Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "266848752",
    "label": "1) Negotiations 2) Escalation 3) De-Escalation Vietnam H.A. Kissinger",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/266848752"
}

{
    "id": "266848752",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/266848752",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "1) Negotiations 2) Escalation 3) De-Escalation Vietnam H.A. Kissinger",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/266848752",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
        "Central Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/266848752.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/266848752.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/266848752.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/266848752",
    "naId": 266848752,
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/266848752.pdf",
    "mediaId": "9abab442137f8883",
    "ocrText": "MEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Vietnam Papers\nAttached are several papers on Vietnam focused on:\n(1) negotiations, (2) possible escalation, and (3) U.S. force levels\nin the South and possible de-escalation. The papers attached are:\nHAK Memo on Vietnam Situation and Options.\nMy effort to summarize where we stand and my recommenda-\ntions for action in the next several months. Attached to this\nmemo is my memo to you on de-escalation and a staff paper\non negotiations.\nLaird Memo.\nTrip report plus recommendations, particularly on U.S. troop\nlevels and ARVN improvement. A lucid description of the\nsituation we face in South Vietnam. A summary of the memo\nis also at the Tab.\nWheeler Memo.\nRecommendations related mainly to reactions to enemy shelling.\nMutual Withdrawal Memo.\nThis memo points to the evidence that Hanoi may be seriously\ninterested in negotiating mutual withdrawal.\nEncls: a/s\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nHAK\nME MO\nind to be ifo\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis dument bas been Order. 12526 and\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM: Henry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT: Vietnam Situation and Options\nThis memorandum contains my analysis of the Vietnam situation\nand my views on the major decisions which you will have to face in the\nnext several weeks concerning: (1) negotiation strategy, (2) the level of\nour forces in the South and possible de-escalation, and (3) response to\nfurther enemy shelling of major cities.\nI. The Situation as of January 20\nThe situation in South Vietnam which we inherited on January 20\nis well described in Secretary Laird's memorandum to you:\n\"General Abrams has made remarkable progress in\nachieving a measure of military superiority throughout\nSouth Vietnam. The pacification program, which must\ndepend primarily and increasingly on South Vietnamese\nefforts, is also proceeding, though at a slower rate. But\nnone of our officials, either military or civilian, is under\nany illusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought\nto a military conclusion within six months, a year or even\nseveral years. Options, over which we have little or no\ncontrol, are available to the enemy for continuing the war\nalmost indefinitely, although perhaps at a reduced intensity. \"\nWhile the domestic opposition to the war which was again increasing\nquieted down after January 20, there is little question that domestic\ncontroversy will begin to mount, certainly within a few months.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nII. Assets and Liabilities\nIn evaluating our options now, we need to take account of our\nown assets and liabilities and those of the enemy.\nOur main asset is the presence of our troops in South Vietnam.\nHanoi has no hope of attaining its objective of controlling the South\nunless it can get us to withdraw our forces. Because of our over-\nwhelming economic strength and military power Hanoi knows that we\ncannot, by military means, be forced to withdraw.\nOur substantial capability to escalate the war confronts Hanoi\nwith the danger of having to rely even more heavily on China and the\nSoviet Union.\nOur liabilities are the domestic opposition in the United States\nand the continuing weak political base of the Saigon government.\nHanoi's assets and liabilities are to a large extent the reverse\nof our own. Hanoi knows it cannot defeat us militarily and that a\nstep up in our actions could threaten its autonomy. There are signs\nof strains in morale in North Vietnam which must worry the leader-\nship. Moreover, the danger of a Sino-Soviet clash which would disrupt\ntheir supplies from both countries almost certainly poses a continuing\nsense of unease. The unpredictable international situation provides an\nincentive to Hanoi to negotiate.\nHanoi's main asset is the high value it attaches to gaining control\nof South Vietnam and hence its willingness to accept casualties and risks\nthat seem disproportionate to us. Hanoi is, of course, fighting in\nfamiliar terrain and has been able to develop a political-military strategy\nfor the conflict. The Hanoi leadership also counts on world and U.S.\npublic opinion.\nIII. Where Do We Go From Here?\nWe must, in the coming months, fully coordinate our diplomacy\nwith our military actions in a carefully orchestrated plan designed to\nmaximize the possibilities of getting a satisfactory settlement.\nWe face the continuing dilemma that if Hanoi believes we are\nrunning out of time it has no incentive to negotiate. We, thus, must\nplay our hand in a way which:\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\n(1) increases the time we have available,\n(2) makes clear to Hanoi that our domestic opposition will\nnot force a precipitous withdrawal, and\n(3) provides incentives to both Hanoi and Saigon to negotiate.\nIn order to do this, we must:\n(1) seek private talks and progress in the negotiations without\nappearing over eager or anxious,\n(2) maintain the confidence of the GVN,\n(3) assess military questions, including possible escalation,\nnot in military terms alone but also for the political effect of our actions\nand, in particular, its impact on the negotiations.\nWe must recognize the paradox that a deliberate pace is the\nfastest route to a settlement. A calm posture will bring peace faster\nthan constantly pressing for talks, seeking to force the pace, and putting\nforward a smorgasbord of proposals.\nHow should we apply these general principals in dealing with\nthe specific questions of negotiations, U.S. force levels and possible\nU.S. de-escalation and the political effects of possible escalatory\nsteps particularly in relation to the Soviet Union?\nIV. Negotiations\nIt is extremely important that we carefully consider the pace of\nour negotiations and the subjects we wish to negotiate about. We must\navoid the mistakes of the past.\nPrior to January 20, we fluctuated between intensive efforts to\nget negotiations started and long periods in which there was no contact\nat all. During our \"peace offensives\" American envoys descended on\ncapitals all over the world; during the intervals between these spasms,\nwe relied largely on military measures. When we engaged in diplomacy\nwe sometimes seemed SO anxious that we encouraged Hanoi to believe\nthat domestic support was fast running out. We thus encouraged Hanoi\nintransigence by giving rise to the hope that domestic opposition would\nforce us to withdraw.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nGovernor Harriman's negotiating style compounded these\nproblems. He presented a picture of being desperate for a settle-\nment and gave Hanoi a smorgasbord of proposals from which to\nchoose. This gave Hanoi a feeling that we were enormously anxious\nand gave Hanoi the ability to choose to discuss those proposals which\nwould create maximum difficulty between us and the GVN.\nWe must avoid these pitfalls in the future. Thus far, our\nobjective has been to establish a deliberate pace in the negotiations.\nWe have developed a careful plan of action designed to assure the GVN\nthat we do not intend to sell out their interests in a desperate effort\nto get out as quickly as possible and to convince Hanoi that we believe\nwe have time. We have not blocked private talks; we have simply not\nasked for them. To have pressed for private talks sooner would have\nrun the risk of a confrontation with the GVN.\nThere are signs that this strategy is evolving successfully:\n(1) Hanoi has indicated a willingness to engage in private dis-\ncussions which would at least include military questions. This was\nreflected in a Vance/Lao conversation and in several recent conver-\nsations with Soviet officials. There is no comparable period during the\nVietnam War in which the enemy has been making so many overtures\nto us for private talks. The enemy is also complaining publicly that\nwe are refusing to talk to them privately.\n(2) The GVN has inaugurated private contacts with the NVN and\nthe NLF.\n(3) Our relations with Saigon have greatly improved. We are\njust beginning to establish full mutual confidence as reflected in your\nconversation with Ky, their failure to press hard for retaliation after\nthe Saigon shellings, and Thieu's agreement to our proposing to Hanoi\nthat we begin bilateral private talks.\nWe must now begin to make progress in Paris moving carefully\nand deliberately. As we move into private talks with Hanoi, the issues\nwe must face are:\n(1) The Pace of the Negotiations. We wish to move as quickly\nas possible towards a settlement. However, we should gear the pace of\nthe negotiations to actual progress and not seek talks for their own sake.\nTo press for frequent private meetings and to constantly alter our position\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nin an effort to show sincerity would be counterproductive. Hanoi\nwould only conclude that by waiting they can get better terms.\n(2) Agenda.\nWe should first discuss the issue of mutual withdrawal on\nwhich our bargaining position is the strongest. Hanoi's primary objec-\ntive is to get us to withdraw our troops; our major objective is to get\ntheir troops withdrawn. We must recgonize that neither we nor Hanoi\nmay want to implement a complete withdrawal until the other parts of\na settlement take shape, but we should delay talking about political\nissues related to SVN since such discussions can only lead to acrimony\nwith the South -- a basic objective of Hanoi. Saigon, in any talks on\npolitical matters, is likely to appear to be obstinate and we will be\nunder great pressure to press the GVN not to prevent successful negoti-\nations.\nI recognize that we must at some point be prepared to dis-\ncuss a political settlement. But the issue is what we talk about first.\nWe should begin with an issue on which our position is close to that\nof the GVN and which the GVN believes is a legitimate subject for US/NVN\ndiscussions.\n(3) Relations with the GVN. There is no doubt that at some\npoint we will have to engage in arm twisting of the GVN. The question\nis again one of timing. If we press the GVN now, since their structure\nis fragile, there may be nothing to negotiate about. We should only be\nprepared to press them very hard towards the end of the negotiations\nwhen an overall settlement is in sight.\n(4) Relations with the Soviets.\nThere is no question that the Soviets could play a major role\nin bringing the war to an end if they decide to put pressure on Hanoi.\nThe Soviets probably would like the war to end but we have not yet\nfound the leverage to get them to act on that desire.\nThere are two views on how we can influence the Soviets.\nThe first argues that we must demonstrate our good faith, our desire\nfor peace.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\n5\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nThe second view, which I share, is that the Soviets will\nput pressure on Hanoi only if after a careful calculation of costs and\ngains they decide that it is in their interest to do so. The Soviets\nclearly would pay a price in terms of their relations with Peking,\nwith Hanoi, and with the world communist movement if the Kremlin\npressured Hanoi into accepting settlement. We must give those in\nthe Soviet hierarchy who might want to move in this direction credible\narguments to use with their hard-line colleagues.\nWe must find a way either within the Vietnam context or\nbeyond it to change the current Soviet calculation of gains and risks.\nWithin Vietnam, we must worry the Soviets about the possi-\nbility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control.\nPossible escalatory steps must be considered in this light.\nOur negotiating strategy must be related to our military\noperations in the field. Our decisions regarding responses to Hanoi's\nshelling of the cities, U.S. military operations in the South, and\npossible troop deployments must show the same determination not\nto be panicked and a sense that we know what we are doing.\nV.\nEscalation\nAny escalatory moves that we take in response to Hanoi's shelling\nof the cities must be based on a clear understanding of what we are\nrying to achieve. Our escalatory moves would not have primarily a\nmilitary objective. Our concern would be the political effect of our\nactions.\nIt is difficult to conceive of political effects in response to Hanoi\nwhich would justify full scale resumption of the bombing. We must weigh\nthe physical damage we can do to North Vietnam against the loss of\ndomestic and international support of the American position which would\nfollow a resumption of the bombing. A consideration of these factors\nleads, I believe, to the conclusion that a sustained resumption of the\nbombing of North Vietnam would not now be justified. What we have\ndone thus far has, I believe, conveyed the appropriate message. If the\nshelling and abuse of the DMZ continues over the next several weeks,\na single escalatory strike might be warranted.\nIf we do engage in more extensive escalation, I believe it should\nbe aimed at influencing the Soviet Union not Hanoi. We must worry the\nSoviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nout of control. The only credible objective we could have in escalating\nwould be to give the Soviets concern. Our planning for possible escala-\ntion does not have this criteria in mind and thus our current options\nhave only the unfortunate consequences of a bombing attack without the\npossible advantages of posing a threat to the Soviets. We have just\nbegun to give imaginative thought to this problem.\nVI. U.S. Military Forces and Operations in the South\nOne school of thought argues that we should de-escalate the war\nin the South in concert with a negotiating initiative and then hope that by\ndemonstrating good faith to the Russians we can get a settlement. As\nI noted above, I do not believe that we could influence the Russians by\ndemonstrating sincerity. Moreover, I believe that we must keep up\nour military pressure in the South. When and if we withdraw troops it\nshould be on the basis that the ARVN forces are now in a position to\npick up the slack of a full scale military campaign against the enemy.\nOrdering de-escalation would not necessarily reduce casualties, since\nthe enemy could still attack, nor would it reduce pressures to bring\nforces home and to end the war. Of equal importance, it would be\nvery difficult to devise orders which would be at all acceptable to the\nfield commanders and which would in fact lead to de-escalation. (My\nmemorandum to you discussing de-escalation is attached.)\nIt is conceivable that at some point we would de-escalate. How-\never, to try to negotiate de-escalation would be demoralizing to our\nforces and any negotiation could only be very protracted. Hanoi may\nseek to discuss de-escalation but we should not assume that we must\ntalk about whatever the enemy wantsto talk about. Discussions about\nde-escalation would only be time wasting.\nAn announcement at the right time, probably May or June, of\nour intention to withdraw about 75, 000 troops this year and to re-examine\nthe situation at the end of the year would buy us a considerable amount\nof time at home, make clear to Hanoi that we will not be forced into\nthe total withdrawal which they seek, and at the same time indirectly\nput pressure on Saigon to negotiate a political settlement in the South.\nI believe we should move in this direction. We should aim at with-\ndrawing U.S. maneuver battalions leaving the combat support units\nbehind to aid the ARVN. Prior to their withdrawal, we may want to\nregroup some of our combat units and hold them in reserve. Since\nthe vast majority of our casualties occur in maneuver battalions,\nthis process would result in reduced U.S. casualties while permitting\nus to support the ARVN.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\nVII. Recommendations\n1. Between now and June we should engage in private talks\nwith the North Vietnamese about mutual withdrawal and press Saigon\nto talk to the NLF. If Hanoi proposes 4-party private talks, we should,\nwith GVN agreement, enter into them but let the GVN take the lead in\ndiscussing political matters.\n2. We 'should announce in June that we will withdraw 75, 000\ntroops from South Vietnam during the remainder of the year and that\nat the end of the year we will re-examine the situation. (General\nAbrams should be told that the decision to withdraw some troops this\nyear has been made in principle and be asked to submit a concrete\nplan for withdrawal of 50 or 75 thousand men between July and December.\nThis is Secretary Laird's recommendation except that he suggests\nwithdrawing 50-70 thousand men.)\n3. The U.S. withdrawal announcement should be in the context\nof a major Presidential speech stressing our desire for peace, presenting\na detailed peace plan, and calling upon Hanoi to engage in serious negoti-\nations about mutual withdrawal. (I am working on a detailed scenario.)\n4. We should do everything possible to accelerate ARVN moderniza-\ntion and put all the pressure that we can on the GVN to improve the quality\nand effectiveness of the ARVN.\n5. We should develop a plan for the withdrawal of our combat\nforces over the next several years. The plan should explore the possi-\nbility of withdrawing U.S. combat troops leaving support units behind\nto aid ARVN combat units.\n6. We should not take any de-escalatory moves within the South.\nIf Hanoi proposes discussions of this subject we should refuse to talk about\nde-escalation except in the context of an agreement on mutual withdrawal.\n7. We should begin immediately to develop alternate plans for\npossible escalatory military actions with the motive of convincing the\nSoviets that the war might get out of hand. (At your direction, work is\nunderway on this question.)\n8. We should continue to press the GVN to engage in discussions\nwith the NLF. We should instruct Ambassador Bunker to continue his\ndiscussions with the GVN about political arrangements in the South and\nurge them to develop a specific plan which they could put forward publicly\nwith details which could be passed privately to the NLF and Hanoi.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 8 Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nDE-ESCALATION\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\ndocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nMarch 8, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nReflections on De-escalation\nIt has become obvious that once private talks start, de-\nescalation will be high on the agenda. Zorin referred to a \"promise\"\nmade by Harriman which I believe to be true. Hanoi has been\nputting it out in newspapers -- see, for example, Joe Kraft's\ncolumn.\nThe question then becomes: what is being de-escalated?\nWhat will be the impact?\nDe-escalation can come about in one of two ways: tacit\nor formal; that is to say, it can occur de facto or by agreement.\nHowever it might take place, it would bring about a major change\nin the situation and thus requires careful assessment.\nDe-escalation must be seen in the light of our overall\nstrategy. The component of the Communist forces which gave the\nwar its distinguishing characteristic has been the guerrilla forces.\nThese have enabled Hanoi and the VC to prevent the consolidation\nof governmental authority, to move large forces unobserved and to\ncreate a general climate of insecurity.\nWhen American forces appeared in the war, they were\nused mainly to fight North Vietnamese main force units. I have\nalways considered this to be a strategic error, though the choice\nwas not entirely up to us. Hanoi was determined to use its forces\nthe way a bullfighter uses his cape: to keep us lunging in strategi-\ncally unproductive areas and to prevent us from grinding down the\nguerrilla forces.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n-2-\nIn recent months, many main force units have been withdrawn\ninto Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam -- either because they were\nforced or because they wish to preserve these forces for the post-\nwar period. This has enabled us to devote -- for the first time in the\nwar -- substantial forces to anti-guerrilla action. If we now de-\nescalate, Hanoi will get for nothing what it has had to pay heavy,\nperhaps excessive casualties to obtain: the effective neutralization\nof U.S. forces with respect to the Communist infrastructure.\nOur military effort leaves a great deal to be desired, but\nit remains one of our few bargaining weapons.\nThe impact of de-escalation on the two sides would be highly\nasymmetrical. The guerrillas operate by terror or assassination;\nour side requires massive military effort. The opponent can achieve\na major impact by occasional actions well below the threshold of\nviolation; no corresponding actions are available to us.\nYou will be told that we can always start military operations\nagain. In fact, the recent Communist offensive has shown that ob-\ntaining clear criteria as to what constitutes a violation is very\ncomplicated. Every difficulty we have had in deciding whether the\nbombing halt \"understanding\" had been violated will be compounded\nin the case of de-escalation. How is one to construe the murder,\nkidnapping or intimidation of selected South Vietnamese officials\nWill we even know who did it?\nViolation criteria would probably be assessed in terms of\nmajor military operations of the type U.S. and Allied forces are\nnow conducting in South Vietnam. These operations have been de-\nsigned to provide a military shield for the GVN which enables them,\nwith our assistance, to progress in the pacification area through\nthe establishment of law and order and security for the populace.\nConversely, it appears that the enemy has concluded that major\nmilitary confrontations are no longer to their advantage. Their\nbest hope for success rests with increased emphasis on terror and\nassassination, while preserving their main force elements as a\npsychological threat and for direct action after U.S. withdrawal.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n-3-\nThus, de-escalation would amount to a self-imposed defusing of our\nmost important asset and the simultaneous enhancement of his most\nimportant asset -- terrorism. We would, in effect, be tying the\nhands of our forces in Vietnam.\nThe related problems associated with maintaining a force\nlevel of 500, 000 -plus combat troops lacking an active combat\nmission could also prove troublesome. Unquestionably, pressures\nwould build to bring our troops home. It would be very difficult to\ncounter these demands if the level of military activity in Victnam\ndid not require their presence. An additional problem area would\nbe the constructive employment of our forces in Vietnam during a\nperiod when military activity had dropped off substantially or com-\npletely. A rash of incidents with the South Vietnamese populations\nmight occur which paralleled our experiences in Europe after\nWorld War II when an unbusy occupation Army soon found itself in\nuneasy economic and social competition with the populace with whom\nthey were stationed.\nAll this suggests that we should not agree to de-escalate\nnow -- all the more so if you plan to withdraw some forces in a few\nmonths. Such 2 measure will be politically meaningful only if it is\ntaken as the result of a choice -- not as the inevitable corollary of\nunder-utilized forces.\nAll this, of course, must be considered as part of an\noverall \"game-plan\" on which I am now working.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nNEGOTIATIONS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nVIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS:\nISSUES AND PROCEDURES\nBefore we move into private negotiations with representa-\ntives of the DRV we should decide:\n(1) What issues we are prepared to negotiate about. For\nthese issues we will have to determine our position on a number of\nsub-issues, as well as developing negotiating tactics.\n(2) What issues we are prepared to discuss without\nengaging in actual negotiations.\n(3) What issues we should refuse to discuss.\nThis memorandum considers each of the major issues which\nwe or Hanoi may raise in the negotiations in terms of each of these\nquestions.\nI. ISSUES\n1. DMZ\nWe have, of course, made this the major issue in the public\ntalks and we should press it in private sessions. The secret negoti-\nations we have had with Hanoi since March 1968 provide a basis for\nour taking the position that Hanoi has committed itself to discussing\nthe DMZ issue once the bombing was halted. While the discussions\nabout the Phase I and Phase II negotiating schemes were never\nformalized, they were carried far enough so that Hanoi is clearly\non notice that we would want to discuss a DMZ agreement once the\nbombing stops and, in effect, is committed to discussing the subject.\nWe should press this point with Hanoi without getting into an argument\nabout whether or not there is any existing agreement on the DMZ in\nconnection with the bombing halt.\nWe want a clear understanding that there will be no infiltra-\ntion of men and material through the DMZ. We should make clear that\nabuse will lead to attacks on the DMZ.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nThere is agreement within the US Government that while we\nshould press this issue vigorously we need not hold back negotiations\non other problems until agreement is reached. However, the more\nthe enemy \"abuses\" the DMZ the more we will need to highlight the\nissue in Paris. The three issues which are likely to arise regarding\nthe DMZ are:\na. Inspection\nWe would like to have some kind of inspection of the\nDMZ either by the existing ICC, by a new international commission\nor by a joint commission of belligerents. We should raise these\npoints and press them but back off if necessary. We can on a\nunilateral basis detect gross violations, and getting Hanoi committed\nto not move troops through the DMZ is worth a good deal even if\nsmaller numbers can continue to infiltrate. We have in the past\ndiscussed both with the Indians and Canadians what steps would be\nnecessary to modify the ICC so that it could police the DMZ and we\nshould consider introducing these into discussions with Hanoi. We\nmay want to take a strong stand on this question initially.\nb. The DMZ as a Political Boundary\nHanoi is leery of accepting any DMZ agreement which solidifies\nthe division of Vietnam and gives formal political status to the demarca-\ntion line. The Geneva Accords stated flatly that the demarcation had no\nparticular significance. We have in the past told Hanoi that we wanted\nsimply to go back to the provisions of the 1954 agreement. But we need\nto consider how explicit we will be in asserting that the DMZ has no\npolitical significance.\nC. Participation of the NLF\nHanoi insists that the NLF has every right to be in the\nsouthern half of the DMZ and, therefore, no DMZ arrangements can\nbe discussed without the NLF. We have to consider whether we should\nbe prepared to move this issue into a private 4-sided group dealing\nwith this single question. We would, of course, have to sound out\nSaigon in advance if we decide we are prepared to move in this direction.\n-2-\nReproduced at the Richard Nispial Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n2. POWs\nWe have an agreed position on this question which we would\nwant to use in the private talks. In general, we should keep this\nissue separate from other questions and try to distinguish problems\nconcerning American prisoners from those concerning South Vietnamese\nones.\n3. Mutual Withdrawal\nThis should be the major focus of our discussions with the\nNorth Vietnamese. A paper has been prepared by the Vietnam Working\nGroup which incorporates the views of Saigon and Paris, as well as\nthose of the Washington agencies. There is a broad measure of agree-\nment on most of the issues concerned. The two major issues on which\nthere are differences of opinion are:\n(a) How should mutual withdrawal be related to a political\nsettlement? and\n(b) How large a U.S. force should remain behind after\nmutual withdrawal?\n4. Laos\nThe Laos issue is in part related to mutual withdrawal\nsince we will have to insist that North Vietnamese forces now in\nSouth Vietnam be withdrawn not to Laos (or Cambodia) but rather\nto North Vietnam, and that North Vietnamese forces in the panhandle\nwithdraw to North Vietnam. There is the broader question of the\nfuture of Laos following a Vietnam settlement and the withdrawal\nof other North Vietnamese forces from Laos. We may want to raise\nthis issue with Hanoi in private discussions making it clear to them\nthat a Laos settlement is an essential part of an overall agreement.\nThe details of any new political arrangement should be negotiated\namong the Laotians and broader international questions might well\nbe discussed at a reconvened Laotian conference. (This is a\nseparate and complicated issue which requires detailed examination\nbut need not be considered in this context.)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n5. Cease-Fire\nThere is no evidence that either side is interested in a\ncease-fire. The NLF depends on coercion and does not appear\nconfident of its ability to survive in a cease-fire situation in the\nabsence of a political settlement. Saigon objects to a cease-fire\nbecause it would legitimize, at least de facto, the NLF's control\nover some of South Vietnam. The crucial modalities of a cease-fire,\ntherefore, would concern allied access and freedom of movement. The\nPresident has, of course, said publicly that a cease-fire makes no\nsense in this war. There has been a considerable amount of work on\nthe cease-fire question, and there is agreement on the question of\nhow we should respond if the enemy proposes a general cease-fire,\ni. e., accept in principle and propose immediate implementation in\na limited area such as the DMZ while the two sides work out the\narrangements for a general cease-fire. At some point, cease-fire\nwould become a serious issue in terms of relating it to a political\nsettlement or mutual withdrawal but for the moment it is largely\na tactical propaganda issue.\n6. Inspection and Verification\nThere is growing skepticism in Washington about the value\nof any inspection and verification procedure, particularly to insure\ncompliance with the initial terms of any agreement. In particular,\nit would be difficult to devise international inspection arrangements\nto verify the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South\nVietnam, and Hanoi is very unlikely to accept any such arrangement.\nThere is some interest in international inspection procedures to\nmonitor continuing compliance with an agreement including monitoring\nof the Laotian passes. Whether we should press for such arrange-\nments obviously depends on the shape of the agreement and this is\nnot something that we can or should get into at an early stage except\nperhaps to put Hanoi on notice in the discussion of mutual withdrawal\nthat we believe some international inspection and verification system\nwould be necessary and should be discussed at an appropriate time.\n7. International Guarantees\nThis issue concerns the question of whether or not a group\nof powers should be asked to guarantee the agreement which was\narrived at. There might be some utility in seeking international\nguarantees for the continued absence of North Vietnamese forces\nfrom South Vietnam but it would be difficult to conceive of inter-\nnational guarantees protecting a particular government or political\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order-13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nstructure in the South. Again, this is an issue which can and should\nbe delayed until the shape of a settlement is more clearly seen.\n8. Reunification\nThe U.S. position has been that we are not opposed to\nreunification provided it comes as a free choice of the people of both\nSouth and North Vietnam. The Geneva Accords, which we claim to\nstill support, explicitly states that Vietnam is a single country.\nHanoi has been relatively relaxed on the reunification issue and they\nmay well not bring it up. If they do, we probably have no choice but\nto stick to our current position. As noted above, it will mainly\narise in connection with the DMZ.\n9. Political Accommodation\nHanoi is, of course, taking the position that political issues\nmust be settled simultaneously, if not prior to, military issues.\nHanoi is likely to bring up questions relating to political settlement in\nthe private talks. Initially, we should take the position that we are not\nprepared to discuss such matters, but we may have to fall back to the\nposition that we are prepared to talk to Hanoi in general terms but\nthat we believe any negotiation should be among the South Vietnamese.\nOur position will, of course, have to be closely coordinated with\nSaigon and it should take the lead in negotiating these matters. The\nGVN has said that it is prepared to talk to the NLF in Paris.\nOn the substance of a political accommodation our knowledge\nis exceedingly poor. We do not really know what the consequences for\nthe possible survival of a non-communist South Vietnamese govern-\nment would be of various alternative forms of political settlement.\nFor this reason, if for no other, we should be very careful not to do\nthe negotiating. There is, of course, the broader issue of not taking\nresponsibility for defending a particular political arrangement in the\nSouth or being held accountable for it in the future. We can improve\nour knowledge but never be very confident.\nThieu has told Bunker that he sees three possible solutions\nto the NLF problem:\n(a) coalition\n(b) a general election before 1971 on a one man-one vote\nbasis, and\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n(c) authorize the NLF members to organize a non-communist\npolitical party and engage in local and national elections, as those\nare now scheduled.\nThieu told Bunker that the first was unacceptable; that the second and\nthird offered possibilities. He stated that he inclined with the second\noption since he would want to have the contest before the NLF had\ntime to organize a peaceful campaign. Ky has told Lodge that the\nGVN was ready for (3).\n10. De-escalation\nBased on recent hints through the French and the Soviets,\nit appears likely that Hanoi will raise the issue of mutual de-escalation.\nWe should agree in principle to discuss the subject but indicate that\nwe wish to do so in the context of mutual withdrawal.\n-6-\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 18526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMO\nLAIRD\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET SENSITIVE\nSummary of\nSecretary of Defense Memorandum for the President\nConclusions and Recommendations\n1. In attmpting to make the determination about how we could\nachieve our objectives, I used four basic assumptions:\n1. No breakthrough in Paris is likely in the near future\nwhich will achieve a political resolution of the conflict.\n2. We will not escalate beyond the limited objective of\nattempting to insure for the South Vietnamese people\nthe right to determine their own political and economic\ninstitutions.\n3. Self-determination requires a capability for sustained\nself-defense and self-reliance.\n4. The North Vietnamese will not voluntarily abandon their\naim to secure political control of South Vietnam.\n2. Our fighting men in Southeast Asia, under the superb leader-\nship of General Abrams, are fully supported and have the resources in\nmen, material, and facilities to accomplish their assigned tasks with\nmaximum possible safety and security.\n3. Steady progress is being made in the application of military\npressure on the enemy. But there is consensus among our civilian and\nmilitary leaders in South Vietnam that a military victory within 6, 12,\n18, or 24 months, or even longer, is not feasible under prevailing\nconstraints.\n4. The enemy's increased use of border sanctuaries as safe\nhavens for logistics, training, and command and control support is a\nmatter of increasing danger to our forces. Consideration should be\ngiven to the modification of our rules of engagement to permit more\neffective actions against this threat, short of lasting extension of the\ngeographic area of the war.\n5. The RVNAF continues to show improvement, but we must\nexplore ways to accelerate equipment delivery and increase combat\neffectiveness. There may be certain areas such as pilot and technical\nSECRET SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET SENSITIVE\n2\ntraining which will be difficult to accelerate. In any event, we shall\nneed to provide additional funding for RVNAF modernization purposes.\n6. The precondition for this additional assistance on an\naccelerated basis must be that it will permit the expedited replacement\nof U.S. forces.\n7. This replacement process should begin and be pursued on a\nsystematic basis designed to assure sustained pressure on the enemy\nand sustained support of the war by the American public.\n8. The leadership of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to\nparticipate in such replacement program and expresses the belief\nthat, as our forces are replaced, the RVN's independent ability to\nmeet the enemy's aggression will be strengthened.\n9. We must make sure that our entire Defense establishment\nunderstands the need to refine our concept of T-Day planning and to\ndevelop a detailed program for transferring and redeploying men and\nmateriel as hostilities diminish and finally terminate.\n10. To enhance the vital interests of our country (particularly in\nrecognition of our worldwide military requirements), to stimulate in-\ncreased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the Government\nof RVN, and to sustain the support of the American public for our\nstated objectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of\n50-70 thousand U.S. troops from South Vietnam this year. These\nplans should also be developed to provide for continuing substantial\nreplacement of U.S. with South Vietnamese forces in the following years.\nReaction to Enemy Shelling\nThe indiscriminate enemy attacks are not militarily significant.\nThe attacks, furthermore, have as yet done little to affect adversely\nthe morale of the South Vietnamese public. In the view of President\nThieu, they are designed primarily to improve the morale of the\nNorth Vietnamese by demonstrating a residual ability to control\nthe level of the conflict in the south.\nIn my opinion, any further significant shelling or rocketing of\nSaigon, Danang, or Hue should bring about an appropriate response on\nour part. This leaves, of course, the key question as to what kind of\nresponse would be appropriate. In my conversation with President\nThieu, he stated that it should be a wise and measured one, not\nSECRET SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET SENSITIVE\n3\ndisproportionate to the level of the enemy attacks. He also suggested\nthat the response might be political or diplomatic, rather than military.\nAs I see it, a response which would entail any extensive bombing of\nNorth Vietnam would yield us little militarily. Though it might\ndemonstrate to the South Vietnamese our continued commitment to\ntheir cause, it would serve to equate justifiable military activity on\nour part with unjustifiable and indiscriminate attacks on the enemy's\npart. It would lead to a renewal of the criticism from many factions\nwithin both the United States and the world community, and would tend\nto put us into the position vis a vis world and U.S. opinion in which the\nprevious administration found itself just about a year ago.\nI believe it would be reasonable to confine ourselves to con-\nsideration of political and diplomatic alternatives in the indiscriminate\nshellings. A temporary suspension of attendance at the plenary Paris\nsessions might be effective. If the North Vietnamese are eager for\nU.S. withdrawal and resolution of the conflict in SVN, such a\ntemporary recess might be more of a burden on them than a military\nresponse. North Vietnam would be cast in the role of impeding\nprogress to peace and would take the brunt of adverse world opinion.\nTo the extent further military action may be indicated against the\nenemy's current offensive, we should look for a response which would\nwork to our advantage, either by securing some immediate military\ngain or by bringing us closer to genuine substantive discussions in\nParis. A well-considered and effective operation against some enemy\nmilitary target in the border areas might provide both an appropriate\nsignal and some military benefit. I will be prepared to discuss this\nissue further with you privately and with the National Security Council.\nSECRET SENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON D.C. 20301\nMarch 13, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Trip to Vietnam and CINCPAC, March 5-12 1969\nAt your direction, I have now spent five days reviewing, with\nGeneral Wheeler, the military situation in Vietnam. Two of these\ndays were spent in consultations with Ambassador Bunker, Generals\nAbrams and Goodpaster and their colleagues, and South Vietnamese\nleaders, including President Thieu, Vice President Ky and Prime\nMinister Huong. Two other days in South Vietnam were spent in the\nfield. I was able to visit I Corps, 111 Corps and IV Corps, the\nareas where the major part of the current military activity is\ntaking place. In the field I saw elements of the Army, Navy, Air\nForce and Marine Corps. Finally, I spent a day-and-a-half at\nCINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii, discussing with Admiral McCain and\nhis staff their views on the current status of affairs in Southeast\nAsia.\nGeneral Wheeler and Assistant Secretary Froehlke were in\nThailand for one day and will submit separately their observations\nabout the situation there. General Wheeler has also prepared a\nreport for you on his views on certain key Vietnam issues.\nIn this report I will make, first, some general observations.\nThereafter, I will review in somewhat more detail:\nThe current military assessment, including the\nissue of retaliation for the recent military\nattacks and the shellings of major population\ncenters.\nThe status of our forces, specifically, whether\nGeneral Abrams has everything that he needs in\nmen and equipment to insure the maximum safety\nand security of our personnel.\nThe present readiness and progress of the\nRepublic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).\nThe plans for withdrawal of American forces.\nTermination Day (\"T\" Day) Planning.\nFinally, I shall draw some conclusions and make some recommendations.\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and hasbeendetermined.to be dectassified. 284\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\n2\nGeneral Observations\nThe trip I just completed to South Vietnam constituted the initial\nopportunity anyone from the new Administration has had to look first-\nhand at the military situation there. The trip was, therefore, in many\nrespects a beginning. Both practically and symbolically, it was the\nbeginning of a concerted and dedicated attempt by your Defense leadership\nto come to grips with the complexities and practicalities of the Southeast\nAsia conflict. The essential purpose of this aspect of the trip was to\n&\ndetermine how we could achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia, consistent\nwith our vital national interests.\nBut my presence in South Vietnam constituted a beginning, too, for\nour military leadership there. Just as it was their duty to provide for\nme the picture of what is happening in Southeast Asia, it was my duty\nto provide for them the realities of the situation in the United States.\nHopefully, each of us accomplished our task.\nIn attempting to make the determination about how we could achieve\nour objectives, I used four basic assumptions:\n1. No breakthrough in Paris is likely in the near future\nwhich will achieve a political resolution of the conflict.\n2. We will not escalate beyond the limited objective of\nattempting to insure for the South Vietnamese people\nthe right to determine their own political and economic\ninstitutions.\n3. Self-determination requires a capability for sustained\nself-defense and self-reliance.\n4. The North Vietnamese will not voluntarily abandon their\naim to secure political control of South Vietnam.\nThe uniform view of U.S. civilian and military leaders in Vietnam,\nof the CINCPAC staff, and of the GVN leadership is that we now have and\ncan retain sufficient military strength to preclude the enemy from\nachieving any kind of military verdict in South Vietnam. At the same\ntime, considering the restrictions with which we are compelled to\noperate in seeking our limited objectives, none of these men forecasts\n3\na military victory for U.S. and allied forces within the foreseeable\nfuture.\nThat, in essence, is what our military leaders in South Vietnam\ntold me. I believe of equal importance is what I conveyed to them.\nIn the sense that beginnings constitute breaks with the past, I emphasized\nthat the American people expect the new Administration to bring the war\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n3\nto a satisfactory conclusion. The people will not be satisfied with less.\nA satisfactory conclusion, I emphasized, means to most Americans the\neventual disengagement of American men from combat.\nAgain, in the context of beginnings and breaking with the past, I\ntold our people your Administration is not being held responsible for\npast decisions. The decisions which committed more than half-a-million\ntroops, nearly $100 billion of resources, and more than 33,000 American\nlives are behind us. They represent \"sunk\" costs.\n&\nThe decisions and the costs the American people and the new\nAdministration are interested in, I stressed, are those in the future.\nAccordingly, I told our leaders in South Vietnam the key factor in\nsustaining the support of the American people is to find the means by\nwhich the burden of combat may promptly, and methodically, be shifted to\nthe South Vietnamese. This must be done while continuing to insure the\nsafety and security of our own and allied forces and while working towards\nthe objective of self-determination for the South Vietnamese. These aims,\nI pointed out, are not in conflict. They can, and must, be attained as\na package. That is the challenge posed for and by the new Administration.\nThe Current Military Assessment\nSince the last week in February, the enemy forces have been engaged\nin a new offensive in South Vietnam. This has consisted primarily of\nattacks by fire against American and Allied military bases. In addition,\nthere has been a troubling frequency of attacks on the civilian population,\nincluding rocket attacks on Saigon, Danang and Hue. These attacks are\nclearly inconsistent with the understandings that provided the reported\nbasis on which the bombing of North Vietnamese territory was stopped.\nFrom the military standpoint, the current offensive appears to be\ndestined for failure. Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, our commanders\nin the field, and the leaders of the Government of Vietnam are in unanimous\naccord that the enemy's efforts will gain no territory, nor will they\nbring about any permanent reduction in the level of pacification. The\nrecently initiated enemy action has had little impact on the morale of\nthe South Vietnamese people and their support for their Government. At\nthe same time, this escalation of activity has increased substantially\n7\nthe rate of U.S. and South Vietnamese casualties, and has brought into\npublic question the validity of the assumptions which led to the elimina-\ntion of the bombing of North Vietnam.\nIt would appear that the enemy's objectives are not primarily\nmilitary, but rather are political and psychological. Perhaps most\nimportant is the enemy's desire to demonstrate that he retains the ability\nto control the level of the combat in South Vietnam. By so doing he\nprobably hopes both to achieve greater negotiating strength in Paris and\nReproduced at the Richard, Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n4\nto increase the amount of disaffection within the United States. The\nenemy's goal appears to be that of producing pressure which will lead\nto an early and disorderly withdrawal of American forces. In the view\nof President Thicu, Hanoi also feels compelled to attempt to show its\nown military personnel and civilian population that the NVA/VC are in\ncontrol of the situation in South Vietnam and have not entered into\nunderstandings with the U.S. in relation to the bombing halt. The MACV\nstaff informed me that enemy attacks, since initiation of the current enemy\noffensive have been below the level of those of the Tet and May offensives\nin 1968, as have been the casualties on both sides.\nOur military leaders in South Vietnam assured me that this offensive\ncan and will be contained, but they also conceded the enemy's ability to\nconduct similar offensives in the future, at least on an intermittent\nbasis. This continued capability on the part of the enemy derives from\ncertain intractable factors in the Vietnamese situation. The forces of\nHanoi and the NLF continue to be supplied with sophisticated equipment\nand weapons, such as 122 mm rockets, from Soviet and Communist China\nresources. In addition, the enemy forces are able to take refuge and\nsanctuary across the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. The\nLaotian and Cambodian sanctuaries are of great importance in the enemy's\nability to withstand our overwhelming superiority in mobility and fire\npower. Moreover, Cambodia has become increasingly important in the\ninfiltration of supplies and men, and in the command and control of the\nenemy forces.\nConsideration should be given to border area operations that will at\nleast temporarily diminish the advantage to the enemy of our self-imposed\ngeographical restrictions. Unless we are willing to expand greatly the\ngeographic confines of the conflict, however, the availability of\nsanctuary areas for the enemy will continue to contribute to the impos-\nsibility of a final military solution.\nInsofar as U.S. and allied military efforts are concerned, steady\nprogress is uniformly reported. For example, in I Corps both General\nCushman and General Stilwell cited significant advances in eliminating\nenemy influence, including the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). General\nCushman, however, informed me that an additional two years would be\nrequired before he could see the situation as being completely in hand.\nInsofar as the VCI is concerned, Ambassador Colby, the Deputy for Civil\n,\nOperations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), estimates that\nthe anti-VCI program, the so-called \"Phoenix\" campaign, has eliminated\nperhaps 16 thousand of the 83 thousand estimated VCI. At the same time,\nhe recognizes that these VCI losses have probably been replaced. A\nsuccessful anti-infrastructure effort will thus require a substantially\nhigher rate of attrition than has yet been realized.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n5\nMilitarily, the situation in 111 Corps is coming more and more\nunder control. General Abrams' tactics and precautions have virtually\nforeclosed the risks of significant enemy incursion into the capital\ncity of Saigon. The mortar and rocket attacks have been infrequent\nand unimpressive in number. In IV Corps, as well, the military situation\nis steadily moving in a direction favorable to the Government of South\nVietnam and the United States. But Major General Eckhardt, the senior\nU.S. Military Advisor in IV Corps, recognizes that the pacification\neffort is proceeding slowly in this traditional VC stronghold.\n&\nSimilarly, the pacification effort has reached the point where\nmore than 79 per cent of the South Vietnamese population is credited\nto the \"relatively secure\" category. This category includes so-called\n\"A\", \"B\", and \"C\" hamlets. The \"C\" category, which includes about\n30 per cent of the population, is pivotal and subject to ready reversion\nto the \"contested\" classification. \"A\" hamlets remain relatively rare.\nThere is none, for example, in the strategic area of 111 Corps immediately\nnorth of Saigon which I visited. Thus some appreciable VC influence\ncontinues to exist for the major share of South Vietnam's people.\nThe basic problem remains that of achieving permanent South\nVietnamese governmental control over the country. Although Ambassador\nBunker gives persuasive documentation of steady political growth by\nthe Government of Vietnam, this progress is difficult to translate into\nnationwide security. Even greater national exertion will be necessary\nto bring GVN administrative and political structures into the villages\nand hamlets of South Vietnam. This would be a difficult task under\npeaceful circumstances. It is herculean while hostilities continue at\nthe present level.\nSubstantial de-Americanization of the war is an indispensable\nprecondition, it appears, to the healthy growth of indigenous political\ninstitutions. This thesis was highlighted in a comment made to me by\nthe Senior Province Advisor assigned to Go Cong Province in the Delta.\nThis advisor remarked that he sees his job as being \"to put myself out\nof business as quickly as possible.\" We should all regard that as our\njob in Vietnam. This would be consistent with the attainment of U.S.\nobjectives in this area.\nIn short, General Abrams has made remarkable progress in achieving\na measure of military superiority throughout South Vietnam. The\n,\npacification program, which must depend primarily and increasingly on\nSouth Vietnamese efforts, is also proceeding, though at a slower rate.\nBut none of our officials, either military or civilian, is under any\nillusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought to a military\nconclusion within six months, a year or even several years. Options,\nover which we have little or no control, are available to the enemy\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n6\nfor continuing the war almost indefinitely, although perhaps at a reduced\nintensity. Under these circumstances, and unless some change can be made\nin the relative contributions of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, we\nare faced with an American killed-in-action rate which could run in excess\nof 100 a week, and at the enemy's initiative could be increased to multiples\nof that rate.\nA matter that requires the closest scrutiny is the question of\nretaliation for the NVA/VC violations of the Paris understandings.\ns\nWhatever the deliberate ambiguity of these understandings, there can be\nno doubt that the rocket attacks on Saigon, Danang and Hue are completely\ninconsistent with the assumptions which underlie the bombing halt. We are,\ntherefore, faced with the question of appropriate response to these indis-\ncriminate attacks on the civilian population. Obviously, the question of\nretaliation, as well as its nature and extent, should be considered in\nthe context of bringing us closer to our objectives in Southeast Asia\nand protecting our credibility. We should not be interested in merely\n\"getting even,\" but rather in advancing vital U.S. interests.\nThese indiscriminate enemy attacks are not militarily significant.\nAs of the preparation of this report, the attacks had not added in any\nsubstantially new way to the jeopardy of U.S. forces. The attacks,\nfurthermore, have as yet done little to affect adversely the morale of\nthe South Vietnamese public. In the view of President Thieu, they are\ndesigned primarily to improve the morale of the North Vietnamese by\ndemonstrating a residual ability to control the level of the conflict\nin the south.\nThe last rocketing of Saigon occurred on the morning of Thursday,\nMarch 6. Since then, enemy rockets have been launched against the\ncity of Hue. In my opinion, any further significant shelling or rocketing of\nSaigon, Danang, or Hue should bring about an appropriate response on our\npart. This leaves, of course, the key question as to what kind of response\nwould be appropriate. In my conversation with President Thieu, he stated\nthat it should be a wise and measured one, not disproportionate to the\nlevel of the enemy attacks. He also suggested that the response might\nbe political or diplomatic, rather than military. As I see it, a response\nwhich would entail any extensive bombing of North Vietnam would yield us\nlittle militarily. Though it might demonstrate to the South Vietnamese\nour continued commitment to their cause, it would serve to equate justifi-\nable military activity on our part with unjustifiable and indiscriminate\n3\nattacks on the enemy's part. It would lead to a renewal of the criticism\nfrom many factions within both the United States and the world community,\nand would tend to put us into the position vis a vis world and U.S.\nopinion in which the previous administration found itself just about a\nyear ago.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n7\nAs I indicated in a separate message to you on March 9, I believe\nwe stand to lose, on balance, if we are encouraged to actions which serve\nto equate military action on our part to indiscriminate terrorism on the\nenemy's part. I believe it would be reasonable to confine ourselves to\nconsideration of political and diplomatic alternatives to the indiscriminate\nshellings. A temporary suspension of attendance at the plenary Paris\nsessions might be effective. If the North Vietnamese are eager for U.S.\nwithdrawal and resolution of the conflict in SVII, such a temporary recess\nmight be more of a burden on them than a military response. North Vietnam\n&\nwould be cast in the role of impeding progress to peace and would take\nthe brunt of adverse world opinion.\nTo the extent further military action may be indicated against the\nenemy's current offensive, we should look for a response which would\nwork to our advantage, either by securing some immediate military gain\n-or by bringing us closer to genuine substantive discussions in Paris.\nA well-considered and effective operation against some enemy military\ntarget in the border areas might provide both an appropriate signal and\nsome military benefit. I will be prepared to discuss this issue further\nwith you privately and with the National Security Council.\nStatus of U.S. Forces -- Men and Equipment\nUnder the superior leadership of General Abrams, our commanders and\nour men in the field exhibit the most heartening qualities of dedication\nand performance. They are confident of their ability to counter and\nthrow back any enemy attack anywhere in South Vietnam. Our men are not\nonly well led, but they are also well equipped and provided for. Not the\nleast among the factors contributing to high morale among our forces is\nthe realization that the most prompt and modern medical care is available.\nI had the opportunity personally to see how this medical care is being\nprovided in one of the many American hospitals which exist throughout the\ncountry. I was assured by General Abrams that he needs nothing further in\nthe way of men, equipment or facilities to insure the maximum safety and\nsecurity for U.S. forces.\nA striking illustration of the complete adequacy of our military\nsupport can be seen in the comparative figures on air ordnance expendi-\ntures. In World War 11, air ordnance utilized by the U.S. in the\nEuropean and Mediterranean theaters amounted to 1.5 million tons. The\n,\nPacific theater accounted for 0.5 million tons. In the Korean War,\nthe total expended by U.S. elements was 0.6 million tons. World War 11\nand the Korean War together thus accounted for 2.6 million tons. By way\nof comparison, during the years 1966 through 1968, 2.8 million tons have\nalready been expended in Southeast Asia.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuantito Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n8\nReadiness and Progress of RVNAF\nI recognize that the RVNAF modernization program had been designed\nto create an RVNAF capable of coping with insurgency that could remain\nif US/NVA forces withdrew. I was disappointed, though, by the relatively\nlow rate of progress evidenced toward raising the RVNAF capability to\nassume more of the burden of the war.\n$\nIn total, the regular, irregular, and police forces of South Vietnam\nnow include over one million men. The arms and equipment furnished by\nthe United States have increased in quantity and quality. I am recom-\nmending that we advance our plans and furnish additional items needed to\nachieve full modernization for these indigenous forces. I am doing so,\nhowever, solely on the basis that this will permit us immediately to\nbegin the process of replacing American forces in South Vietnam with\nbetter trained, better led, and better armed South Vietnamese military\nand para-military personnel.\nI regret to report that I see no indication that we presently have\na program adequate to bring about a significant reduction in the U.S.\nmilitary contribution in South Vietnam. The development of such a program\nshould receive our first priority. For example, despite a strong recom-\nmendation made, I understand, last summer that the promotion policy of\nARVN should be adjusted so as to rectify the substantial shortages in\nofficers in the ranks of captain through colonel, substantial shortages still\nexist. Progress has been slow. The need for a drastic change in promotion\npolicies apparently has been accepted in principle and potentially adequate\ncorrective programs have been initiated but progress continues to be slow.\nSimilarly, although our military leaders have recommended the adoption\nof the accelerated Phase 11 modernization program, I was given no indication\nthat its completion would enable us to effect any substantial reduction in\nAmerican forces in South Vietnam. As mentioned earlier, the present RVNAF\nmodernization program was designed only to build up the South Vietnamese forces\nso that they could cope with VC insurgents. Our military authorities be-\n-lieve neither the South Vietnamese manpower base nor any possible moderniza-\ntion program would enable the RVNAF to cope alone with a threat comparable\nto the present level of aggression. This has been the assumption from\nthe inception of the RVNAF improvement program. However, I do not believe\nwe can accept the proposition that U.S. forces must remain in substantial\n3 numbers indefinitely to contain the North Vietnamese threat, if political\nsettlement proves unobtainable. The heavy expense of RVNAF modernization\ncannot be justified as a measure merely to permit the GVN to cope with\nlocal insurgency.\nThe presentation given to me by the MACV staff was based on the premise\nthat no reduction in U.S. personnel would be possible in the absence of\ntotal withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. I do not believe that our national\ninterests, in the light of our military commitments worldwide, permit us to\nindulge in this assumption. Nor do I feel that true pacification and GVN\ncontrol over its own population can ever be achieved while our own forces\ncontinue such a pervasive presence in South Vietnam.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n9\nOur orientation seems to be more on operations than on assisting\nthe South Vietnamese to acquire the means to defend themselves. Thus,\nfor example, we have continued to tolerate notoriously incompetent\nCommanders in the Fifth and Eighteenth ARVN Divisions in the key\n111 Corps region. I sense, too, a tendency on the part of both our\nown people and the GVN to discount somewhat the seriousness of the high\nRVNAF desertion rate. The emphasis can and must now be shifted to\nmeasures through which South Vietnam can achieve a self-defense capa-\n&\nbility that will strengthen our joint hand in Paris and prevent ultimate\nmilitary defeat if political settlement proves impossible.\nPlanning for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces\nThe question that arises is not whether we should do more in\nSouth Vietnam, but rather whether we should do less. No one now suggests\nthe necessity for sending more U.S. troops to Southeast Asia. But at\nthe same time, no one has furnished me with any detailed analysis of\nthe necessity for the continued presence of over 549 thousand Americans\nin South Vietnam and Thailand.\nWe are presently able to contain the enemy militarily and to\nmaintain mass military pressure on him. With an appropriate improvement\nin the performance of the Armed Forces of South Vietnam, we should be\nable to retain this posture with a simultaneous diminution in the U.S.\nshare of the total military effort. This will require full study of\nthe best way to effect the maximum replacement of U.S. combat forces\nwith those of South Vietnam. With your approval, I will direct that\nsuch a study be undertaken immediately.\nIn the meantime, I believe it is essential that we decide now to\ninitiate the removal from Southeast Asia of some U.S. military personnel.\nThe qualitative and quantitative improvement of the RVNAF to date,\nalthough perhaps less than desired, should permit us to redeploy from\nSoutheast Asia between 50 to 70 thousand troops during the remainder of\nthis calendar year. I am convinced that this will in no way jeopardize\nthe security of the remaining U.S. and Allied forces and that such a\nmove is necessary to retain U.S. public support for our continued efforts\nin South Vietnam. Embassy officials in Saigon suggested to me that any\nreduction on our part would trigger proportionate reductions in other\n3\nallied forces. Given the present highly disproportionate contribution\nof South Vietnam's Asian neighbors, as compared with our own, such\nreduction on their part would be unwarranted. But even if they were made,\nwithdrawal of Korean, Thai, Australian and New Zealand troops in an equal\npercentage would not significantly affect the total military strength\nconfronting the enemy. Moreover, it is clear that South Vietnam's leaders\nexpect and are entirely ready for a reduction of this size. President\nThieu has indicated this repeatedly in public pronouncements. He expressed\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n10\nthis opinion forthrightly in our private discussion on March 8. At the\nsame time, I feel very strongly that we, rather than the GVN or the\npossible reaction of other troop-contributing countries, should determine\nwhen and how many American soldiers should be withdrawn from the conflict\nin SEA.\nTermination (\"T\" Day) Planning\n&\nThe foregoing discussion assumes no termination of the war in South\nVietnam, but rather the orderly replacement of United States Forces as\nthe armed forces of South Vietnam take over a steadily increasing share\nof the war effort. I have discussed with Admiral McCain and General\nAbrams the status of their plans for the more rapid turnover and removal\nof American military equipment that would be required in the event a\npolitical settlement brings the conflict to a termination.\nUnder such circumstances, we would want to leave the South Vietnamese\nforces with the equipment necessary for them to cope with the residual\ninsurgency and to help deter any renewal of aggression by North Vietnam.\nAt the same time, we should not feel that the forces of South Vietnam\nmust be turned into a replica in miniature of the United States military\nestablishment. As in the case of the Republic of Korea, we should\nanticipate that the more sophisticated elements of the needed defensive\nstrength could continue to be derived from United States resources.\nFor planning purposes we should define \"T\" Day as that date on\nwhich agreement is reached to cease hostilities in South Vietnam and\nthe North Vietnamese are returning their forces to North Vietnam. Our\nParis delegation continues to refer to the terms of the 1966 Manila\nConference communique. 1, personally, have had serious questions about\nthose terms and believe that they were rendered obsolete by initiation\nof the Paris negotiations. Under the Manila communique terms, the allied\nforces would begin their withdrawal concurrently with the gradual with-\ndrawal of North Vietnamese troops. Withdrawal of U.S. and Free World\nforces would continue only while North Vietnam moves toward total with-\ndrawal and ceases all infiltration. The provision of the Manila com-\nmunique to the effect that U.S. and other allied forces will be withdrawn\nnot later than six months after these conditions have been fulfilled must\nbe interpreted, if it is to apply at all, as referring to those residual\n3\nforces that would be on hand at the time when all North Vietnamese forces\nhave returned to their own country.\nThe Manila communique may not, of course, form the basis of any\nsettlement that may be reached in Paris. The Manila communique was\ndesigned on the assumption of a de facto termination to hostilities,\nrather than negotiations. The Paris talks may yield a withdrawal formula.\nwhich is either more gradual or more precipitate than that contemplated\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSENSITIVE\n11\nat Manila. In any event, our planning should proceed on a basis that\nwill permit US to effect an orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops and an\nefficient turnover of United States equipment to the South Vietnamese,\nbeginning as soon as hostilities have ceased.\nI found T-Day planning has advanced to the stage where plans\nare either under development, or the plans have been published and are\nunder review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Abrams' staff has\n&\nbeen able during the past few weeks to define more accurately the size\nof the problem confronting us in withdrawing personnel and equipment.\nFor example, whereas in October 1968 MACV estimated that some 10 million\nshort tons of materiel and supplies would require removal from Southeast\nAsia, the current estimate is that the amount is more like 5.5 million\nshort tons. The ongoing MACV staff work includes attempts to improve\ninventory control and to reduce inventories in certain supply categories.\nI believe, however, that we need to address more expeditiously the \"T\"\nDay problems of orderly and systematic withdrawal of men and equipment.\nEven short of cessation of hostilities, such planning can have considerable\nutility in making our phase-down and the transfer of effort to the RVNAF\nmore efficient.\nAs in the case of RVNAF modernization, there appears to be considerable\nreluctance to recognize the inevitability of an early reduction in the\nAmerican effort in South Vietnam. In the event that a political solution\ncannot be found in Paris, I am convinced that achievement of our objectives\nrequires immediate initiation of efforts to diminish our share of the\ntotal military effort. Accordingly, our entire defense organization must\nbe alerted to the need to develop and implement promptly the measures that\nwill facilitate an efficient and orderly reduction in the current United\nStates involvement in Vietnam.\nConclusions and Recommendations\n1. Our fighting men in Southeast Asia, under the superb leadership\nof General Abrams, are fully supported and have the resources in men,\nmaterial, and facilities to accomplish their assigned tasks with maximum\npossible safety and security.\n3\n2. Steady progress is being made in the application of military\npressure on the enemy. But there is consensus among our civilian and\nmilitary leaders in South Vietnam that a military victory within 6, 12,\n18, or 24 months, or even longer, is not feasible under prevailing constraints.\n3. The enemy's increased use of border sanctuaries as safe havens\nfor logistics, training, and command and control support is a matter of\nincreasing danger to our forces. Consideration should be given to the\nmodification of our rules of engagement to permit more effective actions\nagainst this threat, short of lasting extension of the geographic area\nof the war.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order-13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n12\n4. The RVNAF continues to show improvement, but we must explore\nways to accelerate equipment delivery and increase combat effective-\nness. There may be certain areas such as pilot and technical training\nwhich will be difficult to accelerate. In any event, we shall need\nto provide additional funding for RVNAF modernization purposes.\n5. The precondition for this additional assistance on an accelerated\nbasis must be that it will permit the expedited replacement of U.S.\nforces.\n=\n6. This replacement process should begin and be pursued on a\nsystematic basis designed to assure sustained pressure on the enemy\nand sustained support of the war by the American public.\n7. The leadership of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to\nparticipate in such a replacement program and expresses the belief\nthat, as our forces are replaced, the RVN's independent ability to\nmeet the enemy's aggression will be strengthened.\n8. We must make sure that our entire Defense establishment under-\nstands the need to refine our concept of T-Day planning and to develop\na detailed program for transferring and redeploying men and materiel as\nhostilities diminish and finally terminate.\n9. To enhance the vital interests of our country (particularly\nin recognition of our worldwide military requirements), to stimulate\nincreased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the Government\nof RVN, and to sustain the support of the American public for our stated\nobjectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of 50-70 thousand\nU.S. troops from South Vietnam this year. These plans should also be\ndeveloped to provide for continuing substantial replacement of U.S.\nwith South Vietnamese forces in the following years.\noffice\n2 Attachments\n,\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECI ASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nParticipants:\nRVN\nHis Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu\nPresident of the Republic of Viet-Nam\nHis Excellency Nguyen Cao Ky\nVice President\nHis Excellency Tran Chanh Thanh\nMinister of Foreign Affairs\nGeneral Cao Van Vien\nChief of Joint General Staffs\nMr. Nguyen Phu Duc\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nUS\nThe Honorable Melvin R. Laird\nSecretary of Defense\nThe Honorable Ellsworth Bunker\nAmbassador\nGeneral Earle G. Wheeler\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nThe Honorable G. Warren Nutter\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)\nThe Honorable Robert Froehlke\nAssistant Secretary of Defense (A)\nGeneral Creighton W. Abrams\nCOMUSMACV\nThe Honorable Samuel D. Berger\nDeputy Ambassador\nTime/Place: Independence Palace, Saigon\nMarch 8, 1969 - 11:30 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.\nSubject:\nMeeting of Secretary of Defense with President Thieu\n1. After some social exchange, Secretary Laird said that President Nixon\nwished him to visit South Viet-Nam at this time both in connection with his\nnew duties as Secretary of Defense, and in preparation for his appearance\nbefore Congress on the defense budget and military assistance program for\n1970. The new administration has some time, which the last administration\ndid not have, to work out matters with the South Vietnamese government in\norder to achieve our common objectives. He had, therefore, to have a full\nunderstanding of the situation and what the needs would be in the future.\nPresident Thieu replied by asking how the Secretary saw the situation in\nthe United States.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\n2. Secretary Laird said when the new administration took over it was\nquite clear that time had run out on the last administration in terms\nof public support for our Viet-Nam policy. Since the changeover, the\nAmerican people and Congress have shown a willingness to give President\nNixon time to see what can be done to bring the conflict to an end, along\nwith achieving our objectives. There is not the same amoùnt of pressure\nnow that there was toward the end of last year, and the new administration\nhas some time -- perhaps six months or twelve -- he cannot say exactly.\nThe most immediate problems were the modernization and improvement of the\nVietnamese forces and the assumption by Viet-Nam of a greater share of\nresponsibility for the fighting. The reduction of American troops should\nbe based on the improvement of the Vietnamese fighting forces and the\nmilitary requirements. It is important that numbers be avoided in state-\nments about American reductions until after the necessary studies have been\nmade. He could tell the President, in confidence, that when he appears\nbefore Congress in March, he will ask for additional funds for Phase 11 to\naccelerate the modernization and equipment of the Vietnamese forces.\n3. President Thieu said he would like to clearify the Vietnamese view\nof this matter. He knows that South Viet-Nam has given American adminis-\ntrations and the American people many problems. He wants to alleviate\nthese and reduce the burden on the United States. This can only be done\nunder certain conditions. Thére is as yet no sign from the other side that\nthey wish to de-escalate the war. This means the fighting will go on. To\nreduce the burden on the United States, the Vietnamese armed forces must\nbe better trained and equipped so as to enable the United States gradually\nto reduce the size of its forces here. He asked for full support of the\nUnited States to achieve this.\n4. Secretary Laird asked President Thieu to comment on the effect of the\nshelling of the cities on the people and on the government. President\nThieu replied with a long statement, the highlights of which were:\na. The communists hoped in February to initiate another\nTet offensive such as occurred last year, but they were unable\nto achievethis. First, we were too well prepared. Second,\nthey were unable to coordinate the shelling with the spear-\nheaded units moving into the cities, to be followed by ground\nattacks, all designed to produce a general uprising. They\nnow have no hope of an uprising in the South.\nb. The shelling is designed to give their troops confidence\nand build their morale for attacks; also to show the people in the\nNorth that they are doing something. They could not indefinitely\nsit in their bases and sanctuaries waiting for Paris to produce\nvictory. This offensive is a sign of weakness, not strength.\nC. The political aim of these shelling attacks was to impress\nthe United States with their capability to mount another offensive\nand to show the Americans that Hanoi is not prepared to agree\neasily to the US terms for a withdrawal.\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-3-\nd. The shelling, further, is an attempt to make people be-\nlieve there was no understanding with the United States in connec-\ntion with the bombing cessation. It was to prove that the US had\nto call off the bombing because of its weak position in the eyes of\npublic opinion, not because of any understandings.\ne. They hope the shelling will demoralize the people and\ngovernment in South Viet-Nam and create strains between the\nSouth Vietnamese and the United States. They want the GVN\nto ask the Americans to find a solution, and if the United States\ndoes not dare to retaliate, they expect this will create differences\nbetween the United States and the GVN. It is thus a test of Presi-\ndent Nixon and the new administration. Everything now depends\non how we respond both in Viet-Nam and in Paris.\nf. The first rocketing had no effect, but as it goes on,\npeople are beginning to ask what the United States will say in\nParis, and what we will do. If there is no response, the South\nVietnamese will conclude that the United States \"does not have a\nstrong attitude of support for the South. The communists will ex-\nploit this in their propaganda to try to convince people in\nSouth Viet-Nam that the US is moving toward a soft solution.\"\ng. If the shelling continues and no response is made,\ndiplomatically, politically, or militarily, it would have very\nbad effects here. President Nixon's statement at his press conference\non this subject, and Secretary Laird's arrival statement have given\ngreat satisfaction here, but if the shelling continues with no\nresponse, people will begin to wonder.\nh. He is not pushing to resume the bombing of the North.\n\"At least not now, for we must be wise and deliberate in\nour reaction. Each time there is a shelling, we must\nexamine the situation together, and at some point we must\ndecide what to do. General Vien and General Abrams should\nget together to study what kind of responses might be made.\"\n5. President Thieu commented on the excellent relations which now\nexist with the United States. He understands perfectly well that Presi-\ndent Nixon is not yet ready to make decisions and announcements as to\nwhat he will do in South Viet-Nam, but he hopes that this will be\ndone after Secretary Laird returns. He hopes that the \"wise actions\"\nthat he referred to in conjunction with retaliation will be taken in\nconcert and will be discussed in advance between the two governments.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n-4-\n6. Secretary Laird commented favorably on the strong leadership\nwhich President Thieu had given the pacification program and the pro-\ngram to modernize the forces. He then asked how things were going\non the building of a political base in order to compete with the\ncommunists after a settlement. He noted that President Thieu was getting\naround the country a great deal. Speaking as a former politician, he knew\nhow important it was that President Thieu take time to do this.\n7. President Thieu said that he was no politician, but the simple fact\nwas that the GVN had to have a strong and broad political base if it\nwas to fight the war, carry out the negotiations, and ultimately deal\nwith the new situation that would arise when peace came. Viet-Nam,\nunfortunately, has more politicians than businessmen. There are many\npolitical parties and organizations, and politicians operate freely,\nbut they do not operate together. Many have tried to bring them to-\ngether with no success. He must now do this himself. He had, however,\nto move with some caution. People still have vivid memories of Presi-\ndent Diem's political party -- the Can Lao. It was a strong party,\ncomposed of the military forces, government officials, politicians and\nthe people. But that party led to dictatorship, and many people are fear-\nful that another strong party would produce the same result. This was\nwhy he had to move with care, but he hoped to have good results by the end\nof the year. Everyone recognized that after a settlement, the Communists\nwould operate in the free political life of South Viet-Nam and would con-\nstitute a danger. The genuine nationalists therefore had to come together\nto meet this threat.\n8. Continuing on this same subject, President Thieu said while it is\na fact that the nationalists are not well organized, what is also true\nis that the communists have no firm control over the people either. There\nis a vacuum here that has to be filled. One of his main objectives this year\nis to strengthen the GVN's political base at the local level. This means\nelections in the villages and hamlets, and good administration at that level.\n\"We are confident that we can build this base in the countryside. It is\nmore important than uniting the politicians in Saigon, because many of the\npoliticians have no political following.'\n9. One of his main problems is the communists' deliberate campaign of\nassassination directed at anyone with leadership ability, from the top\nto the bottom. They are trying to exterminate every South Viet-Nam\nnationalist leader, following the same pattern as they did in 1945.\nThis year is the decisive year for both sides. But the government is now\nin an advantageous position to win the support of the people and consoli-\ndate its political base. This is why he is training local officials in\nlarge numbers, and why he attaches so much importance to land reform.\n\"I have called for a revolution in the countryside to win popular support.\"\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-5-\n10. Secretary Laird said that one problem in the United States is\nthat over the years, the administration has made one optimistic re-\nport after another to Congress and the people. If those reports of\nprogress had been true, the war should have been won long since. The\nnew administration must be careful about its reports of progress, and\nits predictions, or it, too, will be discredited. It cannot give our\nCongress and our people the impression that success is just around the\ncorner either in Paris or in Viet-Nam. It must present the situation\nas it really is, or the American people will soon come to disbelieve\nit as well.\n11. President Thieu said that his government was proceeding very\nmethodically. It has set out its objectives and now it must \"capture\"\nthem one by one. One of the most important areas is the pacification\nof the countryside. The present communist offensive had, up to now,\nhad little effect on the pacification program. It has not been set back\nand, indeed, is proceeding. If the communists cannot disrupt the paci-\nfication program with this offensive, then it will become obvious that\nthere is no hope for them.\n12. Secretary Laird asked the President if he would discuss the pro-\ngress being made in the police forces. President Thieu replied in\nmuch the same vein as the Prime Minister in the earlier conversation.\nThis year concentration is on establishing the police forces in the\nvillages. It was here and in the hamlets that law and order and security\nhad to be established, and civil administration improved. This was the\njob of the Defense and Interior Ministries. Many police and local offi-\ncials were being trained for this work.\n13. Secretary Laird said when he saw President Nixon on his return\nfrom Europe, the President said he was very pleased with his visit.\nHe had made that trip for several reasons, and President Nixon wished\nPresident Thieu to understand that while he made his first visit abroad\nto Europe, it did not minimize in any way the importance he attaches to\nthe problems in Asia, and here in Viet-Nam. Our position in Europe had\ndeteriorated in several ways, and many questions were being asked by\nthe Europeans. The cost of the war in South Viet-Nam has been a major\nportion of the American defense budget, and while we were engaged here\nthe Soviet Union had been busy building up its military power. The\nEuropeans were greatly concerned over American intentions.\n14. Presidnt Thieu said he would like to confirm what Vice President\nKy had told President Nixon. All Presidents have their priorities, and\nhe understands the reasons why President Nixon went to Paris first.\nHowever, the leaders of Asia, and especially Southeast Asia, feel they\nmust have an opportunity to talk with President Nixon before long. A\nmeeting was needed not just on Viet-Nam, but on the future of Southeast\nGRODET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-6-\nAsia. We have a common point of view with this administration on Viet-\nNam, he said, but there is much uneasiness in the area, and other\nleaders have a psychological need for assurances about the future of\nAmerican policy in this area. Secretary Laird said he would convey this\nmessage to the President, adding that President Nixon had many things to\ndo at home in the immediate future and was not likely to move out of\nWashington very much in the next few months.\n15. President Thieu asked when the next elections would be held in\nthe United States. Secretary Laird said in the fall of 1970, but there\nwould be an election in early April in the Secretary's district to fill\nhis seat. It would be a very tough fight, but it might be an indication\nof the attitude of the American people toward the new administration.\n16. The Secretary said that the communists seemed to have impressed\nmany in the world that it is they who want peace, and it is our side\nwhich wants war. Has President Thieu any suggestions as to how our\nside might deal with this problem of convincing people that it is we\nwho really want peace? President Thieu's reply was rather discursive.\nHe said there is a problem here which he recognizes, but it is not easy\nto solve. We must stake our case on the defense of freedom. We must show\nwe want peace, but not a false peace. We must show that it is the com-\nmunists who are aggressors and it is they who make war. The peace which will\ncome to Viet-Nam must not be a temporary peace. It must be a peace which\nis guaranteed by the free nations. The communists have one aim -- to\nget American power out of Southeast Asia. If that happens, then there\nwill be no peace. We must therefore think of the long term. The com-\nmunists may make concessions in Paris in order to have the Americans\nleave South Viet-Nam and the area, but when this war ends, the com-\nmunists must know that the free world will come back if they invade again.\nThe guarantee of peace in this part of the world is therefore very im-\nportant. It must rest, in the first instance, on the nations in the\narea being strong, so that they can defend themselves, and also they must\njoin together to help each other. But American power will always be\nessential. The problem is how to reduce further burdens on the United\nStates, and this can only be done if each of the countries is made stronger\nto defend itself, and the countries unite for security.\n17. President Thieu then asked Vice President Ky if he had any remarks.\nKy said he had talked to many newsmen in Paris and it was clear they\nwere tired of hearing the communists repeating their verions of history,\nthe war, their demands, etc. This rigidity was doing the communists no\ngood. They were losing press interest and support. On the other hand,\nSouth Viet-Nam had shown its good will and its desire to arrive at a peace-\nful conclusion to the war, and he believed the South Vietnamese government\nhas gained some support in the press.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified\n-7-\n18. Ky then went on:\n\"As the negotiations progress, we must not be expected to con-\ntinue to make concessions in order to make progress. We must\nshow Hanoi that we have more determination than they. We must\nprove they cannot win by force. We must convince them they cannot\nask us or expect us to surrender. American public opinion is\nvery important to us, but if American public opinion demands that we\nmake concession after concession, then we will lose in the nego-\ntiations, and the American sacrifice here will have been in vain.\nA cease-fire or a temporary solution cannot bring lasting peace.\n\"The trouble is that nations who are not involved, nations which\nknow nothing about South Viet-Nam, speak loudly about peace,\nand stopping the war. But for the South Vietnamese the outcome\nof the negotiations is a matter of survival. The issue is funda-\nmental: Hanoi must withdraw, then we can solve our internal\nproblems by ourselves. If the United States forces us to make\nconcessions, or to deal with the communists while the forces of\nHanoi are still in the South, this will never be accepted by the\nSouth.\"\n19. Ky said there were differences between the Vietnamese government\nand the last American administration, and these added to the con-\nfusion in Viet-Nam and the United States. Because of this confusion\npeople began to question the validity of the American commitment or\nthe value of continuing the fight. President Nixon asked him for mutual\ntrust and understanding. He assured the President that South Viet-Nam\nwould give him that trust and understanding. He had said the same\nthing to Harriman. If there was a solid foundation of trust between\nthe two, we will succeed. If there is division between us, we will both\nlose this war.\n\"We in South Viet-Nam must take over a greater share of the\nburden of the war from the United States, but for that we must\nhave help -- more military forces, more training, more and\nbetter equipment.\"\n20. Ky remarked bitterly that the Soviet Union helps North Viet-Nam,\nbut no one criticizes her. Why then this criticism of the United States?\nHe blamed American newsmen. He ended up with an emotional appeal to put\nViet-Nam in front:\n\"We do not ask you to bomb the North -- we will do it ourselves.\nThere will be less criticism, or no criticism, if we bomb. Let\nour pilots be captured, nor yours. If the shelling continues, the\nVietnamese Air Force should be turned loose, and if President\nSECRET\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-8-\nThieu orders me I will lead the attacks myself. We have that\nright. I am aware that the resumption of bombing creates\nproblems for the United States, but if the cities continue\nto be shelled, we must retaliate. Otherwise what can we tell\nour people? If we do nothing our people will regard us as\nweak, there will be no progress in Paris, and people here will\nbegin to say that the ultimate outcome will be a communist takeover\nin the negotiations.\"\n21. Secretary Laird said that President Nixon has decided to go ahead\nwith a supplemental budget in order to accelerate the training and equip-\nment of the South Vietnamese forces so that they can take over more of\nthe burden from the United States. We are prepared to move as rapidly\nas we can to turn over more and more of the fighting to South Viet-Nam.\n22. After the conference concluded, President Thieu made a few further\nremarks to the Secretary and Ambassador Bunker, while they were waiting\nfor lunch to be served.\na. He went over the ground of retaliation for the shelling,\nemphasizing that the response must be \"correct, wise, and\nmoderate.\" The communists were trying to put the GVN in a\nposition of asking for a resumption of the bombing of the North.\nPerhaps, he speculated, a preferable course would be \"one-for-\none, a tooth-for-a-tooth. Each time they shell, we strike the\nNorth.\" Thieu had obviously not thought through all the implica-\ntions of this tactic, for he said again that General Abrams and\nGeneral Vien should talk about the problems and come up with\nsuggestions.\nb. On the enemy's strategy, he thought there would be a\nrenewal of the current offensive any day. They had a capability\nto strike again for two or three weeks, and this time they might\ndirect their aim at the pacification program. They would then\npause, and the pattern would be repeated some time later. He\nthought this would probably go on through April or May, and by\nthen if they were unsuccessful -- and he was confident they would\nfail -- they might be ready to move to substantive talks, possibly\nproposing a cease-fire at Paris.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON D.C. 20301\n13 March 1969\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nSUBJECT: Meeting of Secretary of Defense with the Prime Minister\nParticipants:\nRepublic of Vietnam\nHis Excellency Tran Van Huong - - Prime Minister of the RVN\nHis Excellency Nguyen Van Vy - Minister of Defense\nHis Excellency Huynh Van Dao Minister to the Prime Minister\nMr. Tran Van Dinh - Interpreter\nUnited States\nHonorable Melvin R. Laird Secretary of Defense\nHonorable Ellsworth Bunker - Ambassador\nGeneral Earle G. Wheeler - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nHonorable G. Warren Nutter - - Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)\nHonorable Robert Froehlke - - Assistant Secretary of Defense (A)\nGeneral Creighton W. Abrams - COMUSMACV\nHonorable Samuel D. Berger - Deputy Ambassador\nTime: 1030 - 1130, 8 March 1969\nPlace: Prime Minister's Office\n1. Secretary Laird opened with an expression of concern over the attempted\nassassination, and our great happiness with the Prime Minister's escape.\nThe Prime Minister smiled, \"It's one of the risks of office.\" The Secretary\nsaid he hoped everything would be done to improve further the Prime Min-\nister's personal security arrangements.\n2. The Secretary said he would be appearing before Congress soon on the\n,\ndefense budget for 1970. He had been 17 years in Congress, but this was\nthe first time he would be on the administration's side of the table.\nPresident Nixon thought he should take this trip to Vietnam to acquire a\nbetter understanding of the situation here for his job and for his appear-\nance as a witness.\n3. The Prime Minister replied that this was a good idea. Perhaps the\nreports he has been getting from here are \"too rosy.\" The Secretary replied\nthat President Nixon has great confidence in Ambassador Bunker and General\nAbrams and in what they report, and then asked the Prime Minister how he\nviewed the progress, and what he thought of the problems which still remain.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n2\n4. The Prime Minister said the situation has greatly improved during this\npast year, thanks to the vigorous activities of the government, but espec-\nially thanks to the firmness of President Thieu, who had made the right\ndecisions at the right time. He asked the Secretary what problems he saw\nhere in Vietnam. The Secretary said that we were concerned about reports\nof desertions in the armed forces, and he would like the Prime Minister's\nviews of this matter.\n5. Mr. Huong said the armed forces had come a long way in improving, both\nin quality and quantity. Morale has never been as high as now, and discip-\nline has improved. Proof of the progress can be seen in the successes of\nthe fighting efforts of the SVN forces in these last months. But the situa-\ntion is not yet satisfactory. The Prime Minister then called on the Minis-\nter of Defense to explain the reasons for desertions.\n6. Minister Vy said that compared with previous years desertions are much\nlower, and the desertion rate is not alarming. Most of those who desert\nquit one branch of the service to enroll elsewhere, where they can be nearer\ntheir homes or where the pay and allowances are greater, or the conditions\nbetter. He has been trying to improve conditions in all the services in\norder to reduce the desertion rate. What is very reassuring is that there\nwere few soldiers defecting to the enemy. The Prime Minister expanded on\nthis, but made no additional points.\n7. The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister to discuss the programs for\nimproving and expanding the police forces. The Prime Minister said that\nboth recruiting and training of the police are going on all the time. About\n10,000 are being added each year. The main emphasis this year is training\nthe police for service in the villages and hamlets. Ambassador Bunker said\nthe plan is to put six policemen in each village. The Prime Minister said\nthat the extension of the pacification program has been so great and has\ncome so quickly that it has been beyond their expectations. There is much\nnow to be done to consolidate the presence of the government in the villages\nand hamlets and to introduce projects that would help improve life in the\nvillages. More funds were needed for this kind of work.\n8. The Secretary asked General Wheeler if he would like to make any re-\nmarks, and General Wheeler said he wanted to go back to desertions. It is\nour experience that where there is good leadership there are good results.\nSoldiers like to serve under good officers and when there are good officers\nand good leadership, desertion rates are low. The Prime Minister agreed,\nbut said good officers must have more than technical knowledge of fighting.\n,\nThe men must know what they are fighting for and for whom. There must be\njustice in the units. There must be good morale and a good spirit. The\nofficers must look after their men and be concerned with their welfare.\n9. Secretary Laird then expressed concern about statements made giving\nnumbers of American troops to be reduced this year (an oblique reference to\nPresident Thieu's interview last week with the Washington Post). He was\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n3\nsure he would be asked about these numbers when he appeared before Congress.\nAmerican troop reductions will require close coordination between the two\ngovernments. The question had to be studied by the respective staffs and\nany statement made had to be carefully worked out together and coordinated.\nTo make statements that could not be fulfilled would create additional prob-\nlems in the United States. At the end of the last administration, he had\nto say frankly, public support for Vietnam was very low, and many of our\npeople no longer believed what they were told. The new administration had\nto work on these matters in order to revive public support for our Vietnam\npolicy. The American people will give the new administration some time to\nwork out things, both here and in Paris. He doesn't know how long that\nwill be -- six, ten, twelve: months, or longer. The important thing is\nthat troop reductions must be associated with the ability of the South\nVietnamese forces to take on the greater share of the burden of fighting\nso as to reduce the American burden, and that when we make the reduction\nannouncement we know it can be carried out.\n10. The Prime Minister said that he understood this problem very well.\nPresident Thieu's statement was aimed to appease the American people and\ngive them a feeling that South Vietnam was prepared to take on a greater\nshare of the fighting. Secretary Laird said that until we see the studies\nof General Vien and General Abrams and have some better estimate of the\ndegree of progress in the training and equipment of the South Vietnamese\nforces and in the general situation, it would be wise to avoid giving out\nany numbers for the reduction. The Prime Minister agreed.\n11. The Secretary asked what effect the shelling of the cities was having\nthe people of South Vietnam. The Prime Minister said the people were\ngetting used to it. Vietnamese, like other asians, are fatalistic. They\nbelieve there is a time fixed in destiny when each person will die, and\nnothing can be done about it. What was remarkable was that there was no\npanic here during these recent shellings, and this was perhaps because the\nintensity and frequency of the rocketing was small compared with the past.\nThe rocketing has also given the government some advantages. It has proved\nto both the Vietnamese people and the people of the world the true face\nof communism. It has sown even more hatred here for the communists. The\nfighting forces are very angry and they speak only of revenge. Ambassador\nBunker asked what is the enemy's purpose in shelling the cities. The Prime\nMinister said their ultimate purpose is to take over the country at any\ncost, but this they can no longer do. They have suffered too many losses,\nand so they find it difficult to face their people in the North and in the\n,\nSouth. They must therefore do something to show they are active, something\ndramatic to impress their supporters. This is one aspect, but there is\nanother. Hanoi believes the people here and abroad are impatient for peace.\nThe rocketing is designed to show the world and the people in the South\nthat they are strong and they can strike at will. They believe it will\nput them in a better position in Paris. The Northerners arepatient and they\nbelieve that American patience is running out. If they step up the attacks\nperhaps the Americans will pull out. They, therefore, have staged these\nrecent attacks in order to try to extract concessions in Paris. This is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\n4\nthe trap that they are laying. Southerners are also patient, and indeed\nmore patient than Northerners. The question is American patience. It is\nhere where the South Vietnamese are concerned.\n12. Secretary Laird said that the Americans recognize Hanoi's game and\ntake this into account. He believes the great majority of Americans will\ngive the new administration some time to see what progress could be made\nin terms of bringing the war to an end, but it is a little early to gauge\nhow American public opinion will go. He then asked if South Vietnam has\nto face elections how much public support does the government have.\n13. The Prime Minister said when he took over in May the situation was\nvery difficult. It was just after Tet with all its destruction and uncer-\ntainty, and the confidence of the people was low. He accepted office be-\ncause it was his duty to help restore the confidence of the people in\ngovernment and in victory. It is difficult to measure the extent of public\nsupport of the government, but there are tangible signs that confidence\nhas been restored:\na. Last May there was much talk of an economic crisis and collapse,\nand people were getting ready to leave the country. But there has been no\ncollapse. Prices have since been fairly stable and there has been an\neconomic revival. The people no longer fear danger in this quarter.\nb. The military successes of last year have also done much to restore\nconfidence. Last year many people were doubtful and fearful of the future\nbecause of the heavy attacks of the communists at Tet. But the communists\nhave had so many casualties, so many caches have been captured, and the\nfighting forces of the South are so much more effective that people now, he\nthinks, do have confidence in the future.\nC. Many of the caches that have been found, much of the success in\nbattle, have come through the cooperation of the people, who more and more\nare supplying information about the enemy to the government. This is a\nvery good sign.\nd. Finally, although he did not want to appear vain, he thought it\nmight be useful to mention the reaction of the people to the attempted\nassassination on him earlier this week. He has had hundreds of cables and\nletters and expressions of sympathy. These have come from every part of\nthe country, from all the religious groups, from both sides of the Buddhists,\nfrom the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, and others. \"Even the Upper and Lower\n,\nHouse and the Tri Quang Buddhists,\" he said with a smile, \"have come to me\nto express their sympathy.\"\n14. The Prime Minister ended by saying there has been a very great im-\nprovement here since last May when he took over, and he thinks there is\nnow a good measure of confidence in the country and support for what the\ngovernment is trying to do.\n15. The Secretary thanked the Prime Minister, and this concluded the\nconversation.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMO\nWHEELER\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nMarch 13, 1969\nMEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT\nI am providing separately the\nimpressions I gained from the recent trip\nGeneral Wheeler and I made to South\nVietnam.\nAttached are General Wheeler's\nobservations and recommendations.\nCapitaint\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSENSITIVE\nTHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20301\nCM-4001-69\n12 March 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nSUBJECT: Observations and Recommendations Concerning\nthe Military Situation in Southeast Asia\n1. This memorandum is designed to set forth in summary\nfashion my impression of the current situation in South\nVietnam, to include the effect of the enemy attacks launched\nin recent days, and the military problems posed General\nAbrams by the continuing enemy build-up in the DMZ area,\nLaos and Cambodia. Also presented are my views concerning\nmilitary actions which we should take. Since this report\nis deliberately in summary form, I will not attempt docu-\nmentation from operational and intelligence sources; such\nsupporting detail is readily available.\n2. The current series of enemy attacks has, to date,\nachieved no results of military significance. Contrary\nto effects of the Tet offensive of 1968, the enemy has\ngained little or nothing psychologically. Indeed, I was\nsurprised at the calmness displayed by President Thieu,\nPrime Minister Huong and General Vien, Chief of the\nVietnamese Joint General Staff, regarding the attacks by fire\n(ABF) launched by the enemy against Saigon and DaNang and, most\nrecently, against Hue. Nevertheless, I think it clear that,\nif rocket attacks (even in the small numbers employed to date)\ncontinue against major population centers, an appropriate\nreaction must be undertaken. I make this judgment based on\ntwo factors: first, the GVN will be under great pressure to\nretaliate in kind; and, second, beyond a certain point U.S.\nrestraint will be interpreted as confirming North Vietnamese\ncontentions that our bombing halt was \"unconditional,\" and\nthat the U.S. lied to the GVN regarding the circumstances\nleading to the cessation of acts of force against North\nx\nVietnam. I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have\nforwarded a package of appropriate retaliatory actions to\nMr. Packard. (Apropos of retaliatory actions, you will\nrecall Vice President Ky's assertion that the Vietnamese\nAir Force could retaliate with attacks against Hanoi.\nCopy\n/\nor\ncopies\nof\n4\npages series\nDOWNORADED\nReproduce at the Richard Nixon Presidential ibrary DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nThis is nonsense. However, at my request General George\nBrown, Commander, Seventh Air Force, drew up a plan for\nan attack against military facilities in the vicinity of\nDong Hoi. Under this concept the South Vietnamese forces\nwould provide the strike aircraft; U.S. forces would\nprovide support in the areas of MIG cap, Sam and flak\nsupp ession, ECM, photo reconnaissance, etc. I consider\nthat this plan has a certain political and military\nattractiveness.)\n3. All sources, U.S. and Vietnamese, confirm that\nthe pacification effort has been very little affected by\ncurrent enemy actions. Indeed, there is evidence that,\nspurred by President Thieu's personal interest, progress\ncontinues in this key program. The Phoenix attacks on\nthe VC infrastructure continue successfully. The Hoi\nChanhs (enemy defectors) are on the rise. The RVNAF,\nincluding RF & PF, is steadily improving in effectiveness;\nthey can be expected over time to assume more of the burden.\n4. Free World forces continue to hold the initiative\nwithin SVN. The enemy continues to have the capability\nto mount offensive \"surges\" periodically. However, he can\ndo so only at the expense of heavy personnel losses when\nhe debouches from his sanctuaries, weeks and months of\npreparation of the battle area, and the expenditure of\nlaboriously assembled logistic resources. Moreover, his\ntactical concepts require that he preposition supplies along\nhis routes of advance to the battle, thus exposing them to\ncapture or destruction. As General Abrams expresses it,\nthe VC/NVA do not base their operations on a logistic \"tail\"\nas do other armies but on a logistic \"nose.\"\n5. The most striking and dangerous situations are\ncomprised of the enemy troop and logistic build-ups in the\nDMZ area, in the panhandle of Laos and in Cambodia.\na. Ten (10) NVA regiments are deployed just north\nof, within and south of the DMZ. Moreover, intelligence\nnow indicates that an additional NVA division may well be\n,\ndeployed in this same area. Moreover, the enemy has, since\n1 November 1968, established an ample logistic base contiguous\nto the DMZ with which to support forces of the above magnitude\nin offensive operations. Also, there is quite convincing\nevidence that the enemy is infiltrating through the DMZ.\n2\nSENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nISA SECRET\nb. The enemy has been urgently stocking his base\nareas in the panhandle of Laos in order to be logistically\nprepared for the onset of the rainy season in that area.\nNormally, the monsoon will switch about four to six weeks\nhence. The immense quantities of materiel and supplies\nseized or destroyed during the recent operation in the A Shau\nvalley are, I think, ample proof that enemy base areas situated\ndeeper and further to the north in Laos represent lucrative\ntargets for pre-emptive action by our ground and air forces.\nAs an illustration, using 1968 rates of enemy ammunition\nexpenditure and friendly casualties the caches found in the\nA Shau valley would have provided the enemy the capability\nof inflicting 7,658 friendly KIA and 24, 471 friendly WIA.\nC. By now, I think that all of us recognize the\nimportance to the enemy and the threat to our forces posed\nby the Cambodian sanctuary base areas. In actuality, it is\nthose base areas from which the threat to Saigon originates\nand is sustained. They, and their counterparts in Laos and\ncontiguous to the DMZ, are also the prime cause of U.S.\ncasualties.\n6. I have reached the following conclusions and,\naccordingly, submit the recommendations which follow:\na. Enemy base areas provide the human and material\nmeans to inflict casualties on U.S. forces and those of our\nallies. If these base areas are destroyed or neutralized,\nfriendly casualties will automatically decrease.\nb. The next rocket attack (s) on Saigon, Hue or Da Nang\nmust be followed by an appropriate response by us. Preferably\nour response should take the form of naval and/or air attacks\nagainst targets in North Vietnam.\nC. General Abrams should be authorized immediately\nto operate offensively in the southern DMZ in order to pre-\nempt enemy build-up in and use of that area.\nd. General Abrams should be tasked for plans to\nattack and destroy, by air and ground action (raids in force)\ncritical enemy base areas in Laos in order to deplete enemy\nlogistic resources during the rainy season in Laos.\n3\nSENSITIVE\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTOR SEMIT\ne. General Abrams should be tasked for plans to\ndestroy by air and ground action (raids in force) enemy\nCambodian sanctuary base areas.\nEARLE G. WHEELER\nChairman\nJoint Chiefs of Staff\n>\n4\nSENSITIVE Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nSECRET\nPARIS 20873, September 15, 1968 (Section 1 of 8)\n*\n8. We said that in connection with withdrawal of forces we had\nindicated at our last meeting that we would have some further comments\non this subject. We said we wished to make a statement of policy on\nthis matter which was important and new.\n9. We said: United States and Free World forces will be withdrawn\nfrom South Viet-Nam as North Viet-Nam withdraws to the North all\npersonnel infiltrated from North Viet-Nam. Withdrawal by both sides\nwill begin simultaneously and as soon as possible.\n10. Any US or Free World forces remaining in South Viet-Nam, after\nthe complete withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces, will leave\nSouth Viet-Nam as soon as possible and in any event not later than\nsix months thereafter.\n11. When North Vietnamese withdrawal has been completed, there\nwill be no more infiltration from the North. Similarly, when all US\nand Free World forces have left, no further troops will be introduced.\n12. In the Manila Declaration there was a phrase \"When the level of\nviolence thus subsides. 11 This phrase is descriptive of the condition\nwhich would result from withdrawal of external forces. It does not\nrefer to any violence that may occur among South Vietnamese after\nthe withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.\n13. As we said at the last meeting, the question of modalities and\ntiming of mutual withdrawal should be discussed and agreed between us.\n14. Xuan Thuy interrupted twice while we were reading the above\nstatement to be sure he understood it correctly. First regarding our\nstatement on the level of violence subsiding, Thuy said he took our\nstatement to mean that if fighting continues after the withdrawal of\nforeign forces such violence would be considered to be between\nsoutherners. We replied affirmatively. Thuy also asked about our\nstatement to the effect that we were willing to withdraw simultaneously\nas NVA troops withdraw. He wondered whether there was not a contra-\ndiction between that statement and the subsequent one that US and Free.\nWorld forces would withdraw six months after the withdrawal of North\n/ietnamese forces had been completed. We replied that we have many\nmore forces in South Viet-Nam than the DRV does. We have many more\nbases to evacuate and much farther to go. Tho replied that the US has\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nconsiderable means to effect a withdrawal. Its forces came to\nViet-Nam quickly and they can leave more quickly than the North\nVietnamese could.\n15. We replied. we would be glad to provide transportation for the\nDRV to take its troops back quickly. These were matters to be dis-\ncussed. As for the six-month period, it is the outside limit. The\ngeneral idea is that these should be simultancous withdrawals to start\nas soon as possible. This is not intended to be a condition, but an\naffirmative guarantee that our troops will be withdrawn within six\nmonths at the latest after complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese\nforces.\n16. We said we believed our new statement is a major step in the\ndirection of peace and should resolve any question DRV side may have\nabout our good will and serious intentions to withdraw our forces from\nSVN, as well as our serious intention to leave the future of SVN to\nthe South Vietnamese people without interference from outside.\n* * *\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nWITHDRAWAL\nMUTUAL\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nSECRET/NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS\nMarch 20, 1969\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHenry A. Kissinger\nSUBJECT:\nHanoi's Interest in Mutual Withdrawal\nThere is evidence that Hanoi is seriously interested in mutual\nwithdrawal.\nOn September 15, 1968, Harriman presented to Xuan Thuy\nof the DRV a statement of the U.S. position on mutual withdrawal.\nThuy interrupted twice during the presentation to clarify the U.S.\nposition on the \"level of violence thus subsiding\" and on the \"six\nmonth clause. 11 His remarks, at least by implication, accepted\nthat there were North Vietnamese troops in the South (Report of\nConversation attached).\nSince January, Hanoi has moved from saying that political\nissues must be negotiated first to the position that U.S. withdrawal\nis the paramount issue. They must understand that we will not\nwithdraw unless they do.\nIf we stick to the issue of mutual withdrawal in the private\nconversations for several weeks, I believe Hanoi may be prepared\nto begin to discuss this issue. If we waiver and start to introduce\npoltical issues, they will almost certainly pull back and\ndemand that we talk to the NLF.\nAttachment\nSECRET/NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}