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VIETNAM Operations in Laos and Cambodia Vol. II [2 of 2]
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VIETNAM Operations in Laos and Cambodia Vol. II [2 of 2]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
MEMO
HELMS TO KISSINGER
1/28/71
B
W/ATTACH
2
REPORT
STATUS of UNITS
1/28/71
B
3
MEMO
ELIOT TO HAIG
1/28/71
B
W/ATTACH
TELEGRAM
1/27/71
B
4
ZCZCKAB068
5
MEMO
KARAMESSINES TO HAIG
1/27/71
B
W/ATTACH
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES
80
FOLDER TITLE
/
VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (FOLDER 2 of2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORD&ARMINGS at the Richard Nixon Presidentiar Library DECLASSI FIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
6
MEMO
HAIG TO KARAMESSINES
1/27/71
B
W/ATTACH
7
MEMO
KARAMESSINES TO HAIG
1/26/71
B
8
MEMO
HAIG TO GODLEY
1/26/71
B
9
MAP
VIETNAM 510573 (5 COPIES)
N/D
B
10
MAP
VIETNAM
500117
(2 COPIES)
N/D
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES
80
FOLDER TITLE
2
VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (FOLDER 2 OF2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORrd Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER / ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
27 1207Z JAN 7]
TO BE DELIVERED TO GENERAL HAIG FROM AMBASSADOR GODLEY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FROM: AMBASSADOR
FOR: GENERAL HAIG
SUBJECT: OPERATION GOLD
I HAVE JUST TRANSMITTED TOP SECRET EMBTEL 485
NODIS/ASHAU WHICH FOLLOWS:
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
VIENTIANE 485
TOPSECRET
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
RE STATE 013902
1. AT 1530 LOCAL I CALLED ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND
WENT OVER THE POINTS RAISED REFTEL BUT MADE NO
REPEAT NO ALLUSION TO DATES PROPOSED. HE TOOK IT
ALL IN GOOD STRIDE BUT WHEN I CAME TO THE QUESTION OF
THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION HE FROWNED, EVEN WHEN I
HASTILY RETREATED TO THE SIX WEEKS MINIMUM.
I THEN WENT ON TO INDICATE OUR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HOPE THAT WHEN SOUVANNA PROTESTS, WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH
NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD BE
CALLED FOR. HE SAID THAT HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD INCLUDE
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
2. SOUVANNA HAS BEEN GIVING THIS MATTER MUCH THOUGHT
AND SAID HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE MUST CONSULT THE
KING. FOR THIS PURPOSE HE PLANS TO GO TO LUANG PRABANG
ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 31. HE IS TOTALLY BOOKED UP UNTIL
THEN. I DID NOT REPEAT NOT DEMUR BUT ASKED IF HE
WISHED ME TO BE IN LUANG PRABANG AT THAT TIME. HE
OFFERED TO TAKE ME WITH HIM BUT I SAID I DID NOT THINK
THAT WAS WISE. HE SAID HE WOULD THINK THIS OVER AND
MIGHT WANT ME TO BE DISCREETLY IN LUANG PRABANG.
THIS CAN EASILY BE ARRANGED FOR THE LAST TIME I WAS
THERE I HAD TOLD THE AREA COORDINATOR I HOPED TO BE
BACK SOON TO VISIT WITH THE SWISS MEDICAL TEAM, ETC.
3. ONE QUESTION THAT STILL REMAINS UNANSWERED IS
THAT RAISED IN PARA 6 OF VIENTIANE 470, I.E., WHETHER
SOUTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP THE
OPERATION SECRET FOR A FEW DAYS. I THINK THE ANSWER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IS OBVIOUSLY THATTHIS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, GIVEN
THE SIZE OF THE FORCES INVOLVED, BUT IT GIVES ME A
CHANCE TO GO BACK TO SOUVANNA PRIOR TO HIS GOING TO
LUANG PRABANG.
4. SOUVANNA THIS AFTERNOON WAS AS RESOLUTE AS HE
WAS YESTERDAY. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT AS HE
CONTINUES TO MULL OVER THIS PROBLEM HE WILL BE
WORRIED OVER THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION.
I HAVE NEVER MENTIONED OUR PRESIDENT WITH REGARD TO THIS OPERATION.
I THINK THAT THE TIME MIGHT NOW BE RIGHT FOR A
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY AS THE KING
HAS GO NE OUT OF HIS WAY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO
EXPRESS HIS ADMIRATION FOR OUR PRESIDENT AND HIS
RESOLUTION AND STEADFASTNESS IN CARRYING OUT HIS
INTENTIONS. SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BE ALONG THE
FOLLOWING LINES:
"YOUR HIGHNESS:
I FULLY APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULT DECISION YOU'RE
FACED WITH IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING
ACTION IN THE TCHEPONE AREA. I HAVE BEEN GIVING
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THIS OPERATION MY PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR I BELIEVE
IT IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO REDUCE THE ENEMY'S
PRESSURE AND HIS CAPABILITIES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
AND CAMBODIA. WHILE YOUR TROOPS HAVE BEEN
GALLANTLY DEFENDING THE BOLOVENS, I AM DEEPLY
CONCERNED WITH THE BUILDUP OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES
IN SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION III AND IN THE NORTHERN
PORTION OF MILITARY REGION IV.
"I HAVE CONSIDERED WITH PRESIDENT THIEU THE
POSSIBILITY OF KEEPING THIS OPERATION SECRET AI
LEAST FOR A WHILE. THIS, HOWEVER, WE FIND IMPOSSIBLE
GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES REQUIRED
TO EXECUTE IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER THE OPERATION.
"IT ALSO HAS BEEN MY HOPE THAT THE OPERATION MIGHT
BE OF A SHORT DURATION. HERE AGAIN, DETAILED STUDIES
THAT WE HAVE MADE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY
PRESENCE IN THE TCHEPONE AREA AND THE COMPLEXITY
OF HIS BASE STRUCTURE THERE LEADS ME TO CONCLUDE THAT
TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE OPERATION SHOULD LAST THROUGH
THE DRY SEASON. IF THIS IS ABSOLUTELY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OUT OF THE QUESTION, A MINIMUM TIME THAT WOULD BE
REQUIRED FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WOULD BE SIX
WEEKS.
"I WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO ASSURE YOUR
HIGHNESS THAT NO U.S. GROUND FORCES
WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION BUT WE WILL
SUPPORT OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES IN EVERY
OTHER POSSIBLE MANNER, I.E., IN THE AIR AND WITH
ARTILLERY BASED IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I ALSO WISH TO
ASSURE YOUR HIGHNESS THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS
GUARANTEED ME THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
WILL BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS THEIR MISSION IS
ACCOMPLISHED."
GP- 1GODLEY"
TOPSECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
declassified
determined
has
and
13526
Order
Executive
to
pursuant
reviewed
been
has
document
This
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2/4/71
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
(D-DAY is the day when GVN units cross the border and is calculated on basis of Washington time and calendar)
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBE
ATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
(1) Inform President
State
(1) Press stories from
lays
Thieu that US is pre-
Saigon concerning US
pared to provide
and RVNAF troop move-
support which will
ments in MR1 have
permit operation to
caused much speculation
proceed to Phase II.
concerning possible
Work out exact time-
move into south Laos
table with him for
both military and
public relations
moves. Advise him
against any con-
firmation of fact
Souvanna had been
previously con-
sulted.
(2) Inform Souvanna that
operation will pro-
ceed to Phase II
and that border
crossing will
occur within 72
hours. Tell him the
public position we and
GVN will take. Obtain
from him exact formu-
lation he will use
and assure him we
will not reveal our
prior consultation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
-2-
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
DATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
D-2
(1) Consult with Senator
State
days
Stennis concerning
DOD
proposed operation.
D-1
(3) Send cables to our
State
(2) Press officers will
White
day
Ambassadors in Aus-
continue to confirm
House
tralia, New Zealand,
our concern over NVN
at
H-36
Thailand, Cambodia,
buildup in Laos pan-
State
hours
Korea, and the UK to
handle, but will say
DOD
be pre-positioned for
they have nothing to
subsequent action.
add to the briefings
(Texts being prepared)
coming from Saigon.
These Ambassadors
No officials, either
will inform their
in Washington, Saigon,
respective govern-
or Vientiane will hold
ments between H-16
press conferences or
and H-12 hours of the
backgrounders.
contents of the cablesi.
H-26
(2) Consult with Senator
State
hours
Scott and Congress-
DOD
man Ford.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
-3-
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
DATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
D-day
(4)
Ambassadors with pre
State
positioned cables
H-16 hrs
carry out their
to
instructions.
H-12 hrs
H-5
(3) Consult with Senator
State
hours
Mansfield and
DOD
Congressmen Hebert
and Mahon.
H-4
(5) Japanese and Canadian
State
hours
Ambassadors in
Washington are in-
formed of action.
H-2
(6) Circular cable to all
State
(4) Consult BYRD with Senators
State
hours
US Missions is sent,
Aiken, Cooper,
DOD
explaining our action
Ellender, Fulbright,
and instructing our
Griffin, Smith,
officials on position
Young, and Congress-
to be taken publicly.
men Albert, Arends,
Boggs, Bow, Byrd,
(7) Inform representatives
Griffin, Mailliard,
of other selected
Minshall, Morgan
friendly nations in
Washington as follows:
Germany, Norway, Italy,
Netherlands, Mexico,
China, India, Belgium,
Philippines, Malaysia,
Indonesia.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
-4-
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
DATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
H-hour
(3) RVNAF (probably Gen.
DOD
Lam) holds press
briefing at MR-I press
headquarters, shortly
after cross-border
operations are launched.
Gen. Sutherland should
be present to answer
questions concerning
US participation.
H+2
(8) Souvanna issues state-
State
(5) Senate Foreign Re-
State
(4) USIA begins broad-
USIA
hours
ment which previously
lations Committee
DOD
casting US explanation
agreed with us.
informed that Sec-
for action taken in
retary of State and
world-wide, all:-
(9) GVN observer in New
State
Secretary of Defense
language coverage.
York delivers letter
will appear follow-
to President of Secu-
ing day in executive
rity Council explain-
session.
ing action taken;
copies sent to Geneva
co-chairmen and ICC
members.
H+2 1/2
(10) US Ambassador to UN
State
hours
delivers letter to
President of Security
Council explaining
action; copies to
Geneva co-chairmen
and ICC
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
-5-
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
DATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
H+3
(5) Release texts of all
State
hours
US and GVN letters to
President of Security
Council.
D+1
(11) Brief NATO, SEATO
State
(6) Secretaries of State
State
(6) Press spokesmen, an-
State
day
Councils on operations
and Defense appear
DOD
nounce that Sec-
DOD
and explain rationale.
Fin executive
retaries of State and
session] of Senate
Defense will appear
Foreign Relations
before Senate Foreign
Committee. Texts of
Relations Committee.
their prepared state
ments released to
(7) Texts of prepared
State
press immediately
statements of two
DOD
after the session.
Secretaries distri-
buted.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SCENARIO FOR PHASE II
-6--
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
ACTION
RESPONSIBLE
DATE
DIPLOMATIC
AGENCY
CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY
PUBLIC RELATIONS
AGENCY
D+2
(8) DOD and MACV spokes-
DOD
day
men explain nature of
MACV
operation, and stress
fact that operation is
essentially GVN, with
limited US support.
GVN spokesman confines
himself to bare de-
tails of action,
citing security
reasons for his failure
to elaborate further.
(9) State spokesman gives
State
political-diplomatic
rationale for action.
He answers "no com-
ment" to question
whether Souvanna was
consulted and directs
press attention to
RLG statement.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
MACV's Proposed Handling of the Press in Conjunction
with Phase I of Tchepone Operation (LAMSON 719)
1. (TS) Estimate of Press Reaction.
a. The United States press have for several months
speculated with each significant westward movement of troops
in Military Region 1 as an indication of an intent of
incursion into Laos to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Troop
movements of 30 January will revive the speculation with
the inevitable charges of widening the war, exceeding
Congressional limitation, violating the neutrality of Laos,
etc.
2. (TS) Press Accessibility.
a. The press will learn about the operation before or
shortly after it is initiated from informants or troop
movements. Commanders may restrict the press from their
area of operations as a temporary measure if the tactical
situation warrants, however, this will not prevent them
from reporting the story from other sources unless embargoed
by MACV.
b. US and TCN press are accredited to MACV on condition
that ground rules pertaining to release of military information
are observed. Future or ongoing operations cannot be reported
until officially released by MACV on pain of suspension or
loss of accreditation. Vietnamese press, who may break a
MACV embargo with impunity as they are not MACV accredited,
must be controlled by the GVN through existing suspension
procedures.
C. We can expect the press to make every effort to
cover the operation from any available source unless an
embargo is imposed. Restricting them from the area will
accomplish no useful purpose and will only lead to more
speculation. By imposing an embargo, we will permit the
press to cover the ongoing story until the embargo is lifted
at which time they can file their stories. This time lag
in filing may permit the story to settle down and be placed
somewhat in perspective.
d. While the embargo is still on, it would be useful
to achieve as much press objectivity as is possible by
conducting daily, an exclusive background briefing in Saigon
on the ongoing operation to describe its purposes and limited
objectives. I would propose that these briefings, for a
selected group of newsmen would cover only the combat activities
of the previous day and the limited objectives of the operation,
i.e., establishing a stronger
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
defensive posture in MR 1 and interrupting the enemy's
supply lines into RVN. Information presented at these
briefings would not be releasable until the embargo is lifted.
e. I would also propose to discourage the press from
accompanying the operation. But the relatively easy access
by road from Danang and availability of charter and commer-
cial aircraft will make restriction from the area difficult.
Press pools will be used where necessary.
3. (TS) XXIV Corps information personnel, which also operate
the Danang Press Center, will be supplemented by MACV
information officers so as to provide escorts for all press
whenever possible. No information concerning the operation
would be released until the embargo is lifted by MACV.
4. (TS) Therefore, I plan to embargo Operation LAMSON 719
on 29 January and coordinate with the RVNAF to extend the
embargo to the Vietnamese Press.
2
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Reference your message concerning LAMSON 719 and the press
plan it proposes, your approach designed to obtain as much security as
possible while keeping the press informed is well conceived and has
our concurrence. We recognize that there will be need for flexibility,
but the basic thrust of the MACV concept for handling press briefings,
visits to the field, embargoes, coordination with the GVN public infor-
mation people, etc., has our endorsement. We would expect, of course,
that MACV would keep us fully and currently informed as to all public
affairs activities related to this operation.
We need particularly the date and time of the initial briefing and
immediately after its conclusion a run-down on what happened.
We would suggest that you invite newsmen for a gathering, without
indicating its purpose in advance. They could well think that it is a
coffee or refreshment hour, depending upon the time of the day.
Looking to the future, we believe you should handle the CHUP
operation with a separate briefing at a time you deem appropriate.
The overall press guidance for the CHUP operation as now seen should
parallel that of the Kompong Cham operation, with initial announcement of
this RVNAF operation in Cambodia to be made by the RVN. This announcement
would stress that the operation is being conducted in full consultation
and cooperation with the Government of Cambodia. It should highlight that
this is an RVNAF operation and that maximum use of VNAF helicopters
and other resources will be made to transport RVN troops for action against
NVA and VC invaders, in order to prevent re-establishment of sanctuaries.
Reproduced at the Library DECLASSIFIED
TOR SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to xecutive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
9
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 10 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Xiangkh ang
72
104
Nghia Hung
106
7
Cua Rao
4
Song
Ban Muong Ngan
Southern Laos
Ba Ta Viang
7
Ca
Ga Cau 1A
Giat
Tha Thom
Con Cuong
ROAD NETWORK
Phu Dien Chau
Sane
Nam
4
Nam
15
Nhiep
84
Vinh
Muone
83
Borikhane
13
8
4?
401
Linh Cam
Paksane
Ban Pak Sa
Nanè Pass
Bung Kan
Ha Tinh
Road
Trail
Nape
8
0
25
50 Miles
212
212
81
NORTH
Lak Sao
1A
0
25
50 Kilometers
MEKONG
Nam
222
13
Theun
VIET NAM
18
151
2026
Ban Nong Su
8
212
NEW Nov
Ron
137
15 La rong
Ba Don
Nam
Mu Gia Pass
101
222
Songkhram
Nhommarath
1201
12
GULF OF TONKIN
22
12
Na Phao
12
137
Dong Hoi
Nakhon Phanom
Khammouane
Mahaxay
121
22
22
23
Ban Som Peng
Vin Vuc Ni
135
Ban Karai
122
101
237
Pass
Sakhon Nakhon
136
911
212
23
1036
1A
S
915
912
Vinh Linh
125
103
223
Demarcation Line
Ban
13
126
That Phanom
Muong Sen
92
102
213
1
Dong Ha
94
91
92
9
Séno
9
23
925
9
608
Muong Phalane
Quang Tri
9
Sépone
9
13
556
95)
931
Mukdahan
Savannakh
9
9
92
1
SOUTH
1
11
San 93
Mudng Phin
209
Hu
THAILAND
Keng Kok
238
VIETNAM
11
111
212
Muong
13
92
Sé
Bang Hieng
548
547
Nông
922
Maha
2048
Sarakham
23
23
Roi Et
A Shau
23
92
16
Khemmarat
Kong
923
Ban Toumlan
16
215
13
214
216
233
Ban
614
216
Bac
7026
Dong
Saravane
162
Nam 23
Lann
Khong
16
Sédone
16
96
212
7065
163
92
7025
231
969
161
Вап
hateng
966
208
2050
7064
Ban Phone
16
Chavane
165
Moe
Nam
231
23
Nam Mu
Ubon Ratchathan
Mae
Khong
13
165
165
217
Chiam
23
968
Warin Chamrap
10
Paksé
Pak
232
214
Song
96
Ban
24
Houei Kong
13
16
Dak Sut
Surin
Det Udom
Champassak
Muong May
96
Phiafay
Attope
24
7067
16
16
24
Kong
110
18
110
512
96
613
221
13
166
511
141
ONG
97
14
69
Cheom Ksa
613
Samrong
68
69
Khong
Siem Pang
63
131
14
129
113
Virachei
693
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
KOND
194
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
CAMBODIA
12
Lines
19
Andaung
78772 8-70
126
13
Pech
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Xiangkh
72
104
Nghia Hung
106
7
Cua Rao
4
Song
Ban Muong Ngan
Southern Laos
7
Ga Cau 1A
Ba Ta Viang
Giat
Tha Thom
Con Cuong
ROAD NETWORK
Phu Dien Chau
Sane
Nam
4
Nam
15
Nhiep
84
Vinh
Muone
83
Borikhane
13
8
47
401
Linh Cam
Paksane
Bung Kan
Ban Pak Sa
Nanè Pass
Ha Tinh
Road
Trail
Napè
8
0
25
50 Miles
212
212
81
NORTH
1A
0
222
MEKONG
Lak Sao
25
50 Kilometers
13
VIET NAM
151
18
2026
Ban Nong Su
8
212
15
La
rong
LICENSE NOV
Ron
137
Mae
Ba Don
Nam
Mu Gia Pass
101
222
Songkhram
Nhommarath
1201
12
GULF OF TONKIN
22
12
Na Phao
12
137
Dong Hoi
Nakhon Phanom
Khammouane
Mahaxay
121
22
22
23
Ban Som Peng
Vin Vuc Ni
135
Ban Karai
122
101
237
Pass
Sakhon Nakhor
136
911
212
23
1036
1A
915
912
Vinh Linh
125
103
223
Demarcation Line
126
Ban
13
That Phanom
Muong Sen
92
102
1
213
Dong Ha
94
91
92
9
Séno
23
925
9
9
608
Muong Phalane
Quang Tri
9
Sépone
9
13
556
95)
931
Mukdahan
Savannakh
9
9
92
SOUTH
1
11
Sang 93
Mudng Phin
209
Hu
THAILAND
Keng Kok
238
VIETNAM
11
111
212
Muong
13
92
Bang Hieng
548
547
Sé
Nöng
922
Maha
2048
Sarakham
23
23
Roi Et
A Shau
23
92
16
Khenmarat
Kong
923
Ban Toumlan
16
215
13
216
233
Ban
614
214
216
Bac
7026
Dong
Saravane
162
Name CHU 23
Khong
16
Sédone
16
96
212
7065
163
92
7025
231
969
161
Ban
hateng
966
208
2050
7064
Ban Phone
16
Chavane
165
Mae
Nam
231
23
Nam
Mur
Ubon Ratchathan
Mae
13
165
Khong
165
968
217
Chiam
23
Warin Chamrap
10
Paksé
Pak
232
214
Song
96
Ban
24
Houei Kong
13
16
Dak Sut
Surin
Det Udom
Champassak
Muong May
96
Phiafay
Attope
24
7067
16
16
24
Kong
18
110
110
512
96
613
221
13
166
511
141
14
ONG
97
Cheqm Ksa
613
69
Samrong
68
69
Khong
Siem Pang
63
131
14
129
113
Virachei
Se
693
NAMES AND BOUNDARY representation
AUTHORITATIVE
Korth
194
ARE NOT NECESSARILY
CAMBODIA
19
78772 8-70
12
Andaung
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 126 Library DECLASSIFIED
13
Pech
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT RTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
4
0 301051Z JAN 71 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6.05
8030Q
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1401
30 JAN 1971
11 36Z
NODIS/ASHAU
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER
REF: A. VIENTIANE 522
B. VIENTIANE 550
1. ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL ABRAMS, I MET THIS MORNING WITH
PRESIDENT THIEU TO INFORM HIM OF AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S CONVERSATION
WITH SOUVANNA REPORTED REFTEL B. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT AMBASSADOR
GODLEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SOUVANNA (REF A) THAT THE INFORMATION HE
HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN HIM REGARDING THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION,
I.E., "FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DRY SEASON OR AT LEAST SIX WEEKS",
AND THAT THE SIZE WOULD BE TWO DIVISIONS PLUS, WAS ACCURATE.
2. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT FROM HIS AMBASSADOR
WHICH COINCIDED FULLY WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S REPORT. SOUVANNA
TOLD THE GVN AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE POSITION HE HAD
NOT REQUESTED THE OPERATION AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED ABOUT IT.
HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DELAY ANY DECLARATION FOR AS LONG
AS POSSIBLE. IF HE DOES MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SAID, HE WOULD NOT
GO BEYOND ASKING BOTH SIDES TO WITHDRAW NOR WOULD HE ACCUSE
SOUTH VIET-NAM OF AN INVASION OF LAO TERRITORY. HE WOULD ALSO
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NORTH VIET-NAM HAS OCCUPIED A PART OF LAOS
WHICH THE RLG CANNOT CONTROL.
3. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION WAS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH
THIEU'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE OPERATION AND QUESTIONS PUT TO GENERAL
ABRAMS. THIEU SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED GENERAL VIEN NOT TO GET
TIED DOWN IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AT TCHEPONE AS HAPPENED AI
KHE SANH AND DIEN BIEN PHU, BUT TO KEEP MOBILE; THAT AFTER THE
TCHEPONE AREA HAD BEEN CLEARED, EFFORTS COULD BE DIRECTED AT
CLEARING THE AREA SOUTH AND WEST TOWARD ASHAU. GENERAL ABRAMS
AGREED.
4. THIEU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD LESS CONCERN FOR THE ENEMY'S
GROUND FORCES THAN FOR ITS ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES. GENERAL
ABRAMS ALSO AGREED AND EXPLAINED WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING IN THE
WAY OF SUPPRESSION.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- SAIGON 1401, 301051Z JAN, (NODIS/ASHAU)
5. THIEU THEN ASKED WHAT GENERAL ABRAMS THOUGHT THE ENEMY
REACTION WOULD BE, SAY AFTER THREE WEEKS. GENERAL ABRAMS
SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD PROBABLY MOVE SOME FORCES
DOWN TO CONTEST THE AREA, BUT DOUBTED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO
SO IN THREE WEEKS. HE GAVE PRESIDENT THIEU AN INTELLIGENCE
BRIEFING ON LOCATIONV OF ENEMY UNITS. HE ADDED THAT INTELLIGENCE
SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY IS PUZZLED AND DOES NOT KNOW
WHAT WE ARE UP TO.
6. THIEU ASKED GENERAL ABRAMS WHAT HE THOUGHT THE ENEMY WOULD
ATTEMPT TO DO IN NORTHERN MR 1, AND GENERAL ABRAMS REPLIED THAT
THEY WILL TRY TO DO WHAT THEY CAN WITH THE 22 BATTALIONS NORTH
AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ AND ACTIVATE LOCAL UNITS IN MR 1. BUT HE DOES
NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN BE VERY EFFECTIVE IN MR 1.
7. THIEU THEN INQUIRED WHETHER WE THOUGHT THE ENEMY WOULD ATTEMPT
TO EXERT PRESSURE ON OTHER AREAS OF LAOS, SUCH AS THE PLAINE
DES JARRES OR LUANG PRABANG. GENERAL ABRAMS THOUGHT THEY MIGHT
DO so, BUT WE WOULD PROVIDE VERY STRONG AIR SUPPORT AGAINST ANY
EFFORTS OF THIS KIND. HE EXPLAINED THAT 70 PERCENT OF ALL TACTICAL
AIR WAS NOW BEING APPLIED IN THE LAO PANHANDLE, THAT 95 PERCENT
OF THE B-52 EFFORT WAS ALSO BEING APPLIED THERE.
8. AFTER THE MEETING, THIEU TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT HIS
AMBASSADOR HAD REPORTED THAT SOUVANNA WAS IN FACT PLEASED
BY THE OPERATION. I PRESUME THIS WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY AN
INTIMATION THAT SOUVANNA HAD NOT BEEN DISPLEASED BY THE GVN
APPROACH AND IN RESPONSE TO WHAT I SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY ABOUT
LEAVING THE DISCUSSIONS IN AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S HANDS.
9. THIEU SEEMS TO BE FULLY ON BOARD FOR BOTH PHASE I AND PHASE II
PENDING OUR DECISION ON THE LATTER.
BUNKER
BT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon esidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FII
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
HAIG ONLY
4
R 131830Z FEB 71 ZFF-3
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1448
4904Q
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 893
14 FEB 1971
14 45Z
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. IN ABSENCE AMBASSADOR UP-COUNTRY DCM AND ARMA
N
SAW PRIMIN THIS MORNING (FEB 13) TO BRIEF HIM ON
MILITARY SITUATION. SOUVANNA'S REACTIONS WERE
SUBDUED BUT ATTENTIVE. ON LAMSON 719 HE ASKED WHETHER
GVN AND US WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE NVA STRIKE
INTO FRIENDLY FLANK ACROSS DMZ. HE WAS REASSURED TO
HEAR THAT THIS THREAT HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED IN SAIGON
AND BLOCKING FORCE WAS IN POSITION.
2. WHEN TOLD THAT ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT ARMS CACHE
HAD BEEN DISCOVERED THUS FAR IN OPERATION SOUVANNA
OBSERVED THAT MAIN NVA SUPPLY DEPOTS WERE PROBABLY
FARTHER WEST. HE POINTED TO MUANG PHINE (XD0928)
ON MAP AND SAID IT WAS NECESSARY FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES TO MOVE INTO THIS AREA AFTER TCHEPONE.
3. SOUVANNA ALSO WONDERED WHETHER ARVN WOULD LINK
UP WITH SGU'S CONDUCTING OPERATIONS DESERT RAT AND
OKLAHOMA ON RT 23 SOUTH OF MUANG PHINE. DCM REPLIED
THAT FOR BOTH OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL REASONS THIS
WAS PROBABLY NOT FEASIBLE, BUT OPERATIONS WOULD BE
N
COORDINATED THROUGH GWSPGBIVE HEADQUARTERS. SOUVANNA
NODDED AGREEMENT AND EMPHASIZED THAT FRIENDLY
INTERDICTION OF RT 23 WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND
WOULD BECOME MORE SO AS ARVN PUSHED ENEMY LOC'S
FURTHER WEST. GP- GODLEY
BT
(*) AS RECEIVED CORRECTION TO FOLLOW:
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TAB SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential. Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 300605Z JAN 71 ZFF-3
INCN: 7974Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
JAN 30, 1971
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1263
0638Z
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 553
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY EYES ONLY
REF: VIENTIANE 550 JAN 29
1. AFTER THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC ATTITUDE SOUVANNA
COULD ADOPT TO ROUTE 9 OPERATION, I BELIEVE WE
SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO HIS PROTESTING SOUTH VIET-
NAMESE INCURSION INTO LAOS IF HE ALSO MAKES CLEAR
HIS OPPOSITION TO PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE.
IN FACT, HE SOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DISSOCIATE
HIMSELF PUBLICLY FROM ROUTE 9 OPERATION AND
PUT HIMSELF ON RECORD AS WANTING ALL FOREIGN
TROOPS OUT OF LAOS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. ANY LESS CATEGORIC POSITION THAN THIS WOULD
DAMAGE SOUVANNA'S STANDING AS A NEUTRALIST
ALMOST BEYOND REPAIR. I ASSUME THAT WHEN
WASHINGTON SPOKESMEN ARE ASKED WHETHER SOUVANNA
WAS CONSULTED ABOUT OPERATION IN ADVANCE THEY
WILL RESPOND WITH "NO COMMENT" RATHER THAN FLAT
DENIAL. THIS WILL LEAD JOURNALISTS IRRESTABLY TO
CONCLUSION THAT SOUVANNA WAS NOT ONLY CONSULTED
IN ADVANCE BUT GAVE COVERT APPROVAL TO OPERATION.
EVEN IF WE ARE ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE IN WASHINGTON,
I DOUBT THAT FICTION OF NO ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH RLG
COULD LONG BE MAINTANED IN SAIGON.
3. FOR THESE REASONS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO OUR
UTMOST TO PROTECT SOUVANNA AND REMAINING FABRIC
OF THE 1962 GENEVA ACCORDS BY ENCOURAGING HIM TO
MAKE CLEAR, AS HE HAS BEFORE, THAT RLG DOES NOT
WANT VIETNAMESE WAR FOUGHT IN LAOS. HE COULD ALSO
SAY THAT HE RECOGNIZES NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATION
OF LAO SOVEREIGNTY CAME FIRST AND PROVOKED SOUTH
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
200-0
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 553, JANUARY 30.
INCN: 7974Q
VIETNAMESE REACTION, BUT HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT
HE WAS OPPOSED TO ANY FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN
LAOS AND HAD ORDERED LAO MILITARY FORCES TO SET UP
DEFENSIVE SCREEN WEST OF AREA OF OPERATIONS ON ROUTE 9.
IMPLICATION OF LATTER REMARK WOULD OF COURSE BE
THAT RLG WAS DETERMINED TO SEE THAT AREA OF
OPERATIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT EXPAND
INTO WESTERN PANHANDLE. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF
SETTING UP SUCH A SCREEN WOULD BE TO INHIBIT
WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE.
GP- 1.
200-0
GODLEY
BT
NNNNY
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-360.575
DIPARTMENT Op STATE
TOP SECRET
Classification
OF STATES the UNITED AMERICA
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy VIENTIANE
PRIORITY
STATE
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR AMBASSADORS BUNKER AND GODLEY ONLY
REF: A. Vientiane 470
B. Vientiane 485
C. State
D. Saigon 1330
1. You should arrange to see President Thieu soonest to
inform him of conversations which Godley has had with
and latest instructions to Godley (Refs A, B and C).
Souvanna/ (Refs-A-and-B). You should explain that we-do-not
final decision on Phase II has to await fuller explanation of Lao views
/repeat-nct,-hoever, expect-to-have-dafinitive-lao-position
after
until/Souvanna returns from visit with King on or about
1 February.
2. You should then propose to President Thieu that he agree,
now
/in-any-event, to execute first phase of Operation Ashau and
that scheduled redeployments of RVNAF forces to Military
DRAFTING DATE
TEL. EXT.
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY win
EA:WHSullivan:mw
1/28/71
20272
The Secretary
CLEARANCES:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
REFORE
THE
TELEGRAM
IC
Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON
TOP SECRET
Classification
View is here that troop movements can be
Region I take place as planned. _Nou-should-state -clearly-that_this-be
justified on grounds of increasing threat to MR I from Panhandle.
done with the realization that border crossing phase of this
eperation-may-not,-repeat_not,be_subsequently_authorized.
3. If Thieu this proposal, this mean that Abrams
and Vien will have to agree alternate plans for the gainful
empleyment of-the operational forces-within country._lt_alsomcans
that no, repeat precise date can be fixed at this time for
putative execution of second phase of this operation.
4. You should also tell Thieu of our intention to inform Souvanna
decision on
of manner in which we are proceeding and of fact that/second phase
pending his reaction.
execution order being held in abeyance /at- thi -time- and may-not,--
repeat not be authorized. You and he should agree on appropriate
public line to take if, in your judgment, public attention to this
first phase requires official comment. We will appreciate opportunity to com-
ment on proposed line to assure our public position and yours will be consistent.
5. Report soonest the results of your conversation SO that we may
further
formulate appropriate/instructions to Godley - per Ref. C.
End.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE
FROM:
SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TO:
AMBASSADOR BERGER, U.S. EMBASSY SAIGON
INFO:
AMBASSADOR GODLEY
GENERAL ABRAMS
Highest authority has approved execution of Phase II of
Tchepone operation and authorized employment of U.S. Tacair,
arc light, fixed and rotary wing gunships and airlift in Laos in
support of operation. General Abrams has already been provided
execute authority via military channels. It is requested that you
and General Abrams inform Thieu as soon as possible of U.S.
decision to proceed with Phase II commencing February 8 Saigon time.
In your discussion with President Thieu, you should emphasize the
importance of portraying Phase II as all Vietnamese operation,
supplemented by necessary U.S. air support. In this regard, it is
important that decision to enter Laos also be portrayed as Vietnamese
decision. U.S. has agreed to give air support which may be needed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2
Please advise soonest of outcome of discussions with
President Thieu. Additional instructions covering coordination of
U.S., GVN and Laotian official and public statements on Phase II
will follow.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
&
Department of State
280-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 080601Z FEB 71 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
INCN: 2553Q
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1354
FEBRUARY 8, 1971
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH 5530
0624Z
BT
TOPSECRETVIENTIANE 73I
NODIS/ASHAU
N
FOR THE SECRETARY
n-00z
REF: (A) STATE 021021
(B) VIENTIANE 720
LAO NATIONAL RADIO HAS JUST BROADCAST IN NAME OF LAO
GOVERNMENT THE TEXT OF THE STATEMENT AS TRANSMITTED
TO DEPARTMENT IN REF B.
GP - 1.
GODLEY
BT
S
NNNN
TOP SECRET
200-0
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NOTTHiS document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to execlassified.E SECRETARY
so
8
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
wild
.
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
P' 080525Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
INCN: 25550
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2988
FEBRUARY 8, 1971
BT
TOPSECRET PHNOM PENH 544
0646Z
NODIS
SUBJECT: KHMER REACTION TO OPERATION LAMSON 719
N
REF: (A) STATE 20982
(B) STATE 21006
(C) STATE 21017
(D) VIENTIANE 563
1. LON NOL RECEIVED ME AT MY REQUEST EARLY EVENING FEBRUARY 7
BEFORE RECEIPT REF (B).
2. HE FULLY APPROVES ARVN OPERATIONS INTO LAOS, AS MIGHT
HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, AND SAID THAT GKR WILL COMMENT POSITIVELY
ON THEM.
3. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT BOUN OUM AND SISOUK HAD REQUESTED
KHMER MANPOWER FOR US IN SOUTHERN LAOS. HE SAID HE WISHES TO
MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS SISOUK SUGGESTED TO AMBASSADOR GODLEY (REF D,
PARA 2). WE WILL TRY TO ASCERTAIN WHERE THIS PROJECT STANDS,
OUR PRESENT UNDERSTANDING BEING THAT MEN WILL BE ASSEMBLED
ON VOLUNTARY BASIS FOR VARIOUS UNITS AND THAT NO MAP-
EQUIPPAE BATTALION (OR MAP EQUIPMENT) WILL BE INVOLVED
N
PER SE.
4. DEPARTMENT PASS VIENTIANE IF DESIRED.
SWANK
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRO Reproduced the Richard Nixon residential ibrary DECLASSIFIED HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
280-0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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0 080516Z FEB 71 ZFF4
OUTCN: 02531Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
8 FEB 71 0539Z
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6702
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE 021034
NODIS/ASHAU
N
REF: SAIGON 1829
DO NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT TO GVN UNTIL
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO DO so.
ROGERS
BT
NNNN
DRAFTEDBY: S/S - MR. ELIOT APPROVED BY: S/S - MR. ELIOT
N
TOP SECRET
NOT Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOBERER reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. ECRETARY
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
8
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
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0 030430Z FEB 71
2552Q
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
RECVD: 08 FEB 71
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6917
BT
1:12AM
TOPSECRE T TOKYO 1106
NODIS
SUBJ: THIEU ANNOUNCEMENT
REF: STATE 021020
N
1. DUE TO ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR BUT AT AMBASSADOR'S
DIRECTION POL COUNSELOR SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH XIICE MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MORI TO CONVEY INFORMATION REFTEL. AT TIME OF
APPOINTMENT, HOWEVER, MORI WAS SUDDENLY CALLED TO PRIMIN OFFICE
AND INFORMATION WAS PASSED INSTEAD TO DIRGEN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
YOSHINO ON UNDERSTANDING THAT INFORMATION WOULD BE RELAYED
IMMEDIATELY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER.
2. YOSHINO LISTENED CAREFULLY TO PRESENTATION TAKING
FULL NOTES, EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION OF JAPANESE GOVERN-
MENT AT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND SAID HE WOULD
IMMEDIATELY CONVEY SUBSTANCE TO FONMIN AICHI.
3. POL COUNSELOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT GOJ WOULD ENDEAVOR
COMMENTS SYMPATHETICALLY. YOSHINO REPLIED THAT HE WAS
SURE SENIOR AUTHORITIES OF GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE FULL
ATTENTION TO POINTS MADE IN THIS REPRESENTATION.
MEYER
N
BT
NNNN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
G-002
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 080410Z FEB 71 ZFF4
S
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
2527Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 88Ø
BT
FEB 7, 11:41 PM 1971
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1829
NODIS/ASHAU.
REF: STATE 021021
200-0
TODAY UNLESS I HEAR TO CONTRARY FROM DEPT, AT 1800 HOURS SAIGON
ISSUE I WILL GIVE NHA FOR THIEU TEXT OF STATEMENT DEPT PLANS TIME TO
PLEASE LET ME KNOW.
0930 HOURS WASHINGTON TIME FEBRUARY 8. IF ANY CHANGES
BERGER
BT
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
200-0
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
2524Q
FEB 7, 11:21 PM 1971
Z 080355Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 879
BT
TOPSECRETSAIGON 1827
200-0
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 021027
MACV STATEMENT MADE.
BERGER
BT
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Due
00Z
N
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 080338Z FEB 71 ZFF4
S
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 878
BT
2522Q
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1826
FEB 7, 11:07 PM 1971
NODIS/ASHAU
N
FOREIGN MINISTRY CALLED TCC REPS TO A MEETING AT 1045 HOURS.
AMBASSADOR PHUONG GAVE US TEXTS OF BROADCAST, SAID ICC REPS HERE
AND CO-CHAIRMEN BEING SUPPLIED TEXTS AFTER BROADCAST. HE SAID
RUSSIANS WOULD BE SUPPLIED TEXT BY THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN
PARIS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR, HE
ADVANCE. SAID WE COULD ASSUME LAO GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF BROADCAST IN
BERGER
BT
N
TOP-SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRO DUCED Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIEDHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
200-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
2520Q
Z 080242Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FEB 7, 9:42 PM 1971
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH 6701
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE 021027
N
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: SAIGON 1823
1. CONCUR IN YOUR SENDING TEXT THIEU STATEMENT FLASH AND
IN CLEAR UPON COMPLETION BROADCAST FOR DEPARTMENT TO
RETRANSMIT TO ALL POSTS.
2. ALSO, ADVISE FLASH WHEN MACV STATEMENT MADE PER STATE
20978 SO THAT DEPARTMENT CAN TRANSMIT IT TO ALL POSTS. ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: S/S Mr. Eliot
Cleared by: USIA - Mr. Towery
EA - Mr. Sullivan
N
Approved by: S/S Mr. Eliot
S
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NO This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
280-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 080105Z FEB 71 ZFF4
2513Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
Feb 7, 8:28 PM 1971
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 875
BT
TOPSECRETSAIGON 1823
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 21019
200-0
1. COMMUNICATIONS CHIEF AND NICKEL INFORM ME THAT FASTEST AND MOST
PRACTICAL WAY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IS TO SEND TEXT IN CLEAR TO DEPT
FOR RETRANSMISSION AS CIRTEL ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS. WE WILL HAVE
CABLE PREPARED IN ADVANCE AND SENT FLASH ON COMPLETION OF BROAD-
CAST.
2. THE MESSAGE WE WOULD SEND DEPT WOULD READ: PLEASE RETRANSMIT AS
IMMEDIATE CIRCULAR TEL ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS. FOLLOWING IS OFFICIAL
ENGLISH TEXT OF STATEMENT BROADCAST BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU
AI (BLANK) HOURS SAIGON TIME FEBRUARY 8.
3. PLEASE CONFIRM.
BERGER
BT
N
TOP SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPR Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECL ASSIFIED THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
N
Department of State
UNITED STATES STATEMENT OF
TELEGRAM
TOP-SECRET
S
Z 080050Z FEB 71 ZFF4
2512Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 874
FEB 7, 8:06 PM 1971
BT
TOPSECRET. SAIGON 1822
NODIS/ASHAU
N
REF: STATE 21014
G-002
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BROADCAST ICC REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE INFORMED
BY FOREIGN MINISTER LAM AND GIVEN STATEMENT. POLISH ICC REP WILL
ALSO BE GIVEN STATEMENT TO PASS TO SOVIET UNION. BRITISH AMBASSADOR
WILL BE ASKED TO INFORM UK.
BERGER
BT
N
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED DECLASSIFIED THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been Reproduced reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(4)
280-0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
P 080005Z FEB 71
2507Q
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4089
FEB 7, 7:37 PM 1971
BT
TOPSECRET WELLINGTON 203
NODIS
N
REF: STATE 021018
G-00Z
1. IN ABSENCE AMBASSADOR AND PRIME MINISTER DCM INFORMED
LAKING WHO HAS SINCE FULLY BRIEFED PRIME MINISTER. LAKING
SAYS PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION IS SAME AS GORTON'S AND
HE WILL MAKE PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSED STATEMENT AVAILABLE
WHEN IT IS READY. PRME MINISTER TIED UP ALL DAY IN
IMPORTANT CABINET MEETING CON WAGES AND PRICES). DCM
TOLD LAKING HE WAS AVAILABLE TO PRIME MINISTER AT ANY
TIME.
S
2. LAKING SAYS GNZ FULLY UNDERSTANDS NECESSITY THIS OPERA-
TION IN THIS AREA. GP-1. FRANZHEIM
BT
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
F
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
TOP SECRET
0 072040Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6699
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8575
2488Q
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 021021
FEB 7, 3:40 PM 1971
NODIS/ASHAU
STRICTLY FOR AMBASSADORS BERGER AND GODLEY
N
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DEPARTMENT PLANS TO ISSUE 0930
WASHINGTON TIME FEBRUARY 8. FIRST SENTENCE PARA 8 WILL OF
COURSE BE OMITTED IF SOUVANNA HAS NOT ISSUED HIS STATEMENT
BY THEN. HOWEVER, WE COULD WAIT UNTIL AS LATE AS 1100 TO
INCLUDE OUR SENTENCE IF SOUVANNA MAKES STATEMENT BY THEN.
VIENTIANE PLEASE FLASH NECESSARY INFO.
QUOTE LAST EVENING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
ANNOUNCED IN SAIGON THAT BLEMENTS OF ITS ARMED FORCES HAVE
CROSSED INTO ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF LAOS TO ATTACK
NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND MILITARY SUPPLIES WHICH HAVE
BEEN ASSEMBLED IN SANCTUARIES CLOSE TO THE BORDER OF SOUTH VIET-
NAM. THESE SANCTUARIES LIE BETWEEN THE 16TH AND 17TH PARALLELS
AND COMPRISE CONCENTRATIONS WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE
HO CHI MINH TRAIL SYSTEM. OUR MILITARY COMMAND IN VIET-NAM
HAS ANNOUNCED THE LIMITS OF THE U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION.
THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ASSIST IS BASED ON THE
N
FOLLOWING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:
1. NO AMERICAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES OR ADVISORS WILL CROSS
INTO LAOS.
2. THE OPERATION WILL BE A LIMITED ONE BOTH AS TO TIME AND
AREA. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT ITS OB-
JECTIVE WILL BE TO DISRUPT THOSE FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONCEN-
TRATED IN THIS REGION FOR USE AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND UNITED
STATES FORCES LOCATED IN THE NORTHERN MILITARY REGIONS OF SOUTH
VIET-NAM, AND TO INTERCEPT OR CHOKE OFF THE FLOW OF
SUPPLIES AND MEN DURING THE DRY SEASON WHICH ARE DESIGNED FOR
USE FURTHER SOUTH ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL IN SOUTH VIET-
NAM AND CAMBODIA.
3. THE OPERATION WILL PROMOTE THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF
JUP SECKET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2- STATE 021021, FEB 7, 1971.
TOP SECRET
AMERICAN AND ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND IS CONSISTENT
WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. IT WILL MAKE THE ENEMY LESS ABLE
TO MOUNT OFFENSIVES AND STRENGTHEN SOUTH VIET-NAM'S ABILITY TO
DEFEND ITSELF AS U.S. FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN FROM SPUTH
VIET-NAM. IT WILL PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES.
4: THIS GROUND OPERATION BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AGAINST THE
SANCTUARIES THUS WILL AID IN THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM. THE
WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM VIET-NAM WILL CONTINUE.
DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE FURTHER
WITHDRAWALS.
5. THE MEASURES OF SELF-DEFENSE BEING TAKEN BY THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. A
REPORT TO THIS EFFECT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-
NAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED
N
NATIONS, TO THE GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN, AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS
WHICH COMPRISE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION.
6. THIS LIMITED OPERATION IS NOT AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE WAR.
THE TERRITORY INVOLVED HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF COMBAT SINCE 1965.
THE PRINCIPAL NEW FACTOR IS THAT SOUTH VIET-NAM FORCES WILL
MOVE AGAINST THE ENEMY ON THE GROUND TO DENY HIM THE SANCTUARIES
AND DISRUPT THE MAIN ARTERY OF SUPPLIES WHICH HE HAS BEEN
ABLE TO USE SO EFFECTIVELY AGAINST AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES IN THE PAST.
7. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO END THE CON-
FLICT IN INDOCHINA THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT NIXON
SPECIFICALLY PROPOSED LAST OCTOBER THAT THERE BE (A) A
CEASE-FIRE THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA, (B) A NEGOTIATED TIMETABLE
FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES, (C) IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OF ALL PRISONERS OF WAR, (D) AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE
FOR ALL OF INDOCHINA, AND (E) A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
N
8. THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED
A STATEMENT, WHICH, WHILE CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT
MILITARY ACTION POINTS OUT THAT THE "PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
RESTS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR THEIR SCORNFUL VIOLATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY AND
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE KINGDOM." THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO FAVOR THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS AND
THE RESTORATION OF THE SITUATION CONTEMPLATED BY THE 1962
GENEVA ACCORDS IN WHICH ALL FOREIGN FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN
FROM LAO TERRITORY. A NEW INDOCHINA CONFERENCE AS PROPOSED BY
PRESIDENT NIXON COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. UNQUOTE
ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: J - U A Johnson
Cleared by: S/S - T L Eliot
TOP SECRET
Approved by: J - U Alexis Johnson
NOT TO BE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TOP SECRET
TELEGRAM
O 072039Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2157
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE021020
2487Q
FEB 7, 3:39 PM 1971
NODIS
TO BE DECRYPTED ONLY BE SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
N
1. AI ABOUT 1000 HOURS SAIGON TIME FEBRUARY 8, PRESIDENT
THIEU WILL ANNOUNCE THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED, FORCES WILL
CROSS INTO ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY OF LAOS TO ATTACK
SANCTUARIES CLOSE TO THE BORDER OF SOUTH VIET-NAM BETWEEN
THE 16TH AND 17TH PARALLELS. THIS ACTION WILL BE OF LIMITED
DURATION AND IS INTENDED TO DISRUPT THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND
MEN FURTHER SOUTH DOWN THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL INTO SOUTH
VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA, AND THEREBY TO ENHANCE THE SAFETY
AND SECURITY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AS THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES
TO WITHDRAW ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AS PART OF THE VIETNAMIZATION
PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, BY THIS ACTION THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
EXPECT TO DISRUPT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BASES, ARMS AND
SUPPLIES WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED IN THIS REGION FOR USE
AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AS WELL AS THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE AND UNITED STATES FORCES LOCATED IN SOUTH VIET-
NAM.
N
2. NO RPT NO UNITED STATES GROUND TROOPS OR ADVISERS WILL CROSS
INTO LAO TERRITORY. THE UNITED STATES WILL, HOWEVER, ASSIST BY
PROVIDING WHATEVER AIR POWER-COMBAT, LOGISTICS, AND MEDEVAC,
EITHER FIXED WING OR HELICOPTERS--IS REQUIRED TO AUGMENT THE
CAPABILITIES OF THE RVNAF, AND BY THE USE OF ARTILLERY FIRING
FROM POSITIONS EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH
VIET-NAM: THUS, EXCEPT FOR THAT ARTILLERY AND SOME TROOP
AND LOGISTIC LIFT FOR ARVN FORCES, US OPERATIONS IN LAOS
WILL NOT BE ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE CARRIED ON IN
THE PAST.
3. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT THE TERRITORY IN WHICH THIS CURRENT
MILITARY ACTION IS TAKING PLACE HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE WAR FOR
MANY YEARS AND HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO ATTACK BY UNITED STATES
AIR POWER SINCE 1965, THIS IS, THEREFORE, NOT A NEW THEATER
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 'BUT RATHER ONE WHICH HAS BECOME MORE
TOP-SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRO Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 021020, FEB 7, 1971
CRITICAL SINCE THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT CLOSED THE PORT OF
KOMPONG SOM (SIHANOUKVILLE) TO COMMUNIST LOGISTICS
OPERATIONS. NORTH VIET-NAM'S AGGRESSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
OUTSIDE ITS FRONTIERS DIRECTED AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM, CAMBODIA,
AND SOUTHERN LAOS, HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY MOUNTED FROM
AND THROUGH THESE ILLEGAL SANCTUARIES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN
TERRITORIES OF LAOS.
4. AS SOUVANNA HAS POINTED OUT, THE TERRITORY OF LAOS ON WHICH
THIS ACTION WILL TAKE PLACE HAS BEEN INVADED AND CONTROLLED
BY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES FOR MANY YEARS IN VIOLATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE MOST SOLEMN
OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY NORTH VIET-NAM IN THE 1954 AND 1962
N
GENEVA AGREEMENTS. THE ORIGINAL LAO CIVILIAN POPULATION HAS
LONG SINCE FLED FROM THE AREA, WHICH IS TOTALLY OCCUPIED BY
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. THE LAO GOVERNMENT
HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ITS INABILITY TO EXERT ITS CONTROL OVER
THE AREA OR TO EXPEL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVADERS.
5. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT DRY SEASON, THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AND SUPPLIES WHICH THEY HAVE INTRODUCED INTO THIS AREA. THEY
HAVE ALSO SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE ARMED FORCES THEY HAVE
DEPLOYED THERE. DESPITE REPEATED AIR ATTACKS BY UNITED
STATES AIRCRAFT ATTEMPTING TO INTERDICT THIS DEVELOPMENT,
THEY SEEM INTENT UPON AUGMENTING THEIR PRESENCE AND INCREASING
THE THREAT TO GVN AND U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.
6. THE MEASURES OF SELF-DEFENSE BEING TAKEN BY THE GVN,
ASSISTED BY THE UNITED STATES, ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH INTER-
NATIONAL LAW. THEY ARE BEING SO REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE GVN GOVERNMENT.
COPIES OF THIS LETTER WILL BE SENT TO THE GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN,
AND TO THE ICC GOVERNMENTS.
7. SINCE THESE ACTIONS RAISE ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE
GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962, WE WOULD EXPECT RLG PRIME MINISTER
SOUVANNA PHOUMA TO PROTEST THEM AND TO ASK FOR THE WITHDRAWAL
OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. WE UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION, CONTINUE TO
RESPECT THE RLG DESIRE FOR NEUTRALITY AND TO RETURN THE
1962 ACCORDS TO THE RESPECT OF ALL SIGNATORIES. HOWEVER, WE
AND THE GVN WILL EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS THE VIOLATION OF THESE
ACCORDS BY THE DRV WHICH HAS MADE THIS OPERATION NECESSARY.
8. IN GENERAL, WE WISH TO STRESS THE FACT THAT THIS ACTION IS
PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF A GVN DECISION, IS OF LIMITED
SCOPE AND DURATION, AND TO WHICH WE ARE PROVIDING
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined THE to be EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
N
TOP SECRET
-3- STATE 021020, FEB 7, 1971
LIMITED ASSISTANCE. WE CONSIDER IT FULLY JUSTIFIED IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO OCCUPATION OF
LAO TERRITORY. AS THE GVN WILL MAKE CLEAR, THE GVN FORCES
WILL RETIRE WHEN THEIR MISSION IS ACCOMPLISHED.
9. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED CONFIDENTIALLY TO INFORM GOJ OF FOREGOING
AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE AND AVAILABLE LEVEL NOT MORE THAN THREE
HOURS PRIOR TO THIEU'S STATEMENT: THAT IS, 1000 HOURS FEBRUARY
8, SAIGON TIME. YOU MAY INFORM GOJ THAT THEY ARE BEING
GIVEN THIS ADVANCE AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION BECAUSE OF USG
SPECIAL CONCERN THAT THEY BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE AREA. WE WOULD NATURALLY WELCOME WHATEVER GOJ MAY
N
FEEL ABLE TO SAY IN SUPPORT. ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: J - U A Johnson
Cleared by: S/S - T L Eliot
Approved by: Under Secretary Johnson
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPR Reproduced at the Richard-Nixon THE Presidential UTHORIZ Library DECLASSIFIED ATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
N
CC
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-7 FEB 712 20 16
0 072000Z FEB 71
002486
S
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6845
BT
SECRE T PARIS 1978
NODIS
N
FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
REFERENCE: PARIS 1977
JUST TALKED WITH PRIME MINISTER CHABAN DELMAS
WHO CAME BACK FROM BORDEAUX EARLY TO SEE ME EVEN THOUGH I
OFFERED TO FLY DOWN THERE TO CONSULT WITH HIM. I WENT OVER
8 POINTS OF STATE 020982 WITH HIM. HE WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED TO
HAVE BEEN INFORMED AHEAD OF TIME ON THIS IMPORTANT MATTER
BUT SAID HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON CONTENTS OF MESSAGE. HE ASSURED
ME HE WOULD SEND INFO TO PRESIDENT POMPIDOU AND WOULD MAINTAIN
SECRECY.
WATSON
N
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Preside brary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
LidoaS d01,
P 071936Z FEB 71 ZFF4
2484Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 6698
7 FEB 71 Z19 36
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 021019
NODIS/ASHAU
200-0
STRICTLY FOR AMBASSADOR BERGER
IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIEU'S STATEMENT IS IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED BY USIS IN TEXTUALLY ACCURATE FORM, WE LEAVE IT TO
EMBASSY TO CIRCULATE TEXT TO ALL USIS POSTS IMMEDIATELY
AFTER DELIVERY. THEREAFTER USIA WILL BE ISSUING GUIDANCE
TO ALL POSTS RE OPERATION. ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY:
200-0
EA:MGreen:mw
J: U Alexis Johnson
CLEARANCES:
USIA -Mr. Towery
S/S-TLEliot
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State "
Haig4
200-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 071935Z FEB 71 ZFF-4
2485Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
7 FEB 71 Z20 09
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 873
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1821
200-0
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 021016
WILL OBTAIN INFO FROM NHA AT 0800 HOURS.
BERGER
200-0
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
IMP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
280-0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 071759Z FEB 71 ZFF4
24740
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
7 FEB- 71 Z17 59
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE FLASH 8572
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 6696
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 021016
NODIS/ASHAU
N
G-002
STRICTLY FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BERGER
S
REF: A) VIENTIANE 720
B) SAIGON 1800
C) DEPTEL 21006
1. IN VIEW OF DELAY OF THIEU'S STATEMENT, ASSUME SOUV ANNA
WILL ALSO DELAY HIS STATEMENT. REQUEST VIENTIANE FLASH
DEPARTMENT WHEN SOUVANNA MAKES HIS STATEMENT AND WHETHER
ANY CHANGE IN TEXT CONTAINED REFTEL A.
280-0
2. ALSO REQUEST SAIGON XLASH VIENTIANE WHEN THIEU
BROADCAST STARTS. ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY:
J:UAJohnson:mw
J:U. Alexis Johnson
CLEARANCES:
S/S - TLEliot
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENTA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 060040Z FEB 71 ZFF4
CONTROL: 1700Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
FEB 4, 1971-7:40 P.M.
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6584
BT RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8530
TOPSECRET STATE 19872
NODIS/ASHAU
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS BERGER AND GODLEY
1. FOLLOWING IS OUR SUGGESTED DRAFT OF GVN NOTIFICATION TO
PRESIDENT OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES TAKEN
BY ARMED FORCES OF REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, ASSISTED BY U.S. AIR
POWER. THIS DRAFT IS NOT TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY VIETNAMESE
OR LAO OFFICIALS, BUT WE WISH TO HAVE YOUR COMMENTS NO LATER
THAN 7:00 AM FEBRUARY 5 WASHINGTON TIME FOR CONSIDERATION AT
HIGH-LEVEL MEETING MORNING FEBRUARY 5.
BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
"I HAVE THE HONOR TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL FURTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WHICH HAVE REQUIRED APPROPRIATE
MEASURES OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
"YOU WILL RECALL THAT NORTH VIET-NAM HAS CONTINUED FOR MANY
YEARS TO CARRY OUT AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM.
IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD REFER TO THE LETTERS OF FEBRUARY 7 AND
27, 1965, FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING
MEASURES OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE REQUIRED TO MEET THAT ATTACK.
I WOULD ALSO REFER TO THE LETTER OF MAY 5, 1970, FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING ACTIONS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
ARMED FORCES IN CAMBODIA WHICH REQUIRED LIMITED DEFENSIVE
STATES. COUNTERMEASURES BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED
"AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES TAKEN IN CAMBODIA BY
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ARMED RESISTANCE BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVADERS, THE IMPORTANT LINE OF
SUPPLY TO THE INVADING TROOPS THROUGH THE GULF OF SIAM HAS BEEN
CLOSED AND THE CONTINUANCE OF AGGRESSION HAS THEREBY BEEN MADE
MORE DIFFICULT. however. WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE DRY SEASON
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD CERRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP
SECRET
-2-STATE 19872,
EB
4
IN LAOS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE GREATLY INCREASED THE FLOW
OF MEN AND SUPPLIES SOUTHWARD THROUGH THAT NEUTRAL COUNTRY TO
FUEL THEIR WAR OF AGGRESSION IN CAMBODIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET-NAM. IN PARTICULAR, VASI QUANTITIES OF MUNITIONS AND
OTHER WAR SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN SENT SOUTH, DIRECTED TO OR
THROUGH A CONCENTRATION OF ROUTES AND SUPPLY DEPOTS IN AREAS
KNOWN AS BASE AREAS 604 AND 611 LOCATED BETWEEN THE SIXIEENTH
AND SEVENTEENTH PARALLELS AND ADJACENT TO THE BORDER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM. THE LAO CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THIS AREA
FLED SOME YEARS AGO IN THE FACE OF ITS EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION AND
USE BY NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. THE PRESENCE OF THIS LARGE
SANCTUARY AREA, WHICH INCLUDES MANY THOUSANDS OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS, POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE REPUBLIC OF
VIET-NAM, PARTICULARLY TO THE FIRST MILITARY REGION. THE THREAT
INCREASES DAILY AND MUST BE DEALT WITH QUICKLY AND DIRECTLY.
- TO THAT END THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM HAS DETERMINED TO
TAKE ACTION IN THIS' SANCTUARY AREA OF LAOS AS REQUIRED FOR
SELF-DEFENSE. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM,
ASSISTED BY U.S. AIR POWER AND BY U.S. ARTILLERY FIRING FROM POSITIONS
EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, HAVE BEGUN
TO CHOKE OFF THIS ARTERY OF AGGRESSION BY DISRUPTING THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE SUPPLY LINES AND DESTROYING THE BASES, ARMS AND OTHER
MILITARY SUPPLIES IN THIS AREA OF LAOS. WHEN THIS TASK IS
ACCOMPLISHED, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
WILL WITHDRAW; NO OCCUPATION OF LAOTIAN TERRITORY WILL OCCUR.
"YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE 1962 AGREEMENT ON THE NEUTRALITY OF
LAOS REQUIRED NORTH VIET-NAM TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS ARMED FORCES
FROM LAOS AND PROHIBITED THEIR REINTRODUCTION AND THE USE OF
THE TERRITORY OF LAOS FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
OF OTHER COUNTRIES. NORTH VIET-NAM NEVER LIVED UP TO THOSE
COMMITMENTS AND HAS CONTINUED TO OCCUPY MUCH OF THE TERRITORY
OF LAOS AND TO WAGE WAR AGAINST THE ROYAL LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT.
THE SUPPLY LINES AND BASES IN SOUTHERN LAOS HAVE BEEN USED
N
CONTINUALLY SINCE 1962, IN VIOLATION OF LAOTIAN NEUTRALITY AND
THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM. IN VIEW OF THIS HISTORY AND IN THE CURRENT
CIRCUMSTANCES AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED, THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
IS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN TEMPORARILY SETTING ASIDE COMPLIANCE WITH
THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE 1962 AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROHIBIT THE
DEFENSIVE MEASURES IT IS NOW TAKING IN THE TERRITORY OF
LAOS.
"THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM REITERATES ITS RESPECT FOR THE
SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY OF THE KINGDOM OF LAOS AND ITS FIDELITY TO THE 1962 GENEVA
AGREEMENT ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS. COMPLIANCE BY NORTH
VIET-NAM WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THAT AGREEMENT WOULD MAKE
UNNECESSARY THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES I HAVE DESCRIBED AND WOULD
MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA TO BEGIN TO ENJOY THE
PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION IT HAS SOUGHT FOR SO LONG.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
200-0
-3-STATE 19872, FEB 4
"I WOULD REQUEST THAT MY LETTER BE CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
"ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.
SIGNED: "BLANK" FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM. END QUOTE
ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY: Marshall Green: EA
APPROVED BY: Under Secretary Johnson
CLEARANCES: TLEliot:S/S
200-0
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENT
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
P 071759Z FEB 71 ZFF4
2480Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
7 FEB 71 Z17 59
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0740
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4794
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5296
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 2990
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1846
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2918
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6636
N
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8573
RUEHCR/USDEL FRANCE 5747
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE021017
NODIS
TO BE DECRYPTED ONLY BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY PRESIDENT
THIEU AT OR SOON AFTER 1100 RPT 1100 HOURS FEBRUARY 8 SAIGON
TIME:
QUOTE
MESSAGE OF HIS EXCELLENCY NGUYEN VAN THIEU, PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, TO ALL THE PEOPLE, SOLDIERS,
N
AND CADRES ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY
BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
1. TODAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1971, I HAVE ORDERED THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO ATTACK THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE BASES OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY
ALONG THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER IN MILITARY REGION I.
2. THIS OPERATION IS CALLED OPERATION LAMSON 719.
3. THIS IS AN OPERATION LIMITED IN TIME AS WELL AS IN
SPACE, WITH THE CLEAR AND UNIQUE OBJECTIVE OF DISRUPTING
THE SUPPLY AND INFILTRATION NETWORK OF THE COMMUNIST
NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS LYING IN THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY,
AND WHICH FOR MANY YEARS WAS OCCUPIED BY THE COMMUNIST NORTH
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 21017, FEB 7, NODIS
VIETNAMESE FORCES AND USED TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST OUR
COUNTRY.
4. TODAY I SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
ALWAYS RESPECTS THE INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS.
5. I ALSO SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
DOES NOT HAVE ANY TERRITORIAL AMBITION WHATSOEVER AND
NEVER INTERFERES IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM
OF LAOS. I ALSO PLEDGE THAT WHEN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
LIMITED OPERATION ENDS, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC
N
OF VIET-NAM WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE LAOTIAN
TERRITORY.
6. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WE ALL KNOW THAT SINCE MANY
YEARS THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES HAD OPENLY
VIOLATED THE NEUTRALITY AND THE TERRITORY OF THE ROYAL
KINGDOM OF LAOS, AND BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE 1962 GENEVA
AGREEMENT ON LAOS JUST AS THEY HAD BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE
1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON INDOCHINA IN ORDER TO WAGE THE
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIEINAM.
7. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WE ALL DO ALSO KNOW THAT THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD OPENLY OCCUPIED ONE IMPORTANT
PART OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY, HAD BUILT THE Ho CHI MINH
TRAIL THERE IN ORDER TO MOVE COUNTLESS SOLDIERS, WEAPONS,
AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY MATERIEL INTO THE SOUTH, AND HAD
ESTABLISHED IN THAT PART OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY GREAT
MILITARY AND LOGISTIC BASES IN ORDER TO WAGE THE AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
N
8. IF THIS SITUATION PREVAILS, THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE WILL STUBBORNLY CONTINUE THEIR WAR OF AGGRESSION
THROUGHOUT VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THE KHMER REPUBLIC.
9. IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OV VIET-NAM, WHILE
WE SHOW MAXIMUM GOOD WILL AT THE PARIS TALKS IN ORDER TO
solve THIS WAR THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND
THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE THE ALLIED NATIONS HAVE
WITHDRAWN A GREAT PART OF THEIR TROOPS AND CONTINUE TO
WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, ON THE CONTRARY, THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE STILL CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE TROOPS, WEAPONS,
AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND ARE GETTING READY
TO LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS IN THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-3- STATE 21017, FEB 7, NODIS
10. FOR THESE REASONS, THE ATTACKS OF OUR ARMED FORCES AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS ON
THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF BELLIGERENCE
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, BUT ARE SOLELY AN ACT OF
LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS.
11. THIS IS NOT AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AGAINST THE FRIENDLY NATION OF LAOS, ON THE CONTRARY,
THIS CONSTITUTES AN ACT DESIGNED TO STOP THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE FROM EXPANDING AND MAINTAINING THEIR
AGGRESSION POTENTIAL.
12. THIS IS NOT EITHER A WAR UNDERTAKEN BY THE REPUBLIC
200-0
OF VIET-NAM; ON THE CONTRARY, THIS IS AN ACT TO HELP SOON
END THE WAR AND RESTORE PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.
UNQUOTE. ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY
J
- JIGetzELM
J- Ambassador Johnson
CLEARANCES:
S/S-TLEliot
200-0
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
"
4
280-0
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
VV XRJ753
00 RUEHC
-7 FEB71217 25
00247
DE RUFNCR 1977 0381720
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 071717Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6844
BT
SECRET PARIS 1977
NODIS
200-0
REFERENCE: DEPTEL 20999
FOR SECRETARY ROGERS FROM AMBASSADOR WATSON
WILL MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER CHABAN-DELMAS AT 20:00
PARIS TIME SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 7.
WATSON
BT
NNNN
200-0
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Haig
*
Department of State
200-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
P 071712Z FEB 71 ZFF4
2473Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
7 FEB 71 Z17 12
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5295
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 21015
NODIS
TO BE DECRYPTED BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
280-0
LITERALLY FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY
AMBASSADOR CROMER AND MINISTER MILLARD CALLED AT
GREEN'S OFFICE AT 11:15 TODAY (WASHINGTOW TIME) WHERE
THEY RECEIVED BRIEFING ON LAOS OPERATION. THEY MOST
APPRECIATIVE OF UKG'S THUS KEPT INFORMED, ESPECIALLY IN
VIEW OF UK'S CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ROLE. ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY:
EA: MGreen :mw
J:John I. Getz
CLEARANCES:
S/S- TLEliot
200-0
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
4
200-0
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
2471Q
Z 071712Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
7 FEB 71 Z 17 12
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH 6695
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 021014
NODIS/ASHAU
N
FOR AMBASSADOR BERGER ONLY
S
ADVISE WHEN AND WHERE GVN WILL INFORM ICC AND GENEVA
CO-CHAIRMEN, ROGERS
DRAFTED BY:
APPROVED BY
N
S/S-TLEliot
EA:Marshall Green:elm
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD CECONT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENTA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 071619Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
2466Q
TO USMISSION US UN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5948
7 FEB 71 Z16 19
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE021013
NODIS
TO BE DECRYPTED ONLY BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR YOST
N
FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF THIEU STATEMENT:
QUOTE
MESSAGE OF HIS EXCELLENCY NGUYEN VAN THIEU, PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, TO ALL THE PEOPLE, SOLDIERS,
AND CADRES ON THE OPERATIONS IN THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY
BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
1. TODAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1971, I HAVE ORDERED THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO ATTACK THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE BASES OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY
ALONG THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER IN MILITARY REGION I.
2. THIS OPERATION IS CALLED OPERATION LAMSON 719.
3. THIS IS AN OPERATION LIMITED IN TIME AS WELL AS IN
SPACE, WITH THE CLEAR AND UNIQUE OBJECTIVE OF DISRUPTING
THE SUPPLY AND INFILTRATION NETWORK OF THE COMMUNIST
NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS LYING IN THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY,
AND WHICH FOR MANY YEARS WAS OCCUPIED BY THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE FORCES AND USED TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST OUR
COUNTRY.
4. TODAY I SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
ALWAYS RESPECTS THE INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS.
5. I ALSO SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
DOES NOT HAVE ANY TERRITORIAL AMBITION WHATSOEVER AND
NEVER INTERFERES IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM
OF LAOS. I ALSO PLEDGE THAT WHEN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED
LIMITED OPERATION ENDS, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE LAOTIAN
TERRITORY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IUP SECRET
N
-2- STATE 21013, FEB 7, NODIS
6. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WE ALL KNOW THAT SINCE MANY
YEARS THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES HAD OPENLY
VIOLATED THE NEUTRALITY AND THE TERRITORY OF THE ROYAL
KINGDOM OF LAOS, AND BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE 1962 GENEVA
AGREEMENT ON LAOS JUST AS THEY HAD BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE
1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON INDOCHINA IN ORDER TO WAGE THE
AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
7. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WE ALL DO ALSO KNOW THAT THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD OPENLY OCCUPIED ONE IMPORTANT
PART OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY, HAD BUILT THE HO CHI MINH
TRAIL THERE IN ORDER TO MOVE COUNTLESS SOLDIERS, WEAPONS,
AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY MATERIEL INTO THE SOUTH, AND HAD
ESTABLISHED IN THAT PART OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY GREAT
MILITARY AND LOGISTIC BASES IN ORDER TO WAGE THE AGGRESSION
AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
N
8. IF THIS SITUATION PREVAILS, THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE WILL STUBBORNLY CONTINUE THEIR WAR OF AGGRESSION
THROUGHOUT VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THE KHMER REPUBLIC.
9. IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OV VIET-NAM, WHILE
WE SHOW MAXIMUM GOOD WILL AT THE PARIS TALKS IN ORDER TO
SOLVE THIS WAR THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND
THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE THE ALLIED NATIONS HAVE
WITHDRAWN A GREAT PART OF THEIR TROOPS AND CONTINUE TO
WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, ON THE CONTRARY, THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE STILL CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE TROOPS, WEAPONS,
AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND ARE GETTING READY
TO LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS IN THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS.
10. FOR THESE 'REASONS, THE ATTACKS OF OUR ARMED FORCES AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS ON
THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF BELLIGERENCE
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, BUT ARE SOLELY AN ACT OF
N
LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSORS.
11. THIS IS NOT AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM AGAINST THE FRIENDLY NATION OF LAOS, ON THE CONTRARY,
THIS CONSTITUTES AN ACT DESIGNED TO STOP THE COMMUNIST NORTH
VIETNAMESE FROM EXPANDING AND MAINTAINING THEIR
AGGRESSION POTENTIAL.
12. THIS IS NOT EITHER A WAR UNDERTAKEN BY THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM; ON THE CONTRARY, THIS IS AN ACT TO HELP SOON
END THE WAR AND RESTORE PEACE IN THIS PARI OF THE WORLD.
UNQUOTE. ROGERS
DRAFTED BY: JIGetz :mw
APPROVED BY:
J: John I. Getz
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD CERRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IUP SECRET
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
Z 071516Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY BANGKOX FLASH 0739
2457Q
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 4793
071527Z
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5294
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 2989
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1845
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2917
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6635
RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 85 65
RUEHCR/USDEL FRANCE 5746
200-0
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5947
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 021006
NODIS
TO BE DECRYPTED ONLY BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE
REF: STATE 20982
1. THIEU'S BROADCAST WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL 1100, REPEAT
1100 HOURS FEBRUARY 8 SAIGON TIME AND ACTUAL START MAY
BE FIFTEEN TO THIRTY MINUTES LATER. REALIZE MOST POSTS
HAVE ALREADY MADE APPROACH AS INSTRUCTED. THUS HOST
GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE ASKED CONTINUE MAINTAIN COMPLETE
200
SECURITY UNTIL CONFIRMATION BY PRESS TICKER OR OTHERWISE
THAT THIEU HAS ACTUALLY BROADCAST.
2. TEXT OF THIEU'S STATEMENT AS NOW KNOWN BEING TRANS-
MITTED SEPTEL. ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY: :UAJOHNSON
APPROVED BY: J:U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
CLEARANCES: S/S-
S
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
R 0713352 FEB 71
2455Q
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
7 FEB 71 Z14 06
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6636
BT
TOPSECRET CANBERRA 0676
NODIS
INDEX: EXPO, MIOP/TOPS/RPLY/MAS, AXX.
N
REFERENCE: STATE 020982
1. AMBASSADOR HAS GONE OVER REFTEL IN CAREFUL DETAIL WITH
PRIME MINISTER GORTON WHO APPRECIATED BEING INFORMED. PM
SAID HE WOULD CONSULT APPROPRIATE MINISTERS, WITH NECESSARY
SECRECY, TO PREPARE PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT TO BE MADE
AFTER GVN ANNOUNCEMENT. AMBASSADOR TOLD HIM THIS WOULD BE
ESPECIALLY WELCOME FROM AUSTRALIAN PARTNER.
2. GORTON'S PRIVATE REACTION WAS HIGHLY FAVORABLE AND HAWKISH.
HE WELCOMED THE ACTION AND THOUGHT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE
LONG AGO. NOTING LIMITED SCOPE AND DURATION OF OPERATION, AND
CIRCUMSCRIBED ROLE OF US FORCES, HE SAID WHEN WE FIGHT WE OUGHT
TO FIGHT TO WIN. GORTON THOUGHT IT WISE THAT TERMINAL DATE HAD
NOT BEEN SPECIFIED AS IN CAMBODIAN CASE. ON POINT ABOUT NO
OCCUPATION OF LAOS HE SUGGESTED WISHFULLY IT MIGHT BE HARD TO GET
ARVN OUT ONCE THEY WERE IN.
N
3. HAVING LAMENTED LIMITATIONS PM WENT ON TO SHOW CLEAR UNDER-
STANDING OF OUR POLICIES AND PURPOSE AND OF POLITICAL REALITIES
IN US. HE ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE REACTION FROM USUAL US CONGRESS-
IONAL CRITICS BUT BELIEVED PUBLIC EMOTION ON INDOCHINA HAS
CALMED DOWN MARKEDLY. HE REMARKED CAMBODIAN OPERATION PROVED
TO BE GREAT THING.
4. PM DID NOT DISSENT ON ANY POINT AND HIS REACTION WAS TOTALLY
FAVORABLE. WE CAN AGAIN COUNT ON HIS BACKING.
RICE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SEPRIT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPART
STATE
Department of te
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 061535Z FEB 71 ZFF -4
2376Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
6 FEB 71 Z16 33
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1348
BT
TOPSECRETVIENTIANE 723
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
REF: EMB TELS 720, 721
1. KAMPHAN PANYA CAME TO EMBASSY AT 1300 TO
ASCERTAIN MY PERSONAL REACTIONS TO RLG STATEMENT.
I TOLD HIM I HAD TELEGRAPHED TEXT TO YOU
BUT THAT PERSONALLY I THOUGHT IT WAS ADEQUATE.
2. I ASKED HIM IF HE WAS AWARE THAT ARVN GROUP
MIGHT ARRIVE HERE TOMORROW. HE WAS IGNORANT OF
THIS AND SAID IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS. HE ASKED
IF I WOULD DISCUSS THIS WITH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR.
I REFUSED. HE WENT TO SEE SOUVANNA.
3. AT 1930 KHAMPHAN PANYA SAID AFTER CONSULTING
WITH SOUVANNA HE CONTACTED SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AMBASSADOR AND TOLD HIM ARVN GROUP SHOULD
NOT REPEAT NOT PROCEED VIENTIANE TOMORROW.
RLG WOULD INFORM HIM WHEN THEY WOULD
BE WELCOME.
4. CURRENT RLG PLANS ARE:
A. IF PRESIDENT THIEU MAKES STATEMENT
AT 0800 SAGION TIME FEB 8(0700 VIENTIANE
TIME) LAO RADIO WILL AT 1000 LOCAL
CARRY THIEU'S STATEMENT AND SAY THAT: RLG
DECLARATION IS BEING PREPARED AND INVITE
LISTENERS TO STAY ON STATION.
B. AT ABOUT 1030 LOCAL RLG DECLARATION
WILL BE CARRIED BY LAO RADIO.
C. SUBSEQUENTLY EITHER IN MORNING OR
EARLY AFTERNOON FEB 8 SOUVANNA WILL MEET WITH
PRESS AND WILL EMPHASIZE NVA VIOLATION
GENEVA AGREEMENTS, LONG TIME OCCUPANCY
HO CHI MINH TRAIL AREA AND FACT THAT RLG
NOT REPEAT NOT CONSULATED RE OPERATION. HE MIGHT
ALSO ADD THAT RLG POSITIONING TROOPS WEST OF
MOUNG PHALANE IN SELF DEFENSE, RLG APPEALING TO ICC
ETC.
GP-1. GODLEY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 061125Z FEB 71 ZFF- 1
2342Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1347
6 FEB 71 Z12 26
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 721
NODIS/ASHAU
N
FOR THE SECRETARY
REF: LAST SENTENCE VIENTIANE 704
THIS AFTERNOON PRIME MINISTER AND I ATTENDED CEREMONY
OF ANNUAL LAO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION MEETING. I ASKED
HIM IF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMB HAD ANYTHING TO ADD TO
WHAT I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING. PRIME
MINISTER SAID AMB HAD INFORMED HIM THAT A SOUTH
VIETNAMESE MILITARY DELEGATION IS ARRIVING HERE
TOMORROW TO DISCUSS MILITARY MATTERS WITH THE LAO
GENERAL STAFF. PRIME MINISTER HAS DIRECTED HIS SON
MAJOR MANGKALA TO ARRANGE FOR THEIR RECEPTION ON
THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE AIRFIELD WHERE THEIR ARRIVAL
SHOULD PASS UNNOTICED. GVN'S DISREGARD FOR THE
PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION HERE IS SHOCKING. ONCE
IT IS KNOWN THAT A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION
ARRIVED HERE PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THE
OPERATION IT WILL DESTROY THE PRIME MINISTER'S
N
POSITION THAT HE HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN CONSULTED.
THE ARRIVAL OF THIS DELEGATION WILL ALSO PUT THE
PRIME MINISTER AT THE MERCY OF THE LAO MILITARY
WHO AT ANYTIME CAN THREATEN TO REVEAL THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER APPROVED THE ARRIVAL OF THIS
DELEGATION, WHICH COULD BE CITED BY MANY AS
HIS RENUNCIATION OF LAO NEUTRALITY.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 061100Z FEB 71 ZFF-1
2343Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
6 FEB 71 Z 12 31
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1345
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 5526
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 720
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
N
REF: (A) STATE 020170
(B) VIENTIANE 704
1. DELEGATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS KHAMPHAN PANYA
CONVOKED DCM THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS STATEMENT
LAO GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 8.
KHAMPHAN HAD JUST LEFT PRIME MINISTER WHO HAD
INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONSULT WITH US ABOUT EXACT
WORDING OF STATEMENT. FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT, BOTH
IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH, WHICH WE CONSIDER STRIKES
A GOOD BALANCE AND PROTECTS RLG'S POSITION AS MUCH
AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT UNDULY EMBARRASSING GVN.
2. BEGIN ENGLISH TEXT. (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)
QUOTE DECLARATION OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT.
SEVERAL DAYS AGO NEWS APPEARED IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PRESS SPEAKING OF THE POSSIBLITY
OF AN IMPORTANT CONFRONIATION ON THE TERRITORY
OF THE KINGDOM BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
ON THE ONE HAND AND ON THE OTHER SOUTH VIETNAMESE
FORCES WITH AMERICAN LOGISTIC SUPPORT, SPECIFICALLY
ON THE ILLEGAL ACCESS AND INFILTRATION ROUTE CALLED
THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL WHICH HAS BEEN USED FOR YEARS,
DESPITE THE CONTINUAL PROTESTS AND DENUNCIATIONS
OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT, TO TRANSPORT NORTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND WAR MATERIEL TOWARD
CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM.
"THESE NEWS STORIES ARE TODAY UNFORTUNATELY CONFIRMED.
"THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT DEPLORES ONCE AGAIN
THAT FOREIGN TROOPS BELONGING TO COUNTRIES AND
GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES
TO GUARANTEE AND DEFEND THE SOVEREIGNTY, NEUTRALITY
AND INVIOLABILITY OF LAOS HAVE DELIBERATELY CHOSEN
ITS TERRITORY AS A BATTLEFIELD.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IUP SECRET
N
-2- VIENTIANE 20, EB6, NODIS/ASHAU
"CERTAINLY THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
RESTS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
WHO, SCORNFUL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AS REPRESENTED
BY THE ACCORDS SOLEMNLY CONCLUDED IN GENEVA IN
1962 BEGAN AND CONTINUES TO VIOLATE THE NEUTRALITY
AND TERRITORIAL INTERGRITY OF THE KINGDOM. BUT
THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE ENTRY OF OTHER FORCES INTO LAOS.
" IN ANY CASE, THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT DEMANDS
THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY
FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE KINGDOM AND REQUESTS
THE POWERS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SAFEGUARDING
THE STIPULATIONS OF THE GENEVA ACCORD ON LAOS TO
UNDERTAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO CAUSE ALL
THE SIGNATORIES TO RESPECT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER
N
OF THIS ACCORD, TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT AND
PEOPLE OF LAOS REMAIN DEVOTED. END QUOTE.
3. BEGIN FRENCH TEXT. QUOTE DECLARATION DU
GOUVERNEMENT ROYAL.
"IL Y A QUELQUES JORS DES NOUVELLES PARUES
DANS LA PRESSE INTERNATIONALE FAISAIENT ETAT DE
L' EVENTUALITE DUN AFFRONTEMENT IMPORTANT SUR
LE TERRITOIRE DU ROYAUME, ENTRE LES FORCES
NORD-VIETNAMIENNES D' UNE PART, ET LES FORCES
SUD-VIETNAMIENNES AVEC LE SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE
AMERICAIN D'AUTRE PART, PRECISEMENT SUR LA
VOIE ILLEGALE D'ACCES ET D' 'INFILTRATION DENOMMEE
"PISTE HO CHI MIN ", QU' EMPRUNTENT DEPUIS DES
ANNEES, MALGRE LES INCESSANTES PROTESTATIONS
ET DENONCIATIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT ROYAL, LES
TROUPES ET LE MATERIEL DE GUERRE NORD-VIETNAMIENS
POUR SE RENDRE AU CAMBODGE AND AU SUD-VIETNAM.
"CES NOUVELLES SONT AUJOURD' HUI MALHEUREUSEMENT
N
CONFIRMEES.
"LE GOUVERNEMENT ROYAL DEPLORE, UNE FOIS DE
PLUS, QUE DES TROUPES ETRANGERES QUI APPARTIENNENT
A DES PAYS ET DES GOUVERNEMENTS AYANT TOUS SOUSCRIT
DE GARANTIR ET DEFENDRE LA SOUVERAINETE, LA
NEUTRALITE ET INVIOLABILITE DU LAOS, AIENT CHOISI,
DE PROPOS DELIBERE, SON TERRITOIRE COMME CHAMP
DE BATAILLE.
"CERTES, LA RESPONSABILITE PREMIERE INCOMBE A
LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU VIETNAM QUI, AU
MEPRIS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL COMME DES
ACCORDS SOLENNELLEMENT CONCLUS A GENEVE EN 1962,
A COMMENCE ET CONTINUE DE VIOLER LA NEUTRALITE
ET INTEGRITE TERRITORIALE DU ROYAUME. MAIS, CELA
NE PEUT NON PLUS CONSTITUER UNE JUSTIFICATION A
L' ENTREE DES AUTRES TROUPES ETRANGERES DE SE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-3- VIENTIANE 720, FEB 6, NODIS/ASHAU.
RETIRER IMMEDIATEMENT DU TERRITOIRE DU ROYAUME,
ET PRIE LES PUISSANCES QUI ONT LA RESPONSABILITE DE
FAIRE RESPECTER LES STIPULATION DE L'ACCORD DE
GENEVE SUR LE LAOS DE PRENDRE LES MESURES NECESSAIRES
POUR FAIRE RESPECTER PAR TOUS LES SIGNATAIRES L'ESPRIT
ET LA LETTRE DE CET ACCORD AUQUEL DEMEURENT
S
ATTACHES LE GOUVERNEMENT ET LE PEUPLE LAO.
4. KHAMPHAN SAID PRIMIN WOULD PROBABLY CALL IN PRESS
MORNING FEB 8 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING RELEASE OF
STATEMENT AND IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WOULD
OUTLINE ACTIONS RLG WAS TAKING OR PROPOSED TO TAKE
TO BRING ABOUT DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM
N
LAOS. THESE WOULD INCLUDE APPEAL TO CO-PRESIDENTS,
ICC AND POSSIBLY TO UNITED NATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVERS IN REGION OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
N
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 060607Z FEB 71 ZFF-4
CN-2280
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 855
6 Feb 71
BT
0713Z
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1786
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: SAIGON 1785
N
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT:
1. I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TODAY, FEBRUARY (BLANK), 1971, I HAVE
ORDERED THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO ATTACK
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE BASES ON THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY
ALONG THE VIETNAM-LAOS BORDER IN MILITARY REGION I.
2. THIS IS AN OPERATION LIMITED IN TIME AS WELL AS IN SPACE, WITH
THE CLEAR AND UNIQUE OBJECTIVE OF DISRUPTING THE SUPPLY AND INFIL-
TRATION NETWORK OF THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS LYING
IN THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY, AND WHICH FOR MANY YEARS WAS USED TO
LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.
3. I SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE RVN ALWAYS RESPECTS THE INDEPEN-
DENCE, NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS.
4. I ALSO SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE RVN DOES NOT HAVE ANY
TERRITORIAL AMBITION WHATSOEVER AND NEVER INTERFERES IN THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS. I ALSO PLEDGE
N
THAT WHEN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LIMITED OPERATION ENDS, THE ARVN
WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY.
5. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WE ALL KNOW THAT SINCE MANY YEARS THE
COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES HAD OPENLY VIOLATED THE NEUTRALITY
AND THE TERRITORY OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS, AND BLATANTLY
VIOLATED THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON LAOS JUST AS THEY HAD
BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON INDOCHINA IN ORDER
TO WAGE THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE RVN.
6. THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WE ALL DO ALSO KNOW THAT THE COMMUNIST
NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD OPENLY OCCUPIED ONE PART OF THE LAOTIAN
TERRITORY, HAD BUILT THE Ho CHI MINH TRAIL THERE IN ORDER TO
MOVE COUNTLESS SOLDIERS, WEAPONS, AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY
MATERIEL INTO THE SOUTH, AND HAD. ESTABLISHED IN THAT PART OF THE
LAOTIAN TERRITORY GREAT MILITARY AND SUPPLY BASES IN ORDER TO
WAGE THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE RVN.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- SAIGON 1786, 6 FEB 71, CN-2280
7. IF THIS SITUATION PREVAILS, THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE
WILL STUBBORNLY MAINTAIN THEIR WAR OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM, LAOS,
AND THE KHMER REPUBLIC.
8. IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE RVN, WHILE WE SHOW MAXIMUM
GOOD WILL AT THE PARIS TALKS IN ORDER TO SOLVE THIS WAR THROUGH
A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE
THE ALLIED NATIONS HAVE WITHDRAWN A GREAT PART OF THEIR TROOPS
AND CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, ON THE CONTRARY, THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE STILL CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE TROOPS,
WEAPONS, AMMUNITIONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND ARE GETTING
READY TO LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS IN THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS.
9. FOR THESE REASONS, THE ATTACKS OF OUR ARMED FROCES AGAINST
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS ON
THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF BELLIGERENCE
FROM THE RVN, BUT ARE SOLELY AN ACT OF LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY
SELF-DEFENSE OF THE RVN AGAINST THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE
AGGRESSORS.
10. THIS IS NOT AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OF THE RVN AGAINST THE
FRIENDLY NATION OF LAOS, ON THE CONTRARY, THIS CONSTITUTES AN ACT
DESIGNED TO STOP THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE FROM EXPANDING
THEIR AGGRESSION POTENTIAL.
11. THIS IS NOT EITHER AN EXPANSION OF THE WAR OF THE RVN;
ON THE CONTRARY, THIS IS AN ACT TO HELP soon END THE WAR AND
RESTORE PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. END TEXT.
BERGER
BT
NNNNRY
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#4
Department of Siate
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
2271Q
0 060606Z FEB 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
6 FEB 1971, 0642Z
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 854
BT
TOPSECRE T SAIGON 1785
N
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 020549
1. WHEN I SAW NHA HE GAVE ME SLIGHTLY REVISED TEXT, WHICH I AM
SENDING SEPTEL IN FULL. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED OUR SUGGESTIONS. TIMING
IS NOW 0700 HOURS FEBRUARY 8, WHEN VN RADIO GOES ON AIR.
2. PRESIDENT THIEU HAD ALREADY PLANNED TO SEND STATEMENT TO THEIR
UN REP FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE UNSC PRESIDENT AT TIME OF RELEASE
HERE, AND FOR RELEASE TO PRESS. THEY WILL USE THEIR OWN FACILITIES.
3. THEY ALREADY PLANNED FOR FOREIGN MINISTER TO SEND STATEMENTS
TO CO-CHAIRMEN AND TO ICC GOVERNMENTS:
4. NHA SAID THIEU DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH TO HAVE ANY PRESS BRIEFING
DONE HERE ON IN MR I ON THE FIRST DAY. (I ASKED HIM TO CONVEY OUR
RECOMMENDATION TO THIEU AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THIS
WAS STILL THIEU'S VIEW.) THIEU PLANS TO HOLD PRESS CONFERENCE
N
EITHER IN SAIGON OR MR I ON FEBRUARY 9. THIS SUGGESTS THAT MACV
WOULD ISSUE STATEMENT ON US ROLE, IMMEDIATELY AFTER PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT IS READ.
5. IN INTERESTS OF SECRECY OF OPERATIONS CAND PRESUMABLY THEIR
SAFETY), THIEU WILL KEEP PRESS OUT OF LAOS UNTIL AFTER HIS PRESS
CONFERENCE, AFTER WHICH ARVN WILL PROVIDE TRANSPORT AND FACILITIES
FOR PRESS. AI PRESENT GENERAL ABRAMS AND I THINK THIS MAKES SENSE.
6. THIEU WISHES TO KNOW IF PRESIDENT NIXON OR WHITE HOUSE WILL
MAKE STATEMENT AT ANY TIME, AND IF SO WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IN ADVANCE
TEXT AND TIMING.
BERGER
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 060603Z FEB 71 ZFF-1
CN-2273Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1339
6 Feb 71
BT
0655Z
TOPSECRETVIENTIANE704
NODIS/AŠHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
REF: STATE 020170
1. DCM AND I SAW SOUVANNA AT 1230 LOCAL. TOLD HIM
OF TIME THAT OPERATION WILL COMMENCE AND THAT
WE HOPED PRESIDENT THIEU WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT
AI THAT TIME. READ HIM THE DRAFT OF THIEU'S STATE-
MENT ON WHICH HE MADE NO COMMENT. SUGGESTED THAT
HE MAKE A STATEMENT AT TEN AM AND ASKED THAT HE
GIVE ME AN ADVANCE COPY. HE AGREED AND SAID HE
WOULD GET WORKING IMMEDIATELY. I ALSO TOLD HIM
OF OUR PLANS RE UN AND HE NODDED. I SUGGESTED THAT
HIS STATEMENT INCLUDE FACT THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN
CONSULTED WHICH WE COULD REFER TO IF EVER QUERIED
ON THIS POINT. HE SAID "OF COURSE, I WILL SAY THAT."
OUR CONVERSATION WAS BRIEF. THE PRIME MINISTER
N
LISTENED IMPASSIVELY TO WHAT I SAID AND MADE NO
REPEAT NO COMMENT ON THIEU'S DRAFT. I EMPHASIZED
THAT THE TIMING OF THIEU'S STATEMENT HAD NOT
REPEAT NOT YET BEEN AGREED TO. AS WE LEFT
PRIMIN'S RESIDENCE WE CROSSED WITH THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR WHO WAS CALLIN ON THE
PRIMIN.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
BT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
T.ELioT
TOP SECRET
Z 060540Z FEB 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH
BT
TOP SECRET SERVICE NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 020549, SAIGON 1780.
1. RE PARA 2 0800 SAIGON TIME FEBRUARY 8 IS 1900 HOURS SUNDAY.
OUR TEL SHOULD READ 7:00 P.M., 1900 HRS.
2. RE BALANCE OF SENTENCE. WE COULD EXPECT THE VN REP TO
INFORM PRESIDENT BUT SINCE U.S. IS PRESIDENT OF THE S.C. FOR
MONTH HANDLING. OF FEBRUARY WE WOULD ALSO EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE IN PRESS
3. DO NOT DELAY CARRYING OUT ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS. FORMAL
FOLLOW-UP TO THIS SERVICE FORTHCOMING LATER IN DAY. ROGERS
BT
NNNN
A. Sackmann
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
200-0
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
107 SEGRET
4
Z 060420Z FEB 71 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CN-2247
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0850
Feb. 6, 1971
BT
0402Z
200-0
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1780
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 020549
1. RE PARA 2, 0800 SAIGON TIME FEBRUARY 8 IS 1900 HOURS SUNDAY
NEW YORK TIME. URTEL READS 9:00 P.M. I ASSUME THIS SHOULD BE
1900 HOURS. ALSO, RE BALANCE OF THIS SENTENCE, ASSUME YOU MEAN
VN REPRESENTATIVE WOULD INFORM PRESS THAT HE HAD GIVEN STATEMENT
TO UNSC PRESIDENT. PLEASE CONFIRM.
2. I AM SEEING NHA AT 1230 HOURS AND WILL ASK TO SEE THIEU THIS
AFTERNOON ON THIS MESSAGE.
BERGER
BT
200-0
NNNN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential brary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAMI
TOP SECRET
0 052343Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6641
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8542
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 020549
2170Q
NODIS/ASHAU
FEB 5, 6:43 PM 1971
FOR AMBASSADORS BERGER AND GODLEY ONLY
N
REFS: A. SAIGON 1750, B. DEPTEL 20170.
1. AS INDICATED REFTEL B, DRAFT THIEU STATEMENT TRANSMITTED
REFTEL A SEEMS TO US EXCELLENT ALMOST EVERY RESPECT. WE CONCUR
WITH CNANGES THAT YOU HAVE SUGGESTED PARA 5 REFTEL A. ONLY
FURTHER SUGGESTION WE HAVE IS TO SUBSTITUTE "DISRUPT" FOR
"DESTROY" IN PARA (2) OF DRAFT TEXT, AS WE THINK IT
PREFERABLE NOT TO OVERSTATE OBJECTIVES LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED.
2. WE STRONGLY FEEL AND URGE THAT THIEU ISSUE STATEMENT
AT 0800 SAIGON TIME FEBRUARY 8, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR
EVENING TIME, SO THAT HIS EXCELLENT STATEMENT CONSTITUTES
FIRST AND AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF AND INFORMATION
ON OPERATION. (HE COULD, OF COURSE, REPEAT IT IN EVENING DURING
PRIME TV AND RADIO PERIOD IN VIET-NAM. ALSO RELEASE AT THAT
HOUR WILL PERMIT STATEMENT TO BE SUBMITTED TO UNSC PRESIDENT
AT SAME HOUR (9:00 PM SUNDAY, NEW YORK TIME) AND IMMEDIATELY
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PRESS HERE. PLEASE CONFIRM SOONEST WHETHER
THIEU IS AGREEABLE.
3. OUR RECOMMENDATION HERE IS THAT THIEU'S STATEMENT BE
200-0
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED, PERHAPS AT 8:30 A.M. BY ARVN PRESS BRIEFING
IN SAIGON ON OPERATION. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS BRIEFING SHOULD
BE CAREFULLY DONE, SO AS TO BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THIEU
STATEMENT. IT SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE A "JOINT" BRIEFING
WITH MACV, BUT A RELATIVELY JUNIOR AMERICAN OFFICER SHOULD
BE PRESENT TO MAKE STATEMENT SOLELY ON U.S. ROLE IN OPERATION.
TEXT OF SUCH STATEMENT BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL. FOLLOWING
THIEUS STATEMENT AND ARVN BRIEFING, WOULD PRESUME THAT
AT SOME STAGE THERE WOULD BE ARVN BRIEFING IN MRI.
4. UNDER THIS SCENARIO, WE WOULD PLAN NO USG STATEMENTS OR
SPECIAL BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON THROUGH MONDAY WASHINGTON
TIME, SO THAT PUBLIC ATTENTION CAN BE FOCUSED ON THIEU'S
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 020549, FEB 5, 1971
STATEMENT AND STORY FROM SAIGON. FYI WE WILL HAVE BRIEFED A
FEW SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND ON MONDAY WOULD HOPE FOR
FAVORABLE STATEMENTS FROM AT LEAST SOME OF THEM. WE ARE
TENTATIVELY THINKING OF SECRETARY ROGERS' AND SECRETARY LAIRD'
APPEARING AT EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES RESPECTIVELY ON TUESDAY MORNING,
FOLLOWING WHICH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD BE RELEASED BY THEM.
END FYI.
5. IN CONNECTION WITH PRESS MATTERS, WOULD APPRECIATE THOUGHTS
YOU AND GENERAL ABRAMS MAY HAVE WITH RESPECT TO HANDLING
REQUESTS BY U.S. CORRESPONDENTS IN VIET- NAM TO ACCOMPANY ARVN
N
FORCES INTO LAOS AND/OR TRANSPORTATION ON U.S. AIRCRAFT OR
HELICOPTERS ENTERING LAOS.
6. AS NOTED ABOVE, WE PLAN TO DROP OUR PROPOSED TEXT (STATE
19872) AND WOULD LIKE TO USE THIEU STATEMENT AS DOCUMENT TO
BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT OF UNSC CAMBASSADOR YOST THIS MONTH)
UNDER COVER OF BRIEF TRANSMITTAL LETTER FROM GVN REPRESENTATIVE
AT UN. WE DO NOT RPT NOT PLAN TO TRANSMIT ANY U.S. STATEMENT TO
UNSC PRESIDENT.
7. AMBASSADOR YOST HAS MADE DISCREET ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE
THAT GVN REPRESENTATIVE AND SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE ARE AVILABLE
AFTERNOON OF SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 7. IF THIEU IS AGREEABLE TO
FOREGOING ACTION IN UNSC AND SO DESIRES, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO
TRANSMIT HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO GVN REPRESENTATIVE AI NEW YORK FOR
HANDLING THIS MATTER.
8. IN ORDER TO HANDLE QUESTION OF GENEVA ACCORDS 1954 AND 1962
WE FEEL GVN FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD PROMPTLY AND FORMALLY
N
TRANSMIT TEXT OF THIEU'S STATEMENT TO THE CO-CHAIRMAN BY
LETTER OR CABLE AND TO THE ICC GOVERNMENTS EITHER DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH ICC COMMISSIONERS IN SAIGON.
GP- 1. ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: J - Under Secretary Johnson
Cleared by: S/S - T L Eliot
S/PRS - Mr. McCloskey
Approved by: Under Secretary Johnson
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
N
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 051122Z FEB 71 ZFF4
1888Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
5 FEB 71 Z13 29
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 838
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1750
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: SAIGON 1708
N
1. NHA HAS JUST GIVEN ME DRAFT TEXT OF STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON
"D-DAY," AND HAS ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS.
2. HE SAID PRESIDENT THIEU STILL UNDECIDED WHETHER TO ISSUE
STATEMENT FROM THE PALACE OR PUT IT OUT AS A MESSAGE TO THE NATION.
PRESENT THINKING WAS TO DO THIS AI PEAK RADIO AND TV TIME AT 2000
HOURS ON FEBRUARY 8, BUT THIS STILL OPEN. I POINTED OUT THAT IF
OPERATION LAUNCHED THAT MORNING EARLY PRESS WOULD SOON FLASH THE
NEWS, THERE WOULD BE LONG GAP BETWEEN FLASH AND STATEMENT, AND
THAT MUCH EARLIER TIME MIGHT BE ADVISABLE. NHA SAID THEY WERE
OPEN-MINDED ON THIS AND IT COULD BE DONE AT NOON OR EVEN EARLIER.
3. NHA SAID THIEU IS THINKING OF GOING TO MR I TWO OR THREE DAYS
AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE.
4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT:
QTE: 1). I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TODAY, FEBRUARY (BLANK),
N
1971, I HAVE. ORDERED THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
TO ATTACK THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE'S BASES ON THE LAOTIAN
TERRITORY ALONG THE VN-LAOS BORDER IN MILITARY REGION I.
2) THIS IS ONLY AN OPERATION LIMITED IN TIME AS WELL AS SPACE,
WITH THE CLEAR AND UNIQUE OBJECTIVE TO DESTROY THE SUPPLY AND
INFILTRATION NETWORK OF THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
LYING ALONG THE BORDER OF THE RVN.
3) I SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE RVN ALWAYS RESPECTS THE INDEPENDENCE,
NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS.
4) I ALSO SOLEMNLY CONFIRM THAT THE RVN NEVER INTERFERES IN THE
INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE ROYAL KINGDOM OF LAOS, AND I PLEDGE THAT
WHEN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LIMITED OPERATION ENDS, THE ARVN WILL
WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- SAIGON 1750, FEB 5, NODIS/ASHAU
5) NOBODY IN THE WORLD CAN EVER DISPUTE THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO VIOLATED THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT
ON INDOCHINA AND BLATANTLY WAGED THE AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR NATION.
6) NOBODY IN THE WORLD CAN EVER DISPUTE THE FACT THAT IT WAS ALSO
THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO VIOLATED THE 1962 GENEVA AGREE-
MENT ON LAOS, WHO BLATANTLY OCCUPIED BY FORCE THE TERRITORY OF
THIS COUNTRY SINCE MANY YEARS AND USED IT TO SET UP THE HO CHI MINH
TRAIL TO MOVE COUNTLESS TROOPS, WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND FOOD FROM TH
NORTH TO THE SOUTH, AND ESTABLISHED A NETWORK OF GREAT BASES IN
N
THE TERRITORY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC AND LAOS IN ORDER TO WAGE THE
AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THE RVN.
7) IF THIS SITUATION PREVAILS, THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE NOT
ONLY WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEIR WAR OF AGRESSION IN VIETNAM,
LAOS, AND THE KHMER REPUBLIC, BUT WILL ALSO FEEL ENCOURAGED TO
EXPAND THEIR AGGRESSION IN THIS ENTIRE AREA OF THE WORLD.
8) IN THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE RVN, WHILE WE SHOW MAXIMUM GOOD
WILL AT THE PARIS TALKS IN ORDER TO SOLVE THIS WAS THROUGH A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION AND THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, WHILE THE
ALLIED NATIONS HAVE WITHDRAWN A GREAT PART OF THEIR TROOPS AND
CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM; ON THE CONTRARY, THE COMMUNIST
NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE AGAIN STEPPED UP THE INFILTRATION OF TROOPS,
WEAPONS, AND MILITARY MATERIEL IN RECENT MONTHS AT A FASTER RATE
THAN EVER BEFORE, AND ARE GETTING READY TO ESCALATE THE WAR IN
THE RVN AND THE KHMER REPUBLIC MORE VIOLENTLY THAN EVER BEFORE.
9) FOR THESE REASONS, THE ATTACKS OF THE ARVN AGAINST THE
COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS ON THE TERRITORY
OF LAOS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE FRIENDLY
NATION OF LAOS, BUT ARE SOLELY AN ACT OF LEGITIMATE AND NECESSARY
SELF-DEFENSE OF THE RVN AGAINST THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE
AGGRESSORS.
10) THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN EXPANSION OF THE WAR UNDERTAKEN
BY THE RVN; ON THE CONTRARY THIS CONSTITUTES AN ACT DESIGNED
TO STOP THE BELLICIST COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE FROM EXPANDING
AND MAINTAINING THEIR AGGRESSION POTENTIAL.
11) THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE EITHER AN ACT OF BELLIGERENCE FROM
US; ON THE CONTRARY, THIS CONSTITUTES AN ACT TO HELP SOON END THE
WAR AND RESTORE PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. UNQUOTE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-3- SAIGON 1750, FEB 5, NODIS/ASHAU
5. I GAVE HIM FOLLOWING PERSONAL COMMENTS:
A. IN PARA 7 DELETE "NOT ONLY," AND ALL THE WORDS AFTER "KHMER
REPUBLIC." I SAID MANY PEOPLE MIGHT QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE
FINAL CLAUSE, BUT THEY COULD NOT DENY THE FIRST PART OF THE
SENTENCE, AND IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE POINT.
B. IN PARA 8 I SUGGESTED DELETION OF THE WORDS "AT A FASTER
RATE THAN EVER BEFORE" AND INSERTION OF THE WORD "AGAIN" BETWEEN
"HAVE" AND "STEPPED." I SAID THE STATEMENT WAS FACTUALLY WRONG,
SINCE THE INFILTRATION RATES DO NOT COMPARE TO 1968, AND THE
PRESENT WORDS WOULD BE CHALLENGED BY THE WORLD PRESS.
6. NHA IS STANDING BY TOMORROW AND SUNDAY TO WORK WITH ME ON THE
TEXT, AND HE SAID THIEU WAS IN TOWN AND AVAILABLE OVER THE WEEKEND.
BERGER
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Debartment of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
1803Q
0 050713Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 801
5 FEB 1971, 075 0Z
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1709
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 019872
1. FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON DRAFT:
A. SECOND PARA: THIEU MAY FEEL THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME REFERENCE
TO GVN COMMUNICATIONS TO UN AS WELL. EXCLUSIVE REFERENCE TO US
COMMUNICATIONS MAY GIVE HIM TROUBLE.
B. THIRD PARA: THIEU HAS SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE SHOULD NOT
RPT NOT MENTION TCHEPONE OR OTHER OBJECTIVES IN ANY INITIAL
STATEMENTS WE MAKE. I KNOW GENERAL ABRAMS SHARES THAT VIEW.
SENTENCE BEGINNING "IN PARTICULAR," INDICATES PRECISE OBJECTIVES,
S
AND THIEU MAY BALK AT THAT.
C. LAST SENTENCE PARA 4: THIEU TOLD GENERAL ABRAMS AND ME THIS
MORNING HE VISUALIZES HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT AS MAKING CLEAR THIS
WILL BE A LIMITED OPERATION, WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES, AND WITHIN
LIMITED TIME. HE MAY WANT TO ADD WORDS ALONG THESE LINES.
N
D. LAST SENTENCE FIFTH PARA: ADMISSION THAT GVN TEMPORARILY
SETTING ASIDE COMPLIANCE WITH 1962 AGREEMENT MAY GIVE THIEU SOME
TROUBLE. THIEU MAY PREFER ALTERNATE WORDING THAT GVN DEEPLY REGRETS
THE NECESSITY FOR THIS CROSS-BORDER OPERATION, BUT REFUSAL OF
HANOI TO NEGOTIATE WITH GVN, AND ITS CONTINUOUS AGGRESSION AGAINST
SOUTH VIETNAM LEAVES GVN NO ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO TAKE THESE
MEASURES IN SELF-DEFENSE.
E. ONLY OTHER THOUGHT I HAVE IS THAT SOME REFERENCE TO US-GVN
OFFER AT PARIS FOR CEASE-FIRE IN INDOCHINA FOLLOWED BY SERIOUS
NEGOTIATIONS MAY HAVE SOME PUBLIC RELATIONS VALUE AND HELP SHOW
THAT GVN STILL FAVORS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
BERGER
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DE
D
partment of Stat
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
1799Q
S
5 FEB 1971, 075 OZ
0 050712Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 800
BT
200 - M
TOPSECRETSAIGON1708
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 019640
1. GENERAL ABRAMS AND I SAW PRESIDENT THIEU AT 1000 HOURS TO
CONVEY MESSAGE IN REFTEL.
2. HE SAID HIS ASSISTANT NHA WILL WORK UP DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE
ISSUED BY PALACE AND WILL WORK WITH ME ON COORDINATION OF PUBLIC
STATEMENTS. HOPES TO HAVE DRAFT FOR ME TOMORROW MORNING.
BERGER
BT
200-0
NNNN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1969-360-575
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET
Classification
of STATES THE AMERICA UNITED
Department of State
INDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
DISTRIBUTION
ACTION:
Amembassy VIENTIANE
IMMEDIATE
Amembassy SAIGON
IMMEDIATE
STATE
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR BERGER AND GODLEY ONLY
REFS: A. State 19640
B. State 19872
C. Saigon 1750
1. As you are aware from reftels, GVN operation into Base
Areas 604 and 611 will begin at 0800 Saigon time February 8.
You are authorized now to provide Souvanna with this info.
2. We will naturally expect Souvanna to hold his advance
knowledge of these facts extremely closely, and Godley
may assure him that we will respect his desire that we
refrain from any indications that he was consulted in advance.
We would, in fact, expect him to issue a public statement
about 1000 hours Saigon time February 8 in which he will
exculpate himself from any complicity in this operation.
wh
DRAFTING DATE
TEL EXT
APPROVED BY:
DRAFTED BY:
EA: WHSullivan:ms: elm
2/5/71
20272
The Secretary
CLEARANCES:
S/S-TLEliot
XXX White House/Dr. Kissinger
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 3 of telegram to Amembassies Vientiane & Saigon IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
Classification
3. In order prepare ourselves and GVN to handle queries concerning
Souvanna's position on this action, we will want to have advance text
of statement he intends to make Monday as soon as possible. We have
sent you by septel draft of statement Thieu is intending to make on
February 8. While we will be making a few suggestions for small
changes in Thieu's draft, in general it appears excellent to us and
you are authorized to show it to Souvanna as draft subject to some
We will urge that Thieu make statement Monday morning Saigon time.
change, NWe are dropping our draft of a GVN letter to SC (Reftel B)
and instead will propose that GVN rep at New York transmit text Thieu's
statement to President of SC, repeated to Geneva ce-chairmenand ICC
governments. FYI we are not planning any USG statement until Monday
Washington time. Guidance being sent our missions being repeated
to you septel.
4. With specific respect to questions concerning advance consultation
with Souvanna, we are contemplating a position which would state,
in effect, that current action is really a matter between GVN and
RLG. Role of U.S. air power is same as it has previously been and
therefore no rpt no new type of U.S. action is involved. By thus
referring the consultation question to Saigon and Vientiane, we would
expect both GVN and RLG to stand fast by their denials of any such
coordination between their two governments.
END
GP-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Depariment of
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 050520Z FEB 71 ZFF-3
INCN: 1 7 7 8Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
FEBRUARY 5, 1971
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1320
0552Z
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 5523
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 674
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR BERGER
REF: STATE 19872
1. I HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE SUGGESTED DRAFT AND
MY SUGGESTIONS RELATE MORE TO TONE THAN SUBSTANCE. I
THINK IN PARTICULAR THAT GVN SHOULD RELATE ITS OPERATIONS
EXCLUSIVELY TO NEED TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST NORTH
VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND SHOULD POINT OUT MORE CLEARLY
THAN DOES PRESENT DRAFT THAT EASTERN PANHANDLE HAS NOT
BEEN NEUTRAL FOR MANY YEARS. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE
KEYED TO INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF TEXT.
2. PARA 1. ALTHOUGH THIS IS AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S BUSINESS
MORE THAN MINE, WORDING OF FIRST SENTENCE IS SOMEWHAT
MISLEADING SINCE SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS DO NOT
DESCRIBE "FURTHER" ACTS OF AGGRESSION. A MORE EFFECTIVE
OPENING MIGHT BE TO SAY "I HAVE THE HONOR TO BRING TO
THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT HAVE REQUIRED APPROPRIATE MEASURES OF COLLECTIVE
SELF DEFENSE BY ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAMAND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA."
3. PARA 2. I SEEM TO RECALL THAT CAMBODIA HAS ALSO
APPEALED TO THE UNITED NATIONS ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF ITS
SOVEREIGNTY BY NORTH VIETNAM. IF so, REFERENCE TO THE
CAMBODIAN COMPLAINT WOULD STRENGTHEN THIS PARAGRAPH.
4. PARA 3. I WOULD OMIT THE SENTENCE ABOUT THE LAO
POPULATION OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS HAVING FLED.
WHILE THIS AREA IS CERTAINLY VERY THINLY POPULATED, LARGE
SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS WILL INEVITABLY GENERATE REFUGEES.
THE PARAGRAPH. SENTENCE IN QUESTION ADDS LITTLE TO THE FORCE OF THE
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 674, FEBRUARY 5.
INCN: 1778
5. PARA 6. I SUGGEST THAT THIS PARAGRAPH BE COMPLETELY
REWRITTEN TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE
1962 AGREEMENT ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS REQUIRED NORTH
VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS ARMED FORCES FROM LAOS AND
PROHIBITED THEIR REINTRODUCTION AND THE USE OF
THE TERRITORY OF LAOS FOR INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. NORTH VIETNAM NEVER LIVED
UP TO THOSE COMMITMENTS AND HAS CONTINUED TO USE AND
EXPAND ITS SUPPLY LINES AND BASES IN SOUTHERN LAOS TO
ATTACK THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE ACTIONS THAT
MY GOVERNMENT IS TAKING ARISE DIRECTLY FROM THE NEED OF
SOUTH VIETNAM TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST NORTH VIEINAMESE
ATTACKS FROM LAOTIAN SOIL. IT IS MY GOVERNMENT'S HOPE
AND WISH THAT THESE ACTIONS NOT WEAKEN BUT RESTORE THE
NEUTRALITY OF LAOS IN AREAS ADJACENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM
WHICH FOR MANY YEARS HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED BY NORTH
VIETNAM TO SUPPORT ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST MY
COUNTRY".
6. FOREGOING ARE MY ONLY COMMENTS ON DRAFT AS SUBMITTED
REFTEL.
GP- 1. GODLEY
BT
NNNNX
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
04 1600Z Feb 71
TO BE DELIVERED TO TO GENERAL HA IG FROM AMBASSADOR GODLEY
TOPSECRETSENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVEEYESONLY
FROM: AMBASSADOR GODLEY
TO: GENERAL HAIG
UBJECT: OPERATION GOLD,
I HAVE JUST TRANSMITTED TOP SECRET EMBTEL 668
NODIS/ASHAU WHICH FOLLOWS:
"ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
VIENTIANE 668
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. PRIME MINISTER SAID THIS EVENING THAT SOVIET AMB
MININ CALLED LATE THIS AFTERNOON TO INDICATE, UNDER
INSTRUCTIONS, MOSCOW'S PREOCCUPATIONS RE POSSIBLE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK AGAINST SOUTHERN LAOS.
MININ INQUIRED WHETHER ATTACK HAD TAKEN PLACE
AND INDICATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER SUCH AN
ATTACK A GROSS VIOLATION OF GENEVA 1962 AGREEMENTS.
PRIMIN SAID HE HAD NOTED PRESS REPORTS BUT HAD NO
REPEAT NO INDICATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE INCURSION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
INTO SOUTHERN LAOS. IF SUCH ACTION SHOULD TAKE PLACE,
RLG WOULD MAKE AN APPROPRIATE DECLARATION AT THAT
TIME. MININ SAID SOVIETS WOULD REGRET LAOS BECOMING
ANOTHER CAMBODIA. PRIME MINISTER MADE NO COMMENT.
MININ THEN REQUESTED AUDIENCE WITH KING. PRIMIN
REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT REQUEST TOMORROW
VIA KING'S HALF BROTHER NOW IN VIENTIANE. PRIMIN
DID NOT REPEAT NOT OFFER ANY INDICATION WHEN
AUDIENCE MIGHT BE GRANTED. PRIMIN OPIINED TO ME
THAT HE DID NOT THINK HIS MAJESTY WOULD BE IN ANY
PARTICULAR HURRY TO RECEIVE MININ AND THAT
REQUEST WOULD PROBABLY GO FORWARD TOMORROW VIA
AIRCRAFT TO LUANG PRABANG.
2. IN RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRY, PRIME
MINISTER SAID MININ DID NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE ANY
THREATS NOR DID HE INDICATE THAT sovs MIGHT WITHDRAW
MISSION FROM VIENTIANE, ETC. PRIMIN DID NOT REPEAT
NOT EXPRESS ANY CONCERN RE SOV DEMARCHE AND HE
APPEARED COMPLETELY RELAXED AND RESOLUTE. HE
ADDED IN A SLIGHTLY JOCULAR VEIN THAT HE DOUBTED
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THAT KING WOULD BE PARTICULARLY RECEPTIVE TO
SOVIET DEMARCHE AND EXPRESSED NO REPEAT NO CONCERN
RE FORTHCOMING MEETING "IF HIS MAJESTY RECEIVES THE
SOVIET AMBASSADOR."
3. IN A MORE SERIOUS VEIN PRIME MINISTER ASKED IF WE
HAD ANY REACTION FROM PEKING OTHER THAN THE
FBIS REPORTS OF WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS AWARE.
I TOLD HIM I COULD ADD NOTHING TO WHAT RADIO PEKING
HAD BEEN SAYING AND HE NODDED, ADDING RAPIDLY
"THEY ARE THE ONES THAT WORRY ME." HE NOTED
THAT LAOS, UNLIKE CAMBODIA, HAS A COMMON FRONTIER
WITH PEKING AND INQUIRED WHAT WOULD BE OUR REACTION
IF PEKING WERE TO INVADE LAOS. I TOLD HIM I WOULD
HAVE TO REFER THIS QUESTION TO WASHINGTON. HE
LAUGHED. GP-1 GODLEY"T OPSECRET SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENT
TELEGRAM
TOP SECHET
CONTROL: 1663Q
0 042324Z FEB 71 ZFF6
FEB 4, 1971-6:24 P.M.
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6572
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8528
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 019640
NODIS/ASHAU
N
STRICTLY EYES ONLY AMBASSADORS BERGER AND GODLEY
JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE
1. PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED EXECUTION OF PHASE II OF
TCHEPONE OPERATION AND AUTHORIZED EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. TACAIR,
ARC LIGHT, FIXED AND ROTARY WING GUNSHIPS AND AIRLIFT IN
LAOS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION. GENERAL ABRAMS HAS ALREADY
BEEN PROVIDED EXECUTE AUTHORITY VIA MILITARY CHANNELS.
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU AND GENERAL ABRAMS INFORM THIEU
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF US DECISION TO PROCEED WITH PHASE II
COMMENCING FEBRUARY 8 SAIGON TIME. IN YOUR DISCUSSION WITH
PRESIDENT THIEU, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING
IT CLEAR THAT PHASE II IS A VIETNAMESE OPERATION, SUPPLEMENTED
BY US AIR POWER. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT IT BE
POINTED OUT THAT DECISION TO ENTER LAOS IS A VIETNAMESE
DECISION. IT IS HOPED THAT SECURITY PHASE II CAN BE CLOSELY
MAINTAINED UNTIL OPERATION IS LAUNCHED AND COORDINATED
PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM WORKED OUT. (WE HOPE TO AVOID CONTI-
N
NUATION OF PRESS SPECULATION FROM SAIGON THAT GVN AWAITING US
PRESIDENT'S DECISION.)
2. IN THIS REGARD, ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS COVERING COORDI-
NATION OF us, GVN AND LAOTIAN OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS
ON PHASE II WILL FILLOW. ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY: Washington Special Actions Group
APPROVED BY: The Secretary
CLEARANCES:
TLEliot:S/S
TOD SEPDET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
200-0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
4
Z 040918Z FEB 71
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1307
CN- 1328Q
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 649
Feb. 4, 1971
0934Z
NODIS/ASHAU
200-00
FOR THE SECRETARY
DEPT PASS THE WHITE HOUSE
1. PRIME MINISTER AT 1600 LOCAL TELEPHONED ME TO
S
SAY HE HAD JUST SEEN TILLMAN DURDIN, NEW YORK
TIMES CORRESPONDENT. DURDIN TOLD PRIME MINISTER
THAT HE HAD A REPORT FROM NEW YORK THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER REGARDING MILITARY OPERATIONS. THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD DURDIN THAT THIS WAS TOTALLY
FALSE.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED US TO KNOW THE FOREGOING IN THAT
200-0
HE WAS RECEIVING SOVIET AMBASSADOR SHORTLY. I SHALL
BE SEEING THE PRIME MINISTER THIS EVENING AND
BELIEVE I SHALL ASCERTAIN THE TENOR OF THE
SOVIET AMB'S INTERVIEW.
GP-1. GODLEY
BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TIME
START
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPART
STATE
partment of St.De
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
922Q
3 FEB 1971, 1114Z
0 031041Z FEB 71 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 735
BT
N
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1598
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 18205
1. WHEN I SAW PRES THIEU AI 1730 HOURS ON CHHUP OPERATION, HE
ASKED IF ANY WORD FROM WASHINGTON ON LAO OPERATION. I SAID FEB 2
MEETING SHIFTED TO FEB 4. HE SAID TO LET HIM KNOW AS SOON AS I
HAD ANY INFO.
2. HE THEN SAID SOUVANNA AND LAO GENERALS HAD JUST HAD DISCUSSION
WITH HIS AMBASSADOR IN VIENTIANE IN WHICH THEY SAID THEY WOULD
WELCOME ANY AID IN FORM OF WEAPONS, MUNITIONS OR OTHER ITEMS
WHICH GVN COULD PROVIDE AND THAT THEY WISHED SEND MILITARY
DELEGATION TO SAIGON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THIS. HE
HAD SENT BACK WORD THAT LAO SHOULD SEND DELEGATION IN TWO OR THREE
WEEKS, MEANTIME HE WOULD BE STUDYING THEIR REQUEST.
N
3. THIEU ADDED THAT IN 1964 OR 1965, WHEN HE WAS ON GENERAL STAFF,
GVN HAD PROVIDED SOME CLOTHING, SHOES, SPARE PARTS FROM OLD
FRENCH ARMOURED CARS, AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS TO LAO, BUT HE NOT
SURE WHAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO NOW. HE ASKED WHAT WE WERE
SUPPLYING LAO MILITARY FORCES. I SAID I DID NOT HAVE DETAILS AND
WOULD GET THE ANSWER FOR HIM.
4. DEPARTMENT PASS VIENTIANE.
BERGER
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[.f..rtment of Stat
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
858Q
0 030545Z FEB 71 ZFF-3
1971 FEB 3 0621Z
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIAUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1291
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 614
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEPT OF STATE 81205 I GAVE
ITS GIST TO SISOUK. HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF
PROMPT WASHINGTON REACTION BUT WAS DISTURBED
THAT FRENCH PRESS AGENCY REPORTED TODAY THAT
FAR OFFICERS WOULD BE VISITING SAIGON SOON. HE IS
AT 1130 THIS MORNING DENYING THIS REPORT AND AGREED
WITH ME TO POSTPONE THE DEPARTURE OF THE FAR
OFFICERS UNTIL AT LEAST FEBRUARY 5 REPEAT 5.
2. NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT. SISOUK ALSO LET ME
GLANCE AT THE RLG'S DRAFT DECLARATION TO BE ISSUED
AFTER THE OPERATION AGAINST TCHEPONE BEGINS. IT
DOES NOT REPEAT NOT PROTEST THE ACTION BUT ATTACKS
ALL FOREIGN TROOPS IN LAOS. IT NOTES, HOWEVER, THAT
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN HERE FOR SOME
TIME AND THAT THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL IS THEIR MAIN
SUPPLY ROUTE TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA.
IT REAFFIRMS LAO SOVEREIGNTY, NEUTRALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE AND WILL REFER TO THE 1962 AGREE-
MENTS.
3. SUBSEQUENT TO FOREGOING I SAW THE PRIME MINISTER
AND WENT OVER STATE 18205 WITH HIM. HE AGREED
COMPLETELY, PARTICULARLY ON THE NECESSITY FOR
!
DISCRETION BUT SAID HE WONDERS IF WE CAN KEEP
ANYTHING SECRET. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT RATHER
THAN MEETING IN SAIGON THE ARVN AND FAR OFFICERS
MIGHT CONFER IN SOME MORE DISCREET PLACE SUCH AS
DALAI OR BAN ME THOUT.
GP- 1. GODLEY
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has DECLASSIFIED been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 P 030200Z FEB 71 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8511
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 6489
810Q
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 018205
FEB 2, 9:00 PM 1971
NODIS/ASHAU
N
FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BERGER ONLY
REF: VIENTIANE 587
1. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN PROPOSED VISIT BY
FAR MILITARY TO SAIGON, WE BELIEVE THEY ARE MANAGEABLE IF
VISITORS CONDUCT THEMSELVES DISCREETLY. THIS WOULD MEAN
SUCH PRECAUTIONS AS CIVILIAN CLOTHES, UNMARKED AIRCRAFT,
ETC.
2. HOWEVER, WE THINK SISOUK WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO DELAY
THEIR DEPARTURE UNTIL DECISIONS ON EXECUTION PHASE II OF
THIS OPERATION ARE TAKEN IN WASHINGTON. MEETING THIS
S
SUBJECT, WHICH ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 2, HAS NOW
BEEN SCHEDULED FEBRUARY 4, REPEAT 4.
3. GODLEY SHOULD THEREFORE INFORM SISOUK THAT FAR OFFICERS CAN
BE BRIEFED IN SAIGON ON ESSENTIALS OF OPERATION AND SUGGEST
THEY GET IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL VIEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ABOVE
TIMETABLE. ROGERS
BT
200-0
Drafted by: EA: WH Sullivan
Cleared by: S/S Mr. Eliot
White House - Mr. Kissinger
Approved by: The Secretary
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
INCN: 456Q
0 020610Z FEB 71 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
FEBRUARY 2, 1971
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1279
0841Z
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 5512
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 587
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
EYES ONLY FOR AMB BUNKER
1. FOLLOWING PRESS SPECULATION OF WEEKEND, PRIME MINISTER
HAS TOLD SISOUK AND OUAN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOUTH
VIETNAMESE PROBE AGAINST TCHEPONE. LAST EVENING I
LEARNED THAT SISOUK IS SENDING GENERAL ETAM, FAR G-2,
GENERAL OUDONE SANANIKONE, FAR CHIEF OF STAFF, COL,
CHAO SINH, FAR GENERAL STAFF COUAN'S BRAINS) AND COL.
THAO LY, MR III DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (ALSO BOUNPONE'S
BRAINS AND THE COORDINATOR WITH CAS OF ALL MR III
OPERATIONS TO SAIGON TOMORROW TO CONFER WITH
THEIR VIETNAMESE OPPOSITE NUMBERS. I HAVE JUST SEEN
SISOUK AND HAVE ASKED ABOUT THIS TRIP AND WHAT ARE
ITS OBJECTIVES. SISOUK SAYS THAT NONE OF THESE FOUR
OFFICERS ARE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE OPERATION UNDER
CONSIDERATION. THE PRIME MINISTER, HOWEVER, FELT
THAT HE MUST TAKE SOME ACTION IN VIEW OF THE PRESS
STORIES AND HAS TOLD SISOUK TO SEND THESE MEN. SISOUK,
WHO IS PERSONALLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE ACTION
UNDER CONSIDERATION, SAYS IF IT -DOES OCCUR FAR SHOULD
BE READY TO PLAY ITS ROLE AND COORDINATION SHOULD
BE UNDERTAKEN FORTHWITH. HE RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY
FOR SECRECY AND SPECIFICALLY DID NOT REPEAT NOT ASK
THAT THESE MEN BE MADE KNOWLEDGEABLE BY THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE. HE OFFERED TO DELAY THEIR DEPARTURE FOR
24, 48 OR 72 HOURS AND ASKED MY ADVICE. I TOLD SISOUK
THAT I WAS QUITE CERTAIN THAT NO REPEAT NO SOUTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAD ENTERED LAOTIAN TERRITORY.
I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT I ASSUMED FROM HANOI BROADCASTS
THAT SOME TROOPS® HAD ARRIVED AT THE KHE SANH JUMPING
OFF SPOT. I EMPHASIZED TO SISOUK THAT THERE WAS
STILL A DECISION TO BE TAKEN IN WASHINGTON ON WHETHER
WE WOULD SUPPORT AN ARVN ACTION AGAINST TCHEPONE.
A WASHINGTON DECISION WOULD BE OVERRIDING IN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 587, FEBRUARY 2.
INCN: 456Q
THAT THE ARVN PROBABLY WOULD NOT ACT WITHOUT OUR SUPPORT.
I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NO REPEAT NO IDEA WHEN THE
WASHINGTON DECISION MIGHT BE MADE OR WHEN THE ACTION
MIGHT OCCUR.
2. SISOUK DID NOT REPEAT NOT KNOW WHOM THE FOUR
OFFICERS WOULD BE MEETING WITH IN SAIGON. HE MERELY
SAID "THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBERS". THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THEIR TRIP TO SAIGON AND THEIR RECEPTION THERE ARE
BEING MADE BY A VIETNAMESE LIAISON OFFICER WHO IS
ATTACHED TO THE FIFTH MILITARY REGION, I.E., NOT
REPEAT NOT THE SPECIAL EMISSARY WHOM PRESIDENT
THIEU SENT HERE AND WHO, I UNDERSTAND, IS STILL IN
VIENTIANE.. SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIAISON OFFICERS (AS DISTINCT
FROM ARMY ATTACHES) IN VIENTIANE ARE NEW TO ME AND WHEN I
ASKED SISOUK ABOUT THIS HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN "FOR SOME
TIME NOW" SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIAISON OFFICERS IN
MR V, MR III AND MR IV. ACCORDING TO SISOUK, THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIAISON OFFICER HERE HAS NO
REPEAT NO INFORMATION ON ANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE
PLANS.
3. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER RETURNED FROM LUANG
PRABANG, HE TOLD ME THAT IN HIS MEETING WITH THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HE DID NOT REPEAT
NOT INDICATE THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE TCHEPONE
OPERATION WITH ME. I HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT DISCUSSED
ANYTHING WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR
AND HE HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING TO ME. I DO NOT INTEND
TO SPEAK TO MY SOUTH VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUE UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO DO SO.
4. THERE MIGHT BE SOME ADVANTAGE FROM THE POINT
OF VIEW OF SOUVANNA'S RESPONSIBLITY TO HIS COUNTRY
IN SENDING THIS GROUP TO SAIGON, I.E., THE INTER-
NATIONAL PRESS HAS REPORTED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN
INVASION FROM SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE LAO PUBLIC,
INCLUDING THE GENERAL STAFF, DOES NOT KNOW
WHETHER THERE ARE ACTUALLY SOUTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS ON LAOTIAN TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER HAND,
SOUVANNA'S SENDING THIS TROUP TO SAIGON WOULD
INDICATE, IF THE OPERATION OCCURS, THAT THE FAR
HAD COORDINATED WITH THE ARVN. THIS WOULD MEAN
THAT THE RLG HAD REJECTED NEUTRALITY; FURTHER
ERODS SOUVANNA'S POSITION AND THE ALREADY TOTTERING
FRAMEWORK OF THE 62 AGREEMENTS.
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-3- VIENTIANE 587, FEBRUARY 2.
INCN: 456Q
5. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE
AUTHORIZED TO TELL SISOUK THAT WE BELIEVE IT
WOULD BE MOST UNWISE TO SEND THIS DELEGATION TO
SAIGON AI THIS TIME.
6. AS I RECALL, THERE IS A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING IN
WASHINGTON TODAY AND AS AMB BUNKER MIGHT WELL
WISH TO HAVE HIS VIEWS ON THE FOREGOING AVAILABLE
TO YOU BEFORE, THAT MEETING, I AM TAKING THE
LIBERTY OF REPEATING THIS MESSAGE TO HIM FOR
HIS EYES ONLY. GP- 1.
GODLEY
BT
NNNN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
.4.
R 011740Z FEB 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 6421
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 8501
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 016706
NODIS/ASHAU
STRICTLY FOR AMBASSADORS BERGER AND GODLEY FROM SECRETARY
N
1. VIENTIANE S 561- BEING REPEATED SAIGON.
2. I REALIZE THAT TARGET AREA FOR OPERATION ASHAU HAS
ALMOST NO LOCAL POPULACE, BUT BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT
ARVN BE UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO TREAT POPULACE WITH RESPECT
AND HUMANITY. THIS DOUBLY IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF SOUVANNA'S
REQUEST.
3. LEAVE THIS TO YOUR DISCRETION TO HANDLE WITH
PRESIDENT THIEU. IT POSSIBLE SUCH ORDERS HAVE ALREADY
BEEN CONTEMPLATED FOR ISSUE TO TROOPS WHEN AND IF PHASE II
IS ACTIVATED. ROGERS
BT
200-0
Drafted by: Marshall Green
Approved by: The Secretary
Clearances: TLEliotn Jr.
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SEGRE:
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
R 310550Z JAN 71 ZFF-4
8153Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
310810Z Jan
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1265
BT
TOPSECRETVIENTIANE56I
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
N
1. PRIME MINISTER CONVOKED ME THIS MORNING TO SAY
HE HAD JUST HAD VISIT FROM LOCAL AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
REPORTER WHO READ HIM AFP DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON
INDICATING THAT "LOCAL OBSERVERS OF INDOCHINA" PREDICT
AMERICAN/SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK AGAINST SOUTHERN
LAOS, TO OCCUR DURING THE COMING WEEK. PRIMIN TOLD
AFP REPORTER THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT SUCH A
POSSIBILITY AND THAT IF IT DID OCCUR HE WOULD MAKE
A STATEMENT AND TELL SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO GO FIGHT
ELSEWHERE. PRIMIN WAS OBVIOUSLY MOST DISTRESSED.
2. DCM JUST INFORMED ME THAT LOCAL REUTERS REPORTER
AND TAMMAY ARBUCKLE OF THE WASHINGTON STAR BOTH
SPOKE TO HIM LAST NIGHT BASED ON INQUIRIES THEY
HAD RECEIVED FROM HOME OFFICES. REUTERS INQUIRY
INDICATED SIZE OF FORCE INVOLVED TO BE TWO DIVISIONS
PLUS. DCM TOLD NEWSMEN HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT
BUT THAT SUCH A RASH OF STORIES DID NOT SURPRISE
HIM IN THAT POLISH ICC REP HAD ASKED HIM JAN 27
N
ABOUT SUCH RUMORS.
3. NEW BUT RELATED SUBJECT. EARLY THIS MORNING
ON TENNIS COURT PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD JUST
HEARD RADIO REPORTS ABOUT FIGHTING BETWEEN ARVN
AND KHMER UNITS IN CAMBODIA. HE SAID HE HOPES ARVN
SOLDIERS WHEN THEY COME INTO LAOS WILL HAVE KIP
SO THAT THEY CAN PAY FOR WHAT THEY BUY. HE
ASKED ME TO BE SURE TO TRANSMIT THIS SUGGESTION
TO YOU FOR HE IS WORRIED ABOUT THE ARVN BEHAVIOR.
I TOLD HIM I WOULD REPORT HIS SUGGESTION BUT THAT
IT SEEMED TO ME VERY DIFFICULT FOR SECURITY AND
OTHER REASONS TO ISSUE KIP TO ARVN TROOPERS. I
SAID I WAS CERTAIN THAT THE MEN WOULD BE WELL
BEHAVED AND THAT THEY WOULD BE. INSTRUCTED TO
BEHAVE WITH GREATEST COURTESY VIS-A-VIS THE LOCAL
POPULACE.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixch Pres dential ibrary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
PAGE TWO VIENTIANE 561
I AM REPORTING THIS SUGGESTION MERELY AS
INDICATION OF PRIMIN'S CURRENT STATE OF MIND
BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE COURTEOUS IF I WERE
AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM THAT WE HAD THOUGHT OF
THIS PROBLEM AND HAVE ASKED PRESIDENT THIEU
TO ISSUE ORDERS THAT ARVN TREAT CIVILIANS WITH
UTMOST RESPECT.
GP- 1. GODLEY
BT
N
N
73P SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
4
0 301051Z JAN 71 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 605
8030Q
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1401
30 JAN 1971
11 36Z
NODIS/ASHAU
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER
REF: A. VIENTIANE 522
N
B. VIENTIANE 550
1. ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL ABRAMS, I MET THIS MORNING WITH
PRESIDENT THIEU TO INFORM HIM OF AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S CONVERSATION
WITH SOUVANNA REPORTED REFTEL B. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT AMBASSADOR
GODLEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO SOUVANNA (REF A) THAT THE INFORMATION HE
HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN HIM REGARDING THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION,
I.E., "FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DRY SEASON OR AT LEAST SIX WEEKS",
AND THAT THE SIZE WOULD BE TWO DIVISIONS PLUS, WAS ACCURATE.
2. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPORT FROM HIS AMBASSADOR
WHICH COINCIDED FULLY WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S REPORT. SOUVANNA
TOLD THE GVN AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE POSITION HE HAD
NOT REQUESTED THE OPERATION AND HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED ABOUT IT.
HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DELAY ANY DECLARATION FOR AS LONG
AS POSSIBLE. IF HE DOES MAKE A STATEMENT, HE SAID, HE WOULD NOT
GO BEYOND ASKING BOTH SIDES TO WITHDRAW NOR WOULD HE ACCUSE
SOUTH VIET-NAM OF AN INVASION OF LAO TERRITORY. HE WOULD ALSO
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NORTH VIET-NAM HAS OCCUPIED A PART OF LAOS
N
WHICH THE RLG CANNOT CONTROL.
3. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION WAS LARGELY TAKEN UP WITH
THIEU'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE OPERATION AND QUESTIONS PUT TO GENERAL
ABRAMS. THIEU SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED GENERAL VIEN NOT TO GET
TIED DOWN IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE AT TCHEPONE AS HAPPENED AI
KHE SANH AND DIEN BIEN PHU, BUT TO KEEP MOBILE; THAT AFTER THE
TCHEPONE AREA HAD BEEN CLEARED, EFFORTS COULD BE DIRECTED AT
CLEARING THE AREA SOUTH AND WEST TOWARD ASHAU. GENERAL ABRAMS
AGREED.
4. THIEU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD LESS CONCERN FOR THE ENEMY'S
GROUND FORCES THAN FOR ITS ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES. GENERAL
ABRAMS ALSO AGREED AND EXPLAINED WHAT WE HAD BEEN DOING IN THE
WAY OF SUPPRESSION.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
N
-2- SAIGON 1401, 301051Z JAN, (NODIS/ASHAU)
5. THIEU THEN ASKED WHAT GENERAL ABRAMS THOUGHT THE ENEMY
REACTION WOULD BE, SAY AFTER THREE WEEKS. GENERAL ABRAMS
SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD PROBABLY MOVE SOME FORCES
DOWN TO CONTEST THE AREA, BUT DOUBTED THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DO
SO IN THREE WEEKS. HE GAVE PRESIDENT THIEU AN INTELLIGENCE
BRIEFING ON LOCATIONV OF ENEMY UNITS. HE ADDED THAT INTELLIGENCE
SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY IS PUZZLED AND DOES NOT KNOW
WHAT WE ARE UP TO.
6. THIEU ASKED GENERAL ABRAMS WHAT HE THOUGHT THE ENEMY WOULD
N
ATTEMPT TO DO IN NORTHERN MR 1, AND GENERAL ABRAMS REPLIED THAT
THEY WILL TRY TO DO WHAT THEY CAN WITH THE 22 BATTALIONS NORTH
AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ AND ACTIVATE LOCAL UNITS IN MR 1. BUT HE DOES
NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN BE VERY EFFECTIVE IN MR 1.
7. THIEU THEN INQUIRED WHETHER WE THOUGHT THE ENEMY WOULD ATTEMPT
TO EXERT PRESSURE ON OTHER AREAS OF LAOS, SUCH AS THE PLAINE
DES JARRES OR LUANG PRABANG. GENERAL ABRAMS THOUGHT THEY MIGHT
DO SO, BUT WE WOULD PROVIDE VERY STRONG AIR SUPPORT AGAINST ANY
EFFORTS OF THIS KIND. HE EXPLAINED THAT 70 PERCENT OF ALL TACTICAL
AIR WAS NOW BEING APPLIED IN THE LAO PANHANDLE, THAT 95 PERCENT
OF THE B-52 EFFORT WAS ALSO BEING APPLIED THERE.
8. AFTER THE MEETING, THIEU TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT HIS
AMBASSADOR HAD REPORTED THAT SOUVANNA WAS IN FACT PLEASED
BY THE OPERATION. I PRESUME THIS WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY AN
INTIMATION THAT SOUVANNA HAD NOT BEEN DISPLEASED BY THE GVN
APPROACH AND IN RESPONSE TO WHAT I SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY ABOUT
LEAVING THE DISCUSSIONS IN AMBASSADOR GODLEY' HANDS.
N
9. THIEU SEEMS TO BE FULLY ON BOARD FOR BOTH PHASE I AND PHASE II
PENDING OUR DECISION ON THE LATTER.
BUNKER
BT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOD GEORET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#4
N
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 300605Z JAN 71 ZFF-3
INCN: 7974Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1263
JAN 30, 1971
BT
0638Z
TOPSECRE I VIENTIANE 553
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY EYES ONLY
REF: VIENTIANE 550 JAN 29
1. AFTER THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC ATTITUDE SOUVANNA
COULD ADOPT TO ROUTE 9 OPERATION, I BELIEVE WE
SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO HIS PROTESTING SOUTH VIET-
NAMESE INCURSION INTO LAOS IF HE ALSO MAKES CLEAR
HIS OPPOSITION TO PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE.
IN FACT, HE SOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DISSOCIATE
HIMSELF PUBLICLY FROM ROUTE 9 OPERATION AND
PUT HIMSELF ON RECORD AS WANTING ALL FOREIGN
TROOPS OUT OF LAOS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
2. ANY LESS CATEGORIC POSITION THAN THIS WOULD
DAMAGE SOUVANNA STANDING AS A NEUTRALIST
ALMOST BEYOND REPAIR. I ASSUME THAT WHEN
WASHINGTON SPOKESMEN ARE ASKED WHETHER SOUVANNA
WAS CONSULTED ABOUT OPERATION IN ADVANCE THEY
WILL RESPOND WITH "NO COMMENT" RATHER THAN FLAT
DENIAL. THIS WILL LEAD JOURNALISTS IRRESTABLY TO
CONCLUSION THAT SOUVANNA WAS NOT ONLY CONSULTED
IN ADVANCE BUT GAVE COVERT APPROVAL TO OPERATION.
EVEN IF WE ARE ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE IN WASHINGTON,
I DOUBT THAT FICTION OF NO ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH RLG
COULD LONG BE MAINTANED IN SAIGON.
3. FOR THESE REASONS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO OUR
UTMOST TO PROTECT SOUVANNA AND REMAINING FABRIC
OF THE 1962 GENEVA ACCORDS BY ENCOURAGING HIM TO
MAKE CLEAR, AS HE HAS BEFORE, THAT RLG DOES NOT
WANT VIETNAMESE WAR FOUGHT IN LAOS. HE COULD ALSO
SAY THAT HE RECOGNIZES NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATION
OF LAO SOVEREIGNTY CAME FIRST AND PROVOKED SOUTH
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 553, JANUARY 30.
INCN: 7974Q
VIETNAMESE REACTION, BUT HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT
HE WAS OPPOSED TO ANY FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN
LAOS AND HAD ORDERED LAO MILITARY FORCES TO SET UP
DEFENSIVE SCREEN WEST OF AREA OF OPERATIONS ON ROUTE 9.
IMPLICATION OF LATTER REMARK WOULD OF COURSE BE
THAT RLG WAS DETERMINED TO SEE THAT AREA OF
OPERATIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT EXPAND
INTO WESTERN PANHANDLE. PRACTICAL EFFECT OF
N
SETTING UP SUCH A SCREEN WOULD BE TO INHIBIT
WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
BT
NNNNY
N
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES STATE OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 291212Z JAN 71 ZFF- 1
7605Q
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
29 JAN 71 Z12 42
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1261
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 550
NODIS ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY EYES ONLY
REF: VIENTIANE 522 JAN 29
1. CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER 1800 LOCAL. HE SAID
200-0
KING APPROVED THE OPERATION AS I HAD DESCRIBED
IT. HE SAID RLG WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PROTEST
AFTER THE OPERATION HAD BEGUN BUT WOULD MERELY
MAKE A DECLATATION NOTING THAT THE PRESENCE OF
A LARGE NUMBER OF AGGRESSORS ON RLG
TERRITORY, POISED AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM, HAD
REQUIRED THE LATTER TO TAKE ACTION. THIS WOULD
BE THE GENERAL GIST OF THE DECLARATION. THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID IT OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT YET
BEEN DRAFTED. THE ONLY THING THAT THE RLG INSISTS
UPON IS THAT THERE BE NO REPEAT NO REFERENCE TO
PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE RLG. THIS IS THE ONLY
THING THE RLG ASKED.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THE KING WAS
WORRIED ABOUT THE ENEMY'S TAKING YESTERDAY MUONG PHALANE
ON ROUTE 9 WST OF TCHEPONE. KING BELIEVES THAT
WITH SOUTH VIETNAMESE THRUST AGAINST TCHEPONE
200-0
THE ENEMY MIGHT MOVE WESTWARD TO SAVANNAKHET.
KING ASKED THAT I BEAR THIS IN MIND AND, USING THE
FALL OF MUONG PHALANE AS A COVER, GET TROOPS,
PROBABLY SGU'S, PLACED BETWEEEN DONG HENG AND
MUONG PHALANE. I ASSURED THE PRIME MINISTER I
WOULD DO MY BEST WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF
SECURITY, WHICH OF COURSE MUST BE MAINTAINED.
THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID HE HAD INFORMED SOUTH VIETNAMESE
AMBASSADOR AT 1700 LOCAL
OF THE KING'S VIEWS ON THE OPERATION AGAINST TCHEPONE
AND THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING ABSOLUTE SECRECY
ABOUT ANY CONSULTATION WITH THE LAO.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOD
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF STATEMENTA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
Z 282328Z JAN 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH 6308
INFO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE FLASH 8475
7413@
BT
TOPSECRETSTATE 015224
JAN 28, 6:28 PM 1971
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR AMBASSADORS BUNKER AND GODLEY ONLY
REF: A. VIENTIANE 470
B. VIENTIANE 485
C. STATE 15223
D. SAIGON 1330
E. VIENTIANE 521
1. YOU SHOULD ARRANGE TO SEE PRESIDENT THIEU SOONEST TO
INFORM HIM OF CONVERSATIONS WHICH GODLEY HAS HAD WITH
SOUVANNA AND LATEST INSTRUCTIONS TO GODLEY (REFS A, B AND C).
YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT FINAL DECISION ON PHASE II HAS TO
AWAIT FULLER EXPLANATION OF LAO VIEWS AFTER SOUVANNA RE-
TURNS FROM VISIT WITH KING.
S
2. YOU SHOULD THEN PROPOSE TO PRESIDENT THIEU THAT HE
AGREE NOW TO EXECUTE FIRST PHASE OF OPERATION ASHAU AND
THAT SCHEDULED REDEPLOYMENTS OF RVNAF FORCES TO MILITARY
REGION I TAKE PLACE AS PLANNED. VIEW IS HERE THAT TROOP MOVEMENTS
SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN NOW SO THAT PHASE II CAN BE LAUNCHED EXPEDI-
TIOUSLY AFTER DETERMINATION OF LAO VIEWS AND HIGH-LEVEL MEETING
HERE ON FEBRUARY 2. IT CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF INCREASING
THREAT TO MR I FROM PANHANDLE.
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THIEU OF OUR INTENTION TO INFORM SOUVANNA
OF MANNER IN WHICH WE ARE PROCEEDING AND OF FACT THAT DECISION ON
SECOND PHASE EXECUTION ORDER BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING
SOUVANNA REACTION. WE PROPOSE TO REPRESENT PHASE I MOVEMENT, IF
PUBLIC QUESTIONS ARE ASKED, AS BEING MADE TO ESTABLISH A STRONGER
DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN MR I IN THE LIGHT OF INCREASING ENEMY CON-
CENTRATIONS IN THE LAO PANHANDLE AND INTERRUPTING THE ENEMY'S
SUPPLY LINES INTO RVN. IF THIEU HAS DIFFERENT VIEWS WE WOULD LIKE
TO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON HIS VIEWS.
4. THIEU SHOULD BE URGED THAT NO SEPARATE APPROACH BE MADE IN
VIENTIANE BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS IN ORDER TO PREVENT CROSSED
TOP-SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
200
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 015224, JAN 28, 1971
SIGNALS AND UNINFORMED SPECULATION. IN VIEW OF REF E, YOU SHOULD
BE CERTAIN THAT THIEU AND WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT AS TO SIZE AND
DURATION OF OPERATION AND THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN US.
S
4. REPORT SOONEST THE RESULTS OF YOU CONVERSATION SO THAT
WE MAY FORMULATE APPROPRIATE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS TO GODLEY
PER REF. C. ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: EA: WH Sullivan
Cleared by: W.H. - Dr. Kissinger
The Under Secretary (draft)
The Secretary
Approved by: S/S - Theodore L. Eliot, Jr
200-0
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
OF STATE
Department of. State
UNITED STATES OF
TOP SECRET
TELEGRAM
Z 282338Z JAN 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE FLASH 8476
INFO RUEHCR/ANEMBASSY SAIGON FLASH 63 09
BT
7412Q
TOPSECRET STATE 015223
JAN 28, 6:28 PM 1971
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BUNKER ONLY
REFS: A. VIENTIANE 470 B. VIENTIANE 485 C. VIENTIANE 521
1. WE HAVE TAXEN CAREFUL NOTE OF OBJECTIONS WHICH SOUVANNA
CONTINUES TO HAVE CONCERNING PROPOSED RVNAF OPERATIONS IN
TCHEPONE AREA. WE NOW UNDERSTAND HE WILL GO TO LUANG
PRABANG ON OR ABOUT 29 JANUARY TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT
WITH THE KING. WE EXPECT THAT YOU WILL KEEP US INFORMED
AS THESE CONVERSATIONS PROGRESS, AND YOUR REPORTING WILL
BE HELPFUL IN CONNECTION WITH HIGH-LEVEL MEETING HERE ON
2 FEBRUARY.
2. WE DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO INVOLVE PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
IN FORM OF LETTER SUGGESTED REF B. IT IS OUR CONSIDERED
JUDGMENT THAT DISCUSSIONS OF THIS PROPOSED OPERATION SHOULD
REMAIN AT YOUR LEVEL WITH SOUVANNA. WE THEREFORE WISH YOU TO
ASSURE THAT YOU AND HE CAN STAY IN TOUCH OVER THE NEXT FEW
DAYS IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT YOUR END OF SCENARIO TO BE OUTLINED
IN FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.
N
3. WE ARE AUTHORIZING BUNKER TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU
IMMEDIATELY AND INFORM HIM OF THE CONVERSATIONS YOU HAVE
HAD. WITH SOUVANNA. WE WILL PROPOSE THAT THIEU UNDERTAKE THE
REDEPLOYMENT OF RVNAF FORCES TO MILITARY REGION I ON SCHEDULE
CONTEMPLATED BY OPERATION ASHAU. IF THIEU AGREES TO THIS PROPOSAL,
THIS WILL MEAN THAT FIRST PHASE OF OPERATION WILL BEGIN ON
NIGHT OF 30-31 JANUARY.
4. WE WILL FURTHER PROPOSE TO THIEU THAT THIS PHASE BE UNDERTAKEN
IN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT DECISION ON SECOND PHASE, WHICH INVOLVES
CROSSING BORDER INTO LAOS DOES NOT NEED TO BE MADE AT THIS
TIME AND HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN MADE PENDING THE OUTCOME OF
YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SOUVANNA. UNTIL DECISION ON PHASE II
IS MADE THESE RVNAF UNITS WOULD BE OPERATING IN BORDER
REGIONS ENTIRELY WITHIN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND WOULD BE USED TO
CLEAN OUT AREAS IN THE NORTHWEST OF MILITARY REGION I.
TOP SEGRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 015223, JAN 28, 1971
THEIR VERY DEPLOYMENT TO THAT REGION WILL, IN OUR JUDGMENT,
HAVE SOME DISRUPTIVE EFFECT UPON ENEMY OPERATIONS IN LAOS
PANHANDLE AND IS JUSTIFIED ON BASIS ENEMY THREAT TO SVN I
CORPS.
5. BECAUSE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS OF THIS SIZE WILL SOON COME
TO PUBLIC ATTENTION, WE WILL WISH, AT APPROPRIATE TIME, TO
HAVE YOU INFORM SOUVANNA WHAT ACTION IS BEING TAKEN. YOU
WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE BORDER-CROSSING
OPERATION DEPENDS UPON THE PROVISION OF U.S. AIR AND
LOGISTICS SUPPORT, AND, HENCE, CANNOT RPT CANNOT ACTUALLY
TAKE PLACE WITHOUT A POSITIVE DECISION FROM WASHINGTON.
N
6. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS
OPERATIONS WITH SOUVANNA AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 5, YOU WILL
NOT RPT NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO GIVE HIM ANY EXECUTIION DATE FOR
PHASE TWO UNTIL DECISION IS REACHED AS TO DATE. HE WILL, HOWEVER,
FROM FACT THAT PHASE ONE IS BEING EXECUTED, BE ABLE TO GAUGE
POTENTIAL IMMINENCE OF ACTUAL BORDER-CROSSING OPERATION.
7. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR 521 AND HAVE ASKED BUNKER FOR
IMMEDIATE COMMENT. IT WOULD APPEAR EITHER THAT THERE IS SOME
US/GVN MISUNDERSTANDING IN SAIGON OR ELSE THAT GVN IS ACTING
WITH LESS THAN PROPER CANDOR WITH SOUVANNA. THIS DEVELOPMEN,
HOWEVER, DOES NOT, RPT NOT, ALTER OUR BASIC VIEW OR INTENTIONS
AS INDICATED IN FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CONVEY
THEIR GENERAL CONTENT TO SOUVANNA AND WITHHOLD ANY, RPT ANY,
COMMENT ON GVN DEMARCHE UNTIL WE HAVE CLARIFICATION FROM
SAIGON. YOU SHOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, REAFFIRM THE ACCURACY
OF THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY GIVEN HIM ABOUT THE SIZE
AND DURATION PLANNED FOR THIS OPERATION. IT IS VITALLY
IMPORTANT THAT NO MISREPRESENTATION BE MADE EXPRESSLY, IMPLCITLY
OR BY ACQUIESCENCE. ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: EA - Mr Sullivan
Cleared by: WH as Dr Kissinger
The Secretary
The Under Secretary (draft)
Approved by: S/S - Mr Eliot
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
DE
Department of State
UNITED STATE STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 281256Z JAN 71
7147Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
28 Jan 1971
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 545
1320Z
BT
TOPSECRETSAIGON 1330
NODIS/ASHAU
N
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER
REF: SAIGON 1236
1. AS MENTIONED REFTEL, ARVN IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN MOVEMENT
NORTH JAN 30, WITH CLOSING TIME IN I CORPS SET FOR FEBRUARY 2.
THIEU WILL WANT TO SEE ME TOMORROW TO LEARN WHAT RESULTS WE HAVE
HAD FROM APPROACH TO SOUVANNA. HE WILL ALSO BE CONCERNED ABOUT
THE FACT THAT WHEN MOVEMENT OF ARVN BEGINS, PRESS WILL ANTICIPATE
SOMETHING AFOOT AND HE WILL WANT TO KNOW HOW WE PROPOSE TO HANDLE
QUERIES. HIS CONCERN IS EVIDENT BY FACT THAT PALACE CALLED TODAY
TO ASK WHETHER I HAD REQUESTED APPOINTMENT. WE REPLIED THAT I DID
NOT REQUEST AN APPOINTMENT, BUT HOPED TO SEE HIM TOMORROW. HE
WILL UNDERSTAND THIS TO MEAN THAT I DO NOT HAVE THE ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS HE RAISED.
2. I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT GENERAL ABRAMS AND I SEE PRESIDENT
THIEU AND GENERAL VIEN TOMORROW, THE 29TH. THEREFORE REQUEST
INSTRUCTIONS.
N
BUNKER
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
N
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOP SECRET
TELEGRAM
0 290330Z JAN 71 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1247
BT
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 522
7485Q
NODIS/ASHAU
JAN 28, 11:03 PM 1971
REF: VIENTIANE 521
1. AFTER DISPATCHING REFTEL LAST NIGHT, I RETURNED
TO PRIME MINISTER'S AND WE HAD ANOTHER BRIEF CHAT.
HE WAS IN AN EXTREMELY GOOD MOOD AND SAID THAT HE
WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE KING'S
CONSENT TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION. HE WAS THOROUGHLY
FAMILIAR WITH MILITARY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND SAID
HE WOULD EMPHASIZE TO HIS MAJESTY THE ENEMY'S
CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA AND THE RLG WEAKNESS. I
TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT WISH TO CHALLENGE WHAT THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HIM BUT THAT
IT WAS MY DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING THAT MORE THAN A
DIVISION WOULD BE INVOLVED AND THAT THE DURATION
OF THE OPERATION, AT LEAST AS PROVIDED FOR IN CURRENT
PLANS, WAS LONGER THAN PRESENTED BY THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE APPRECIATED
THE FRANKNESS WITH WHICH THE USG WAS APPROACHING
THE PROBLEM.
2. EARLIER IN THE EVENING THE PRIME MINISTER HAD
SPOKEN TO SISOUK ABOUT SISOUK'S TRIP TODAY TO PHNOM PENH
N
AND FACT THAT PRIME NINISTER HAD REFUSED TO
LET PRINCE BOUN OUM GO TO PHNOM PENH TO CONFER
WITH LON NOL. IT WAS THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER ALSO SEES SOME INTERNAL POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE IN REDUCING THE ENEMY PRESSURE IN THE
SOUTH, FOR IF THE ENEMY PRESSURE INCREASES THE
SOUTHERNERS WILL TURN MORE AND MORE TO A
LAOS/SOUTH VIETNAM/CAMBODIA FEDERATION TO WITH-
STAND COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. IF THE PRIME MINISTER
CITES THIS FACTOR IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE KING,
IT WILL, I BELIEVE, WEIGH HEAVILY IN THEIR DECISION.
3. STATE 15223 RECEIVED THIS MORNING. AT 0900 LOCAL
I INFORMED PRIME MINISTER THAT WASHINGTON HAD
ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE INFORMATION HE GAVE
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 522, JAN 28, 1971
ME LAST EVENING. AMB BUNKER WAS BEING ASKED TO
CONSULT WITH PRESIDENT THIEU. HOWEVER, I HAD BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AS FAR
AS WASHINGTON KNEW THE INFORMATION I HAD PREVIOUSLY
GIVEN HIM ABOUT THE SIZE AND THE DURATION OF THIS
OPERATION WAS ACCURATE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID
"YOU MEAN ONE MONTH'S DURATION?" AND I SAID "NO SIR,
FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DRY SEASON OR AT LEAST
SIX WEEKS". HE TOOK OUT HIS LITTLE BLACK BOOK AND
MADE SOME NOTATIONS. YOU MAY BE SURE THERE HAS
BEEN NO REPEAT NO MISREPRESENTATION HERE.
4. PRIME MINISTER CONFIRMED HIS 1030 DEPARTURE FROM
VIENTIANE FOR LUANG PRABANG AND THAT HE PLANS TO
SEE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AT 1700 LOCAL
THIS AFTERNOON. HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE ME
AT 1800 LOCAL.
GODLEY
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
#4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 271015Z JAN 71 AFF- 1
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
INCN: 6.6460
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1231
JANUARY 27, 1971
BT
1110Z
TOPSECRET VIENTIANE 485
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
RE STATE 13902
1. AT 1530 LOCAL I CALLED ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND
WENT OVER THE POINTS RAISED REFTEL BUT MADE NO
REPEAT NO ALLUSION TO DATES PROPOSED. HE TOOK IT
ALL IN GOOD STRIDE BUT WHEN I CAME TO THE QUESTION OF
THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION HE FROWNED, EVEN WHEN I
HASTILY RETREATED TO THE
SIX WEEKS MINIMUM. I THEN WENT ON TO INDICATE
OUR HOPE THAT WHEN SOUVANNA PROTESTS, WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH
NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD BE
CALLED FOR. HE SAID THAT HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD INCLUDE
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
2. SOUVANNA HAS BEEN GIVING THIS MATTER MUCH THOUGHT
AND SAID HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE MUST CONSULT THE
KING. FOR THIS PURPOSE HE PLANS TO GO TO LUANG PRABANG
ON SUNDAY, MANUARY 31. HE IS TOTALLY BOOKED UP UNTIL
THEN. I DID NOT REPEAT NOT DEMUR BUT ASKED IF HE
N
WISHED ME TO BE IN LUANG PRABANG AT THAT TIME. HE OFFERED
TO TAKE ME WITH HIM BUT I SAID I DID NOT THINK
THAT WAS WISE. HE SAID HE WOUL THINK THIS OVER AND
MIGHT WANT ME TO BE DISCREETLY IN LUANG PRABANG.
THIS CAN EASILY BE ARRANGED FOR THE LAST TIME I WAS
THERE I HAD TOLD THE AREA COORDINATOR I HOPED TO BE
BACK SOON TO VISIT WITH THE SWISS MEDICAL TEAM, ETC.
3. ONE QUESTION THAT STILL REMAINS UNANSWERED IS
THAT RAISED IN PARA 6 OF VIENTIANE 470, I.E., WHETHER
SOUTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP THE
OPERATION SECRET FOR A FEW DAYS. I THINK THE ANSWER
IS OBVIOUSLY THAT THIS IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, GIVEN
THE SIZE OF THE FORCES INVOLVED, BUT IT GIVES ME A
CHANCE TO GO BACK TO SOUVANNA PRIOR TO HIS GOING TO
LUANG PRABANC.
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- VIENTIANE 485, JANUARY 27.
INCN: 6646Q
4. SOUVANNA THIS AFTERNOON WAS AS RESOLUTE AS HE
WAS YESTERDAY. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT AS HE
CONTINUES TO MULL OVER THIS PROBLEM HE WILL BE
WORRIED OVER THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION. I HAVE
NEVER MENTIONED OUR PRESIDENT WITH REGARD TO THIS
OPERATION. I THINK THAT THE TIE MIGHT NOW BE RIGHT FOR A
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY AS THE KING
HAS GONE CUTOF HIS WAY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO
EXPRESS HIS ADMIRATION FOR OUR PRESIDENT AND HIS
RESOLUTION AND STEADFASTNESS AIN CARRYING OUT HIS
INTENTIONS. SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:
N
"YOUR HIGHNESS:
I FULLY APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULT DECISION YOU' RE
FACED WITH IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING
ACTION IN THE TCHEPONE AREA. I HAVE BEEN GIVING
THIS OPERATION MY PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR I BELIEVE
IT IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO REDUCE THE ENEMY'S
PRESSURE AND HIS CAPABILITIES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
AND CAMBODIA. WHILE YOUR TROOPS HAVE BEEN
GALLANTLY DEFENDING THE BOLOVENS, I AM DEEPLY
CONCERNED WITH THE BUILDUP OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES
IN SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION III AND IN THE NORTHERN
PORTION OF MILITARY REGION IV.
"I HAVE CONSIDERED WITH PRESIDENT THIEU THE
POSSIBILITY OF KEEPING THIS OPERATION SECRET AT
LEAST FOR A WHILE. THIS, HOWEVER, WE FIND IMPOSSIBLE
GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES REQUIRES
TO EXECUTE IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER THE OPERATION.
N
"IT ALSO HAS BEEN MY HOPE THAT THE OPERATION MIGHT
BE OF A SHORT DURATION. HERE AGAIN, DETAILED STUDIES
THAT WE HAVE MADE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY
PRESENCE IN THE TCHEPONE AREA AND THE COMPLEXITY
OF HIS BASE STRUCTURE THERE LEADS ME IO CONCLUDE THAT
TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE OPERATION SHOULD LAST THROUGH
THE DRY SEASON. IF THIS IS ABSOLUTELY
OUT OF THE QUESTION, A MINIMUM TIME THAT WOULD BE
REQUIRED FOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WOUL BE SIX
WEEKS.
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-3- VIENTIANE 485, JANUARY 27.
INCN: 6646Q
".I WISH TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO ASSURE YOUR
HIGHNESS THAT NO U.S. GROUND FORCES
WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS OPERATION BUT WE WILL
SUPPORT OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES IN EVERY
OTHER POSSIBLE MANNER, I.E., IN THE AIR AND WITH
ARTILLERY BASED IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I ALSO WISH TO
ASSURE YOUR HIGHNESS THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS
GUARANTEED ME THAT HHE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
WILL BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS THEIR MISSION
N
IS ACCOMPLISHED".
GP- 1.
GODLEY
BT
NNNN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPART ENT OF STATE
4.
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
0 270105Z JAN 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8455
INFO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6206
6555Q
BT
JAN 26, 8:10 PM 1971
TOPSECRET STATE 013902
NODIS/ASHAU
REF: STATE 12344
N
STATE 13112
VIENTIANE 470
STRICTLY FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BUNKER
1. WE COMMEND YOU FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU HANDLED
INITIAL APPROACH TO SOUVANNA. YOUR RESPONSES TO HIS
SUGGESTIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS OTHER THAN PROPOSED
TCHEPONE OPERATION WERE WELL TAKEN.
2. SOUVANNA DESIRE TO SLEEP ON OUR PROPOSAL IS UNDERSTAND-
ABLE. WE ALSO SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT HE SHOULD HAVE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, OVER AND ABOVE THAT WHICH YOU HAVE
ALREADY PROVIDED HIM, WHEN YOU MEET FOR SECOND TIME.
3. IT IS OUR FEELING THAT, EXCEPT FOR GIVING HIM THE DATE
WHEN THIS OPERATION IS PROPOSED TO TAKE PLACE, YOU SHOULD
INFORM HIM AI THE NEXT MEETING (WHICH WE HOPE WILL TAKE
PLACE SOONEST) IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL CONCERNING THE NATURE
N
OF THE MILITARY ACTIONS ENVISAGED. WE WISH TO AVOID ANY
POSSIBLE SUGGESTION THAT WE ARE ENGAGING IN DUPLICITY IN
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM. OTHER ALTERNATIVE OPERATIONS,
INCLUDING THE TRI-BORDER OPERATION, HAVE BEEN GIVEN
CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT TCHEPONE
PLAN OFFERS THE GREATEST MILITARY BENEFITS.
4. THEREFORE, YOU CAN DRAW ON ALL THE INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE OPERATION WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED YOU IN REFS A AND B
EXCEPT FOR THE TIME SCHEDULE. YOU SHOULD BE SURE THAT HE
REALIZES THE RVNAF FORCE ENTERING THE TCHEPONE AREA WILL
CONSIST OF TWO DIVISIONS PLUS, THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT TO
STAY IN PLACE DURING MUCH OF THE DRY SEASON UNLESS FORCED
TO WITHDRAW BECAUSE OF MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, (OR IF
THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO SOUVANNA AND A SHORTER PERIOD BUT
NO LESS THAN SIX WEEKS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, PLEASE ADVISE
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 013902, JAN 26, 1971
FOR OUR CONSIDERATION), AND THAT THEY WILL RECEIVE U.S.
SUPPORT AS DETAILED IN PARA 1 OF REF A.
5. THE OBJECTIONS SOUVANNA APPEARS TO HAVE HAD TO THE
PROPOSAL IN YOUR INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH HIM NATURALLY ARE
BEING GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. REFERENCE PARA 9 YOUR
470, IF OPERATION PROCEEDS, WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT IF SOUVANNA
PROTESTS OPERATION AND ASKS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ARVN HE
WILL NOT LIMIT PROTEST TO GVN BUT WILL PROTEST PRESENCE IN
LAOS OF BOTH NVN AND GVN AND ASK FOR WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH.
N
6. FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER: FOREGOING IS STRICTLY FYI.
GP- I ROGERS
BT
Drafted by: EA: W H Sullivan
Cleared by: WH - Dr. Kissinger
S/S - Mr. Eliot
The Undersecretary
Approved by: The Secretary
N
TOP
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TO BE DELIVERED TO GENERAL HAIG FROM AMBASSADOR GODLEY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FROM: AMBASSADOR
FOR: GENERAL HAIG
I HAVE JUST TRANSMITTED TOP SECRET EMBTELL 470
NODIS/ASHAU WHICH FOLLOWS:
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. PURSUANT TO STATE 013312 I DELIVERED LETTER QUOTED
T HEREIN AT 1640 TO PRIME MINISTER. I EMPHASIZED ITS
SECRECY AND CLASSIFIED IT TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY,
DESCRIBING TO HIM WHAT THIS MEANT FOR OUR SECURITY
REGULATIONS.
2. HE READ THE LETTER WITH GREAT CARE.
HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS "WHY DON'T YOU HIT THE TRI-
BORDER AREA (I.E., DOWN ROUTE 110) AND OCCUPY THE
HIGHLANDS SOUTH OF ROUTE 110?" I TOLD THE PRIME
MINISTER THAT AS FAR AS WE WERE AWARE THERE WERE
NO REPEAT NO ENEMY STORAGE AREAS IN THAT AREA
AND THAT ALREADY THERE WAS AN SGU CAMP LOCATED
SOUTH OF ROUTE 110 WHICH WAS OCCASIONALLY RAIDING
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THAT ROAD.
3. WE THEN RETIRED TO HIS MAP ROOM AND
HE EXAMINED MINUTELY THE TCHEPONE AREA. HIS NEXT
QUESTION WAS " HOW LONG WILL THE OPERATION LAST?/
I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD QUERY WASHINGTON
POINTING OUT THAT IT HAD TO TAKE SOME TIME REALLY TO
CLEAN OUT THE ENEMY INSTALLATIONS THERE. HE ASKED
SPECIFICALLY THAT WASHINGTON'S THINKING BE CLARIFIED
ON THIS POINT.
4. HE THEN ASKED THE SIZE OF THE FORCES
INVOLVED. I TOLD HIM I COULD NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY
BUT I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE SIZABLE FOR WE KNEW
THAT THE ENEMY HAD AT LEAST TWO DIVISIONS IN THAT
GENERAL AREA AND THAT IT WOULD BE FATAL TO SEND
A WEAK FORCE IN AGAINST THEM. THIS DID NOT CAUSE
TOO MUCH TROUBLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER BUT HE DID
POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM POLITICALLY
W ITHIN LAOS DUE TO THE PRESS REPORTS OF THE EXCESSES
OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN CAMBODIA. I TOLD
HIM I UNDERSTOOD THIS PREOCCUPATION BUT THAT AS FAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AS I WAS AWARE THERE WERE NO LOYAL LAO ALONG ROUTE 9
WHICH HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO HEAVY BOMBARDMENT,
INCLUDING B-52'S AND THAT THE PICTURES I HAD SEEN OF
THIS GENERAL AREA INDICATED NO CIVILIANS. I ALSO
RECALLED TO HIM THAT WHEN HIS TROOPS OCCUPIED
MUONG PHINE IN FALL OF 1969 AND GOT WITHIN EIGHT KILOMETERS
OF TCHEPONE THAT ONLY SOME THREE THOUSAND CIVILIANS
CAME OUT. THE PRIME MINISTER NODDED IN ASSENT.
5. I THEN DREW UPON PARAS 4A, 4B, 4C, AND 4D OF STATE 012344.
THE ONLY LIBERTIES I TOOK WITH THIS TEXT WAS TO ADD SOUTHERN
LAOS WHENEVER IT SPOKE OF THE SAFETY OF FRIENDLY
FORCES IN PARAS 4A AND 4B. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSA-
TION I MENTIONED MY CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN
THE BOLOVENS AND STRESSED THAT A RAID AGAINST
TCHEPONE WOULD BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO RLG FORCES
IN MR IV.
6. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE PUBLIC POSITION HE
SHOULD TAKE ON THIS OPERATION. HE SAID HE WOULD OF
COURSE HAVE TO PROTEST AND ASKED THAT THE SOUTH
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VIETNAMESE TROOPS WITHDRAW. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT
HE MERELY EXPRESS HIS REGRET, INDICATING AN UNDER-
STANDING WHY SUCH AN OPERATION WAS NECESSARY
AND CITING THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
IN LAOS AS A REASON FOR THE OPERATION. HE DEMURRED
AND ASKED IF THE OPERATION COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET.
I TOLD HIM THAT IN ALL HONESTY I DID NOT SEE HOW AN
OPERATION OF THIS SIZE COULD BE KEPT FROM THE
PUBLIC. HE THEN ASKED IF IT COULDN'T BE KEPT SECRET
FOR A WEEK OR SO. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFTER HE
PROTESTED HE DID NOT EXPECT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY BUT THAT THEY SHOULD LEAVE
WITHIN A WEEK, TEN DAYS OR MAYBE EVEN TWO WEEKS.
HE WAS SPECIFICALLY THINKING ALONG THE LINES THAT
IF THE OPERATION COULD BE KEPT SECRET FOR A WEEK
HE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMAINING IN LAOS FOR, SHALL
WE SAY, A TOTAL OF THREE AND POSSIBLY FOUR WEEKS.
HE KEPT SHAKING HIS HEAD AND SAYING THIS RAISED
SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR HIM AND THERE-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
FORE HE MUST PROTEST. I EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING
FOR HIS POSITION AND SAID IT WAS PRECISELY DUE TO THIS
UNDERSTANDING THAT I HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO CONSULT
WITH HIM.
7. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY THINKING AB OUT A
POSSIBLE ATTACK ON SOME OTHER AREA, FOR STILL AT THE
MAP HE ASKED IF THE ATTACK COULD NOT BE MADE IN
NORTHEAST CAMBODIA. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT
THINK THIS WAS WISE BECUASE (1) THERE WERE NO
KNOWN SIZABLE ENEMY TROOPS OR CONCENTRATIONS
OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT IN THAT AREA AND
(2) AN ATTACK THERE WOULD NOT HELP HIS FORCES
IN MR IV. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AND WE WENT
BACK TO LOOKING OVER ROUTE 9 ON HIS MAP.
8. RETURNING TO WHERE HE HAD RECEIVED ME,
HE KEPT REPEATING THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PROTEST.
I KEPT INJECTING THE IDEA THAT WHILE I ACCEPTED
HE HAD TO PROTEST, HE SHOULD ALSO CITE THE
PRESENCE OF SIZABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
ON LAO TERRITORY AS THE REASON FOR THE OPERATION.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
AT ONE TIME HE SAID THAT IF HE DID NOT PROTEST
VIGOROUSLY THE CHINESE WOULD ACT IN THE NORTH.
I DODGED THIS ONE.
9. WE FINALLY LEFT IT THAT
(1) I WOULD QUERY WASHINGTON ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF A TRI-BORDER OPERATION, (2) I WOULD QUERY
WASHINGTON ABOUT THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION
AND (3) I WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON THAT ONCE THE
OPERATION WAS PUBLIC THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD
PROTEST SOUTH VIETNAMESE ACTION IN LAO TERRITORY
AND ASK THAT ALL REPEAT ALL FOREIGN TROOPS BE
WITHDRAWN FROM LAO TERRITORY.
10. THE ONLY PORTION OF MY INSTRUCTIONS THAT I
DID NOT COVER WAS TO ASK HIM TO REPLY IN WRITING
TO MY LETTER. I FELT THAT SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE
EXTREMELY UNWISE. AS THE CONVERSATION DEVELOPED TO DO SO WOULD
INDICATE A LACK OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN US AND
IF HE PUT HIS THOUGHTS ON PAPER IT MIGHT RAISE
GREATER OBSTACLES. I NEVER ONCE IN THE CONVERSATION
MENT IO NED OUR PRESIDENT FOR IT MIGHT BE
DESIRABLE TO USE OUR PRESIDENT'S NAME IN FUTURE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
11. AS I WAS WALKING OUT THE DOOR, THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID HE WOULD SLEEP ON WHAT I HAD TOLD
HIM AND THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH
ON THIS MATTER. HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE FURTHER
WORD FROM WASHINGTON. IN CONCLUSION I EMPHASIZED
ONCE AGAIN THE SECRECY, POINTING OUT THAT MY
SECRETARY AND I WERE THE ONLY ONES KNOWLEDGEABLE HERE.
HE GRINNED AND SAID HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT HE
WOULD HANDLE THIS PROBLEM IN THE SAME MANNER.
GP- 1
TOPSECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMEN OF STATE
#4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
INCN: 6233Q
0 261108Z JAN 71 ZFF-1
JANUARY 26, 1971
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
1143Z
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 479
BT
TOPSECRET SAIGON 1236
NODIS/ASHAU
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER
REFS: A. STATE 12344
B. VIENTIANE 423
C. STATE 13112
1. I GREATLY APPRECIATE INFORMATIVE REFTELS, SINCE THIEU HAS
EXPRESSED TO ME HIS CONCERN ABOUT NEED TO DEVELOP A SCENARIO
FOR THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IN LAOS. HOW THIS WILL BE DEVELOPED
WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON SOUVANNA'S REACTION. SINCE PREPARATIONS
FOR THE OPERATION HAVE ALREADY BEGUN, HE FEELS THAT THIS IS A
MATTER OF SOME URGENCY. THE AIRBORNE DIVISION AND TWO-THIRDS OF
THE MARINE DIVISION HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE LINE FOR A REST
PERIOD. THE PRETEXT FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL IS POSSIBLE ENEMY ACTION
AGAINST THE SAIGON AREA DURING THE TET HOLIDAY PERIOD.
2. IT IS PROPOSED TO BEGIN MOVEMENT NORTH OF THESE CONTINGENTS
JANUARY 30 WITH CLOSING TIME IN I CORPS SET FOR FEBRUARY 2. THIEU
FEELS THAT WHEN MOVEMENT NORTH OF THIS LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS BEGIN
N
THE PRESS WILL ANTICIPATE SOMETHING AFOOT AND WE WILL HAVE TO
DEVISE SOME DIVERSIONARY SCENARIO FOR THIS MOVEMENT. HE IS ALSO
PLANNING SOME OPERATIONAL DIVERSION ONE OR TWO DAYS BEFORE LAOTIAN
EXERCISE BEGINS.
3. GENERAL ABRAMS AND I, THEREFORE, BRIEFED THIEU AND GENERAL
VIEN ON OUR PROPOSED APPROACH TO SOUVANNA (REFTELS A AND C) AND
AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S VIEWS ON HIS PROBABLE REACTION (REF B). I
TOLD THIEU THAT I WOULD INFORM HIM OF SOUVANNA'S REACTION WHEN
AMBASSADOR GODLEY HAD REPORTED RESULTS OF THEIR MEETING.
THIEU WILL BE AVAILABLE IN SAIGON THROUGHOUT TET HOLIDAY PERIOD.
BUNKER
BT
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
4
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TOP SECRET
TELEGRAM
0 260150Z JAN 71 ZFF6
CONTROL: 6119Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
JAN 25, 1971-8:51P
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8438
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6161
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 013112
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BUNKER ONLY
N
REF: A. STATE 12344 B. VIENTIANE 0423
1. WE APPRECIATE TIMELY RESPONSE TO REFTEL A AND
CONSIDER THAT SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO SOUVANNA CONTAINED
REFTEL B IS MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO TEST SOUVANNA'S REACTION
TO PROPOSED OPERATION. MESSAGE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER
BE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BUT A PROPOSAL BEING CONSIDERED BY
US GOVERNMENT. TEXT REVISED ACCORDINGLY IS AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE YOUR HIGHNESS:
MY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH ADMIRATION
THE GALLANT STAND YOUR ARMED FORCES ARE MAKING AGAINST
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND IN PARTICULAR THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LAOS. WITH THE DENIAL
OF CAMBODIA AS A CONDUIT FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND FOOD,
HANOI IS CLEARLY MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO REINFORCE ITS ONLY
REMAINING SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA THROUGH
LAOS. WE KNOW WHAT DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THIS POSES FOR THE ROYAL
N
LAO GOVERNMENT WHICH, UNDER YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP, IS SEEKING
TO ASSERT THE NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT STATUS OF LAOS ASSURED
BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1962.
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LAOS IS
EQUALLY OF GRAVE CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES; IT COULD
PRESAGE NEW OFFENSIVES BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA AS WELL AS LAOS. THE USAF HAS BEEN
DIRECTED TO DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO SUPPORT NOT ONLY
YOUR FORCES IN SOUTHERN LAOS BUT ALSO TO INTERDICT THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE LINES OF COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE SOUTHERN
PANHANDLE. IT IS APPARENT HOWEVER THAT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE HEAVY TOLL WE ARE TAKING OF THE ENEMY WE ARE UNABLE TO
KEEP HIS GROUND FORCES FROM ATTACKING IN SOUTHERN LAOS AND IN
GETTING SUPPLIES THROUGH TO CAMBODIA. FOR THIS REASON MY
GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THIS ENEMY
THREAT COULD BE COUNTERED.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-STATE 0131 , JAN 25
THE MOST PROMISING FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW WOULD
BE AN OPERATION ON ROUTE 9 DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE LOGISTICS BASE IN THE TCHEPONE AREA. THE
ONLY FORCES CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING SUCH A TASK ARE THE
SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO WOULD NEED FULL U.S. LOGISTIC
AND AIR SUPPORT TO SUCCEED. AS THE OPERATION IS VISUALIZED
AT THE PRESENT TIME IT WOULD BE A PENETRATION- FORCE
WITH CLEARLY DEFINED LIMITATIONS ON ITS SCOPE AND DURATION.
NATURALLY SUCH AN OPERATION COULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING YOU. I HAVE BEEN
INSTRUCTED THEREFORE DISCUSS WITH YOU THE DETAILS OF
OUR THINKING ON THIS MATTER AND TO OBTAIN YOUR REACTIONS
TO IT.
I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED IN PARTICULAR TO EMPHASIZE
THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS AS FIRMLY ATTACHED
AS EVER TO THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS UNDER THE 1962 GENEVA
ACCORDS. IT IS MY GOVERNMENT'S HOPE, AS IT IS YOURS,
THAT LAO NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY CAN BE EXTENDED TO
SOUTHEASTERN LAOS AS WELL AS TO THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.
THE LIMITED OPERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WHOSE
SUPPORT WE ARE CONSIDERING IN THE TCHEPONE AREA IS
DESIGNED TO BRING THAT DAY NEARER. END QUOTE
2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT CURRENT PLANNING WOULD
INVOLVE REDISPOSITION OF RVNAF STRIKE FORCES INTO JUMPING-
OFF BASES EARLY NEXT WEEK, WITH FIRST CROSSING OF LAOS
BORDER SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY FIFTH, REPEAT FIFTH.
THE URGENCY OF CONSULTATION WITH SOUVANNA AND OF IMMEDIATE
COMMUNICATION WITH WASHINGTON AND SAIGON IS APPARENT
FROM THIS TIMETABLE.
3. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER FOREGOING MESSAGE
TO SOUVANNA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT ARE NOT RPT NOT
AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM OF SCHEDULE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 2.
YOU MAY, HOWEVER, INFORM HIM THAT PLANNING WOULD INVOLVE
MOVEMENT BY TWO-DIVISION RVNAF FORCES IN "NEAR FUTURE."
4. AFTER YOU HAVE DELIVERED MESSAGE TO SOUVANNA, YOU
SHOULD REPORT HIS FIRST REACTION BY CABLE IMMEDIATELY.
WE WOULD, HOWEVER, HOPE FOR A WRITTEN REPLY FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER WHICH WOULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THIS
CHANNEL, AND WISH YOU TO URGE HIM TO SEND SUCH A MESSAGE
EXPEDITIOUSLY. ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY: WHSullivan: EA
APPROVED BY: The Secretary
CLEARANCES: Mr. Green:EA, The Under Secretary, Mr. Eliot:S/S,
WH:Mr. Kissinger
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOP GEORGE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
STATES OF UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP-SECRET
CONTROL : 5772 Q
RECIEVED : Jan. 25, 1971
04:45Z
0 250345Z JAN 71 ZFF- 1
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1202
BT
TOPSECRE T VIENTIANE 423
NODIS/ASHAU
FOR THE SECRETARY
REF: STATE 012344
1. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A FAIR CHANCE OF OBTAINING
SOUVANNA'S TACIT APPROVAL TO THE OPERATION OUTLINED
IN REFTEL. HE WOULD NEVER COME OUT AND SAY THAT HE
HAD APPROVED SUCH AN OPERATION BUT HE MIGHT NOT
OPPOSE IT PROVIDED WE TAKE HIM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE
AS SOON AS THIS OPERATION IS KNOWN BELOW THE
PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IF THERE
SHOULD BE A LEAK BEFORE THE OPERATION OCCURS OR IF
IT SHOULD BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT HIS BEING INFORMED, HE
WOULD BE OBLIGED PUBLICLY TO OPPOSE IT AND IN HIS
CURRENT MOOD MIGHT EVEN THREATEN TO USE HIS AIR FORCE
FOR BOMBING THE "AGGRESSORS," I.E., SOUTH VIETNAMESE.
2. IN PRESENTING THE MATTER TO SOUVANNA I RECOMMEND
THAT I BE GIVEN A MESSAGE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER:
200-0
3. "YOUR HIGHNESS": I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING WITH ADMIRATION
THE GALLANT STAND YOUR ARMED FORCES ARE MAKING AGAINST
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND IN PARTICULAR THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LOAS. WITH THE
DENIAL OF CAMBODIA AS A CONDUIT FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND
FOOD. HANOI IS CLEARLY MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO REINFORCE ITS
ONLY REMAINING SUPPLY LINE TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND
CAMBODIA THROUGH LAOS. I KNOW WHAT DIFFICULT PROBLEMS
THIS POSES FOR THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT WHICH, UNDER YOUR
WISE LEADERSHIP, IS SEEKING TO ASSERT THE NEUTRAL AND
INDEPENDENT STATUS OF LAOS ASSURED BY THE GENEVA
AGREEMENTS OF 1962.
TOP-SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2-Page V.ENTIANE 423 TOP SECRET NOLIS/ASHAU
4. "THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BUILDUP IN SOUTHERN LAOS IS
EQUALLY OF GRAVE CONCERN TO ME; IT COULD PRESSAGE NEW
OFFENSIVES BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN SOUTH VIENAM AND
CAMBODIA AS WELL AS LAOS. I HAVE DIRECTED THE USAF TO
DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO SUPPORT NOT ONLY YOUR FORCES IN
SOUTHERN LAOS BUT ALSO TO INTERDICT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
LINES OF COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE SOUTHERN PANHANDLE.
IT IS APPARENT HOWEVER THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE HEAVY
TOLL WE ARE TAKING OF THE ENEMY WE ARE UNABLE TO KEEP
HIS GROUND FORCES FROM ATTACKING IN SOUTHERN LAOS AND
IN GETTING SUPPLIES THROUGH TO CAMBODIA. FOR THIS
REASON I AM CONSIDERING OTHER WAYS IN WHICH THIS
ENEMY THREAT COULD BE COUNTERED.
5. "THE MOST PROMISING FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW
WOULD BE AN OPERATION ON ROUTE 9 DESIGNED TO DESTROY
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LOGISTICS BASE IN THE TCHEPONE
AREA. THE ONLY FORCES CAPABLE OF UNDERTAKING SUCH A
TASK ARE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO WOULD NEED FULL U.S.
LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT TO SUCCEED AS THE OPERATION
IS VISUALIZED AT THE PRESENT TIME IT WOULD BE A
PENETRATION-IN-FORCE WITH CLEARLY DEFINED LIMITATIONS ON
ITS SCOPE AND DURATION.
6. "NATURALLY SUCH AN OPERATION COULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY
CONSIDERED WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING you. I HAVE ASKED
AMBASSADOR GODLEY THEREFORE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE
DETAILS OF OUR THINKING ON THIS MATTER AND TO OBTAIN
YOUR REACTIONS TO IT.
7. " I HAVE ASKED HIM IN PARTICULAR TO EMPHASIZE THAT
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS AS FIRMLY ATTACHED AS
EVER TO THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS UNDER THE 1962 GENEVA
ACCORDS. IT IS MY HOPE, AS IT IS YOURS, THAT LAO
NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY CAN BE EXTENDED TO SOUTH-
EASTERN LAOS AS WELL AS TO THE REST OF THE COUNTRY.
THE LIMITED OPERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WHOSE
SUPPORT WE ARE CONSIDERING IN THE TCHEPONE AREA IS DESIGNED
TO BRING THAT DAY NEARER."
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP-SECRET
-3-Page, VIENTIANE 423 TOP SECRET NODIS/ASHAU
8. I BELIEVE SOUVANNA REACTION WOULD BE CAUTIOUSLY
AFFIRMATIVE BUT HE WOULD INSIST THAT WE MAINTAIN SECRECY
ON CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM AND MIGHT WANT TO LIMIT THE
SIZE AND DURATION OF THE OPERATION. HE MIGHT EVEN INSIST
ON A GUARANTEE THAT SUCH LIMITS BE OBSERVED. HE HAS
FREQUENTLY INDICATED THAT THE WAR IN THE PANHANDLE
IS NOT A LAO AFFAIR AND THAT THE GROUND HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER
COMPLETELY BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. HIS PUBLIC
N
POSTURE AFTER THE ATTACK WOULD BE THAT HIS CONSENT
WAS NOT SOUGHT AND HE COULD ADD THAT THE WAR IN THE PANHANDLE
WAS NOT A LAO AFFIAR. I BELIEVE THAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION
IN LAOS WOULD NOT SUFFER UNDULY THEREFROM (SEE EMBTEL 424).
THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION WOULD CERTAINLY BE STORMIER.
9. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE ENEMY WOULD REACT MILITARY
IN THE NORTH ALTHOUGH SOUTH VIETNAM PRESENCE IN THE
TCHEPONE AREA WOULD RESULT IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PLACING
A GREATER EMPHASIS ON ROUTE 23 THAT PASSES WEST OF
TCHEPONE THROUGH MUONG PHINE.
GP- 1.
GODLEY
BT
N
NNNN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
CONTROL: 756900
0 231855Z JAN 71 ZFF6
JAN 23, 1971-1:55 P.M.
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8433
INFO/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6141
BT
TOPSECRET STATE 012344
NODIS/ASHAU
STRICTLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BUNKER
FROM THE SECRETARY
1. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN HERE TO AN ARVN OPERATION
INTO TCHEPONE AREA OF LAO PANHANDLE, DESIGNED TO DESTROY
SUPPLY CACHES, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL AND INTERDICT THE
FLOW OF SUPPLIES UNTIL THE END OF THIS DRY SEASON.
APPROXIMATELY A TWO-DIVISION EQUIVALENT OF ARVN FORCES
WOULD BE INVOLVED. U.S. PARTICIPATION WOULD BE LIMITED
TO AIR SUPPORT TO INCLUDE FIXED WING AND HELICOPTER,
AIRLIFT, MEDICAL EVACUATION, TACTICAL AIR, HELO GUN SHIPS,
AND U.S. ARTILLERY FIRING EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE VIETNAMESE
SIDE OF THE BORDER. NO RPT NO U.S. GROUND COMBAT FORCES
WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN LAOS. IT WOULD BE HOPED TO MAINTAIN
THE FORCE IN LAOS UNTIL THE END OF THE DRY SEASON, BUT IF THE
SITUATION ON THE GROUND DEVELOPED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MAKE
IT DESIRABLE THE FORCE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN EARLIER. THUS,
WE WOULD NOT WANT TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC DATE
FOR WITHDRAWAL.
2. THE FEELING HERE IS THAT IF SUCH OPERATION CAN
BE SUCCESSFULLY MOUNTED, IT COULD HAVE MAJOR BENEFICIAL
EFFECTS ON THE SITUATION SVN AND SECURITY AND SAFETY
200-0
OUR FORCE IN svn, BUT COULD ALSO DO MUCH TO ASSIST THE
SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH AN
OPERATION WOULD PRESENT SOUVANNA WITH AWKWARD CHOICES,
AND WE URGENTLY NEED YOUR BEST JUDGMENT ON WHEN AND HOW BEST
TO APPROACH SOUVANNA SO THAT BEFORE MAKING OUR FINAL
DECISIONS WE CAN OBTAIN SOME ESTIMATE OF HIS LIKELY
REACTIONS.
3. ON THE QUESTION OF TIMING, THERE IS, OF COURSE,
THE DILEMMA OF THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN GIVING HIM THE FEELING
THAT HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE TIME FOR CONSIDERATION AND THE
NECESSITY FOR MAINTAINING SECURITY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Library DECLASSIFIED
TOD
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 1 3526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 012344, JAN 23
4. ON THE QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING
HERE WOULD BE TO HAVE YOU BRIEF HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE
OPERATION AND TELL HIM THAT WE AND THE GVN WOULD TAKE A
PUBLIC POSTURE CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
A. THE OPERATION IS A RAID OF LIMITED DURATION AGAINST
NVA-OCCUPIED BASE AREAS IN LAOS, DESIGNED TO DESTROY
SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL ACCUMULATED IN VICINITY
OF A MAJOR ENEMY LOGISTICS CENTER AND TO DISRUPT A CRITICAL
ENEMY TRANSPORTATION HUB. THE OPERATION IS BEING UNDER-
TAKEN NOW BECAUSE. THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF RVN AND US FORCES IN
SVN ARE THREATENED BY ENEMY CAPABILITIES SUPPORTED FROM THIS
LOGISTIC COMPLEX.
B. BOTH GOVERNMENTS CONSIDER THIS OPERATION WILL ENHANCE -
THE SAFETY OF ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, HELP ENSURE
THAT VIETNAMIZATION IS CARRIED OUT IN AN EXPEDITIOUS AND
SUCCESSFUL MANNER, AND INHIBIT THE ENEMY EFFORTS TO
REESTABLISH ITS SANCTUARIES IN CAMBODIA.
C. THE OPERATION IS OF LIMITED DURATION; THE GVN HAS NO
INTENTION OR DESIRE TO OCCUPY LAOTIAN TERRITORY;
AND THE GROUND FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN UPON COMPLETION
OF THE OPERATION.
D. THE U.S. WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO U.S. GROUND
COMBAT FORCES WILL ENTER LAOS, BUT WE WOULD FRANKLY SET
FORTH THE SCOPE OF OUR COMBAT AIR ARTILLERY AND LOGISTIC
SUPPORT. (YOU MIGHT THEN WISH TO EMPHASIZE TO SOUVANNA
PRIVATELY THAT USG FAVORS PLAN AND IS PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR
EFFORT TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS.)
N
5. WE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER SOUVANNA WAS INFORMED AND HIS REACTIONS. IN
MANY WAYS IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE ADVANTAGEOUS IF WE COULD
SAY THAT HE WAS INFORMED AND SUPPORTED THE OPERATION,
OR AT LEAST DID NOT OBJECT TO IT. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE
THAT HE MAY WELL FEEL FOR HIM TO TAKE SUCH A POSITION
WOULD RISK LOSING HIS NEUTRAL POSTURE AND THE ACQUIESCENCE
OF THE SOVIETS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE MIGHT ALSO FEEL THAT
SUCH A POSTURE ON HIS PART COULD INVITE MORE AGGRESSIVE
ATTACKS BY THE NVA ON RLG POSITIONS IN NORTH LAOS.
6. THUS, WE WOULD BE UNDERSTANDING IF HE FELT HE COULD
NOT GIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THE OPERATION. IF THIS IS THE
CASE, WE WOULD AT THE MINIMUM HOPE TO OBTAIN HIS PRIVATE
ACQUIESCENCE AND A PUBLIC POSTURE ON HIS PART OF REGRETTING
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
TOD CEPDIT
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
-3- STATE 012344, JAN 23
BUT UNDERSTANDING THE NECESSITY FOR THE OPERATION ARISING
FROM NVA OCCUPATION OF THIS PART OF LAOS, EXPRESSING HOPE
OF PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES
FROM LAOTIAN TERRITORY AND TAKING NOTE OF GVN STATEMENTS ON
INTENTION TO WITHDRAW. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IMPORTANT
THAT ANY PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF REGRET ON HIS PART BE DIRECTLY
ACCOMPANIED BY EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE
NECESSITY OF THE OPERATION OR AS A MINIMUM THAT HE LINK
EXPRESSION OF REGRET TO NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
FORCES FROM LAOTIAN TERRITORY. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO
UNDERSTAND IF HE WOULD PREFER THAT THE PUBLIC POSITION BE THAT
HE HAD NO PRIOR INFORMATION.
7. WE WILL MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR ESTIMATE OF SOUVANNA'S
N
REACTIONS TO AN APPROACH ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES AND
ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR MODIFICATIONS YOU MAY HAVE, AS WELL
AS FOR THE TIMING OF THE APPROACH WITH RELATION TO THE
LAUNCHING OF THE OPERATIONS.
8. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON SOUVANNA'S
REACTIONS TO AND DESIRABILITY OF A COURSE UNDER WHICH HE
WOULD BE GIVEN LITTLE OR NO ADVANCE INFORMATION AND IN
EFFECT WOULD BE PRESENTED WITH A NEAR OR COMPLETE FAIT
ACCOMPLI. UNDER THIS ALTERNATIVE WE WOULD, OF COURSE, STILL
WANT TO DO ALL POSSIBLE AT THE TIME TO INFLUENCE HIS PRIVATE
ATTITUDE AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS.
9. KNOWLEDGE OF THE FOREGOING IS BEING HELD TO A VERY SMALL
NUMBER OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICERS IN WASHINGTON AND, ACCORDINGLY, YOU
SHOULD AT THIS TIME CONFINE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS MESSAGE AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE OPERATION STRICTLY TO YOURSELF. MESSAGES
SHOULD BE SLUGGED NODIS/ASHAU.
N
GP- 1. ROGERS
BT
DRAFTED BY:
Alexis Johnson:J-U
CLEARANCES:
CIA: Director Helms
DOD: Deputy Secretary Packard
JCS: Admiral Moorer
APPROVED BY:
Under Secretary Johnson
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
N
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
4
0 231543Z JAN 71 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 8432
005646Q
INFO RUEHCR/ AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 6139
BI
23 JAN 71Z 15 49
TOPSECRET STATE 012317
NODIS/ASHAU
1. THIS MESSAGE IS TO BE DECRYPTED AND HANDLED ONLY
BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AND IS LITERALLY EYES ONLY
FOR AMBASSADORS GODLEY AND BUNKER.
2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY THERE IS ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN YOU AND DEPARTMENT A NODIS/ASHAU SERIES. MESSAGES
IN THIS SERIES ARE TO BE ENCRYPTED, DECRYPTED AND HANDLED
ONLY BY YOUR SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AND ARE LITERALLY
EYES ONLY FOR YOU.
3. MESSAGES IN OTHER SERIES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT REFER TO NODIS/
ASHAU MESSAGES.
4. DISTRIBUTION AND HANDLING OF NODIS/ASHAU MESSAGES
IN WASHINGTON WILL BE SIMILARLY SEVERELY RESTRICTED.
ROGERS
BT
N
Drafted by: TLEliot, Jr.
Approved by: Ambassador Johnson
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.