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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
TELEGRAM
KENNEDY TO HAIG EIA 711
3/28/71
B
W/ATTACH
2
TELEGRAM
KENNEDY TO HAIG E/A 713
3/28/71
B
3
TELEGRAM
KENNEDY TO HAIG E/A 720
3/28/71
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES
VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES
80
FOLDER TITLE
LAOS OPERATIONS
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S.GPO;1989-235-084/00024
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS ON LAM SON 719
The Situation
1. The South Vietnamese entered Southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation is an important factor in assessing the outcome.
If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade South Vietnamese
forces, then there would have been relatively little fighting and the operation
would have been assessed more in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled
up. But for several good reasons, such as the importance of the area,
the short supply lines to North Vietnam and the availability of reserve
forces in southern North Vietnam -- the North Vietnamese undertook a
major counter attack. They reinforced the area strongly with some of
their best divisions, not only to defend the trail system but in an attempt
to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese as well. As a result,
the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
Immediately Measurable Results
2. In terms of immediately measurable results, the weight of evidence
is that South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves very well in the
six weeks of fighting which followed the initial incursion into Laos. Many
of the ARVN units involved fought without respite for 40 days and, in the
judgment of our field commanders, 18 out of the 22 battalions involved
fought extremely well. Because of the intensity of the fighting, these units
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
did take some heavy losses - an estimated 1400 killed and 4700 wounded.
But respective enemy losses were more than 13, 000 killed and many
were wounded. In terms of combat effectiveness, we estimate that
the equivalent of 13 enemy maneuver battalions were rendered
ineffective in the course of the fighting whereas only 4 ARVN battalions
were put out of combat. Exaggerated reports of enemy losses in
Vietnam have not been numerous, but this time the figure may be low.
The enemy acted more aggressively than he had in several years with
the result that he exposed himself to concentrated allied firepower and
air attack. Thus, we believe the ratio of enemy to friendly losses was
at least 10 to 1, a very high price for Hanoi to pay.
Impact on the North Vietnamese Logistics System
3. It is too early to be precise about the impact of Lam Son 719 on the
enemy's logistical system, although some perspective can be provided.
The North Vietnamese had to move more supplies South to Cambodia
and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for the loss
of three major means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville; purchases
in Cambodia, and food obtained from areas which had previously been
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam but which are now firmly under
the authority of the government. Moreover, he had suffered great losses
in the Cambodian sancuaries last year. Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Trail
has become a more vital element in Hanoi's overall strategy than it
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
was in the past. But we are reasonably certain that the enemy
was well behind last year's pace even before the Lam Son operation
began.
The Lam Son operation clearly compounded Hanoi's problem. It
disrupted the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, physically blocking various
branches of the trail. South Vietnamese forces found or destroyed,
or called in U.S. air power to destroy, some 4900 individual weapons,
1900 crew served weapons and pounds of tons of ammunition and other
supplies. This was in addition to the vast quantity of supplies, ammu-
nition and equipment which was consumed by the North Vietnamese in
Laos instead of continuing down the trail to be used in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. Moreover, when the North Vietnamese were obliged to
engage ARVN forces in a fixed battle position, their units massed and
became targets for concentrated Vietnamese firepower and U.S. air
power which destroyed over 100 tanks and many artillery pieces, some
300 enemy trucks were destroyed directly in the operation and 4300
more were destroyed by air interdiction while the operation was in
progress. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics units were
engaged in the fighting and were badly damaged, their resiliency in
restoring the flow of supplies southward has been degraded. We estimate
that some 3500 enemy rear service personnel vital to the operation of
the trail logistics system were killed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
All these considerations must be viewed against the fact that the Ho
Chi Minh trail complex is useful as a logistics system only during the
dry season, which began later this year than usual. Therefore, when
the rains come in the next four or five weeks, the Communistswill have
little time in which to attempt to make up all the weeks that have been
lost to them in the Lam Son operation.
Forestalling Anticipated Enemy Offensive Activity in South Vietnam
4. A significant measure of Lam Son's achievements will be the
degree it succeeds in forestalling enemy offensive activity. Viewed in
conjunction with ARVN operations conducted simultaneously in Cambodia,
these two efforts have precluded enemy offensive operations in South
Vietnam during the current dry season. We believe that if Lam Son had
not been undertaken, the North Vietnamese would have had the real option
of launching major attacks atainst ARVN and U.S. forces located in the
northern provinces of South Vietnam. Looking to the future, we believe that
the short -fall in their supply efforts will prevent them from mounting major
offensives in South Vietnam in this dry season and will delay any offensives
they might have planned over the next dry season because it will take them
that much longer to rebuild their stocks.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 5 -
The combined military operations also have had the effect of
engaging the enemy and keeping his forces distant from the population
of SouhVietnam. To illustrate this graphically, it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation North of Route 7 inside Cambodia is being
fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong Divisions, the same units which, at this time of the year in
1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon and the surrounding
metropolitan area. As for the enemy units engaged in Lam Son -- the
304th, 308th, 320th and 324-B divisons - - in February and March of 1968,
succeeded in capturing control of the city of Hue, entering the defenses
of Danang, and generally harassing the population in the coastal regions.
All of these enemy units were engaged this year away from population
centers and, in fact, outside of South Vietnam itself.
Lam Son's Bearing on Vietnamization
5. Lam Son has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamization. Three years ago, ARVN units were engaged against
enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now
ARVN units have shown themselves able to deal with the enemy threat in
sanctuary areas without the support of U.S. ground combat forces or advisors
while keeping their own territory pacified as well. They have demonstrated
the ability to mount a complex multi-division operation in conditions of
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather, and against a well-
prepared enemy. Moreover, this is being achieved with a U.S. presence
which has at the Richard Nix26 Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 6 -
To illust rate this point further, it should be recognized that
February and March are the months of the year in which the Communists
traditionally mount the most extensive military operations in all regions
of South Vietnam. This year they were given an additional incentive to
do this because of that fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia and would distract attention
from those two actions. Despite exhortations to their cadre to undertake
such action within South Vietnam, they have been unable to date to mount
anything which can even be considered a major successful high point.
In fact, the situation within South Vietnam has been extraordinarily calm
during the entire month of February and March with the exception of an
action being taken by ARVN forces against Commun ist strongholds in the
U Minh forest of Military Region IV.
The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain security after
the departure of United States forces will, in the long run, be measured by
the balance of strength which exists between North and South Vietnamese
forces. Our assessment is that the balance in the Indochina peninsula has
swung in favor of the South Vietnamese. As Ambassador Bunker has
reported, the operation has created confidence among the South Vietnamese
in the ability of ARVN and pride in its accomplishments. There has been
been
satisfaction in the fact that the fighting has/taken outside the borders of South
Vietnam and that ARVN has been able to inflict for heavier casualties
on the enemy.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 7 -
We conclude, therefore, that the foundation for Vietnamization in
South Vietnam is sound and that the process has been enhanced by the
disruptions Lam Son has caused the enemy and by the increased confidence
it has given the South Vietnamese in meeting their own defense needs.
The Current psychological atmosphere is in some ways reminiscent
of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted maximum political advantage
in the short run, it was only as time passed that the real physical results
began to tell. This time, we must benefit from that lesson and not let
ourselves be misled by surface appearances or by exaggerated stories.
The operation has achieved its primary objective of carrying the
fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and destroying his principal lines of
communications and should buy the South Vietnamese additional time in
which to strengthen their armed forces while permitting continued
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS ON LAM SON 719
The Situation
1. The South Vietnamese entered Southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation is an important factor in assessing the outcome.
If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade South Vietnamese
forces, then there would have been relatively little fighting and the operation
would have been assessed more in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled
up. But for several good reasons, such as the importance of the area,
the short supply lines to North Vietnam and the availability of reserve
forces in southern North Vietnam -- the North Vietnamese as anticipated
undertook a major counter attack. They reinforced the area strongly with
some of their best divisions, not only to defend the trail system but in an
attempt to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese as well. As a
result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
Immediately Measurable Results
2. In terms of immediately measurable results, the weight of evidence
is that South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves very well in the six
weeks of fighting which followed the initial incursion into Laos. Many of
the ARVN units involved fought without respite for 40 days and, in the
judgment of our field commanders, the ARVN forces fought extremely well.
Because of the intensity of the fighting, these units did take some heavy
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
losses - now estimated at 1400 killed and 4700 wounded. But reported
enemy losses were more than 13, 000 killed and many more were
wounded. In terms of combat effectiveness, we estimate that the
equivalent of 13 enemy maneuver battalions were rendered ineffective
in the course of the fighting whereas only 4 out of the 22 ARVN battalions
were put out of combat. Some reports of enemy losses in Vietnam in
the past may have been exaggerated, but this time the estimate may be low.
The enemy acted more aggressively than he had in several years with
the result that he exposed himself to concentrated allied firepower and
air attack. Thus, we believe the ratio of enemy to friendly losses was
at least 5 to 1, a very high price for Hanoi to pay.
Impact on the North Vietnamese Logistics System
3. It is too early to be precise about the impact of Lam Son 719 on the
enemy's logistical system, although some perspective can be provided.
The North Vietnamese had to move more supplies South to Cambodia
and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for the loss
of three major means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville, purchases
in Cambodia; and food obtained from areas which had previously been
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam but which are now under
the authority of the government. Moreover, he comments he had
suffered great losses in the Cambodian sanctuaries last year.
Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Trail has become an even more vital element
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
in Hanoi's overall strategy than it was in the past. But we are
reasonably certain that the enemy supply movement was well behind
last year's pace even before the Lam Son operation began.
The Lam Son operation clearly compounded Hanoi's problem.
It disrupted the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, physically blocking various
branches of the trail. South Vietnamese forces found or destroyed,
or called in U.S. air power to destroy, some 4900 individual weapons,
1900 crew served weapons and thousands of tons of ammunition and other
supplies. This was in addition to the vast quantity of supplies, ammu-
nition and equipment which was consumed by the North Vietnamese in
Laos instead of continuing down the trail to be used in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. Moreover, when the North Vietnamese were obliged to
engage ARVN forces in a fixed battle position, their units massed and
became targets for concentrated Vietnamese firepower and U.S. air
power which destroyed over 100 tanks and many artillery pieces, some
300 enemy trucks were destroyed directly in the operation and 4300
more were destroyed by air interdiction while the operations were in
progress. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics units were
engaged in the fighting and were badly damaged, their resiliency in
restoring the flow of supplies southward has been degraded. An estimated
3500 enemy rear service personnel vital to the operation of the trail
logistics system were killed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
All these considerations must be viewed against the fact that the Ho
Chi Minh trail complex is useful as a logistics system only during the
dry season, which began later this year than usual. Therefore, when
the rains come in the next four or five weeks, the Communists will have
little time in which to attempt to make up all the weeks that have been
lost to them in the Lam Son operation.
Forestalling Anticipated Enemy Offensive Activity in South Vietnam
4.
A significant measure of Lam Son's achievements will be the
degree it succeeds in forestalling enemy offensive activity. Viewed in
conjunction with ARVN operations conducted simultaneously in Cambodia,
these two efforts have precluded major enemy offensive operations in South
Vietnam during the current dry season. If Lam Son had not been under-
taken, the North Vietnamese would have had the real option of launching
major attacks against ARVN and U.S. forces located in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam. Looking to the future, we believe that
the short-fall in their supply efforts will prevent them from mounting
major offensives in South Vietnam in this dry season and will delay any
offensives they might have planned over the next dry season because it
will take them that much longer to rebuild their stocks.
Hanoi will, of course, want to mask the extent to which its
capabilities have been impaired and will therefore endeavor to act as
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
if it is playing from strength. To project this image, the Communists
may be willing to spend additional manpower capital in the days im-
mediately ahead by trying to mount a sharp flurry of attacks in the
northern part of South Vietnam, and elsewhere if they can get such
attacks off the ground. Such attacks may be specifically directed against
U.S. units in an endeavor to increase American casualties, whatever
the cost to Hanoi. Nonetheless, the Communists probably have lost
the ability to mount sustained major offensives and the overall record
of Communist activity over the next few months can be expected to
support this contention.
The combined military operations also have had the effect of
engaging the enemy and keeping his forces distant from the population
of South Vietnam. To illustrate this graphically, it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation North of Route 7 inside Cambodia is being
fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong Divisions, the same units which, at this time of the year in
1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon and the surrounding
metropolitan area. As for the enemy units engaged in Lam Son -- the North
Vietnamese 304th, 308th, 320th and 324-B Divisions -- in February and March of
1968, fought for two weeks in the city of Hue, entered the defenses of Danang,
and generally harassed the population in the coastal regions. All of these
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
enemy units were engaged this year away from population centers and,
in fact, outside of South Vietnam itself.
Lam Son's Bearing on Vietnamization
5.
Lam Son has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamization. Three years ago, ARVN units were engaged against
enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now
ARVN units have shown themselves able to deal with the enemy threat in
sanctuary areas without the support of U.S. ground combat forces or
advisors while keeping their own territory pacified as well. They have
demonstrated the ability to mount a complex multi-division operation
in conditions of difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather, and
against a well-prepared enemy. Moreover, this is being achieved
with a U.S. presence which has diminished by some 260, 000 men since
1969.
To illustrate this point further, it should be recognized that
February and March are the months of the year in which the Communists
traditionally mount the most extensive military operations in all regions
of South Vietnam. This year they were given an additional incentive to
do this because of the fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia and would distract attention
from those two actions. Despite exhortations to their cadre to undertake
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-7-
such action within South Vietnam, they have been unable to date to mount
anything which can even be considered a major successful high point.
In fact, the situation within South Vietnam has been extraordinarily calm
during the entire month of February and March with the exception of an
action being taken by ARVN forces against Communist strongholds in the
U Minh forest of Military Region IV.
The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain security after
the departure of United States forces will, in the long run, be measured
by the balance of strength which exists between North and South Vietnamese
forces. Our assessment is that the balance in the Indochina peninsula has
swung in favor of the South Vietnamese. As Ambassador Bunker has
reported, the operation has created confidence among the South Vietnamese
in the ability of ARVN and pride in its accomplishments. There has been
satisfaction in the fact that the fighting has been taken outside the borders
of South Vietnam and that ARVN has been able to inflict far heavier casualties
on the enemy.
We conclude, therefore, that the foundation for Vietnamization in
South Vietnam is sound and that the process has been enhanced by the
disruptions Lam Son has caused the enemy and by the increased confidence
it has given the South Vietnamese in meeting their own defense needs.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-8-
The current psychological atmosphere is in some ways reminiscent
of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted maximum political advantage
in the short run, it was only as time passed that the real physical results
began to tell. This time, we must benefit from that lesson and not let
ourselves be misled by surface appearances or by exaggerated stories.
The operation has achieved its primary objective of carrying the
fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and disrupting his principal lines of
communications and should buy the South Vietnamese additional time in
which to strengthen their armed forces while permitting continued
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
LAMSON 719
As of 200800Z Mar 71
KIA (A/C)
WIA (A/C)
MIA
US
3/105 (0/37)
19/581(0/129)
0/34(0/28)
RVNAF 57/948
218/3461
2/169
ENEMY 422/11, 314
3642
43
TOTAL US/VNAF HELO SORTIES TO DATE 117, 269/1832
RATIO US HELO LOSSES TOTAL SORTIES 71/1000
TOT US/VNAF TAC AIR SORTIES TO DATE 6821/170
% AIR EFFORT (US/VNAF)
TAC
HCPTR
98/2
99/1
A/C LOSSES (*ADJUSTED)
AHIG (COBRA)
1/24*
UH-1H (HUEY)
0/43*
OH-6 (CAYUSE)
0/8*
OH-58 (KIOWA)
0/4
CH-47 (CHINOOK)
0/3
CH-53 (SEA STALLION)
0/2*
UH-1H (RVN HUEYS)
0/6
CH-34 (RVN)
0/2
F-4
0/3
A-1
0/1
1/95
A/C LANDING IN LAOS 525
16 US PERSONNEL ON GND
49 A/C HIT 45 NON FLYABLE/1 DESTROYED
US IN OPERATION 10,000
RVN IN OPERATION 20,000 (14 519 in Laos)
EN IN OPN AREA 22,000
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LAMSON 719
As of
KIA (A/C)
WIA (A/C)
MIA
US
a/105 (a/37)
21/606 (12/141)
4/38
(4/32)
RVNAF 98/989
573/3816
0/169
ENEMY 485/11,805
3656 KBA
43 DET
7840
TOTAL US/VNAF HELO SORTIES TO DATE 120,039/
RATIO: US HELO LOSSES/TOTAL SORTIES: 75/1000
TOT: US/VNAF TAC AIR SORTIES TO DATE 6940/210
% AIR EFFORT (US/VNAF)
TAC
HCPTR
97/3
99/1
A/C LOSSES
AHIG (COBRA)
0/23
UH-1H (HUEY)
7/50
OH-6 (CAYUSE)
0/8
OH-58 (KIOWA)
0/4
CH-47 (CHINOOK)
0/3
CH-53 (SEA STALLION)
0/2
UH-1H (RVN HUEYS)
0/6
CH-34 (RVN)
0/2
F-4
0/3
A-1
0/1
7/102
A/C LANDING IN LAOS: 520 on 20 March
66 US PERSONNEL ON GND(4MIA)
50 A/C HIT 29NON FLYABLE/7 DESTROYED
US IN OPERATION 10,000
RVN IN OPERATION 20,000 (13,370 in LAOS)
EN IN OPN AREA: 22,000
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
LDX
CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
WINSTON LORD
none copy
FROM:
JOHN D. NEGROPONTE
joal
please has let kmau
SUBJECT:
Lam Son Talking Points
of
Per our conversation, following are State's comments on draft
Lam Son talking points as best they can reconstruct them. (Ambassador
Johnson has the sole copy of their written comments in his possession,
has left his office, and is apparently prepared to discuss them-when he
gets to San Clemente.) Comments are keyed to pages of draft which
General Haig already has.
Page 1: lines 8 through 10, delete phrase beginning with "such as"
and ending with "Southern North Vietnam. 11 (Reason for this suggestion
is to eliminate any implication that we were surprised.)
Same page, second line from bottom: delete "18 out of the 22 battalions
involved". (State believes this avoids invidious reference to ARVN
performance. On the other hand, to retain this reference would be
consistent with what the President himself has said and enhances the
overall credibility of the talking points.)
Page 2: lines 6 and 7, they would delete entire sentence which begins
"Exaggerated reports".
Page 3: 7th line from bottom, they would substitute phrase "over 10 times
that number" for "4300 more". (This apparently relates to degree of
confidence one places in reported truck kills.)
Page 5: 9th line, before "304th" insert "North Vietnamese".
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(1) The Lamson operation should be viewed in conjunction
with the Toan Thang operation in Cambodia. Both actions,
taken together, had the effect of striking at the North
Vietnamese, pulling them off balance, and precluding
enemy offensive operations in South Viet-Nam during the
current dry season. Moreover the Lamson operation pro-
bably preempts the possibility of successful enemy
offensives in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam
during the summer of 1971 when it will be dry on the
eastern side of the Annamite mountains.
Seen in this light the combined military operations
have the effect of engaging the enemy and keeping his
forces distant from the population of South Viet-Nam.
To illustrate this graphically it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation north of Route 7 inside
Cambodia is being fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Divisions which
are the same enemy units which, at this time of the year
in 1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon,
Cholon, and in the Capital Military District. Similarly,
the North Vietnamese units which were engaged in Lamson
the 304th, 308th, 320th, and 324-B Divisions were
the same ones which, in February and March of 1968, suc-
ceeded in capturing control of the city of Hue, entering
the defenses of Danang, and generally harassing the
population in the coastal regions. It is important to
note that both s Toan Thang and Lamson are being fought
in areas that are either very sparsely populated or not
populated at all by civilians, and moreover, that both
of them are being fought outside the territory of South
Viet-Nam.
(2) If one is to view the Lamson operation in terms of
the effectiveness of Vietnamization a look at the
situation inside South Viet-Nam is instructive. February
and March are the months of the year in which the com-
munists traditionally mount their most extensive military
operations in all regions of South Viet-Nam. This year
they were given an additional incentive to do this because
of the fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of the Toan Thang and Lamson operations and would distract
attention from those two actions. Despite exhortation
to their cadres to undertake such action within South
Viet-Nam- they have been unable to date to mount anything
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
which can even be considered a successful high point. In
fact, the situation within South Viet-Nam has been extra-
ordinarily calm during the entire months of February and
March with the exception of the action being undertaken
by ARVN forces against communist strongholds in the U
Minh Forest of Military Region IV.
These observations suggest that the foundation for
Vietnamization in South Viet-Nam is sound and that the
Vietnamese security forces are capable of maintaining the
situation in their home areas even while the bulk of
South Viet-Nam's mobile forces are committed to expedi-
tionary actions outside the country.
(3) The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain
security after the departure of United States forces will,
in the long run, be measured by the balance of strength
which exists between the RVNAF and the North Vietnamese
forces. Our general assessment is that the balance in
the Indochina peninsula, given the continuing presence
of United States air power, has swung in favor of the
South Vietnamese forces.
Substantial support for this conclusion comes from
the North Vietnamese themselves. It seems quite clear
that, in the months of February and early March, the
North Vietnamese were genuinely concerned about the
prospect of an invasion of North Viet-Nam by South Viet-
namese forces supported by United States air power. It
should be noted that these concerns were at their peak
at the moment when the North Vietnamese knew South Viet-
Nam was heavily engaged in both the Toan Thang and Lamson
operations.
North Viet-Nam's concern can be measured not only
in terms of its barrage of statements and charges that
were made during this period, but most particularly by
its call upon Communist China. The statements which Xuan
Thuy made in Paris concerning possible Peking actions
went well beyond anything Peking itself had uttered, and
had a quality of "my big brother can lick your big brother"
about them. Going even beyond this indication of ner-
vousness, the North Vietnamese swallowed their patriotic
pride and asked Chou En-lai to come to Hanoi in order to
give substance to their threats.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
All this illustrates that North Viet-Nam genuinely
believes the South Vietnamese forces are strong enough to
mount major military actions against North Vietnamese units
in Laos and Cambodia and at the same time undertake a
significant blow against North Viet-Nam itself. This
would suggest pretty strong testimony that North Viet-Nam
believes South Vietnamese forces quite able to take care
of themselves after the departure of United States ground
forces.
(4) In assessing the damage which Lamson has done to the
North Vietnamese logistics situation, [it is not possible
to make a definitive judgment at this time However it
should not be concluded that, because Lamson has been
terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly and effectively
repair all the disruption that has taken place and achieve
their logistics goal on throughputs. The disruptions in
the Trail complex resulted not only from the physical
blocking of various branches of the Trail, but more
importantly from other considerations. First of all,
the South Vietnamese forces found and destroyed, or called
in U.S. air to destroy, very significant caches of supplies
and weapons in the areas which they occupied. Secondly,
the North Vietnamese military units which came into the
Trail area to meet the South Vietnamese thrust comsumed
vast quantities of supplies, ammunition, and equipment
which otherwise would have constituted part of the logistics
throughput in the Trail structure. Additionally, when
these units massed and became targets for U.S. air, many
important weapons such as tanks, artillery pieces, etc
were destroyed in the air attacks. Finally, because
North Vietnamese logistics units were engaged in the
fighting and were badly decimated, their resiliency in
establishing the logistics throughput has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is useful as a logistics
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of
the U.S. air interdiction effort.
(5) Finally, some perspective should be given to the
Lamson operation in relationship to the total continuing
South Vietnamese military effort. The South Vietnamese
forces which entered Laos in the Lamson operation con-
stituted less than two per cent of the RVNAF effectives.
It is not, therefore, a question of a major military
offensive having been undertaken by major portions of
the Vietnamese military establishment. It is true that
the units which were employed in this action were among
the very, best of the South Vietnamese regular forces. At
the same time it is also true that the North Vietnamese
units which they encountered were among the very best of
the regular North Vietnamese forces. From the casualty
tolls it is clear that severe battles were fought in this
operation and that in these battles the South Vietnamese
exacted a higher toll from the enemy than they suffered
themselves. It is also clear that, despite the major
North Vietnamese military effort and despite certain
isolated instances of panic, the South Vietnamese withdrew
from their salient in very good order. None of their
forces were cut off and entrapped inside Laos, although
the North Vietnamese made a decisive effort to do just
that. Instead the major South Vietnamese units which have
been withdrawn, although they suffered significant casualties,
have preserved their integrity, their fire power, and
their military capabilities. The amount of equipment
which had to be destroyed or abandoned before withdrawal
was minuscule compared to the amount which was evacuated
in good order. The number of men taken prisoner in the
entire operation was similarly a tiny fraction of those
who were actually engaged. In short, it was a very complex
military maneuver mounted by numerically inferior forces
deep into terrain that had long been held by the enemy,
which inflicted extremely heavy casualties and was ter-
minated in deliberate and orderly fashion.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
MEMO
3/26/71
TO: WH - Col. Kennedy
'71 MAR 26 PH 6:51
FROM: EA - W.H. Sulliva
This is the amended version
of paragraph 4 which in-
SITUATIC
corporates some thoughts and
statements taken from the
President's interview with
Howard K. Smith.
EA: WHSullivan:ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(4) It should not be concluded that, because Lamson
has been terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly
and effectively repair all the disruption that has taken
place and achieve their logistics goal on throughputs.
The disruptions in the Trail complex resulted not only
from the physical blocking of various branches of the
Trail, but more importantly from other considerations.
First of all, the South Vietnamese forces found and
destroyed, or called in U.S. air to destroy, very
significant caches of supplies and weapons in the areas
which they occupied. Secondly, the North Vietnamese
military units which came into the Trail area to meet the
South Vietnamese thrust consumed vast quantities of supplies,
ammunition, and equipment which otherwise would have
constituted part of the logistics throughput in the Trail
structure. Additionally, when these units massed and
became targets for U.S. air, many important weapons such
as tanks, artillery pieces, etc., were destroyed in the
air attacks. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics
units were engaged in the fighting and were badly decimated,
their resiliency in establishing the logistics throughput
has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is useful as a logistics
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of the
U.S. air interdiction effort.
We expect these factors to have as their consequence
a reduction in the future level of enemy activity in
South Viet-Nam. This anticipated reduction in the enemy
effort, coupled with the steady improvement in the
effectiveness and confidence of South Viet-Nam's armed
forces, will have a direct bearing on the rate of with-
drawal of United States armed forces from South Viet-Nam.
It will also mean an improved security situation for those
United States forces which remain in South Vist-Nam. And,
finally, of course, it will enhance the ability of the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves after United States
forces have left.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(1) The Lamson operation should be viewed in conjunction
with the Toan Thang operation in Cambodia. Both actions,
taken together, had the effect of striking at the North
Vietnamese, pulling them off balance, and precluding
enemy offensive operations in South Viet-Nam during the
current dry season. Moreover the Lamson operation pro-
bably preempts the possibility of successful enemy
offensives in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam
during the summer of 1971 when it will be dry on the
eastern side of the Annamite mountains.
Seen in this light the combined military operations
have the effect of engaging the enemy and keeping his
forces distant from the population of South Viet-Nam.
To illustrate this graphically it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation north of Route 7 inside
Cambodia is being fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Divisions which
are the same enemy units which, at this time of the year
in 1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon,
Cholon, and in the Capital Military District. Similarly,
the North Vietnamese units which were engaged in Lamson
the 304th, 308th, 320th, and 324-B Divisions were
the same ones which, in February and March of 1968, suc-
ceeded in capturing control of the city of Hue, entering
the defenses of Danang, and generally harassing the
population in the coastal regions. It is important to
note that both Toan Thang and Lamson are being fought
in areas that are either very sparsely populated or not
populated at all by civilians, and moreover, that both
of them are being fought outside the territory of South
Viet-Nam.
(2) If one is to view the Lamson operation in terms of
the effectiveness of Vietnamization a look at the
situation inside South Viet-Nam is instructive. February
and March are the months of the year in which the com-
munists traditionally mount their most extensive military
operations in all regions of South Viet-Nam. This year
they were given an additional incentive to do this because
of the fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of the Toan Thang and Lamson operations and would distract
attention from those two actions. Despite exhortation
to their cadres to undertake such action within South
Viet-Nam they have been unable to date to mount anything
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
which can even be considered a successful high point. In
fact, the situation within South Viet-Nam has been extra-
ordinarily calm during the entire months of February and
March with the exception of the action being undertaken
by ARVN forces against communist strongholds in the U
Minh Forest of Military Region IV.
These observations suggest that the foundation for
Vietnamization in South Viet-Nam is sound and that the
Vietnamese security forces are capable of maintaining the
situation in their home areas even while the bulk of
South Viet-Nam's mobile forces are committed to expedi-
tionary actions outside the country.
(3) The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain
security after the departure of United States forces will,
in the long run, be measured by the balance of strength
which exists between the RVNAF and the North Vietnamese
forces. Our general assessment is that the balance in
the Indochina peninsula, given the continuing presence
of United States air power, has swung in favor of the
South Vietnamese forces.
Substantial support for this conclusion comes from
the North Vietnamese themselves. It seems quite clear
that, in the months of February and early March, the
North Vietnamese were genuinely concerned about the
prospect of an invasion of North Viet-Nam by South Viet-
namese forces supported by United States air power. It
should be noted that these concerns were at their peak
at the moment when the North Vietnamese knew South Viet-
Nam was heavily engaged in both the Toan Thang and Lamson
operations.
North Viet-Nam's concern can be measured not only
in terms of its barrage of statements and charges that
were made during this period, but most particularly by
its call upon Communist China. The statements which Xuan
Thuy made in Paris concerning possible Peking actions
went well beyond anything Peking itself had uttered, and
had a quality of "my big brother can lick your big brother"
about them. Going even beyond this indication of ner-
vousness, the North Vietnamese swallowed their patriotic
pride and asked Chou En-lai to come to Hanoi in order to
give substance to their threats.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
All this illustrates that North Viet-Nam genuinely
believes the South Vietnamese forces are strong enough to
mount major military actions against North Vietnamese units
in Laos and Cambodia and at the same time undertake a
significant blow against North Viet-Nam itself. This
would suggest pretty strong testimony that North Viet-Nam
believes South Vietnamese forces quite able to take care
of themselves after the departure of United States ground
forces.
(4) In assessing the damage which Lamson has done to the
North Vietnamese logistics situation, [It is not possible
to make a definitive judgment at this time However it
should not be concluded that, because Lamson has been
terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly and effectively
repair all the disruption that has taken place and achieve
their logistics goal on throughputs. The disruptions in
the Trail complex resulted not only from the physical
blocking of various branches of the Trail, but more
importantly from other considerations. First of all,
the South Vietnamese forces found and destroyed, or called
in U.S. air to destroy, very significant caches of supplies
and weapons in the areas which they occupied. Secondly,
the North Vietnamese military units which came into the
Trail area to meet the South Vietnamese thrust comsumed
vast quantities of supplies, ammunition, and equipment
which otherwise would have constituted part of the logistics,
throughput in the Trail structure. Additionally, when
these units massed and became targets for U.S. air, many
important weapons such as tanks, artillery pieces, etc
were destroyed in the air attacks. Finally, because
North Vietnamese logistics units were engaged in the
fighting and were badly decimated, their resiliency in
establishing the logistics throughput has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is useful as a logistics
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-A-
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of
the U.S. air interdiction effort.
(5) Finally, some perspective should be given to the
Lamson operation in relationship to the total continuing
South Vietnamese military effort. The South Vietnamose
forces which entered Laos in the Lamson operation con-
stituted less than two per cent of the RVNAF effectives.
It is not, therefore, a question of a major military
offensive having been undertaken by major portions of
the Vietnamese military establishment. It is true that
the units which were employed in this action were among
the very, best of the South Vietnamese regular forces. At
the same time it is also true that the North Vietnamese
units which they encountered were among the very best of
the regular North Vietnamese forces. From the casualty
tolls it is clear that severe battles were fought in this
operation and that in these battles the South Vietnamese
exacted a higher toll from the enemy than they suffered
themselves. It is also clear that, despite the major
North Vietnamese military effort and despite certain
isolated instances of panic, the South Vietnamese withdrew
from their salient in very good order. None of their
forces were cut off and entrapped inside Laos, although
the North Vietnamese made a decisive effort to do just
that. Instead the major South Vietnamese units which have
been withdrawn, although they suffered significant casualties,
have preserved their integrity, their fire power, and
their military capabilities. The amount of equipment
which had to be destroyed or abandoned before withdrawal
was minuscule compared to the amount which was evacuated
in good order. The number of men taken prisoner in the
entire operation was similarly a tiny fraction of those
who were actually engaged. In short, it was a very complex
military maneuver mounted by numerically inferior forces
deep into terrain that had long been held by the enemy,
which inflicted extremely heavy casualties and was ter-
minated in deliberate and orderly fashion.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20820
MEMO
3/26/71
TO: WH - Col. Kennedy
'71 HAR 26 PM 6:51
FROM: EA - W.H. Sulliva
This is the amended version
of paragraph 4 which in-
SITUATIC
corporates some thoughts and
statements taken from the
President's interview with
Howard K. Smith.
EA: WHSullivan:ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(4) It should not be concluded that, because Lamson
has been terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly
and effectively repair all the disruption that has taken
place and achieve their logistics goal on throughputs.
The disruptions in the Trail complex resulted not only
from the physical blocking of various branches of the
Trail, but more importantly from other considerations.
First of all, the South Vietnamese forces found and
destroyed, or called in U.S. air to destroy, very
significant caches of supplies and weapons in the areas
which they occupied. Secondly, the North Vietnamese
military units which came into the Trail area to meet the
South Vietnamese thrust consumed vast quantities of supplies,
ammunition, and equipment which otherwise would have
constituted part of the logistics throughput in the Trail
structure. Additionally, when these units massed and
became targets for U.S. air, many important weapons such
as tanks, artillery pieces, etc., were destroyed in the
air attacks. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics
units were engaged in the fighting and were badly decimated,
their resiliency in establishing the logistics throughput
has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is useful as a logistics
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of the
U.S. air interdiction effort.
We expect these factors to have as their consequence
a reduction in the future level of enemy activity in
South Viet-Nam. This anticipated reduction in the enemy
effort, coupled with the steady improvement in the
effectiveness and confidence of South Viet-Nam's armed
forces, will have a direct bearing on the rate of with-
drawal of United States armed forces from South Viet-Nam.
It will also mean an improved security situation for those
United States forces which remain in South Vist-Nam. And,
finally, of course, it will enhance the ability of the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves after United States
forces have left.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of the
U.S. air interdiction effort.
We expect these factors to have as their consequence
a reduction in the future level of enemy activity in
South Viet-Nam. This anticipated reduction in the enemy
effort, coupled with the steady improvement in the
effectiveness and confidence of South Viet-Nam's armed
forces, will have a direct bearing on the rate of with-
drawal of United States armed forces from South Viet-Nam.
It will also mean an improved security situation for those
United States forces which remain in South Vist-Nam. And,
finally, of course, it will enhance the ability of the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves after United States
forces have left.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
BACKCHANNEL
TO AMB ELLSWORTH USPERMREP NATO BRUSSELS
FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER (TER-0208) THE WHITE HOUSE Hugzi
In reply to your telegram asking for material to give Brosio about
the Laos incursion, you may find the following helpful:
The South Vietnamese entered southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation, of course, is an important factor in assessing
the outcome. If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade
the ARVN and to harass from a distance, then there would have been
relatively little fighting and the operation would have been assessed more
in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled up. But for several good reasons
such as the importance of the area, the short supply lines to North Vietnam
and the availability of reserve forces in southern North Vietnam - - the
North Vietnamese undertook a major counterattack. They reinforced the
area strongly with some of their best line divisions, not only to defend
the trail system but to inflict a major defeat upon the ARVN as well. As
a result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
An assessment of the operation consequently must begin with some
judgments on the heavy fighting that ensued. In this respect, the ARVN
acquitted itself rather well. It took some heavy losses about 1, 000
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
killed and 4, 000 wounded. But enemy losses are reported at over 13,000
killed plus an unknown number of wounded. The equivalent of 13 enemy
maneuver battalions are now considered ineffective and some 3, 500 rear
service personnel were estimated killed. Exaggerated reports of enemy
losses have not been uncommon in Vietnam, but this time the figure may
be low. It is important to remember that the enemy acted with the sort
of aggressiveness he has not shown for several years and this meant
considerable concentration with exposure to allied firepower. At the
same time, the ARVN was supported by massive allied air strikes,
including more than 1, 200 B-52 sorties. Thus we believe that the ratio
of enemy to friendly losses was at least 10 to 1, a very high price for
Hanoi to pay. In short, we view the physical results of the fighting as a
plus.
We also feel that a number of the North Vietnamese units stationed
in southern Laos were intended for attacks against the northern part of
South Vietnam. By engaging them in Laos, we have pre-empted enemy pla
for the winter-spring campaign and avoided what could have been some vel
nasty engagements in South Vietnam.
It is too early to be precise about the impact on the enemy's logistical
system, although some perspective can be provided. First of all, it
seems clear that the North Victnamese have to move more supplies south
to Cambodia and South Vieinam this year than last in order to make up for
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
the loss of three alternate means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville;
purchases on the Cambodian black market; and food obtained from areas
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam. We are reasonably certain,
moreover, that the enemy was well behind last year's pace even before
the Lam Son operation began.
Under these circumstances, the operation clearly has compounded
Hanoi's problem. The southward flow of supplies was disrupted during
the operation. For example, we have received reports indicating that
the flow of supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia is 75% below last
year's estimate. In addition, the South Vietnamese reportedly captured
or destroyed 4, 900 individual weapons, 1, 900 crew served weapons,
14, 000 tons of ammunition (about 8 times the amount captured in Cambodia
last year), and some 100 tanks. Nearly 300 trucks and vehicles were
destroyed in direct support of the operation as well as some 4, 600 others
due to air interdiction efforts during this period. The fuel pipeline was eu
in a number of places and many gallons of fuel destroyed. A related form
of supply loss was the highly increased consumption of supplies by enemy
units heavily engaged in the Lam Son area. Another potentially significant
factor will be Hanoi's ability to compensate for the loss of trained rear
service personnel who have been operating the trail system for years.
We should have a better idea of the overall logistical effects as the
year progresses. We think that the short-fall in supplie's will prevent
the Commt bists from mounting any major offenses in South Vietnam
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
during this dry season and will delay any offensive they might have
planned over next dry scason because it will take them that much longer
to rebuild their stocks.
Despite the physical achievements of the operation, psychological
aspects are equally important and we face some problems on this score.
First, Hanoi is mounting its usual effective propaganda campaign by
claiming total victory. We know, for example, that enemy units were
under orders to launch all-out attacks on ARVN units when they began
to withdraw. While this is a good military tactic, it is especially helpful
to one's propaganda effort. Second, by concentrating on ARVN units
withdrawing from Laos, our press reporting can only lead public
opinion in the wrong direction; there are no compensatory reports on
decimated or demoralized enemy units.
Until now, the South Vietnamese public has been optimistic about
the operation, but the combination of Communist propaganda, public
reactions in the U.S., and a few war stories could lead to a drop in
South Vietnamese morale. The current psychological atmosphere is in
some ways reminiscent of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted
maximum political advantage in the short run; it was only as time passed
that the real physical results began to tell. This time, we must benefit
from that lesson and not let ourselves be misled by surface appearances
or by exaggerated stories.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
5
It is also worth reflecting on how the initiative and the trend of battle
in Vietnam have been reversed. Three years ago the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong had the initiative. They attacked into all the cities and
they stood at the gates of the U.S. Embassy during the Tet offensive. This
year the South Vietnamese attacked the most important Hanoi supply line.
And this reversal has occurred over a time when one half of all American
forces have been withdrawn from Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese operated without U.S. advisers and without
the reassurance that U.S. ground units could enter Laos to render
assistance if needed. The operation was conducted concurrently with a
major operation in Cambodia and the South Vietnamese demonstrated the
ability to mount a complex multi-division operation in conditions of
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather and against a. well prepared
opponent. The South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves well militarily
achieved the objectives they set for themselves and did so in the face of
determined opposition. Although some units will require a period of rest
and refitting, before they are again ready to enter combat, other units left
Laos with high morale and a feeling they could handle whatever the North
Victnamese could throw against them. The operation has achieved its
primary objective of carrying the fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ONLY
6
destroying his principal lines of communications and should buy the
South Victnamese additional time in which to strengthen their armed
forces while permitting continued withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
SECRET/SÉÑSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS ON LAM SON 719
The Situation
1. The South Vietnamese entered Southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation is an important factor in assessing the outcome.
If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade South Vietnamese
forces, then there would have been relatively little fighting and the operation
would have been assessed more in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled
up. But for several good reasons, such as the importance of the area,
the short supply lines to North Vietnam and the availability of reserve
forces in southern North Vietnam the North Vietnamese undertook a
major counter attack. They reinforced the area strongly with some of
their best divisions, not only to defend the trail system but in an attempt
to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese as well. As a result,
the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
Immediately Measurable Results
2. In terms of immediately measurable results, the weight of evidence
is that South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves very well in the
six weeks of fighting which followed the initial incursion into Laos. Many
of the ARVN units involved fought without respite for 40 days and, in the
judgment of our field commanders, 18 out of the 22 battalions involved
fought extremely well. Because of the intensity of the fighting, these units
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
did take some heavy losses - an estimated 1400 killed and 4700 wounded.
But respective enemy losses were more than 13, 000 killed and many
were wounded. In terms of combat effectiveness, we estimate that
the equivalent of 13 enemy maneuver battalions were rendered
ineffective in the course of the fighting whereas only 4 ARVN battalions
were put out of combat. Exaggerated reports of enemy losses in
Vietnam have been numerous, but this time the figure may be low.
The enemý acted more aggressively than he had in several years with
the result that he exposed himself to concentrated allied firepower and
air attack. Thus, we believe the ratio of enemy to friendly losses was
at least 5 to 1, a very high price for Hanoi to pay.
Impact on the North Vietnamese Logistics System
3. It is too early to be precise about the impact of Lam Son 719 on the
enemy's logistical system, although some perspective can be provided.
The North Vietnamese had to move more supplies South to Cambodia
and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for the loss
of three major means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville; purchases
in Cambodia; and food obtained from areas which had previously been
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam but which are now firmly under
the authority of the government. Moreover, he had suffered great losses
in the Cambodian sanctuaries last year. Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Trail
has become a more vital element in Hanoi's overall strategy than it
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
was in the past. But we are reasonably certain that the enemy
was well behind last year's pace even before the Lam Son operation
began.
The Lam Son operation clearly compounded Hanoi's problem. It
disrupted the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, physically blocking various
branches of the trail. South Vietnamese forces found or destroyed,
or called in U.S. air power to destroy, some 4900 individual weapons,
1900 crew served weapons and thousands of tons of ammunition and other
supplies. This was in addition to the vast quantity of supplies, ammu-
nition and equipment which was consumed by the North Vietnamese in
Laos instead of continuing down the trail to be used in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. Moreover, when the North Vietnamese were obliged to
engage ARVN forces in a fixed battle position, their units massed and
became targets for concentrated Vietnamese firepower and U.S. air
power which destroyed over 100 tanks and many artillery pieces, some
300 enemy trucks were destroyed directly in the operation and 4300
more were destroyed by air interdiction while the operations was in
progress. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics units were
engaged in the fighting and were badly damaged, their resiliency in
restoring the flow of supplies southward has been degraded. We estimate
that some 3500 enemy rear service personnel vital to the operation of
the trail logistics system were killed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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-4-
All these considerations must be viewed against the fact that the Ho
Chi Minh trail complex is useful as a logistics system only during the
dry season, which began later this year than usual. Therefore, when
the rains come in the next four or five weeks, the Communistswill have
little time in which to attempt to make up all the weeks that have been
lost to them in the Lam Son operation.
Forestalling Anticipated Enemy Offensive Activity in South Vietnam
4. A significant measure of Lam Son's achievements will be the
degree it succeeds in forestalling enemy offensive activity. Viewed in
conjunction with ARVN operations conducted simultaneously in Cambodia,
these two efforts have precluded enemy offensive operations in South
Vietnam during the current dry season. We believe that if Lam Son had
not been undertaken, the North Vietnamese would have had the real option
of launching major attacks atainst ARVN and U.S. forces located in the
northern provinces of South Vietnam. Looking to the future, we believe that
the short -fall in their supply efforts will prevent them from mounting major
offensives in South Vietnam in this dry season and will delay any offensives
they might have planned over the next dry season because it will take them
that much longer to rebuild their stocks.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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- 5 -
The combined military operations also have had the effect of
engaging the enemy and keeping his forces distant from the population
of SoufhVietnam. To illustrate this graphically, it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation North of Route 7 inside Cambodia is being
fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong Divisions, the same units which, at this time of the year in
1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon and the surrounding
metropolitan area. As for the enemy units engaged in Lam Son -- the
304th, 308th, 320th and 324-B divisons - - in February and March of 1968,
succeeded in capturing control of the city of Hue, entering the defenses
of Danang, and generally harassing the population in the coastal regions.
All of these enemy units were engaged this year away from population
centers and, in fact, outside of South Vietnam itself.
Lam Son's Bearing on Vietnamization
5. Lam Son has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamization. Three years ago, ARVN units were engaged against
enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now
ARVN units have shown themselves able to deal with the enemy threat in
sanctuary areas without the support of U.S. ground combat forces or advisors
while keeping their own territory pacified as well. They have demonstrated
the ability to mount a complex multi-division operation in conditions of
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather, and against a well-
prepared enemy. Moreover, this is being achieved with a U.S. presence
which has diminished by some 260, 000 men since 1969.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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- 6 -
To illust rate this point further, it should be recognized that
February and March are the months of the year in which the Communists
traditionally mount the most extensive military operations in all regions
of South Vietnam. This year they were given an additional incentive to
do this because of that fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia and would distract attention
from those two actions. Despite exhortations to their cadre to undertake
such action within South Vietnam, they have been unable to date to mount
anything which can even be considered a major successful high point.
In fact, the situation within South Vietnam has been extraordinarily calm
during the entire month of February and March with the exception of an
action being taken by ARVN forces against Commun ist strongholds in the
U Minh forest of Military Region IV.
The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain security after
the departure of United States forces will, in the long run, be measured by
the balance of strength which exists between North and South Vietnamese
forces. Our assessment is that the balance in the Indochina peninsula has
swung in favor of the South Vietnamese. As Ambassador Bunker has
reported, the operation has created confidence among the South Vietnamese
in the ability of ARVN and pride in its accomplishments. There has been
been
satisfaction in the fact that the fighting has/taken outside the borders of South
Vietnam and that ARVN has been able to inflict for heavier casualties
on the enemy.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 7 -
We conclude, therefore, that the foundation for Vietnamization in
South Vietnam is sound and that the process has been enhanced by the
disruptions Lam Son has caused the enemy and by the increased confidence
it has given the South Vietnamese in meeting their own defense needs.
The Current psychological atmosphere is in some ways reminiscent
of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted maximum political advantage
in the short run; it was only as time passed that the real physical results
began to tell. This time, we must benefit from that lesson and not let
ourselves be misled by surface appearances or by exaggerated stories.
The operation has achieved its primary objective of carrying the
fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and destroying his principal lines of
communications and should buy the South Vietnamese additional time in
which to strengthen their armed forces while permitting continued
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
BACKCHANNEL
TO AMB ELLSWORTH USPERMREP NATO BRUSSELS
FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER (FER-ORDX) THE WHITE HOUSE
In reply to your telegram asking for material to give Brosio about
the Laos incursion, you may find the following helpful:
The South Vietnamese entered southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation, of course, is an important factor in assessing
the outcome. If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade
the ARVN and to harass from a distance, then there would have been
relatively little fighting and the operation would have been assessed more
in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled up. But for several good reasons
such as the importance of the area, the short supply lines to North Vietnam
and the availability of reserve forces in southern North Vietnam - - the
North Vietnamese undertook a major counterattack. They reinforced the
area strongly with some of their best line divisions, not only to defend
the trail system but to inflict a major defeat upon the ARVN as well. As
a result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
An assessment of the operation consequently must begin with some
judgments on the heavy fighting that ensued. In this respect, the ARVN
acquitted itself rather well. It took some heavy losses about 1, 000
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
killed and 4, 000 wounded. But enemy losses are reported at over 13, 000
killed plus an unknown number of wounded. The equivalent of 13 enemy
maneuver battalions are now considered ineffective and some 3,500 rear
service personnel were estimated killed. Exaggerated reports of enemy
losses have not been uncommon in Vietnam, but this time the figure may
be low. It is important to remember that the enemy acted with the sort
of aggressiveness he has not shown for several years and this meant
considerable concentration with exposure to allied firepower. At the
same time, the ARVN was supported by massive allied air strikes,
including more than 1, 200 B-52 sorties. Thus we believe that the ratio
of enemy to friendly losses was at least 10 to 1, a very high price for
Hanoi to pay. In short, we view the physical results of the fighting as a
plus.
We also feel that a number of the North Vietnamese units stationed
in southern Laos were intended for attacks against the northern part of
South Vietnam. By engaging them in Laos, we have pre-empted enemy pla
for the winter-spring campaign and avoided what could have been some ver
nasty engagements in South Vietnam.
It is too early to be precise about the impact on the enęmy's logistical
system, although some perspective can be provided. First of all, it
seems clear that the North Victnamese have to move more supplies south
to Cambodia and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for
SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
the loss of three alternate means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville;
purchases on the Cambodian black market; and food obtained from areas
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam. We are reasonably certain,
moreover, that the enemy was well behind last year's pace even before
the Lam Son operation began.
Under these circumstances, the operation clearly has compounded
Hanoi's problem. The southward flow of supplies was disrupted during
the operation. For example, we have received reports indicating that
the flow of supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia is 75% below last
year's estimate. In addition, the South Vietnamese reportedly captured
or destroyed 4, 900 individual weapons, 1, 900 crew served weapons,
14, 000 tons of ammunition (about 8 times the amount captured in Cambodia
last year), and some 100 tanks. Nearly 300 trucks and vehicles were
destroyed in direct support of the operation as well as some 4, 600 others
due to air interdiction efforts during this period. The fuel pipeline was ou
in a number of places and many gallons of fuel destroyed. A related form
of supply loss was the highly increased consumption of supplies by enemy
units heavily engaged in the Lam Son area. Another potentially significant
factor will be Hanoi's ability to compensate for the loss of trained rear
service personnel who have been operating the trail system for years.
We should have a better idea of the overall logistical effects as the
year progresses. We think that the short-fall in supplie's will prevent
the Commitio from mounting any major offenses in South Vietnam
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
4
during this dry season and will delay any offensive they might have
planned over next dry scason because it will take them that much longer
to rebuild their stocks.
Despite the physical achievements of the operation, psychological
aspects are equally important and we face some problems on this score.
First, Hanoi is mounting its usual effective propaganda campaign by
claiming total victory. We know, for example, that enemy units were
under orders to launch all-out attacks on ARVN units when they began
to withdraw. While this is a good military tactic, it is especially helpful
to one's propaganda effort. Second, by concentrating on ARVN units
withdrawing from Laos, our press reporting can only lead public
opinion in the wrong direction; there are no compensatory reports on
decimated or demoralized enemy units.
Until now, the South Vietnamese public has been optimistic about
the operation, but the combination of Communist propaganda, public
reactions in the U.S., and a few war stories could lead to a drop in
South Vietnamese morale. The current psychological atmosphere is in
some ways reminiscent of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted
maximum political advantage in the short run; it was only as time passed
that the real physical results began to tell. This time, we must benefit
from that lesson and not let ourselves be misled by surface appearances
or by exaggerated stories.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
5
It is also worth reflecting on how the initiative and the trend of battle
in Vietnam have been reversed. Three years ago the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong had the initiative. They attacked into all the cities and
they stood at the gates of the U.S. Embassy during the Tet offensive. This
year the South Vietnamese attacked the most important Hanoi supply line.
And this reversal has occurred over. a time when one half of all American
forces have been withdrawn from Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese operated without U.S. advisers and without
the reassurance that U.S. ground units could enter Laos to render
assistance if needed. The operation was conducted concurrently with a
major operation in Cambodia and the South Vietnamese demonstrated the
ability to mount a complex multi-division operation in conditions of
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather and against a. well prepared
opponent. The South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves well militarily
achieved the objectives they set for themselves and did so in the face of
determined opposition. Although some units will require a period of rest
and refitting, before they are again ready to enter combat, other units left
Laos with high morale and a feeling they could handle whatever the North
Victnamese could throw against them. The operation has achieved its
primary objective of carrying the fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and
NSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ONLY
6
Ains
S.
destroying his principal lines of communications and should buy the
South Victnamese additional time in which to strengthen their armed
forçes while permitting continued withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
SECRET/SÉÑSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(1) The Lamson operation should be viewed in conjunction
with the Toan Thang operation in Cambodia. Both actions,
taken together, had the effect of striking at the North
Vietnamese, pulling them off balance, and precluding
enemy offensive operations in South Viet-Nam during the
current dry season. Moreover the Lamson operation pro-
bably preempts the possibility of successful enemy
offensives in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam
during the summer of 1971 when it will be dry on the
eastern side of the Annamite mountains.
Seen in this light the combined military operations
have the effect of engaging the enemy and keeping his
forces distant from the population of South Viet-Nam.
To illustrate this graphically it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation north of Route 7 inside
Cambodia is being fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh,
and Ninth North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Divisions which
are the same enemy units which, at this time of the year
in 1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon,
Cholon, and in the Capital Military District. Similarly,
the North Vietnamese units which were engaged in Lamson
the 304th, 308th, 320th, and 324-B Divisions were
the same ones which, in February and March of 1968, suc-
ceeded in capturing control of the city of Hue, entering
the defenses of Danang, and generally harassing the
population in the coastal regions. It is important to
note that both - Toan Thang and Lamson are being fought
in areas that are either very sparsely populated or not
populated at all by civilians, and moreover, that both
of them are being fought outside the territory of South
Viet-Nam.
(2) If one is to view the Lamson operation in terms of
the effectiveness of Vietnamization a look at the
situation inside South Viet-Nam is instructive. February
and March are the months of the year in which the com-
munists traditionally mount their most extensive military
operations in all regiòns of South Viet-Nam. This year
they were given an additional incentive to do this because
of the fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of the Toan Thang and Lamson operations and would distract
attention from those two actions. Despite exhortation
to their cadres to undertake such action within South
Viet-Nam- they have been unable to date to mount anything
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
which can even be considered a successful high point. In
fact, the situation within South Viet-Nam has been extra-
ordinarily calm during the entire months of February and
March with the exception of the action being undertaken
by ARVN forces against communist strongholds in the U
Minh Forest of Military Region IV.
These observations suggest that the foundation for
Vietnamization in South Viet-Nam is sound and that the
Vietnamese security forces are capable of maintaining the
situation in their home areas even while the bulk of
South Viet-Nam's mobile forces are committed to expedi-
tionary actions outside the country.
(3) The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain
security after the departure of United States forces will,
in the long run, be measured by the balance of strength
which exists between the RVNAF and the North Vietnamese
forces. Our general assessment is that the balance in
the Indochina peninsula, given the continuing presence
of United States air power, has swung in favor of the
South Vietnamese forces.
Substantial support for this conclusion comes from
the North Vietnamese themselves. It seems quite clear
that, in the months of February and early March, the
North Vietnamese were genuinely concerned about the
prospect of an invasion of North Viet-Nam by South Viet-
namese forces supported by United States air power. It
should be noted that these concerns were at their peak
at the moment when the North Vietnamese knew South Viet-
Nam was heavily engaged in both the Toan Thang and Lamson
operations.
North Viet-Nam's concern can be measured not only
in terms of its barrage of statements and charges that
were made during this period, but most particularly by
its call upon Communist China. The statements which Xuan
Thuy made in Paris concerning possible Peking actions
went well beyond anything Peking itself had uttered, and
had a quality of "my big brother can lick your big brother"
about them. Going even beyond this indication of ner-
vousness, the North Vietnamese swallowed their patriotic
pride and asked Chou En-lai to come to Hanoi in order to
give substance to their threats.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
All this illustrates that North Viet-Nam genuinely
believes the South Vietnamese forces are strong enough to
mount major military actions against North Vietnamese units
in Laos and Cambodia and at the same time undertake a
significant blow against North Viet-Nam itself. This
would suggest pretty strong testimony that North Viet-Nam
believes South Vietnamese forces quite able to take care
forces. of themselves after the departure of United States ground
(4) In assessing the damage which Lamson has done to the
North Vietnamese logistics situation, [It is not possible
to make a definitive judgment at this time However it
should not be concluded that, because Lamson has been
terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly and effectively
repair all the disruption that has taken place and achieve
their logistics goal on throughputs. The disruptions in
the Trail complex resulted not only from the physical
blocking of various branches of the Trail, but more
importantly from other considerations. First of all,
the South Vietnamese forces found and destroyed, or called
in U.S. air to destroy, very significant caches of supplies
and weapons in the areas which they occupied. Secondly,
the North Vietnamese military units which came into the
Trail area to meet the South Vietnamese thrust comsumed
vast quantities of supplies, ammunition, and equipment
which otherwise would have constituted part of the logistics,
throughput in the Trail structure. Additionally, when
these units massed and became targets for U.S. air, many
important weapons such as tanks, artillery pieces, etc.
were destroyed in the air attacks. Finally, because
North Vietnamese logistics units were engaged in the
fighting and were badly decimated, their resiliency in
establishing the logistics throughput has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is-usoful as a logistics
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of
the U.S. air interdiction effort.
(5) Finally, some perspective should be given to the
Lamson operation in relationship to the total continuing
South Vietnamese military effort. The South Vietnamese
forces which entered Laos in the Lamson operation con-
stituted less than two per cent of the RVNAF effectives.
It is not, therefore, a question of a major military
offensive having been undertaken by major portions of
the Vietnamese military establishment. It is true that
the units which were employed in this action were among
the very, best of the South Vietnamese regular forces. At
the same time it is also true that the North Vietnamese
units which they encountered were among the very best of
the regular North Vietnamese forces. From the casualty
tolls it is clear that severe battles were fought in this
operation and that in these battles the South Vietnamese
exacted a higher toll from the enemy than they suffered
themselves. It is also clear that, despite the major
North Vietnamese military effort and despite certain
isolated instances of panic, the South Vietnamese withdrew
from their salient in very good order. None of their
forces were cut off and entrapped inside Laos, although
the North Vietnamese made a decisive effort to do just
that. Instead the major South Vietnamese units which have
been withdrawn, although they suffered significant casualties,
have preserved their integrity, their fire power, and
their military capabilities. The amount of equipment
which had to be destroyed or abandoned before withdrawal
was minuscule compared to the amount which was evacuated
in good order. The number of men taken prisoner in the
entire operation was similarly a tiny fraction of those
who were actually engaged. In short, it was a very complex
military maneuver mounted by numerically inferior forces
deep into terrain that had long been held by the enemy,
which inflicted extremely heavy casualties and was ter-
minated in deliberate and orderly fashion.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20820
MEMO
3/26/71
TO: WH - Col. Kennedy
'71 MAR 26 PM 6:51
FROM: EA - W.H. Sulliva
This is the amended version
of paragraph 4 which in-
SITUATIC
corporates some thoughts and
statements taken from the
President's interview with
Howard K. Smith.
EA:WHSullivan:ms
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS CONCERNING LAMSON 719
(4) It should not be concluded that, because Lamson
has been terminated, the North Vietnamese can quickly
and effectively repair all the disruption that has taken
place and achieve their logistics goal on throughputs.
The disruptions in the Trail complex resulted not only
from the physical blocking of various branches of the
Trail, but more importantly from other considerations.
First of all, the South Vietnamese forces found and
destroyed, or called in U.S. air to destroy, very
significant caches of supplies and weapons in the areas
which they occupied. Secondly, the North Vietnamese
military units which came into the Trail area to meet the
South Vietnamese thrust consumed vast quantities of supplies,
ammunition, and equipment which otherwise would have
constituted part of the logistics throughput in the Trail
structure. Additionally, when these units massed and
became targets for U.S. air, many important weapons such
as tanks, artillery pieces, etc., were destroyed in the
air attacks. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics
units were engaged in the fighting and were badly decimated,
their resiliency in establishing the logistics throughput
has been degraded.
All these considerations must be viewed against the
fact that the Trail structure is useful as a logistics
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
system only during the dry season and that the dry season
began very late this year. Therefore, assuming the rains
come within the next few weeks, the communists will have
very little time in which to attempt to make up all the
weeks that have been lost to them in the Lamson operation.
It should be remembered, moreover, that they will be
attempting to do this under constant United States air
harassment, which includes a significantly improved weapon
system in the form of the AC-130 aircraft and a sig-
nificantly higher toll of trucks in the performance of the
U.S. air interdiction effort.
We expect these factors to have as their consequence
a reduction in the future level of enemy activity in
South Viet-Nam. This anticipated reduction in the enemy
effort, coupled with the steady improvement in the
effectiveness and confidence of South Viet-Nam's armed
forces, will have a direct bearing on the rate of with-
drawal of United States armed forces from South Viet-Nam.
It will also mean Ex22 improved security situation for those
United States forces which remain in South Vist-Nam. And,
finally, of course, it will enhance the ability of the
South Vietnamese to defend themselves after United States
forces have left.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
BACKCHANNEL
TO AMB ELLSWORTH USPERMREP NATO BRUSSELS
FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER (TER-0208) THE WHITE HOUSE
In reply to your telegram asking for material to give Brosio about
the Laos incursion, you may find the following helpful:
The South Vietnamese entered southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation, of course, is an important factor in assessing
the outcome. If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade
the ARVN and to harass from a distance, then there would have been
relatively little fighting and the operation would have been assessed more
in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled up. But for several good reasons
such as the impørtance of the area, the short supply lines to North Vietnam
and the availability of reserve forces in southern North Vietnam the
North Vietnamese undertook a major counterattack. They reinforced the
area strongly with some of their best line divisions, not only to defend
the trail system but to inflict a major defeat upon the ARVN as well. As
a result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
An assessment of the operation consequently must begin with some
judgments on the heavy fighting that ensued. In this respect, the ARVN
acquitted itself rather well. It took some heavy losses about 1, 000
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
killed and 4, 000 wounded. But enemy losses are reported at over 13, 000
killed plus an unknown number of wounded. The equivalent of 13 enemy
maneuver battalions are now considered ineffective and some 3, 500 rear
service personnel were estimated killed. Exaggerated reports of enemy
losses have not been uncommon in Vietnam, but this time the figure may
be low. It is important to remember that the enemy acted with the sort
of aggressiveness he has not shown for several years and this meant
considerable concentration with exposure to allied firepower. At the
same time, the ARVN was supported by massive allied air strikes,
including more than 1, 200 B-52 sorties. Thus we believe that the ratio
of enemy to friendly losses was at least 10 to 1, a very high price for
Hanoi to pay. In short, we view the physical results of the fighting as a
plus.
We also feel that a number of the North Vietnamese units stationed
in southern Laos were-intended for attacks against the northern part of
South Vietnam. By engaging them in Laos, we have pre-empted enemy pla
for the winter-spring campaign and avoided what could have been some ver
nasty engagements in South Vietnam.
It is too early to be precise about the impact on the enemy's logistical
system, although some perspective can be provided. First of all, it
seems clear that the North Victnamese have to move more supplies south
to Cambodia and South Vieinam this year than last in order to make up for
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
the loss of three alternate means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville;
purchases on the Cambodian black market; and food obtained from areas
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam. We are reasonably certain,
moreover, that the enemy was well behind last year's pace even before
the Lam Son operation began.
Under these circumstances, the operation clearly has compounded
Hanoi's problem. The southward flow of supplies was disrupted during
the operation. For example, we have received reports indicating that
the flow of supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia is 75% below last
year's estimate. In addition, the South Vietnamese reportedly captured
or destroyed 4, 900 individual weapons, 1, 900 crew served weapons,
14, 000 tons of ammunition (about 8 times the amount captured in Cambodia
last year), and some 100 tanks. Nearly 300 trucks and vehicles were
destroyed in direct support of the operation as well as some 4, 600 others
due to air interdiction efforts during this period. The fuel pipeline was ou
in a number of places and many gallons of fuel destroyed. A related form
of supply loss was the highly increased consumption of supplies by enemy
units heavily engaged in the Lam Son area. Another potentially significant
factor will be Hanoi's ability to compensate for the loss of trained rear
service personnel who have been operating the trail system for years.
We should have a better idea of the overall logistical effects as the
year progresses. We think that the short-fall in supplie's will prevent
the Commit bists from mounting any major offenses in South Vietnam
SECRET/SENSITIVE/LYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
1
during this dry season and will delay any offensive they might have
planned over next dry scason because it will take them that much longer
to rebuild their stocks.
Despite the physical achievements of the operation, psychological
aspects are equally important and we face some problems on this score.
First, Hanoi is mounting its usual effective propaganda campaign by
claiming total victory. We know, for example, that enemy units were
under orders to launch all-out attacks on ARVN units when they began
to withdraw. While this is a good military tactic, it is especially helpful
to one's propaganda effort. Second, by concentrating on ARVN units
withdrawing from Laos, our press reporting can only lead public
opinion in the wrong direction; there are no compensatory reports on
decimated or demoralized enemy units.
Until now, the South Vietnamese public has been optimistic about
the operation, but the combination of Communist propaganda, public
reactions in the U.S., and a few war stories could lead to a drop in
South Vietnamcse morale. The current psychological atmosphere is in
some ways reminiscent of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted
maximum political advantage in the short run; it was only as time passed
that the real physical results began to tell. This time, we must benefit
from that lesson and not let ourselves be misled by surface appearances
or by exaggerated stories.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
5
It is also worth reflecting on how the initiative and the trend of battle
in Vietnam have been reversed. Three years ago the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong had the initiative. They attacked into all the cities and
they stood at the gates of the U.S. Embassy during the Tet offensive. This
year the South Vietnamese attacked the most important Hanoi supply line.
And this reversal has occurred over a time when one half of all American
forces have been withdrawn from Vietnam.
The South Vietnamese operated without U.S. advisers and without
the reassurance that U.S. ground units could enter Laos to render
assistance if needed. The operation was conducted concurrently with a
major operation in Cambodia and the South Vietnamese demonstrated the
ability to mount a complex multi-division operation in conditions of
difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather and against a well prepared
opponent. The South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves well militarily
achieved the objectives they set for themselves and did so in the face of
determined opposition. Although some units will require a period of rest
and refitting, before they are again ready to enter combat, other units left
Laos with high morale and a feeling they could handle whatever the North
Victnamese could throw against them. The operation has achieved its
primary objective of carrying the fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and
SECRET/SI NSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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6
destroying his principal lines of communications and should buy the
South Victnamese additional time in which to strengthen their armed
forces while permitting continued withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
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208A
JACKSON 3-28 WA
1ST ADD JACKSON WASHINGTON 207A XXX SYSTEM.
"MY IMMEDIATE CONCERN," JACKSON SAID IN HIS PREPARED SENATE
STATEMENT, IS THAT THE PACE OF EVENTS MAY OVERTAKE OUR EFFORTS
TO CONCLUDE A SALT AGREEMENT COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF SYSTEMS
UNDER CONSIDERATION. OUR PAST EPERIENCE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
DOES NOT ENVOURAGE THE VIEW THAT WE HAVE THE TIME IN WHICH TO RESOLVE
ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED
208A
JACKSON 3-28 WA
1ST ADD JACKSON WASHINGTON 207A V SYFTZM.
"MY IMMEDIATE CONCERN," KACKSON SAID IN HIS PREPARED SENATEM
RESTART
MM
208A
HANOI 3-28 NX
NIGHT LD
WITH INDOCHINA
TOKYO (UPI)--NORTH VIETNAM SAID SUNDAY THAT 15,400 SOUTH
VIETNAMESE DIED IN THE LAOS INCURSION, NEARLY THREE TIMES THE TOTAL
CASUALTIES REPORTED BY SAIGON.
IN A BROADCAST MONITORED IN TOKYO, HANOI S VIETNAM NEWS
AGENCY SAID THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DRIVE WAS "COMPLETELY SMASHED"
BY "LIBERATION FORCES".
SOUTH VIETNAM HAS SAID IT ACCOMPLISHED ITS MISSION OF
DISRUPTING COMMUNIST TRAFFIC ON THE HO CHI MINH SUPPLY TRAIL
AND THAT ITS TOTAL CASUALTIES WERE 5,642 DEAD, WOUNDED OR MISSING.
THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALSO SAID THERE WERE ABOUT 24,000 GOVERNMENT
TROOPS IN THE INCURSION. HANOI SAID THE FIGURE WAS 45,000.
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BROADCAST SAID "LIBERATION FORCES" CAPTURED
1,000 MEN IN ADDITION TO THOSE KILLED AND "WIPED OUT TWO
PARATROOPS BRIGADES DECIMATED AN INFANTRY REGIMENT ... WIPED OUT
EIGHT ARTILLERY BATTALIONS AND BADLY MAULED FIVE OTHERS."
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAM LOST 496 PLANES, 586
MILITARY VEHICLES INCLUDING 318 TANKS AND ARMORED CARS, AND
144 ARTILLERY PIECES, THE BROADCAST SAID IN ITS REPORT ON THE
INCURSION.
"BY MARCH 23, THE WHOLE OPERATION WAS COMPLETELY SMASHED,"
THE REPORT SAID. "THE ENEMY S TACTICS IN THIS OPERATION CONSISTED
IN USING HELICOPTERS AS THE MAIN MEANS OF MOBILITY, ARMORED CARS
AS THE STRIKE FORCE AND ARTILLERY AS SUPPORT. ALL THIS WAS
MASSIVELY SUPPORTED BY AIRCRAFT.
"THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. PUPPETS INITIALLY TOTALED MORE
THAN 30,000 MEN SUPPORTED BY MORE THAN 300 TANKS AND ARMORED CARS
AND OVER 250 ARTILLERY PIECES.
"WHEN THE OPERATION GOT BOGGED DOWN, THE ENEMY SENT
REINFORCEMENTS FROM CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM. THE TOTAL FORCE
INVOLVED WAS IN THE AREA OF 45,000 MEN AT THE PEAK OF THE
OPERATION."
THE ALLIED FORCES, HANOI SAID, "INITIALLY PLANNED TO CARRY ON
THE OPERATION UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF THE RAINY SEASON ... (BUT)
HARDLY HAD THE OPERATION BEGUN THAN THE U.S. AND PUPPETS ALREADY
RAN INTO BIG DIFFICULTIES IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR TROOPS AS
WELL AS IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF WAR SUPPLIES."
JN245PES
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
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207A
JACKSON 3-28 WA
URGENT
WASHINGTON (UPI) --SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON PROPOSED SUNDAY
THAT THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AN INTERIM
ONE-YEAR ARMS CONTROL PACT TO GIVE THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TIME TO REACH A
LASTING SETTLEMENT AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS (SALT) IN
VIENNA.
THE WASHINGTON DEMOCRAT, WHO SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS PROPOSAL ON
THE SENATE FLOOR MONDAY, ARGUED THAT THE SHORT-TERM AGREEMENT WAS
NECESSARY TO OFFSET MAJOR RUSSIAN ADVANCES BEING MADE IN OFFENSIVE
MISSILES.
IF CONTINUED, JACKSON SAID, THESE ADVANCES COULD OVERSHADOW THE
U. S. ABILITY TO RETALIATE WITH A SECOND STRIKE SHOULD THE SOVIET
UNION DECIDE TO LAUNCH A NUCLEAR ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
JACKSON DISCLOSED PLANS TO MAKE HIS PROPOSAL TO THE SENATE DURING
AN INTERVIEW ON ABC S ISSUES AND ANSWERS TELEVISION PROGRAM.
HE ALSO RELEASED TO THE PRESS THE PREPARED STATEMENT HE WILL MAKE
TO THE SENATE MONDAY.
JACKSON SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEK TO SIGN
WITH RUSSIA A FOUR-POINT, ONE-YEAR PACT CALLING FOR:
--THE UNITED STATES TO IMMEDIATELY HALT THE DEPLOYMENT OF
MINUTEMAN 111 MISSILES WITH THEIR MIRV (MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY
TARGETABLE RE-ENTRY) WARHEADS.
--THE SOVIETS TO HALT IMMEDIATELY THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW
INTERCONT INANTAL BALLISTIC MISYILES, INCLUDING THOSE NOW UNDER
CONYTRUCTION.
--BOTH NATIONS TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO PROTECT THEIR LAND-BASED
FORCES SO LONG AS THEY DO NOT ADD TONTHEIR OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL.
--NEITHER SIDE BE PECMITTED TO DEPLOYSA POPULATION-DEFENDING
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTE
--NEITHER SIDE BE PEGMITTED TO DEPL
--NEITHER SIDE BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY A POPULATION-DEFENDING
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.
MORE PA228PES
208A
JACKSON 3-28 WA
1ST ADD JACKSON WASHINGTON 207A XXX SYSTEM.
"MY IMMEDIATE KONCERN," JACKSON SAID IN HIS PREPARED SENATE
STATEMENT, "... IS THAT THE PACE OF EVENTS MAY OVERTAKE OUR EFFORTS
TO CONCLUGT A SALT AGREEMENT COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF SQSZEMS
ONDOSIDERATION
2;8A
JAC
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Wh
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CONFIDENTIAL SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR MOORER INFO
MCCAIN FROM WEYAND (CORDS)
SUBJ: RVN RALLIES IN SUPPORT OF LAM SONG 719 (U)
ON 26 MARCH DURING LAND TO TILLER CEREMONIES, PRESIDENT
THIEU INFORMED AMBASSADOR BUNKER THAT THERE WOULD BE COUNTRY-
WIDE RALLIES ON SUNDAY 28 MARCH IN ORDER TO LET THE PEOPLE
DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPPORT OF LAM SON 719. INITIAL REPORTS
OF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION
OF SIGNIFICANCE WILL BE PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE.
MR 1: NO DEMONSTRATIONS/RALLIES REPORTED.
MR 2: TUYEN DUC PROVINCE: IN DALAT CITY, 2000 TO 3000
SCHOOL CHILDREN ATTENDED A RALLY IN THE MARKET SQUARE BETWEEN 0930
AND 1145 HRS IN SUPPORT OF OUT-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. IN PHU YEN
PROVINCE, TUY HOA (CITY), 1000 PEOPLE ATTENDED A SIMILAR RALLY IN
THE LOCAL THEATER.
MR 3: GIA DINH PROVINCE HELD A RALLY 0930 HRS TO 1040 HRS
ATTENDED BY AN ESTIMATED 3000 PEOPLE. THE RALLY WAS CHAIRED BY THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCE COUNCIL. SPEECHES WERE MADE
SUPPORTING THE GVN OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.
MR 4: RALLIES WERE HELD IN SIX PROVINCES: DINH TUONG, GO CONG,
KIEN HOA, VINH LONG, AN XUYEN, KIEN PHONG. ALL HAD NATIONALISTIC
THEMES AND LASTED FROM ONE TO TWO HOURS. THESE RALLIES WERE
SPONSORED BY PROVINCE OFFICIALS AND ATTENDANCE VARIED FROM 100 TO
3000 PEOPLE. A RALLY IS SCHEDULED ALSO FOR PHONG DINH PROVINCE ON
29 MARCH 71.
SAIGON: AT 0800 HRS 28 MARCH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SAIGON CITY
COUNCIL LED A DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE CITY HALL, IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. NUMEROUS SPEECHES WERE DELIVERED
REMINDING THE PEOPLE OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE FIGHTING MEN
PAGE 1
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EXCLUSIVE
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
EXCLUSIVE
MESSAGE CENTER
CONFIDENTIAL
10544
AND DENOUNCING THOSE AGAINST THE OUT-COUNTRY OPERATIONS. BANNERS
WERE DISPLAYED DENOUCNING MR. NGO CONG DUC AND MR. HO NGHOC NHUAN.
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AS "HENCHMEN OF COMMUNISM"
AND URGING "DOWN WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERS STABBING THE COMBATANTS IN
THE BACK" AND "STRIKE TO DEATH THE TWO UNDERGROUND COMMUNISTS." THE
PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION ENDED AT ABOUT 0900 HRS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER,
6 PEOPLE ON 3 HONDAS THREW MOLOTOV COCKTAILS AT THE TIN SANG
NEWSPAPER OFFICE, OWNED BY THE SAME MR. NGO CONG DUC, RESULTING
IN MINOR DAMAGE. LEAFLETS WERE ALSO DISTRIBUTED IN THE AREA WITH THE
SAME STATEMENTS AS ON THE BANNERS. GP-4
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#9421
ANNOTES
STAMP THIS MESSAGE SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
ADVANCE CJCS SIX COPIES AND DDO ONE COPY
g3(1)c,
NUMBER COPIES
(1
1 miste de w/come lie
HEG
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EXCLUSIVE
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Libary DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
Impact of the Lam Son Operation
Thus far the effects of Lam Son have been viewed in the overly
simplistic terms of whether trucks continued moving on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. We know trucks were moving, though at a substantially
reduced rate in the operational areas. Lam Son was never intended
to stop the movement of all trucks. Fundamental to an assessment of
Lam Son, however, is what the ultimate effectiveness of the movement
of these trucks is in terms of the enemy's ability to continue or escalate
the war in South Vietnam and Cambodia. If the trucks are supplying
troops in South Laos, then they cannot be moving supplies to troops in
South Vietnam or Cambodia.
The most mufull wryto uness the wont of LAMSON 719 is internes of
On these grounds, there are some rather striking conclusions to be
drawn about the effects of Lam. Son. At the beginning of this year enemy
supplies were low and one might assume that matching last year's logistics
effort would meet this year's requirements, at least for sustaining a
protracted war effort. However, in 1971 the enemy must meet a long list
of new demands on his logistics system in addition to the output he achieved
last year. These new demands must be met in 1971 merely to sustain a
protracted war.
The new demands are the supply increases necessary to compensate for:
- - (1) the loss of Sihanoukville,
-- (2) logistics demands for support of the greatly enlarged force
structure stationed in South Laos in anticipation of a South
Vietnamese incursion,
-- (3) heavy demands of combat consumption by enemy troops
defending the trail against the South Vietnamese operation,
- (4) the tonnanges of supplies in caches destroyed by Lam Son,
-- (5) increased tonnages destroyed by bombing in the 1970-71
dry season versus the 1969-70 dry season.
The loss of Sihanoukville alone placed an enormous additional logistics
burden on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At least one-third and possibly one-half
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
2
of the enemy's supply requirement for South Vietnam was met by
shipments through Sihanoukville and purchases on the Cambodian
economy. If the tonnages formerly shipped through Sihanoukville go
down the Trail they must be multiplied by a factor of four to five to
sustain the same output because of consumption and losses to interdiction
along the Trail.
When all of these new requirements are added together, they indicate that
the enemy must increase his trail input effort by at least 50% this year
merely to come out where he did last year. His trail output to Cambodia
and South Vietnam must be about one-third more than last year's.
To date we are reasonably confident that output from the trail into
South Vietnam and Cambodia is only one-third last year's output. It
is too early to say what the final results will be, but we do know that:
Even a record enemy logistics effort through the rest of the
dry season is likely to leave the enemy significantly short of
the supplies he needs in 1971 to conduct a protracted war
effort. This means major offensives of country-wide impact are
unlikely. It means the Vietnamese government will have the oppor-
tunity in 1971 to continue to achieve pacification gains against a low
level of enemy activity.
- - Supplies will arrive too late for offensive activity in the 1971
dry season, the usual time of enemy highpoint activity. Thus far
in 1971 enemy activity in Cambodia and South Vietnam has fallen
below the level of similar periods in past years.
The enemy will have fewer options in 1972. Because it takes several
months of the dry season to attain a logistics outflow rate to Cambodia
and South Vietnam, the failure of the enemy to build up large stock-
piles in 1971 will mean that it will be late in the dry season (the dry
season ends about May 15) or into the wet season in 1972 before his
logistics capabilities would permit a major offensive. This, of course,
assumes the enemy can successfully solve the logistics problems in
1972 he was unable to solve in 1971.
- Local supply shortages minimize the possibility of major offensives
this year in MR 2 and MR 1 except across the DMZ where the enemy
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
3
is less logistically constrained. Lam Son would appear to have
preempted an offensive this dry season in MR I or MR 2 by preventing
the enemy from establishing forward-based stocks in northern
South Vietnam and the adjoining Laos border areas.
While the logistics impact of the Lam Son operation is very important, it
also means that Hanoi must maintain large forces in South Laos to protect
its logistics corridor since the credibility of the South Vietnamese threat
is now even greater. Therefore, these forces (a portion of which were
formerly in South Vietnam) cannot be used to threaten Vietnamization in
South Vietnam. Another near-term benefit of the operation is that enemy
units destined to conduct offensive activity in Cambodia and the highlands
of South Vietnam were held in Laos to cope with ARVN. A possible four
enemy regiments were put out of commission by the combat.
The combination of enemy manpower and logistics setbacks resulting from
the Lam Son operation make it unlikely that the enemy will mount major
offensive activities in South Vietnam or in Cambodia, despite evidence that
the enemy planned to mount such offensives.
TOP SECRET
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