Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848747
label
VIETNAM Operations in Laos and Cambodia Vol. IV [Folder 1 of 2]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848747
contentType
document
title
VIETNAM Operations in Laos and Cambodia Vol. IV [Folder 1 of 2]
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Central Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848747
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
ad5f9d25612fdc50
ocrText
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
TYPE
1
Memo
Kissinger to the President
June 8,
B
w/attach
1971
2
Memo
Helms to Kissinger
9 April
B
w/attach
1971
3
Memo
Helms to Kissinger
5 Mar
B
w/attach
1971
4
Memo
Kissinger to the President
March 20,
B
w/attach
1971
DECLASSIFIED per Rite 20056/06/13
5
Memo
Robinson to Haig
April 21,
D
w/attach
1971
6
Memo
Smith to Kissinger
n/d
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files
82
Folder Title
VIETNAM Operations in Laos and Cambodia Vol. IV (Folder 1 of 2)
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
*U.S. GPO; 1989-235-084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
[82/4/4]
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
INFORMATION
March 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
HC
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
SUBJECT: Lam Son
You will be asked for your assessment of the Lam Son operation.
Thus far the effects of Lam Son have been viewed in the overly
simplistic terms of whether trucks are moving on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. We know trucks are moving, though at a substantially
reduced rate south of operational areas. Lam Son was never
intended to stop the movement of trucks.
What is fundamental to an assessment of Lam Son, however, is
what the ultimate effectiveness of the movement of these trucks
is in terms of the enemy's ability to continue or escalate the war
in South Vietnam and Cambodia. If the trucks are supplying troops
in South Laos, then they cannot be moving supplies to troops in
South Vietnam or Cambodia.
On these grounds, there are some rather striking conclusions to
be drawn about the effects of Lam Son.
We assume that at the beginning of this year enemy supplies were
low and that his supply effort last year roughly approximates the
logistics flow that will be required to support a protracted war in
1971.
But we know that in 1971 the enemy must meet a long list of new
demands on his logistics system in addition to the output he achieved
last year. These new demands must be met merely to sustain a
protracted war in 1971.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Perrace 2403/06/13
By a
NARA, Date 198011
(P.1087)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
2
The new demands are the supply increases necessary to compensate
for:
-- (1) the loss of Sihanoukville,
-- (2) new logistics demands for non-combat consumption to
support the greatly enlarged force structure stationed
in South Laos in fear of the kind of operation Lam Son
has proved to be,
-- (3) new demands for combat consumption by enemy troops
defending the trail against Lam Son,
-- (4) the tonnages of supplies in caches destroyed by Lam Son,
-- (5) increased tonnage destroyed by bombing in the 1970-71
dry season versus the 1969-70 dry season.
The loss of Sihanoukville alone placed an enormous additional logistics
burden on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. At least one-third and possibly
one-half of the enemy's supply requirement for South Vietnam was
met by shipments through Sihanoukville and purchases on the Cambodian
economy.
If the tonnages formerly shipped through Sihanoukville go down the
Trail they must be multiplied by a factor of four to five to arrive at
the total tonnage necessary to feed the additional logistics and
combat troops in South Laos, to supply the POL for trucks, etc.
When all of these new requirements are added together -- to offset
Sihanoukville, direct consumption and destruction caused by Lam
Son, etc. -- they indicate that the enemy must increase his trail
input effort by at least 50% this year merely to come out where he did
last year. His trail output must be about one-third more than last
year's.
Yet, to date we are reasonably confident that output from the trail
into South Vietnam and Cambodia is only one-third last year's output.
It is too early to say what the final results will be, but we do know
that:
TOP SECRET
(p.2017)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
-- Even a record enemy logistics effort through the rest of the
dry season, starting today, is likely to leave the enemy significantly
short of the supplies he needs in 1971 to conduct a protracted war
effort. This means major offensives of country-wide impact are
unlikely. It means the Vietnamese government will have the oppor-
tunity in 1971 to continue to achieve pacification gains against a low
level of enemy activity.
-- Supplies will arrive too late for offensive activity in the 1971
dry season, the usualtime of enemy highpoint activity. Thus far in
1971 enemy activity in Cambodia and South Vietnam has fallen below
that of similar periods in past years.
-- The enemy will have fewer options in 1972. Because it takes
several months of the dry season to attain a logistics outflow rate to
Cambodia and South Vietnam, the failure of the enemy to build up
large stockpiles in 1971 will mean that it will be late in the dry
season (the dry season ends about May 15) or into the wet season
in 1972 before his logistics capabilities would permit him to launch
a major offensive. This, of course, assumes the enemy can success-
fully solve the logistics problems in 1972 he was unable to solve in
1971.
-- Local supply shortages minimize possibility of major offen-
sives this year in MR 2 and MR 1 except across the DMZ where the
enemy is not logistically constrained. Lam Son would appear to have
preempted an MR 1 or MR 2 offensive this dry season by preventing
the enemy from establishing forward-based stocks in northern South
Vietnam and the adjoining Laos border areas.
While the logistics benefits to Lam Son are very important, another
key result of the operation was that it made credible the threat Hanoi
has maintained up to 30, 000 combat forces in South Laos in 1970 to
meet. Hanoi mustmaintain large forces in South Laos to protect its
logistics corridor as long as friendly forces pose a credible threat to
the Trail.
Thus, a key long range benefit to Lam Son is that the enemy will feel
some compulsion to continue to maintain large combat forces in South
TOP SECRET
(p.3.47)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
4
Laos. Therefore, these forces (a portion of which were formerly
Vietnam. in South Vietnam) cannot be used to threaten Vietnamization in South
A near term benefit to Lam Son is that enemy units destined to conduct
offensive activity in Cambodia and the highlands of South Vietnam have
been held up to cope with ARVN. A possible four enemy regiments
have been put out of combat commission by Lam Son. These results
complement the logistics benefits to Lam Son in making it unlikely
that the enemy will mount major offensive activities in MRs 1 or 2 of
South Vietnam and in Cambodia, despite evidence that the enemy
planned to mount such offensives.
The assumptions and calculations underlying the estimates in this
memorandum are at Tab A.
TOP SECRET
(p.40ft)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
Assumptions and Quantitative Estimates for
Assessing the Effects of Lam Son
Assumptions
1. The enemy's planned Trail input (plus Sihanoukville) for the
1969-70 dry season was intended to support the protracted war
strategy he pursued in 1970.
2. Stockpiles remain unchanged. It is probably safe to say that
stockpiles at the outset of the 1970-71 dry season were at minimum
levels. Thus it is unlikely that the enemy could support combat
activities in 1971 by running down his stockpiles. It is possible
however that he could build up his stockpiles this year. Therefore,
any conclusion we draw as to the level of combat activity the
1970-71 input could support would have to be qualified to recognize
the possibility that he could elect to build up his stockpiles in 1971.
3. The enemy's South Laos logistics system, outside the variables
identified above, is operating at about the same level of effectiveness
this year as it was last year. In other words, whatever gains the
enemy has obtained from expanding his road network have been
offset by improvements in our bombing (outside the additional gunship
losses explicitly accounted for in the model), by our SGU-type opera-
tions and by the increased throughput the expanded system must
support i.e., the load factor is the same this year as last.
4. Other sources of supplies by sea and from commercial sources, are
utilized by the enemy this year to the same extent as last year. We
know the enemy has sharply increased his efforts to infiltrate supplies
by trawler from North Vietnam and on at least one occasion has succeeded. His
many failures have been well documented. Some small coastal supply
efforts may have taken place from Thailand. Against this, however,
must be weighed the decreased enemy access to South Vietnam's resources
that has resulted from the continued expansion of GVN control of the rural
population from 48% to 67% in the last year. It is probably safe to say
the enemy has not been able to substantially increase sea-borne infiltra-
tion, although we should continue to insure that naval operations preclude
this.
TOP SECRET
(p.s.ft)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
2
5. We assume that the logistics requirement to offset the Sihanoukville
increment is in part a ttributable to Lam Son in that were it not for the
threat of ARVN attacks against the Trail, a threat made credible
by Lam Son, the high (75% to 80%) proportion of non ordnance input
(to sustain the enemy's forcesin South Laos) relative to ordnance input
would not be required.
Preliminary Quantitative Estimates
Preliminary quantitative estimates on the additional demands on the
logistics system are:
Sihanoukville offset and non-combat supply requirements for added
forces in South Laos (items 1 and 2 above): 21,000 tons of ordnance
transited Sihanoukville from late 1966 through early 1969. Approximately
5,000 tons of this total arrived in a time frame that could be attributed
to the inflow for 1970 activities. We know that 17% to 25% of the input
onto the Trail consists of ordnance, the rest being POL and food for
troops and transport on the Trail. To get 5, 000 tons through this
year would require an inflow of 20, 000 tons if we use the conservative
25% ordnance figure. Another 5% or 1, 000 tons should be added if
we use CIA's conservative estimate of the supplies lost to bombing in
South Laos. Total 21, 000 tons.
-- Ammunition consumption by enemy troops coping with
Lam Son is estimated by DIA to be 15 tons per day. Assuming
60 days of operations, 900 tons will be consumed to counter Lam
Son.
-- As of March 16, 1971, 2, 118 tons of supplies had been
destroyed by the Lam Son operation.
-- 1970-71 additional losses to improved bombing are
estimated on the basis that thus far this year truck losses are
62% above last year's (6, 198 vs. 3, 833). Applying this factor
to last year's entire total, enemy truck losses this year will
increase by 3,000 over last year. If this figure is multiplied by
two tons (or 50%) of each truck load (DIA uses 3 tons), the
additional input increment to offset this loss is 6, 000 tons.
Total additional requirements for 1971 activities versus 1970 activities
are:
21,000
900
2,118
6,000
30,018
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
(p647)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
We know that about 60, 000 tons were put into the Trail system last
year to support the protracted war in 1970. We will take this figure
and add to it estimates of the additional demands identified above
to arrive at a total logistics input requirement for this dry season
to sustain a protracted war in 1971.
If the total requirement exceeds our estimate of the capacity of the
system, or more accurately what the enemy appears willing to pay
the price to put through the system, then he would be unable to
support a protracted war in 1971 at 1970's level of activity. Alter-
natively, even if he can reach the total requirement for protracted
war, he would not be able to throughput the supplies to support higher
levels of activity, and this in itself would be extremely important
to us and a justification for Lam Son.
The total additional supplies over last year needed to meet all of these
new 1970-71 dry season input requirements is 30, 018 tons or half
the enemy's 1969-70 input. This means, according to the conserva-
tive calculations spelled out above and still subject to refinement, the
enemy will have to increase his logistics input by 50% or to 90,000
tons this dry season compared with 60, 000 tons last year, to sustain
logistically his protracted war effort.
Through March 9th, 41, 301 tons had been put into the Trail. If
we grant the enemy the highest capability he has demonstrated
(400 tons per day input in January 1971), we conclude that if he
sustains his logistics operations at this level through April 30th
or for another 52 days he can input 20, 800 additional tons into South
Laos. A lower rate of input, at 200 tons per day through June 30th
when the monsoon becomes unbearable, would add another 12, 000
tons. This would bring his total tonnage to 74, 101 for the dry season,
significantly short of the 90, 000 necessary to sustain a protracted
war at 1970 supply input levels.
TOP SECRET
(p-7687)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DATE 22 MAR 1971 CONTROL NO.
FROM: Kearney
TO:
00
Admiral Moorer
01
LtGeneral Knowles
02
Captain Train
04
Mr. Kearney
03
LCdr Francis
01A
RAdm Robinson
01B
Colonel Davis
01C
Captain Hilton
01D
Colonel MacDonald
01E
Colonel Wickham
01F
Captain Valentine
01G
Commander MacKercher
05
LColonel Ratliff
06
Major Salmon
05A Lt. Buckles
03A YNC Brown
03B YNC Kissel
attached 16 MAR
WHITE HOUSE talking
paper is good - but
dated
JR
Davis
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined t
THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CABINET
I hope the attached talking
paper will be of assistance
to you.
Herbert G. Klein
March 16, 1971
LAM SON 719 -- The South Vietnamese
Operation in Laos
Objectives
-- This operation is "limited in time as well as in space, with the
clear and unique objective of disrupting the supply and infiltration
network of the Communist North Vietnamese troops lying in the Laotian
territory, and which for many years was occupied by the Communist
North Vietnamese and used to launch attacks against our country."
(From a statement by President Nguyen Van Thieu - February 8, 1971)
-- The operation is intended to reduce North Vietnamese capability to mount
an offensive and to strengthen South Vietnam's ability to defend itself as
U.S. forces are withdrawn under the Vietnanization program.
-- U.S. supplementary air support has the objectives of helping to protect
the lives of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam and enhancing
Vietnamization. (From a statement by a spokesman for the U.S. Military
Assistance Command Vietnam, Saigon, February 8, 1971)
-- The operation is not an expansion of the war but rather an effort to end it
sooner. It was never intended to occupy territory.
Timing
Prior to May 1970, the Ho Chi Minh Trail supplied the North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong forces in the northern half of South Vietnam. In the past six years
some 630, 000 North Vietnamese troops and an estimated 200 million pounds of
food, 400, 000 weapons and over 100 million pounds of ammunition have been
moved down the Trail network from North Vietnam. Communist military assaults
in the Mekong Delta were supported primarily by supplies arriving through the
Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. The change in Government in Phnom Penh, and
the U.S. and South Vietnamese operations against the Cambodia sanctuaries,
forced North Vietnam to switch to a total reliance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail
which can only be used effectively in the dry season from November to May.
The Lam Son operations have been launched at a time when the flow of supplies
and manpower on the trail is at a critical peak.
Results to Date
-- Route 9, a major east-west road providing access from the supply center
of Tchepone into South Vietnam, has been severely disrupted. South
Vietnamese forces have occupied parts of Route 9 and have also entered
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
and destroyed supplies in the North Vietnamese base area in the
Tchepone area.
-- Route 92, a major North-South road in the Ho Chi Minh Trail, has been
closed also.
-- Intense pressure has been placed upon Route 914, another Trail artery.
-- The Fuel pipeline has been cut in a number of places by South Vietnamese
forces and nearly 200, 000 gallons of petroleum reported destroyed. Loss
of this fuel supply means that vulnerable truck cargo destined for the South
must carry fuel instead of ammunition and food.
-- North Vietnamese attempts to shift traffic westward to the flat land on
Route 23 is making their movement of supplies more vulnerable to air
interdiction. Successful air interdiction efforts have destroyed large
numbers of trucks in Southern Laos.
-- Indicative of the disruption to enemy supply activities is the destruction of
nearly 300 trucks and 2,000 bunkers and structures in the South Vietnamese
area of operation.
-- More than 8, 500 of the enemy have been killed in actions as compared
with South Vietnamese losses of approximately 750. Six enemy regiments
in the area have suffered significant casualties. The enemy has lost
nearly 100 tanks and many weapons on the battlefield. More than 3, 800
individual and 1, 100 crew-served weapons have been captured or
destroyed.
-- South Vietnamese units which have been hit hard have fought back and
inflicted much heavier losses on the enemy.
-- Fire bases built to protect South Vietnamese forces as they disrupt the
supply network are being held only for the time needed in a particular area.
-- The enemy has been unable to mount an offensive in South Vietnam. A
serious threat to the security of northern South Vietnam is being blunted.
-- Although the purpose of the operation was not aimed at seizing large
caches of supplies, a considerable amount of enemy war materiel has
been reported captured or destroyed: more than 3 million pounds of food,
more than 500, 000 rounds of ammunition, and nearly 100,000 pounds of
miscellaneous equipment and supplies.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
Impact of Lam Son 719
-- The operation is disrupting the flow of supplies needed to sustain North
Vietnamese offensives in South Vietnam.
-- The North Vietnamese capability to continue attacks upon Laos and
Cambodia is being hampered.
-- Further time for supply, training and development of the economic,
social and military aspects of Vietnamization is being gained.
-- While the United States is providing air and logisticssupport, South
Vietnamese ground forces are carrying out the operation in Laos without
American ground forces or advisors, thus gaining experience and self-
confidence.
-- American and South Vietnamese lives are being safeguarded and the U.S.
troop withdrawal timetable remains on schedule.
-- The operation demonstrates that time is not on the side of North Vietnam
and that meaningful negotiations at the conference table are a better path
to peace than Hanoi's continued efforts to attack the nations of Indochina.
-- The South Vietnamese are taking the initiative to thwart enemy plans
for a dry season offensive.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed
File
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 7, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
David Young Dey
SUBJECT:
Briefings on Laos and Cambodia
March 21 - 25, 1971
Attached are the briefings for each of the following days:
March 21 - Tab 21
March 22 - Tab 22
March 23 - Tab 23
March 24 - Tab 24
March 25 - Tab 25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Lt. General M. Zais
Lt. Colonel Robert Molinelli
DATE:
Sunday, March 21, 1971 - 10:15 a.m.
PLACE:
Mr. Kissinger's Office, the White House
Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting by asking Colonel Molinelli who had
commanded an air cavalry squadron during the Lam Son operation and
had just returned from the area, to describe the operation as he saw it.
Molinelli explained that as Lam Son 719 had begun, four air cavalry
troops of helicopters crossed into Laos on a 40-kilometer front charged
with general support of the South Vietnamese units, flank support, and
locating and destroying enemy anti-aircraft positions. The initial job
was to find landing zones and to secure air passages from South Vietnam
to the zones to insure continued access. The most difficult areas on
the first day were the landing sites intended for the Ranger battalions.
Because of the intensity of enemy antiaircraft fire, these zones had to
be moved to the north and east from the planned locations.
Colonel Molinelli continued by explaining that although there were heavy
helicopter losses initially, the pilots learned to survive the heavy anti-
aircraft fire by varying their tactics. Some initial losses were due
to tactical errors, but as time progressed they were able to operate
more effectively with less losses. He explained that the first time
they attacked a tank with a helicopter, they stopped three out of four
with conventional ordnance. This was before they had received high-
explosive antitank rockets. They found they were able to stop T-34
tanks but not necessarily destroy them. On another occasion, they
stopped the movement of 14 tanks from the Tchepone area. A lead
column of eight tanks was spotted, supported by ground troops, and
there was no tactical air available. In 2-1/2 hours time, using only
Cobras, they were able to stop both columns with high-explosive rockets.
The rockets are heat-seeking and penetrate the tank so that one is unable
to determine the internal damage from the outside. But it was significant
that the helicopters were able to stop tanks. He added that they never
found tanks unprotected, explaining that there were always antiaircraft
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
guns and ground troops in the vicinity of the tanks. He also noted that
they had never lost a helicopter to a tank.
Mr. Kissinger then asked Colonel Molinelli if he had observed the ARVN
in action. Colonel Molinelli explained that he had and felt that the First
Infantry Division was a very knowledgeable fighting unit which was used
to working in large numbers. By way of contrast, the Airborne and
Rangers were not used to working in larger elements and had some
difficulty with coordination. They were also not quite as aggressive as
the First Division. Mr. Kissinger commented that it was the First
Division which had taken the heavy losses at fire support base Lo Lo.
General Zais noted that the best battalion commander in the First Regiment
had been killed at Lo Lo. He was an outstanding leader, although only
26 years old. General Zais observed that this indicated his battalion had
had "just one hell of a fight. "
Mr. Kissinger then asked whether the South Vietnamese had made themselves
vulnerable by extending way out to the West. General Zais responded
that he felt it had not made much difference and that a new division had been
moved up to replace those elements which extended farther west. He
noted that the enemy had intensive artillery support and attacked in
kamikaze style. The South Vietnamese had caused heavy losses and it
was obvious that there had been a "hell of a fight. " He also noted that the
extraction process, which was then in full swing, was a very complex
military operation, and that the South Vietnamese were understandably
having some difficulty with it which compounded their problems.
Mr. Kissinger then asked how the enemy knew where the South Vietnamese
were going to go. General Zais answered that they intercepted a lot of the
South Vietnamese messages. He explained that the First Division of the
ARVN was well trained in U.S. intercept techniques and observed that,
since we knew what the enemy was doing, it was logical to conclude that
they probably also used similar techniques to learn what we were doing.
In addition, they watched the direction of our helo operations with observers
sitting in trees, and this helped them determine where we planned to go.
Mr. Kissinger then asked why fire support base Lo Lo had been established
near Route 9. General Zais replied that he thought it was because the base
overlooked Route 9. He explained that the battalion which had been hit hard
was the one that had been down on Route 914. Mr. Kissinger asked why that
battalion had come back up from 914 and General Zais answered that the new
location provided better defensive terrain. Referring to the fire support
base south of Route 9 Colonel Molinelli interjected that in friendly hands,
the high terrain provided a relatively secure route for air traffic for the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
assault on Tchepone. He further explained that toward the end of
February the enemy had been deploying west of Tchepone and their
anti-aircraft subsiding. Since their major forces were west of this
high ground, it made the best defensive position for the move to
Tchepone.
General Zais then commented on the fire support base concept, explaining
that artillery pieces and a control center are located there, but that the
remainder of the battalions assigned to the base operated in a range of
up to 10 kilometers away. He noted that one should not focus on a dot
on the map, since troops were located at various distances from the
actual fire support base.
Mr. Kissinger then asked for a briefing on the air strikes which had been
conducted the night before against SAM facilities in North Vietnam.
General Zais showed him a map of target locations and noted that only
preliminary results had been received. He reported that they had destroyed
a SAM launcher at the Site which had shot down a Canberra aircraft in the
recent past. He also noted that there was dense smoke and three SAM
missiles had ignited and been observed skittering around the site location.
Mr. Kissinger then apologized that he had to run off and thanked the briefers,
saying the meeting had been most helpful. However, as he was leaving his
office, Mr. Kissinger asked Colonel Molinelli if there had been any panic
observed among ARVN troops. Colonel Molinelli said that he felt there
had been some panic by the Rangers when they were coming out of fire
support bases 30 and 31. There was some panic when fire support base 31
was overrun by tanks. Unfortunately, they had not spotted the tanks soon
enough to prevent the North Vietnamese tank assault and air support was
hindered by bad weather.
Colonel Molinelli then explained that the morale of his helicopter squadron
had gone up as they found they were having significant results against the
enemy. Mr. Kissinger asked about the pilots on TV that have complained
about the operation. General Zais answered that the newsmen loved to hang
around desk officers in the war zone taking notes on anything they heard
and looking for sensationalism. He didnnot believe that these reports gave
a true picture. Colonel Molinelli added that the pilots who had complained
were not his and were probably those who had seen only a small piece of
the action.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
Mr. Kissinger then asked Colonel Molinelli how the South Vietnamese
would do when the North Vietnamese came into South Vietnam.
Molinelli responded that he felt the First Division would do very well,
but that the Rangers and Airborne would not be quite as good. General
Zais explained that the Airborne and Rangers were used to fire brigade-
type operations and didn't have the staying power or expertise in coordinating
support operations. These units had fought gallantly but they were not well
coordinated and not as professional as the others. Mr. Kissinger then asked
why the Airborne and Rangers had been selected for the operation.
General Zais answered that it had to do with availability and that the
Airborne normally served as reserve forces. They had traditionally
been used for fire brigade-type operations such as Hue and had only
been used as a full division twice in the past.
Mr. Kissinger again thanked the two officers for their comments and on
this note the meeting ended.
Howe
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
22
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This
e to te Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Briefing of March 22, 1971
PRESENT:
Henry A. Kissinger
Lt General Zais
Brig. General Haig
Lt Colonel Martin (Briefer)
David R. Young (Notetaker)
LAOS
Kissinger: It looks like they are at least successful at
retrograde movements.
Martin: Well, they have done it in an orderly way. One good
bit of news we have is that since Saturday noon, there have been about
1500 enemy KIA.
Kissinger: Do you really believe that?
Martin: Well, the weapons count is three bodies to every one
weapon found, and usually that is a good ratio. So, the enemy KIA
may be as high as 1500.
Zais: Another reason why it may be that high is that we are
having very good close-in air support and the gunships are moving in
on them as they are trying to hit the ARVN pulling out. They are
definitely taking very heavy losses.
Haig: One of the things which we have found out is that the
enemy is getting their men hopped up on booze -- a kind of a rice wine.
We even found it in their canteens. They have got them so hopped up
that they are suicidal.
Kissinger: That ought to make a great battle -- one army hopped
up on drugs and the other army hopped up on booze. Seriously, when do
you think they will all be out? You know, the President is going on TV
tonight and he has to have some answer on this.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Zais: We just don't know.
Kissinger: Could it be the end of this week?
Zais: Yes, it could be by the end of this week. The whole
1st Division is back now.
Kissinger: That's General Lam?
Zais: Yes.
Kissinger: Why do you think they are coming back now?
Zais: Well, I think it is a combination of a number of internal
political-type reasons and some intrigue within the armed forces. I
am sure that General Lam is furious at General Khan's remarks. Khan
simply sat on the sidelines taking shots at Lam. To needle him, Khan
even sent through a message denying a rumor that he was going to take
over for Lam. There are definitely some hard feelings now between Lam
and Khan. The fact that the marines are the ones that are staying in is
a logical point. They are in a better position to stay in. They went into
the least concentrated area and they have received the least pressure.
And only 2 of the 3 marine brigades have been committed.
Kissinger: What about the airborne units?
Zais: They are really part of the armored task force along
Route 9 and as such they can't be pulled out by themselves.
Kissinger: What then should I say to the President?
Zais: I really don't know.
Kissinger: Haig, what do you think I should say?
Haig: I think the President should know that they may be out
within a week or 10 days but he should not say anything. He shouldn't
let the enemy know to what degree we are anticipating a quick withdrawal.
Kissinger: How much more does the enemy have left?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Zais: Well, the enemy is building up and I would think that
it is very likely they will attack from
north of Route 9. The battle
is not going to be over just when we cross the Laotian border and get
back into Vietnam. I would say that the situation is much as Abrams
has told us and that our actions the ARVN actions will be in response
to or related to the pressure that is put on them.
Kissinger: But if we have knocked out 6 of the 10 enemy regiments,
how can they attack us with only 4? Will they attack with 4?
Zais: Yes, they could and it is somewhat misleading to say
"knocked out". That cannot be taken literally. There is still some
effectiveness left in those 6 regiments and they may be combined or
cannibalized into another unit.
Kissinger: That means we are going to have a fairly rough
April.
Zais: Yes. At least during the early stages. I think also that
the NVA has been reading our press and that they to some degree are
smelling victory and trying to capitalize and push on that. They are
very hopped up. They have high morale right now and even though they
are losing heavily and the troops find that their buddies are dying all
around them they feel that they are on the path to a glorious victory.
Martin then showed Kissinger on the map the programmed B-52
strikes today. He also indicated one area in which a strike went in
yesterday and according to an early report over a thousand bodies were
found.
Kissinger to Zais: What in your own personal opinion went wrong?
Zais: That in part is a leading question because I don't really
think that much went wrong. There are a number of factors in assessing
the results some good and some bad. For one, I think that when Abrams
requested that the 2nd ARVN Division be brought in, it should have come
in; that was a crucial point. If it had been followed, I think that they
could have stayed much longer and the whole operation would have turned
the other way.
But Thieu faces some very serious political problems and I have
a feeling that in part there was some hysteria back in Saigon. The
further away you get from the battle, the more rumors you have. I
think that in Saigon they had a sense of extremely heavy casualties and a
feeling that the relationship between Kahn and Lam was going sour.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This TOP document SECRE has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
On top of this Thieu is worrying about his reelection. The result was
that he got a little bit edgy. It definitely was a presidential decision
not to commit that second division. His thinking apparently was simply
that we have done them some damage; the casualties are getting a bit
too high; we will live to fight another day.
Ky's stepping out also presents a problem. Thieu has got to protect
his flanks against Ky. You are right in that they came out sooner than we
had expected. That in itself, however, doesn't mean a defeat. There has
been substantial disruption but it has not been the crucial blow we had
hoped for. Abrams has an unusual instinct for the jugular and if his advice
had been followed, we could have come out differently.
Haig: Abe tried to get them to commit the second division on three
different occasions. He tried first a week or so ago and then again on
Tuesday and Wednesday. Thieu just would not do it.
Kissinger to Zais: Do you think Lam is any good?
Zais: Yes, he is both a political and a military leader. He is
more of a combination than Tri and some of the other generals have been.
They are more military only. He is sensitive and he has coped with the
uprisings of the students, the Buddhists, and the veterans very well.
(Kissinger: Then the only trouble he has had is with the NVA!)
Zais: But his problem is that he doesn't have the instinct for the
jugular which Abrams has.
Kissinger: Do you expect the NVA to launch a major offensive now?
Zais: Yes.
Martin: But we are bringing in U.S. tank reinforcements.
Zais: Yes, the 1st of the first is being relieved by the 1st of the
77th.
Kissinger: What do the sensors read today?
Martin: 92-C has some additional, but otherwise they are minimal.
914-B
914-C
99
9-D
92-C
922
29/75
21/25
22/41
-
13/13
19/18
92-E
23-I
3/1
1/1
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
5 ! I
CAMBODIA
Martin: They moved in the Chup Plantation and discovered 300
and some bodies. 180 were in fresh graves and 187 were still lying on
the ground as the result of an Arc Light drop on top of the 95th C
25 additional were killed in a contact.
Kissinger: Do you really believe that they found that many?
Zais: Well, they are certainly less likely to exaggerate body claims
when they are the result of air strikes.
Kissinger: How about the Snoul area?
Martin: They are still sitting there.
Kissinger: Who was it that Abe wanted to relieve?
Haig: It is this new commander.
Kissinger: Why have they broken contact again in the Chup?
Were they just not being aggressive enough?
Haig: Tri ran his task forces himself. Minh has given the authority
here to the division commanders and as a result they are being more
cautious. They had a good fight going there on about 3 or 4 March but
broke off contact. I can tell you that Abrams was extremely upset and
told Thieu about it.
Martin: One good sign that we have now is that the enemy has
brought its artillery back over north of the Chup Plantation.
Haig: We also have a number of reports saying that the enemy is
running short of supplies in the Chup.
Zais: He has to. I don't see where else he can get his supplies in.
Haig: Snoul definitely has a disaster in the making and Abrams
has accordingly told Thieu.
Kissinger to Zais: What do you think is the effect on the morale
of the ARVN troops coming out of the Lam Son Operation?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
Zais: I do not think it can be described in one general assessment.
It is not all bad and it is not all good. One underlying fact is that they
are not fighting in Hue they are in a foreign country, the morale of the
different units will depend on what action they have been in. War is a
kaleidoscope. Some will come back exuberant having really whipped the
enemy where they were. Others will come back semi-panicked. The
regimental commanders in the first ARVN are very good. Col Chong is
a soldier-scholar, a very tough man in combat. Col Bui Dhiem - they
call him the one-meter colonel he is SO short - is intelligent, hard-nosed
and I think a very good commander. I don't think that they are demoralized.
They are going to be very tough when they fight again. For one thing they
are now back into Vietnam where they have their own dependents nearby.
They were also in the top ten of all the provinces in pacification. They
are the ones just over the DMZ who will have to block any advance by the
NVA up there.
Haig: Even in the unit that had only 80 some men left, when they
were taken out they had their weapons and they brought back their dead
and wounded.
Zais: They really did very well.
NORTH VIETNAM
Martin then went over with Kissinger the points on the map where
the bombing runs took place yesterday on North Vietnam. 72 sorties were
run. The Navy could not get in at all. He also noted those that were
programmed for today.
Zais then showed Kissinger photos on the weather reconnaissance.
Kissinger: Yesterday was then very good.
Zais: Yes it was.
Kissinger: But this sort of operation really doesn't do much
damage.
Zais: It doesn't win the war but it certainly helps.
Kissinger: Where will the A-6's go in?
Zais: I asked about that before coming over, but at that time they
could not tell me for sure. He then pointed to the place on the map where
the 24 F-4s went in yesterday or will be going in again today.
[END OF BRIEFING]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOPS reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
23
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DATE:
March 23, 1971
SUBJECT:
Laos Operation; Lam Son 719; Cambodian Operation;
Toan Thang 01/71
PRESENT:
Henry A. Kissinger
General Haig
David R. Young (notetaker)
May
BRIEFER:
Lt Colonel David Martin
Martin: The information we have this morning is that an ARVN unit
has been ambushed on Route 9 inside Laos. 13 APC's were destroyed
and 4 M-41 tanks; 12 ARVN were killed and about 75 wounded. They were
ambushed a couple of miles inside Laos. Back further behind them on
Route 9 there are about 30 enemy tanks proceeding east. 7 have been
knocked out, 2 have been damaged.
Kissinger: What do you think this means? Do you think they have
really knocked out that many and there are 30 still coming?
Martin: My conclusion is that there are less than 30.
Kissinger: What do you mean, our pilots can't even count?
Martin: No, they should be able to count them. The only units now
remaining in Laos are the marines at Fire Support Base Delta.
Kissinger: I knew they would be out by Wednesday, isn't that what
I told you last week.
Martin: Yes, you were right.
Fire Support Base Delta has been attacked during the night
and for the last couple of days. The estimate is that over 600 enemy are
dead and about 85 friendly. On B-52 strikes we have 7 attacks laid on
for today.
Kissinger: How many troops are left in Laos now?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
Martin: The early MFR had 11, 200 but this has been now revised
down to 4, 400 as of this morning.
Khe Sanh was hit 5 times during the night by indirect fire. A force
of about 40 sappers broke through the perimeter, about 18 or 20 were
killed, one was captured; 3 U.S. were killed when they broke through
and 8 aircraft were damaged. It is important to note that the NVA is re-
positioning some of its units and they now have one to the north of Khe
Sanh and two to the south.
Kissinger: What do you think this means?
Martin: I think it means that we are going to have a big fight there.
Kissinger: How can they attack if they are hurt as badly as you say?
I thought that they couldn't move against our air. Do we know when they
are moving?
Martin: We have a feel but we have not been able to pick them up
precisely. When we have, that's when we have gotten our good kills like
with the B-52 strikes southeast of Tchepone.
Kissinger: How is the planning going for the Muong Nong operation?
With intensity I presume.
Martin: A lot is still to come in on that.
CAMBODIA
Martin: Task Force III has moved. They are now to the south/
southeast of the Chup.
Kissinger: Why have they moved?
Martin: I do not know. They lost some M-41 tanks, 4 to be exact,
in the exchange they had there the other day. They are only now reporting
them. This is the first indication we have gotten that they had a battle
there. The enemy regiment has moved back and is cleaning up.
Kissinger: What does the Task Force say they are doing outside the
Chup?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
Martin: They say they are resupplying, refitting, getting ready for
future operations but I don't know what their future operations are going
to be.
Kissinger: How are things going in Snoul?
Martin: They are moving back down along both roads but one good
bit of news here is that a CP has been moved up in order to monitor their
operations. I think this is a good sign.
Kissinger: What do you really think it means?
Martin: Well, at least it means they are putting the command up
there close to Snoul to keep track of them. This may also result in better
guidance. I don't know if I have ever gone into the history of this new re-
giment with you but the Colonel that was up there was a political Colonel.
He was an Aide to Kahn and he got this unit as a political payoff. He was
the commander of it until January when he was relieved. Then the Division
commander had given him free reign to do what he wanted but since he really
didn't want to do much, nothing was done. He was relieved in January but
again not much has happened.
In another action a U.S. air cavalry unit engaged an enemy truck
convoy north of the Chup and 31 enemy were killed in that oppression.
Kissinger: What about Task Force 225, are they doing anything yet?
Martin: No, it seems they are still milling around.
Martin to Haig: Did you get any feeling on this?
Haig: No, they are not doing anything?
Kissinger: It really seems that when we lost Tri, we really lost an
awful lot here and that no one has done anything since.
END OF BRIEFING.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
24
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF BRIEFING
SUBJECT:
Lam Son 719; Toan Thang 01/71
DATE:
March 24, 1971
BRIEFER:
Lt Colonel David Martin
PRESENT:
Henry A. Kissinger
Brigadier General Haig
David R. Young (Notetaker) way
LAOS
Martin: Only one battalion of about 600-700 marines now remains
in Laos. The rest are at Khe Sanh. Earlier today we had a report that
about 3600 were still in Laos, but just before coming over I received word
that the number dropped to 600 or 700. Eight tanks were knocked out
yesterday on Route 9 and three more were knocked out by air right at the
border. I think that their plan is to keep pursuing the ARVN just as long
as they can. The name of the game now from their point of view is to
hang on. We will have to move our marines to Khe Sanh; the 54th regiment
is now at Don How, the corps reserve position.
Kissinger to Haig: Did you tell Pursley to make sure that the ARVN
troops are at the border so that we don't bear the brunt of any attack across?
Haig: Yes I did, and I have talked to him about the other matter
we discussed as well.
Martin: Another significant development is the fact that there have
been no attacks by fire within the last 24 hours.
Kissinger: What do you think that means?
Martin: That either they are moving or they are conserving their
ammo, or they may be doing both.
Kissinger: If we knocked out 8 of 13 regiments, what are they going
to attack with?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 - -
Martin: I don't know the figures.
Kissinger: Well, even if it's 6 out of 10.
Martin: Well, they can still pursue with what they have left.
They can also come up with some of the units which were not that heavily
pressured or committed during the fighting. It's a matter of judgment
on how many forces they want to forfeit. They could run suicide missions.
We also have intercepts that they have been using Routes 92, 9
and 914 to move supplies. The sensors yesterday do not show that much
traffic.
Sensor Report
914-B
914-C
99
9-G
92-C
922
92-E
23-I
N/S
N/S
N/S
W/E
N/S
W/E
N/S
N/S
53/79
14/17
30/56
0
2/8
6/10
1/4
0/4
Kissinger to Haig: When do you think those extra gunships are going
to get over there? Will you check on that today and be sure they are going?
Haig: Yes.
CAMBODIA
Martin: It looks like they are resupplying and preparing, but they
are not doing anything.
Kissinger: Compared to Tri they just aren't moving at all. Don't
they have an airborne unit?
Martin: No, but they do have the Rangers.
Kissinger: Well, how did Tri get up to Chhlong then?
Martin: They helo lifted them up.
Kissinger: You know in some ways this operation is more bothersome
to me than the Lam Son one. At least in Lam Son they are fighting. Down
here they aren't even fighting. How do you really think they spend their day?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
Martin: Oh, they just patrol along the roads and send a few
patrols along the side, but they don't do much at all.
Kissinger: How are things going in Snoul?
Martin: Again, they are also just moving along the roads. We
had a U.S. Cobra shot down there yesterday.
Kissinger: By whom?
Martin: That's a good question. We don't know for sure. Both
the crew were killed. They might have gotten hit from one of the NVA
units just to the southeast of Snoul.
Kissinger: But other than that, nothing is going on?
Martin: That's it.
Kissinger: Do you think they are any better at defending than they
are at running offensive missions?
Martin: No unit is better at defending. What they must do is get
out and grab on and lock on and fight. My feeling is that they had ahold of
them in the Chup operation there last week and they let go.
Kissinger: Who commands the task force?
Martin: General Tho. He's the division commander and he's really
the one that calls the shots.
END OF BRIEFING.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
25
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM OF BRIEFING
PRESENT:
Henry A. Kissinger
David R. Young (notetaker) way
DATE:
March 25, 1971
SUBJECT:
Lam Son 719, Toan Thang 01/71
BRIEFER:
Lt. Col. Martin
LAOS
Martin: All of ARVN is back except for 15 men who are at Korat.
The ARVN marines are being placed in the front and will take the
brunt of any attack. U.S. troops are behind them, except in one
place a little to the north of Khe Sanh. Twelve U.S. were killed
yesterday in various contacts. The enemy does not seem to be
pressing in the last 24 hours.
CAMBODIA
Martin: Task Force 3 had a contact yesterday and killed 5 enemy.
They are moving now to make contact with the 271st NVA Regiment
which is in the northeast part of the Chup Plantation. The ARVN
air force also killed about 15 enemy in an attack. Task Force 225 is
being replaced with a new task force. The sensors are about the same -
no major increase in the last 24 hours. On Muong Nong they are still
thinking about it.
Kissinger: What would they be able to do it with?
Martin: The 54th. It is moving into Khe Sanh today and they can use
it plus several marine battalions which have not been under very heavy
pressure during the Lam Son operation. The original plan in this
Muong Nong exercise called for 3 battalions and they will have 3 fresh
battalions there to do it if they want to. One other matter which the
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
Chairman will fill you in on in more detail, is that we have an
intercept saying that BimTram 33 is to construct a POW camp.
This may give them some added incentive for the Muong Nong
operation. Some of the POWs may be American and there are
42 U.S. missing in the Lam Son operation.
Kissinger: Where exactly will they be building it? Do we know?
Martin: We do not know just where yet, but it will be off 914
somewhere near 234.
Kissinger: Have we been doing any air preparation for Muong Nong?
Martin: Not yet, but that will have to be done. It may also be better
to first put the men in, then hit them with the air and then move. The
average on B-52 strikes isstaying the same at 12 a day.
End of Briefing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SFORETARY OF DEFENSE
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
April 29, 1971
Memo for Mr. John Scali
Mr. Bob Houdek
Dan asked me to send this on to you for your
information.
Obviously, there have been some goofs but
I think our guys are trying to be as helpful
as they can. We are going to have problems--
and these should be recognized--as we turn
over more and more responsibilities to the
South Vietnamese and as the level of U.S.
combat participation declines.
Jerry W. Friedheim
Atch
Jerry W. Friedheim
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
CONFIDENTIAL
75862
AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING THE 1ST ARVN DIV IS GOVERNED BY ARVN POLICY.
COORDINATION IS EFFECTIED BETWEEN THE 1ST ARVN DIV INFORMATION OF -
FICER AND THE SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT UNIT COMMANDER,
2. (C) AS A MATTER OF INTEREST, THE FOLLOWING SUPPORT WAS PRIVIDED
BY THE DIVISION IN THE PAST S VERAL DAYS:
A. 23 APRIL -- UPI, A FREE LANCER FOR AP, AND REUTERS WERE
TRANSPORTED TO À FIRE BASE AND WERE SCHEDULED T OVERFLY THE A shau
BUT THE AIRCRAFT WAS DIVERTED BECAUSE OF AIR STRIKES IN THE AREA, THE
HELO FLEW THE PARTY TO LAVANG, FORWARD CP OF ARVN FORCES PARTICIS.
PATING IN LAM SON 720,
R . 24 APRIL NY TIMES, LOOK AND A FREE LANCER TRASPORTED TO
A FIRE BASE,
C. 25 APRIL NY TIMES, LOOK AND NBC TRANSPORTED TO A FIRE
BASE WHEER LOOK PHOTGRAPHER SELECTED THREE SOLDIERS FOR PORTRAIT
S RIES ON "FACES OF THE WAR." SOLDIERS WERE TRANSPORTED TO LOOK
TEMPORARY STUDIO AT DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. NBC ACCOMRANIED A
GROUND PATROL, NBC VISITED ANOTHER FIRE BASE WITH UPI CORRESPONS.
DENT AND PHOTOGRAPHER, REUTERS AND TWO FREE LANCERS, REUTERS,
UPI AND FREE LANCER TRANSPORTED TO LAVANG.
D. 26 APRL NBC, UPI PHOTOGRAPHER AND CORRESPONDENT,
REUTERS AND FREE LANGER COVERED GUNSHIP ACTIVITY FROM FORWARD FIRE
BAS ARTILLERY PRPARATION OF ALANDING ZONE AND ACCOMPANIED A
COMBAT ASSAULT ITO THE LZ, TALKED TO BATTALION AND COMPANY COME.
MANDERS AND EM IN COURS OF OPERATON."
F. 26 APRIL -- ABO REQUESTED A SECOND OVERFLY OF A SHAU, THE
FIRST HAVING TAKEN PLACE ON 19 APRIL, TO SUPPLEMENT FOOTAGE OF PRES.
VIOUS INTERVIEW WITH RANGER PAROL LEADER AND RANGER COMPANY COM-
MANDER WHO DISCUSSED CONDUCT OF A PATROL IN GENERAL TERMS AT A
MINICONFERENCE, AS NO AIRCRAFT WERE AVAILABLE, ABC WITH ESCORT
OFFICER WENT SPACE AVAILABLE TO A FORWARD AIRCRAFT REFUELING POINT
BUT WERE UNABLE TO GET SPACE AVAILABLE FORWWARD.
F. A FREE LANCER AND A STARS AND STRIPES REPORTER ACCOMPANIED
A HOC BAO (ARVN) OPERATION IN THE LAM SON 720 AO ABOARD A 101ST
ABN DIV AIRCRAFT ON A SPACE AVAILBLE BASIS. NO ESCORT REPORTEDLY
WAS PROVIDED BY THE ARVN,
3.60) THE DIVISION PLANS TO MOVE AVAILABLE PRESS OR, IF
TOO MANY, A
POOL TO COVER SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS IN ITS AO, AS OF 28 APRIL, ONLY
TWO FREE LANCERS WERE KNOWN TO BE IN THE DIVISION AO.
4. (c) ALL SIGNIFIANT INFORMATION ON OPERATION HAS BEEN RELEASED BY
MACV OR THE DIVIION TO INCLUDE: SIGNIFICANT GUNSHIP ACTIONS, SUP-
PORT FOLE OF THE ARVN FOR THE 101ST MISSION OF THE CO-LOCATED US
FACILITY AT LAVANG WHICH IS CORDINATING us SUPPORT OF THE ARVN, RE-
PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL
00000000
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
75862
CONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY IN THE DIGSION AO WITHOUT SPECIFYING LOCATIONE
OF PATROLS, AND B52 MISSIONS IN THE AO. RELEAS IS GOVERNED BY
EXISTING POLICIES T AVOID PROVIDING INFORMATION OF VALUE TO THE
ENEMY. THE NATURE OF TH OPERATION PRECLUDES AN ADVANCE BRIEFING
OF THE PRESS.
5, (C) THE NEED TO INFORM THE PRESS IS RECOGNIZED AN IS BEING MET.
HOWEVER, THE SAFETY AN SECURITY OF TROOPS AND TH NEED FOR PROTECT
ING SCHEMES OF MANEUVERS ARE GOVERNING FACTORS IN THE LOAL COME
MANDERIS DECISION TO IMPOS TACTICAL RESTRICTIONS. THES REQUIRE-
MENTS TAKE PRECEDENT OVER GRANTING UNLIMITED ACCESS TO THE PRESS.
GP-4
ST
#5931
ANNOTES
PMC 583
PAGE 3
CONFIDENTIAL
00000000
NNNN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
St
ASST
29 APR 71 13 56z
L
APR 29 10/30/11:17
VZCZONC0936
NMGC 0 N/F IDENTIAL
NMCC
75862
ACTION ASDIPA(01)
DISTR DJOS DJS J3(12) J5(02) NMCC SECDEF(07) ASD:ISA(09)
CSA
CSAF
ONO
CMC DIA(20) CIA NSA MOCC FILE(1)
(052)
ADV DISTR DIA(E1)
TRANSIT/2911592/291354Z/001:55TOR1191340
DE RHMSMVA #5931 1191241
ZNY CCCCC
O 291159Z APR 71
FM COMUSMACY
TO RUEKJOS/SODEF
RUKHHQA/CINCRAC
INFO RUMUHFA/CG XXIV CORRS DA NANG
RUMUMJA/OG 1015T ABN DIV AMBL OP EAGLE
et
C 0 NFIDENTIAL OI FOR OASDRA, AND FOR
CINCRAC (PAO)
SUBJ PRESS SUPPORT OF LAM SON 720
1. (0) PRESS SUPPORT FOR LAM SON 720 AN ON-GOING OPERATION, HAS
BEEN PROVIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISING POLICIES AND THE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF MILITARY SECURITY,
A. THE 101ST ABN DIV (AIRMOBILE) HAS DECLARED TACTICAL RE-
STRICTED AREAS AT TWO FIRE BASES SUPPORTING THE THE OPERATION, THIS
WAS TAKEN TO INSURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF TROOPS INVOLVED IN
FUTURE TACTICAL OPERATIONS, T @TACTICAL RESTRICTIONS WERE ANNOUN-
CED TO THE PRESS AT A BRIEFING BY THE DIVISION INFORMATION OFFICER,
8, IN ACCORDANCE WITH MACV AND DIVISION POLICY, NEWSMEN HAVE
PEEN PROVIDED EVERY ASSISTANCE IN MOVING THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF
THE DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS TO GATHER STORY MATERIAL.
C. DIVISION POLICY, AS AUTHORIZED BY MACV DIRECTIVE 360-1, IS
THAT PRESS WILL BE ESCORTED IN ITS AO TO ASSIST CORRESPONDENTS IN GET:
TING THEIR STORIES AND TO INSURE THAT MILITARY S CURITY IS NOT COMPRO
MIS D WITH ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON TROOP SAFETY. THERE IS NO RESTICE
TION ON MOVEMENT OF ESCORTED PRESS ABOARD DIVISION AIRCRAFT PRO-
VIDED THERE IS SPACE AVAILBLE AND THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE
MISSION. THE DIVISION HAS PROVIDED DEDICATED AIRCRAFT ON COUNTLESS
OCCASIONS TO TRASPORT THE PRESS TO POINTS WITHIN ITS AO.
D. MOVEMENT ON A SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS OF NEWWSMEN ON DIVISION
PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL
00000000
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
April 19, 1971
Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger
From:
Al Haig
@
Subject:
Lam Son Talking Points
Attached is a copy of the Lam Son 719 talking
points which contains updated statistics. The
changes which have been made are minor and
reflect the most recent reporting of Lam Son
719 results.
-- ARVN KIA's have been changed from
1400 to 1500 and wounded from 4700
to 5400.
-- The killed ratio has been left at 5 to 1,
as a conservative figure, although it
still is 8.9 to 1 actually.
-- The number of individual weapons
captured/destroyed has been increased
from 4900 to 5000.
-- The number of enemy trucks destroyed
has been increased from 300 to 400.
(This actually reflects reporting of
vehicles seized/destroyed.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
IADAINO POINTS ON LAM SON 719
The Situation
1. The South Vietnamese entered Southern Laos in early February in
order to disrupt the operation of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the southward
flow of enemy supplies bound for Cambodia and South Vietnam. Hanoi's
response to this operation is an important factor in assessing the outcome.
If, for example, the North Vietnamese had chosen to evade South Vietnames
forces, then there would have been relatively little fighting and the operatio
would have been assessed more in terms of supplies destroyed or bottled
up. But for several good reasons, such as the importance of the area,
the short supply lines to North Vietnam and the availability of reserve
forces in southern North Vietnam -- the North Vietnamese as anticipated
undertook a major counter attack. They reinforced the area strongly with
some of their best divisions, not only to defend the trail system but in an
attempt to inflict a major defeat on the South Vietnamese as well. As a
result, the most intensive fighting since 1968 developed.
Immediately Measurable Results
2. In terms of immediately measurable results, the weight of evidence
is that South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves very well in the six
weeks of fighting which followed the initial incursion into Laos. Many of
the ARVN units involved fought without respite for 40 days and, in the
judgment of our field commanders, the ARVN forces fought extremely well.
Because of the intensity of the fighting, these units did take some heavy
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
losses - now es nated at 1500 killed and 540 ounded. But reported
enemy losses were more than 13, 000 killed and many more were
wounded. In terms of combat effectiveness, we estimate that the
equivalent of 13 enemy maneuver battalions were rendered ineffective
in the course of the fighting whereas only 4 out of the 22 ARVN battalions
were put out of combat. Some reports of enemy losses in Vietnam in
the past may have been exaggerated, but this time the estimate may be low
The enemy acted more aggressively than he had in several years with
the result that he exposed himself to concentrated allied firepower and
air attack. Thus, we believe the ratio of enemy to friendly losses was
at least 5 to 1, a very high price for Hanoi to pay.
Impact on the North Vietnamese Logistics System
3. It is too early to be precisè about the impact of Lam Son 719 on the
enemy's logistical system, although some perspective can be provided.
The North Vietnamese had to move more supplies South to Cambodia
and South Vietnam this year than last in order to make up for the loss
of three major means of supply: the Port of Sihanoukville; purchases
in Cambodia; and food obtained from areas which had previously been
under Viet Cong control in South Vietnam but which are now under
the authority of the government. Moreover, he comments he had
suffered great losses in the Cambodian sanctuaries last year.
Thus, the Ho Chi Minh Trail has become an even more vital element
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
in Hanoi's over strategy than it was in the 1 t. But we are
reasonably certain that the enemy supply movement was well behind
last year's pace even before the Lam Son operation began.
The Lam Son operation clearly compounded Hanoi's problem.
It disrupted the Ho Chi Minh trail complex, physically blocking various
branches of the trail. South Vietnamese forces found or destroyed,
or called in U.S. åir power to destroy, some 5000 individual weapons,
1900 crew served weapons and thousands of tons of ammunition and other
supplies. This was in addition to the vast quantity of supplies, ammu-
nition and equipment which was consumed by the North Vietnamese in
Laos instead of continuing down the trail to be used in South Vietnam
or Cambodia. Moreover, when the North Vietnamese were obliged to
engage ARVN forces in a fixed battle position, their units massed and
became targets for concentrated Vietnamese firepower and U.S. air
power which destroyed over 100 tanks and many artillery pieces, some
400 enemy trucks were destroyed directly in the operation and 4300
more were destroyed by air interdiction while the operations were in
progress. Finally, because North Vietnamese logistics units were
engaged in the fighting and were badly dàmaged, their resiliency in
restoring the flow of supplies southward has been degraded. An estimated
3500 enemy rear service personnel vital to the operation of the trail
logistics system were killed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
All these considerations must be viewed against the fact that the Ho
Chi Minh trail complex is useful as a logistics system only during the
dry season, which began later this year than usual. Therefore, when
the rains come in the next four or five weeks, the Communists will have
little time in which to attempt to make up all the weeks that have been
lost to them in the Lam Son operation.
Forestalling Anticipated Enemy Offensive Activity in South Vietnam
4.
A significant measure of Lam Son's achievements will be the
degree it succeeds in forestalling enemy offensive activity. Viewed in
conjunction with ARVN operations conducted simultaneously in Cambodia,
these two efforts have precluded major enemy offensive operations in South
Vietnam during the current dry season. If Lam Son had not been under-
taken, the North Vietnamese would have had the real option of launching
major attacks against ARVN and U.S. forces located in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam. Looking to the future, we believe that
the short-fall in their supply efforts will prevent them from mounting
major offensives in South Vietnam in this dry season and will delay any
offensives they might have planned over the next dry season because it
will take them that much longer to rebuild their stocks.
Hanoi will, of course, want to mask the extent to which its
capabilities have been impaired and will therefore endeavor to act as
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
if it is playing from strength. To project this image, the Communists
may be willing to spend additional manpower capital in the days im-
mediately ahead by trying to mount a sharp flurry of attacks in the
northern part of South Vietnam, and elsewhere if they can get such
attacks off the ground. Such attacks may be specifically directed against
U.S. units in an endeavor to increase American casualties, whatever
the cost to Hanoi. Nonetheless, the Communists probably have lost
the ability to mount sustained major offensives and the overall record
of Communist activity over the next few months can be expected to
support this contention.
The combined military operations also have had the effect of
engaging the enemy and keeping his forces distant from the population
of South Vietnam. To illustrate this graphically, it should be pointed out
that the Toan Thang operation North of Route 7 inside Cambodia is being
fought against the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong Divisions, the same units which, at this time of the year in
1968, were operating inside the city limits of Saigon and the surrounding
metropolitan area. As for the enemy units engaged in Lam Son the Nort
Vietnamese 304th, 308th, 320th and 324-B Divisions -- in February and Mar
1968, fought for two weeks in the city of Hue, entered the defenses of Dana:
and generally harassed the population in the coastal regions. All of these
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
enemy units were engaged this year away from population centers and,
in fact, outside of South Vietnam itself.
Lam Son's Bearing on Vietnamization
5.
Lam Son has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamization. Three years ago, ARVN units were engaged against
enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now
ARVN units have shown themselves ablé to deal with the enemy threat in
sanctuary areas without the support of U.S. ground combat forces or
advisors while keeping their own territory pacified as well. They have
demonstrated the ability to mount a complex multi division operation
in conditions of difficult and unfamiliar terrain, adverse weather, and
against a well-prepared enemy. Moreover, this is being achieved
with a U.S. presence which has diminished by some 260, 000 men since
of
1969.
To illustrate this point further, it should be recognized that
February and March are the months of the year in which the Communists
traditionally mount the most extensive military operations in all regions
1
of South Vietnam. This year they were given an additional incentive to
do this because of the fact that such actions would harass the rear areas
of ARVN operations in Laos and Cambodia and would distract attention
from those two actions. Despite exhortations to their cadre to undertake
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
such action within South Vietnam, they have been unable to date to mount
anything which can even be considered a major successful high point.
In fact, the situation within South Vietnam has beèn extraordinarily calm
during the entire month of February and March with the exception of an
action being taken by ARVN forces against Communist strongholds in the
U Minh forest of Military Region IV.
The ability of the South Vietnamese forces to sustain security after
the departure of United States forces will, in the long run, be measured
by the balance of strength which exists between North and South Vietnamese
forces. Our assessment is that the balance in the Indochina peninsula has
swung in favor of the South Vietnamese. As Ambassador Bunker has
reported, the operation has created confidence among the South Vietnamese
in the ability of ARVN and pride in its accomplishments, There has been
satisfaction in the fact that the fighting has been taken outside the borders
of South Vietnam and that ARVN has been able to inflict far heavier casualti
on the enemy.
We conclude, therefore, that the foundation for Vietnamization in
South Vietnam is sound and that the process has been enhanced by the
disruptions Lam Son has caused the enemy and by the increased confidence
it has given the South Vietnamese in meeting their own defense needs.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The current psychological atmosphere is in some ways reminiscent
of the 1968 Tet offensive. Hanoi extracted maximum political advantage
in the short run; it was only as time passed that the real physical results
began to tell. This time, we must benefit from that lesson and not let
ourselves be misled by surface appearances or by exaggerated stories.
The operation has achieved its primary objective of carrying the
fight to the enemy's sanctuaries and disrupting his principal lines of
communications and should buy the South Vietnamese additional time in
which to strengthen their armed forces while permitting continued
withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
of
conclude
S
C.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 21, 1971
THE president HAS SEEN
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
General Abrams' Remarks to the Press
on Lam Son 719
In General Abrams' background briefing for the press on March 21, he
made the following points:
-- With the exception of TET in 1968, "This certainly has been
one of the biggest and toughest single battles since I've been here. I am
quite satisfied with the way the ARVN performed."
-- "The ARVN are going to come out of this with C/ higher confidence.
They know that they fought top enemy units under the most critical circum-
stances and that the have done the job. 11
-- When the planning originally was done for Lam Son 719 it was
divided into phases and this current withdrawal phase is one of them.
-- There was no fixed timetable for the operation; it was left
flexible. The number of days the ARVN has been in Laos and the current
timing of the operation is well within the original planning parameters.
Lam Son 719 had to end before the rains came.
-- Some ARVN units were very good, others not so good in com-
municating with their air support. In future training, stress will be placed
on improving communications and liaison between ARVN ground units and
U.S. and South Vietnam air units.
-- It is essential in an operation like Lam Son 719 to have a
central control point at a forward base with full authority to commit all of
the resources required in the operation. There was one for Lam Son 719,
but it was not fully operational until the operation was under way for about
two weeks.
-- Four of the twenty-two ARVN battalions in Laos are considered
to be of questionable combat effectiveness as a result of the heavy fighting.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
Once they receive replacements, a little rest and some training they will be
back and will be strong.
-- Some weaker ARVN battalions with poor leadership did withdraw
in the face of enemy pressure. The major ARVN units however performed
well and did not retreat. They will come out of Lam Son 719 with higher
confidence and morale. They have defeated some of the enemy's top units.
-- The poor condition of Route 9 in Laos, the marginal weather, the
heavy anti-aircraft fire, and the enemy's capacity to move artillery were
the major problems we had to work around.
-- The degree to which the enemy moved SAM's into the Lam Son
719 area and his commitment of T-54 tanks to the battle were not fully
expected.
-- The enemy's entire focus is now on interfering with the withdrawal
which he knows is under way.
MACV briefers who assisted General Abrams made the additional significant
points:
-- "Lam Son 719 has succeeded in disrupting vital portions of the
enemy's logistical system, capturing or destroying significant quantities of
supplies and inflicting considerable damage on enemy units within the area
of operation. TT
-- "The operation has compounded the enemy's already considerable
logistic problem through loss of supplies and disruption of the logistical
system in the Laotian panhandle."
- - "The enemy has lost over 11, 000 killed. When compared to
friendly forces the ratio is at least ten to one in favor of the friendly forces.
The enemy has lost the equivalent of 13 of the 33 manuever battalions organic
to the 11 regiments committed. 11
-- "A significant long-term effect of the ongoing operation involves
enemy casualties among experienced personnel in units that have been operating
the logistical system. Loss of trained rear-service personnel will further
degrade the enemy's capability to move supplies through the Laotian pan-
handle. 11
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
- - "The throughput of supplies into South Vietnam and Cambodia is
quite low, only one-fifth of the throughput achieved at this time last year.
With the dry season well over one-half gone the enemy will probably experience
considerable difficulty in meeting his current logistic goals. 11
- - "A related form of supply loss is increased consumption. Deploy-
ment of additional enemy troops to resist allied interdiction activity resulted
in greatly increased food requirements and ammunition expenditures by
enemy units committed to the area. 11
- - "Lam Son 719 has caused the enemy to divert supplies intended for
southern Indochina just to defend his lines of communication and has diluted
his direct efforts to achieve his goals in the south. It has caused him to
defend forces which he could have been using elsewhere in Cambodia and
South Vietnam. 11
-- "The heavy personnel losses inflicted upon the enemy in Lam Son
719 has materially reduced his capability to conduct tactical operations on
any significant scale within military region one in South Vietnam. "
-- "By seizing the initiative in the Laotian panhandle and Cambodia
the ARVN has pre-empted enemy plans for the winter-spring campaign. 11
-- "Lam Son 719 has been a milestone in the development of the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. For the first time the South Vietnamese
have conducted a multi-division operation against a strong and determined
enemy. The ARVN without U. S. advisors, penetrating into an area which
had been controlled for years by the enemy, has faced their sternest test
to date and acquitted themselves against an aggressive enemy. 11
-- Lam Son 719 was conducted at the same time a major ARVN
operation was underway in Cambodia. In that operation (Operation Thoan
Thang) the enemy has lost over 4, 400 men killed. Nine battalions of the
27 under-strength manuever battalions the enemy has committed to this action
have thus been rendered ineffective for combat.
I will bersending you a retypedicopy of the full transcript of the background
briefing first thing on Monday morning.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
GENERAL ABRAMS QUESTION AND ANSWER
SESSION FOLLOWING BACKGROUND BRIEFING IN SAIGON
SUNDAY, MARCH 21, 1971
QUES: I was wondering a couple of things. One, the general impression
now is this, that the operations now closing and the withdrawal will be
complete, and the implication is that they will be reequipped and refitted
and might go back into. Without getting into future operations is there any
sort of restrictions as to just what phase? Are we in the last stage of the
operation? (Inaudible).
ANS: The mosť that you can say about this is that this is in the withdrawal
phase and I think that that ought to be about as far as we go. It has no date
in my mind and I don't believe any date in General Vien's mind when this phase
will be concluded. I might say about that, too, when the planning was originally
done for this particular operation it was divided then into phases and this is
one of them. We talked at great length, the senior officers on the U.S. side
and the senior officers on the Vietnamese side, as to what kind of timing we
would come down to. The unknowns in here, in the planning part, were such
that we felt from the outset that we were going to have to do this sort of week
by week depending largely on the judgment of Gen. Lam and Gen. Sutherland
as for the timing for shifting from one period to another. That's pretty
much the way we have gone at it and that's why I wouldn't go beyond that now,
saying that we are in the withdrawal stage and just leave it at that.
QUES: As far as timing is concerned here has this gone along pretty much
the way as we envisioned it? In other words to what degree in general have
you had to step up the timetable, if at all, as a result of what transpired or
the unexpected?
ANS: Again, the only thing I'll say about that is we knew that this had to be
concluded in all its phases by the arrival of the rainy season, you can't do
these things in the rainy season. I am sure you know that even it is a little
risky to come to a prescribed moment (inaudible), that's something that is
variable and that's something you just don't have a good tight hold on. You
can take on a 40 year average, that no year that I have been here, has that
been worth much, because on a specific year it just doesn't come out that
way. When you want to talk about the monsoons there is a technical defini-
tion of the monsoons among the weather experts and technicians. When they
decide that it has shifted you can now make the statement that it's shifted,
they are prepared to say that about two weeks after it occurs. But, it also
means their technical definition of the monsoon doesn't really have much.
application in the tactical environment. Once you get all the way into the
monsoòn and everybody can see it even a non-weather guy can see it, that
means it's something you can count on, but its in a transitional stage. Now
this operation as it was discussed in the planning part, the total number of
days jointly discussed by us, varied in wide limits, and I think I can say that
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
we didn't have an agreed timetable, not timetable, but period, that was as
long as the time they had been there now, if you are talking about total
time for the operation.
QUES: So what you are saying, sir, is that as far as the general character-
istics, the timing does not in any way contradict what you envisioned?
ANS: No.
QUES: In the course of this operation, the ARVN has held on to certain areas
and have been driven off certain hills; we have had several instances where
ARVN troops have been killed by air, we have some conflict in communications.
What have we learned from this operation that we can apply in the future in
terms of Vietnamization and in terms of improving the ARVN and in terms of
taking care of this thing if it might arise in the future?
ANS: The use of communications, I'm not only talking about just radios,
but the ability to communicate intelligently to the FACS and supporting air-
craft and then the techniques involved in there in directing them to where you
want them to hit, through the use of smoke, there is a váriety of techniques.
Greater stress is going to have to be put on that in the future in their training
programs and more skill developed, more practice with it. As you probably
also know there are some of these units with the 1st Division that are pretty
good at it. So it's a mixed bag, but it's an area that is going to require more.
In the planning part, we tried to overcome this by just about all of the FACS
that work for the ARVN units up there, have a VNAF who speaks English
riding in the FAC aircraft. It's not true in every case, but that was the aim,
and sometimes in the daily shuffle of things didn't work out that way, that
would overcome the language problem and that sort of thing. I think another
thing that has come out of this is that you just got to have a central point for-
ward, where all the authorities are there for the commitment of resources, of
all kinds TAC air, B-52, targetting, gunships, medevac, lift, artillery,
the whole works. So, that in an operation like this there has to be someone
at that point, first of all that has all of General Lam's authority on this, and
all of General Sutherland's, and then there has got to be people in there, like Gen
Berry, Gen, Myer, and Gen. Jackson, and that group that know how to pull
things together.
QUES: Sir, were you implying by that last statement perhaps that there has
not been a central point (inaudible)?
ANS: I think we got it in about the 13th, 14th of February. It was fully
operational (inaudible).
QUES: (Inaudible)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
ANS: They had a set up like that; they were all there. They had a central
authority for helicopters; they had a central authority for artillery, and so
on. My point is that the people that can do that have all got to be at a point
where General Lam's authority and General Sutherland's authority is physi-
cally located, present and operating. When Lam wasn't there then Colonel
Vinh had it and they've got to be in the same installation. They can't be in
different bunkers in that geography in Khe Sanh.
QUES: What did you find out about VNAF to support the ARVN ground forces in
operation?
ANS: In the Lamson operation it's been fairly limited, although in Cambodia
it's been very extensive. I think what it means is that when they take their
total assets, of course, they (inaudible). They haven't got the capacity to
do all of these things that we've got going now simultaneously, there are just
not that many aircraft (inaudible).
QUES: Can you give us a handle on how many ARVN (inaudible) group of
that they'l need (inaudible) operation how long it might take to (inaudible)?
ANS: We feel as of the last report we had that there were about four that
had got to the point in terms of requiring the replacement, the fittings, that
we could consider questionably combat effective. I think that the 39th
Rangers is an example of one of these. You have heard the story about
what the 39th Rangers did. I might add that a week and a half ago the 39th
Rangers had been refitted, rehab and were back in that particular operation
again. The other three to four battalions are in the process now of being
refitted.
QUES: You have four battalions out how many are committed there so we
can get some sort of picture?
ANS: Twenty-two across border.
QUES: (Inaudible)?
ANS: No, I'm not. I think this probably has been one of the biggest and
toughest battles since I've been here, as a single battle. Tet in '68 was worse,
it ran from one end to the country to the other, and everybody was in it.
This was certainly the toughest and I think the biggest and I'm quite satisfied
with the way they've performed.
QUES: The reports you hear about the retreat, being routed, what is your
reply to that?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
ANS: It's true that this has happened to certainly the airborne battalion up
there at 30 which we say -- also the Vietnamese. It's a weak battalion
but turns out to be weak when it started, and it still is. The battalion com-
mander left it apparently, in the course of the battle, and the military let it
down an unforgiveable sin -- you can't say that. In my opinion it would
be a mistake to extrapolate that into the 1st Airborne Division, or the Marine.
They re going to come out of this with higher confidence. They know that
they look at it (inaudible) under the most critical circumstances and they've
done the job. I think that's the way they're going to be next month, the month
after and so: on. So I think that's the way it'll turn out. Since the First
Battalion of the Third (inaudible), and they took a lot of losses to what they
say at the moment; they've had something like 110 or 140 defectors (inaudible)
they haven't had their replacements in either, and he thinks their morale is
higher than any he knows of in the operation.
In a thing like this it's not so much the facts, it's what they believe. They
believe that they can feel, that they will handle the regiment and I don't know
whether they did or not. But that's the way those people in that battalion
are going to feel forever. When they get some replacements, a little rest,
and a chance to get some training together, it'll be back and it'll be strong.
QUES: What does the enemy believe about this operation? What do they think?
ANS: I don't know. All we have to go by is what he is putting out on the Radio
in Hanoi.
QUES: Was there anything the enemy did that was unexpected?
ANS: Condition of Route 9 was a surprise. One of those things we thought
where ditches were 25, 30 feet deep. The anti-aircraft everybody had worked
on that plan noticed that that was one of the toughest problems we had. We
know he had the capacity to move the artillery over there. We already had
some tanks there we knew he had some more just above the DMZ. (inaudible)
the weather those were the problems, and we had to work around it.
QUES: Did the enemy show any strength, exceptional strength, or exceptional
weaknesses (inaudible)?
ANS: I think I should say the SAMS, the degree with which he's moved SAMS
down there, is certainly more than I expected. I personally was surprised
to see him move T-54 tanks in there.
QUES: (Inaudible) or things that you would like to have done if you were
(inaudible)?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5
ANS: With the forces that it was possible to make available for this operation,
I think you would have to say that I was satisfied.
QUES: What do you think he's doing now?
ANS: He's made every effort and he's guarding his units to interfere with
this withdrawal. He knows this withdrawal is going on. His whole focus
now is to interfere with getting that done.
- END
-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TEXT OF MACV BACKGROUNDER
MARCH 21, 1971
This background briefing can only be attributed to military sources.
The presentation will be in three parts. It will be led off by the J-2 briefer,
who will give an update from the J-2 point of view. He will be followed by
Assistant Deputy J-3, giving a more complete view of the Lamson operation.
Following this there will be some opportunities for questions and answers.
J-2 Briefer: Gentlemen, the purpose of this briefing is to provide you
with an update on the progress of Operation Lamson 719 and Operation Thoan
Thang 0171, and a summary of enemy reactions to date. According to all
indications, Operation Lamson 719 has succeeded in disrupting vital portions
of the enemy's logistical system, capturing or destroying significant quan-
tities of supplies and inflicting considerable damage on enemy units within
the area of operation.
At the beginning of February, the enemy was primarily concerned with
maintaining the flow of supplies through the Lao Panhandle. Enemy endea-
vors were particularly concentrated on moving goods through Tchepone --
Ban Dong and southward on Route 92. Despite these attempts, enemy input
of supplies to Laos in early February, were substantially behind last year's
record, and throughput into the RVN and Cambodia was minimal. This con-
dition can be attributed to allied air interdiction, harrassments of LOCS
and increased consumption by enemy administrative units and screening
forces of the Lao Panhandle.
To prevent loss of the vital link in his only remaining line of communication,
the enemy reacted strongly in an attempt to counter Operation Lamson 719.
The enemy significantly increased the strength of combat forces in the
Lamson 719 area of operations. The current force comprises elements of
11 regiments. The reported enemy losses during the operation to date are
over 11, 000 killed. When compared to friendly losses, the ratio is at least
10 to 1 in favor of the friendly forces. In terms of units, it is estimated
that at least 8 regiments have suffered casualties equivalent to one or more
of these battalions. The enemy has lost the equivalent of 13 of the 33
maneuver battalions organic to the 11 regiments committed.
The ongoing operation has compounded the enemy's already considerable
logistical problem through loss of supplies and disruption of the logistical
system in the Lao Panhandle. The following list of supplies are examples of
those captured or destroyed during Lamson 719, and highlight the impact of
the enemy losses to date:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
In terms of food, some 1, 550 short tons (primarily of rice)
More than 4, 400 individual weapons
Better than 1, 600 crew served weapons
Over 780 short tons of ammo
55 confirmed tanks
A related form of supply loss is increased consumption. Deployment of
additional enemy troops to resist allied interdiction activity resulted in
greatly increased food requirements and ammo expenditures by VC and
NVA units committed to the area. These losses while considerable, do not
clearly reveal the extent to which Lamson 719 has disrupted the enemy's
logistical campaign. Even more serious for the enemy is the reduction of
his capability to move supplies through the Tchepone and Ban Dong area
and southward along Route 92, which has been interdicted by friendly forces,
No traffic has been noted on Route 92 through Ban Dong, since 10 February.
The enemy has tried to compensate by using Route 914 and 920, but he
has periodically encountered interference here as well, both from ARVN
forces and allied interdiction. Traffic on this bypass road has continued at
a reduced rate. The enemy has diverted some trucks to Route 23. This
road, however, is not developed, passes through more open terrain and
would require deployment of additional forces for adequate protection for
convoys and installations.
Another significant long-term effect of the ongoing operation involves
enemy casualties among experienced personnel in units that have been oper-
ating those logistical systems in previous years. Loss of trained rear ser-
vice personnel will further degrade the enemy's capability to move supplies
through the Lao Panhandle. Current analysis indicates that operation Lam-
son 719 has seriously disrupted enemy supplies. Throughput for RVN and
Cambodia is quite low, only 1/5 of the throughput achieved at this time last
year. With the dry season, well over half gone, the enemy will probably
experience considerable difficulty in meeting his current logistical goals.
To the South, in Cambodia, ARVN forces initiated Operation Thoan
Thang 0171 on 4 February. The operation encompasses three principle
areas in Chup/Dambe, Snuol and the Parrots Beak area. Prior to the
initiation of the operation the Chup/Dambe and Snuol areas comprised the
southern terminus. of the enemy's Mekong supply corridor. This complex
served as a transshipment point for movement of supplies west and south
in Cambodia, and east into the COSVN portion of Vietnam. In addition,
the area straddled known enemy infiltration routes into South Vietnam.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
In January, enemy forces deployed in base areas along the border had the
mission of interdicting LOCS which supported ARVN operations in Cambodia
and of conducting harrassment attacks in western MR 3, RVN, in an effort
to discourage the ARVN from expanding ground operations into Cambodia.
The enemy's reaction to Thoan Thang 0171 indicates the seriousness with
which he viewed the operation. In recent months he avoided significant
contacts with ARVN forces in Cambodia. For example, ARVN intervention
to assist FANK in clearing Route 7 in December and Route 4 in January met
only token resistance by the enemy.
At the onset of the current operation, however, enemy reaction was strong
and determined. The scope of his reaction in Thoan Thang has included
both battalion sized ground attacks and intense stand-off attacks by fire.
In the Chup/Dambe area the level of combat was relatively high in February,
but has slackened since early March. The enemy has deployed his forces
in an attempt to meet and block ARVN moves. In February, he moved three
regiments to the vicinity of Dambe on Route 75. Of major significance in
Operation Thoan Thank 0171, is the enemy personnel losses. The enemy
has lost about 4, 400 men killed in action to date. When compared to friendly
losses to date, the loss ration is about 11 to one in favor of allied forces.
As a result of repeated and heavy contact with ARVN forces, it is estimated
that the equivalent of 9 battalions of the 27 under strength maneuver battalions
that constitute the 9 committed regiments have been rendered ineffective for
combat.
It is too soon to accurately assess the impact of OP Lamson and Thoan Thang
on the enemy's capability. It was several months after the allied cross
border operations in May and June of 1970 before the complete picture of
his predicament became clear. There are several facets of the current
operations that would indicate that the enemy's plans have been disrupted.
The enemy's short term objectives are to wage protracted warfare in Cam-
bodia, RVN, while attempting to reconstitute and expand his sole remaining
line of communication in the Panhandle and in North Eastern Cambodia.
Operation Lamson has caused the enemy to divert supplies intended for
southern Indo China just to defent its LOC, and has dilluted his direct efforts
to achieve his goal in the South. Heavy commitment of enemy units in the
Lamson 719 and Thoan Thang 0171 areas resulted in diversion of forces
which the enemy could have been using elsewhere in Cambodia and RVN.
Furthermore, the heavy personnel losses inflicted upon the enemy in Lamson
719 has materially reduced his capability to conduct tactical operations on
any significant scale within MR 1 in RVN. This has always been the area of
his greatest force density.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
In Cambodia, Operation Thoan Thang 01/71 caused the enemy to shift from
protracted warfare tactics to main force activities. The resulting personnel
loses have been much higher than in recent months and probably represent
an unplanned for degradation of his future tactical capability.
In conclusion, by seizing the initiative in the Lao Panhandle and Cambodia,
ARVN has disrupted enemy logistical operations during the current dry season
and preempted enemy plans for the winter/spring campaign. Disruption of
enemy logistical activities and erosion of his combat strength in his base
areas will materially affect the enemy's future capabilities to conduct offen-
sive operations in both Cambodia and the RVN. While at the same time en-
hancing the Vietnamization program providing additional time for the develop-
ment and improvement of FANK forces and permitting continued withdrawal
of American forces from the RVN.
(End of J-2 Briefing).
J-3 Assessment: The purpose of this briefing is to describe some of the keý
aspects of the current operation and situation. Highlights will be the inter-
diction program; Operation Lamson 719; Operation Thoan Thang 01/71; the
Mekong River Convoys, and helicopter support.
Interdiction Program: An extremely effective interdiction campaign has been
under way to isolate enemy forces in the RVN from outside support. This
campaign is being waged by air force conducting strikes in Laos, Cambodia
and the border regions of Vietnam; naval forces in coastal waters, including
border areas, and ARVN ground forces conducting cross border operations
in Cambodia and most recently in Laos.
The Naval interdicti on campaign and the denial of the port Kompong Som to
the enemy on 18 March 1970, has made the enemy totally dependent on the
overland lines of communication through Laos. After an intensive terrain
study, four choke points in the Laos lines of communications were selected
as the most difficult to by-pass. Heavy concentration of both B-52 and TAC
air sorties have been placed in these choke points, resulting in considerable
reduction in the amount of supplies being shuttled into the RVN and Cambodia.
As an example of the effect of the interdiction program, nearly 14, 000 trucks
have been destroyed or damaged since October of last year.
There have been three major operations since last July -- Operation Cuu Long
4402, Lamson 719, and Thoan Thang 01/71. The Cuu Long Operation was
terminated 25 February. The latter two operations Lamson 719 and Thoan
Thang 01/71 are still in progress. Lamson has been one of the three major
RVNAF cross border operations and has been a milestone in the development
of the RVNAF. For the first time he conducted a multi-division operation
against a strong and determined enemy and is an indication of the SVN's con-
cern over the enemy's use of border sanctuaries in the Laos operation. He
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5
has maintained a daily average of 22 maneuver battalions in Laos to insure dis-
ruption of the enemy's base system.
The enemy's massive use of AAA and artillery has been a significant factor of
the operation. Of great significance also in the operation is that the RVNAF
is penetrating an area which had been controlled for years by the enemy.
There has been significant gains from this operation. The RVNAF, without
U.S. advisors, faced their sternest test to date and acquitted themselves
against an aggressive enemy.
The estimates of enemy killed exceed 11, 000. Large amounts of supplies have
been destroyed or captured, major damage has been inflicted on his LOC and
his timetable for offensive operations has been set back for a considerable
period. Collaterally, the RVNAF success has had impact on the NVA by
effectively demonstrating that the RVNAF is capable of mounting a multi-
division operation, attacking the enemy in strongly held positions and destroy-
ing a considerable portion of his caches in the area.
Insofar as the Vietnamization program is concerned, Lamson has enhanced
security, provided a. greater chance for rural development and community
defense to succeed, and has improved the environment for orderly
Vietnamization and continued U.S. troops withdrawals.
The objective of Operation Thoan Thang 01/71 in Cambodia is the destruction
of enemy forces primarily in the Chup Plantation area which is known to be
a base area for a large number of enemy troops. It is near the southern
terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and is used for storage areas and distribu-
tion points for supplies going into the Cosvn area and (inaudible) area of
Cambodia. This operation is a logical followon to Thoan Thang 70/2 which
was conducted from July 1970 to February of this year. This kept Route 1
open between Vietnam and Leak Nuong, disrupted the free flow of enemy
personnel and supplies bound from the plantation area, north of Route 7 and
resulted in over 2, 000 enemy being killed in the 6-1/2 months operation.
Thoan Thang 01/71 is characterized by heavy fighting and heavy casualties
particularly in the Chup/Dambe area. The operation is progressing generally
according to plan. Although the U.S. is supporting the operation with air
assets, a larger share is being carried by RVNAF. For example, the VNAF
has flown considerably more TAC air sorties and helo sorties than has the U.S.
In the sixth weeks of current operations, Route 7 has been open from the Viet-
nam border west to Tong Le Bot and is being secured with FANK assistance.
The enemy's traditional como liaison route, traffict to Kratie, Chhlong,
Komgang Trabek, has been severely disrupted. The enemy has been forced
to retain major elements of two divisions north of Route 7, thus reducing
the threat to Kompang Chamand other areas west of the Mekong and MR 3 and
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified.
6
MR 4. Most significantly, heavy casualities have been inflicted on the enemy.
As the J-2 has pointed out, the numbers of 4, 400 enemy killed in action,
while the ARVN has sustained less than 400 KIA and 2, 000 WIA.
In regard to Mekong river convoys, to maintain supplies in Phnom Penh and
to thwart the enemy's desire to cut off this city, a joint combined Mekong
River Convoy operation is being carried out by Cambodian and Vietnamese
Naval and ground forces, supported by U.S. and Vietnamese air forces. Since
its inception 17 January, there have been 10 convoys. Although the enemy
has attempted to halt the operation only one vessel of the 44 cargo ships has
been sunk. The convoys have successfully supplied Phnom Penh with 2, 800
tons of military equipment and 16, 000 tons POL. It is planned to increase the
convoy rate shortly to allow for stockpiling.
Helo operations in Laos have provided the mobility necessary for success
while facing exceptionally concentrated AAA weapons. One example of suc-
cessful large scale air mobile operation took place on 7 March 1971, when
2 battalions were inserted into a LZ in 37 minute period by a total of over
150 lift helos and gunship escorts, with only one helo receiving damage from
enemy fire. Units engaged in supporting Lamson 719 have flown 57, 900
hours and 145, 700 sorties during the period 29 January to 11 March. A total
of 135, 200 passengers and 26, 200 tons of cargo were carried and gunships
were credited with 1, 500 (KBA) killed by air.
During this operation it's been our experience that 67% of the damaged helos
are returned to service within 48 hours; 17% are expected to be operational
within 30 days and 12% are expected to take more than 30 days to repair.
The status of additional 4% has not been determined.
In summary, the interdiction campaign, Operation Lamson, Operation Thoan
Thang, the Mekong River Convoys, and helo support, are major elements of
the current combined efforts to produce a more secure environment for
Vietnamization and for orderly redeployment of U.S. forces.
(End J-3 Assessment)
J-3 Briefer: To report on the operation as it looks right now, I would like to
show you a few slides, here.
This shows the U.S. troop disposition. As you know, these troops have been
deployed in the Quang Tri Province for the purpose of providing the rear
area support that was the basis for the ARVN cross border operation (inaudible).
We have approximately 21 battalions of all types assisting the ARVN. By
way of orientation, Dong Ha, up in the upper right hand corner, Route 9 is
the heavy black cutting cross to the southwest (inaudible). Khe Sahn is very
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
7
faintly seen down below and just to the right of the range portion of the border.
We have infantry units, engineering units, artillery units in support. Notice
the artillery units at the extreme western end of Route 9 that are within our
authority to provide artillery support into Laos. These are assembled at
the black dot. (inaudible). This particular portion of the operation we feel
is vital one that has been characterized by small yet sharp (inaudible) contact.
It seems to be aimed at cutting Route 9 with the LOCS up to Khe Sanh and
farther along the border. There has been significant attacks by fire also as
you know against a few support area (inaudible) and Khe Sanh.
Insofar as the RVNAF. side of the operation is concerned. We are now in Laos,
Route 9 again moving right across the center from east to west. Sepone on
the left of this chart. The First Division operating just a bit west and the
airborne division and elements of the various armored task force operating
just to the north of the First Division area. These are the battalions that
were in there yesterday. Since that time there has been several battalions
withdrawn- the 1st of the 3rd, and the regimental headquarters that is asso-
ciated with that, 2nd regimental headquarters, have both been withdrawn as
of today. One battalion of the airborne, plus a brigade héadquarters of the
airborne has been withdrawn to Khe Sanh as of today. Remaining in Laos we
have 16 battalions as of now, that includes 4 armored battalions; 4 airborne
battalions; 2 infantry battalions and 6 Vietnamese battalions.
The contacts in this area are characterized I would say as larger than they
are within RVN. Our spot reports that are coming in from the field indicate
large casualty figures on both the enemy side and reasonably heavy casualties
on the ARVN side. The weapons count that we are picking up are proportion-
ately indicative of the fact that the body count is reasonably accurate insofar
as the enemy is concerned. The enemy is obviously closing with the ARVN
units that are on fire support bases, a favorite tactic of his, heavy attacks by
fire, mortar and artillery, and the ARVN are using their own weapons, their
own artillery and our air to return the fire.
Currently, the units that are being withdrawn from Laos are moving to Khe Sanh
for refitting rehabilitation. The first one has been moved farther on to the east.
Some of you may have seen them at Dong Ha, possibly at Quang Tri, and areas
northeast in Quang Tri province.
- END -
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY council
TOP SECRET
ACTION
March 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
K. Wayne Smith KNA
SUBJECT: Lam Son
Attached is the memorandum for the President on Lam Son you
requested. Attached at Tab A to the President's memorandum are
two pages on the assumptions and quantitative estimates that under-
1y the final calculations in this memorandum.
1
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab A.
Nancy Pres. to
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Ed
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
April 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
HK
SUBJECT:
Lam Son 719 Final Report
Laos (Lam Son 719)
Cumulative Totals
Individual weapons
5,100
Crew-served weapons
2,000
Small arms ammunition
(rounds)
580,600
Other assorted ammo
(pounds)
40,002,200
Food (pounds)
2,565,000
Vehicles
530
Tanks
80
Petroleum (gallons)
218,000
Structures destroyed
1,300
Bunkers destroyed
1,330
Medical supplies
(pounds)
8,000
Miscellaneous equipment
& supplies (pounds)
80,000
Enemy KIA
13,650 includes 4,400 KBA
U.S. KIA
180
ARVN KIA
1,550
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
-2-
In a final report on Operation Lam Son 719, MACV makes the
following observations on the effectsoof the operation:
-- The enemy's aggressive reaction caused his forces
to mass and they were thus exposed to Allied ground
and air fire power.
-- The operation has shown the enemy that his sanctu-
aries are vulnerable. Thus, an offshoot of the opera-
tion will be fixing of significant enemy forces.
-- Fixing the enemy forces will assist in keeping them
distant from the population of South Vietnam.
-- If there were any who still believed that this was
a South Vietnamese "civil war", the reports and pictures
of the elaborate network of roads, trails and streams
that link enemy activity from North Vietnam to the RVN
should expose that fiction.
-- Detailed ground reconnaissance developed many lucra-
tive target locations during the operation. This informa-
tion is being used to refine the accuracy of continued
air strikes against the enemy's logistic system in Laos.
-- The experience gained in command and control of large
combat formations, coordination of combined arms efforts
and logistical support of large-scale operations will
enhance RVNAF combat effectiveness.
-- The operation has underlined the progress which has
been made in Vietnamization.
-- Lam Son 719 may be over for the RVNAF, but for the
enemy it is still going on as B-52s, tac air and gunships
continue to attack targets developed during February and
March.
-- The operation appears to have widespread popular support
in RVN.
-- Although Lam Son 719 was an important operation, it was
only part of the total effort designed to disrupt the
entire enemy system. Understandably, the total effect of
this operation is difficult to quantify completely at this
time, and all the results will not be known for many months.
-- Although it is too early to make a final judgment, Lam
Son 719 may well prove to have been a pivotal point in the
Indochina conflict.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 14, 1971 @
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Jim Fazio
Per your request at Tab B. Recommend
that you sign memorandum for the Presi-
dent at Tab A.
Henry mitt
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declas
MEMORANDUM
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 14, 1971
Make for Pres.
but round out
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Lyines
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
SITUATION ROOM
SUBJECT:
LAMSON 719 FINAL REPORT
Laos (Lamson 719)
Cumulative totals
Individual weapons
5,066
Crew-served weapons
1,935
Small arms ammunition (rounds)
480,566
Other assorted ammo (pounds)
40,002,160
Food (pounds)
2,564,720
Vehicles
528
Tanks
75-80
Petroleum (gallons)
217,710
Structures destroyed
1,270
Bunkers destroyed
1,328
Medical supplies (pounds)
7,900
Miscellaneous equipment &
supplies (pounds)
80,000
Enemy KIA
13,642 includes 4,364 killed by air
U.S. KIA
176
ARVN KIA
1,531
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
In a final report on Operation Lam Son 719, MACV makes the
following observations on the effects of the operation.
A. The enemy's aggressive reaction caused his forces to mass and they
were thus exposed to allied ground and air fire power.
B. The operation has shown the enemy that his sanctuaries are vulnerable.
Thus an offshoot of the operation will be fixing of significant enemy
forces.
C. Fixing the enemy forces will assist in keeping them distant from the
population of South Vietnam.
D. If there were any who still believed that this was a South Vietnamese
"civil war", the reports and pictures of the elaborate network of roads,
trails, and streams that link enemy activity from North Vietnam to the
RVN should expose that fiction.
E. Detailed ground reconnaissance developed many lucrative target locations
during the operation. This information is being used to refine the
accuracy of continued air strikes against the enemy's logistic system
in Laos.
F. The experience gained in command and control of large combat formations,
coordination of combined arms efforts, and logistical support of large
scale operations will enhance RVNAF combat effectiveness.
G. The operation has underlined the progress which has been made in
Vietnamization.
H. Lam Som 719 may be over for the RVNAF, but for the enemy it is still
going on as B-52's, tac air, and gunships continue to attack targets
developed during February and March.
I. The operation appears to have widespread popular support in RVN.
J. Although Lam Son 719 was an important operation, it was only part of
the total effort designed to disrupt the entire enemy system.
Understandably, the total effect of this operation is difficult to
quantify completely at this time, and all the results will not be known
for many months.
K. Although it is too early to make a final judgement, Lam Son 719 may well
prove to have been a pivotal point in the Indochina conflict.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.