many countries would
resist the entry of foreign personnel into sensitive nuclear
facilities because proprietary information might be revealed.
Once again, it may be possible to achieve greater stringency in
these procedures through an agreement among suppliers to require
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submission to bilateral or international inspection as a precondition
for further sales or assistance. Effective international standards
must be seen as basically non-discriminatory; this implies a
willingness by the supplier nations to accept the same standards and
international inspection arrangements that they jointly require of
their customers. This problem is highlighted by the fact that most
of the current and key potential suppliers are also major recipients.
The degree to which the supplier nations are willing to accept inter-
national controls may in fact set the outside limits on the kind of
international physical security regime. that can be achieved.
3) Trial or Extradition of Persons Stealing Nuclear Material
The inclusion in an international convention of a requirement
for the trial or extradition of persons stealing nuclear materials
or sabotaging protected facilities would be designed to deter
such acts by minimizing the possibility that terrorists could
avoid prosecution by escaping to countries which would be politically
reluctant to take action against them in the absence of a firm
international legal obligation to do SO.
In this respect, it would be similar to the anti-terrorism provisions
in the Hague, Montreal and Protection of Diplomats Conventions.
This requirement raises some of the same issues as those associated
with hijacking and flow of drugs. Such a provision may generate
intense political controversy, particularly if it is viewed as part
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of the general U.S. anti-terrorism campaign. It may, however, be
more acceptable because nuclear theft or sabotage by terrorists has
potentially far more disastrous and destabilizing consequences.
4) Cooperation in Recovery of Stolen Nuclear Materials
A convention might also obligate parties to cooperate in recovering
stolen nuclear materials, and in informing one another promptly of
any information on possible attempts at nuclear theft or sabotage
involving other countries. Such obligations would be stated in a
general manner in the convention, and thus implementation would depend
essentially on the good faith and common interest of the parties.
However, procedures and mechanisms could be instituted within existing
international police organizations, such as Interpol, to allow for
meaningful procedures for cooperation on recovery of stolen nuclear
materials. A system of rewards may be adopted to assist in the pursuit
and recovery operations, both domestically and internationally.
c. The Multinational Suppliers Agreement Approach
In addition to a purely bilateral approach by the U.S. or an
international convention of supplier and recipient nations,
another avenue for upgrading national physical security measures
would be through joint agreement by key supplier countries to enforce
stringent worldwide physical security measures through their bilateral
arrangements with recipient countries. This would somewhat
parallel the efforts of the Zangger Committee, a committee of supplier
nations formed to determine export characteristics that would
trigger IAEA safeguards.
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An agreement on the imposition of physical security measures
by supplier nations, however, has definite coercive aspects which
make it rather different than the export controls under delibera-
tion by the Zangger Committee. First, there is at present no
supporting international organization charged with insuring
compliance with physical security measures. (Although the IAEA
is concerned with export of special nuclear materials as well
as facility safeguards to detect national diversion, it has not
officially recognized the Zangger Committee, although will
probably acknowledge the export controls determined by the
Committee.) Imposition of physical security safeguards is some-
what comparable to implementing constraints on export of
technology, a concept which has been introduced into Zangger
Committee deliberations but was rejected by some members as
falling outside the purview of the NPT.
As a second point of difference, in the absence of any agreed
international obligations in this area, the unilateral imposition
of stringent physical security requirements by a consortium of
supplier nations, as contrasted to export controls that would
merely trigger safeguards, would probabły result in open hostility of
many recipient nations. This situation would, in turn, present a
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significant economic advantage to those supplier nations which
chose not to be a party to such a suppliers agreement. For this
reason, it would be essential that all key suppliers, especially
France which currently is not a member of the Zangger Committee,
be a party to such an agreement.
In lieu of universal acceptance of a convention specifying stringent
and mandatory physical security standards and international
inspection (a highly unlikely outcome), a joint supplier nations
agreement to enforce such standards would probably be the only
effective means of insuring compliance. Again, the major
disadvantage of such an agreement is that its highly coercive
character might make it objectionable to some supplier nations
as well as recipient States. One possible solution to this
problem, as indicated in the previous section, would be a two-step
process:
a. an international convention that attempts to obtain
agreement on a framework for universal application of
physical security measures with as much specificity as
practicable, but perhaps commendatory rather than
obligatory in nature so as to induce most nations
to sign and ratify the convention.
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b. A subsequent suppliers agreement to insure that these
standards are stringently enforced.
The value of this approach is that a commendatory
convention would have a much greater chance of success
than an obligatory convention; the convention would then
serve as the legal-political basis for a subsequent
suppliers agreement to enforce the convention.
A further problem concerns the difficulty of formulating uniform
mandatory standards to apply universally without losing a great
deal of their specificity, whether for use in an international
convention or in a suppliers committee. Enforcement by the supplier
through bilateral agreements could permit the physical security
requirements to be tailored to the particular needs and
capabilities of the recipient, but this appraoch might lead to
recipient charges of discriminatory treatment by suppliers and
in any event might erode the application of agreed and uniform
sťandards.
An alternative might be to extend the mandate of the IAEA to
encompass the negotiation of agreements with recipient nations
containing explicit physical security standards and the supervision
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of their execution. The supplier nations would then impose a
common requirement in bilateral agreements that recipient
nations negotiate physical security agreements with the LAEA,
similar to IAEA safeguards agreements. This approach would
permit the IAEA to apply universal standards with some flexibility
to meet varying national requirements, and might reduce the risks
of erosion of the standards or discriminatory treatment. It is
not without its own political problems however, as the experience
of the IAEA in negotiating safeguards agreements attests.
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3. Postulated Positions of Other Nations on an International Convention
Most countries of the world are expected to have no objection, in
principle, to the draft standards on physical security provided they are
commendatory in nature. There is recognition throughout the world of the
dangers inherent in having fissionable material fall into the wrong hands,
and most countries will be willing or have taken appropriate physical security
measures to prevent such diversion. The PRC, however, will almost certainly
not participate. There could also be problems with France and the Latin
American countries. Although most countries would agree with recommendations
for security standards, many would not agree to obligatory international
inspections or enforcement of the standards.
WESTERN EUROPE. The energy crisis is leading to increased dependence
on nuclear energy with attendant greater awareness of the possibilities of
diversion, loss, or theft of nuclear materials. Many European countries are
already sensitive to the problems of terrorism. Thus, it appears that most
Western European nations would gladly accept some agreement on security
measures. (France may be a problem and is addressed separately.)
EURATOM, as the nuclear supply agency of Western Europe, presents
a special problem. There could be objections on any agreement which excluded
or superseded EURATOM. Standards promulgated through EURATOM would probably
be more acceptable to the Western European countries than bilateral agreements
between the various countries and the U.S.
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Inspections or enforcement of security standards would probably be accepted,
but grudgingly. The conduct of such inspections by an international organi-
zation such as TAEA would probably be more acceptable than U.S. inspections.
FRANCE. France will occupy a crucial position in any negotiations
aimed at producing effective physical security standards. As a key supplier
nation, her attitude may be the controlling factor in implementing such a
convention. France is concerned about the vulnerability of her nuclear
installations and is likely to support a fairly stringent convention, provided
that it did not interfere significantly with normal operations, protected
proprietary information, and was acceptable to most nations. However, any
arrangement which threatens to weaken France's competitive position in the
international market is likely to be strongly resisted. To gain the partici-
pation of France in any supplier's agreement enforcing the convention would
probably be the most difficult and most important element in such an
arrangement. EURATOM could play a role in gaining France's cooperation.
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. The Soviets are likely to be favorable to
such an international convention. As long as the agreement is self-policing
there will be no conflict with normal, very tight Soviet and Eastern
European security. They would likely object to inspections. As a major
economic power, the USSR recognizes its stake in world stability. Further-
more, the Soviets have a keen appreciation for the potential for abuse of
nuclear technology, and take an active role in international efforts to limit
opportunities for misuse of nuclear energy. The proposed convention would be
consistent with such Soviet objectives.
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However, should Third World countries object strongly to the convention,
Moscow might be reluctant to align itself for fear of being perceived as an
overbearing superpower. On the other hand, should world reactions be
favorable or neutral, and the PRC reaction adverse as expected, the USSR might
support the convention even more enthusiastically in order to expose Chinese
intransigency.
The Eastern European States will almost certainly follow the Soviet lead. They,
like the USSR, are eager to reap the benefits of international nuclear cooperation.
ASIA
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. The Peoples Republic of China may very
well oppose the proposed convention as another example of "superpower interference"
in the internal affairs of others. There is virtually no chance that the PRC
would participate in it. The PRC has not participated in previous nuclear
conventions because she feels they are dominated by the two superpowers- the U.S.
and the USSR--and might limit China's own nuclear program. Furthermore, Peking
has made no public statement to indicate a concern in the area of physical security.
Normal security in the PRC is probably much stronger than any which would be
proposed internationally.
Republic of China. The ROC would probably readily accept the
necessity for physical security standards. Due largely to the potential Peking
threat, it maintains strict security standards now. The ROC might well, however,
object to additional on-site inspections and consequent greater exposure of her
nuclear facilities. Since the ROC is no longer an IAEA member, use of that
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forum to discuss and draft a convention could exclude her. But any attempt to
include her could jeopardize the continuing--and extremely important--IAEA
safeguards program on Taiwan which the PRC has already protested. For this reason,
it would be best to handle the ROC aspect--if necessary--either through a
bilateral program or a suppliers' agreement and avoid introducing the Chinese
representation issue into efforts to conclude an international convention.
JAPAN. Japan also is expected to be in agreement with such an
international convention, though they would not take the lead in its negotiation.
Japan needs Western nuclear cooperation and could not afford to be cut off from
such cooperation. Even though the Japanese nuclear program is growing rapidly,
Tokyo has not shown as much concern about theft of fissionable material as might
be expected. But Japan could resent the imposition of a highly detailed physical
security program, preferring general guidelines with details worked out in Japan.
She would also resent it if she were treated differently than Western Europe.
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
INDIA. India maintains high standards of physical security in its
large and growing nuclear program. She probably would have no objection to the
proposed standards, as long as the policing is internal. But she would object
strongly to anything which involved inspections, disclosures or other
infringements of her sovereignty.
PAKISTAN. Pakistan would be expected to enthusiastically embrace the
international convention. In the wake of India's recent nuclear test, Pakistan is
strongly in favor of an international nuclear controls which would afford greater
protection to non-weapon States. Furthermore, Pakistan's nuclear program is still
strongly dependent on outside support, and she would probably go much further
than India is allowing inspections in order not to alienate world opinion.
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MIDDLE EAST
ISRAEL. Israel would probably agree to the world standards.
Israel's bitter experience with terrorists has already forced her to very
high standards of physical security. Such an agreement would have no real
effect on Israel's normal practices in securing nuclear installations.
Israel almost certainly would object strongly to any inspection of her
nuclear facilities. Nor would Israel be likely to provide access to
information on Israeli security organizations or security plans for nuclear
installations.
EGYPT. Egypt would probably accept the proposed standards.
She might also allow inspection of the security arrangements on a periodic
basis especially if the latter were tied to a similar agreement on the
part of Israel.
IRAN. Iran can be expected to impose effective physical security
standards to safeguard nuclear materials. Iran has had experience in the
comparable areas of safeguarding both oil refineries and sophisticated weapons
possessed by the armed forces. The Iranian National Intelligence and Security
Organization (SAVAK) is a large, modern and reasonably efficient organization.
The Shah is likely to associate nuclear programs with his own prestige and
give top priority to safeguarding nuclear materials. As the Shah is keenly
sensitive concerning national sovereignty, the Shah would probably not accept any
form of inspection under a new convention.
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SOUTH AFRICA. South Africa-will probably support the convention on
physical security. Although it has not signed the NPT, it politically supports
the ideal of non-proliferation. South Africa has large uranium reserves and
wants to enter the world market in enriched uranium. Furthermore, it needs
international recognition to overcome an image as an international outcast.
South Africa is likely to object to inspections of security arrangements at
nuclear facilities.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CANADA. Canada is expected to support the international convention.
Given Canada's strong position as an exporter of natural uranium and its
current sensitivity to having been outmaneuvered in the nuclear arrangements
with India, Ottawa might be particularly receptive to using the leverage to
promote tougher physical security arrangements. This would be in keeping with
its attitude on safeguards.
LATIN AMERICA. The Latin American countries--Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, and Mexico--might be somewhat reticent about accepting such an
international convention. Countries in which terrorism is a definite problem
might welcome technical advice on security procedures and systems. But they
would probably be suspicious of a convention which would involve outside
scrutiny of their facilities or enforcement of standards, or which would limit
their own initiatives in their nuclear programs. Their response would probably
be predicated upon the responses of other nations with similar, fairly small
nuclear programs.
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4. Forums for a Convention
This section considers each of the international organizations that
have some reasonable connections with nuclear materials, their physical
protection, and/or recovery of any that are seized. As will be seen, other
factors cause several of these organizations to be unlikely prospects for
sponsoring a physical security convention.
Also included in this listing is the part each of these organizations has
played in previous similar negotiations, as well as the relevance of the
organization's membership to the problem of physical protection of nuclear
materials.
a. United Nations-Authorized Ad Hoc Committee
The UN General Assembly can play a useful role in nuclear control,
as it did in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by
passing a resolution urging such an agreement and then endorsing
the agreement. However, the General Assembly seems most unlikely
to be able to provide a full working agreement itself, since
the physical security problem is too detailed and scientific,
as well as having controversial overtones of being an extension
of the NPT.
The General Assembly could authorize an ad hoc committee for this
purpose, but resort to such a committee would have many of the
same technical and political problems ad direct action by the
General Assembly itself.
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Advantages of UN-Authorized Committee
1. Provides world wide attention to the problem being considered,
both for public and for the governments.
2. Might involve France and the People's Republic of China
(PRC), who have limited participation in most of the other
suitable organizations.
Disadvantages of UN-Authorized Committee
1. The General Assembly might not authorize an ad hoc committee
for the limited purpose of a convention on physical security.
2. Will provide opportunity for: publicized attacks upon the
associated NPT, particularly for any perceived imbalances
between freedoms for nuclear weapon nations compared to
restraints upon non-nuclear weapon nations.
3. The committee might become bogged down in such questions as
national customs of policing or special status for para-military
subnationals, e.g., Arab terrorists, or in criticisms of the
arms control policies of the nuclear powers.
b. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
As the UN organization which is designated for atomic energy matters,
the IAEA has specialized and knowledgeable staff and national
representatives.
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The IAEA is responsible for safeguards arrangements under
Article III of the NPT, and physical protection can be viewed
as a logical extension of this. Furthermore, the IAEA has
already convened a panel of experts which produced "Recommenda-
tions for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. "* This
provides a precedent and a basis for further work by an IAFA
convention (although nothing in the "Recommendations" by the
panel of experts can be construed as requiring such a convention.)
To comply with usual protocol of the IAEA, approval for an IAEA
physical security convention would first be obtained from the
IAEA Board of Governors and would be followed by approval by
the General Conference.
Advantages
1. Would include all IAEA members. However, the PRC has not
yet accepted membership (although available) and the Republic
of China (ROC) has been outed.
2. Effective people and a proper. setting exist at the IAEA in
Vienna.
*IAEA Vienna, June 1972. These new conditions are not binding
upon the States. (Appendix c)
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Disadvantages
1. As in the case of UN resolutions, anti-NPT spokesmen will
have occasion to launch attacks upon the NPT, although not
from SO public a forum as the UN.
2. Also, as in the UN case, the IAEA could become bogged down in
questions of national customs of policing or of paramilitary
subnationals.
3. The ROC cannot participate, and the PRC is not now participating.
c. Consideration in the NPT Review Conference
The review conference specified in the NPT will be held in May 1975.
In principle, physical security agreements could be considered at
that time for inclusion along with the renewal of the NPT.
Alternatively, it could be a separate agreement supplementary
to the NPT.
For this May 1975 Review Conference, two preparatory meetings have
already been held and a final one will probably be held in
early 1975.
For physical security to be seriously considered in the May 1975
Review Conference, the U.S. position should be established by
January 1975 SO that preparatory discussions can be held with
appropriate persons of other nations and with the IAEA.
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Advantages
1. Nations already involved with the NPT are the most likely
ones to cooperate in a physical security agreement.
2. Conceivably, although not likely, security requirements could
generally be favorably received as an improvement of the NPT.
Disadvantages
1. The non-nuclear nations could make action on physical security
a hostage for possible concessions they demand in the NPT
renewal.
2. Many nations that are, or are likely to be, important producers
of plutonium (Pu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not
participants in the NPT. These include France, the PRC, India,
South Africa and Spain.
3. The time available for preparations might be too short.
4. The four weeks or less of this conference would likely be
too short to negotiate a physical security convention.
d. Consideration in an Ad Hoc Group Commissioned by the NPT Review
Conference
Rather than consider full aspects of a physical security agreement
in the NPT Review Conference itself, an alternative would be for
this conference to commission an Ad Hoc Group for this purpose.
This would also need to be on the agenda for the May 1975 meeting,
but the preparations would presumably not be so time-consuming:
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Advantages
1. Same advantages as the 1. and 2. advantages in possibility (c.)
for NPT review.
2. Adequate preparatory time is probably available.
3. The Ad Hoc Group could use whatever time is needed without
prolonging the NPT Review Conference.
4. Conceivably, non-NPT nations could also be induced to join the
Ad Hoc Group, although this seems somewhat inconsistent and
therefore unlikely.
Disadvantages
1. Same disadvantages as the 1. and 2. disadvantages in
possibility (c.) for NPT review.
2. Even some of the NPT participating nations might be disinclined
to participate in such an Ad Hoc Group.
e. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)
Following President Johnson's 1964 message on non-proliferation
to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which was
the precursor to the CCD, non-proliferation was the principal
item on the ENDC agenda for the next three years. Thus, the NPT
resulted largely from the ENDC.
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The same forum could conceivably be used to achieve an agreement
on physical security. However, physical security of nuclear
materials is not clearly a disarmament subject, in contrast to
the NPT. Thus, it is questionable whether physical security is
a proper subject for the CCD.
Advantages
1. Being specialists in disarmament, the participants should
easily be able to adapt to the issues involved in any compact
on physical security of nuclear materials.
Disadvantages
1. The PRC is not a member and France is regularly absent,
although a member.
2. A physical security compact has questionable appropriateness
for the CCD.
3. The membership includes opponents of the NPT, who could use
this opportunity to harm the NPT.
f. A Special Conference Convened by the UN
This would presumably be similar to the recent Law of the Sea
Conference, the World Food Conference, or the environmental
conference which treated problems of world-wide concern that
require great attention. Both advocates and opponents actively
participate.
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Advantages
The problem would receive great and widespread attention. This
might facilitate agreements, even if they follow after such a
UN conference. All nations would be represented.
Disadvantages
1. The problem might not be sufficiently apparent to warrant the
UN convening such a conference.
2. Such a conference, if it preceded or were held concurrently
with the IAEA and the NPT Review Conference, could possibly
harm both of these groups as well as harm the prospects of
an agreement on physical security.
3. In such a conference, not only would representatives of any
nation have the opportunity to attack the NPT through its
association with the physical security problem, but the press
and other groups would also have occasion to attack.
NOTE: The following fora are involved with nuclear materials and/or physical
security, but do not appear to be suited for this physical security
convention.
g. The Zangger Committee
The membership of this committee consists of the principal
nuclear-supplying nations. This has been an ad hoc committee
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of some IAEA representatives, but meeting outside the auspices
of the IAEA. The IAEA currently takes no position on the
Zangger Committee decisions, but conceivably in the future the
Director General of the IAEA might acknowledge the existence of
the supply controls decided by the Zangger Committee, possibly
without specifying this Committee.
h. IAEA Panel of Experts
The IAEA uses panels of experts for studies, one of them recently
producing a report, "Recommendations for. the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material." However, IAEA regulations restrict such
panels to a small number of participants. Furthermore, the
recommendations are not binding upon the member States.
i. International Criminal Policy Organization (Interpol)
In effect, this is a clearinghouse for information and for requests
for assistance. Almost all nations are members. Headquarters
are in Paris, and France supplies the local costs. The principal
crimes with which it is concerned are narcotics traffic, counter-
feiting, and smuggling, although Interpol is now branching to
terrorism. Interpol does not deal with political crimes or
espionage. Furthermore, the Interpol charter allows consideration
only of individuals. Terrorist groups cannot be identified.
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Being principally a clearinghouse for information and for requests
for assistance, Interpol has no international agents.
Interpol might be useful in providing expertise for use in
negotiating the provisions of a convention dealing with cooperation
in the recovery of stolen nuclear materials, and the prosecution
of offenders.
j. Other Regional Affiliations, Particularly EURATOM
As the nuclear energy organization of the European Economic
Community, EURATOM includes some major nuclear States. Other
regional organizations exist, although any nuclear subgroups
they might have are not nearly as well established. These
include the Organization of African Unity, Organization of
American States, CENTO (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, UK, and the US),
Arab League, Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization. Any effort for a physical security agreement by
combined effort with the necessary number of these groups would
be very fractured.
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5. POSSIBLE PROVISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY
GUIDELINES
Scope of Coverage
The primary purpose for pursuing an international convention on
physical security in relation to the nuclear power industries is to ensure
the physical security of weapons usable and highly toxic materials whether
internationally transferred or indigenously produced. In order to achieve
this broad objective, it is necessary to consider the question of the
different ways that such materials could be illicitly used in the international
environment.
For highly enriched uranium and for plutonium an immediate international
threat is the theft of such materials by terrorists for their ultimate use
in the fabrication of a nuclear explosive device. Another illicit use for
plutonium and other radioactive fission products is to disperse them in
specific geographic areas to create hazardous conditions for extended periods
of time. A third category of illicit acts which involves sabotage to facilities
in which radioactive materials are present and which could consequently
result in the dispersal of such materials to the surrounding countryside.
An act of sabotage to facilities handling materials for nuclear power
industries, particularly such an act which results in significant casualties,
would have political and public repercussions on an international scale in
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many parts of the world. As a consequence, it is assumed in this paper
that such acts of sabotage are a part of the threat to be countered by
physical security systems in international convention.
Basis for Using U.S. Standards as a Starting Point for an
International Convention
The U.S., U.K., USSR, France, and the Peoples Republic of China are
states with some longstanding experience in the area of physical protection
related to their atomic weapons programs. Although all of these states
would have considerable background in a physical protection system, it
became clear during the development of the recommendations for the physical
protection of nuclear material by the IAEA in early 1972 that only the U.S.
was actively pursuing the establishment of rigid physical protection
standards for its own nuclear power industry independent of any international
encouragement.
The U.S. has published in the Code of Federal Regulations an initial set
of physical protection requirements applicable to the private sector of
the nuclear power industry. These requirements were supplemented by several
guides describing in detail specific physical protection systems and
procedures that could be used to satisfy the requirements established by the
Regulations. None of the other states discussed above has published
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publicly such requirements. As a consequence, it is believed that these
published requirements (together with certain upgradings under development
and others now imminent) should be the preferred starting point for an
international convention along with the recommendations for the physical
protection of nuclear materials published by the IAEA in Vienna in June of
1972. The current published AEC requirements and associated guides are
attached as Appendix B and the published IAEA recommendations are attached
as Appendix C. The upgradings under development and those now implemented
are discussed in subsequent paragraphs headed "Projected Improvements in
Current U.S. Standards. "
Objectives for Physical Security Systems
The objectives for a physical security system applicable to nuclear
power industry on a worldwide basis can be summarized in the following ways:
Protect facilities containing radioactive materials against
industrial sabotage.
Protect, against theft, types and quantities of nuclear materials
usable as nuclear explosives.
Protect radiological hazard materials in quantities and types
usable as weapons against theft.
Provide for the immediate detection of an act leading to the theft
of materials discussed above.
o
Provide for reaction mechanisms to neutralize an attempt to
sabotage a facility containing such nuclear Aterials or to
steal these materials.
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Provide to management the mechanisms to deal
with a sub-national nuclear threat.
Provide the capability to recover rapidly such materials which
may have been successfully stolen.
And finally, provide the necessary legal structure to bring
sanctions to bear against any person or group attempting to
commit an act of sabotage or theft against the nuclear industry.
A statement of the objectives in the above terms must precede any attempt
to develop a set of agreed standards since specific measures to be included
in a set of standards would be designed to deal with one or more of the
above stated objectives.
Based on experience to date in the development of domestic standards in the
U.S., there can be no compromising the above stated general objectives.
Accordingly, it is considered essential that the first step for an
international convention should be to arrive at an agreement on objectives
which must as a minimum include those described above.
Current U.S. Standards
Following is a narrative discussion of the current U.S. standards
applicable to the private sector (material attached as Appendix B). These
in general focus on three of the four basic elements to a physical security
system. The three that are dealt with are:
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1. Access control mechanisms which are designed to provide
assurance that only persons requiring legitimate access to
facilities or to the materials within facilities will be
permitted such access.
2. Removal controls which are measures designed to provide assurance
that persons having legitimate access to facilities and materials
therein do not surreptitiously remove such materials.
3. Response and recovery mechanisms which are measures provided
to assure that efforts to breach either the access control or
removal control measures will result in rapid reaction.
Such reaction would be designed to provide assurance that (1) the diverted
materials cannot be used in a hostile way, or (2) if so used, the conse-
quences in terms of public damage are kept to the lowest possible level.
The one additional factor which has not been incorporated in current U.S.
standards because of a need for statutory authority (enacted August 1974)
is that related to a prior determination by government authority to the
trustworthiness of individuals who will be entrusted with the custody,
control or protection of nuclear power industry facilities or radioactive
materials involved therein. This prior determination by appropriate government
authority as to the trustworthiness of individuals having such control
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is considered essential to any physical protection system. It is the only
mechanism available to provide some assurance that individuals who might
carry out an act of industrial sabotage or theft would have to breach an
access control mechanism, which is also part of the facility protection
system. They could not, for example, achieve their need for access to
vital portions of facilities or the radioactive materials by easily
obtaining employment especially if they have a history and record of illicit
acts or are associated with groups with such a history or record.
Projected Improvements in Current U.S. Standards
The current U.S. standards are the product of an evolutionary
system, and they are not considered to be the most effective standards.
Nor are they considered to be completely adequate for the current or future
industry. A number of improvements in these standards are currently under
consideration by the AEC, the salient aspects of which are discussed in
Appendix D.
Discussion of Provisions for an International Convention
Because of the evolutionary nature of the U.S. standards applicable
to the private sector, it is believed that any international convention
should adopt language which will permit flexibility. At the same time,
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if the convention is to result in a definitive set of physical security
measures, the language should include specific, rather than general, guide-
lines. For this reason, the broad general language incorporated in the
IAEA recommendations for physical protection (Attachment C) is not
considered to be a completely adequate approach. However, this document
may serve as a reasonable basis for the framework of an international
convention.
The most essential features that must be included in a meaningful
international convention are as follows:
1. The designation of an inter-governmental. body to develop
standards, approve their application and conduct periodic
professional inspections (at least annually).
2. A system for prior determination of trustworthiness by
professional government employees before individuals may have
custody of or access to nuclear materials of concern.
3. A system of physical barriers (at least double sets of barriers
for nuclear materials and for vital parts of nuclear facilities).
4. Firm access control procedures including positive identification
systems.
5. Use of highly reliable alarm systems to detect unauthorized
entry to protected areas.
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6. Capability for dual communication from armed guard positions to
backup forces.
7. Adequately planned backup forces capable of dealing effectively
with an armed attack by small terrorist groups.
8. Dual armed guard protection for all transport of materials of
concern.
9. Constant communication capability with highly reliable
features for all transportation.
10. Preplanned recovery procedures, including international
cooperation aspects, for diverted materials (should facilitate
hot pursuit as well as more laborious search).
11. Establishment of a security organization ateach site, including
the use of armed guards and a program for thoroughly training
the security force used in the system.
12. Procedures requiring observation of individuals who have access
to materials of concern, e.g., buddy system or remote surveillance.
The goal of the international convention should be to describe detailed
requirements and procedures to meet the above features at the strongest
level possible, using the current U.S. private sector standards and the planned
improvements thereto as a starting point. However, it must be recognized
that circumstances in different states may be such that their ability to
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comply with an international convention would be determined by the
flexibility of the requirements. For example, some governments may not be
able to apply the trustworthiness determination procedures in the same
degree of rigid detail as the U.S. may find appropriate. Accordingly,
although the basic features enumerated above must be maintained, those
responsible for negotiating the detailed language of the international
convention should be prepared to accommodate such problems by including
some flexibility in the language.
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6. U.S. Options and Tactics in Orchestrating a Convention
As indicated in previous sections, there are possible trade-offs
between negotiability and stringency in several key areas. These trade-offs
produce a spectrum of alternatives ranging from a "hard" convention with
stringent and specific guidelines and mandatory international inspection to
a "soft" convention with essentially voluntary provisions for adopting physical
security guidelines and for accepting international inspection and verification.
In general, international acceptability is likely to increase in moving from
"hard" to "soft" provisions. The possibility of using a subsequent agreement
among suppliers as a mechanism to (a) induce wider adherence to a "hard"
convention, and (b) enforce "hard" implementing requirements on the parties
to a "soft" convention, adds an additional dimension to the alternatives.
The following options are illustrative of the extremes of this spectrum,
with and without the second step of a suppliers agreement.
The Options:
1. A hard convention containing precise and stringent provisions
concerning physical security measures, international inspection,
and cooperation in recovery and prosecution.
Pros:
--- If it achieved wide acceptance, would produce maximum
effective results in controlling physical security problem.
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-- Would provide greatest opportunity to air the problems of
physical security in all of its aspects, and in éducating
public and government officials.
Cons:
-- Prospects for wide adoption, or adoption by the most important
countries, are extremely doubtful.
-- It could undercut U.S. leverage on non-proliferation matters
by investing U.S. prestige in pursuit of unlikely objective.
2. A "hard" convention as in Option 1, with a subsequent suppliers
agreement making adherence or substantial conformity with the
convention a condition of further bilateral assistance agreements.
Pros:
-- If suppliers agreement achieved, would provide effective controls.
--1 Same educative effect as in Option 1.
-- Avoids need for obtaining wide initial adherence to convention,
and provides strong leverage for later adherence.
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Cons:
- Assumes agreement among suppliers which may be extremely
difficult to obtain, particularly in case of France.
- Coercive aspect may be highly objectionable to many nations,
both suppliers and recipients.
--- Probably involves coercion of greater number of non-signatories
to the NPT than in Option 4.
3. A "soft" convention, containing essentially voluntary commitments
to institute "adequate" physical security measures which conform
to the extent practicable with specific international guidelines,
no international inspection, or inspection only on voluntary
basis.
Pros:
-- Would stand chance of wide adherence, including ratification
by key countries of present concern, committing most of the
international community to the principle of providing adequate
physical security protection to their nuclear facilities.
---- Might induce some countries to take effective measures.
-- Would have some educative and propaganda value in bringing
issues to attention of governments and general public.
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- Might provide a basis on which to seek stronger measures at
some later time.
--- Would be non-coercive.
----- Avoids practical problems of mandatory international
verification machinery.
Cons:
-- Lacks specific commitments and means of verification, hence
is less likely to produce much practical improvement in
physical security beyond what countries willing to do anyway.
-- Might in practice merely provide veneer of respectability
which allows some countries to do less than they might feel
obliged to do in absence of a convention.
-- Could be used by supplier nations as an excuse for not imposing
bilateral physical security requirements.
4. A "soft" convention as in Option 3, to be followed by an agreement
among key suppliers that bilateral supply agreements will contain
specific mandatory provisions implementing the general obligations
of the convention.
Pros:
-- With respect to the convention itself, the first four
pros of Option 3 above.
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--- Would produce effective physical security measures in countries
where suppliers agreement applied.
--- As compared to Option 2, reduces coercive implications of
suppliers agreement, assuming much wider international
acceptance of a "soft" compared to a "hard" convention, by
permitting suppliers to claim that restrictions are in
implementation of obligations undertaken in the convention
and widely accepted by international community.
--- Coercive of fewer nations than Option 2.
--- If successful, might permit gradual introduction of international
verification, reducing practical problems involved.
Cons:
-- Assumes suppliers agreement which may be extremely difficult
to obtain, particularly in case of France.
-- Applies effective controls only to nations accepting new
supply agreements. Discriminates in favor of nations with
well-established nuclear programs.
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C. ESTABLISHMENT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE INTERNATIONALLY ON TRANSFERS
OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
I. Introduction
In the Action Program, the Under Secretaries Committee concluded
that controls confined to international transfers of plutonium or highly
enriched uranium will be only marginally useful in helping abate the
material aspects of the proliferation problem since the bulk of the world's
plutonium will be produced by nations indigenously; and therefore international
supply policies on the transfer of nuclear technology and equipment may be
equally or more meaningful than restrictions placed on international transfers
of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. It was recommended that consultations
be held with other countries, particularly present and prospective suppliers,
aimed at achieving agreement or understandings in the establishment of
common principles and precautions concerning international transfers of nuclear
equipment and technology.
NSDM-255 directed that we explore the idea of establishing better information
exchange internationally on transfers of materials, equipment and technology.
This section examines existing international controls on exports and
liaison channels that might be used for this exchange of information,
evaluates their potential effectiveness and prospects for successful
implementation and identified expected problem areas.
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The objective of establishing common principles and restrictions on
international transfers of equipment, materials and technology is addressed
in three areas:
1. establishment of better information exchange internationally
2. coordination ofand cooperation in intelligence activities, and
3. establishment of agreements among supplier countries in
controlling exports of certain technology, materials and
equipment.
II. Better Information Exchange
With the rapid growth of nuclear power programs and the attendant
increase in the amounts of fissionable materials throughout the world, it
is becoming increasingly important for the United States as well as the
rest of the international community to maintain a close surveillance of the
actual transfers and location of critical equipment, materials and
technology. Real time information exchanges among supplier countries could
provide valuable assistance in promoting the objective of non-proliferation
and in insuring adequate safeguards and physical security of special nuclear
materials worldwide. The threat of theft or sabotage is probably most
serious while materials are in transit. Information on the nature, quantity,
route and destination of SNM would be a valuable aid to all countries
affected. By alerting third countries over whose territory SNM is being
shipped, such information exchanges could help in the protection and or the
recovery of these materials. Such an inventory movement control might
also assist, in assessing claims of threat perpetrators regarding their
acquisition of SNM.
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Several problems arise in reaching agreements of this nature. Many nations
may be reluctant to enter such understandings for fear that they may hurt
their competitive position in the world market. Our approach to other suppliers
on this question would have to clearly spell out that such exchanges would
not include information of a commercial nature. We would have to stress the
point that our exclusive interest in such a proposal would be to discourage
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to increase the physical security of
SNM while in transit internationally. Information exchange on the nuclear
material transfer should be carried out by overt organizations, for example,
the IAEA or by organizations involved in export control. Having IAEA play
the critical role in this arrangement could help to reduce the commercial
concerns of some countries.
The existing agreements on controls of exports as described later in this
section provide some information exchange, and some, such as the Zangger
Committee, might be expanded to include all major suppliers.
III. Possible Use of the Foreign Liaison Channels of the Intelligence
Community
There are essentially two types of information exchange that could
be conducted in the present foreign liaison channels of the intelligence
community: One involves the exchange of counterihtelligence information on
potential threats of theft or diversion of nuclear materials; and the other
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is an exchange of information which might be necessary between governments
to coordinate or assist in the pursuit and recovery of stolen nuclear material.
A similar extensive exchange of counterintelligence information on general
international terrorist activities does now occur with many foreign
intelligence and security services in support of the programs coordinated
by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT). Adding a "nuclear
dimension" to such an exchange--assuming that governments controlling such
services recognize the grave international ramifications of the nuclear
physical security problem--would not appear to pose any great problem.
We would, of course, expect differences in response from the various services,
depending on their general cooperativeness, professional effectiveness,
and alertness to the problem.
Whether or not the intelligence community should become involved in the
pursuit and recovery effort is highly dependent upon the given situation.
We do not believe any single information exchange mechanism now exists or
is likely to be designed that can cope with the wide range of "theft scenerios"
that have been discussed in the community. We can conceive of situations,
particularly when great discretion is required, where our liaison with foreign
intelligence and security services might be a very important or even the
principal channel for cooperation. But, giveň other situations,
particularly those in which the potential danger was great and appeared
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imminent, exchange might well be initiated at the highest government
levels and could exceed the capabilities of any existing liaison with a
local intelligence or security service. Use of diplomatic channels, country
team participation, and even direct contacts among military services might
be required. The foreign country or countries involved would also be an
important factor, since liaison relationships differ in nature and degree
of cooperation from service to service. In sum, intelligence liaison
channels would certainly be a possibility in such a crisis situation.
However, the nature and location of the crisis, the kind of information
exchange required, and the extent of action to be taken based on that
information would determine whether intelligence liaison channels should be
employed or other routes followed.
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IV. Establishment of Agreements to Control Exports
In its Action Program, the Under Secretaries Committee
recommended that attempts be made to reach agreement or understandings with
other potential suppliers on limiting transfers of sensitive enrichment
technology to other countries. These understandings should indicate that
such technology
a. preferably would not be internationally transferred to
states not now possessing such technology except for use
in multinational plants.
b. preferably would only be transferred to states that have
signed the NPT (stipulating NPT signature as an absolute
precondition in consultations with France or South Africa
may be impractical since neither has signed the NPT), and
c. would be transferred only under specific agreements (1) to
prohibit technology retransfer except as authorized by
party supplying the technology, (2) to provide that the
materials involved would be subject to IAEA safeguards,
(3) to call for maintenance of secrecy on sensitive
details of the technology, and where feasible, to prohibit
or limit the production of highly enriched uranium.
Further, the Under Secretaries Committee concluded that the export of
enrichment equipment should be subject to the same general restraints
proposed for enrichment technology since a substantial degree of reverse
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engineering could serve to disclose technology. For this reason the
inclusion of enrichment equipment on the Zangger Committee list should not
be viewed as agreement that sale of such equipment is automatically
acceptable when covered by IAEA safeguards.
Other countries should be encouraged to adopt suitable controls over the
export of nuclear technology, including cooperation in the field of
chemical processing where much of the information is unclassified and
largely transferred to the private sector. The U.S. regulatory framework
which is stated in the NSDM-235 Action Plan was recommended as a desirable
point of departure.
Current International Agreements on the Control of Exports
The history of international agreements on controlling the export
of technology, equipment and materials reveals many problems in negotiating
and implementing understandings of this type. Several understandings or
agreements exist among potential suppliers, and each has important
limitations.
COCOM
Since essentially all potential proliferation problems are likely
to occur outside of communist countries, there is little reason to attempt
to pursue restrictions on nuclear technology," equipment and materials
through the COCOM mechanism. However, an examination of COCOM:can provide
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some insights into the the problems of a similar arrangement
among nuclear supplier countries.
Japan, as well as all of the NATO countries with the exception of Iceland,
exercises embargo controls over an agreed list of commodities to communist
countries. Most other COCOM members do not have strict systems of controls
as does the United States; particularly in the area of reexports. For
example, most appear to make little or no use of prelicensing or post
shipment checks and indicate that they have no way to assure that their
finished goods, parts or technology, after receipt by consignees in other
non-communist countries, will not be reexported or utilized for other than the
intended purpose. COCOM-established obligations for all member countries
provide that their agreed commodity controls are not frustrated by exports
of parts and technology to make COCOM products. These obligations are,
however, of only a "so far as practicable," and "such action as it can"
nature.
Many COCOM countries reportedly can only deal with violations committed
within their borders, i.e., in connection with exports, not reexports, of
their goods. All depend on criminal prosecutions or customs seizures.
None has an administrative export denial procedure as in the U.S. And,
as stated, only a few say they maintain black or grey lists.
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Zangger Committee
The Zangger Committee is an informal, ad hoc group of delegates of
fifteen states which are present or potential exporters of nuclear equipment
and material. The principal objective of the Zangger Committee has been to
establish guidelines on the export of materials and equipment to non-nuclear
weapon states which are not party to the NPT in support of Article III.2.
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
After some years of deliberations, the Committee was able to agree on only
a limited list of items whose export would trigger the application of safe-
guards. Although the Committee has been useful in achieving agreement on
this trigger list, it has been estremely difficult to put additional items on
the list. Moreover, since Article III.2. of the NPT does not call for safe-
guards on technology trnasfers, the Zangger Committee's list does not include
technology. Finally the membership of the Committee does not include several
important suppliers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.
France is not a member and has not indicated whether it will abide by its
list. Several members of the Zangger Committee have said that their final
acceptance of the list will be dependent on French acceptance of the list.
Agreement with the Tripartite Countries
The Tripartite group (The Netherlands, FRG and UK) has made an
agreement with the U.S. that they will classify and protect centriguge
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This document has béen reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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information similar to that protected by the U.S. Although we have no
recent discussions with the group about the conditions under which they
would export either enrichment equipment or technology, the international
organization, Association for Centrifuge Enrichment (ACE) was established
by the Tripartite to permit the export of both material and enrichment
equipment or technology on a government-to-government basis to members of
the association.
Ad Hoc Agreements
In a few instances, the U.S. Government has been successful in
obtaining agreements from potential foreign suppliers to deny the export of
technology and equipment to countries which would not accept international
safeguards. For example, the U.S. succeeded in soliciting the cooperation
of other supplier nations in denying exports of chemical reprocessing
equipment to Taiwan because there was no assurance that international
safeguards could be maintained in the Republic of China since it is no longer
a member of the IAEA.
Energy Coordinating Group
The Washington Energy Conference (WEC) of February 1974 agreed on
the need for a comprehensive action program to deal with all facets of the
world energy situation by cooperative ventures. In establishin an
Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) and an ad hoc group on international
cooperation on uranium enrichment, the WEC has set in motion a mechanism
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for such cooperation in a framework of assured supply, geographic
dispersion and control against proliferation. The ECG has under discussion
draft principles including two related to proliferation and security
considerations. The Energy Coordinating Group is not limited to a select
group of countries and might serve as a forum for addressing questions
relating to the appropriate control on the transfer of technology and
equipment.
U.S. Export Controls
Control of export of nuclear technology from the U.S. is based
upon provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the Export Administration Act
and the Mutual Security Act. Restricted Data can be communicated to other
countries only under stipulated conditions. An Agreement for Cooperation
is required and such agreements require Presidential approval and must be
submitted to Congress.
Present U.S. export controls over nuclear and nuclear related unclassified
equipment, technology and materials are administered by three agencies;
(1) AEC, (2) Department of Commerce, and (3) State Department.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, authorizations are required
from the AEC for the export of byproduct, source, and special nuclear material
(SNM), and production and utilization facilities. Licenses for the export of SNM
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and production and utilization facilities can only be issued by the AEC'
if the export is undertaken pursuant to an Intergovernmental agreement
for cooperation between the U.S. and the recipient country contemplating
such exports. These agreements must be approved by the President and
submitted for review to the JCAE. Under Part 110 of the AEC's regulations,
a specific authorization is required from the Commission for any U.S.
person or company to engage in activities outside of the U.S. pertaining to
designing, constructing, fabricating, furnishing or operating facilities
and equipment related to the chemical processing of irradiated SNM,
the production of heavy water, and the separation of isotopes of uranium,
The effect of this general authorization is to permit, without specific
licensing, the export to non-communist destinations of civilian land-based
nuclear reactor technology.
The Commerce Department exercises export controls for the AEC over certain
identified nuclear related equipment, material and technology, the
majority of which are of a multipurpose nature, that could be utilized in
either nuclear or nonnuclear applications. Items controlled by Commerce
either for or at the request of the AEC are specifically identified on an
"AEC Referral List" which is furnished by the AEC to the Office of Export
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DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
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Administration (OEA), U.S. Department of Commerce. Any applications
received by OEA for export of any of these items are referred to AEC for
comment before action is taken on the license. There are approximately 100
items, on the AEC referral list. Many are COCOM controlled items, while
some are subject only to U.S. unilateral export control, i.e., they are
not controlled internationally by COCOM.
The Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State exercises
export controls over (1) naval nuclear propulsion plants, their land
prototypes and special facilities for their construction, support, and
maintenance including any machinery, device, component, or equipment
specifically developed or designed for use in such plants or facilities,
as well as technical data relating thereto; (2) any article, material,
equipment, or device specially designed or modified for use in the design,
development or fabrication of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices,
or for use in the devising, carrying out, or evaluating of nuclear weapon
tests or any other nuclear explosions; and (3) certain other specially
designed items of a nuclear-related nature.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Present Procedures
The foregoing summary reveals that there are a number of existing
agreements and understandings to control the export of various materials,
equipment and technology. Each of these has limitations in terms of the
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to. Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONFIDENTIAL
- 71 -
number and kinds of goods covered, their membership or the destination
of exports covered. The fundamental problem is whether major supplier countries
desire to join with the U.S. in controlling exports of certain specified
commodities in the interest of limiting or retarding the spread of nuclear
weapon capabilities. Any curtailment of normal commerce in non-munitions
commodities has been strongly resisted by our NATO allies which represent
many of the major nuclear supplying countries of the world. This
resistance to limiting exports is well documented in our negotiations over
the years in COCOM, to limit exports of strategic commodities to Communist
bloc countries, and in the Zangger Committee which was established to
implement Article III.2. (b) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Zangger
Committee experience to date indicates quite clearly that the Europeans
would be reluctant to take actions which would limit the economic benefits
to their countries. Therefore, the major obstacle facing any agreement
among nations to control export throughout the world is not the question of
whether adequate export control procedures exist or can be promulgated,
but whether major supplying countries can be convinced that some loss
of exports is of a higher interest to their well being than the continued
promotion of export sales.
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D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As indicated in the options of Section B, there is a spectrum of forms
which a convention might take, and the options discussed are intended to
illustrate a range of possibilities rather than specific choices.
Since a convention with specific, rigorous, mandatory, and enforceable
provisions appears unlikely to be ratified by many of the most important
countries, we believe that the prospects for obtaining effective physical
security measures must rest largely on a supplier's understanding. It must
be clearly recognized, however, that such an understanding is far from assured
and that it will require the cooperation of several countries, most notably
France, whose attitude toward such an understanding may be negative.
The bilateral consultations which the President has approved in NSDM-255
and which are now under way may provide some initial indications of the likely
attitude of supplier nations toward an agreement of this kind. Before any
steps are taken to negotiate an international convention, it is recommended
that the two-stage approach described in Options 2 and 4 herein be discussed
with the U.K., Canada, the FRG, France and the Soviet Union on a highly
confidential basis. The approach is as follows:
a. an international convention by which a large number of countries
would subscribe. at least in principle, to adequate and effective
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physical security standards and procedures which conform to the extent
practicable with specific international guidelines. This would be
combined with provisions defining international procedures for pursuit,
recovery, extradition and prosecution in the event of nuclear theft
or sabotage of nuclear facilities.
b. adoption of common policies by the key suppliers to implement and
enforce the convention through their bilateral assistance agreements
with recipients.
If these countries favor this approach, these consultations might be
broadened to include other suppliers including EURATOM, EURODIF, and
South Africa.* The initial steps to negotiate a convention might be
taken at some point during these consultations, but we believe that this
decision should be deferred until the reaction of some of the suppliers is
known. It is of course essential that every possible precaution be taken to
ensure the confidentiality of consultations among suppliers until the
convention is in force.
We strongly favor the UN as the appropriate forum for preparing a convention,
and the LAEA as the appropriate forum in which to draft and negotiate the
*Alternatively, consultations with supplier nations could take place at the
suppliers conference proposed by Secretary Kissinger in the State Department
Analytical Staff Meeting.
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- 74 -
convention. Other international bodies such as the Zangger Committee and
Interpol might be utilized for negotiation or implementation of some components
of the convention. Discussions with the UN and the IAEA regarding their
possible roles in formulating and verifying compliance with the convention,
and as the forum for its negotiation, will of course be necessary before the
U.S. proposes a convention. However, if the U.S. opts for a two-stage
approach involving a subsequent suppliers' agreement, discussion of the
IAEA's possible role in implementing such an agreement should be deferred
until the convention has been concluded.
An international convention will require considerable time to bring into
effect. There are many steps that could and should be taken to flushout this
framework. An action plan might include:
--- An appeal for international action on physical security by the
Secretary of State in UNGA;
-- An UNGA resolution agreeing, in principle, to the need for physical
security measures and assigning follow-on action to the IAEA if it
appears as a result of the above consultations that it would be useful
to do so.
--- Consultations with key suppliers to discuss common non-proliferation
policies in such areas as technology transfer, additional special arrange-
ments, etc. This could include discussion of some initial common policies
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$ 75 -
on physical security. This might also provide an opportunity to
discuss on a confidential basis with other key suppliers the two-step
concept and the eventual imposition of specific physical security
obligations by the suppliers;
-- Drafting of a convention by IAEA, and multilateral cooperation to
bring it into force;
--- Agreement among the suppliers to implement the convention via
bilateral supply contracts;
In negotiating a convention, the U.S. tactic should be to advocate a fairly
"hard" convention initially, but be prepared to move toward softer provisions
as required. Since we believe that a supplier's understanding is a more
likely means of achieving rigorous enforcement than an international
convention, our objective should be to achieve wide international acceptance
of the convention on the hardest terms which will permit that result.
While intelligence liaison channels may assist in exchanges of information
related to thefts, or recovery of nuclear materials, the nature and location
of the crisis, information required and extent of action to be taken would
determine whether intelligence liaison channels should be employed.
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Current international agreements on the control of exports provide some
information on transfers as well as the embargo of strategic materials.
These agreements, such as the Zangger Committee, offer an opportunity to
expand the exchange of information and controls.
Richard Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Form AEC-8
(1-67)
AECM 0240
A
INCOMING AND SIGNATURE TAB
Use this side of the sheet to precede the incoming material
when assembling correspondence.
(USE REVERSE SIDE FOR SIGNATURE TAB)
16-75922-4 GPO
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DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX A
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/GDS
June 3, 1974
National Security Decision Memorandum 255
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SUBJECT:
Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination
of Nuclear Power Industries
The President has reviewed the report of the NSC Under Secretaries Com-
mittee (USC), prepared in response to NSDM 235 and forwarded by the
USC Chairman on April 5, 1974, outlining steps the United States could
take with other nations concerning the problems associated with the
increased availability of weapons useable materials from the growth
and dissemination of nuclear power industries.
The President has approved the recommended consultations with other
countries-particularly present or potential suppliers of materials,
technology and equipment-with the objectives detailed in the USC report.
The initial consultations should emphasize but not necessarily be limited
to the need for: (1) establishing agreed international guidelines, preferably
based on U.S. practice, to ensure the physical security of weapons useable
and highly toxic materials whether internationally transferred or indigenously
produced; (2) reaching some common principles regarding the supply of
sensitive enrichment technology or equipment; (3) avoiding or applying
stricter terms for supply in situations where special hazards could be
present; and (4) encouraging, where appropriate, multinational enrich-
ment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities.
The Department of State, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (and other interested agencies when appropriate), will have primary
responsibility for the conduct of these consultations and for reporting
significant developments.
In addition, the President has directed that a prompt study of possible
provisions for an international convention concerned with physical security
05265
SECRET/GDS:
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- 78 - :
SECRET/GDS
2
guidelines be conducted by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a
representative of the Atomic Energy Commission and comprising
representatives of the addressees. In addition, the Ad Hoc Group
should explore the idea of establishing better information exchange
internationally on transfers of materials, equipment, or technology.
The Ad Hoc Group's study should be forwarded by August 12, 1974
for the President's consideration.
A. Kim
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
14:2 XAP FL,
SECRET/GDS
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Form AEC-8
(1-67)
AECM 0240
INCOMING AND SIGNATURE TAB
Use this side of the sheet to precede the signature page
when assembling correspondence.
(USE REVERSE SIDE FOR INCOMING TAB)
16-75922-4 GPO
&
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DECLASSIFIED
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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
RULES and REGULATIONS 0 TITLE 10 - ATOMIC ENERGY
PART
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
73
(As republished 12/28/73, unless otherwise indicated)
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec.
GÉNERAL PROVISIONS
any combination of these materials,
which is 5,000 grams or more computed
73.1
Purpose and scope.
73.2
Definitions.
$ 73.1 Purpose and scope.
by the formula, grams= (grams con-
73.3
Interpretations.
(a) Purpose. This part prescribes re-
tained U-235) +2.5 (grams U-233+grams
73.4
Communications.
quirements for physical protection of
plutonium).
73.5
Specific exemptions.
special nuclear material at fixed sites
(3) This part also applies to shipments
73.0
Exemptions for certain quantities and
and in transit and of plants in which
by air of special nuclear material in
kinds of special nuclear material.
special nuclear material is used. for the
quantities exceeding (i) 20 grams or 20
PHYSCAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
purpose of protection against acts of in-
curies, whichever is less, of plutonium
MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
dustrial sabotage and protection of spe-
or uranium-233, or (ii) 350 grams of
73.30 General requirements.
cial nuclear material against theft by
uranium-235 (contained in uranium en-
73.31 Shipment by road.
establishment and maintenance of a
riched to 20 percent or more in the U-235
73.32 Shipment by air.
physical protection system of: (1) Pro-
isotope).
73.33 Shipment by rail.
tective barriers and intrusion detection
(4) Special nuclear material subject
73.34 Shipment by sea.
devices at fixed sites to provide early
to this part may also be protected pur-
73.35 Transfer of specal nuclear material.
73.36 Miscellaneous requirements.
detection of an attack, (2) deterrence to
suant to security procedures prescribed
attack by means of armed guards and
by the Commission or another Govern-
PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AT FIXED
escorts, and (3) liaison and communica-
ment agency for the protection of classi-
SITES
tion with law enforcement authorities
iled materials. The provisions and re-
73.40 Physical protection: General require-
capable of rendering assistance to
quirements of this part are in addition
ments at fixed sites.
counter such attacks.
to, and not in substitution for, any such
73.50 Requirements for physical protection
(b) Scope. (1) This part prescribes
security procedures. Compliance with the
of licensed activities.
73.60 Additional requirements for the phys-
requirements for (i) the physical pro-
requirements of this part does not re-
ical protection of special nuclear
tection of production and utilization fa-
lieve any licensee from any requirement
or obligation to protect special nuclear
material at fixed sites.
cilities licensed pursuant to Part 50 of
this chapter; (ii) the physical protection
material pursuant to security procedures
RECORDS AND REPORTS
of plants in which activities licensed
prescribed by the Commission or other
73.70 Records.
pursuant to Part 70 of this chapter are
Government agency for the protection
73.71 Reports of unaccounted for shipments,
of classified materials.
conducted. and the physical protection
suspected theft, unlawful diversion,
of special nuclear material, by any per-
$ 73.2 Definitions.
or industrial sabotage.
son who pursuant to the regulations in
As used in this part:
ENFORCEMENT
Part 70 of this chapter possesses or uses
(a) Terms defined in Parts 50 and 70
73.80 Violations.
at any site or contiguous sites subject
of this chapter have the same meaning
Appendix A-United States Atomic Energy
to control by the licensee, uranium-235
when used in this part.
Commission Regulatory Operations Re-
(contained in uranium enriched to 20
(b) "Authorized individual" means
gional Offices.
percent or more in the U-235 isotope),
any individual, including an employee, a
uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in
consultant, or an agent of a licensee, who
any combination in a quantity of 5,000
has been designated in writing by a li-
grams or more computed by the formula,
censee to have responsibility for surveil-
grams= (grams contained U-235) +2.5
lance of special nuclear material.
* (grams U-233+grams plutonium).
(2) This part prescribes requirements
(c) "Guard" means a uniformed indi- I
for the physical protection of special nu-
vidual armed with a firearm whose pri-
clear material in transportation by any
mary duty is the protection of special
person who is licensed pursuant to the
nuclear material against theft and/or
regulations in Part 70 of this chapter
the protection of a plant against indus-
who imports, exports, transports, deliv-
trial sabotage.
ers to a carrier for transport in a single
(d) "Watchman" means an individual,
shipment, or takes delivery of a single
not necessarily uniformed or armed with
shipment free on board at the point
a firearm, who provides protection for a
where it is delivered to a carrier, either
plant and the special nuclear material
uranium-235 (contained in uranium en-
therein in the course of performing other
riched to 20 percent or more in the U-235
duties.
isotope), uranium-233, - or plutonium, or
(e) "Continuous visual surveillance"
means unobstructed view at all times of
a shipment of special nuclear material,
and of all access to a temporary storage
*Corrected
217
December 31, 1973
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
area or cargo compartment containing
provides the same function as a built-in
the shipment.
combination lock or combination pad-
(f) "Physical barrier" means
lock, which can be operated remotely or
(1) Fences constructed of No. 11
by the "reading" or insertion of infor-
American wire gauge, or heavier whe
mation, which can be uniquely charac-
fabric, topped by three strands or more
terized, and which allows operation of
of barbed wire or similar material en
the device. "Locked" means protected by
brackets angled outward between 30° and
an operable lock.
45° from the vertical. with an overall
(n) "Vault" means a burglar-resistant
height of not less than eight feet, in-
windowless enclosure with walls, floor
cluding the barbed topping.
and roof of: (1) Steel at least one-half
(2) Building walls constructed of
inch thick, (2) reinforced concrete or
stone, brick, cinder block, concrete, steel
stone at least 8 inches thick, (3) non-
or comparable materials (openings in
reinforced concrete or stone at least 12
which are secured by grates, doors, or
inches thick. or (4) monolithic floor or
covers of construction and fastening of
roof construction of equivalent resistance
sufficient strength such that the integrity
to entry, with a built-in lock in a steel
of the wall is not lessened by any open-
door at least 1 inch thick, exclusive of the
ing), or wails of similar construction,
locking mechanism.
not part of a building, provided with a
(o) "Vault-type room" means a room
barbed topping described in paragraph
with one or more doors, all capable of
(f) (1) of this section of a height of not
being locked, protected by an intrusion
less than 8 feet.
alarm which creates an alarm upon the
(3) Ceilings and floors constructed to
entry of a person anywhere into the room
offer resistance to penetration equivalent
and upon exit from the room or upon
to that of building walls described in
movement of an individual within the
paragraph (f) (2) of this section.
room.
(g) "Protected area" means an area
(n) "Industrial sabotage" means any
encompassed by physical barriers and to
deliberate act directed against a plant
which access is controlled.
in which an activity licensed pursuant to
(h) "Vital area" mcans any area
the regulations in this chapter is con-
which contains vital equipment within
ducted, or to anv component of such a
a structure, the walls, roof, and floor of
plant, which could directly or indirectly
which constitute physical barriers of con-
endanger the public health and safety by
struction at least as substantial as walls
exposure to radiation, other than such
as described in paragraph (f) (2) of this
acts by an enemy of the United States,
section.
whether foreign government or other
(i) "Vital equipment" means any
person.
equipment, system, device, or material,
the failure, destruction, or release of
§ 73.3 Interpretations.
which could directly or indirectly endan-
Except as specifically authorized by
ger the public health and safety by ex-
the Commission in writing, no interpre-
posure to radiation. Equipment or sys-
tation of the meaning of the regulations
tems which would be required to function
in this part by any officer or employee of
to protect public health and safety fol-
the Commission other than a written in-
lowing such failure, destruction, or re-
terpretation by the General Counsel will
lease are also considered to be vital.
be recognized as binding upon the Com-
(j) "Material access area" means any
mission.
location which contains special nuclear
$ 73.4 Communications.
material, within a vault or a building,
the roof, walls, and floor of which each
Except where otherwise specified, all
constitute a physical barrier.
communications and reports concerning
(k) "Isolation zone" means any area,
the regulations in this part should be ad-
clear of all objects which could conceal
dressed to the Director of Licensing, U.S.
or shield an individual, adjacent to a
Atomic Energy Commission. Washington,
physical barrier, which is monitored to
D.C. 20545, or may be delivered in per-
detect the presence of individuals or ve-
son at the Commission's offices at 1717
hicles within that area.
H Street. NW., Washington, D.C.; at 7920
(1) "Intrusion alarm" means a tamper
Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland; or
indicating electrical, electromechanical,
at Germantown, Maryland.
electrooptical, electronic or similar de-
§ 73.5 Specific exemptions.
vice which will detect intrusion by an in-
dividual into a building, protected area,
The Commission may, upon applica-
vital area, or material access area, and
tion of any interested person or upon its
alert guards or watchmen by means of
own initiative, grant such exemptions
actuated visible and audible signals.
from the requirements of the regulations
(m) "Lock" in the case of vaults or
in this part as it determines are author-
vault type rooms means a three-position,
ized by law and will not endanger life or
manipulation resistant, dial type, built-in
property or the common defense and
combination lock or combination padlock
security, and are otherwise in the public
interest.
and in the case of fences, walls, and
buildings means an integral door lock or
$ 73.6 Exemptions for certain quantities
padlock which provides protection equiv-
and kinds of special nuclear material.
alent to a six-tumbler cylinder lock.
A licensee is exempt from the require-
"Lock" in the case of a vault or vault type
ments of §§ 73.30 through 73.36 and of
§§ 73.60 and 73.70 of this part, with re-
room also means any manipulation re-
spect to the following special nuclear
sistant, electromechanical device which
material:
December 31, 1973
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED 217a
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PART 73 --- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
(a) Uranium-235 contained in ura-
(e) By January 7, 1974, each licensee
nium enriched to less than 20 percent in
shall submit a plan outlining the proce-
the U-235 isotope:
dures that will be used to meet the re-
(b) Special nuclear material which is
cntirements of §§ 73.30 through 73.36 and
not readily separable from other radio-
73.70(g) including a plan for the selec-
active material and which has a total ex-
tion, qualification, and training of armed
ternal radiation dose rate in excess of
escorts, or the specification and design
100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet
of a specially designed truck or trailer
from any accessible surface without in-
as appropri: is This plan shall be fol-
tervening shielding: and
lowed by the licensee after March 6,
1974.
(c) Special nuclear material in a
quantity not exceeding 350 grams of ura-
(f) A licensee or applicant for a 11-
nium-235, uranlum-233, plutonium, or a
cense may apply to the Commission for
combination thereof, possessed in any
approval of proposed procedures for
analytical, research, quality control, met-
transport of special nuclear material in
allurgical or electronic laboratory.
a manner not otherwise authorized by
the regulations of this part. Such appli-
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL
cation shall include a description and
NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
quantity of the special nuclear material
§ 73.30 General requirements.
involved, the origin and destination, the
carriers to be used, the expected time in
(a) Except as specified in § 73.36(a)
transit, the number of transfer points,
or as otherwise authorized pursuant to
the communications to be used, the ve-
$ 73.30(f), each licensee who transports
hicle visual identification, and the cargo
or who delivers to a carrier for transport
security and surveillance measures to be
either uranium-235 (contained in ura-
used.
nium enriched to 20 percent or more in
(g) Paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (f)
the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plu-
of this section are effective March 6,
tonium, or any combination of these
1974.
materials, which is 5,000 grams or more
computed by the formula, grams=
§ 73.31 Shipment by road.
(grams contained U-235) +2.5 (grams
(a) All shipments by road shall be
U-233-grams plutonium), shall make
made without any scheduled intermedi-
arrangements to assure that such special
ate stops to transfer special nuclear ma-
nuclear material will, if a common or
terial or other cargo between the facility
contract carrier is used, be transported
from which it is shipped and the facility
under the established procedures of a
of the receiver.
carrier which provides a system for the
(b) All motor vehicles used to trans-
physical protection of valuable material
port special nuclear material shall be
in transit and requires an exchange of
equipped with a radiotelephone which
hand-to-hand receipts at origin and
can communicate with a licensee or his
destination and at all points enroute
agent. The licensee or agent with whom
where there is a transfer of custody.
communications shall be maintained for
(b) Transit times of shipments other
different segments of the shipment shall
than those specified in § 73.1 (b) (3) shall
be predesignated before a shipment is
be minimized and routes shall be se-
made. Calls to such licensee or agent shall
lected to avoid areas of natural disaster
be made at least every 2 hours when
or civil disorders. Such shipments shall
radiotelephone or conventional telephone
be preplanned to assure that deliveries
coverage is not available along the pre-
occur at a time when the receiver at the
planned route, at which time a conven-
final delivery point is present to accept
tional telephone call shall be made. In
receipt of shipment.
the event no call is received in accord-
(c) Special nuclear material shall be
ance with these requirements, the li-
shipped in containers which are sealed
censee or his agent shall immediately
by tamper indicating type seals. The
notify an appropriate law enforcement
container shall also be locked if it is not
authority and the appropriate Atomic
in another container or vehicle which is
Energy Commission Regulatory Opera-
locked. If inspection of the container or
tions Regional Office listed in Appendix
vehicle is not required by State or local
A of this part.
authorities before final destination, the
(c) A shipment shall be accompanied
outermost container or vehicle shall also
by at least two people in the vehicle con-
be sected by tamper indicating type
taining the shipment, which may be two
seals. No container weighing 500 pounds
drivers or one driver and an authorized
or less shall be shipped in open trucks,
individual. The vehicle containing the
railroad flat cars or box cars and ships.
shipment shall be under continuous vis-
This paragraph does not apply to ship-
ual surveillance, or one of the drivers
ments of quantities specified in § 73.1(b)
or authorized individuals shall be in the
(3).
cab of the vehicle, awake, and not in a
(d) When guards are used pursuant
sleeper berth. The shipment shall be fur-
to 11 73.31(c) (1), 73.31(c) (2), 73.33 and
ther protected by one of the following
73.35, the licensee shall not permit an
methods:
individual to act as a guard unless there
(1) An armed escort consisting of at
is documentation that the individual
least two guards shall accompany the
has been qualified by demonstrating an
shipment in a separate escort vehicle. Es-
understanding of his duties and respon-
corts shall maintain continuous vigilance
Libilities. The licensee or his agent shall
for the presence of conditions or situa-
have documentation that guards have
tions which might threaten the security
been requalified annually.
of the shipment, take such action as cir-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 has been determined to be declassified
December 3
PART 73 --- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
cumstances might require to avoid inter-
(d) Paragraph (c) of this section is
ference with continuous safe passage of
effective March 0. 1974.
the cargo vehicle, provide assistance to,
or summon aid for crew of cargo vehicles
§ 73.33 Shipment by rail.
in case of emergency, check seals and
(a) A shipment by rail shall be escort-
locks at each stop where time permits,
ed by two guards, in the shipment car
and observe the cargo vehicle and adja-
or an escort car of the train, who shall
cent areas during stops or layovers. Con-
keep the shipment cars under observa-
tinuous radio communication capability
tion and who shall MASTOPS when
shall be provided between the cargo ve-
practicable and time permits to guard
hicle and the escort vehicle. Escort ve-
the shipment cars under observation,
hicles shall also be equipped with a radio-
and check car or container locks and
telephone. The licensee may use his own
seals. Radiotelephone communication
employees as armed escorts or he may
shall be maintained with a licensee or
use an agent. Only the driver is required
his agent to relay position every 2 hours
in the vehicle containing special nuclear
or less, and at scheduled stops in the
material for shipments involving an
event that radiotelephone coverage was
average of less than an hour in trans-
not available in the last 5 hours before
portation, if communication is main-
the stop. The licensee or agent with
tained during the course of the shipment
whom communications shall be main-
with the licensee or agent monitoring the
tained for different segments of the ship-
shipment.
ment shall be predesignated before a
(2) The shipment shall be made in a
shipment is made. In the event no call
specially designed truck or trailer which
is received in accordance with these re-
reduces the vulnerability to diversion.
quirements, the licensee or his agent
Design features of the truck or trailer
shall immediately notify an appropri-
shall permit immobilization of the van
ate law enforcement authority and the
and provide barriers or deterrents to
appropriate Atomic Energy Commis-
physical penetration of the cargo com-
sion Regulatory Operations Regional
partment unless armed guards are also
Office listed in Appendix A of this part.
used in which case immobilization of
(b) Transfers shall be in accordance
the vehicle is not required.
with 8 73.35.
(d) Transfers to and from other modes
(c) This section is effective March 6,
of transportation shall be in accordance
1974.
with § 73.35.
§ 73.34 Shipment by sea.
(e) Vehicles shall be marked on top
(a) Shipments shall be made on ves-
with identifying letters or numbers
sels making the minimum ports of call.
which will permit identification of the
Transfers to and from other modes of
vehicle under daylight conditions from
transportation shall be in accordance
the air in clear weather at 1,000 feet
with § 73.35. There shall be no scheduled
above ground level. The same code of
transfers to other ships. At domestic
letters and numbers as those used on
ports of call where other cargo is trans-
the top shall also be marked on the sides
ferred, the shipments shall be protected
and rear of the vehicle to permit identi-
in accordance with $ 73.35(a)
fication from the ground.
(b) The shipment shall be placed in a
(f) This section is effective March 6,
secure compartment which is locked and
1974.
sealed. Locks and seals shall be periodi-
§ 73.32 Shipment by air.
cally inspected in transit, if accessible,
by an escort or crew member.
(a) Except as specifically approved by
(c) Export shipments shall be escorted
the Atomic Energy Commission, no
by an unarmed authorized individual,
shipment of special nuclear material
who may be a crew member, from the
shall be made in passenger aircraft in
last port in the United States until the
excess of (1) 20 grams or 20 curies,
shipment is unloaded at a foreign port.
whichever is less, of plutonium or uran-
He shall perform monitoring duties at
ium-233, or (2) 350 grams of uranium-
foreign ports as described in $ 73.35.
235 (contained in uranium enriched to
(d) Ship-to-shore communications
20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).
shall be available, and a ship-to-shore
(b) In shipments on cargo aircraft of
contact shall be made every twenty-four
either uranium-235 (contained in urani-
hours to relay position information, and
um enriched to 20 percent or more in
the status of the shipment, which shall
the U-235 isotope), uranium-233 or plu-
be determined by a daily inspection
tonium, or any combination of these
where possible. This information shall
materials which is 5,000 grams or more
be sent, as often as It is available, to the
computed by the formula, grams=
licensee or his agent who makes the ar-
(grams contained U-235) + 2.5 grams U-
rangements for the protection of the
233 + grams plutonium), transfers shall
shipment.
be in accordance with § 73.35. Transfers
(e) This section is effective March 6,
shall be minimized.
1974.
(c) Export shipments shall be escort-
ed by an unarmed authorized individ-
§ 73.35 Transfer of special nuclear
material.
ual, who may be a crew member. from
the last terminal in the United States
All transfers shall be monitored by a
until the shipment is unloaded at a for-
guard. An alternate guard shall be des-
eign terminal. He shall perform moni-
ignated at all transfer points to sub-
toring duties at foreign terminals as de-
stitute, if necessary. Monitoring of spe-
scribed in & 73.35.
cial nuclear material transfers shall be
conducted as follows:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document 31 has 1973 been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order and has been determined to be declassified
PART 73 --- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
(a) At scheduled Intermediate stops
teletype, of the time of departure of the
where special nuclear material is not
shipment, and shall notify or confirm
scheduled for transfer, the guard shall
with the consignee the method of trans-
observe the opening of the cargo com-
portation, including the names of car-
partment and assure that the shipment
riers, and the estimated time of arrival
Is not removed. The guard shall maintain
of the shipment at its destination. (2) In
continuous visual surveillance of the
the case of a shipment free on board
cargo compartment. Continuous visual
(f.o.b.) the point where it is delivered to
surveillance of the cargo compartment
& carrier for transport, each licensee
shall be maintained up to the time the
shall. before the shipment is delivered to
vehicle is ready to depart. The guard
the carrier, obtain written certification
shall observe the vehicle until it has de-
from the licensee who is to take delivery
parted, and shall notify the licensee or
of the shipment at the f.o.b. point that
his agent of the latest status immediately
the physical protection arrangements re-
thereafter.
quired by §§ 73.30 through 73.35 for li-
(b) At points where special nuclear
censed shipments have been made. When
material is transferred from a vehicle
an AEC license-cxempt contractor is the
to storage, from one vehicle to another.
consignee of a shipment, the licensee
or from storage to a vehicle. the guard
shall, before the shipment is delivered
shall keep the shipment under con-
to the carrier, obtain written certifica-
tinuous visual surveillance by observing
tion from the contractor who is to take
the opening of the cargo compartment of
delivery of the shipment at the f.o.b.
the incoming vehicle and assuring that
point that the physical protection ar-
the shipment is complete by checking
rangements required by AEC Manual
locks and/or seals. Continuous visual
Chapters 2401 or 2405 have been made.
surveillance of a shipment shall be main-
(3) Each licensee who delivers special
tained at all times it is in the terminal
nuclear material to a carrier for trans-
or in storage. Shipments shall be pre-
port shall also make arrangements with
planned in order to avoid storage times
the consignee to be notified immediately
in excess of 24 hours. Continuous visual
by telephone, telegraph, or teletype. of
surveillance of the cargo compartment
the arrival of the shipment at its
shall be maintained up to the time the
destination.
vehicle is ready to depart from the ter-
(d) In addition to complying with the
minal. The guard shall observe the vehi-
requirements specified in paragraphs (c)
cle until it has departed, and shall notify
and (f) of this section, each licensee who
the licensee or his agent of the latest
exports special nuclear material shall
status immediately thereafter.
comply with the requirements specified
(c) The guard shall be required to
in §§ 73.30 through 73.35, as applicable,
immediately notify the carrier and the
up to the first point where the shipment
licensee who made the arrangements for
is taken off the vehicle outside the United
protection of special nuclear material of
States. The licensee shall also make ar-
any deviation from or attempted inter-
rangements with the consignee to be no-
ference with schedule or routing.
tified immediately by telephone and
(d) This section is effective March 6,
telegraph, teletype, or cable, of the ar-
1974.
rival of the shipment at its destination,
$ 73.36 Miscellaneous requirements.
or of any such shipment that is lost or
unaccounted for after the estimated time
(a) Each licensee who takes delivery of
of arrival at its destination.
special nuclear material free on board
(e) Each licensee who receives a ship-
(f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered
ment of special nuclear material shall
to a carrier for transport shall make the
immediately notify the person who de-
arrangements to assure that such special
livered the material to a carrier for
nuclear material will be protected in
transport of the arrival of the shipment
transit as prescribed in §§ 73.30 through
at its destination. In the event such a
73.35, rather than the person who de-
shipment fails to arrive at its destination
livers such shipment to the carrier for
at the estimated time, the consignee, if
transport.
a licensee, or in the case of an export
(b) Each licensee who imports special
shipment, the licensee who exported the
nuclear material shall make arrange-
shipment, shall immediately notify by
ments to assure that such material will
telephone and telegraph, or teletype, the
be protected in transit as follows:
Director of the appropriate Atomic En-
(1) An individual designated by the
ergy Commission Regulatory Operations
licensee or his agent, or as specified by a
Regional Office listed in Appendix A of
contract of carriage, shall confirm the
this part, and the licensee or other per-
container count and examine locks and/
son who delivered the material to a car-
or seals for evidence of tampering, at the
rier for transport. The licensee who made
first place in the United States at which
the physical protection arrangements
the shipment is discharged from the
shall also immediately notify by tele-
arriving carrier.
phone and telegraph, or teletype the DI-
(2) The shipment shall be protected at
rector of the appropriate Atomic Energy
the first terminal at which it arrives in
Commission Regulatory Operations Re-
the United States and all subsequent
gional office listed in Appendix A of the
terminals as provided in §§ 73.30 through
action being taken to trace the shipment.
73.35 and paragraphs (c) and (f) of this
(f) Each licensee who makes arrange-
section.
ments for physical protection of a ship-
(c) (1) Each licensee who delivers spe-
ment of special nuclear material as re-
clal nuclear material to a carrier for
transport shall immediately notify the
quired by §§ 73.30 through 73.36 shall
consignee by telephone, telegraph, or
immediately conduct a trace investiga-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has emdetermined to be declassified
Decemb
PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
tion of any shipment that is lost or un-
riers. More than one vital area may be
accounted for after the estimated ar-
within a single protected area.
rival time and file a report with the
(2) The licensee shall locate material
Commission as specified in 8 73.71. If
access areas only within protected areas
the licensee who conducts the trace in-
such that access to the material access
vestigation is not the consignee, he shall
area requires passage through at least
also immediately report the results of his
two physical barriers. More than one
investigation by telephone and telegraph,
material access area may be within a
or teletype to the consignee.
single protected area.
(g) Paragraphs (a), (b),
(c) and
(3) The physical barrier at the pe-
(d) of this section are effective March 6,
rimeter of the protected arca shall be
1974.
separated from any other barrier desig-
PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
nated as a physical barrier within the
AT FIXED SITES
protected area. and the intervening
space monitored or periodically checked
§ 73.40 Physical protection: General re-
to detect the presence of persons or ve-
quirements at fixed sitcs.
hicles so that the facility security organi-
Each licensee shall provide physical
zation can respond to suspicious activity
protection against industrial sabotage
or to the breaching of any physical bar-
and against theft of special nuclear ma-
rier.
terial at the fixed sites where licensed
(4) An isolation zone shall be main-
activities are conducted. Security plans
tained around the physical barrier at the
submitted to the Commission for ap-
perimeter of the protected area and any
proval shall be followed by the licensee
part of a building used as part of that
after March 6, 1974.
physical barrier. The isolation zone shall
be monitored to detect the presence of
$ 73.50 Requirements for physical pro-
individuals or vehicles within the zone so
tection of licensed activities.
as to allow response by armed members
In addition to any other requirements
of the licensee security organization to
of this part, each licensee who is author-
be initiated at the time of penetration
ized to operate a fuel reprocessing plant
of the protected area. Parking facilities,
pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter or
both for employees and visitors, shall be
who possesses or uses uranium-235 (con-
located outside the isolation zone.
tained in uranium enriched to 20 percent
(5) Isolation zones and clear areas be-
or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-
tween barriers shall be provided with il-
233, or plutonium alone or in any com-
lumination sufficient for the monitoring
bination in a quantity of 5000 grams or
required by paragraph (b) (3) and (4)
more computed by the formula, grams =
of this section, but not less than 0.2 foot
(grams contained J-235) + 2.5 (grams
candles.
U-233 + grams plutonium), other than
(c) Access requirements. The licensee
in the operation of a nuclear reactor 11-
shall control all points of personnel and
censed pursuant to Part 50 of this chap-
vehicle access into a protected area, in-
ter, shall comply with the following.
cluding shipping or receiving areas, and
(a) Physical security organization.
into each vital area. Identification of per-
(1) The licensee shall establish a secu-
sonnel and vehicles shall be made and
rity organization, including guards, to
authorization shall be checked at such
protect his facility against industrial
points.
sabotage and the special nuclear mate-
(1) At the point of personnel and ve-
rial in his possession against theft.
hicle access into a protected area, all in-
(2) At least one supervisor of the se-
dividuals, except employees who possess
curity organization shall be on site at
an AEC personnel security clearance,
all times.
and all hand-carried packages shall be
searched for devices such as firearms, ex-
(3) The licensee shall establish, main-
plosives, and incendiary devices, or other
tain and follow written security proce-
items which could be used for industrial
dures which document the structure of
sabotage. The search shall be conducted
the security organization and which de-
either by a physical search or by the use
tail the duties of guards, watchmen, and
of equipment capable of detecting such
other individuals responsible for secu-
devices. Employees who possess an AEC
rity.
personnel security clearance shall be
(4) The licensee shall not permit an
searched at random intervals. Subse-
individual to act as a guard or watch-
quent to search, drivers of delivery and
man unless such individual has been
service vehicles shall be escorted at all
properly trained and equipped and has
times while within the protected area.
qualified by demonstrating: (1) An un-
(2) All packages being delivered into
derstanding of the licensee's security
the protected area shall be checked for
procedures, and (ii) the ability to exe-
proper identification and authorization.
cute all duties required of him by such
Packages other than hand-carried
procedures. Each guard and watchman
packages shall be searched at random
shall be requalified at least annually.
intervals.
Such requalification shall be docu-
(3) A picture badge identification sys-
mented.
tem shall be used for all individuals who
(b) Physical barriers. (1) The licensee
are authorized access to protected areas
shall locate vital equipment only within
without escort.
a vital area, which, in turn, shall be lo-
(4) Access to vital areas and material
cated within a protected area such that
access areas shall be limited to indi-
access to vital equipment requires pas-
viduals who are authorized access to vital
sage through at least two physical bar-
equipment or special nuclear material
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
December 31, 1973
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has 217é been determined to be declassified
PART 73 --- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
and who require such access to perform
tion within the protected area, who shall
their duties. Authorization for such indi-
be capable of calling for assistance from
viduals shall be provided by the issuance
other guards and watchmen and from
of specially coded numbered badges indi-
local law enforcement authorities.
cating vital areas and material access
(2) The alarm stations required by
areas to which access is authorized. Un-
paragraph (d) (1) of this section shall
occupied vital areas and material access
have conventional telephone service for
areas shall be protected by an active in-
communication with the law enforce-
trusion alarm system.
ment authorities as described in para-
(5) Individuals not employed by the
graph (e) (1) of this section.
licensee shall be escorted by a watchman,
(3) To provide the capability of con-
or other individual designated by the
tinuous communication, two-way radio
licensee, while in a protected area and
voice communication shall be established
shall be badged to indicate that an escort
in addition to conventional telephone
is required. In addition, each individual
service between local law enforcement
not employed by the licensee shall be re-
authorities and the facility and shall
quired to register his name, date, time,
terminate at the facility in a continu-
purpose of visit, employment affiliation,
ously manned central alarm station
citizenship, name and badge number of
within the protected area.
the escort, and name of the individual to
(4) All communications equipment,
be visited. Except for a driver of a deliv-
including offsite equipment. shall remain
ery or service vehicle, an individual not
operable from independent power sources
employed by the licensee who requires
in the event of loss of primary power.
frequent and extended access to a pro-
(f) Testing and maintenance. Each
tected area or a vital area need not be
licensee shall test and maintain intrusion
escorted provided such individual is pro-
alarms, emergency alarms, communica-
vided with a picture badge. which he
tions equipment, physical barriers, and
must receive upon entrance into the pro-
other security related devices or equip-
tected area and which he must return
ment utilized pursuant to this section as
each time he leaves the protected area,
follows:
which indicates (i) nonemployee-no
(1) All alarms, communications equip-
escort required, (ii) areas to which access
ment, physical barriers, and other secu-
is authorized, and (iii) the period for
rity related devices or equipment shall be
which access has been authorized.
maintained in operable and effective
(6) No vehicles used primarily for the
condition.
conveyance of individuals shall be per-
(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be
mitted within a protected area except
functionally tested for operability and
under emergency conditions.
required performance at the beginning
(7) Keys, locks, combinations, and re-
and end of each interval during which
lated equipment shall be controlled to
it is used for security, but not less fre-
minimize the possibility of compromise
quently than once every seven (7) days.
and promptly changed whenever there is
(3) Communications equipment shall
evidence that they have been compro-
be tested for operability and perform-
mised. Upon termination of employment
ance not less frequently than once at the
of any employee, keys, locks, combina-
beginning of each security personnel
tions, and related equipment to which
work shift.
that employee had access shall be
(g) Response requirement. (1) The
changed.
licensee shall establish liaison with
(d) Detection aids. (1) All alarms re-
local law enforcement authorities. In de-
quired pursuant to this part shall an-
veloping his physical security plan, the
nunciate in a continuously manned cen-
licensee shall take account of the prob-
tral alarm station located within the
able size and response time of the local
protected area and in at least one other
law enforcement authority assistance.
continuously manned station, not neces-
(2) Upon detection of abnormal pres-
sarily within the protected area, such
ence or activity of persons or vehicles
that a single act cannot remove the ca-
within an isolation zone, a protected
pability of calling for assistance or other-
area, a material access area or a vital
wise responding to an alarm. All alarms
area, or upon evidence of intrusion into
shall be self-checking and tamper indi-
a protected area, a material access area
cating. The annunication of an alarm at
or a vital area, the facility security or-
the onsite central alarm station shall
ganization shall (1) determine whether
Indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intru-
or not a threat exists, (li) assess the ex-
sion alarm, emergency exit alarm, etc.)
tent of.the threat, if any. and (iii) take
and location. All intrusion alarms, emer-
immediate measures to neutralize the
gency exit alarms, alarm systems, and
threat, either by appropriate action by
line supervisory systems shall at mini-
facility guards or by calling for assist-
mum meet the performance and relia-
ance from local law enforcement au-
bility levels indicated by GSA Interim
thorities, or both.
Federal Specification W-A-00450 B
(h) This section is effective March 6,
(GSA-FSS).
1974.
(2) All emergency exits in each pro-
§ 73.60 Additional requirements for the
tected area and each vital area shall be
physical protection of special nuclear
alarmed.
material at fixed sites.
(e) Communication requirements. (1)
In addition to the applicable require-
Each guard or watchman on duty shall
ments of § 73.50, each licensee who pur-
be capable of maintaining continuous
suant to the regulations in Part 70 of
communication with an individual in a
this chapter possesses at any site or con-
continuously manned central alarm sta-
tiguous sites subject to control by the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
217f
December 31,
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
licensee uranium-235 (contained in
vices utilized pursuant to the require-
uranlum enriched to 20 percent or more
ments of this section as follows:-
in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or
(1) Intrusion alarms, physical bar-
plutonium alone or in any combination
riers, and other devices used for material
in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more
protection shall be maintained in oper-
computed by the formula, grams= (grams
able condition.
contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 +
(2) Each intrusion alarm shall be in-
grams plutonium) shall protect the spe-
spected and tested for operability and Γo-
cial nuclear material from theft or di-
quired functional performance at the be-
version as follows:
ginning and end of each interval during
(a) Access requirements. (1) Special
which it is used for material protection,
nuclear material shall be stored or proc-
but not less frequently than once every
essed only in a material access area. No
seven (7) days.
activities other than those which require
(e) This section is effective March 6,
access to special nuclear material or
1974.
equipment employed in the process, use,
RECORDS AND REPORTS
or storage of special nuclear material,
§ 73.70 Records.
shall be permitted within a material ac-
cess area.
Each licensee subject to the provisions
(2) Material access areas shall be lo-
of §§ 73.30 through 73.36 and/or $ 73.50
cated only within a protected area to
and/or $ 73.60 shall keep the following
which access is controlled.
records:
(3) Special nuclear material not in
(a) Names and addresses of all indi-
process shall be stored in a vault equip-
viduals who have been designated as au-
ped with an intrusion alarm or in a
thorized individuals.
vault-type room, and each such vault
(b) Names, addresses, and badge num-
or vault-type room shall be controlled
bers of all individuals authorized to have
as a separate material access area.
access to vital equipment or special nu-
(4) Enriched uranium scrap in the
clear material, and the vital areas and
form of small pieces, cutings, chips, so-
material access areas to which authori-
lutions or in other forms which result
zation is granted.
from a manufacturing process, contained
(c) A register of visitors, vendors, and
in 30-gallon or larger containers, with a
other individuals not employed by the
uranium-235 content of less than 0.25
licensee recorded pursuant to § 73.50(c)
grams per liter, may be stored within a
(5).
locked and separately fenced area which
(d) A log indicating name, badge num-
is within a larger protected area pro-
ber, time of entry, reason for entry, and
vided that the storage area is no closer
time of exit of all individuals granted
than 25 feet to the perimeter of the pro-
access to a normally unoccupied vital
tected area. The storage area when un-
area.
occupied shall be protected by a guard
(e) Documentation of all routine se-
or watchman who shall patrol at inter-
curity tours and inspections, and of all
vals not exceeding 4 hours, or by intru-
tests, inspections, and maintenance per-
sion alarms.
formed on physical barriers, intrusion
(5) Admittance to a material access
alarms, communications equipment, and
area shall be under the control of au-
other security related equipment used
thorized individuals and limited to indi-
pursuant to the requirements of this
viduals who require such access to per-
part.
form their duties.
(f) A record at each onsite alarm an-
(6) Prior to entry into a material ac-
nunciation location of each alarm, false
cess area, packages shall be searched for
alarm, alarm check, and tamper indica-
devices such as firearms, explosives, in-
tion that identifies the type of alarm, lo-
cendiary devices, or counterfeit substi-
cation, alarm circuit, date, and time. In
tute items which could be used for theft
addition, details of response by facility
or diversion of special nuclear material.
guards and watchmen to each alarm, in-
(7) Methods to observe individuals
trusion, or other security incident shall
within material access areas to assure
be recorded.
that special nuclear material is not di-
(g) Shipments of special nuclear ma-
verted shall be provided and used on a
terial subject to the requirements of this
continuing basis.
part, including names of carriers, major
(b) Exit requirement. Each individual,
roads to be used, flight numbers in the
package, and vehicle shall be searched
case of air shipments, dates and expected
for concealed special nuclear material
times of departure and arrival of ship-
before exiting from a material access
ments, names and addresses of the moni-
area unless exit is into a contiguous ma-
tor and one alternate monitor at each
terial access area. The search may be
transfer point, verification of communi-
carried out by a physical search or by use
cation equipment on board the transfer
of equipment capable of detecting the
vehicle, names of individuals who are to
presence of concealed special nuclear
communicate with the transport vehicle,
material.
container seal descriptions and identifi-
(c) Detection aid requirement. Each
cation, and any other information to
unoccupied material access area shall be
confirm the means utilized to comply
locked and protected by an intrusion
with §§ 73.30 through 73.36. Such infor-
alarm on active status. All emergency
mation shall be recorded prior to ship-
exits shall be continuously alarmed.
ment. Information obtained during the
(d) Testing and maintenance. Each
course of the shipment such as reports of
licensee shall test and maintain intrusion
all communications, change of shipping
alarms, physical barriers, and other de-
plan including monitor changes, trace in-
December 31, 1973
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 217g Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
vestigations and others shall also be
recorded.
APPENDIX A
(h) Procedures for controlling access
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REGULATORY OPERATIONS REGIONAL OFFICES
to protected areas and for controlling
access to keys for locks used to protect
Telephone
special nuclear material.
Region and address
Daytime
Nights and
§ 73.71 Reports of unaccounted for ship-
holidays
ments, suspected theft, unlawful di-
version, or industrial sabotage.
Region I, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, USAEC, 631 Park Ave., 215-337-1150
215-337-1150.
(a) Each licensee who conducts a
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406.
Region II, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, USAEC, Suite 818, 230 404-526-4503
404-526-4503.
trace investigation of a lost or unac-
Peachtree St. NW., Atlanta, Ga. 30303.
Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, USAEC, 799 Roosevelt 312-858-2660
312-730-7711.
counted for shipment pursuant to
§ 73.36(f) shall immediately report to the
Rd., Glen Ellyn, III. 60137.
Region V. Directorate of Regulatory Operations, USAEC, P.O. Box 1515, *415-486-3141
415-273-4237.
Director of the appropriate Atomic En-
Berkeley, Calif. 94701.
ergy Commission Regulatory Operations
Regional Office listed in Appendix A, by
For the purposes of this regulation, the geographical areas assigned to the regional offices are as follows:
telephone, telegram, or teletype, the de-
REGION I
tails and results of his trace investigation
and shall file within a period of fifteen
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Colum-
(15) days a written report to the Director
bia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
of the appropriate Regulatory Operations
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
Regional Office with a copy to the Di-
rector of Regulatory Operations, U.S.
REGION II
Atomic Energy Commission, Washington,
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Ken-
D.C. 20545, setting forth the details and
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
results of the trace investigation.
lina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennes-
(b) Each licensee shall report immedi-
see, Virginia, and West Virginia.
ately to the Director of the uppropriate
REGION III
Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Operations Regional Office listed in Ap-
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
pendix A, by telephone, telegram, or tele-
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wis-
type, any incident in which an attempt
consin.
has been made, or is believed to have
REGION V
been made, to commit a theft or unlaw-
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Ha-
ful diversion of special nuclear material
waii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
which he is licensed to possess, or to
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
commit an act of industrial sabotage
Wyoming.
against his plant. The initial report shall
be followed within a period of fifteen
(15) days by a written report submitted
to the Director of the appropriate Regu-
latory Operations Regional Office, with
a copy to the Director of Regulatory
Operations, U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission, Washington, D.C. 20545, setting
forth the details of the incident. Subse-
quent to the submission of the written
report required by this paragraph, a li-
censee shall immediately inform the Di-
rector of the appropriate Regulatory
Operations Regional Office by means of
a written report of any substantive ad-
ditional information, which becomes
available to the licensee, concerning the
incident.
ENFORCEMENT
§ 73.80 Violations.
An injunction or other court order may
be obtained prohibiting any violation of
any provision of the Act or any regula-
tion or order issued thereunder. A court
order may be obtained for the payment
of a civil penalty imposed pursuant to
section 234 of the Act for violation of
sections 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 82, 101, 103, 104,
107, or 109 of the Act or any rule, regu-
lation, or order issued thereunder, or any
term, condition, or limitation of any li-
cense issued thereunder, or for any viola-
tion for which a license may be revoked
under section 186 of the Act. Any person
who willfully violates any provision of
the Act or any regulation or order issued
thereunder may be guilty of a crime and
upon conviction, may be punished by fine
or imprisonment or both, as provided by
law.
*Amended
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
December 31,
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
June 1973
ATONIC ENERGY COMMISSION
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.7
CONTROL OF PERSONNEL ACCESS TO PROTECTED AREAS,
VITAL AREAS, AND MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS
A. INTRODUCTION
firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices which could
aid in industrial sabotage to the facility or in the theft of
Proposed amendments to the Commission
special nuclear material. Searching individuals and
regulations of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production
packages for concealed special nuclear material at exit
and Utilization Facilities," 10 CFR Part 70, "Special
points from material access areas provides a means of
Nuclear Material." and 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical
detecting attempted theft or diversion of special nuclear
Protection of Special Nuclear Material," would, if
material.
adopted, require measures (1) for the protection against
industrial sabotage of fuel reprocessing plants and
Some means by which control of access can be
certain facilities subject to the provisions of 10 CFR Part
accomplished include a key and lock system, a magnetic
70 and (2) for the protection of special nuclear material
or electronic key-card system, an attendant guard or
(SNM) against theft or diversion from certain licensed
watchman. or a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) in conjunction
facilities.
with keys or key-cards. Of these means, the magnetic or
electronic key-card system in conjunction with closed-
One element of this protection is proper control of
circuit TV offers the greatest security with a minimum
access of personnel to and from protected areas, vital
of personnel. The key-cards are much more difficult to
areas, and material access areas. Searching persons and
duplicate than keys and the locks cannot be "picked."
packages for firearms, explosives, and other devices
Further, the control system can "read" the key-card and
which could aid in sabotage or theft of SNM is another
record the identity of the card (to whom it was issued)
element of physical protection.
and the time of entry. A closed-circuit TV system would
allow visual observation of the access point without
This guide describes acceptable methods of
requiring an attendant guard or watchman. In fact, by
searching personnel prior to entry into a protected area
use of closed-circuit TV several such access points can be
and upon exit from a material access area, and of
maintained under observation by a single guard or
controlling access to protected areas, vital areas, and
watchman. Such a system would be especially useful at
material access areas.
access points to remote or normally unoccupied vital
areas or material access areas. In any case, visual
B. DISCUSSION
observation. either directly or via CCTV, provides a
positive means of assuring that only individuals
The objective of controlling access to protected
authorized access to an area pass through the access
areas, vital areas, and material access areas is to ensure
point into the area.
that (1) only persons authorized access to a protected
area are permitted within that area and (2) that only
Searching of individuals can be carried out by means
individuals authorized access to vital equipment or
of a hands-on search ("frisking"), or by means of devices
special nuclear material will be allowed within vital areas
which will detect the presence of weapons and
or material access areas.
explosives or SNM concealed on the individual, or by a
combination of both. The search should be conducted in
The objective of searching individuals prior to
a manner which (1) provides assurance that firearms,
permitting entry into a protected area is to prevent illicit
explosives, and other such contraband are not being
passage into the protected area of objects such as
carried into the protected area and that SNM is not
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide 8 basis for the findings requisite to
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
being transported out of a material access area and (2)
exiting from a material access area pass through the SNM
minimizes inconvenience to the individuals being
check system.
searched. The use of equipment capable of detecting
weapons, explosives, or SNM is usually the preferable
It is the facility guards and watchmen who are
form of searching, since the use of detection devices
charged with the responsibility of assuring that firearms,
avoids the personal imposition of a hands-on search.
explosives, and other similar items or devices are not
transported into the protected area and that SNM is not
An "airport type" weapon (metal) detector located
removed from a material access area without
in a passageway arranged so that all individuals entering
authorization. Hence, they should search any packages
the protected area pass through the detector provides a
being carried into the protected area or out of a material
convenient and effective means of searching for firearms.
access area. No individual should be allowed to directly
hand carry any package, valise, tool box, or similar
Devices capable of detecting dynamite, TNT, and
hand-carriable item into the protected area or out of a
other explosives can be used to search individuals for
material access area. Such objects should be handed to
concealed explosives. Most explosive detectors
an attendant guard or watchman who will check them
commercially available at present are of the hand-held
and pass them into the protected area or out of the
"sniffer" variety; hence an attendant guard or watchman
material access area. To further reduce the possibility of
must pass the detector over the individual being
concealment, where feasible, bulky outer clothing such
searched. However, it is possible to locate an explosive
as overcoats, raincoats, greatcoats, and ski jackets should
detector in a passageway and to use the detector in the
be left in a cloak room provided outside the protected
same manner that a fixed weapon detector is used.
area and in any case should never be taken into a
material access area. The licensee may wish to use several
If a hand-held explosive detector is used, the
members of the security force to check packages, coats,
explosive check is best made after the weapon detector
etc., during shift change to minimize the delay
has indicated that no weapon is concealed upon the
encountered in gaining access. Unattended access points
individual. This procedure affords greater protection to
into the protected area can be used, provided
the attendant guard or watchman on the presumption
observation of such points is maintained by CCTV to
that concealed explosives offer less of an immediate
assure that packages are not being hand carried into the
danger to the guard or watchman than a concealed
protected area at that point.
firearm.
Posting of a sign in a conspicuous location will
One alternative approach to the hand-held explosive
inform individuals requesting access into the protected
detector would be the location of an explosive detector
area that they will be searched, and that any packages,
within a revolving-door frame. The rather small volume
etc., they wish to take into the protected area will also
of air trapped in a section of the revolving door would
be searched.
be sampled by the explosive detector and, as the
isolation of the air volume by a revolving door section
Although the Commission regulations do not
provides some concentration of vapors emitted by any
require searching of individuals entering a material access
explosives within that section, the effectiveness of the
area, observation of access points provides a convenient
detector would be increased. To further increase
method of ensuring that personnel do not carry
efficiency of the explosive detector, the air in the door
weapons, explosives, and other similar items or devices
into the material access area.
section might be flushed through the detector.
In emergency situations, such as those which may
Searching individuals for concealed SNM upon exit
require the evacuation of a material access area, the
from material access areas can be accomplished in a
objectives of access control and search should not be
variety of ways. For example, at facilities processing
allowed to compromise health and safety. Hence, the
plutonium or uranium-233 the search for concealed
licensee should develop plans of action and provide areas
SNM can be made in an attended air lock between
and equipment for searching and controlling access
change rooms. At areas where only highly enriched
under emergency conditions compatible with the
uranium is processed, the search can be carried out by
objectives of both safety and security. Such emergency
use of a doorway SNM monitor and a metal detector in
procedures will minimize the effectiveness of an
conjunction with a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) system,
emergency situation deliberately perpetrated to conceal
hence a guard or watchman need not be attendant.
theft of SNM.
However, whether or not the access point is attended,
the use of both an SNM monitor and a metal detector
Administrative controls, as well as physical barriers
would seem necessary to assure that enriched uranium,
where applicable, may be employed to gather evacuating
shielded or unshielded, is not being concealed. In
individuals within a holding area. Such controls would
addition, exit from any material access area should be
serve both to verify that no one has remained in the
controlled to assure that all individuals and packages
evacuated area and to ensure that an emergency
5.7-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
situation will not successfully conceal an attempted
minimum of 200 grams of non-ferrous metal placed
theft of SNM.
anywhere on the body at a 90% confidence limit. The
false alarm rate should be a maximum of 1%.
C. DEFINITIONS
d. Explosive Detector
For the purpose of this guide the following
The explosive detector, as a minimum, hould be
definitions are provided:
capable of detecting dynamite, TNT, and similar
1. "Guard" means an armed and uniformed individual
nitrogen compounds in minimum amounts of 200 grams
whose primary duty is the protection of materials and
at a 90% confidence limit. The false alarm rate should be
property to the extent that theft of SNM or sabotage of
a maximum of 1% If detector is hand held rather than
the facility could pose a threat to the common defense
permanently fixed to a passageway or revolving door
and security or result in a radiological hazard to public
frame, hence requiring an attendant guard or watchman,
health and safety.
the search for explosives should be performed after the
2. "Watchman" means an unarmed individual, not
search for firearms. An acceptable arrangement is
necessarily uniformed, who provides protection for
illustrated in Figure 2.
materials and property in the course of performing other
duties.
e. Alarm Annunciation
3. "Patrol watchman" means an arms-qualified
The alarms of the weapon detector and the
individual whose primary duty, at least during threat or
explosive detector should annunciate at the location of
emergency situations, is the protection of material and
the detectors, if attended, as well as in a central alarm
property, and who is normally unarmed but who may be
station. The alarm annunciation at the location of the
detectors need not be aural.
armed during emergency or threat situations. A patrol
watchman may or may not be uniformed.
f.
Alarm System
D. REGULATORY POSITION
The alarms of the weapon (metal) detector and
the explosive detector should be interfaced with the
1. Protected Areas
inner door lock so that, with an alarm triggered, the inner
door cannot be opened from either side without a
a. Identity and Authorization
specific action by the individual manning the central
At each access point into a protected area, an
alarm station acknowledging the alarm and enabling the
identity and access authorization check should be made
inner door to be opened.
in conjunction with a search for firearms and explosives.
Such identity and access authorization checks should be
2. Material Access Areas Containing Pu or U-233
performed by an attendant guard or watchman or by
a. Change Room Exit
means of an electronic or magnetic key-card system and
Checking for concealed plutonium or
a closed-circuit TV system. Packages should be taken
uranium-233 at an exit point from a material access area
into the protected area only at access points attended by
into a protected area should be performed in an
a guard or watchman. If the access point is unattended,
attended secure access passageway located between
the individual monitoring the access point via
change rooms. An acceptable arrangement is shown in
closed-circuit TV should carefully observe any individual
Figure 3. Unless exit is into a contiguous material access
requesting access at that point to ensure that no
area, all individuals should exit from a material access
packages are being carried into the protected area.
area, other than a vault, only via the change rooms and
b. Personnel Search
should be required to deposit all work clothing in the
inner change room, walk through the passageway, and
If the search of individuals is to be carried out
dress in street clothing in the outer change room. The
by means of detection equipment, a weapon (metal)
licensee should generally not allow packages to be
detector and an explosive detector should be used. An
transported out of the material access area via the
acceptable arrangement for the use of detection
change rooms. Showers, except those used exclusively
equipment in a secure access passageway is illustrated in
for health physics, should be located in the outer change
Figure 1. The doors on the secure access passageway
room. A guard or watchman need not be attendant
should be interlocked so that both cannot be
except when personnel are exiting from the material
simultaneously open, thus providing positive access
access area.
control. An explicit enabling act should be required of a
security individual, either attending the secure access
b. SNM Detector
passageway or in the central alarm station, to open the
An SNM detector should be located within the
inner door.
passageway. The detector should be capable of detecting
0.5 gram of plutonium or 1 gram of uranium-233
c.
Metal Detector
shielded by 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an
The metal detector located within the secure
individual at a 90% confidence limit. The false alarm rate
access passageway should be capable of detecting a
on the detector should be less than 0.1%.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon 57-3 Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
c.
Door Interlock
c.
Metal Detector
The doors of the attended secure access
The metal detector in the secure access
passageway should be interlocked SO that both cannot be
passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum
simultaneously open. The doors should also be alarmed
of 100 grams of non-ferrous metal (shielding) at a 90%
so that an explicit action must be taken by either the
confidence limit concealed anywhere on an individual.
attendant security individual or the individual manning
The false alarm rate should not exceed 0.1%.
the central alarm station to enable either door to open
without triggering the alarm.
d. Alarms
The doors of the secure access passageway
d.
Packages
should be alarmed and interfaced with the doorway
All packages, including waste barrels and work
monitor such that an individual can be detained for a
clothes hampers, being transported out of a material
sufficient time for the doorway monitor to operate. If
access area should be checked by an attendant guard or
an individual passes through without waiting for the
watchman for concealed SNM, preferably at an exit
proper period of time (perhaps indicated by a light) the
point expressly provided for packages. SNM packages
alarm should sound. The doorway monitor and metal
should be checked for proper seals, identification, and
detector alarms and the door alarms should annunciate
transfer documentation.
in the central alarm station and may also annunciate at
the passageway.
e. Change Room Access
Access by personnel into a material access area
e.
Access
should be permitted only through the change rooms.
The exit points from the material access area
Control of access should be accomplished either by a
should be used for access points as well. Control of
guard or watchman attending the secure access
access should be by either the attendant security
passageway between the change rooms, or by a
individual or by a key-card CCTV system.
combination of key-card and CCTV when the
passageway is unattended.
f. Closed-Circuit TV Observation
If observation of the passageway is
f.
Observation of Individuals
accomplished by CCTV, the guard or watchman
Procedures should be employed in the control
monitoring the passageway should carefully observe any
of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone
individual within to ensure that no packages are being
individual is allowed within a material access area
carried into or out of the access area.
without some means to observe that individual's
activities.
g.
Observation of Individuals
Procedures should be employed in the control
3. Material Access Areas Containing Highly Enriched
of access to material access areas to ensure that no lone
Uranium, and Vaults Containing SNM
individual is allowed within a material access area
without some means to observe that individual's
a.
Exit
activities.
At material access area exit points, the check
for concealed SNM should be carried out by means of an
h.
Vaults
SNM doorway monitor and a metal detector. A secure
A key-card CCTV system should be employed
access passageway located at the exit point from the
to control access to and from a vault if such access and
material access area should house the detection
exit points do not open to or from material access areas
equipment. An attendant guard or watchman or a
contiguous to the vault. In addition, all individuals who
closed-circuit TV connected to the central alarm station
transport SNM between material access areas or to or
should also be provided. Administrative procedures
from a vault, should be escorted by a member of the
should require the passage of packages only through
facility's security force during any period of the
attended exit points. The doors of the secure access
transport that the SNM is not within a material access
passageway should be interlocked so that both cannot be
area.
simultaneously open. A suggested layout is illustrated in
Figure 4.
4. Vital Areas
Control of access into vital areas should be
b. SNM Detector
accomplished either by an attendant guard or watchman,
The SNM doorway monitor in the secure access
or by means of magnetic or electronic key-card access in
passageway should be capable of detecting a minimum
conjunction with closed-circuit TV. The identification
of 3 grams uranium enriched to 90% in the uranium-235
check should include either direct observation by an
isotope in 3 mm of brass concealed anywhere on an
attendant guard or watchman or observation by CCTV
individual at a 50% confidence limit. The false alarm rate
of each individual passing into the vital area, or some
should not exceed 0.1%.
alternate means (e.g., an escort) which will provide
Reproduced at the Richa7d4 Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
positive assurance that only individuals authorized access
c. Unoccupied Vital Areas and Material Access
to the vital area are permitted to pass into that area.
Areas
5. Security Force Response to an Alarm
If unauthorized entry is made or attempted
into a vital area or material access area, or if an intrusion
The guards and patrol watchmen should be trained
alarm protecting an unoccupied vital or material access
and prepared to protect the facility from sabotage and
the SNM within from theft.
area is triggered, two armed security personnel should be
dispatched immediately to the area of alarm. If,
a. Protected Area Access Point
however, the area of the alarm can be observed by
CCTV, the guard or watchman in the alarm station
Upon annunciation of an alarm from explosive
or weapon detection equipment located at a protected
where the TV monitor is located should first verify the
area access point attended by a lone guard or watchman,
existence of intrusion and assess the extent of a threat, if
a guard should be dispatched immediately to the access
any, before dispatching the security personnel. If the
point originating the alarm. If the access point is
existence of an intrusion is verified, either by CCTV or
unattended, two guards should be sent to the access
security personnel in the area, a law enforcement
point. At the access point the guard or watchman should
authority should be notified immediately. If possible,
request that the individual's pockets be emptied and that
the intruder(s) found by the security personnel should
the individual pass again through the detection
be searched and detained until arrest by local police.
equipment. If the individual complies and if the alarms
do not register, the individual may be allowed to pass
into the protected area after the contents of the
6. Emergency Procedures
individual's pockets have been examined verifying that
The licensee should provide procedures and
no attempt has been made to pass explosives or firearms
equipment to maintain the level of access control and
into the protected area. If, however, an alarm continues
SNM and facility protection during conditions of
to register, the individual should be physically searched
emergency or equipment failure. Emergency procedures
by an unarmed security individual, while at least one
should be developed and executed in a manner
guard or armed patrol watchman observes, to verify that
consistent with safety.
no firearms or explosives are yet concealed by the
individual. If the individual refuses to comply with the
a. Evacuation Procedures
request for further searching, or if a weapon or
During emergency conditions which require
explosives are found, the individual should be denied
evacuation of part or all of the facility, temporary SNM
access.
checking stations should be established at the perimeter
of the protected area or at a personnel collection area
b. Material Access Area Exit Point
outside the protected area. All individuals should be
If an SNM or metal detector alarm or a door
searched for concealed SNM before being released from
the protected area or collection area. In addition, a roll
alarm is triggered at a material access area exit point
of all individuals who had entered the evacuated area
attended by a guard or watchman or at an unattended
exit point, security personnel, at least one of whom is
should be taken to ensure that all have evacuated safely.
armed (a guard or armed patrol watchman), should be
If an evacuation or other emergency alarm sounds,
dispatched to that exit point. The individual should be
guards and watchmen should take position at
searched by emptying pockets and passing again through
prearranged surveillance points to ensure that:
the detection equipment or by a hands-on search
(1) Proper evacuation routes are being
observed.
performed by an unarmed security individual while at
least one guard or armed patrol watchman observes. The
(2) SNM is not being tossed over the protected
cause of the alarm should be determined before the
area perimeter barrier, and
individual is released. If the cause of the alarm was an
(3) No one attempts to gain unauthorized
object, metal or SNM, not concealed by the individual,
access to the protected area during the emergency.
the individual should be searched without the object to
ensure that the object is not a decoy and that SNM is
b. Failed Detection Equipment
not still being concealed by the individual. If the
Failed detection equipment should be repaired
security personnel determine that attempted
as quickly as possible. In the interim, alternate access or
unauthorized removal of SNM has been made with the
exit points or hand-held detection devices or hands-on
intent to steal SNM, local police and the Federal Bureau
search procedures should be employed. In no case
of Investigation should be contacted, and the individual
should the failure of equipment be allowed to
should be held by the security personnel until the local
compromise the protection of the facility or the SNM
police arrive and arrest the individual.
within the facility.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixgm7Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PROTECTED AREA
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECUBE vCCEaPROTECTED AREA VICE HOOWS
3
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WEAPON
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ACCESS
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SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY AT ENTRANCE TO PROTECTED AREA (ATTENDED)
DED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECURE SESECA VV22V0EMVA V.I. ЕИТАРИСЕ 10 BHOJECLED VBEV (V.LLENDED)
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Figure 3
SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY BETWEEN CHANGE ROOMS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
PROTECTED AREA
MATERIAL ACCESS AREA
KEY-CARD READER
SNM DETECTOR
5.7-9
METAL DETECTOR
CCTV
KEY-CARD READER
Figure 4
SECURE ACCESS PASSAGEWAY AT EXIT FROM MATERIAL ACCESS AREA
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ATOMAL ENERGY COMARDSON
July 1973
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.10
SELECTION AND USE OF PRESSURE-SENSITIVE SEALS ON CONTAINERS
FOR ONSITE STORAGE OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
1.
Composition. The seal is basically a backing on one
surface of which is a layer of adhesive covered by a
Paragraph 70.22(b) of 10 CFR Part 70, "Special
protective liner.
Nuclear Materials," requires that certain applicants for
licenses to possess special nuclear material (SNM)
The backing of pressure-sensitive labels or seals is
provide a full description of their procedures for control
usually made of paper, vinyl film, or plastic-coated paper
of and accounting for the SNM possessed under license,
and may be composed of more than one layer. To
including procedures used in storing said material.
provide a consistent degree of adhesion, the adhesive on
Paragraph 70.32(c) requires that licenses authorizing
the backing should be aggressively tacky at room
possession of certain quantities of SNM contain and be
temperature and not require activation by water,
subject to a condition requiring the licensee to maintain
solvents, or heat to form a bond to the container to
fundamental material controls identified in Part 70 and
which it is to be applied. Curing adhesives which harden
other material control procedures deemed essential by
as a result of exposure to air are not recommended
the Commission for the safeguarding of SNM. Section
because the initial adhesion should be adequate, and
70.56 requires licensees to perform, or permit the
further adhesion only increases the difficulty of cleaning
Commission to perform, tests appropriate or necessary
old seals from reusable containers.
for the administration of the regulations in 10 CFR Part
70, including tests of equipment and devices used in
The surface of the seal should carry a logotype to
connection with the production, utilization, or storage
identify the licensee, and the complete surface of the
of SNM.
seal should be covered with a regular and fine design to
reveal erasures.
Pressure-sensitive seals on containers used for onsite
storage of SNM are passive devices that indicate, upon
All seals should provide enough space to write by
inspection, whether tampering or entry has occurred.
hand the type of material; the composition, weight, and
These seals may also serve as labels. This guide provides
serial number of items; the initials or signature of the
criteria acceptable to the Regulatory staff for selecting,
person responsible for the statement of content; and the
affixing, and testing pressure-sensitive seals used for
date of application of the seal.
tamper-safing in connection with the onsite storage of
SNM for compliance with the Commission's regulations
Lettering on the seal, other than the logotype,
with respect to material control.
should be large enough to be easily readable. The writing
materials used to record information on the seals should
B. DISCUSSION
be specified on the basis of qualification tests that
establish compatibility with the surface of each type of
The effective use of pressure-sensitive seals for
seal.
tamper-safing containers of SNM in onsite storage should
consider such basic elements as (1) composition, (2) seal
2. Seal Properties. From the point of view of tamper
properties, (3) method of affixing, (4) seal control, and
resistance, the backing, adhesive, and ink of the seal
(5) quality assurance.
should resist without damage all chemicals normally
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to refiect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
present in the environment where the seal is to be used.
duplication of numbers in use at the facility. Only
For example, paper-base seals in general are sensitive to
designated custodians or their alternates should have
weather exposure; consequently, seals for exterior use
access to the seals or affix them to containers. The
should be made with a plastic base.
properties of the inks to be used for printing and
recording have in common a sensitivity to the solvents
Any chemical capable of destroying or softening the
that attack the adhesive. Thus seal numbers printed with
adhesive should also destroy either the backing or the
such inks could be lost if accidentally damaged by
ink of the printing. This is particularly true of paper
solvents. To prevent this loss of identification of the
seals with acrylic adhesives that are most likely to tear
container, the numbers should be printed with
when mechanical removal is attempted but are very
solvent-resistant inks or as perforations through the
permeable to solvents that attack the adhesive. Since the
backing.
paper backing is usually not affected by the solvent, the
ink used in the printing must be sensitive to such
5. Quality Assurance. The licensee is responsible for
solvents in order to provide indication of tampering.
demonstrating that the seals have and maintain the
required resistance to and indication of tampering. Such
In general, paper backing on seals provides a surface
a demonstration should include:
capable of accepting various inks well because of the
a. A solvent test in which an affixed seal sample is
ease of wetting of the paper. Conversely, plastic
tested with a solvent to determine the effect on the
backings, which are useful in applications requiring
adhesive, backing, and inks.
exposure to weather, tend to repel inks and have poor
b. A peel test in which a tensile tester is used to
penetration, thus requiring special inks with surface
determine the acceptability of the tear strength.
active agents that ensure proper wetting of most plastics.
c. An erasing test in which rubber erasers and
solvents are used to determine if any writing or printing
The seal backing should have a tear strength
can be erased without a clear indication of erasure.
sufficiently low to provide an indication of tampering by
careful peeling of the seal. The tear strength of the
C. REGULATORY POSITION
backing can be reduced and the peel force of the
adhesive increased to the point where the peel test is
An acceptable program using pressure-sensitive seals
satisfied. Another method of preventing peeling without
to assist in assuring that the diversion or theft of SNM
tearing is to provide cross-shaped cuts in the backing.
from containers in temporary onsite storage has not
Seals should be capable of withstanding normal or
occurred and also to assist in assuring the validity of
reasonably abnormal wear in use, without damage that
previously made measurements should give particular
would render the writing illegible or impair the detection
consideration to the composition, seal properties,
of tampering.
method of affixing, seal control, and quality assurance.
1. Composition. The composition of a
3. Method of Affixing. It is important to affix seals
pressure-sensitive seal should include:
properly in order to assure that SNM cannot be removed
a. A backing or body usually made of paper, vinyl
from a container without destroying either the seal or
film, or plastic-coated paper;
the container. Surfaces to which seals are to be applied
b. An adhesive that covers one of the surfaces of
should be clean and smooth. It is recommended that, for
the backing and is aggressively tacky at room
sealing cans, the seals be designed SO they can be applied
temperature;
completely across the lid, extending at each end beyond
the lid onto the body of the container for more than an
c. A liner that protects the adhesive and that is
inch. One such seal might consist of a T-shaped backing;
removed prior to affixing;
the cross of the tee is the label with boxes for the
d. Logotype printing on the surface of the seal
handwritten information, and the upright of the tee is a
identifying the licensee;
tape long enough to extend completely across the lid.
e. A background printing of a fine design covering
the complete surface of the seal;
f. Readable lettering.
4. Seal Control. Without adequate control of seals,
replacement and subsequent duplication of the affixed
2. Seal Properties. The properties of the seal
seal would be more readily possible. There are two
components should be selected SO that any attempt to
simple methods of preventing this type of replacement:
tamper with the seal will be clearly indicated. The
strict control of the seal blanks and sequential
following requirements should be included:
numbering of the seals. As strict control of the seal
a. The components of the seal should resist
blanks is difficult to maintain and verify, sequential
without damage all chemicals in the normal environment
numbering is preferred. However, for sequential
where the seal is to be used.
numbering of seals to be effective, the seal numbers
b. Either the backing material or printing inks
should be included in the record system, and the length
should yield to chemicals that are capable of
of the number sequence should be adequate to prevent
compromising the adhesive.
5.10-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
c. The tensile strength of the seal should be
a. Solvent Test. Samples should be prepared by
sufficiently low that any tampering by peeling will be
affixing at least one square inch of seal material to a
indicated by tearing or delamination before the joint
clean test panel of the proper material and rolling the
between the lid and the container is reached.
sample with a 4-1/2-lb rubber-covered roller (ASTM
Standard D2860-70, "Adhesion of Pressure-Sensitive
3. Method of Affixing. The method of affixing seals
Tape to Fiberboard at 90-Deg Angle and
should include the following requirements:
Constant Stress"¹) Markings should be made on the
a. The surfaces to which seals are to be applied
seal materials with acceptable marking materials. At least
should be clean and smooth.
five samples of seal material chosen at random from
b. A single continous seal, properly shaped, should
normally available stock should be tested with each
be applied across opposite parts of the joint between the
solvent in the solvent test. The test panel and the
lid and the container, and the backing and adhesive
samples adhering thereto should be immersed in the
should extend at least one inch on each side of the joint
reagents identified and described in ASTM Standard
over a width of at least one-half inch. The seal should be
D543-67, "Resistance of Plastics to Chemical Rea-
affixed with sufficient tension to preclude the tilting of
gents," 2 within 5 minutes of application and remain
the lid allowing access to the contents without damage
at room temperature for one-half hour.
to the seal.
c. The seals should be applied immediately after the
If for any one sample, the seal material can be
samples and data to identify and measure the contents
slid off the test panel, or if it falls free during or at the
have been taken.
end of the period of immersion in any solvent, and if the
backing and printing on a sample so removed remain
4. Seal Control. In order to detect replacement or
unchanged, the sample and stock should be considered
duplication of applied seals, strict control should be
to have failed the test.
maintained over the seals in stock. Seal control should
include the following requirements:
b. Peel Test. At least five samples of the seal
a. Seals should be available to and affixed and
material should be prepared and mounted on a test panel
removed by only designated individuals responsible to
in the same manner as in Pressure Sensitive Tape Council
material control and accounting management.
Standard PSTC-5, "Quick Stick,"3 except that the seal
b. Seals should be sequentially numbered with
material in this test should be rolled with a 4-1/2-lb
sufficient alphameric or numeric digits to prevent
rubber-covered roller, as identified in C.5.a above, after
duplication of numbers in use at that facility.
application. The test panel should be mounted in a jig
c. Sequential numbers on seals should be printed
which is mounted on a tensile tester as per PSTC-5 and
with solvent-resistant inks or as perforations through the
the tester started immediately at 0.2 inch per minute.
backing.
This peel test should be conducted at a temperature of
d. Precise records of all the seals by number should
23 ± 2 degrees Centigrade. If for any sample, as much as
be kept and should include pertinent data on the seal
one-half inch of seal material can be peeled free without
and data on the contents of the container. Such records
tearing or delamination, the sample and stock should be
considered to have failed the test.
should include any discrepancy that is observed in the
container content, dates and times of application and
removal of the seal, and the signatures of the individuals
c. Erasing Test. Where the seal number is not
perforated in the backing, at least five samples of the
responsible to material control and accounting
seal material containing the printed seal number should
management for the data and for affixing and removing
be affixed to a test panel. Rubber erasers and swabs
the seal.
moistened with all of the standard reagents as indicated
e. Assurance should be required of the manufacturer
in the solvent test should be used in attempts to erase
that their masters of prenumbered seals and the scrap
the seal number. Each attempt should be limited to five
from fabrication are controlled.
minutes duration. If in any attempt, the printing can be
erased without leaving a clearly apparent indication of
5. Quality Assurance. The licensee should establish a
erasure, the sample and stock should be considered to
quality assurance program to ensure that the seals
have failed the test.
conform to the above requirements. The quality
assurance program should include qualification tests of
1 Copies may be obtained from American Society for
seals at each time a new supply of seals is obtained and
Testing and Materials, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19103.
with existing stocks at intervals no greater than one year.
The qualification tests should include a solvent test, a
2 The specific standard reagents for the solvent test are in
peeling test, and an erasing test. Tests requiring metallic
paragraphs 4.4.3, 4.4.7, 4.4.8, 4.4.12, 4.4.13, 4.4.15, 4.4.16,
surfaces should use stainless steel test panels; those
4.4.19, 4.4.21, 4.4.28, 4.4.29, 4.4.31, 4.4.42, 4.4.45, 4.4.48,
and 4.4.50 of ASTM Standard D543-67.
requiring nonmetallic surfaces should use test panels of
the same material as the container on which the seal is to
3 Còpies may be obtained from Pressure Sensitive Tape
be used. Acceptable test methods are described below:
Council, 1201 Waukegan Road, Glenview, Illinois 60025.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ENERGY
November 1973
ATOMIC
COMMISSION
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.12
GENERAL USE OF LOCKS IN THE PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF
FACILITIES AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS
A. INTRODUCTION
are difficult to pick or manipulate, no lock can claim to
be "manipulation proof." Because of the large variety of
Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing
locks available, it is necessary to subdivide the discussion
of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires each
on locks into the following types: (1) combination, (2)
application for a license to operate a production or
key, (3) electrical, and (4) pushbutton mechanical locks.
utilization facility and paragraph 70.22(b) of 10 CFR
The discussion of each type includes a general section on
Part 70, "Special Nuclear Material," requires certain
advantages and disadvantages, a section on control over
applications for a license to possess or use special nuclear
the locks, and a section on the applicable standards and
material (SNM) to include a physical security plan to
specifications.
demonstrate how the applicant plans to meet the
physical protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 73,
1.
Combination Locks
"Physical Protection of Plants and Materials."
Paragraphs 50.54(p) and 70.32(e) require existing
a.
General. It is desirable that a combination
licensees licensed under Part 50 and certain licensees
lock be designed to afford a choice of a large number of
licensed under Part 70 who have not submitted a
combinations. The number of combinations is
physical security plan to submit such a plan to the
determined by the number of tumbler wheels in the lock
Commission for approval. Section 73.40 of 10 CFR Part
mechanism and the number of graduations on the dial.
73 requires that certain licensees provide physical
High-quality locks usually have 100 divisions on the dial
protection against industrial sabotage and against theft
and three tumbler wheels; such a lock is capable of
of SNM at the fixed sites where licensed activities are
providing a theoretical 10⁶ combinations which in
conducted.
practice reduces to tens of thousands. Some
combination locks are made with four tumbler wheels,
but it is considered that the added number of
Locks are acceptable devices to be used in adhering
combinations possible does not proportionally improve
to the physical protection requirements identified above
the security of the lock and does increase the
to assist in controlling access to areas, facilities, and
inconvenience of dialing the combination.
materials through doors, gates, container lids, and similar
material or personnel access points, and are considered
It is desirable for a combination lock to be
essential components of a physical barrier. This guide
designed SO its combination can be easily changed but at
provides criteria acceptable to the Regulatory Staff for
the same time be tamper resistant. The combination of
the selection and use of commercially available locks in
some locks can be changed by disassembly of the
the protection of facilities and SNM.
tumbler wheel pack and relocation of screws or pins. In
this method the effective number of combinations
possible is restricted. Another method involves taking
B. DISCUSSION
apart the wheel pack and resetting an insert in each
wheel. This method requires substantial skill on the part
Locks are very important components of a physical
of the operator. The most desirable method of changing
barrier. Their effectiveness, however, lies in their use in
a combination is by a special key which requires minimal
conjunction with other security measures such as
training of the operator and provides a maximum
intrusion alarm systems and seals. Although some locks
number of combinations. The special key is inserted in
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8, Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
the back of the lock case to release the wheels from their
Combination locks can be set to a single
present combination while a new combination is
number to simplify the daily chore of opening, but this
imposed by dialing.
is a very poor practice since it reduces the security of the
lock. Frequently four-wheel locks are set to only three
The combination of some locks can be
different numbers for ease of opening. This defeats the
covertly determined by using a radiographic technique.
purpose of the fourth wheel but it is not considered
Resistance to this form of attack is designed into certain
serious since the number of remaining combination
locks by utilizing materials in the mechanism that are
choices is considered adequate. It is not recommended
not easily radiographed, e.g., plastics.
that one select combinations in common sequences and
multiples of ten. It is also not generally recommended
Combination locks are vulnerable to
that the last number of a combination be set close to
compromise if the back of the lock is readily available,
zero because in some cases the lock can jam.
e.g., when the lockable access is open. Removing the
back cover from the lock usually allows the combination
c. Standards and Specifications. A standard for
to be determined. The combinations of some key-change
three- or four-tumbler combination locks issued by
locks can be changed directly when the lock is in the
Underwriters' Laboratories, UL-768, "Combination
open position, while other must have the existing
Locks," covers "combination locks designed for
combination redialed to a different index when the
attachment on doors of safes, chests, vaults, and the like
access is in the open position to permit the combination
to provide a means of locking the boltwork against
change. The former type permits an intruder to make a
unauthorized opening." Quality assurance provisions
quick change of the combination to one of his own
covering the description, examination, and testing of the
choosing; this would permit him to enter following the
product are included through the UL Label Service. A
closing of the lock and would deny entry to the user.
Federal Specification issued for combination padlocks,
For these reasons it is desirable to protect the back of
FF-P-110F, "Padlock, Changeable Combination
the lock by back plates or other devices.
(Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and Surreptitious
Attack),' includes quality assurance provisions for
High-quality combination locks are designed
design, materials, and performance testing.
for use in two basic forms: (1) in a lock case to be
mounted on or into a door as a mortise or rim lock and
2.
Key Locks
(2) as a padlock.
a.
General. As in the case of combination locks,
Protection against forcible attack of a mortise
it is desirable for a key lock to be capable of being set
or rim-mounted lock can be increased if the lock is
for a large number of different keys. A high-quality
provided with hardened steel plates and if the lock is
six-pin lock with 10 key cutting levels per pin
designed with relocking triggers or devices that deadlock
potentially permits 10⁶ different keys to be used.
the bolt or bolt-actuating mechanism.
However, this large number of key cuts is not as useful
as a large number of combinations because less
Combination padlocks are not vulnerable to
time-consuming techniques for defeating key locks are
the usual rapping techniques and are usually resistant to
available. Nevertheless, there is value in specifying at
manipulation. However, common combination padlocks
least 10⁶ key cuts because it requires careful
construction of the lock.
made of a cast aluminum alloy are without great
strength, have little resistance to forcible attack, and are
not weather resistant. There are others that are weather
It is important that the key cut required to
resistant but offer little protection against attack.
open a lock (bitting of a lock) be changeable to permit
changes whenever keys are lost or an employee having
b. Combination Lock Control. The most
access to a key is reassigned to other duties or
important aspect of lock control for combination locks
is the protection of the combination. It is desirable to
change the combination of a lock every time that a
1 Copies may be obtained from the offices and testing
person who knows the combination no longer requires it
stations of Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. located at the
as a result of termination or reassignment of duties. This
following addresses: 207 East Ohio Street, Chicago, III. 60611;
would assure that only those individuals actually
333 Pfingsten Road, Northbrook, Ill. 60062; 1285 Walt
Whitman Road, Melville, L.I., N.Y. 11746; 1655 Scott
required to gain access would know the combination.
Boulevard, Santa Clara, Calif. 95050.
Losing the combination of a manipulation-
2 Copies may be obtained from business service centers of
proof, well-designed lock in a high-rated door is an
the General Services Administration Regional Offices located in
the following cities: Boston, Mass.; New York, N.Y.;
expensive situation. This can be prevented by keeping a
Washington, D.C.; Ft. Worth, Texas; Denver, Colo.; San
record of the combination in another location which is
Francisco, Calif.; Atlanta, Ga.; Chicago, III.; Kansas City, Mo.;
as secure as the place protected by the lock.
Los Angeles, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.
5.12-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
terminated. Changing the bitting of a lock can be
c. Standards and Specifications. A standard for
accomplished usually by changing pins, wafers, or levers.
key locks has been issued by Underwriters' Laboratories,
To ease the task of a bitting change, some locks have
UL-437, "Key Locks," and includes quality assurance
cores that are removable for replacement by means of a
provisions through the UL Label Service. Interim
special key called a "control key." If all the locks in a
Federal Specification FF-P-001480 (GSA-FSS),
given facility are keyed to the same control key, the
"Padlock, Key Operated (Resistant to Opening by
locks are virtually master keyed because, with the core
Force, Pick, and Bypass Techniques)," covers two
removed, the problem of opening the lock is elementary.
types of key-operated dead-bolt padlocks: the exposed
shackle and the shrouded shackle. Quality assurance
Master keying is undesirable from a security
provisions concerning the design, materials, and
point of view because disassembly and inspection of any
qualification testing are included.
lock in the system by a competent person provides
access to all the other locks in the master-keyed system,
3.
Electric Locks
and because termination of an employee who had access
to a master key would require changing the bitting of all
a.
General. In the most popular electric locks, a
locks set for his master key. The changing of the bitting
signal generated by magnetized elements in a plastic card
of a large number of locks can be costly, but the
or by sequential activation of buttons is compared with
convenience of master systems is such that there is
a stored code to activate an electrically operated door
strong pressure for using them. A compromise in this
strike. In some cases the magnetic card and pushbutton
conflict between convenience and security may be to use
systems are used in coincidence. Combined card and
a nonmastered set of locks for protected areas, material
pushbotton systems provide, in general, higher security
access areas, vital areas, and access to vital equipment
than card-only systems.
and to permit master key sets for other less sensitive
areas.
The advantages of the electric lock are
isolation of the part containing the code from the
It is necessary for a lock to have some
exposed part of the lock, versatility of programming,
resistance to picking and impressioning (a method used
and ease of integration into alarm systems.
to prepare a key by the impressions of the bitting of a
lock on a blank key). In general, this resistance can be
Magnetic card systems have some of the
provided by precision machining of the mechanisms or
problems of common key locks because a lost or stolen
by special design features such as side bars, odd-shaped
card can be used by an unauthorized person. However,
pins or a large number of levers.
reproduction of a card is more complicated than
reproduction of a metal key.
Protection of key locks against forcible attack
can be enhanced by the use of hardened steel plates in
Pushbutton systems require memorization of
front of the pins or side bars.
a few digits, usually four, and require more time to
operate than the magnetic card system. Although the
It is essential for a bolt of a lock to be
number of possible combinations usually is smaller than
retained in the locked position by positive means (dead
in the combination lock system, quality electric
bolt). In some locks, the bolt is held in a locked position
pushbutton systems compensate for this by
by a spring only. This permits, in the case of padlocks,
incorporating devices which prevent trial and error
the use of appropriate rapping or shimming techniques
methods of surreptitious attack by activating an alarm
and, in the case of door locks, the opportunity to
after a number of unsuccessful attempts or by
surreptitiously retract the bolt without the use of force.
introducing a delay after each unsuccessful attempt
which prevents operation of the lock for a short period
b. Lock Control. The security of an access
of time.
control system based on key locks depends on complete
denial of keys to unauthorized persons. It is essential to
It is desirable for an electric lock to have the
have a record of each key and the names of individuals
capability for an easy change of combinations. The part
to whom keys have been issued and to check all keys at
of the lock where the combination is set and the housing
periodic intervals.
of the card reader (if the contents of the housing can
reveal the combination) should be protected against
A common weakness in mastered key systems
tampering by tamper switches connected to the alarm
is the lack of accountability of lock cylinders. To correct
system.
this situation, it would be necessary to require a control
system involving the accountability of every mastered
Generally, where electric locks are installed, a
lock cylinder having the bitting in present use either for
mechanical lock is also installed as a bypass. This lock
the master or, in the case of removable cores, the control
should be of a quality as discussed in the part on key
key.
locks in this guide.
5.12-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
b. Lock Control. The security of an electric lock
protected and vital area perimeters, and for access to
system depends on strict control of combinations and
vital equipment in preference to key padlocks.
cards. The magnetic codes in the cards and the
Combination padlocks should be used on closed vehicles
combinations need to be changed whenever an employee
or containers holding SNM that are required to be
having had access to them terminates or is reassigned.
locked. Combination padlocks should be three-position-
Strict accountability of cards is strongly recommended.
dial type changeable-combination padlocks meeting
Federal Specification FF-P-110F, "Padlock, Changeable
c.
Standards and Specifications. There are
Combination (Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and
currently no comprehensive standards or specifications
Surreptitious Attack).
covering electric locks. The reputation of the
manufacturer, the specification for his product, and the
3. Key locks used in lieu of combination padlocks on
experience of users must be carefully considered in their
doors or gates to material access areas. in protected and
selection and use.
vital area perimeters, and for access to vital equipment
should provide a high degree of resistance to opening by
4.
Pushbutton Mechanical Locks
force and tamper techniques and should meet
Underwriters' Laboratories UL-437, "Key Locks."¹
a.
General. This is a type of combination lock
utilizing mechanical-pushbutton-activated linkages that
4. Key padlocks used in lieu of combination padlocks
on doors or gates to material access areas, in protected
connect a gate with an external knob to permit opening
of the lock. In this lock it is difficult to design in
and vital area perimeters, and for access to vital
penalties for punching a wrong combination as is done in
equipment should be of rugged and sturdy construction
electric locks. Therefore, it is important to have a large
and designed for outdoor use if necessary, and should
meet Interim Federal Specification FF-P-001480 (GSA
number of possible combinations.
FSS), "Padlock, Key Operated (Resistant to Opening by
Provisions for easy change of combinations
Force, Pick, and Bypass Techniques).
are desirable. Some locks permit a new combination to
5. Electric locks should be used inside the protected
be dialed in utilizing an Allen wrench when the lock is
area as a means of access control only if a magnetic card
open, a procedure similar to that for some combination
key system is coupled with a pushbutton system and
locks. Others require the replacement of internal parts to
integrated into the alarm system. This lock combination
change the combination.
should have features that resist tampering with the
combination-changing mechanism and that alarm after a
The mechanical locks appear to be fairly
set number of errors in punching the combinations is
resistant to concealed attack; however, more
made.
information is needed on their resistance to forcible
attack.
6. Pushbutton mechanical locks are not recommended
for use at this time because of the lack of comprehensive
b. Lock Control. Similar to other combination
standards and specifications against which the locks can
locks, the combinations need to be changed when
be evaluated.
employees having access to the combination terminate
or are reassigned.
7. Mechanical locks used as panic locks on emergency
exit doors within protected area perimeters should be
c. Quality Assurance. There are currently no
operable only from the inside.
comprehensive standards or specifications for
mechanical pushbutton locks.
8. Combinations, keys and locks should be controlled,
protected and changed in accordance with the following
C. REGULATORY POSITION
requirements:
The following guidelines are acceptable to the
a. Combinations of locks or padlocks on
Regulatory staff for the selection and use of locks in the
repositories containing SNM or used to secure gates or
protection of facilities and SNM:
doors to material access areas, in protected and vital area
perimeters, and for access to vital equipment should be
1. Combination locks installed in solid doors such as
known only to those authorized access to the material or
those in vaults or vault-type rooms in protected areas
to the area. They should be changed when repositories
should be three- or four-position dial-type changeable-
or areas are first placed in use, whenever a person
combination locks meeting the Underwriters'
knowing the combination no longer requires it as a result
Laboratories Standard UL-768, "Combination Locks,"
of reassignment of duties or termination, whenever the
for Group I locks.
combination may have been compromised, or at least
twice every year. A record of the combinations of locks
2. Combination padlocks should be used when
should be kept in a location that is secured by a
practicable on doors or gates to material access areas, in
combination lock.
5.12-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
b. Keys and cards to locks or padlocks on
a mastered system, a complete remastering of the system
containers holding SNM or used to secure gates or doors
should be conducted whenever a core, card, master or
to material access areas and in protected and vital area
control key, or a lock is lost or compromised.
perimeters should be issued only to persons authorized
access to the material or to the area. Keys or cards in use
c.
A record of all locks, cores, keys, and cards
should be checked in at the end of each shift or
should be maintained and kept in a location secured by a
workday, and a log should be maintained showing keys
combination lock. A physical inventory of locks, cores,
and cards, users, in and out times, and other pertinent
keys, and cards should be conducted semiannually when
information. Keys and cards should be recovered from
the locks are used for protection of facilities and
reassigned or terminating personnel. Locks should be
bimonthly when the locks are used for the protection of
immediately changed or cores replaced and an inventory
SNM. Unused locks, cores, keys, and cards should be
conducted whenever a core, key, or card is lost or
stored in a location secured by a combination lock. A
missing; the lock, core, key, or card has been
specific individual at each site should be named and
compromised; or unrecorded keys or cards are found. In
placed in charge of all locks, cores, keys, and cards.
5.12-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ENERGY
ATOMI
COMMISSION
November 1973
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.14
VISUAL SURVEILLANCE OF INDIVIDUALS IN MATERIAL ACCESS AREAS
A. INTRODUCTION
protection and/or probability of recovery of such
material in the following manner:
Title 10 CFR, Part 73, "Physical Protection of
a.
The likelihood of diversion will be reduced. An
Plants and Materials," delineates requirements for the
individual who is aware that his actions are being
physical protection of licensee plants and the special
monitored will tend to be deterred from illegal acts.
nuclear materials used, stored, or processed therein.
b. Diversion can be detected. Information can be
Paragraph (a)(7) of § 73.60,¹ "Physical Protection of
obtained about the identities and activities of individuals
Special Nuclear Material at Fixed Sites," specifically
suspected of diverting or attempting to divert SNM from
requires that the licensee provide and use on a
a specific unit process or location in the material access
continuing basis methods to observe individuals within
area.
the material access areas to assure that special nuclear
c.
The capability of recovering diverted material is
material is not diverted. Visual surveillance techniques
enhanced. When material is discovered to be missing,
(e.g., closed-circuit television, observation galleries, or
reconstruction of the diversion event may be possible
direct visual observation by fellow workers or special
from routine surveillance information.
surveillants), if used to meet this requirement, can be
d. Surveillance can provide a backup to access
aided by proper consideration of surveillance
control. The presence of unauthorized individuals in a
requirements both in the initial phases of plant
material access area or the nonessential presence of
construction and the installation of process equipment
personnel normally authorized access can be observed
and in the continuing development of operating
and documented.
procedures and administrative controls.
2. Scope of Surveillance
This guide describes operational measures and
physical features which the AEC Regulatory staff
As used herein, visual surveillance means the direct
considers to be adequate for the implementation of
or indirect observation of individuals to detect activities
visual surveillance. Such measures are generally not
potentially involving access to special nuclear material
dependent on the nature of the process operations
for diversion.
planned for a particular plant. However, specific physical
features (for example, glove box enclosures) may not be
In some special cases, visual surveillance
applicable to all plants.
(observation) may be replaced by deductive surveillance
to assure that special nuclear material is not diverted.
B. DISCUSSION
For example, if the only special nuclear material allowed
in a particular material access area is of a size, weight, or
1. Objective of Surveillance
form such that unauthorized removal would be readily
detected and this material cannot be clandestinely
Effective surveillance of individuals having access to
subdivided into concealable size, weight, or shape, then
special nuclear material (SNM) can enhance the
visual surveillance of individuals in that material access
area may be unnecessary. Similarly, if the only SNM in
an area is contained in instrumented packages (e.g., a
1
38 F.R. 30537, 11/6/73.
specially designed vault or automated or remotely
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Livrarytection
10. General
ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
controlled process equipment) so that any attempt to
protection of SNM (similar to current safety awareness
surreptitiously remove the SNM (such as by attempted
campaigns which usually combine features of both
bypassing of protective devices or use of manual override
"fellow worker" and "outsider" surveillance) can serve
options) will be indicated at a manned control console
to counteract these disadvantages.
and the individual manning the console will interpret the
indication as a potential theft attempt and annunicator
5. Surveillance Instrumentation
systems will assure his cognizance of such an indication,
then visual surveillance may not be necessary.
The surveillance function can be aided by either
optical (mirrors, periscopes, etc.) or electronic (closed-
Further, different visual surveillance methods may
circuit television) hardware systems. Closed-circuit
be appropriate to specific parts of a particular facility
television cameras offer greater operational freedom
and for specific purposes. While direct observation may
since they can be mounted on a remotely positioned
be required for high-risk areas, closed-circuit television
base and can be equipped with remotely operated pan,
may be suitable for others. Information obtained and
tilt, and zoom controls. In either case, the system can be
analyzed immediately could be used to prevent a
augmented by photography or video tape to provide
diversion while information suited to later analysis could
permanent records for later use. The recording system
be used to identify and apprehend the diverter who may
can also be activated by a command signal from an
have eluded initial detection.
intrusion alarm to automatically provide a record of any
action or irregularity following the indication of
3. Management Support
intrusion.
A well-designed or well-equipped surveillance
6. Physical Characteristics
system will not function satisfactorily without a
company-backed policy for proper utilization of the
Any interference in the capability to monitor the
system. Without proper attention to operating
activities of an individual presents a problem for
procedures, a diversion may be difficult to detect and
effective surveillance. This interference may result from
diverted material much more difficult to recover.
unnecessarily complex operating procedures or from
inherent physical limitations such as inadequate visibility
If a surveillance system is to be effective, a
resulting from poor lighting or the presence of smoke,
sufficient number of surveillants must be available to
steam, or fumes or the presence of partitions, physical
observe processes and individuals during normal
obstructions, or shielding. To reduce the effect of floor
operation, during shift change, when the process is shut
level obstructions, elevated viewing galleries have been
down such as at night or on weekends, and when
used.
conditions are not normal such as during a physical
inventory or during an emergency.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
4. Surveillance Personnel
In addition to the immediate area where SNM is
processed or stored (which must be in a material access
Surveillance personnel may include guards,
area²), all areas accessible from an SNM process or
watchmen, management personnel, remotely located
storage area without a check of individuals and packages
surveillants and/or fellow workers. To be effective, the
for concealed SNM 3 are considered a part of a material
surveillant must be familiar enough with the operation
access area and when occupied must be provided with a
he is witnessing to be capable of detecting activities that
means of observing individuals therein. While visual
are not authorized or are inconsistent with established
surveillance techniques are generally applicable to all
materials protection procedures.
SNM processing or storage activities, proper attention to
SNM storage restrictions (size, weight, form) and
Surveillance, whether by fellow workers or others, is
protective instrumentation can, in lieu of visual
subject to certain inherent problems. The use of pairs of
observation, deductively provide assurance that SNM
workers to observe each other is susceptible to collusion
cannot be diverted from or through the area. This
between the two. While this susceptibility can be
section describes operational measures and physical
reduced by rotating the activity assignments of
features which will aid the use of visual surveillance for
individuals so as not to have set pairs, any surveillance
the protection of special nuclear material.
system that relies heavily on fellow worker surveillance
must recognize the inherent reluctance of most
employees to report a fellow worker. On the other hand,
a surveillance system that relies extensively on
watchmen, uniformed guards, and remote viewing
2
$73.60 (a)(1) of 10 CFR Part 73.
devices can adversely affect employee morale. A
concerted effort by management to instill in its
3 See Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access
employees a sense of mutual responsibility for the
to Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas.
5.14-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
1. Operational Measures
stored process materials, scrap, and trash so as not to
interfere with surveillance of the area.
The following guidelines set forth features and
characteristics of administrative and procedural measures
2. Aids to Effective Surveillance
acceptable to the Regulatory staff for assuring that
satisfactory visual surveillance can be maintained.
Whether direct or indirect visual observation
techniques are used, the following physical features are
a.
Administrative Controls
acceptable to Regulatory staff to assure a capability for
effective visual surveillance. Dimensional guidance is
(1) All facility personnel should be instructed
based on generally accepted industrial practice.
in the objectives of the surveillance system and how it
operates. Individuals whose primary responsibility is
a. Area Characteristics
surveillance (e.g., escorts, watchmen, or guards should be
trained 4 in the use of surveillance aids and should be
(1) An area where SNM is processed or stored
sufficiently familiar with routine plant operations and
should be provided with lighting capable of illuminating
special purpose activities to be able to recognize irregular
equipment and working surfaces with no less than 50
procedures.
ft-candles during normal working hours or when
(2) A surveillance system relying on fellow
otherwise occupied. 6 7
worker surveillance must recognize the reluctance of
(2) Support areas or other "nonprocess or
most employees to inform authorities on the misdeeds
nonstorage" locations within a material access area
of their companions. If utilized, special attention should
should be provided with lighting capable of illuminating
be given to a program aimed at instilling in each
the area with no less than 30 ft-candles during normal
employee a sense of personal jeopardy as a result of a
working hours or when otherwise occupied. 6
7
theft of SNM by a fellow worker.
(3) If obstructions (e.g., room partitions,
(3) Surveillance policies for emergency
screen panels, radiation shielding, and safety barricades)
situations should provide for continued surveillance of
interfere with direct surveillance of process aisles,
personnel evacuating the material access area until they
process equipment, or operators, special vantage points,
have been checked for concealed SNM, for remote
mirrors, or remote viewing devices should be provided.
surveillance of the evacuated area while not
(4) Storage areas for in-process, feed, product,
compromising the surveillance of other areas that may
scrap, and waste materials containing SNM should have
not have been evacuated, and for temporarily assigning
sufficient capacity that material can be stored in
special surveillance activities as may be required. (A
designated locations in a manner that will not interfere
more detailed description of emergency measures is to
with lighting or the field of view of surveillance devices.
be included in another regulatory guide dealing with
If storage is above floor level, the area should be
materials protection under emergency conditions.)
arranged with clearly defined aisles between storage
racks and shelves. Each aisle that provides access to SNM
b. Operating Procedures
should be capable of being monitored by I direct or
indirect visual surveillance. If storage is below floor level
(1) The surveillance system should be tested
(e.g., in trenches or individual pits) the area should be
periodically and the results of those tests documented.
free of partitions, obstructions, or structures above floor
(a) The range and clarity of fields of view,
level that could conceal an individual from view.
including the vulnerability of hardware components to
(5) Containers of SNM in storage should be
interferences from fluorescent lighting or sources of
arranged so that covers and seals are visible from
vibration, heat, or electric fields, should be checked.
adjacent aisles or passageways and from a distance of at
(b) The adherence to required reporting
least 5 feet.
procedures 5 should be verified.
(6) Shipping and receiving areas should be
(2) Equipment, supplies, and byproducts that
arranged with sufficient clear space that movement of an
are used or are produced in the material access area
individual around vehicles in the area can be observed.
should be kept in designated storage locations when not
The dock area adjacent to the cargo portal of a vehicle
in use and should not be allowed to accumulate where
being loaded or unloaded should be kept clear of objects
they can interfere with surveillance.
which could obstruct observation of activities within 20
(3) All aisles and passageways through a
feet of the portal.
material access area should be kept free of temporarily
6 Intrusion alarms are required for such areas when
4
A regulatory guide on the training, equipping, and
unoccupied pursuant to § 73.60(c) of 10 CFR Part 73.
qualifying of guards and watchman is under development.
7 ANSI Standard A11.1-1973, "American National
5 Includes reports to the AEC and the facility security
Standard Practice for Industrial Lighting." Copies may be
organization as necessary pursuant to § § 73.71(b) and 73.50(g),
obtained from the Illuminating Engineering Society, 345 East
respectively, of 10 CFR Part 73.
47th Street, New York, New York 10017.
5.14-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
b. Process Equipment Characteristics
is determinable (verifiable) from a distance of at least 10
feet.
8
(1) Surveillance devices or stations should be
(5) The boundaries of areas dedicated to a
located so that access ports (covered or in use) or bag
particular process or, in the case of parallel process lines,
out stations of enclosed process lines (glove boxes or
to a particular line should be clearly marked (e.g., with
hoods) will not be obscured from view.
colored floor tile, painted lines). Clearly marked aisles
(2) Where possible, material protection devices
not less than 8 feet in width should be located between
on, or associated with, process equipment and including
equipment or equipment enclosures that constitute
auxiliary surveillance equipment itself should be
separate process lines or functions.
equipped with alarms to signal the surveillant of
(6) Piping, ducts, or conveyor systems used to
tampering. Where closed-circuit television with video
move SNM within a process, from one process to
tape recording is used, it should be coupled to the
another process, and to or from storage should be
intrusion alarm system so that an indication of an
distinctly marked (e.g., color coded) to identify the
intrusion will automatically actuate recording
contents.
equipment.
(7) All containers for SNM should be designed
(3) Surveillance devices or stations should be
so as to have characteristic markings and characteristic
located so that heating and ventilating ducts, utility
colors or shapes to identify whether the SNM is buffer
piping, conduit, or other items providing services to
storage, final product, scrap for recycle, scrap for
process equipment or equipment enclosures do not
recovery, or waste. These containers should also be
block observation of work areas.
distinguishable from all other containers in the area.
(4) Process equipment that normally contains
SNM should be so arranged (or designed) that openings
to
and drains used to remove liquids, slurries, and dry
8 See also other regulatory guides dealing with the design of
materials (including samples) from the equipment
process equipment (e.g., Regulatory Guide 5.6, "Design
Considerations for Minimizing Residual Holdup of Special
operate in either a fully open or fully closed mode which
Nuclear Material in Drying and Fluidized Bed Operations").
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5.144
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ENERGY
ATOMIC
COMMISSION
January 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY 5.15
SECURITY SEALS FOR THE PROTECTION AND CONTROL
OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
A property common to all types of seals is
frangibility. A seal is not expected to present a serious
Paragraph 70.51(e) of 10 CFR Part 70, "Special
obstacle to entry or tampering, and for that reason it is
Nuclear Material," requires that certain licensees
usually a rather weak mechanical obstruction which can
authorized to possess at any one time special nuclear
be overcome with small effort. Some seals, such as those
material (SNM) in a quantity exceeding one effective
utilizing sealing wax, are brittle. This property of seals is,
kilogram maintain, among other things, procedures for
in certain cases, intentionally enhanced, as in the case of
tamper-safing containers or vaults containing SNM not in
prestressed glass containers used as seals to define a
process, control of access to devices and records of the
secure volume. Here, the stored energy serves to shatter
date and time of application of each device to a
the glass if excessive force is used. In some metallic seals,
container or vault, unique identification of each such
notches are cut SO that if one attempts to bend back the
item, and other pertinent records of all such items.
essential part of the seal to reclose it, the metal breaks
Paragraph 73.30(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical
from fatigue along the notched part.
Protection of Plants and Materials" requires, among
other things, that SNM be shipped in containers which
Seals are passive devices requiring inspection to
are sealed by tamper-indicating type seals and that,
indicate whether entry or tampering has occurred. An
except under certain conditions, the outermost
unalarmed glass door is a seal in the sense that it is
container or vehicle also be sealed by tamper-indicating
frangible and passive. On the other hand, the wall of a
type seals. Paragraph 73.41(c) requires, among other
vault is a passive barrier but is not frangible and is
things, that each licensee keep records of shipments of
therefore not commonly considered to be a seal.
SNM subject to the requirements of this part, including
seal descriptions and identification and that such
Seals are nonreversible in the sense that once
information be recorded prior to shipment. This guide
broken, they are difficult to reassemble without leaving
identifies features of security seal systems and describes
signs of the reclosing.
types of seals that are generally acceptable to the
Regulatory staff for tamper-safing of SNM.
Seals are identifiable, in that it is possible to add
unique identification characteristics, allowing detection
B. DISCUSSION
of whether the seal is the one originally applied and not
a forgery. This property, however, is sometimes replaced
by limiting the availability either of the seals in the
Security Seals
unapplied state or of some part of the sealing procedure.
Resorting to limitations on availability to replace
A security seal is a passive device used to detect
identification procedures is now recognized to be a poor
tampering or entry. Various types have been developed
practice. This is probably one of the most important
to meet specific requirements. The different types of
evolutionary changes observed in seals. It appears that,
seals retain essentially the same elements but with varied
in early sealing wax seals, the main emphasis was on
emphasis.
protection of the tool used for impressing the hot sealing
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential I ibrary
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
wax. Similarly, for some currently available seals, such as
Sealing systems that depend on a lack of availability
lead seals, emphasis is placed on the difficulty of
of blanks can also fail if it is possible to steal blanks
obtaining replicas of crimping tools and on the inability
from the storage area. Again, this presupposes some
of unauthorized persons to obtain seals from the
weakness in the identification method.
manufacturer. However, in sophisticated modern seals,
the emphasis is on the unique identification
A sealing system can fail if new seals are not
characteristics (fingerprint) of the seal..
properly protected. Assume that an inspector brings a
supply of seals previously fingerprinted at the home
Function of a Sealing System
office. A diverter replaces some of the seals with
forgeries, which the inspector, not having fingerprinting
Seals are devices which are applied at convenient
capability in the field, unsuspectingly installs in the
places to detect tampering and entry. Sealing systems
plant. The diverter breaks the forged seals, gains access
consist of the seals themselves and the sets of
to the protected material, and applies the good seals
procedures, techniques, and devices used in procuring,
previously stolen from the inspector. The inspector later
storing, and fingerprinting the seals; selecting the point
removes the seals and sends them to the home office for
of application; applying, removing, and identifying the
the post-mortem examination that certifies their
seals; and judging whether entry or tampering has
identity.
occurred.
A sealing system can fail in the method of
The objective of utilizing a sealing system is to
fingerprinting if the type and detail of information
provide a level of assurance that no tampering or entry
about the seal taken and recorded at the time of
occurred during the period that the seal was applied. The
application are inadequate to make forgery by a diverter
degree of confidence in a seal system will vary directly
unattractive. In the case of sealing systems using lead
with the effort required to defeat the seal and inversely
seals, the fingerprinting is normally restricted to
with the motivation for defeating it. If the scheme used
markings made at the time of application by means of
by a would-be diverter of the contents requires
the engraved dies of the sealing press. Such a die can be
undetected tampering with the sealed object, the seal
reproduced from an old seal. Another method of
will present an added obstacle for the diverter which will
defeating any fingerprinting system is to substitute false
require him to undertake extra activities. The chance
records of fingerprints in the files of the sealing agency.
that he will make a mistake and be detected is therefore
increased.
The selection of the point of application of the seal
An intangible effect of a sealing system is the
in a sealing system can lead to weakness if the
psychological one of informing would-be diverters that
containment membrane is not tamperproof. For
security measures are being taken, thus deterring acts by
instance, sealing the door of a truck might be useless if
weakly motivated people.
access can be gained by unbolting the door at the hinges.
Limitations of Sealing System
The method of post-mortem examination of the seal
can lead to failure of the system if the examination is
The methods of attack on sealing systems that are
not sufficiently thorough. A complete examination of
potentially the most successful are those exploiting
the removed seal is required if the seal is to serve fully in
weaknesses of parts of the sealing system other than the
the detection of tampering.
seal itself. Although a sealing system would fail at the
seal if the seal could be opened and reclosed without
A sealing system can fail if the ways the seals are
leaving any identifying marks that would indicate
applied make them vulnerable to accidental damage
tampering, this would be difficult even in the case of
since a history of such incidents might be used to
lead seals which are normally considered relatively
conceal a few willful attacks. In particular, some seals
unreliable. Opening and closing the seal without leaving
used on shipping containers can be easily damaged
marks is difficult because of work hardening of the lead.
during normal handling. In some cases plant operators
Seals of a more sophisticated type are virtually
request advance authorization to break some seals in
impossible to open without leaving some indication of
emergency situations when inspectors will not be
tampering.
available to witness the operations. In either case, an
A sealing system that depends on a lack of
inspector could be facing a broken seal, a plausible
availability of blanks to the adversary can fail if the
explanation, and some unsafeguarded material.
supplier of the seals or one of his employees can be
persuaded to produce a set of replicas. This also
Types of Seals Commercially Available
presupposes a weakness in the method of identification
used in the sealing system. In recognition of this
Some types of security seals are being made in large
problem, all manufacturers of seals make the point in
numbers and have found use in industry for
their sales literature that precautions are taken to
tamperproofing such things as utility meters, tanks of
prevent delivery of unauthorized orders of blanks.
bonded liquor, and oil wells. These seals vary widely in
Reproduced at the Richard 5.15-2 Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
reliability, and the simpler ones probably will not find
The steel padlock seal is a one-time padlock seal
an application in safeguarding nuclear materials. A brief
that is destroyed when removed. The most secure design
description of some types of seals follows.
at present appears to be the one requiring a hammer to
drive a hardened steel shackle into a steel block. This
Lead Seal. Various types of lead seals are in
seal is very rugged and may have use in some situations
where accidental damage may be likely and where a lock
common use. Essentially, a lead seal consists of a small
is also needed.
block of lead with holes for the passage of the sealing
wire. The wire is passed through the closure hasp on the
container and then through the holes in the lead, which
The type E seal is a seal in which a fingerprint may
is then compressed SO as to embed the wire.
be artificially created by scratches inscribed on the
inside surfaces of the seal. The scratches are
Self-Locking Padlock Seal (Plastic). This seal uses an
photographed before application of the seal. Later, at
elastic wire which passes through the hasp and is inserted
the container inspection point, the seal is removed and
in a plastic block shaped in such a way that, once the
sent to a laboratory for analysis and comparison with
wire springs into position, the wire cannot be removed
the original photograph. The seal is destroyed in the
without tearing or deforming the plastic.
examination. A disadvantage is the undesirable time
lapse in getting the seal to the laboratory for the
Notched Metal Seal. This seal is a metal strip which
post-mortem examination and in getting the report back
is notched. The strip is passed through the hasp and bent
to the custodian who removed the seal.
at the notch. To remove the seal requires bending the
metal strip at the notch again which results in breakage.
The type E seals when fingerprinted are considered
high-security seals. Defeating the seal by forgery would
Self-Locking Padlock Seal (Steel). This seal is a
require accurate reproduction of internal surface details
sturdy lock-type seal. A U-shaped shackle is passed
to such a degree that differences would not be
through the hasp and is then inserted into a steel block;
distinguishable in a macrophotographic comparison.
expansion rings inside the block fall into grooves in the
Defeating the seal by surreptitious attack would require
shackle ends when the shackle is properly seated.
penetration and repair techniques that would not be
visibly evident under microscopic examination of the
Wire Lock Seal. This seal uses a serrated wire that is
surfaces. The seal could be defeated by cutting and
passed through the hasp and whose ends are inserted
rejoining the wire without leaving marks. However, the
into holes in a metal box with spring teeth locking onto
use of multistrand wire makes unnoticeable rejoining
the serrations of the wire.
difficult. At present, there appears to be no known form
of attack by which the type E seal when fingerprinted
can be defeated.
Boxcar Seal. This type is the typical railroad boxcar
seal employing a metal strap which is passed through the
hasp. Both pads of the strap are locked together inside a
Other seals based on fiber optics and on cast plastics
metal box at the time of closure.
using photographic fingerprints are under development
but not in common use. In general, such systems involve
a field assembly and check of the fingerprint. Further
Type E Seal. This seal consists of two metallic parts
development and evaluation are needed before they can
that, when snapped together, form a closed box about
be recommended.
the knot on the wire passing through the hasp.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
Pressure-Sensitive Seal. This seal has paper or plastic
backing on one surface of which is a layer of adhesive.
1. The three types of security seals identified below
After proper application, this type of seal is difficult to
are generally acceptable to the Regulatory staff for use
remove without an indication that tampering has
in protection and control of SNM:
occurred.
a. Pressure-sensitive seals as described in
Regulatory Guide 5.10, "Selection and Use of
Seals for Use in Safeguarding of SNM
Pressure-Sensitive Seals on Containers for Onsite Storage
of Special Nuclear Materials."
Of the seals commercially available, three are
b. Padlock seals. These seals should be made of
sufficiently reliable for use in safeguarding SNM. These
hardened steel that is capable of resisting cutting by a
seals are (1) the pressure-sensitive seal, (2) the steel
hacksaw. The shackle and the block should each carry a
padlock seal, and (3) the type E seal.
serial number.
c. Type E seals. The brass crown-like clasping
The pressure-sensitive seal recommended for use in
device of this type of seal should be soldered to the brass
onsite storage of SNM is described in Regulatory Guide
top of the cylindrical cup. The bottom of the cylindrical
5.10.
cup should be copper. The interior surfaces of the cup,
5.15-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
top and bottom, should have a unique fingerprint
d. A seal should be resistant to or be protected
applied. The wire passing through the hasp of the
against the effect of the environment or rough treatment
enclosure to be sealed should be a stainless steel aircraft
which would be detrimental to the seal components and
cable. This cable is fabricated of a minimum of nineteen
would destroy any indications of tampering.
strands of wire.
e. Seals should be available to and applied and
2. An acceptable sealing system should include the
removed by only designated individuals responsible to
following considerations:
material control and accounting management. Removed
a. The outer surface of a seal should carry a serial
seals should be disposed of in a manner to prevent reuse.
number and the name or initials of the organization
f. Precise records of each and all seals by serial
using the seal. The lettering and numbering should be
number should be kept and, after application, should
readable and should be engraved, molded, punched, or
include data on the sealed contents. Such records should
otherwise applied in a way that prevents removal or
include dates and times of application and removal of
changing of the numbers without leaving apparent
the seals, the signatures of the individuals responsible to
damage. The seals should be sequentially numbered with
material control and accounting management for the
sufficient alphameric or numeric symbols to prevent
data and for applying and removing the seal, and any
duplication of numbers in use at that facility.
discrepancy that is observed in the sealed contents.
b. A seal should be applied to a container in a
g. Written procedures should be prepared covering
manner that ensures that the contents cannot be
the control, application, documentation, and
removed from the sealed enclosure without destroying
post-mortem examination of seals. If the post-mortem
the seal or breaking into the enclosure. A seal should be
examination is made by a person other than the
applied immediately after the samples and data to
custodian removing the seal, procedures should be
identify and measure the contents have been taken.
established to maintain the chain of custody of the
c. The design and construction of a seal should
removed seal.
ensure that disassembly and reassembly of the seal result
in apparent residual indications of tampering detectable
h. Samples of every batch of seals received from a
by the post-mortem examination techniques
seal supplier should be retained for future reference and
recommended for the seal.
comparison in case of detected tampering.
is
5.154
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
January 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GUIDE
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.20
TRAINING, EQUIPPING, AND QUALIFYING
OF GUARDS AND WATCHMEN
A. INTRODUCTION
Training and qualification of guards and watchmen
are necessary to assure knowledge of the facility
Section 73.50 of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical
licensee's or transport licensee's (transporter) 1 security
Protection of Plants and Materials," requires fuel
plan and to assure a thorough understanding as to
reprocessing licensees and persons licensed to possess
exactly what is and what is not expected of each guard
certain specified quantities of special nuclear material
and watchman. Further, the legal responsibilities and
(SNM), respectively, to provide trained and equipped
limitations involved in the execution of his duties should
guards and watchmen to physically protect their
be made clear to every guard and watchman. Special
facilities and to protect the SNM in their possession
emphasis should be given to the bearing and use of
against theft. Further, § § 73.30 through 73.36 of
firearms.
10 CFR Part 73 require certain shipments of SNM to be
accompanied by guards as escorts. This guide provides
Testing and requalification is needed to ensure the
criteria acceptable to the Regulatory staff for a program
continued performance and reliability of guards and
for training, equipping, and qualifying guards and
watchmen as components of the security system.
watchmen.
The licensee should provide all guards and
B. DISCUSSION
watchmen training with regard to the details of the
security plan they are expected to follow. The specific
Guards and watchmen responsible for the
physical and training requirements of each guard and
protection of SNM onsite and in transit and for the
watchman will depend upon the duties charged to that
protection of the facility against industrial sabotage
guard or watchman.
should, like other components of the physical security
system, meet minimum levels of performance and
The Commission's regulations make the following
reliability. The licensee should assure that those
distinction between guards and watchmen: guards are
responsible for security are capable, and qualified to
armed and uniformed and have protection of SNM
execute the duties prescribed for them. Performance and
against theft and/or the protection of a plant against
reliability of the guard force can be assured by strict
industrial sabotage as their primary duty; watchmen,
adherence to a program of:
1. Preemployment screening,
2. Training and qualification, and
3. Testing and requalification.
1 For the purposes of this guide, a transport licensee, or
transporter, is any person who is licensed pursuant to the
regulations of 10 CFR Part 50 or 70 who imports, exports,
Preemployment screening provides a means to
transports, delivers to a carrier for transport, or takes delivery
determine whether a prospective security employee is
free on board at the point where it is delivered to a carrier,
trustworthy and capable of performing the security tasks
special nuclear material, and who is subject to the requirements
that will be assigned to him.
for the physical protection of special nuclear material in transit
of 10 CFR Part 73.
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential
5. Materials and Plant,Proyection
10. General
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
who may or may not be armed and uniformed, protect
(2) All security personnel should have vision
the plant and the SNM therein in the course of other
correctible to 20/20 (Snellen) in each eye,
duties. For the purpose of this guide, the term
(3) All security personnel should have hearing
watchman will refer to an individual who is never armed,
loss not exceeding 30 dB in both ears, or 35 dB in the
and a third category, patrol watchman, will be
poorer ear, relative to normal hearing,
considered as an arms qualified individual who may be
(4) All security personnel should be mentally
issued arms during an emergency or threat situation and
alert and capable of understanding and performing the
whose primary duty, at least during an emergency or
duties assigned.
threat situation, is the protection of the plant and the
SNM therein.
d. Contract Service
For material shipments, armed escorts and armed
If the licensee chooses to use a contract guard
monitors are considered guards, and unarmed escorts are
service, he should accept only security personnel who
considered patrol watchmen.
have undergone preemployment screening and who meet
the qualifications prescribed above.
C. REGULATORY POSITION
2. Training
A program acceptable to the Regulatory staff for
the preemployment screening, training, testing,
Prior to assignment of security duties, each guard,
equipping, and qualifying of licensee security personnel
watchman, and patrol watchman, whether hired by the
should include the following:
licensee or provided by a contract service, should
successfully complete a training program consisting of
1. Preemployment Screening
the following:
a. Minimum Qualification
a. General training as outlined in Appendix A of
this guide,
Preemployment screening should be designed to
b. Training specific to the facility or transport
assess the suitability of an applicant for consideration as
licensee's security plan for normal, emergency. and
a member of the licensee's security organization. The
threat situations as outlined in Appendix B of this guide.
following are minimum qualifications:
(1) Minimum age of 21.
3. Testing and Requalification
(2) Minimum education high school diploma
or equivalent,
Each guard, watchman, and patrol watchman should
(3) No record of felony convictions,
be tested and requalified according to the following
(4) General good health as determined by a
schedule:
physician prior to employment.
a. Facility or transport security plan: general
duties and responsibilities of security personnel-
b. Employment Application
annually,
b. Facility or transport security plan: specific
An employment application should be used to
duties and responsibilities as assigned-semiannually,
provide a basis for the screening process. The application
c. Communication equipment and security
should contain the following information:
equipment as appropriate-semiannually,
(1) Full name,
d. Arms qualification for guards and patrol
(2) Date and place of birth,
watchmen (Appendix C)-semiannually,
(3) Citizenship,
e. Medical examination-annually. 3
(4) Current residence.
(5) Prior residences (past 5 to 10 years),
4. Equipment
(6) Educational background (institutions,
dates),
The facility licensee, transporter, or contract service
(7) Previous employment history (full adult
should issue uniforms, firearms, communication devices,
life) including supervisors, employment function, reason
and other security equipment as appropriate. Inspections
for termination,
(8) Military service,
(9) Record of criminal convictions.
2 United States Army Regulation AR 40-501, "Standards of
Medical Fitness," offers a guide to the determination of an in-
c. Physical Capabilities
dividual's physical ability to perform the duties of a guard or
patrol watchman.
(1) All security personnel should be capable of
3 Prior to reassignment to duty, a physician should certify
arduous physical exertion and be able to withstand
exposure to unusual or inclement weather,
2
the general good health of any guard, watchman, or patrol
watchman returning for service after a prolonged illness.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIZIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
should be conducted and documented by the security
d. Guards and watchmen on patrol should carry
supervisor of the facility or transporter or by another
radio communication devices. An intercom or other
individual designated by the licensee at least quarterly to
means should be used to provide communication in areas
assure proper care and condition of said equipment.
of the facility where direct radio communication is not
possible.
a. As a general practice, uniforms issued to guards
e. Fixed-site security organizations should be
and uniformed watchmen and patrol watchmen should
provided with at least one dedicated vehicle, such as a
be markedly distinct from those of local law
jeep, equipped with two-way radio communication for
enforcement authorities.
the purpose of quick response to intrusion or to an
b. On-duty guards should be armed with sidearms
alarm. If the patrol area is so large that only patrol by
of not less than caliber .38. Weapons should be kept
vehicle is practical, at least one other dedicated vehicle
loaded at all times while being carried by guards.
should be provided. In addition to radio communication,
c. Weapons such as shotguns, rifles, riot guns, tear
vehicles used for response to intrusion or for armed
gas, and mace should be available and issued to guards
escort of SNM shipments should be equipped with a
and patrol watchmen as necessary. Such weapons should
loaded shotgun or riot gun, extra rounds of ammunition,
be loaded only upon issue, and should remain loaded for
flares, spare batteries for communication devices,
as long as they are carried by the guards or patrol
spotlights, a CO2 or dry powder fire extinguisher, and a
watchmen.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIONED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX A
GENERAL TRAINING PROGRAM
This appendix lists topics and suggested time
sabotage or SNM from theft, either in transit or at a
allotments for a 10-day general training program for
fixed site. until the arrival of assistance from law
guards and watchmen. The program is divided into two
enforcement authorities. The following potential sources
sections: points of law and security skills. The section on
of threats should be considered in the training program:
points of law is not intended to be a course in all aspects
of the law, but rather is intended to introduce the guards
a. Lone individuals familiar with the construction and
and watchmen to, and familiarize them with, some
operation of the facility or the routing of vehicles
essential principles of law of which the guards and
transporting SNM.
watchmen should have a basic understanding in order to
b. A group of several individuals, some of whom may
assist and protect them in the proper performance of
be armed with weapons such as rifles, sidearms, and
their duties. Hence, the topics listed in that section
explosives,
should be covered in sufficient depth to assure that each
c.
A group of unarmed individuals engaged in
guard, watchman, and patrol watchman possesses an
disorderly conduct or mob activities.
understanding of (1) the general limits of legal authority
of a private security guard as provided by State statutes
TOPICS
and the common law, (2) the differences between a
felony and a misdemeanor insofar as that difference
affects his authority, (3) the permissible legal extent of a
The following is a list of topics which should be
search and seizure as affected by his suspicion of a crime
presented, with suggested corresponding time
and by his actual witness of a crime, (4) the evidence
allotments, in the 10-day training program. This list is
generally necessary to prove the commission of a crime
not intended to be all inclusive nor is any
and particularly the importance of the preservation of
recommendation made as to the order of presentation.
"real evidence," and (5) the use of force legally
permissible in self defense or in prevention of a crime
Points of Law
involving property. The section on security skills should
be directed at enabling security personnel to (1) perform
For this part of the training program to be
their security duties in an effective manner, (2)
successful, the legal concepts in this section of the
effectively cooperate with other security personnel
program should be directly related to, and discussed in
(including Federal, State, or local law enforcement
the narrow context of. the duties that guards,
authorities) responding to a request for assistance, and
watchmen, and patrol watchmen are expected to
(3) effectively defend themselves and others, if
perform. It is suggested that approximately three days
(24 hours) of the 10-day program be devoted to
necessary.
discussion of the topics listed below:
The program need not be limited to the topics listed
herein, and other subjects may be included. 4
Role of Law Enforcement
1 hour
Reasonable latitude IS expected to enable the licensee to
develop his training program to best suit his needs. When
A brief history of the development of law
formulating and implementing his training program, the
enforcement, division of legal authority
licensee should consult with and obtain the advice of
(e.g., Federal, State, and local), and law
State and local law enforcement authorities.
enforcement ethics.
Legal Phrases and Definitions
2 hours
SCOPE
The general training program should be adequate to
An explanation of the meanings and legal
help assure that the licensee's guards and watchmen are
significance of the most commonly used
capable of providing protection of the facility against
legal phrases that a guard or watchman is
likely to encounter.
Crimes and Elements
3 hours
4 The licensee is referred to the recommendations contained
Common law and/or statutory elements
in the "Private Police Training Manual" prepared and published
necessary for establishing certain specific
by the Ohio Peace Officer Training Council in conjunction with
crimes (e.g. assault, assault and battery,
the Attorney General of the State of Ohio. The licensee should
evaluate the peculiarities of his own operation and determine
burglary, breaking and entering, larceny,
whether additional topics should be included in his training
receiving stolen property, carrying a
program.
concealed weapon, robbery).
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Laws of Arrest (Criminal Laws)
4 hours
First Aid
8 hours
A discussion of the legal authority to make
Basic first aid techniques in emergency
arrests (without a warrant), probable cause,
situations. American Red Cross Standard
due process, rights of the accused, and
Course should be taught.
other constitutional guarantees. Discussion
should emphasize amount of force
Response to Crimes in Progress
3 hours
permissible when making arrest and
situations where State law justifies use of
Descriptions of the proper action to be
"killing force."
taken upon observing or being notified of a
Rules of Evidence
4 hours
crime in progress.
Brief instruction in the fundamental
Patrol Procedures
4 hours
concepts and rules of evidence, generally
what is admissible and what is inadmissible
A discussion of functional patrol
in court as evidence, and methods of
procedures and methods in private
preserving real evidence.
property patrol, both on foot and by
vehicle.
Search and Seizure
4 hours
An introduction to laws, rules, and
Crowd and Mob Control
4 hours
methods of lawful search and seizure
specifically as they pertain to private
Crowd control problems frequently faced
security guards and watchmen.
by special officers. State and Federal laws
and court rulings as well as police handling
Techniques and Mechanics of Arrest
4 hours
and control.
Basic police techniques and methods used
Firearms Training
16 hours
to make proper arrests and safe searches.
(for guards and patrol watchman)
Examination
2 hours
Firearms training for those who are armed
while on duty should be required in
An examination should be given at the
addition to the basic training course.
completion of this section. A passing grade
Training should include weapons
should be established as one of the
familiarization, weapons safety, and range
requirements for satisfactory fulfillment of
firing of revolvers and shotguns.
the course.
Firemanship
3 hours
Security Skills
A brief training period discussing the
Approximately seven days (56 hours) of the 10-day
methods of fire safety, fire prevention, and
training program should be devoted to the following
fire control.
practiced security skills:
Self Defense
16 hours
Examination
2 hours
(for guards and patrol watchman)
An examination should be given at the
A discussion of defensive weapons and
completion of this section. A passing grade
methods of defending oneself against
should be established as one of the
attack. Up to six hours of physical training
requirements for satisfactory fulfillment of
should be included.
the course.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX B
FACILITY OR CARRIER TRAINING PROGRAM
This appendix lists topics and suggested time
Facility Alarm System
8 hours
allotments for a 5-day (3-day for transporter guards)
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
program of training specific to the duties and
responsibilities of guards, watchmen, and patrol
Discussion of intrusion alarms used at the
watchmen under the facility or carrier security plan.
facility, their operation, location, and
testing procedures. Explanation of the
SCOPE
alarm testing schedules. Field demon-
strations of alarm equipment.
Training with respect to the licensee's security plan
should be adequate to ensure that the licensee's guards
SNM Transport Vehicles
1 hour
and watchmen are fully aware of the duties and
(Transporter escorts)
responsibilities charged to them under normal operating
conditions, emergency conditions, and threat situations.
A description of the vehicles used to
It should be emphasized and clearly understood by every
transport SNM and of the methods of
member of the security organization that under threat
packaging SNM for shipment.
situations the primary responsibility of the licensee's
security organization is to provide protection until the
Communication Equipment
1 hour
arrival of assistance from local law enforement
authorities.
Operation and routine testing of
communications devices used by the
The training program should emphasize that guards
licensee.
and armed patrol watchmen are not to display or
discharge their weapons, but are to keep their weapons
in their holsters and are not to withdraw and discharge
Routine Procedures
8 hours
their weapons except in situations when such conduct
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
would be permitted under the law of the State in which
the facility is located or under the law of the State
A variety of topics should be covered;
through which the vehicle transporting special nuclear
among them are: identification checks;
material is traveling.
badges and badging procedures; detection
equipment used by licensee; vital areas,
At no time should a guard or armed patrol
what they contain, why they are vital:
watchman fire a "warning shot" into the air or ground.
escort procedures within protected area,
Warnings should be given verbally. Above all, it should
personnel and package searching
be stressed to the guards the vital importance to the
procedures; patrol and inspection
public health and safety and to the common defense and
procedures.
security of the United States that the unauthorized
removal of special nuclear material from the facility or
Emergency Procedures
4 hours
vehicle transporting the special nuclear material or the
(Fixed site guards and watchmen)
industrial sabotage to the facility be prevented.
Fire and criticality evacuation procedures,
TOPICS
location of fire equipment, and security
procedures under emergency conditions.
Security Overview
3 hours
(2 hours for transporter escorts)
Emergency Procedures
3 hours
(Transporter escorts)
A discussion of the objectives of security
plan, details of security organization
structure, and command responsibility
Security procedures following a vehicle
accident.
Records and Reports
3 hours
(2 hour for transporter escorts)
Routine Procedures
3 hours
(Transporter escorts)
Detailed description of licensee procedures
for completing status. inspection, tour, and
Discussion of check-in procedures, detour
other appropriate routine and special
policy, and shift-change procedures (long
reports.
hauls).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Threat Situations
3 hours
processed, or transported, and identifying
characteristics of SNM containers.
Types of credible attack and expected
Provisions of the Commission's regulations
response. Procedures for calling for
for the protection of personnel against
assistance: who to call, when, what
exposure, health problems associated with
information is to be given.
exposure, precautions and procedures to
minimize exposure, and proper handling
Use of Firearms
2 hours
procedures for SNM.
Proper use of firearms during threat
Examination
3 hours
situations emphasizing permissible use of
(2 hours for transporter escorts)
force in various situations.
Supervision
Radiological Safety
5 hours
In addition to the above topics, training
Areas where SNM is found at the facility,
should include up to six weeks of
type 'and form of the SNM stored,
on-the-job supervision.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX c
ARMS QUALIFICATION PROGRAM
Guards, and other individuals who may be issued
NATIONAL POLICE COURSE
arms during a threat situation (e.g., patrol watchmen),
should qualify semiannually on one of the following
Firing Stages:
courses:
a. Seven-Yard Course: Twelve shots double action
SHORT COURSE
from the crouch position. Time starts with gun in
Type
No.
Maximum
holster and includes reloading for second six shots.
No.
Range
Fire
Time
Shots Strings
Target
Points
Time allowed: 25 seconds.
25
yd
Slow
5
min
5
2
25 yd (SF)
100
b. Twenty-Five-Yard Course: Six shots kneeling,
double action; six shots standing, double action, left
25 yd Timed 20 sec
5
2
25 yd (TF)
100
hand from behind barricade; six shots standing,
double action, right hand from behind barricade.
25 yd Rapid 10 sec
5
2
Silhouette
100
Time allowed: 90 seconds.
c. Fifty-Yard-Course: Six shots sitting, six shots prone,
six shots left hand police standing from behind
Target Specifications:*
barricade, and six shots right hand from behind
25 yd (SF) 21 in. X 24 in. with No. 7, 8, 9, and 10
barricade single action. Time allowed: 2 minutes
rings black and black area 5.50 in. diameter
and 45 seconds.
(B-16).
d. Twenty-Five-Yard Course: Six shots standing
25 yd (TF)--21 in. X 24 in. with No. 9 and 10 rings
black and black area 5.54 in. diameter (B-8).
without support, single action. No barricade or
other support is used. Time allowed: 12 seconds.
Silhouette B-27
Target Specifications:* B-27 Target
Guards must achieve a minimum point total of 175.
Guards must achieve a minimum percentage score of
70%.
In addition, guards and patrol watchmen should be
* As set forth by the National Rifle Association in its
instructed in the use of mace or tear gas if provided by
Official Rules and Regulations.
the licensee or contract service.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ATOMAL ENERGY COMMISSON
June 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GUIDE
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.27
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL DOORWAY MONITORS
A. INTRODUCTION
2. General Characteristics
Typically, the detectors of a doorway monitor are
Paragraph (b), "Exit Requirement," of § 73.60, "Ad-
NaI(TI) scintillators or solid or liquid organic scintilla-
ditional Requirements for the Physical Protection of
tors. Geiger-Mueller detectors have also been used in this
Special Nuclear Material at Fixed Sites," of 10 CFR Part
application, although the lower intrinsic efficiency of
73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,"
these detectors renders them less suitable than scintilla-
requires that individuals exiting from material access
tion detectors.
areas be searched for concealed special nuclear material
(SNM). This guide describes means acceptable to the
Detectors are arranged such that a detection area is
Regulatory staff for employing SNM doorway monitors
defined by a plane perpendicular to the line of passage
to comply with that requirement.
of individuals through the doorway monitor. Various
arrangements of the detectors are possible; however,
B. DISCUSSION
specific placement of detectors is usually dictated by the
need to eliminate dead spots.
Special nuclear material doorway monitors provide an
efficient, sensitive, and reasonably unobtrusive means of
Some commercially available doorway monitors are
searching individuals exiting from a material access area
equipped with an automatic background updating
for concealed SNM. With proper installation and opera-
system. The automatic background updating system
tion, gram quantities or less of SNM can be detected
periodically monitors and averages the background. A
with a high level of reliability while maintaining a low
doorway monitor equipped with an automatic back-
false alarm rate.
ground updating system is also provided with a treadle
pad or beam-break system to indicate that the sensitive
1. Theory of Operation
area is occupied. When the sensitive area is occupied, the
The doorway monitor is composed of a detector
radiation level detected by the doorway monitor is
unit(s), associated electronics, and alarm logic. The
compared with the mean background. If the level is
detector unit(s) is sensitive to the radiations which
"significantly" greater than the mean background, an
emanate from the SNM and responds to these radiations
alarm condition ensues. Significance is usually deter-
mined by comparing the radiation level when the
(usually gamma rays) by generating current pulses. These
sensitive area is occupied with the mean background plus
pulses are amplified, filtered, and fed to alarm logic
some multiple of the square root of the mean back-
which interprets the number (or rate) of pulses in some
ground*
period of time, for example, one second. The alarm logic
may be either a digital or analog system; in either case, if
the number (or rate) of pulses exceeds a set level, an
*The square root of the mean of a Poisson-distributed quantity
is the unbiased estimate of the standard deviation of that
alarm condition ensues.
quantity.
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Thus the condition for an alarm can be written as
Areas, and Material Access Areas,") in such a manner
that objects cannot be passed over, around, or under the
G>B+nVB,
detection area.
(2) The detector elements should be designed and
where B is the mean background, G is the radiation level
positioned so that detection sensitivity is as uniform as
with the sensitive area occupied, and n is a multiplier,
possible over the detection area; in no case should any
usually an integer between 4 and 10.* The value of n
areas where SNM is not detectible be permitted.
directly affects the false alarm rate, and the combination
(3) Power, sensitivity, and other controls of the
of B and n affect the sensitivity.
doorway monitor should be tamper-safed when unat-
tended.
Although the automatic background updating system
(4) Signal lines connecting alarm relays to the
allows unattended use of the doorway monitor, for
alarm monitor should be supervised.
technical reasons, the system may be less effective in
(5) Some doorway monitors may require an indi-
certain situations. Techniques to prevent this are des-
vidual to occupy the detection area for a specified time,
cribed in the Regulatory Position.
longer than a normal walking pace would provide. If this
is the case, the doorway monitor should be provided
Doorway monitors not equipped with an automatic
with a treadle pad and a "clock" device to assure that
background updating system either must rely on the
the detection area is occupied for the requisite time. An
inherent sensitivity of the instrument and low back-
aural and visual indication should be given if an
ground variation to ensure that concealed SNM will be
individual being searched does not occupy the area
detected or must be attended SO that a measurement of
sufficiently long.
background can be taken immediately prior to use and
b. System Specification
the alarm level set to maintain the desired sensitivity to
(1) Plutonium-239. A doorway monitor used to
concealed SNM. As with the doorway monitor equipped
detect plutonium should be capable of detecting a
with an automatic background updating system, a
minimum of 0.5 gram of plutonium-239 encased in a
doorway monitor not so equipped compares the activity
minimum of 3 mm of brass at a 90% confidence limit.
with the detection area occupied with some set value,
The false alarm rate should be less than 0.1% (Appendix
usually the measurement of background taken just prior
C).
to use. In any case, the expression above can be used as a
(2) Uranium-233. A doorway monitor used to
condition of alarm by replacing B + m/B with the set
detect uranium-233 should be capable of detecting
level.
within 4 hours of purification* a minimum of 1 gram of
uranium-233 containing between 7 and 10 ppm of
Whether or not a doorway monitor is equipped with
uranium-232 encased in a minimum of 3 mm of brass at
an automatic background updating system, high back-
a 90% confidence limit. The false alarm rate should be
ground activity will decrease sensitivity. Measuring activ-
less than 0.1% (Appendix C).
ity for longer periods will somewhat compensate for
(3) Uranium-235. A doorway monitor used to
high background; however, longer measurement periods
detect uranium-235 should be capable of detecting a
will make use of the doorway monitor less convenient.
minimum of 3 grams of uranium-235 contained in
uranium enriched to 20% or more in the uranium-235
C. REGULATORY POSITION
isotope encased in a minimum of 3 mm of brass at a 50%
confidence limit. The false alarm rate should be less than
1. Minimum Qualifications for SNM Doorway Monitors
0.1% (Appendix C).
a. General
(1) SNM Doorway monitors should be used in
2. Use of Doorway Monitors
conjunction with a metal detector and should be
In general, doorway monitors should be used in
installed in a passageway (see Regulatory Guide 5.7,
locations of minimum background and minimum back-
"Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital
ground fluctation. If circumstances dictate use of a
doorway monitor in an area of high background,
*Note that, in general, for a count rate system, the condition for
sufficient shielding should be provided to maintain
alarm should be modified to account for the response time of
the instrument as follows:
necessary sensitivity.
a. Attended Doorway Monitor
(1) If the doorway monitor is attended during
where t is the counting time and T is the time constant of the
use, it need not be equipped with an automatic
instrument. If, as should be the case, t/r > 5 the added factor is
essentially unity.
*Purification means removal of all decay products.
5.27-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
background updating system, although such capability is
(d) Activate the electronics and alarm logic
when an individual is within the detection area and
preferred.
(2) Prior to each use* of a doorway monitor not
initiate operation of the doorway monitor.
equipped with an automatic background updating
(3) An alarm should sound in the central alarm
system, a measurement of background should be taken,
station if, when occupied, the activity in the detection
and the alarm threshold should be set to the proper
area exceeds the internally set threshold level (the mean
value listed in Table I for the measured background and
background plus some multiple times the square root of
the proper n value as determined in Appendix B. Each
the mean background), as such a situation would
individual to be checked should, in turn, enter the
indicate the presence of SNM upon the individual being
detection area and be required to remain sufficiently
checked.
long for the device to operate properly. During use, the
(4) The doorway monitor should be equipped
background should be checked and the alarm threshold
with a high-background alarm which will sound if the
reset at least each 15 minutes.
average background at the location of the doorway
(3) With the individual being checked in the
monitor exceeds the appropriate maximum permissible
detection area, an alarm should sound if the activity in
background level listed in Table II as determined in
the detection area exceeds the alarm threshold T, as such
Appendix C. The doorway monitor should not be used
a situation would indicate the presence of SNM.
during such periods of high background. Other moni-
(4) The doorway monitor should be equipped
tored exits should be used.
with a high-background alarm which will sound if the
measurement of background exceeds the appropriate
3. Testing and Calibration
maximum permissible background level listed in Table II
a. Testing
as determined in Appendix C. The doorway monitor
Doorway monitors should be tested by passing an
should not be used during such periods of high back-
appropriate source of the amount and isotope specified
ground.
in Regulatory Position C.1.b. through the doorway
b. Unattended Doorway Monitor
monitor no less frequently than once per day.* In
(1) If the doorway monitor is unattended, an
addition, a functional performance test should be carried
automatic background update system should be incor-
out at least once per week. An acceptable functional
porated into the doorway monitor electronics and alarm
performance test procedure is discussed in Appendix A
logic. The control circuitry, if possible, should be located
of this guide
at the central alarm station (or other monitoring point).
b. Calibration
(2) Door interlocks and closed-circuit TV in
Doorway monitors should be calibrated with a
combination with beam breaks, motion detectors, and/
source of the amount, configuration, and variety of SNM
or treadle pads, should be employed to:
to be detected (e.g., 0.5 gram Pu in 3 mm of brass).
(a) Indicate to the person manning the central
Calibration should be carried out according to a proce-
alarm station that an individual has entered the secure
dure such as that in Appendix B.
access passageway and/or is approaching the doorway
c. Operating Instructions
Operating instructions should be posted near the
monitor,
(b) Allow observation of the individual ap-
doorway monitor, if attended, or at the monitoring
proaching the doorway monitor,
point if the doorway monitor is unattended. The
(c) Preclude a slow approach to the sensitive
instructions should clearly indicate the procedure for use
area of the doorway monitor, and
of the doorway monitor and the procedure for setting
thresholds, if appropriate. In addition, the operating
*By use is meant an individual or several individuals, each, in
instructions should indicate what corrective action is to
turn, being checked for SNM by the doorway monitor. The
be taken and who is to be notified in the event of a
maximum period between threshold sets while the doorway
malfunction.
monitor is in use is determined by the stability of local
background and may necessarily be more frequent than every
*Doorway monitors used to search for concealed U-233 should
15 minutes.
be tested according to §6 of Appendix A.
CSSI
2211
5.27-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE I
ALARM THRESHOLD
T
B
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
100
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
120
164
175
186
197
208
219
230
140
187
199
211
223
235
246
258
160
211
223
236
249
261
274
286
180
234
247
260
274
287
301
314
200
257
271
285
299
313
327
341
220
279
294
309
324
339
353
368
240
302
317
333
348
364
379
395
260
324
341
357
373
389
405
421
280
347
364
380
397
414
431
447
300
369
387
404
421
439
456
473
320
392
409
427
445
463
481
499
340
414
432
451
469
488
506
524
360
436
455
474
493
512
531
550
380
458
477
497
516
536
555
575
400
480
500
520
540
560
580
600
420
502
522
543
563
584
604
625
440
524
545
566
587
608
629
650
460
546
567
589
610
632
653
674
480
568
590
611
633
655
677
699
500
589
612
634
657
679
701
724
520
611
634
657
680
702
725
748
540
633
656
679
703
726
749
772
560
655
678
702
726
749
773
797
580
676
700
724
749
773
797
821
600
698
722
747
771
796
820
845
620
720
744
769
794
819
844
869
640
741
766
792
817
842
868
893
660
763
788
814
840
866
891
917
680
784
810
836
863
889
915
941
700
806
832
859
885
912
938
965
720
827
854
881
908
935
961
988
740
849
876
903
930
958
985
1012
760
870
898
925
953
981
1008
1036
780
892
920
948
975
1003
1031
1059
800
913
941
970
998
1026
1055
1083
820
935
963
992
1020
1049
1078
1106
840
956
985
1014
1043
1072
1101
1130
860
977
1007
1036
1065
1095
1124
1153
880
999
1028
1058
1088
1117
1147
1177
900
1020
1050
1080
1110
1140
1170
1200
920
1041
1072
1102
1132
1163
1193
1223
940
1063
1093
1124
1155
1185
1216
1247
960
1084
1115
1146
1177
1208
1239
1270
980
1105
1137
1168
1199
1230
1262
1293
5.27-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE I (Cont'd)
ALARM THRESHOLD
T
B
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1000
1126
1158
1190
1221
1253
1285
1316
1200
1339
1373
1408
1442
1477
1512
1546
1400
1550
1587
1624
1662
1699
1737
1774
1600
1760
1800
1840
1880
1920
1960
2000
1800
1970
2012
2055
2097
2139
2182
2224
2000
2179
2224
2268
2313
2358
2402
2447
2200
2388
2435
2481
2528
2575
2622
2669
2400
2596
2645
2694
2743
2792
2841
2890
2600
2804
2855
2906
2957
3008
3059
3110
2800
3012
3065
3117
3170
3223
3276
3329
3000
3219
3274
3329
3383
3438
3493
3548
3200
3426
3483
3539
3596
3653
3709
3766
3400
3633
3692
3750
3808
3866
3925
3983
3600
3840
3900
3960
4020
4080
4140
4200
3800
4047
4108
4170
4232
4293
4355
4416
4000
4253
4316
4379
4443
4506
4569
4632
4200
4459
4524
4589
4654
4718
4783
4848
4400
4665
4732
4798
4864
4931
4997
5063
4600
4871
4939
5007
5075
5143
5210
5278
4800
5077
5146
5216
5285
5354
5424
5493
5000
5283
5354
5424
5495
5566
5636
5707
5200
5488
5561
5633
5705
5777
5849
5921
5400
5694
5767
5841
5914
5988
6061
6135
5600
5899
5974
6049
6124
6199
6273
6348
5800
6105
6181
6257
6333
6409
6485
6562
6000
6310
6387
6465
6542
6620
6697
6775
6200
6515
6594
6672
6751
6830
6909
6987
6400
6720
6800
6880
6960
7040
7120
7200
6600
6925
7006
7087
7169
7250
7331
7412
6800
7130
7212
7295
7377
7460
7542
7625
7000
7335
7418
7502
7586
7669
7753
7837
7200
7539
7624
7709
7794
7879
7964
8049
7400
7744
7830
7916
8002
8088
8174
8260
7600
7949
8036
8123
8210
8297
8385
8472
7800
8153
8242
8330
8418
8507
8595
8683
8000
8358
8447
8537
8626
8716
8805
8894
8200
8562
8653
8743
8834
8924
9015
9106
8400
8767
8858
8950
9042
9133
9225
9317
8600
8971
9064
9156
9249
9342
9435
9527
8800
9175
9269
9363
9457
9550
9644
9738
9000
9379
9474
9569
9664
9759
9854
9949
9200
9584
9680
9775
9871
9967
10063
10159
9400
9788
9885
9982
10079
10176
10273
10370
9600
9992
10090
10188
10286
10384
10482
10580
9800
10196
10295
10394
10493
10592
10691
10790
5.27-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE II
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
a
=
0,
Pα = 50%
B
G
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
100
67
61
55
50
46
42
38
120
83
76
70
64
59
54
50
140
100
92
85
78
72
67
62
160
117
108
100
93
86
80
74
180
134
124
116
107
100
93
87
200
151
141
131
123
114
107
100
220
168
157
147
138
129
121
113
240
186
174
163
153
144
135
127
01
260
203
191
180
169
159
150
141
280
221
208
196
185
174
165
155
300
238
225
213
201
190
179
170
320
256
242
229
217
205
194
184
340
274
259
246
233
221
210
199
360
292
277
263
249
237
225
214
380
310
294
280
266
253
240
229
400
328
312
297
282
269
256
244
420
346
329
314
299
285
272
259
440
364
347
331
316
301
287
274
460
382
365
348
332
317
303
290
480
400
382
365
349
334
319
305
500
418
400
383
366
350
335
321
520
436
418
400
383
367
351
337
540
455
436
417
400
383
367
352
560
473
454
435
417
400
384
368
580
491
471
452
434
417
400
384
25
600
510
489
470
451
433
416
400
620
528
507
488
468
450
433
416
640
546
525
505
486
467
449
432
SI
660
565
543
523
503
484
466
448
680
583
562
541
520
501
EIT
482
464
700
602
580
558
538
518
499
481
720
620
598
576
555
535
516
497
740
639
616
594
573
552
532
513
760
657
634
612
590
569
549
530
780
676
652
629
607
586
566
546
800
695
671
647
625
603
583
563
820
713
689
665
643
621
600
579
840
732
707
683
660
638
617
596
860
750
725
701
678
655
633
613
880
769
744
719
695
673
650
629
900
788
762
737
713
690
667
646
920
806
780
755
731
707
685
663
940
825
799
773
748
725
702
679
960
844
817
791
766
742
719
696
980
863
835
809
784
760
736
713
5.27-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE II (Cont'd)
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
a
=
0,
Pα
-
50%
B
G
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1000
881
854
827
802
777
753
730
1200
1069
1039
1009
981
953
926
900
1400
1258
1225
1193
1161
1131
1101
1073
1600
1448
1412
1377
1343
1310
1278
1247
1800
1638
1600
1563
1527
1491
1457
1423
2000
1829
1789
1749
1710
1673
1636
1600
2200
2020
1978
1936
1895
1855
1816
1778
2400
2212
2167
2124
2081
2039
1998
1958
2600
2404
2357
2312
2267
2223
2180
2138
2800
2596
2548
2500
2453
2407
2363
2318
3000
2789
2738
2689
2640
2593
2546
2500
3200
2982
2929
2878
2828
2778
2730
DOE
2682
3400
3175
3121
3068
3016
2964
2914
2865
3600
3368
3312
3258
3204
3151
3099
3048
3800
3561
3504
3448
3392
3338
3284
3232
4000
3755
3696
3638
3581
3525
3470
3416
4200
3949
3888
3829
3770
3713
3656
3600
4400
4143
4081
4020
3960
3900
3842
3785
4600
4337
4273
4211
4149
4088
4029
3970
4800
4531
4466
4402
4339
4277
4216
4155
5000
4725
4659
4593
4529
4465
4403
4341
5200
4919
4852
4785
4719
4654
4590
4527
5400
5114
5045
4977
4910
4843
4778
4713
5600
5309
5238
5169
5100
5032
4966
4900
5800
5503
5432
5361
5291
5222
5154
5087
6000
5698
5625
5553
5482
5411
5342
5274
6200
5893
5819
5745
5673
5601
5531
5461
6400
6088
6012
5938
5864
5791
5719
5648
6600
6283
6206
6130
6055
5981
5908
5836
6800
6478
6400
6323
6247
6172
6097
6024
7000
6673
6594
6516
6438
6362
6286
6212
7200
6868
6788
6709
6630
6552
6476
6400
7400
7064
6982
6902
6822
6743
6665
OST
6588
7600
7259
7176
7095
7014
6934
6855
6777
7800
7455
7371
7288
7206
7125
7045
6965
8000
7650
7565
7481
7398
7316
7234
7154
8200
7846
7760
7674
7590
7507
7425
7343
8400
8041
7954
7868
7782
7698
7615
7532
8600
8237
8149
8061
7975
7889
7805
7721
8800
8433
8343
8255
8167
8081
7995
7911
9000
8628
8538
8449
8360
8272
8186
8100
9200
8824
8733
8642
8553
8464
8376
8290
9400
9020
8928
8836
8745
8656
8567
8479
9600
9216
9122
9030
8938
8848
8758
8669
9800
9412
9317
9224
9131
9039
8949
8859
5.27-7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE II (Cont'd)
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
a = 1.3, Pα = 90%
B
G
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
100
57
51
46
42
38
34
31
120
72
65
59
54
49
45
41
140
87
80
73
67
62
57
52
160
103
95
87
81
75
69
64
180
119
110
102
95
88
81
76
200
135
126
117
109
101
94
88
DOSS
220
151
141
132
123
115
107
100
240
168
157
147
138
129
121
113
260
185
173
163
153
143
135
127
280
201
189
178
168
158
149
140
300
218
206
194
183
172
163
154
320
235
222
210
198
187
177
167
340
252
239
226
214
202
191
181
360
270
255
242
229
217
206
196
380
287
272
258
245
233
221
210
400
304
289
275
261
248
236
224
420
322
306
291
277
263
251
239
440
339
323
308
293
279
266
254
460
357
340
324
309
295
281
268
480
374
357
341
325
311
297
283
500
392
374
357
342
326
312
298
520
409
391
374
358
342
327
313
540
427
409
391
374
358
343
329
560
445
426
408
391
374
359
344
580
463
443
425
407
391
375
359
600
480
461
442
424
407
390
375
620
498
478
459
441
423
406
390
640
516
496
476
457
439
422
406
660
534
513
493
474
456
438
421
680
552
531
511
491
472
454
437
700
570
549
528
508
489
470
453
OOST
720
588
566
545
525
505
487
469
OOAT
740
606
584
562
542
522
503
485
760
624
602
580
559
539
519
500
780
642
619
597
576
555
535
516
800
660
637
614
593
572
552
532
820
679
655
632
610
589
568
549
840
697
673
649
627
605
585
565
860
715
690
667
644
622
601
581
880
733
708
684
661
639
618
597
900
751
726
702
679
656
634
613
920
770
744
720
696
673
651
630
940
788
762
737
713
690
668
646
960
806
780
755
731
707
684
662
980
824
798
773
748
724
701
679
5.27-8
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TABLE II (Cont'd)
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
a = 1.3,
Pα
=
90%
G
n =
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1000
843
816
790
765
741
718
695
1200
1027
997
968
940
913
887
861
1400
1212
1180
1148
1117
1088
1059
1030
1600
1398
1363
1329
1296
1264
1232
1201
1800
1586
1548
1512
1476
1441
1407
1374
2000
1773
1734
1695
1657
1620
1584
1548
2200
1962
1920
1879
1839
1800
1761
1724
2400
2151
2107
2064
2022
1980
1940
1900
2600
2340
2294
2249
2205
2162
2119
2078
2800
2530
2482
2435
2389
2344
2300
2256
3000
2720
2670
2622
2574
2527
2481
2435
3200
2911
2859
2808
2759
2710
2662
2615
3400
3101
3048
2996
2944
2894
2844
2795
3600
3292
3238
3183
3130
3078
3027
2976
3800
3484
3427
3371
3317
3263
3210
3158
4000
3675
3617
3560
3503
3448
3393
3340
4200
3867
3807
3748
3691
3634
3577
3522
4400
4059
3998
3937
3878
3819
3762
3705
4600
4251
4188
4126
4066
4006
3946
3888
4800
4443
4379
4316
4253
4192
4131
4072
5000
4636
4570
4505
4442
4379
4317
4256
5200
4828
4761
4695
4630
4566
4502
4440
5400
5021
4953
4885
4819
4753
4688
4624
5600
5214
5144
5075
5007
4940
4874
4809
5800
5407
5336
5266
5196
5128
5061
4994
6000
5600
5528
5456
5386
5316
5247
5180
6200
5793
5720
5647
5575
5504
5434
5365
6400
5987
5912
5838
5765
5692
5621
5551
6600
6180
6104
6029
5954
5881
5808
5737
6800
6373
6296
6220
6144
6070
5996
5923
7000
6567
6488
6411
6334
6258
6184
6110
7200
6761
6681
6602
6524
6447
6371
6296
7400
6955
6874
6794
6715
6636
6559
6483
7600
7148
7066
6985
6905
6826
6747
6670
7800
7342
7259
7177
7096
7015
6936
6857
8000
7536
7452
7369
7286
7205
7124
7044
8200
7731
7645
7561
7477
7394
7313
7232
8400
7925
7838
7753
7668
7584
7501
7419
8600
8119
8031
7945
7859
7774
7690
7607
8800
8313
8225
8137
8050
7964
7879
7795
9000
8508
8418
8329
8241
8154
8068
7983
9200
8702
8611
8521
8433
8345
8257
8171
9400
8897
8805
8714
8624
8535
8447
8360
9600
9091
8998
8906
8815
8725
8636
8548
9800
9286
9192
9099
9007
8916
8826
8737
5.27-9
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX A
PROCEDURE FOR TESTING SNM DOORWAY MONITORS
FOR
FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE
01
8
Doorway monitors should be tested by employing a
background taken immediately after the test varies by
test source of the same isotope of SNM the doorway
more than 2VB from the background taken before the
monitor is used to detect as follows:
test, the test should be repeated, for such a difference
indicates nonrandom fluctuations of the background or
1. With the detection area unoccupied, measure and
equipment malfunction. The probability of such an
record background.
occurrence due to the randomness of the background is
less than 8%.
0005
saer
2. Determine alarm threshold T from Table I (see
Appendix B).
5. A calibration source (Appendix B) should be carried
repeatedly to various places within the detection area of
3. Place a test source in the detection area of the
the doorway monitor in simulation of actual use to
doorway monitor. The test source should be such that
verify that the SNM can be detected everywhere within
the activity in the detection area slightly exceeds the T
the detection area and to assure proper operation of
level. * The doorway monitor should go into an alarm
treadle pads, beam-break, or similar devices if the
condition if operating properly.
DEIE
doorway monitor is so equipped.
008E
EASE
TIEE
008E
4. Remove DAEE test source to its original location and
6. Doorway monitors used to search for concealed
measure background once again. If the measurement of
uranium-233 should be tested with each uranium
purification run, but no more frequently than daily. The
*The test source may be improvised by partially shielding the
test source should be freshly purified uranium-233
calibration source.
(within four hours of removal of decay products).
2021
0002
0000
088A
2004
LATA
8884
2000
8831
ESTA
218A
2884
EZEA
1502
00A2
2084
4584
0021
1002
2502
AAIZ
ALSE
2002
ДОСА
1002
8812
0012
aase
2333
TOA2
0082
2180
INSE
area
0882
82A2
8522
0002
0000
2002
2⑈3⑈
4022
2722
гдаг
osrs
2012
oosa
1222
sear
2212
8882
siee
1882
0018
1892
8082
1882
2222
esoa
A018
0810
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0005
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aaor
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ooar
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ГГУГ
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0085
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sees
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5.27-10
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX B
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
Background should be measured over several work-
found from Table II, the sensitivity of the doorway
shifts to determine the setpoints for alarm threshold
monitor will generally be below that specified as
(with or without automatic background updating) to
minimum in Regulatory Position C.1.b of this guide.
assure that normal operation will be minimally affected
by alarms due to high background.
The parameter n is a function of the background
variation and the permissible false alarm rate and is
The doorway monitor should be calibrated with the
calculated from
amount of the appropriate isotope specified in Regula-
tory Positions C.1.b(1), (2), or (3) of this guide (e.g., 0.5
gram plutonium-239 in 3 mm of brass).
n ≥ 3.1
(2)
The calibration procedure described below is essen-
tially a means of determining maximum permissible
Generally, n is taken as an integer. If n satisfies the
background for effective operation of the doorway
above expression, the expected false alarm rate (Appen-
monitor.
dix C) due to background fluctuations should be less
than 0.1%. Larger values of n will decrease the expected
1. Place a calibration source variously about the detec-
false alarm rate; however, the maximum allowable
tion area and take readings to determine the least
background for a given G will also decrease.
sensitive point. This location of minimum sensitivity
should be maintained as the calibration point.
4. For doorway monitors equipped with automatic
background updating systems, the alarm threshold is
2. Measure background over several workshifts to deter-
mine the periods of high background and the range of
Counts >
(3)
background. A minimum of 20 measurements should be
taken. The variance of the background is given by
where fl should be derived from expression (2), and the
instrument set accordingly.
N
Var B (Bᵢ
(1)
5. The high-background alarm should be set at the B
value given in Table II for the measured G and calculated
n values.
where N is the number of measurements, B is the mean
of the background measurements, and Bi is the ith
6. For doorway monitors not equipped with an auto-
background measurement.
matic background update, the value of n determined
above should be employed in the use of the doorway
3. With the calibration source at the calibration point,
monitor according to Regulatory Position C.2.a.
the mean gross counts G should be determined during a
period of high background to establish the upper
*The false alarm rate is estimated by the probability that an
operating range of the doorway monitor. Table II lists
observation of a quantity distributed normally about some
value X will exceed X by n(Std. deviation of X). The factor 3.1
various maximum permissible background levels for a
limits the false alarm rate to 0.1%, while the factor
given value of G for values of the parameters n and α.
(Var B/B) 1/2 compensates for observed deviations in the
During periods when the background exceeds the value
background distribution from Poisson.
5.27-11
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
APPENDIX C
DETECTION CONFIDENCE IMITS, THRESHOLDS,
AND MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE BACKGROUND
With a calibration source at the calibration point, the
The condition for a false alarm* is written as
condition for an alarm is, in general,
b=B+βvVarB>T
(4)
g>T=B+mVVarB
(1)
where b is a single measurement without the source and
ß is a number corresponding to a false alarm probability
Pß. For Pß = 0.1%, ß = 3.1. Hence the necessary
where g is a single measurement of G (the mean
condition for maintaining a false alarm rate below Pß is
radiation level with the source), B is the mean back-
ground, and m is some multiplier. The detection
(5)
confidence limit is the probability that with the calibra-
However, the doorway monitor actually compares b
iton source at the calibration point, any single determin-
with B + nVB, hence the condition on n becomes
ation of G will exceed a threshold T, i.e., the above
inequality will be satisfied. For any given probability Pα,
(6)
there exists a value a such that
or
g>G-aVVarG
(2)
n>ß
(7)
In Table I threshold values of T were determined by
with a probability of Pa, where g is any single measure-
substituting equation (6) into equation (3):
ment of the quantity G. Hence the condition for a
detection confidence limit of Pa is
T=B+nVB
The values of B in Table II were then calculated for
(3)
α = 1.3 and a = 0 from equation (3) assuming that, for
the determination of G, the background should be
reasonably stable and therefore VVarG^VG.
For a given value of G, solving (3) gives the maximum
permissible B at which the doorway monitor will detect
*False alarm means an alarm condition generated by statistical
the source with a confidence Pα. For Pα = 90%, a = 1.3,
fluctuations in the background radiation or by instabilities of
and for Pα = 50%, a = 0.
the electronics which appear as background fluctuations when
the detection area is occupied.
driw bequiupe
8
to
n to
2018
X basoxe Hiw X
ni
5.27-12
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ENERGY
ATOMIC
COMMISSION
June 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.30
MATERIALS PROTECTION CONTINGENCY MEASURES FOR URANIUM
AND PLUTONIUM FUEL MANUFACTURING PLANTS
A. INTRODUCTION
B. DISCUSSION
Sections 73.40, "Physical Protection: General Re-
1. Scope of Materials Protection Contingency Measures
quirements at Fixed Sites," and 73.50, "Requirements
for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities," of 10
The basic philosophy of this guide to the establish-
CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and
ment of design and operational measures for the
Materials," prescribe requirements for the physical pro-
protection of SNM under nonroutine conditions is that,
tection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and the plants
since no system is immune to malfunction, backup
in which they are used or stored. Section 70.22,
measures should be provided to maintain the level of
"Contents of Applications," of 10 CFR Part 70,
protection afforded by each of the normal materials
"Special Nuclear Material," requires, among other
protection systems. Further, since emergencies or non-
things, that each application for a license to possess
routine situations may not follow anticipated patterns,
certain quantities of special nuclear material (SNM)
such backup measures should provide flexibility to
contain a full description of the applicant's program for
accommodate a variety of possible failure modes. For
control of and accounting for SNM which will be in his
example, to provide adequate protection capability in
possession under license and a physical security plan for
the event of power failure, equipment malfunction, or
meeting the physical protection requirements of 10 CFR
guard incapacitation, the contingency measures should
Part 73. Section 70.51, "Material Balance, Inventory,
include, respectively, an alternative source of power,
and Records Requirements," requires, among other
redundant hardware, and additional support personnel.
things, that certain licensees establish, maintain, and
follow written material control and accounting proce-
Protection of the plant against industrial sabotage
dures which are sufficient to enable the licensee to
that could endanger the public health and safety by
account for the SNM in his possession under license.
exposure to radiation is beyond the scope of this guide,
Proposed §70.58, "Fundamental Nuclear Material Con-
although some of the measures identified herein may
trols," would require, if adopted, that each licensee who
provide protection against such acts as well. In addition,
is authorized to possess certain quantities of SNM
emergencies that may pose a threat to plant security or
establish material balance areas or item control areas for
personnel health and safety but not to the protection of
the physical and administrative control of nuclear
SNM are also beyond the scope of this guide. Emer-
material.
gencies that may be caused or utilized by a thief to
conceal the removal (either previous or concomitant) of
Essential to the protection of special nuclear material
SNM, however, are considered.
against theft are proper planning, implementation, and
testing of measures designed to provide protection of
2. Objectives of Emergency Materials Protection Mea-
special nuclear material even under emergency or other
sures
nonroutine conditions. This guide describes measures
acceptable to the Regulatory staff for assuring continued
During emergencies, the effectiveness of normal
protection of special nuclear material in such instances.
security measures for protecting SNM may be reduced.
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Any emergency that requires complete or partial evacua-
equipment malfunction, guard incapacitation, or a
tion of a material access area because of health and
change in equipment and plant structure that leads to a
safety considerations may result in a necessary relaxa-
reduction in the capability to protect SNM can each
tion of exit control requirements. The possibility of
represent a functional loss of part of the required
evacuation procedures deleteriously affecting the protec-
materials protection system.
tion of SNM can be minimized by proper planning and
posting of emergency procedures and by a program of
b. EMERGENCY MEASURES are those provisions
instruction and drills for personnel at the facility.
that are taken to protect SNM in response to a
nonroutine event. In addition, emergency measures
It also is possible that routine accountability mea-
include nonroutine measures taken to prevent the
sures for protecting SNM may be compromised by the
degradation of conditions that could result in a reduc-
sudden and unexpected movement, removal, or altera-
tion or loss of materials protection if not controlled or if
tion of SNM or SNM records. Effective emergency
left untreated. Postemergency measures are taken to
measures that replace or supplement routine materials
protect and account for SNM following events during
protection measures and are implemented in accordance
which its protection may have been compromised.
with established emergency planning procedures can
enhance the protection of materials in the following
c. NATURAL EVENT means a condition that results
manner:
from natural causes such as severe weather conditions,
floods, and earthquakes.
a. The likelihood of theft will be reduced. Measures
taken to limit access to SNM and to provide surveillance
d. NUCLEAR EVENT means a condition resulting
over an area in which an emergency situation exists will
from a nuclear accident such as the sudden release of
tend to deter an individual from engaging in unautho-
radiation (as in a criticality incident).
rized or illegal acts.
e. OPERATIONAL EVENT means a condition re-
b. Theft of special nuclear material can be detected.
sulting from fire, equipment failure, injury to personnel,
Emergency and postemergency measures can control and
release of and contamination from SNM or other
document the movement, removal, or alteration of SNM
radioactive material following a spill or process mal-
and the quantities involved.
function, false alarm, or the functional loss of part of
the materials protection system.
c. The amount of damage to or accidental loss of
SNM may be reduced, thereby further improving the
4. Emergency Materials Protection System
likelihood that a theft will be detected. Emergency
materials protection measures for locating and identify-
An emergency materials protection system, as with
ing an emergency condition, transmitting emergency
any security system, consists of detection, communica-
information to responsible individuals, and taking
tion, and response elements (human or automatic),
actions necessary to protect material can minimize the
which together constitute a workable system. The failure
extent of damage to or accidental loss of SNM.
or any one of these elements to function constitutes a
system failure.
d. The capability for recovering stolen material is
improved. Emergency monitoring and postemergency
Warning of an impending or imminent emergency can
assay and accountability measures can help to recon-
be obtained from (1) detection measures based on
struct the event, thereby aiding recovery of material.
sensors that automatically activate alarms or otherwise
alert individuals that an emergency exists, (2) instru-
e. If potential nonroutine conditions are thoroughly
ments that monitor normally varying conditions, and (3)
considered in the initial planning and established emer-
surveillance of emergency indicators by either remote
gency operating measures are followed, a facility can be
devices or direct observation. Such warning could
operated under certain nonroutine conditions without
include indications of severe weather conditions, pro-
jeopardizing the protection of SNM.
cesses that are out of control with respect to tempera-
ture or pressure, buildup of SNM approaching criticality
3. Definitions
limits, or the release of radioactive materials. Appro-
priate sensors may detect among other things, radiation,
For the purpose of this guide, the following defini-
temperature changes, motion, interruption or alteration
tions are provided:
of an electric current, and electromagnetic changes. An
emergency also may be detected by remote observation
a. NONROUTINE EVENT means any condition that
with the aid of closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitors
alters the approved features of a facility, the equipment,
or by direct observation by an individual at the scene.
or the method of operation such that the requirements
for materials protection are threatened or are not being
When an existing or imminent emergency condition is
met. For example, a power outage, damage to records,
detected, individuals responsible for taking appropriate
5.30-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
actions must be notified. The actions taken by security
bility to protect SNM requires immediate remedial
personnel, plant management, and employees at the time
measures if the materials are to be provided with
of an emergency depend on the alarms and information
continued protection.
that are transmitted to them. Emergency instructions
and actions usually are based on signal transmissions by
Identification of appropriate contingency measures
wire or radio to visible and audible annunciating
can be aided by consideration of the following non-
(warning) devices. Warnings and instructions also may be
routine conditions:
relayed during an emergency by direct voice communica-
tion.
a. Functional loss of SNM isolation measures such as
access control devices for materials processing or storage
The objectives of the response or emergency actions
areas or remotely operated process or storage handling
taken by individuals to deal with an emergency are, in
equipment.
order of priority, (1) to protect the health and safety of
the general public and of individuals at the plant, (2) to
b. Need for access by maintenance, installation, or
assure overall security and protection of materials, (3) to
construction personnel not authorized to have access to
assure that all SNM is accounted for, and (4) to
SNM and not normally permitted to work in a materials
reestablish routine materials protection procedures as
access area.
soon as possible.
c. Reduced capability to inspect or test for com-
In protecting the safety and lives of individuals,
pliance with requirements for processing, storing, trans-
measures taken to evacuate personnel, administer first
ferring, measuring, or protecting SNM. This could be a
aid, and protect personnel from radiation hazards also
result, for example, of process or equipment changes or
can help to protect SNM. The rapid deployment of the
relocation.
guard force and other emergency security personnel can
assure continued materials protection during and follow-
d. Compromise of keys, locks, or combinations to
ing an emergency. Emergency actions by an emergency
locks that are used to secure SNM or SNM account-
supervisor and by trained technical support personnel
ability records.
can assure a rapid assessment of the location, condition,
and amount of SNM affected by the emergency, thereby
e. Functional loss of personnel or package searching
aiding postemergency actions and the resumption of
devices installed at passage points in the physical
routine materials protection procedures.
barriers.
5. Temporary Operation Under Nonroutine Conditions
f. Failure of remote surveillance equipment.
Following a natural, operational, or nuclear event
g. Unavailability of dock facilities normally used for
that results in a temporary loss of part of a materials
isolating shipments and receipts of SNM or for isolating
protection system, it may be desirable to continue
SNM from other materials.
operation (cleanup, production in unaffected areas, etc.)
of the facility on a temporary basis, provided the facility
h. Failure of the intrusion alarm protection system.
or equipment is properly designed to accommodate
emergency measures adequate for the protection of
i. Loss of offsite communication capability at the
material during such periods. Operating in such a
condition also might be desirable during periods of plant
central alarm station.
construction, alteration, or equipment changes.
j. Commingling of SNM assigned to different mate-
Whenever a system functions under conditions for
rial balance areas (MBAs) as a result of loss of
which it was not designed, the possibility of component
identification or undocumented movement of SNM-
malfunction increases. In such cases a system failure can
bearing materials.
be averted by a fail-safe design and by proper action of
individuals.
k. Loss of automatic data processing capability for
control and accounting of SNM:
Nonroutine conditions may occur as a result of
modification of process equipment and plant design,
1. Reduced vault storage capacity that may be caused,
changes in operating or maintenance procedures, or the
for example, by a spill of radioactive material.
temporary loss of portions of the materials protection
system (detection, communication, or response ele-
The materials protection measures that would apply
ment).
to nonroutine operations are emergency substitutes for
normal requirements. Operation under these measures
Some nonroutine operating conditions may not be
are intended to proceed only during a temporary loss of
recognized as emergencies. However, any loss of capa-
routine protection capability.
5.30-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C. REGULATORY POSITION
c. In the event of failure of a sensor or other
instrumentation, parameters that had been monitored by
Backup or special measures and actions that can be
the failed device should be visually monitored by direct
taken to help assure the continued protection of SNM
or remote means unless a redundant sensor is available to
during an emergency or threatened emergency are
monitor the parameter.
described below. For each component of the normal
materials protection system the failure mode that may
2. Communication Measures
result from fire, explosion, criticality, or contamination
(either accidental or deliberate) should be identified. To
The following guidelines constitute emergency mea-
provide protection, the backup measure for each system
sures that are acceptable to the Regulatory staff for
component should be invulnerable to the event that
transmitting warning or alert signals and for communi-
caused the failure of that component.
cating during and after a reported emergency.
Emergency materials protection measures that affect
a. Signals that indicate when and where an emer-
activities in material access areas may, in some, cases,
gency condition exists should be a fail-safe, tamper-
impact on necessary safety measures. If prescribed
resistant design and should include both visible and
emergency materials protection measures (e.g., evacua-
audible annunciating devices. Transmission and annun-
tion to a supervised assembly area or surveillance of
ciator equipment should conform to Interim Federal
rescue vehicles) would place individuals in further
Specification W-A-00450B(GSA-FSS) dated February
jeopardy, health and safety considerations take prece-
16, 1973, entitled "Alarm Systems, Interior, Security,
dence. Further, if prescribed materials protection mea-
Components For.
sures are less stringent than other requirements (as, for
example, health and safety requirements or local build-
b. Tamper-resistant annunciators should be located in
ing codes) the more stringent requirements should apply.
at least two places within a material access area such that
they can be seen and heard by supervisory and operating
1. Detection Aids
personnel whose actions may be needed to protect
material or to avert an imminent emergency that could
The following guidelines constitute measures accept-
compromise the protection of material. Additional
able to the Regulatory staff for detecting actual or
annunciators for all emergency signals should be located
potential conditions that would compromise routine
at the continuously manned central alarm station.
materials protection measures.
C. Onsite one-way communications consisting of a
a. Reports from offsite severe-weather warning or
plant-wide public-address system and portable battery-
meteorological services should be used for predicting
powered megaphones should by available for relaying
adverse weather conditions that could compromise
instructions to evacuating and evacuated personnel.
materials protection. If a natural event that can jeopar-
dize the protection of SNM is predicted, all SNM in
d. At the time of an emergency, telephone usage
process, to the extent practicable, should be placed in
should be restricted to essential messages having to do
containers, sealed and locked in vaults, or located in
with the emergency.
other areas that will provide protection from theft and
from physical damage that could reduce the effective-
e. In addition to systems required for communica-
ness of postemergency procedures. (See also Regulation
tion with local law enforcement authorities, 4 communi-
Position C.5, "Postemergency Materials Accountability
cation by telephone or radio should be available to
Measures.")
notify key off-duty company personnel (to provide
additional security, supervisory, technical support, or
,b. Sensors should be installed to detect conditions of
cleanup personnel, as needed to protect or account for
temperature, pressure, shock, release of radioactive
SNM). A backup communication capability, e.g., desig-
materials, and interruption of vital services and equip-
nation of an offsite duty officer (supplied with company
ment that could precipitate an emergency with a
transportation) who would be contacted by the law
potential effect on the protection of SNM. (Although
enforcement agency, should be available for contacting
written for a different purpose, IEEE Standard
key individuals in the event of a general telephone
279-19712 contains useful guidance for the installation
outage.
of sensors in Section 3, Items 3-6.)
f. Security plans with local law enforcement agency
1 Other regulatory guides that deal with emergency plans to
authorities should provide for periodic "check-in" pro-
protect the health and safety of workers and the general public
cedures and should assure that an inability of the
from accidental radioactivity releases are under development.
2
IEEE Standard 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for
3 Copies may be obtained from the Standardization Division,
Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Copies may be obtained
Federal Supply Service, General Services Administration,
from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.,
Washington, D.C. 20406.
345 East 47th Street, New York, New York 10017.
4 Paragraph 73.50(e)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73.
5 30-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
authorities to communicate with the continuously
State, or Federal agencies. Offsite organizations may
manned central alarm station will be treated by the
include local law enforcement authorities, fire depart-
authorities as a call for assistance. Contacts or liaison
ments, AEC personnel, State health departments, hospi-
with local law enforcement authorities should include
tals, and ambulance and rescue services.
utilization of intelligence-gathering groups for possible
warning or to aid in the recovery of stolen material.
b. Emergency Access Control
(1) Records of persons granted access to material
3. Personnel Control
access areas prior to, during, and after an emergency
should be secured and maintained for later analysis.
The following guidelines constitute emergency mea-
(2) Measures should be taken to protect or pro-
sures that are acceptable to the Regulatory staff for
vide backup for required intrusion detectors 6 SO that all
controlling access to SNM during or following an
exits from and entrances to an evacuated material access
emergency.
area can be closed, locked, and alarmed. If not alarmed,
such areas should be kept under continuous direct or
a. Evacuation
remote visual surveillance.
(1) All personnel should be instructed and drilled
(3) Construction materials should be available on
in the salient features of the emergency materials
site for making emergency repairs to breaks in the
protection plan. Since the plan may be quite complex
physical barriers.
and repetitive, an abstract, memo, manual, or list of
(4) Access to evacuated material access areas
rules should be published and distributed to all em-
should be restricted to authorize security, supervisory,
ployees and visitors. In addition, key instructions for
emergency materials protection, and rescue personnel in
individual areas within the plant should be posted in
accordance with established emergency procedures.
conspicuous locations.
(5) Emergency keys or lock combinations neces-
(2) If consistent with personnel health and safety
sary for emergency personnel should be stored in
considerations, emergency rendezvous areas should be
tamper-resistant, alarmed enclosures and should be
located within the protected area.
changed whenever there is reason to believe such an
(3) Personnel who are evacuated from a facility
enclosure may have been compromised. (Disadvantages
because of an emergency should leave according to
of master keyed locks is discussed in another regulatory
established plans and routes with a minimum of travel
guide.⁷)
through material access areas. Emergency exit routes
from a material access area should avoid passage through
c. Surveillance
other material access areas.
(4) Personnel evacuated from or through a mate-
(1) Emergency lighting from an alternative or
rial access area should be under surveillance wherever
secondary power source should be provided to all
possible as they are being evacuated, should be kept
material access areas to provide illumination sufficient
under surveillance after they are evacuated, and should
for surveillance⁸ during periods when the normal light-
rendezvous at a single predetermined location until
ing system is inoperative. If an area-wide power failure
dismissed or instructed to return to work. Such person-
would disrupt the secondary power supply, battery-
nel should be identified from area access control records
powered floodlights designed to activate automatically if
and accounted for. 5
the normal lighting system fails should be installed
(5) Emergency exits from the protected area
throughout the material access area in a manner that
provides general illumination of not less than 0.2
should be designed to allow continuous visual surveil-
foot-candle. 9 In addition, all security personnel should
lance of evacuating personnel during evacuation.
(6) Areas where individuals assemble following an
be provided with portable battery-powered spotlights.
evacuation should be clear of obstructions that would
All battery-powered lights should be provided with a
signal light to warn of weak batteries.
provide concealment such as buildings, fences, trees, or
shrubbery and should be restricted from public access.
(2) Planning should include, as appropriate, the
(7) All persons and vehicles leaving a protected
use of portable CCTV equipment to survey and to
area or emergency rendezvous area should be assumed to
monitor activites in a material access area following an
bear concealed SNM and should be accompanied by
emergency in which sensors or other monitoring equip-
ment have become inoperative and conditions exist that
supervisory or security personnel until circumstances
allow a search to be conducted.⁵ Personnel requiring
make extended occupancy hazardous.
offsite medical attention should not be exempted.
(8) If an emergency situation cannot be con-
6 Paragraph 73.60(c) of 10 CFR Part 73.
trolled adequately with the available onsite manpower,
7 Regulatory Guide 5.12, "General Use of Locks in the Protec-
additional off-duty company personnel should be called
tion and Control of Facilities and Special Nuclear Material."
in or support should be obtained from offsite local,
8 Regulatory Guide 5.14, "Visual Surveillance of Individuals in
Material Access Areas."
5 See also Regulatory Guide 5.7, "Control of Personnel Access to
9 Local safety codes may require higher levels of illumination to
Protected Areas, Vital Areas, and Material Access Areas."
assure safe evacuation.
5.30-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
(3) Additional security or guard personnel should
ware and tools removed from a material access area
be called in or other qualified plant personnel should be
should be examined for SNM, and all personnel should
designated to support the regular security personnel as
be searched for concealed SNM. 13
needed for performing backup guard functions, surveil-
(4) To provide for temporary handling of both
lance, and materials protection for a material access area
shipments and receipts of SNM in the same dock area,
that is threatened or affected by an emergency.
physical separation should be provided between the
(4) All emergency vehicles (company-owned or
dock platforms and material storage areas at the dock.
owned by an offsite organization) that are brought into
Storage areas should be designed with clear space
a protected area and are used for the transfer of
sufficient to accommodate operations normally done on
equipment or personnel to or from a material access area
the dock e.g., removal of outer packaging, gross measure-
during or following an emergency should be under
ment check, seal verification, etc.
continuous surveillance by supervisory or security per-
(5) Process equipment in which in situ measure-
sonnel while within the protected area. If surveillance
ments or in situ calibration of instruments is normally
has not been continuous, exiting vehicles and any
performed should be designed with provisions for
individuals therein should be accompanied until both
emergency access and working space to utilize alterna-
can be searched for concealed SNM.
tive or duplicate sampling, measuring, and calibrating
equipment or devices.
4. Nonroutine Operation
b. Protection System Component Failure
The following guidelines constitute measures that are
acceptable to the Regulatory staff for assuring continued
Continuous direct visual surveillance by security or
protection of SNM while a plant or process is tempo-
supervisory personnel or other backup measures should
rarily operating under nonroutine conditions which
be provided for all materials security devices, the
could otherwise reduce the protection afforded by
operability or required level of performance of which
routine materials protection measures.
cannot be verified.
(1) Whenever changes in process operations,
a. Necessary Nonroutine Operation
equipment design, or equipment location can reduce
normal inspection and testing capability, special design
While certain nonroutine operations may be desir-
features and operating procedures implemented must be
able (particulary cleanup after a natural or nuclear
consistent with approved license amendments. 14 To aid
emergency), extensive use of emergency measures can-
implementation and approval, duplicate or equivalent
not justify long-term operation in noncompliance with
backup measuring and testing devices may be provided.
AEC rules, regulations, license conditions, or orders. 10
Also, use of calibrated nondestructive assay equipment,
(1) The design of automated or remotely operated
or procedures which call for a partial shutdown for
equipment for processing, transporting, or storing SNM
sampling, special calibration of instruments, or obtaining
should provide for access to equipment, as allowed by
physical measurements, may be substituted for normal
safety considerations, to facilitate removal or draindown
in-line or dynamic inventory measurements. Equipment
of SNM. Manual operations or maintenance to equip-
also may be designed with supplemental viewing and
ment that may permit access to SNM should be
inspection ports or openings that can take the place of
performed within controlled material access areas by
primary access ports blocked owing to changes in
individuals authorized to have access to SNM.
equipment design or location.
(2) Material access areas should be designed with
(2) Provisions for manual searches or backup
sufficient clearance to permit the installation of tempo-
monitoring equipment should be available in the event
rary physical barriers to isolate areas that might require
of temporary malfunction of equipment routinely used
postemergency cleanup or other nonroutine activities by
to search individuals, packages, and vehicles exiting from
personnel who are not authorized access to SNM. If
material access areas. Equipment normally in use at two
deductive surveillance¹ is to be utilized for activities in
different control points may serve as backup for one
such "isolated" areas, the area should be separated from
another, provided either control point can be deacti-
other areas by barriers equivalent to those normally
vated (blocked, locked, and alarmed) when not properly
required for material access areas. 12
equipped.
(3) Where possible, SNM should be removed from
(3) Backup equipment should be available for
process equipment and accounted for before any non-
monitoring all waste streams for SNM. When not in use,
routine activites are undertaken in that area. All hard-
this equipment should be stored in an area physically
separated from primary monitoring equipment.
10 Paragraphs 70.32(c) and 70.32(e) of 10 CFR Part 70.
(4) Backup capability for surveillance of material
processing or storage areas should be provided in the
11
See Regulatory Guide 5.14, "Visual Surveillance of Indivi-
event of failure of an intrusion alarm or remote visual
duals in Material Access Areas."
12
Paragraph 73.2(f) of 10 CFR Part 73. (Standards for Barrier
13 Paragraph 73.60(b) of 10 CFR Part 73.
Construction are the subject of a regulatory guide under
development.)
14 Paragraph 70.32(b) of 10 CFR Part 70.
5.30-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
surveillance system. This backup may be a redundant
remote surveillance until needed for inventory and SNM
intrusion alarm system and/or a capability for con-
accountability.
tinuous on-location visual surveillance by security or
supervisory personnel who can communicate with the
b. Control and Documentation
continuously manned central alarm station.
(1) Emergency exits should be designed so that
(5) Security, supervisory, or authorized operating
they may be used temporarily to replace normal access
personnel such as storage or vault custodians should
or exit control points. Inoperative access points should
provide continuous direct surveillance of any normally
be barricaded or locked and, in either case, they should
locked or secured process or storage area for periods
be alarmed consistently with requirements for material
access areas. 16 Direct visual surveillance should be
when keys are lost or unaccounted for, locks are
damaged, or lock combinations are compromised. This
maintained over any unalarmed, though inoperative or
surveillance should be continued until all affected locks
unused, access points (emergency as well as normal
are replaced or until lock combinations are changed by
access points).
authorized security or management personnel.
(2) Solid, liquid, and gaseous effluents from a
material access area normally must be monitored to
detect and measure SNM that may be released. 17
5. Postemergency Materials Accountability Measures
Retention ponds and tanks should be provided as
necessary to allow monitoring of liquid effluents from
emergency-related activities such as fire fighting and
The following guidelines constitute actions that are
decontamination.
acceptable to the Regulatory staff for assuring continued
(3) The location of all SNM in a facility should be
materials control and accounting following an emer-
determined as soon as possible after an emergency to
gency.
assure continued surveillance and access control of such
material. Temporary material access areas or boundaries
should be established in the event that SNM must be
a. Accounting
moved or barriers removed during or as a result of an
(1) Emergency measures should assure the integ--
rity of material accountability records so that a valid
emergency.
(4) Nondestructive assay equipment should be
postemergency material balance can be made following
available to assist in timely verification of SNM content
conditions in which the identification of SNM items may
of materials that may have been spilled, moved, or
have been lost or obliterated, SNM may have been
altered during an emergency.
relocated to another material balance area (MBA)
(5) If SNM that is not in process cannot be
without adequate transfer records, or equipment that
protected because of temporary loss of normal vault or
may have contained SNM has been removed.
storage capability, emergency measures should be taken
When SNM has been relocated to another area, a
to assure that security and accountability requirements
temporary MBA should be established that encompasses
are met. Temporary storage areas should be designated
both the original area and the new area. This temporary
and should be physically separated from process or other
MBA should be physically identified with suitable
material access areas with a temporary isolation barrier
markings or barriers. All SNM within the temporary
that can be kept under continuous direct surveillance by
MBA should be physically inventoried and new records
security personnel or by an authorized vault custodian.
obtained and reconciled with the preemergency records.
If other areas approved for SNM storage are available,
Measurements should be of sufficient quality that the
material should be relocated to these areas and afforded
uncertainty of the postemergency inventory is no greater
the full protection routinely required of SNM (access
than the uncertainty of the preemergency records. New
control, intrusion alarms, surveillance, etc.). While SNM
separate MBAs with material transfer stations, custo-
dians, and records may be necessary for SNM (or
is being relocated to temporary storage, sealed con-
tainers should not be opened unless there is reason to
equipment containing SNM) that is relocated for post-
suspect that seals have been compromised. Unsealed
emergency cleanup or recovery.
containers of SNM should be identified, sealed, and
(2) If electronic data processing is used for SNM
listed before being relocated. All relocated containers
control and accounting, a master file should be main-
should be locked⁷ (either individually or in a larger
tained which can be updated from a log of transactions
processed subsequent to the last updating of the file. A
container with others) to physically isolate them from
individuals who are authorized to have access to mate-
capability for the manual recording of data normally
entered automatically may also be desirable. 15
rials normally assigned to the temporary storage area.
Similarly, SNM normally assigned to the area should be
(3) As soon as possible after an emergency all
locked or otherwise protected from individuals who are
SNM control records should be accounted for and placed
authorized to have access to the relocated material.
in locked storage or kept under continuous direct or
15
16 Paragraph 73.60(c) of 10 CFR Part 73.
Regulatory guides dealing with material control and account-
ing records are under development.
17 Paragraph 70.22(b)(1) of 10 CFR Part 70.
5.30-7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
When normal vault or other storage capability has been
illicitly transferred to another container to aid later
restored and the material is returned from temporary
removal.
storage, the integrity of each seal should be verified. 18
(7) All measures taken to protect SNM during an
(6) In the event the relocated SNM has not been
emergency, whether in accordance with established
continuously isolated while in temporary storage or if
emergency plans or a departure from such plans, should
there is reason to suspect that a seal has been com-
be documented. This should include, where feasible, a
promised, all suspect and unsealed packages at that
record of instructions given and actions taken and
storage location, whether believed to contain SNM or
should include interviews with individuals who were in
not, should be opened if necessary and the contents
the material access area immediately prior to the
remeasured to verify that no SNM has been stolen or
emergency. These records should be reviewed for post-
accident or postemergency analysis of possible deliberate
18 Regulatory Guide 5.15, "Security Seals for the Protection and
cause and for modifying emergency procedures as
Control of Special Nuclear Material."
appropriate.
30-8
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ATOMONT ENERGY COMMISSION
June 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.31
SPECIALLY DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR
ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
A. INTRODUCTION
ized entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel
within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the
Paragraph 73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical
inherent design of the armored vehicle.
Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road
movements of special nuclear material (SNM)
Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel
in quantities identified in §73.1(b)(2) be protected by
used in armored car service are provided in this guide.
one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least
two armed guards accompaning the shipment in a
1. ARMOR
separate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially
designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability
Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a
to diversion by design features that permit immobiliza-
very small number of manufacturers. The specific design
tion of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to
of the armor supplied by each company is considered
physical penetration of the cargo compartment. If armed
proprietary information. The armor can generally be
guards are used with the specially designed vehicle,
described with respect to its resistance to projectile
immobilization is not required. Paragraph 73.30(d),
penetration. All manufacturers provide armor which will
requires that the qualification of individuals to act as
resist initial penetration by bullets from readily available
guards used pursuant to §73.31(c) be documented. This
small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in
guide describes features acceptable to the Regulatory
such a way as to provide protection to the occupants
staff for a vehicle operated by armed guards to ship
against attack from any external direction.
special nuclear material by road and for the qualification
of the armed guards.
2. CAB-CARGO INTERFACE
The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several
B. DISCUSSION
options. In most cases the separating wall between cab
and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection
There are two approaches that can be taken to satisfy
in case either compartment is compromised. A window
§73.31(c)(2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer.
of bullet-resistant material which allows the crew in one
One method would be the use of a specially designed
compartment to have a clear view of the access doors of
secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist
the other compartment is also provided. Some models
entry for a substantial period of time by unauthorized
have a door that allows passage from the cab to the
personnel using a wide variety of tools and weapons. The
cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other
penetration time would be commensurate with the time
models are equipped with gunports that permit firing
needed for law enforcement agencies to respond to the
from cab to cargo compartment.
scene of an emergency. The vehicle would be designed to
be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion
3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS
attempt.
Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of two or
three individuals divided between the cab and cargo
The other method would be through the use of
compartments. For long-distance trips the crew is often
armored car service. In this case resistance to unauthor-
increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards.
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guidas are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long-
draw outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle
distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain
and expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of
the full protective capacity of the armored service during
the vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided
these trips, it is important that adequate crews for
by the air system offers some resistance to the intro-
continuous manning of both compartments during
duction of gaseous substances. The air intake is under
normal operation be supplied. Considerable flexibility in
occupant control and can be closed. Some vehicles are
achieving this end would be provided if both guards and
normally equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks,
drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either
filters, and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM
function (guard or driver).
would enhance the ability of vehicle crew members to
resist gas attacks.
4. DOOR LOCKS
All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment
9. ANTENNA PROTECTION
locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases
Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with com-
access to the cargo compartment requires positive action
munication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is
by personnel in both compartments when the cargo
equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the
compartment is occupied by a guard.
manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access
areas for the communication system components. In
5. ALARM SYSTEM
some instances, the purchaser may provide the com-
Many of the armored cars presently in service are
munication equipment to the manufacturer who will
equipped with audible alarms and/or flashing lights
install the equipment at the time the vehicle is con-
similar to those used by police and emergency vehicles.
structed. Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in
The awareness of attack that such alarms elicit in the
use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals
general public can facilitate response to attack or
received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted an-
recovery of diverted material.
tenna which could logically become the first target of an
attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would preclude
6. SECURING OF CARGO
the vehicle occupants from either notifying external
Armored cars have no standard provision for tying
agents of the attack or from seeking aid or assistance. To
down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types
provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle
of cargo normally handled by these carriers. For SNM
crew to transmit emergency messages, antenna protec-
cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected,
tion is desirable. Such protection could be provided in
some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be
the form of concealment, multiplicity, or hardening. The
required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel
actual antenna could be concealed or designed to appear
safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense
as some other object while conventionally appearing
would be required to equip existing vehicles with
dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the
tie-down fittings.
vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could
offer a delay sufficient to enable emergency messages to
7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
be transmitted. Hardened, attack-resistant antennas
Each shipment will be configured at origin to be in
could be designed and used to provide a delay time.
compliance with Department of Transportation (DOT)
Combinations of these or other similar methods could
general packaging and safety requirements (DOT regu-
enhance the viability of transmission.
lation 49 CFR 173.393). Additionally, in order to
monitor total radiation absorbed by personnel, some
C. REGULATORY POSITION
type of personnel dosimetry should be considered.
Types of personnel dosimeters are the film badge and
The characteristics listed below are acceptable to the
pocket dosimeter for gamma radiation, and the ther-
Regulatory staff for a road vehicle operated by armed
moluminescent neutron dosimeter (TLD) for neutron
guards in order to comply with AEC regulations pertain-
radiation. The film badge consists of a film packet in a
ing to SNM shipments. Additional Federal, State, and
plastic holder. The film badge or TLD provide an
local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local
accurate indication of exposure to radiation over a long
transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments
period of time. Since the film has to be developed and
and compliance with these requirements is expected.
read on a densitometer, it may take some time to obtain
a radiation reading. The pocket dosimeter, on the other
1. ARMOR
hand provides a quick estimate of radiation received over
The vehicle should provide protection for the
a short period of time, but is not as accurate as the film
driver(s) and guard(s) against projectile impact. The
badge for gamma radiation.
external surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top,
firewall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed
8. GAS PROTECTION
of materials which are resistant to at least the muzzle
Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow-
impact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. The fuel tank(s)
through (front-to-back) air system for heating and
should also be provided with similar protection against
cooling the vehicle interior. Typically, these systems
projectile impact. The fuel tank(s) should be equipped
5.31-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
with a lock-type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to
compartment door lock should require positive action
prevent the insertion of an explosive device into the
by personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the
tank.
cab compartment. The cab compartment doors also
should normally be locked and should require key
2. CAB-CARGO INTERFACE
insertion for operation from the outside.
The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments
should be armored. Additional features to be considered
5. ALARM SYSTEM
in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface
The vehicle should be equipped with an audible
depend on the method selected for the protection of the
and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the
shipment. At least one of the methods listed below
vehicle and which has the same range of detection as
should be used. These methods are similar in that each
that normally required by emergency vehicles. Deac-
provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to
tivation of the alarm system circuitry should require
prevent entry into the cargo compartment without
access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.
leaving the vehicle.
a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed
6. SECURING THE CARGO
in the cargo compartment. In this case, a continuous
The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the
wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be
cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment
considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.
for such securing devices as are required to provide
b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab
restraint against substantial movement of or damage to
should be available so that a guard can go directly from
the cargo in normal operation and during emergency
the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the
stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR
vehicle.
Part 177.
c. Gunports should be available which will permit
firing from the cab into the cargo compartment.
7. RADIATION MEASUREMENTS
Additionally, the gunports should permit firing of the
Personnel involved in the handling of radioactive
weapon at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides
material should be provided with a film badge, a pocket
of the cargo compartment can be prevented.
dosimeter and for plutonium shipments, a ther-
moluminescent neutron dosimeter. These should be
3. GUARDS AND DRIVERS
monitored after each trip.
All personnel of an armored vehicle should be
qualified to perform all normal operational tasks in-
8. GAS PROTECTION
volved with a shipment. Both guards and drivers should
The vehicle compartments should be equipped with
be qualified to perform either function, and interchange
gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the
of function should be allowed if required for the safety
crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a
and security of the cargo and crew.
sufficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message
and, if possible, the arrival of aid.
Compliance with DOT regulation 49 CFR
173.393(j)(4) which deals with radiation levels in oc-
9. ANTENNA PROTECTION
cupied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to
Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be
other applicable State and local requirements. All guards
provided in order to afford sufficient time for the
and drivers should be qualified in accordance with AEC
communication system to transmit an emergency mes-
Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and
sage.
Qualifying of Guards and Watchman," or an equivalent
program.
10. IMMOBILIZATION
Although there is no requirement for immobilization
4. DOOR LOCKS
of vehicles which use armed guards, this is a desirable
The cargo compartment doors should normally be in
feature. The vehicle could have a provision for immobi-
a locked mode and should be secured by a locking
lization upon an authorized command originating from
mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in
within the vehicle. Once commanded, the immobi-
both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if
lization system should resist unauthorized deactivation
the cargo compartment is occupied. If the cargo com-
for as long as feasible. Caution should be taken to assure
partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door
that activation devices which cause immobilization are
lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be
adequately shielded to prevent them from being ener-
further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo
gized from spurious electromagnetic signals.
5.31-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ATOMY ENERGY COMMISSION
June 1974
U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGULATORY GUIDE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY STANDARDS
REGULATORY GUIDE 5.32
COMMUNICATION WITH TRANSPORT VEHICLES
A. INTRODUCTION
channels, which are individual circuits around a par-
ticular carrier frequency, for each system are shown in
Paragraphs 73.31(b) and 73.33(a) of 10 CFR Part 73,
Table I.
"Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," require
that road or rail vehicles transporting special nuclear
material in quantities identified in §73.1(b)(2) be
TABLE I
equipped with a radiotelephone in order that com-
NUMBER OF CHANNELS PER CARRIER
munication between the transport vehicle and a respon-
sible licensee can be maintained. Paragraph 73.70(g) of
(35,43)
(152, 158)
(454, 459)
10 CFR Part 73 requires that certain information with
MHz
MHz
MHz
regard to the shipment be recorded prior to the
shipment. This includes the name of the carriers, major
Bell
10
13ª
12
roads to be used, verification of communication equip-
ment on board the transfer vehicle, names of individuals
RCC
None
7
7
who are to communicate with the transport vehicle, and
other information needed to comply with § §73.30
ᵃ11 in U.S., 2 in Canada
through 73.36 of 10 CFR Part 73. This guide describes
radiotelephone equipment and systems, and procedures
for their use, that are acceptable to the Regulatory staff
The (152, 158) MHz carrier is the most popular
for complying with the Commission's regulations regard-
throughout the country for both Bell and RCC; the
ing radiotelephone communication in connection with
approximate number of cities served by each carrier is
road or rail shipments of special nuclear material.
shown in Table II.
B. DISCUSSION
TABLE II
AVAILABLE SYSTEMS
NUMBER OF CITIES PER CARRIER
There are two radiotelephone systems that have a
sufficient number of transmitter/receiver stations
(35, 43)
(152, 158)
(454,459)
throughout the country to allow the placement of long
MHz
MHz
MHz
distance calls. These are the Bell System Mobile Tele-
phone system and the Radio Common Carrier system
Bell
70
1260
54ª
(RCC). The Bell system uses three different carrier
frequencies [(35, 43), (152, 158), and (454, 459) MHz],
RCC
211ᵇ
625
137
and the RCC uses two different carriers [(152, 158) and
(454, 459) MHz]. The vehicle receives long distance
ᵃIn five of these - Chicago, St. Louis, Dallas,
calls on the lower carrier frequency in each group, i.e.,
Ft. Worth, and Houston - only local sub-
35, 152, and 454 MHz, and transmits on the higher
scribers are served.
frequencies, i.e., 43, 158, and 459 MHz. The available
b Paging service.
USAEC REGULATORY GUIDES
Copies of published guides may be obtained by request indicating the divisions
desired to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
Regulatory Guides are issued to describe and make available to the public
Attention: Director of Regulatory Standards. Comments and suggestions for
methods acceptable to the AEC Regulatory staff of implementing specific parts of
improvements in these guides are encouraged and should be sent to the Secretary
the Commission's regulations, to delineate techniques used by the staff in
of the Commission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. 20545,
evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to
Attention: Chief, Public Proceedings Staff.
applicants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance
with them is not required. Methods and solutions different from those set out in
The guides are issued in the following ten broad divisions:
the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to
the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
1. Power Reactors
6. Products
2. Research and Test Reactors
7. Transportation
3. Fuels and Materials Facilities
8. Occupational Health
Published guides will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate
4. Environmental and Siting
9. Antitrust Review
5. Materials and Plant Protection
10. General
comments and to reflect new information or experience.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
METHODS OF OBTAINING SERVICE
radiotelephone will now automatically select available
There are two ways to obtain radiotelephone service.
channels in that area. Another type of radiotelephone
One is to rent the mobile equipment from the Bell
operates on the (454, 459) MHz carrier and can
System or the Radio Common Carrier (rental will
automatically select channels in a local area only; it does
include telephone service and repairs), and the other is
not have a feature which permits selection of other
to buy the mobile equipment directly from manufac-
channels, but could operate in another area on an IMTS
turers and then rent telephone service from either of
mode if the channels were the same as in the Home area.
these systems. Application for equipment rental or
telephone service could be made to a local Bell or RCC
Other variations in the available equipment are
system company where a licensee or carrier would have
nondialable phones (used only for manual service) and
most need of the service.
simplex or duplex operation. Simplex operation means
that the telephone cannot transmit and receive informa-
If purchased equipment is to be operated on the Bell
tion simultaneously. That is, while a person talks, he will
System, a license will be required from the Federal
not be able to hear a response from the other party. To
Communications Commission (FCC). Purchased equip-
hear the other party, he must stop talking and release a
ment operating on the RCC system may not require an
button on the telephone. Duplex operation allows the
FCC license. Maintenance of the equipment is provided
transmission and receipt of information simultaneously
when it is leased from the Bell or RCC systems.
as in normal telephone service.
Purchased equipment must be serviced by licensed
operators, as required by FCC regulation 47 CFR
21.207(e), "Transmitter Measurements".
PREPLANNING
Radiotelephone call-in times can be preplanned in
There are several categories which define the priority
advance of the shipment by using a booklet issued by
for obtaining service. These are described in FCC
the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. entitled
regulation 47 CFR 21.512, "Priorities for service to
"National Mobile Telephone Service Area Listing" or a
subscribers."
booklet issued by the Radio Common Carrier entitled
"Nationwide Service Directory" in conjunction with the
SYSTEM ASPECTS
route maps to be used with the shipment. The area
There are several types of service and equipment that
covered by each base station can be put on the route
can be obtained. The service available is dependent on
maps, and radiotelephone call-in times not to exceed 2
the area. The equipment that can be ordered depends on
hours determined. When a radiotelephone call cannot be
whether local or nationwide service is desired. In general,
planned to occur within a 2-hour period, conventional
the types of service available are:
telephone call-in location and time should be deter-
mined. This can initially be determined by locating
1. Manual service with access to an operator.
cities, towns, or populated commercial areas along the
route. The conventional call can be preplanned to occur
2. Two-way dial with automatic channel selection and
at an approximate time (planned not to exceed 2 hours)
access to an operator (also known as Improved Mobile
from one of these areas. As experience is gained with
Telephone Service, IMTS).
particular routes, conventional telephone calls can be
planned with greater precision. The drivers can note
3. Two-way dial service with access to an operator.
specific telephones or areas where telephones are avail-
able along the route for future conventional telephone
4. Two-way dial service without access to an operator.
call-in planning.
The most inclusive service afforded is that of two-way
dial with automatic channel selection and access to an
COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
operator (IMTS). This service is available on the (152,
A radiotelephone conversation can be overheard by
158) MHz and (454, 459) MHz carriers only. There are
anyone having a radiotelephone set with the same carrier
at least two varieties of radiotelephone equipment that
frequency and channels. It is therefore necessary to
can be applied to this service. In one type of radio-
disguise the position of the shipment and routes to
telephone operating on the (152, 158) MHz carrier, all
be taken. One method for accomplishing this is the use
eleven channels in the United States are available
of a transparent nonfoldable grid overlay on a standard
through the selection of pushbuttons on the telephone.
road atlas. This grid can consist of one-half-inch squares
Additionally, three other pushbuttons, Home, Roam,
with the horizontal axis labeled with letters and the
and Manual, are available. When a vehicle is in the Home
vertical axis labeled with numbers. A typical overlay is
area the Home pushbutton is depressed and the Home
shown in Figure 1 and is about 10.5 inches by 14 inches
area channels will be selected automatically. When a
in overall dimensions. The road atlas chosen should have
vehicle is outside the Home area the channels for the
a scale of one inch equals 3 miles or less. The resolution
particular area must be selected by depressing the
of a one-half-inch square on the overlay would then be
channel pushbuttons, as well as the Roam button. The
about 1.5 miles.
5.32-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
A
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU
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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U
Figure 1. Overlay with 1/2-inch grid (not to scale) :ale)
5.32-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
With a scale of one inch equals 3 miles, it may be
C. REGULATORY POSITION
necessary to use several road maps to cover a shipment.
A typical procedure that could be followed under these
1. SYSTEMS ASPECTS
conditions is as follows:
The system that provides the most radiotelephone
coverage along the route of the shipment should be
1. Each map is assigned a number.
selected. After a system has been selected (i.e., Bell or
RCC) the radiotelephone selected should have all avail-
2. In order to position the grid with respect to the map,
able channels for the carrier chosen. Further, the
reference points are selected on the map. The grid is
telephone shall be dialable and should provide for
placed over the map, and distinct intersections or other
duplex operation.
identifiable landmarks are selected and given grid coor-
dinates. These should be placed directly on the map as
2. PREPLANNING
shown in Figure 2 with a relatively fine black marker
The licensee should preplan the shipment route if he
type pen.
is going to make the shipment; otherwise, he should
obtain a preplanned route from the carrier. Routes
3. The driver could use the following procedure to
should be preplanned to use as much radiotelephone
telephone his position:
coverage as possible. The requirement that transit times
a. Select the map which includes his position.
be minimized (paragraph 73.30(b)) should be observed;
b. Locate his position between two reference points
however, making radiotelephone calls is the more desir-
on the map and place the appropriate coordinates over
able feature, and transit times could be somewhat
the reference points. Telephone the position as map
increased to accommodate good radiotelephone cover-
number, reference points, and actual coordinates.
age. Since all radiotelephone stations may not accept
calls from a number which is not in the local directory,
4. Duplicate sets of maps should be made by the
calls to each radiotelephone area selected should be
licensee or his agent prior to the shipment; copies should
made to assure that the operators will accept outside
be given only to the drivers and escorts (when they are
calls. Where radiotelephone coverage is not available
used) and the individuals responsible for maintaining
without extensive rerouting, conventional telephone
telephone communication with the shipment.
calls should be preplanned every two hours when
available along the route.
Another method that can be used to disguise the
position of the shipment is known as the "check point"
The licensee(s) or agent(s) responsible for communi-
system. This approach, applicable to preplanned routes,
cations liaison with the shipment should be predesig-
uses landmarks as check points. The landmarks are
nated before a shipment is made. A continuously
typically all towns, cities, villages, state lines, and major
manned telephone with an unlisted number should be
highway intersections along the preplanned route. The
provided at the licensee's or agent's facility. This
landmarks are identified by a symbol (number or
telephone should not be used for any other calls while a
alphabetical character) on a single strip map carried
shipment is in progress.
along with the shipment. The driver, in reporting his
position, relates only the symbol applicable to his
Appropriate local law enforcement authorities
position, or "x" number of miles from a landmark.
(LLEA) such as the Head of the State Police, the State
Mileages between landmarks and those locations where
Safety Director, or the local State police barracks,
commercial telephones are available on the strip maps
should be contacted in advance of a shipment to assure
may also be included. Personnel controlling the ship-
that recovery procedures will be followed and that
ment should have a corresponding strip map and plot the
adequate response forces will be available along the
progress and locations of the shipment.
route. Once initial contact has been made it is not
necessary to reestablish contact for subsequent ship-
A third method of disguising the movement of a
ments through the same jurisdiction except that pro-
shipment is through the use of a telephone voice
cedures should be reaffirmed at least annually. The
scrambler. This device, when placed in front of a
telephone number of the LLEA along the preplanned
telephone, will "scramble" the message over the com-
route of the shipment who will be called in case of an
munication link and will produce unintelligible sounds
emergency or failure of the transport vehicle to call in
at the other end of the circuit unless a companion device
should be given to the vehicle crew and the person(s)
which is matched to the sending device is also available
responsible for maintaining communications with the
in front of the telephone at the other end. Telephone
vehicle crew.
voice scramblers are therefore available in coded pairs
and can be made available in matched sets of more than
3. COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
two units to handle conference calls or calls from a
The check point or voice scrambler is preferred to the
vehicle to different locations.
grid method for concealing the position of a vehicle. The
5.32-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
esti Has E al
YORK FARM
LECHLIDERS
OR
DRUMEL
PAINT BRANCH
FARMS
SPEN
SHERWOOD
HERMITAGE
HADIAN SPRING
FOREST
CAPLET
PARK
COUNTRY CLUB
BOLESVILLE
101
183
PRINSBROOM
MEADOWOOD
D
SPRINGBROOK
INGBROOK
-
MANDOLPH
ARRMS
QUAINT
PARK
TON
LUXMANOR
WHITE
COUNTRY
BURNT
MILLS
U-11
ALIBA
SCHOOL
GOLF COURSE
PIKE
ALLANABLE
THROWEN
HOMEWOOD
NORTH
SDA
CHEVN
23
24%
18
FORES
20
SONOM
NAVAL
MEDICAL
CENTER
BRIHEALTH
BUROOD
390)
THINES
CHASE
SIEVER SPRING
COLUMBI
CAPTHESOA
95
PARK
19
C-26
HEVY CHANE
29
MPSHIRE
CHEMY
1
WASHINGTON
%
14
x
0
2
3 MILES
5000
3000
1000 0
5000
10000
15000 FEET
Figure 2. Typical roadmap with grid reference points
5.32-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
grid may offer some operational problem in a moving
In cases where a radiotelephone call has been planned
vehicle. All three methods, however, are considered
and cannot be made because of overcrowded channels,
acceptable for concealing the position of a vehicle. When
atmospheric interference, or other reason, the vehicle
a scrambler is used, some method of obtaining an
personnel should continue attempts to complete the
accuracy equivalent to that of the grid or check point
radiotelephone call and should also plan to make a
system should be developed. Maps containing the routes
conventional telephone call as soon as possible. The
to be used as part of the grid or check point systems
licensee monitoring call-in's should contact the LLEA
should be assembled and distributed to the vehicle crew
where the vehicle last reported, the LLEA where the
and to individuals who will be responsible for main-
vehicle is supposed to be, and all intermediate LLEA's
taining communication with the shipment.
within 30 minutes after the scheduled call-in time if
communications with the vehicle have not been estab-
The vehicle crew should update their position at least
lished. The AEC regional office of the licensee monitor-
every fifteen minutes so they could communicate their
ing communications and the AEC regional office for the
location in case of emergency. Porcedures for obtaining
region in which the vehicle was last reported should also
telephone channels when all are busy and an emergency
be notified.
exists should be understood and practiced by the vehicle
crew.
5.32-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Form AEC-8
(1-67)
AECM 0240
INCOMING AND SIGNATURE TAB
C
Use this side of the sheet to precede the incoming material
when assembling correspondence.
(USE REVERSE SIDE FOR SIGNATURE TAB)
16-75922-4 GPO
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Produced
by a panel of experts
working under IAEA sponsorship
in Vienna 6-10 March 1972
Printed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, June 1972
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION
1
OBJECTIVES
2
II.
III.
RESPONSIBILITY
3
IV.
COMMON FEATURES OF SYSTEMS FOR
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
IN USE, STORAGE AND TRANSIT
4
1. Promulgation of Regulations
2. Implementation
3. Information System
4. Initiation of Recovery System
5. Delegation of Authority
V.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN USE AND STORAGE
6
1. Protected Area
2. Movements of Nuclear Material
3. Access
4. Control of Nuclear Material
5. Process Sub-Stores
VI. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN USE AND STORAGE
7
1. General Statement
2. Essential Features for Groups I and II Material
3. Additional Essential Features for Group I Material
4. Additional Essential Features for Group II Material
5. Optional Features for Groups I and II Material
VII. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
11
1. Hazards
2. Division of Measures
3. Measures prior to Shipment of Groups I and II Material
3.1. Advance Notification to Receiver
3.2. Advance Notification to Other Bodies
3.3. Advance Authorization
3.4. Marking and Coding
3.5. Selection of Transportation and Routing
4. Measures in Actual Transit
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
VIII. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
14
1. Different Needs in Each State
2. Aims
3. Methods
I. INTRODUCTION
4.
Communication and Emergency Action
5. Routing
6. Essential Requirements
7. Additional Considerations
1. National safeguards systems have as one of their aims the prevention of
diversion of nuclear material. The physical protection of nuclear material
8. Necessity for Advance Agreements
is an essential supplement to the State's national system of accounting for
Annex I - Grouping of Nuclear Material for Physical Protection
18
and control of nuclear material (hereinafter referred to as the "national
system of nuclear materials control").
Annex II - Definitions
20
Annex III - List of Participants, Observers and
2. The recommendations for physical protection given in this report have
Agency Staff Members
21
been developed by a panel of experts working under Agency sponsorship.
Whilst they are not binding upon States they represent the conclusions of the
experts for an optimized system and they are recommended for use by States
as required in their physical protection systems.
1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
II.
OBJECTIVES
III. RESPONSIBILITY
1.
The objectives of the States' physical protection system should be:
1. The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance
of a physical protection system within a State shall rest entirely with that
(a) To establish conditions which will minimize the possibilities for
State.
clandestine or overt theft of nuclear material. It should assure the
physical protection of nuclear material during storage, use and transit;
2. A State may delegate the administration of physical protection measures
either to a national body, or to duly authorized persons.
(b) To provide for rapid and comprehensive measures by the State to locate
and recover nuclear material whether it is stolen, lost, misrouted, late
3. The State's physical protection system should be promulgated in co-
in arrival, etc.
ordination with the national system of nuclear materials control.
2. The objectives of the Agency are:
4. In the case of international transfer the responsibility for physical
(a) To provide a set of recommendations on requirements for the physical
protection measures shall be the subject of agreement between the States
protection of nuclear material in storage, use and transit. The recom-
concerned.
mendations are for consideration by the competent authorities in the
5. The Agency has no responsibility either for the provision of a physical
States for use in conjunction with their national systems of nuclear
materials control. Such recommendations could provide guidance but
protection system or for the supervision, control or implementation of such
could not be mandatory upon a State and would not infringe the sovereign
a system. The Agency may informally advise the State of observations made
during its normal safeguards activities. Further assistance by the Agency
rights of States;
will be provided only when so requested by the State. 1
(b) To be in a position to give advice to competent national authorities in
respect of their physical protection systems at the request of the State.
The intensity and the form of assistance required are, however, matters
to be agreed upon between the State and the Agency.
1 INFCIRC/153 paragraph 68 provides that a State shall make special reports without delay to the Agency
in the case of possible losses within the State. Similarly INFCIRC/153 paragraph 97 provides for reporting to the
Agency in cases of possible losses during international transfers. Corresponding provisions are included in safe-
guards agreements by the Agency and States other than those which are based upon INFCIRC/153.
3
2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
3. Information System
An information system should be provided to notify the State's physical
protection system of any changes which may affect implementation.
In addition, the State's physical protection system should have access to
IV. COMMON FEATURES OF SYSTEMS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
information which it requires from the national system of nuclear materials
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN USE, STORAGE AND TRANSIT
control.
4. Initiation of Recovery System
A State's physical protection system should include the following features.
It is envisaged that despite the existence of preventive measures, a
1. Promulgation of Regulations
recovery system would also be required.
In circumstances when there is reason to believe that there has been an
The State should promulgate and review regularly its comprehensive
unauthorized removal of nuclear material, the State's physical protection
regulations for the physical protection of nuclear material whether in State
system should provide for prompt notification to the authority responsible for
or private possession. These regulations should include provision for the
co-ordination of the State's physical protection activities.
timely detection of possible theft of nuclear material.
One of the most essential components of an effective system for physical
The State's physical protection system should provide for co-ordination
protection of nuclear material is the capability to initiate timely recovery
with the State's national system of nuclear materials control.
action in case of possible theft or misrouting of the material. This should be
done in full co-ordination with the existing public security forces.
2. Implementation
Although actual recovery actions may not be part of physical protection
Arrangements should be made to ensure that physical protection measures
measures they must be recognized as an important feature in the development
are implemented and that these measures include the following features:
of any domestic procedures. Particular attention must be given whenever
international transport of nuclear material is contemplated.
(a) Security survey; (see definition in Annex II)
(b) Licensing after approval of physical protection measures;
5. Delegation of Authority
(c) Personnel authorization;
The features in 1 through 4 above may be the responsibility of one single
(d) Sanctions concerning falsification of nuclear material records and
authority, or they may be divided amongst separate competent authorities
reports;2 and
provided that arrangements are made for overall co-ordination.
(e) Measures to ensure that employees and the public are aware of the
A State may delegate the administration of physical protection measures
danger inherent in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and to
either to a national body, or to duly authorized persons. It is implicit in
encourage by suitable means their continual co-operation.²
such cases of delegation that the State satisfies itself that the physical pro-
tection arrangements conform to the requirements laid down by the State.
The State should confirm that the physical protection requirements are
Furthermore, the duly authorized persons shall be fully responsible for the
being implemented.
continuing confirmation of complete compliance with the physical protection
measures.
The State should license activities within that State only when they
comply with physical protection regulations. It should be noted that other
regulations such as those relating to radiological safety may also apply.
The State's physical protection system should make provision for
periodic review of the licensed activities to ensure continuous compliance
with physical protection regulations.
2
Although these items are not in themselves physical protection measures, it should be recognized that
they could be a valuable part of a State's domestic procedures.
5
4
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DECLASSIFIED
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V.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
VI. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN USE AND STORAGE
OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN USE AND STORAGE
1. General Statement
1. Protected Area
Nuclear material in Groups I and II (see Annex I) should be used or
This section has been designed to identify, so far as possible, the elements
stored only within a protected area (see Annex II).
comprising an effective physical protection system for Groups I and II
material in use and storage. Considerable flexibility has been incor-
2. Movements of Nuclear Material
porated into the element descriptions and optimal features have been de-
scribed. Special attention should be given to the situation where the sum
Movements of nuclear material within a protected area are the responsi-
of the quantities of nuclear material held in adjacent or contiguous buildings
bility of the operator and he should apply all prudent and necessary physical
is sufficient to enter a protection category or to pass from Group II to
Group I.
protection measures.
Movements out of or between two protected areas are to be treated in
full compliance with the requirements for nuclear material in transit after
2. Essential Features for Groups I and II Material
taking account of prevailing conditions.
The essential features for Groups I and II material should be:
3.
Access
(a) Protected Area (see definition in Annex II): nuclear material should
Access to nuclear material within a protected area should be restricted
be used or stored only in a protected area.
and closely controlled.
(b) Security Survey (see definition in Annex II): a security survey should
be made at least annually (or whenever a significant change in the
4.
Control of Nuclear Material
facility, or its function takes place) by the State's physical protection
authority to evaluate the effectiveness of the physical protection
Arrangements should be made in any protected area to avoid the possibi-
measures, and to identify necessary changes in measures so as to
lity of unauthorized nuclear or substitute material being carried into or out
optimize their effectiveness in particular situations at the facility.
of the area.
Furthermore, plant operators should maintain checks on the efficient
5.
Process Sub-Stores
functioning of the physical protection measures.
(c) Facilities which handle, use or store nuclear material should be so
Nuclear material in mid-process or in process substorage must be
arranged that the number of entries and exits is minimized (ideally
deemed to be in storage at all times when the facility is not in normal operation,
only one). All emergency exits should be fitted with alarms (see
e.g. overnight when under single shift operation, at week-ends or during
definition in Annex II) if specified by the security survey. Any ground
holidays. Protection measures appropriate to storage should be applied at
level windows should be permanently locked where possible, or
those times.
covered with firmly embedded bars. Facilities should not be sited
close to public thoroughfares, if possible.
In the case of Group I material there should be a readily available
communication capability to local police or other public security
forces.
For Groups I and II material the access of all persons and vehicles
entering or exiting the area should be checked. This includes checking
packages, loads, etc. Special consideration should be given to the
advisability of preventing the entry of private motor vehicles inside
protected areas.
7
6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
(d) Admittance Controls (see definition in Annex II) should be used at all
In addition, personnel trained by the facility should be prepared to
points of entry to protected areas and within them to storage areas or
meet all necessary demands of physical protection and recovery and
other buildings or rooms when these contain nuclear material of
should act in full co-ordination with external emergency forces and
Group I or II. All persons entering the protected area should be
safety response teams, who should also be appropriately trained.
issued either special passes or badges, appropriately registered.
These should follow the general outline below:
3. Additional Essential Features for Group I Material
Type I:
Employees whose duties permit or require continual
access to areas containing nuclear material, including
The essential features for Group I material, additional to those in
nuclear material records keepers and members of the
2 above should be:
management. Issue of passes or badges should be limited
(a) The perimeter of the protected areas should normally consist of a
to those authorized by the State's physical protection
physical barrier (see definition in Annex II) in addition to and outside
authority.
of the building walls. However, where the walls of a building are of
Type II:
Other regular employees; these should be determined by
such solid construction as to be designated, as a result of a security
facility normal practices.
survey, as being the perimeter of a protected area, they should be
supplemented by a surveillance system outside the building walls.
Type III:
Temporary repair, service or construction workmen;
these should be escorted by a Type I badged employee at
(b) A 24 hour guarding service should be provided. The guard (see definition
all times when they may have access to nuclear material.
in Annex II) should report at scheduled intervals to local police or other
public security forces during non-working hours.
Type IV:
Visitors; these should be escorted by any badged employee
at all times in the protected area and by a Type I badged
(c) An external and internal patrol (see definition in Annex II) should be
employee when they may have access to nuclear material.
provided.
Passes and badges should be designed so as to make counterfeiting
(d) In all cases where separate storage structures are used they should be
extremely difficult.
of the "strong room" type in design and must be located within a
protected area. They should be provided with adequate locks and the
(e) All employees should be frequently (about annually) informed of the
issue of keys should be closely controlled. Access to storage must be
importance of effective physical protection measures and trained in
strictly limited to assigned officials and to others only when under
their implementation. Notices on the subject should be conspicuously
their escort. Where nuclear material is stored overnight in work
posted throughout the facility.
areas, or in a sub-storage structure within a work area, specially
(f) Nuclear material handlers should be required to conform to proce-
authorized procedures should be used to protect the area. Alarms,
dures for transferring custody of the nuclear material to the suc-
patrols, or TV monitors would satisfy this requirement.
ceeding handler.
4. Additional Essential Features for Group II Material
Additionally, nuclear material handlers should endeavour to ascertain
on reporting for duty that no interference or theft has taken place and
The essential features for Group II material, additional to those in
to report to a senior authority whenever they have reason to believe
2 above should include either:
that a discrepancy may exist.
(a) a separate guarded physical barrier fitted with alarms; or
(g) A record should be kept of all persons having access to or possession
of keys concerned with the containment or storage of nuclear material.
(b) external and internal building alarms.
Arrangements should be made for:
In either case, where alarms are used, they should be so connected
the checking of keys, particularly to minimize the possibility of
as to initiate reaction by public or private security personnel within the
duplication; and
shortest possible time.
the changing of combinations at suitable intervals.
5. Optional Features for Groups I and II Material
Locks should be changed when compromised.
(a) Alarms of various types which give an appropriate response to indicate
(h) Emergency plans of action should be prepared to effectively counter
forced entry or unauthorized presence may be used to assist guards
any possible threats to nuclear material, including attempted diver-
as required.
sion, accident or natural disaster. Such plans should provide for the
training of facility personnel in their actions in case of alarm or
(b) Tamper indicating seals may be used in conjunction with locks or on
emergency.
infrequently used containers holding nuclear material. Such seals
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should be serialized and otherwise resistant to counterfeiting and
their integrity should be checked daily.
(c) TV monitors may be used as required to minimize manned surveil-
lance (see definition in Annex II) in certain areas containing nuclear
material or at other parts of the facility. They may be used together
VII. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
with alarms and may record observations for later examination.
NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
These recordings should be checked hourly or the screen should be
constantly watched by personnel.
(d) Doorway monitors designed to detect uranium and plutonium may
1.
Hazards
be used.
A State's physical protection system should be designed to cover, SO
far as practicable, the following types of hazard in transit:
10
S
-
improper routing;
-
damage;
-
accidents;
-
hijacking;
-
theft;
-
sabotage;
-
interference;
or
-
substitution en route.
The existence of these hazards increases the relative danger of the
transit situation as compared with use and storage.
2.
Division of Measures
The measures required may conveniently be divided into those to be
taken in advance, those to be applied between despatch and receipt and
those to be applied after receipt. The following recommendations are
accordingly made for the protection of nuclear material in transit
ml
3. Measures prior to Shipment of Groups I and II Material
3.1. Advance Notification to Receiver
The readiness of the receiver to accept delivery at the expected time
of arrival should be ascertained prior to the commencement of the
shipment.
II
3.2. Advance Notification to Other Bodies
In cases where advance notifications have to be despatched to various
bodies by virtue of safeguards obligations and radiological safety regula-
tions, it is suggested that such notifications be made use of whenever they
might be regarded as useful for purposes of physical protection, provided
that the necessary cross-links exist between the appropriate bodies
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3.3. Advance Authorization
In the case of Group II material some, but not all the measures are
essential.
In cases covered by adequate regulations, routine shipments may be
The extent to which these measures will be used by persons actually
carried out without the obligation to seek case-by-case authorization or
accompanying the consignment or respectively stationed centrally, or at
to notify the national control authority in each particular case in advance.
various points along the route of the consignment will depend upon the
In all cases not covered by existing regulations or going beyond
particular conditions prevailing in the State. It should, however, be
boundary conditions defined in such regulations, consent of a national
ensured that these functions are properly exercised and integrated into a
control authority to a transport operation should be sought in advance.
viable and reliable system.
This implies the performance of an appropriate security survey in advance.
Furthermore, the transport permission may include specific limitations
and conditions related to the particular circumstances and to whatever
emergency plans have been prepared.
3.4. Marking and Coding
It is undesirable to advertise transport operations if this could lead to
a decrease in the degree of physical protection. This requires great
restraint in the use of any special markings, inspections on vehicles, etc.,
and in particular on the use of open channels for the transmission of
messages concerning shipments of nuclear material. When such messages
are required by safeguards or radiological safety regulations, consider-
ation should be given to the extent practicable, to measures such as coding
and appropriate routing; care should be exercised in the handling of such
information. These considerations also apply to any subsequent
communications.
3.5. Selection of Transportation and Routing
In choosing the route, consideration should be given to the security
of passage. The transport method for any given consignment should be
such as to keep to a reasonable minimum the number of cargo transfers
and the length of time the cargo remains in the transport means. The
co-operations of the carrier concerning the implementation of physical
protection measures should be ensured in advance.
4. Measures in Actual Transit
Greater variations may be expected in the implementation of measures
for the physical protection of nuclear material in transit than in the case of
nuclear material in storage or use where a greater measure of uniformity
can be recommended.
The general measures to be adopted during the actual transportation
of nuclear material of Group I are given below:
(a) monitoring/escorting/guarding;
(b) emergency response capability; and
(c) communication.
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(e) Ensure that the intended receiver will check the integrity of the
packages and seals, and accept the shipment immediately upon arrival.
The packages should not be left in a vehicle until the next working day.
4. Communication and Emergency Action
VIII. DETAILED REQUIREMENTS FOR
NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT
Conventional physical protection measures are not operative in trans-
portation in the same way or with the same preventive results as in the
environs of a facility. Although audible alarms, for example, may be used
1. Different Needs in Each State
in both environments, the transportation vehicle may be in a remote area,
out of hearing range for a response action. This example demonstrates
This section was prepared in full recognition that nuclear material in
a key need for effective transportation safeguards, communication and
transit is in an environment vulnerable to theft and which does not lend
response. Ideally, vehicles carrying nuclear material should be constantly
itself readily to conventional techniques for physical protection. It is
monitored by the communication system and arrangements should be made
recognized that the different structures of the nuclear industry, trans-
to provide an adequately sized and trained response force.
portation services and geography in different States make it impossible to
The latter should reach the scene of a theft from transportation either
find a single structure for transportation safeguards that will provide for
while it is in process so they can prevent its successful completion or
uniform effectiveness and be uniformly practicable. Accordingly this
immediately after its completion so they can optimize the possibility of re-
document identifies certain basic requirements applicable to all nuclear
covery. Domestic transportation safeguards should include frequent or
material transportation and then provides for alternatives from which each
continuous communication with vehicles carrying nuclear material and
State may design its own system in such a manner as to achieve the
should include a programme to establish teams who would be trained to
desired goals.
react and provide assistance in emergency or delay. Such teams would be
sited at strategic locations within the State.
2. Aims
5. Routing
It has been recognized that two basic aims must be achieved to reduce
the vulnerability to theft during transportation. These are:
Vehicles carrying nuclear material should be routed in such a way as
(a) minimize the total time during which nuclear material remains in the
to avoid areas of troubles (either human or natural). In addition, the
transportation environment; and
State's physical protection system should minimize the danger that may
arise when vehicle operators leave their vehicle for any reason, including
(b) minimize the number of transfers of the nuclear material during
refreshment stops or the like. In some cases two-man operation may be
transportation, i.e. transfer from one vehicle to another, transfer to
required and may be essential for Group I material.
temporary storage awaiting transportation vehicle arrival, etc.
6. Essential Requirements
3. Methods
The following list contains the essential requirements for a State's
To achieve these basic aims, several possibilities are suggested,
transportation system, except that items marked* are optional for
these are:
Group II material.
(a) Use a single dedicated vehicle or aircraft exclusively for each nuclear
(a) Advance communication with the receiver to assure his readiness to
material shipment (i.e. full load concept) and despatch it on a non-stop
accept delivery.
schedule using seals wherever possible.
(b) Pre-routing of transport vehicle to avoid troubled or violent areas.
(b) Use air transport, cargo aircraft where possible.
(c) Arrangements to ensure that minimum journey time and transfers
(c) Despatch escorts (see definition in Annex II) or guards with each
are involved.
shipment who should expedite its handling, particularly at transfer
points. Such escorts or guards should be effective in avoiding mis-
(d) Telephone or telegraph communication between shipper and receiver
routing which among other dangers prolongs the time the material
at expected arrival time to achieve prompt recognition of possible
remains in transit. They may also be used to manage problems
diversion.
related to safety during accidents.
(e) Arrangements with the carrier to ensure that vehicle operators will
(d) Use monitors to meet the transportation vehicle at each scheduled
not leave the vehicle unattended at any time during transit.
transfer point to avoid misrouting described in (c) above.
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* (f) Optimized communication with the shipment en route by one of the
shipping and receiving States should, to the extent practicable, identify
following means:
the States involved in such transit with a view to securing in advance their
(i) constant radio;
co-operation and assistance for recovery actions on the territory of such
(ii) checkpoint reports from designated observers en route; or
States in case of loss of an international shipment thereon.
(iii) scheduled phone reports from the vehicle operator.
States may wish to consider the possibility of establishing a convention
(g) Optimized arrangements for the despatch of trained teams to prevent
wherein States could aid each other in the recovery of nuclear material in
successful completion of a theft in process or to initiate efforts to
any cases where such aid would be of value.
recover diverted material. The teams should be designated by a State
from its military units, public security organizations, specially
designated units or combinations thereof.
(h) Development, and use when developed, of mechanisms to thwart or
delay thieves, such as:
(i) vehicle disabling system when under recognizable threat from
diverters;
(ii) cargo tie down or lacking systems to delay removal of nuclear
material;
(iii) alarm mechanisms, e.g. emission of coloured smoke to enhance
locating vehicle under threat, particularly in remote areas.
(j) Advance planning of temporary storage of nuclear material during
transport. Access to the temporary storage should be limited.
7. Additional Considerations
In addition to the essential elements in 6 above, for Group I material,
States should consider the need to insist upon the use of guards or escorts
to accompany the shipment of monitors at transfer points to ensure proper
handling of the cargo at all transfers. These measures should be used
where conditions indicate a need for such services, particularly where
several transfers are necessarily involved.
All problems connected with the domestic transport of nuclear material
also arise in connection with international transport. However, some of
them become more complex in the international context. Additional pro-
blems also arise.
8. Necessity for Advance Agreements
In the case of international transport between two States sharing a
common frontier the State's responsibility for physical protection and the
point at which physical protection responsibilities transfer from one State
to another should be the subject of an agreement between the States. How-
ever, with respect to the maintenance of communication regarding the
continuing integrity of the shipment and with respect to the responsibility
for carrying out a maximum recovery effort in the event that a shipment
becomes lost, the agreement between the States should provide that this
responsibility will rest with the shipping State up to the frontier and then
will transfer to the receiving State.
When international shipments transit the territory of States other than
the sending State and the recipient State, the arrangements between the
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(b) For the purposes of physical protection the following are cases which
may not enter Group I or II even though the quantities of nuclear
material involved put them into either Group I or II:
(i) irradiated fuel because it requires heavy shielding, special
ANNEX I
handling equipment and expensive chemical reprocessing; and
(ii) material which is not easily handled for other reasons, e.g.
GROUPING OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION
batches comprising large drums of waste.
In developing a physical protection system a State should take
(c) The exclusion of certain small quantities of nuclear material from
account of:
the group definitions should not be interpreted to mean that they should
(a) the accessibility of material for diversion, which depends on physical
not be protected. It is expected that such material be protected
form, isotopic and chemical composition, etc;
through prudent management practices.
(b) the quantity of nuclear material involved;
(c) the location of the material, i.e. in use, storage or transit; or
(d) the particular circumstances prevailing either in the State or along the
transportation route.
The following Table gives the two groupings of the different types of
nuclear material taking into account quantities and isotopic composition.
These groupings have been used throughout the contents of this document.
Material
Group I
Group II
U-233, Pu, U enriched to 20% U-235
More than
More than
or more, or mixtures thereof
5 ekg
1 ekg
U enriched to 5% U-235 or more and
More than
-
less than 20% U-235
5 ekg
U at enrichments above natural, but
-
10 t
less than 5% U-235
Note:
(a) ekg is defined in INFCIRC/153 as follows: "effective kilogram"
means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear material. The
quantity in "effective kilograms" is obtained by taking:
(i) for plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(ii) for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight
in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005
(0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or below,
and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
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ANNEX III
ANNEX II
PANEL ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
DEFINITIONS
VIENNA 6 - 10 MARCH 1972
1. Admittance Control
A system providing for limiting by appropriate checks the entrance
List of Participants, Observers and Agency Staff Members
or exit to the passage of identifiably authorized persons and material.
2. Alarm
I. Participants
Home Address
A technical device for the purpose of sensing intrusion or interference.
Such a device should be independent of any power supply failure. It should
M. Billy
Commissariat à l' énergie atomique,
be arranged to signal any interference with its function.
29-33 rue de la Fédération,
Paris XV, France
3. Door Monitors
L. Brenner
USAEC,
A passive device for the purpose of detecting the passage of nuclear
Division of Nuclear Materials Security,
material.
Washington, DC 20545,
United States of America
4. Guard or Escort
G.J. Dorogov
State Committee on Utilization
A person entrusted with surveillance or access control, his duties
should be specified by the security survey.
of Atomic Energy,
Staromonetny Preulok 26,
5. Patrol
Moscow, USSR
A person or persons (who may be guards) scheduled to inspect
D. Gupta
Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik,
barriers, seals or other features at regular or irregular intervals.
Postfach 3640,
75 Karlsruhe 1,
6. Physical Barrier
Federal Republic of Germany
A physical barrier is a fence or wall or a similar impediment approved
H. Kurihara
Atomic Energy Bureau
by a security survey.
Science and Technology Agency,
7. Protected Area
Policy Division (Agency staff member
since 30 May 1972)
A protected area is an area under constant surveillance (by a guard
Tokyo, Japan
for Group I material; by a guard or by electronic means for Group II
O. Lendvai
material surrounded by a physical barrier and having a limited number of
National Atomic Energy Commission,
P.O. Box 565,
controlled admittance points and approved by a security survey.
Budapest V, Hungary
8. Security Survey
A.E. Ross
UKAEA,
A critical examination made by competent officers, in order to eva-
Reactor Group,
luate, approve and specify physical protection measures.
Risley, Warrington, Lancs,
9. Surveillance
United Kingdom
N. Srinivasan
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre,
Close observation to be achieved by invigilator (personnel), photo
Fuel Reprocessing Division,
electric, closed circuit television, sonic detectors, electronic, photo-
Bombay, India
graphic, or other means.
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DECLASSIFIED
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II. Observers
III. Agency Staff Members
S. Abiko
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
E. López-Menchero
Director, Division of Development
Development Corporation,
Nuclear Fuel Division,
B.C. Bernardo
Division of Nuclear Safety and
1-9-13 Akasaka, Minato-ku,
G.E. Swindell
Environmental Protection
Tokyo, Japan
P. Ha-Vinh
Legal Division
S. Hagsgaard
AB Atomenergi,
R.A. Borthwick
Division of Development
Studsvik,
M. Ryzhov
611 01 Nyköping, Sweden
D.F. Rawson
Scientific Secretary,
Permanent Mission of Australia
Division of Development
G.L. Hanna
to the IAEA,
Concordiaplatz 2/III,
1010 Vienna, Austria (Australia)
K. Heil
Bundesministerium für Bildung
und Wissenschaft,
Heussallee 2 - 10,
53 Bonn 9,
Federal Republic of Germany
A. Nedelik
Osterreichische Studiengesellschaft
für Atomenergie,
Seibersdorf, Austria
A. Pilgenröther
Nukem GmbH,
Wolfgang bei Hanau,
Federal Republic of Germany
R.E. Tharp
USAEC,
Washington, DC 20545,
United States of America
L.W. Thorne
British Nuclear Fuels Ltd,
Risley, Warrington, Lancs,
(Agency staff member since
4 April 1972)
United Kingdom
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Form AEC-8
(1-67)
AECM 0240
INCOMING AND SIGNATURE TAB
Use this side of the sheet to precede the incoming material
when assembling correspondence.
(USE REVERSE SIDE FOR SIGNATURE TAB)
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APPENDIX D
PROJECTED IMPROVEMENTS IN CURRENT U.S. STANDARDS
Following the enactment of legislative authority in August of this year:
1. Requirements are being established for prior government trustworthiness
determinations for all individuals who will have access to sabotage-
vulnerable areas of nuclear power industrial facilities or who will have
access to or custody of radioactive materials in quantities and types
that could be used for nuclear explosive fabrication or as radioactive
contamination weapons.
2. Studies are currently being conducted to determine
a. Ways to improve armed guard protection for facilities and materials
including the question of whether such services should be provided
by government personnel as opposed to private corporate individuals.
b. Grouping and siting of fuel cycle plants to reduce and possibly
eliminate transportation of potential target materials.
c. Designs for transportation vehicles which will provide considerable
hardening against attempts to sabotage or hijack shipments.
d. The practicability of using massive shipping containers to make the
removal of potential target materials from transport vehicles more
difficult for potential saboteurs and thieves.
e. Mechanisms for providing constant communication with transportation
vehicles and escort vehicles while enroute and for providing automatic
location of such vehicles to enhance reaction efforts in the event
of an alarm.
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f. Ways in which physical barriers, currently required by regulations,
can be strenthened.
g. Penalty modes that would be triggered by illicit attempts to breach
access control mechanisms. These penalty modes would be designed
to provide further time delay for the accomplishment of the illicit
act. Such things as debilitating gases, smoke, etc., are being
considered.
h. The possible application of advanced access control systems such
as fingerprint identification, etc.
i. Ways in which the radiological properties of special nuclear material
might be changed to inhibit the use of such material in the manufacture
of an illicit nuclear explosive device.
In addition, certain other changes are ready to be implemented. These are:
1. A minimum of two armed guards must escort all shipments (ground, air
and seas) of the specified quantity and type of special nuclear
material (see 10CFR 73)
2. Constant communication with transport vehicles carrying the special
quantity and type of SNM.
3. Implementation and publicizing of safeguards rewards.
4. Requirement to use "hardened" vehicles for transport.
5. A study geared to the strengthening of the physical barriers for fixed
sites.
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(USE REVERSE SIDE FOR SIGNATURE TAB)
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPENDIX E
6/18/74
IAEA SAFEGUARDS & THE NPT
To understand the Non-Proliferation Treaty it is essential to understand
the role, status, and effectiveness of the safeguards system which is to
police the non-proliferation guarantees given by the parties to the
Treaty. If the degree of validity and meaning of these safeguards is
not accurately understood, our premise for relying on and supporting the
Treaty is weakened. The continued effectiveness of safeguards is the
factor most likely to have bearing on the long-term preservation and
stability of the Treaty. It is probably safe to say that if IAEA safe-
guards had been applied to the CIR Reactor in India, the May 18 explo-
sion would not have occurred.
1. Introduction
A major issue impeding final agreement on the language of the NPT was
the question of whether and how the Treaty could be policed. Article III,
on safeguards, was the last Article to be written and agreed. There was
an option, which the U.S. rejected, that there should be no policing;
that the word of sovereign nations would provide sufficient assurances
that the parties were honoring their non-proliferation undertaking;
(backed up by national intelligence gathering organizations which, hope-
fully, would give a warning if a party was violating that undertaking).
Article III was finally agreed, calling for the IAEA to apply its safe-
guards to police the Treaty undertaking.
An important question to consider in appraising the value of the NPT is
the status and meaningfulness of those safeguards, to the extent that it
can be determined at this early date in the life of the Treaty; What
assurances will the system give? (And what can't it give?) How
technically valid are the assurances? Will the assurances be suffi-
ciently meaningful and valid to warrant our reliance on them? What
technical, political, and organizational problems does the system have?
What might be done to upgrade the effectiveness of the system?
2. Brief Technical Description of IAEA Safeguards
Objective
The objective of applying IAEA safeguards to nuclear materials in
facilities is: (a) the timely detection of government instigated (or
supported) diversion of significant quantities of. that material from
peaceful nuclear activities; and (b) the deterrence of such diversion
through the risk of early detection and sanctions. To detect diversion,
the IAEA must verify the quantities and location of safeguarded nuclear
material
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OFFICIAL
DSE
UNLT
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Sanctions
If the Agency finds, in applying safeguards in a given situation, there
has been a diversion or that it is not able to verify that there has been
no diversion, and after giving the subject country reasonable opportunity
to furnish sufficient explanation and reassurances, the Agency will report
the non-compliance to its Board of Governors, all members of the Agency
and the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. The
Agency may also suspend rights and privileges of Agency membership, cur-
tail or suspend assistance and call for the return of materials and equip-
ment which may have been provided.
Elements of the Svstem
Nuclear materials accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards tool with
containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. Accoun-
tancy is essential to knowledge of how much safeguarded material is supposed
to be at a facility and, therefore, determination of how much may have been
diverted. To permit good accountability, facilities have to be designed to
permit adequate measurement and control of the nuclear materials being
processed or used in them. The IAEA reviews nuclear facility design from
this point of view. Detailed and accurate records and periodic reports need
to be kept and submitted to keep track of the inventories, input, process
losses, wastes, and shipments of nuclear materials. The IAEA reviews the
system of records and reports for adequacy. The Agency also processes the
periodic reports to assist in planning inspections, follow the flows of
materials and check for quantity agreement between shippers and receivers.
This data also can be evaluated to determine if significant uncertainties
are developing in the measurement of nuclear material quantities flowing
through a process. The Agency conducts periodic inspections to audit and
verify information in records and reports, to account for the material by
independent measurement, to review the methods of measurement, to investi-
gate process losses and sources of uncertainties in the inventory and
throughput, and to read and service containment and surveillance devices.
Containment and surveillance techniques (such as tamper indicating seals on
stored nuclear materials, or tamper resistant automatic cameras providing
unmanned observation of nuclear material in storage) give evidence whether
there may have been unreported changes in the quantities of nuclear mate-
rial in a given location since the last inspection.
Technical Conclusions
The technical conclusions of the Agency's verification activities are
statements, covering defined areas in which safeguarded nuclear material
has been stored, used or processed, of the amounts of nuclear material
unaccounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of
the amounts stated. If the amounts which cannot be accounted for are
significant and cannot be reasonably explained the political procedures
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6/18/74
noted in the "sanction" section above may be initiated.
3. Role of IAEA Safeguards
IAEA safeguards play a role in two general areas: (a) to police the NPT
undertakings of non-nuclear weapons states (N-NWS') party to the Treaty;
and (b) to police undertakings of non-NPT parties with respect to indi-
vidual facilities and shipments of nuclear material, which undertakings
the countries have given to suppliers as a condition of supply or have
given unilaterally to the Agency.
NPT Safeguards Agreements
The IAEA's safeguards under NPT agreements are applied on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the
N-NWS party to the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Thirty such agreements were in force at the end of March 1974,
although only 17 of the countries had nuclear programs requiring safe-
guards implementation.
Non-NPT Safeguards Agreements
Under non-NPT agreements, IAEA safeguards are applied to select nuclear
activities in the non-NPT party country with a view toward ensuring that
the special fissionable or other materials, services, equipment facili-
ties, and information under Agency controls are not used in such a way as
to further any military purpose. Forty-one such agreements are in force
dealing with specific facilities in 23 non-NPT countries, plus the U.S.
and the U.K. Examples are the two U.S. -supplied power reactors at
Tarapur, India; the two Canadian-supplied power reactors at Rajasthan,
India; the Research Reactor at Nahal Soreq, Israel; the major fraction
of the Japanese and Swiss nuclear programs, research reactors in
Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, etc. The U.S. interprets its NPT.
obligations as permitting cooperation with and supply to activities in
non-NPT countries if IAEA safeguards apply to the U.S. assistance and if
it is clearly understood by the recipient country that the U.S. considers
"peaceful nuclear explosives" to be prohibited by the recipients under-
taking not to further any military purpose.
Effect of Safeguards
The desired effect of IAEA safeguards is: (a) to deter national level
diversion of safeguarded nuclear material by the governments of the
countries involved; (b) to place a responsibility on those governments
to institute domestic programs which would døter sub-national level
diversion of safeguarded nuclear material (i.e., by individuals or groups
acting contrary to Government policy); (c) to reduce specific international
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tensions by providing a degree of assurance among countries, especially
hostile neighbors, that the safeguarded country is not developing nuclear
weapons; and (d) more generally, create an environment of confidence that,
to the extent safeguards are being applied, international nuclear commerce
to exploiť the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy can be freely con-
ducted without contributing to insecurity and tension among nations.
Range of Effectiveness
It would be difficult if not impossible to prove whether or to what
degree the safeguards actually accomplish the desired effects, as des-
cribed above. Although certain technical conclusions can be derived from
safeguards activities, the overall extent to which the safeguards are
effective, as applied, is largely a matter of speculation/judgment. How-
ever, there is clearly a broad range of technical and procedural rigor
possible in the implementation of the safeguards system which would bear
on the effectiveness; from occasional visits to facilities involving
minimal independent verification activities (basically "window dressing")
to a tight, statistically based, highly independent technical program of
verification. If the final judgment is that, regardless of the rigor of
the system, the assurances will not be sufficient, then there is no need
to pursue the more rigorous (and more costly) approach. In any event,
it is important to have in mind where on the scale we want the system to
be, and to what extent we are getting what we want.
4. Important Things IAEA Safeguards Do NOT Do
It is important to recognize the limitations of IAEA safeguards. Several
key limitations are identified below:
(a) IAEA safeguards under NPT agreements do not preclude a country from
using nuclear materials in military programs as long as those pro-
grams are not developing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, (e.g., naval propulsion programs are permitted). Further,
if a country wishes to use nuclear material in such a non-proscribed
military use, Agency safeguards will not be applied to that material
and no international controls to verify non-diversion to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be. in effect for
those activities. If an outside supplier wants to prevent his
assistance from being used in this way under NPT safeguards agree-
ments, he must enter into a special understanding to this effect
with the IAEA and the recipient country, as the U.S. has done.
(b) IAEA safeguards under non-NPT agreements are specifically against
"furthering any military purpose." Several countries consider
this to allow development of peaceful nuclear explosives. There-
fore, the U.S., U.K., Canada, and some other suppliers have made
general public statements and specific private statements to
recipients of assistance that we consider the peaceful use
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guarantees to preclude the use of safeguarded material for any
nuclear explosive device; and that IAEA safeguards, even under
non-NPT safeguards agreements, are to check this.
(c) IAEA safeguards under NPT agreements cover only declared peace-
ful nuclear activities; both indigenously supported activities,
and those supported by outside suppliers. The IAEA has no
authority nor ability to seek out undeclared or clandestine
activities. Under non-NPT safeguards agreements, the IAEA might
apply safeguards at only one minor facility out of a large civil
nuclear program involving many facilities. The LAEA would have
no authority with respect to those other facilities unless safe-
guarded nuclear material was transferred to them.
(d) IAEA safeguards measures are limited to accountancy, passive con-
tainment, and surveillance. The Agency has no authority to
implement physical protection measures (against nations) in safe-
guarded activities, such as armed guards, locks and other exclusion
devices, pursuit and capture of diverted material, etc. These
measures can only be employed by sovereign nations (against sub-
national groups or individuals) which have legal bases and jurisdic-
tion for applying the force inherent in them. Therefore, IAEA safe-
guards provide no physical protection against overt takeover of
safeguarded nuclear material for military purposes, but rather only
an assurance that such takeover would be discovered and reported.
(e) IAEA safeguards are not foolproof; the system cannot provide
absolute assurances that nuclear material has not been diverted.
In situations where large quantities of nuclear material are being
used or processed, technical limits on the ability to measure
inventories and throughput of nuclear material will leave large
uncertainties in the actual quantities being safeguarded. If the
safeguarded country or facility operator has more sophisticated
and accurate control of his nuclear material than the IAEA is
aware of and can detect, diversion within the limits of IAEA
uncertainty might take place without detection. It is a question
of competition for technological competence.
5. Current Problem Areas in IAEA Safeguards System
There are several areas in which the evolving IAEA safeguards program
is encountering difficulties. Many of these problems are being actively
worked on by Agency personnel and by groups in some of the interested
IAEA member countries and it is expected (hoped) that the problems can
be solved.
The underlying general problem is that of transforming an idea (that
an international group can be formed with responsibility to devise and
implement a technically sound plan which will verify that sovereign
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nations are not diverting nuclear material) into a practical and
effective reality. There are no precedents to look at in solving this
problem. More specifically, there are three problem areas; political/
financial, technical/procedural, and organizational.
Political/Financial Problems
Safeguards cost money* and good safeguards cost a lot of money. The
U.S., USSR, Canada, and a few other smaller countries have been active
promoters and supporters of the NPT and its safeguards. The remaining
IAEA member nations, including those party to the Treaty, have either
been generally passive, or openly negative regarding these safeguards.
With such a low level of political support, there is a corresponding
low level of enthusiasm for financial support. This became evident
when the group of 50 nations which drew up the structure and content
of NPT safeguards agreements in 1971 required that a special formula
be developed for apportioning the cost of Agency safeguards among the
IAEA membership. Under this formula, the cost, which is paid out of
the Agency's regular budget, is borne in a slightly higher proportion
by the more developed countries, than the cost of the remaining LAEA
operations. Additional stark evidence was given this past April when
several members of the IAEA Board of Governors complained that IAEA
safeguards costs were too high in relation to IAEA expenditures for
technical assistance to the less developed countries. Proposals were
made that IAEA safeguards manpower should be frozen at the 1974 levels
and that less developed countries should not have to pay more toward
the safeguards porti on of the budget then they paid in 1971 (this latter
was an Indian suggestion). Many nations have expressed the view that
IAEA safeguards primarily benefit the major powers (U.S., U.K., USSR)
and, therefore, the major powers should pay for the safeguards. With-
out more widespread political support for IAEA safeguards it will be
difficult to raise sufficient funds to conduct an effective safeguards
program.
The IAEA's safeguards budget for 1975 is 5 .million dollars out of
a total Agency budget of 26.5 million.
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Technical/Procedural Problems
A. Develop sophisticated nuclear materials measurement techniques, pref-
erably non-destructive and unmanned, which allow Agency inspectors to
verify quantities of all nuclear materials which have gone through a
safeguarded process or which are in storage in a safeguarded nuclear
facility. Sometimes these materials are not directly accessible for
physical sampling (e.g., they might be contained in a $50,000 fuel
assembly which would have to be destroved to put the nuclear material in
a form which could be measured; or they might be in a highly radioactive
solution in a tank behind six feet of concrete. The inspector's problem
is to try to verify, with as much certainty as the facility operator can
verify it, how much nuclear material is in that assembly or tank). The
Agency must keep in the forefront of nuclear material measurement
techniques. Industry must be able to accept the reasonableness of these
techniques. For example, where a proprietary process is used, can the
inspector employ methods of verification which do not require access to
the process?
B. Develop independent procedures and techniques to apply these quantity
verification measures to inventories and flows of nuclear material using
limited rights of access (duration and location) within safeguarded
facilities and with limited dollar and manpower resources; i.e., optimize
cost-effectiveness of techniques and procedures.
C. Develop more effective containment and surveillance techniques. As
larger facilities and flows of nuclear material are encountered, nuclear
material accountancy becomes a less powerful deterrent to a possible
significant diversion and the assurances gained by accountancy must be
supplemented by containment and surveillance techniques to assure that
the material which cannot be accounted for is not leaving the plant
undetected.
D. Assure to the extent possible that the procedures and techniques are
non-intrusive and do not impede the safe, economical operations of the
facility.
E. Develop computer programs to organize, process, and evaluate the
very large amounts of data which will be submitted in reports to the
Agency and brought in as a result of inspections.
F. Assure that all the separate facets of measurement techniques,
inspection procedures, containment and surveillance, data handling and
processing, etc., fit into a logical, balanced, effective, coherent
system which meets the desired objective.
G. Determine the most practical way of using the domestic safeguards
systems
of
applied,
recognizing the difference in their objectives, techniques, and authority,
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and maintaining the necessary independence of the Agency's verifica-
tion activities. Determine how this can be done in detailed practice
in the special case of Euratom and its multi-national safeguards system.
H. Determine how to relate and evaluate the technical conclusions of
safeguards implementation (e.g., the quantity of nuclear material that
cannot be accounted for) from several individual safeguards areas (e.g.,
several nuclear facilities) in order to arrive at a rational and mean-
ingful conclusion about whether or not the country involved is in non-
compliance with the NPT. Set up the process by which it would be
officially decided that a diversion is suspected or has taken place;
the procedures to follow in case a diversion is suspected.
I. Determine and be prepared for the possible impact of possible future
nuclear technology on the efficacy and meaning of safeguards - e.g.,
simple isotope separation techniques, widespread use of highly-enriched
uranium and plutonium in HTGRs and breeder reactors, fusion power, etc.
Organizational Problems
A. Determine optimum organizational structure to develop and carry out
the IAEA's safeguards obligations. Is the current structure the best?
B. Most effective ulitization of manpower, when initial assignments are
for two years and when there has to be a balance of nations represented
on the staff without full regard for availability of talent.
C. Logistics problems involving international travel for inspections;
moving instruments, visas and ease of passage from country to country
(e.g., to investigate special incidents involving possible loss or
diversion of nuclear materials), regional offices VS. a central office
in Vienna, international shipping and handling of radioactive samples
taken by inspectors, etc.
D. Problems associated with language and cultural differences (e.g.,
the impediment to effectiveness when a non-oriental is trying to inspect
a facility where the routine communications and records are in Japanese;
or, trying to hire, for safeguards, a Japanese-speaking individual with
a good background in nuclear technology who is not a Japanese national
owing political allegiance to Japan).
E. Develop effective safeguards inspector training techniques.
6. Possibilities of Strengthening Agency Safeguards
The following suggestions would need further detailed elaboration and
evaluation before being considered for adoption:
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A. Educational efforts to increase political support by other
countries - stressing the benefits to them of the NPT and of effec-
tive IAEA safeguards.
B. Press for higher level of safeguards financing; look for new
possibilities of financing.
C. Increase level of U.S. unilateral and cooperative support for
current problem areas through, e.g., U.S. R&D efforts, making available
expert consultants, competent U.S. nationals on IAEA safeguards staff,
IAEA safeguards training and procedure exercises at U.S. facilities,
etc.
D. Within the existing IAEA safeguards guidelines (INFCIRC/153 and
INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2) press for full implementation making maximum use of
the rights already provided to obtain independent verification.
E. Upgrade the IAEA safeguards guidelines (INFCIRC/153 and
INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2) to provide for greater access and independence of
IAEA inspectors (e.g., such as originally granted in the IAEA Statute).
F. Upgrade IAEA's safeguards authority, e.g., more flexible and wider
range of sanctions, powers in the physical security field, greater inter-
national mobility, regional offices, laboratories and staffs with
necessary diplomatic immunities.
G. Upgrade and increase IAEA role in setting standards (and possibly
checking for compliance with them) in National systems of safeguards,
especially in the area of physical security.
H. Establish a high-level, highly competent Safeguards Review Committee
to critically monitor IAEA safeguards development and implementation and
suggest areas where improvement in effectiveness and efficiency are
needed.
(Following are more far reaching and radical possibilities to consider:
I. Modify the IAEA Statute and/or the NPT to provide stronger IAEA
safeguards responsibility and authority.
J. Transfer the safeguards responsibility from the IAEA to a separate,
independent organization, possibly loosely affiliated with the IAEA or,
more directly, with the UN.)
7. NPT Article III.2. and the Nuclear Exporters Group (Zangger
Committee)
Article III.2. of the NPT calls for states to refrain from providing
nuclear material or equipment especially designed or prepared for the
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processing, use, or production of nuclear material to any non-nuclear
weapons state for peaceful purposes, unless the nuclear material shall
be subject to IAEA safeguards. Seventeen major nuclear supplier nations
(excluding France) have voluntarily formed an ad-hoc group in order to
work out a common minimum interpretation of this provision, so as to
minimize the likelihood of safeguards requirements influencing inter-
national commercial competition. The group has developed minimal guide-
lines which have not yet been made publicly known, although it is hoped
to make them public in the near future. The impediment to moving ahead
is the fact of French non-cooperation and the resulting possibility that
France would freely supply the critical material and equipment, thus
undermining the objectives of the group and the NPT, and at the same
time making sales which others have denied themselves the opportunity to
make. The objective of this effort is to deny the ten or SO relatively
capable (technically) countries which are non-signatories to the NPT from
an external source of safeguards-free nuclear materials and equipment.
The guidelines do not cover supply of nuclear technology inasmuch as this
is not covered by NPT Article III. However, they do provide a clear
understanding that, although the safeguards to be applied are not pursuant
to NPT safeguards agreements, they would be aimed at diversion to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Successful efforts to increase the scope of coverage over materials and
equipment and to enlist further members for the group have the effect of
spreading the application of safeguards. Without a corresponding increase
in financial and political support for LAEA safeguards the probable
effect would be to decrease the effectiveness of those safeguards.
JFMahy/plg
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